



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 12 JULY 2010  
9.00 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Julia Sebutinde, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Erica Bussey

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Ms Zainab Fofanah

For the Prosecution:

Mr Nicholas Koumjian  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Ms Terry Munyard  
Mr Silas Chekera  
Ms Logan Hambrick  
Ms Fatiah Balfas

1 Monday, 12 July 2010

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.]

08:58:23 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MR KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Madam President. Good morning,  
8 your Honours and counsel opposite. For the Prosecution this  
9 morning, Maja Dimitrova and Nicholas Koumjian.

09:04:27 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Madam President, your Honours,  
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay  
12 Griffiths, with me Mr Silas Chekera, Ms Logan Hambrick, Mr Terry  
13 Munyard, Ms Fatiah Balfas and Ms Elizabeth Espinosa.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning, Mr Sesay. Before we  
09:04:47 15 continue with your evidence, I remind you of your oath to tell  
16 the truth. That oath is still binding on you this morning.

17 WITNESS: DCT-172 [On former oath]

18 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Cont'd]

19 Q. Mr Sesay, last Friday when we adjourned for the weekend we  
09:05:06 20 were looking at a document which was supposed to be notes of a  
21 meeting held at Waterworks in December 1998. Do you recall that?

22 A. Yes, I do recall.

23 Q. And whereas you say you did attend a meeting at Waterworks  
24 when an attack on Kono was planned, you do not recall attending  
09:05:37 25 the meeting supposedly recorded in those minutes; is that  
26 correct?

27 A. Yes, that's what I said.

28 Q. Now, at this stage, Mr Sesay, I'd like you to be shown a  
29 map, our exhibit P-5, S1 and I'm going to ask you to trace for us

1 the path you took in December 1998, beginning with an attack on  
2 Kono, ending with the capture of Makeni, okay?

3 A. Okay, sir.

09:06:40

4 Q. Now, what I would suggest, Mr Sesay, is this. Could you  
5 please sit in the other seat? Because what I'd like you to do is  
6 to indicate with a pen the various targets which you captured  
7 during that operation. First of all, where did you set off from  
8 in order to mount this operation? Could you first of all just  
9 give us the name of your jumping-off point?

09:07:40

10 A. We took off from Buedu. That is here.

11 Q. Yes. And then you went to where?

12 A. And we came to Kailahun Town.

13 Q. And then?

09:08:09

14 A. Then we crossed the Moa River here and we came to  
15 Gandorhun.

16 Q. Yes?

17 A. And from Gandorhun we went to the outskirts of Koidu Town  
18 and there was an area of Kambia called Guinea base, Superman  
19 Ground. The name of the village is Kuyor.

09:08:29

20 Q. Pause there. The name of the village is what?

21 A. Kuyor.

22 Q. How do you spell that?

23 A. K-U-Y-O-R.

24 Q. Thank you. And then?

09:08:39

25 A. Then from Kuyor we planned the attack on Sefadu, Koidu  
26 Town. That is here.

27 Q. And having captured Koidu Town, where did you go next?

28 A. Then from Koidu Town we used the main road to Yengema, but  
29 it was the main road from Yengema, Bumpe. Then we went to Jiama

1 Sewafe. From Jiama Sewafe, we went through Gold Town, Masingbi,  
2 here.

3 Q. Yes?

09:09:38

4 A. From Masingbi, Makali. I'm not seeing Makali on the map,  
5 but there is Matotoka there.

6 Q. And then from Matotoka?

7 A. We went to Magburaka and went to Makeni here.

8 Q. And as I understand your evidence, you thereafter remained  
9 in Makeni; is that right?

09:10:03

10 A. Yes. We captured Makeni and were based there. I was based  
11 there from --

12 Now, Mr Sesay, you've told us that in particular during the  
13 attack on Koidu Town you captured a large quantity of arms and  
14 ammunition. Is that right?

09:10:24

15 A. Yes, sir, that's correct. I told you that all the  
16 armaments that ECOMOG had were left in Koidu Town.

17 Q. And when you arrived in Makeni after that successful  
18 campaign, did you still have large quantities of that captured  
19 arms and ammunition with you?

09:10:54

20 A. Yes, the ammunition were there. Some of them, we used them  
21 until the time of disarmament.

22 Q. Now, help us: Why, then, if you had such arms and  
23 ammunition, did you stop at Makeni? Why did you not continue on  
24 to Freetown?

09:11:14

25 A. Well, the reason for the attack on Freetown - you know, the  
26 attack on Freetown was not planned by the RUF. It was the AFRC.  
27 That's why we did not take part. It was planned by the AFRC.  
28 Especially when Bockarie told Bockarie to wait at Waterloo, and  
29 Bockarie did not agree, that's why --

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, Mr Interpreter, you said,  
2 "Especially when Bockarie told Bockarie to wait at Waterloo and  
3 Bockarie did not agree."

09:11:55

4           THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, it's supposed to be  
5 Bockarie told Gullit, sorry.

6           PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, what did you say? Who did you  
7 say was talking to who?

09:12:14

8           THE WITNESS: I said when Gullit told Bockarie that SAJ  
9 Musa was dead and they wanted to go and attack Freetown and  
10 Bockarie told Gullit that they should wait because he wanted to  
11 send reinforcement, but Gullit did not agree and they went to  
12 Freetown and launched the attack. That's why we did not go with  
13 the reinforcement.

14           MR GRIFFITHS:

09:12:29

15 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, help us: When you arrived in Makeni, what  
16 was your knowledge as to opposition forces between you - your  
17 position in Makeni and Freetown? What was to stop you in terms  
18 of enemy forces from moving on to Freetown after Makeni?

09:13:08

19 A. Well, the Guineans were at Waterloo and the Nigerians were  
20 at Mile 38 and Masiaka. But if really the attack on Freetown was  
21 an organised one or it was planned between the AFRC and the RUF,  
22 we had armaments in Kono and we had tanks that we would have used  
23 to join the attack on Freetown and nothing would have stopped us.

09:13:56

24 Q. Can we put that map away now, please. Could I ask that the  
25 witness now be shown our exhibit P-149. I wonder before that's  
26 put on the screen if I could look at the original of this  
27 document, please. Yes. I wonder if I could have the original to  
28 look at and we could my copy up on the screen because the print  
29 is very small on the photocopy document. Then we can magnify it

1 on the screen. Yes.

2 Now, Mr Sesay, if you need to look at the original you can,  
3 but do you see towards the top of the page that this document  
4 dated 21 January 1999 is addressed to you as battlefield

09:16:33 5 commander Brigadier IH Sesay, do you see that?

6 A. Yes, I see it.

7 Q. Now, first of all this: Were you a brigadier in January  
8 1999?

9 A. No. I became a brigadier in February. In January I was a  
09:16:57 10 colonel.

11 Q. And, if you recall, in those minutes of the meeting at  
12 Waterworks in December which we looked at on Friday you were  
13 referred to as Colonel Sesay in that document, do you recall?

14 A. Yes.

09:17:16 15 Q. Now, this document, have you seen it before?

16 A. Yes. They showed it to me during my trial. I saw it.

17 Q. Prior to your trial, had you seen this document before?

18 A. No, I had not seen it before.

19 Q. Now, we see that the document is headed, "Restricted",  
09:17:45 20 followed by the heading, "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra  
21 Leone, RUFL, 2nd INF." What does INF stand for, Mr Sesay?

22 A. Please repeat.

23 Q. Do you see on the second line of the title appear these  
24 letters, 2nd, second, INF. What does INF stand for?

09:18:29 25 A. I don't know the meaning of INF.

26 Q. Followed by "Brigade headquarters, Bombali District,  
27 revolution intelligent office." In which district is Makeni?

28 A. It's the Bombali District.

29 Q. We then see that it's addressed to the battlefield

1 commander, Brigadier IH Sesay, from the overall intelligent  
2 officer commander and Black Guard adjutant.

3 Pausing there, what's the name of the individual who held  
4 that post as best you know?

09:19:21 5 A. Well, during this time, the IO commander was Ibrahim  
6 Mannah.

7 Q. And if we go to the second page of the document, bottom of  
8 the second page, please, we see a name at the bottom, Major  
9 Christ A Mannah. Is that the individual you're talking about?

09:20:09 10 A. Yes. It's Mannah.

11 Q. Let's go back --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Excuse me, was that Ibrahim or Abraham?

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Sesay, was it Ibrahim Mannah or Abraham Mannah?

09:20:28 15 A. Well, I knew him for Ibrahim Mannah and that's the name  
16 that everybody knew him for.

17 Q. Did you know him as Christ A Mannah?

18 A. No, I don't know that name. I know Ibrahim Mannah.

19 Q. Let's go back to the front page, please:

09:20:53 20 "Upon hearing the confirmed report that the strike force  
21 commander, Brigadier Goodisl entered Freetown with his troops,"  
22 who is Brigadier Goodisl, G-O-O-D-I-S-L? Who is that?

23 A. Well, I am not familiar with this name, Goodisl. But the  
24 name I know for the person who attacked Freetown is Gullit.

09:21:36 25 Q. "... entered Freetown with his troops, Colonel Boston  
26 Flomo, alias Verndam" - what was Colonel Boston Flomo's nickname?

27 A. Yes, it was Van Damme.

28 Q. Did he have another nickname?

29 A. That is Rambo.

1 Q. So he was known as both Rambo and Van Damme, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "... was instructed to meet with him with his troops, date  
4 5 January 1999." Pausing there, was Colonel Boston Flomo given  
09:22:29 5 such an order on 5 January 1999, to your knowledge?

6 A. No. He was not given such an order.

7 Q. "We launched a serious attack on Masiaka around 5.55 in the  
8 morning." Now, pausing there, who was in charge of the force  
9 that attacked Masiaka, Mr Sesay?

09:22:59 10 A. Superman was the senior commander and Rambo was the 2IC  
11 when they attacked Masiaka.

12 Q. Were you involved in the attack on Masiaka?

13 A. No. I was in Makeni.

14 Q. "The enemies were not able to withstand or confront us."  
09:23:24 15 Then it goes on to list logistics captured: One American GMG,  
16 some light automatic rifles, some assorted GMG rounds. Now,  
17 pausing again, Mr Sesay, this is a report of an attack on Masiaka  
18 led, you tell us, by Superman and Rambo. Is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

09:23:57 20 Q. Did Superman and Rambo report to you or to Sam Bockarie?

21 A. Well, the report I received from Rambo, they did not  
22 capture ammunition in Masiaka but that was after the attack on  
23 Port Loko and it was not during this time.

24 Q. What I'm asking you is this: At this time, in January  
09:24:28 25 1999, did Superman and/or Rambo report to you or report to  
26 Bockarie?

27 A. Well, they reported to me, and there are times they sent  
28 reports to Bockarie, but whatever happened at the front line,  
29 they would inform me.



1 Q. And why would they inform you? Was that because you were a  
2 superior officer or what?

3 A. Yes. I was a superior officer and I was the most senior  
4 man around Makeni, because Bockarie was way in the Kailahun  
09:25:13 5 District. Especially Rambo, he reported all activities to me  
6 from the front line.

7 Q. "Casualty: Two wounded in action, WIA. With that zeal we  
8 advanced to RDF but no enemy confronted us." What is RDF?

9 A. RDF was a camp at Sumbuya. From my understanding it was a  
09:25:44 10 military camp called rapid defence force, Rapid Deployment Force.

11 Q. "Straightaway we headed for Waterloo with confidence that  
12 Waterloo may be out of enemy control. Unfortunately we got in  
13 the midst of Guinean troops. We fight for the whole day unto the  
14 night.

09:26:10 15 Logistics captured. RDF, six rockets RPG bombs with 6  
16 TNTs, one box of mortar bombs."

17 Then it goes on, dates:

18 "6 January 1999. In the noon, whilst resting at Waterloo  
19 displaced and refugees camp, the deployed soldiers sent some  
09:26:39 20 civilians to us from the Guineans saying that they want to go to  
21 Guinea.

22 7 January 1999. 3 a.m. We launched attack on their  
23 position at Peninsula Secondary School Waterloo. This act  
24 gathered them from their deployment zone to the said secondary  
09:27:05 25 school. In the afternoon, the enemies communicated with us  
26 through letter that they doesn't want to fight any longer with  
27 us. Colonel Boston Flomo replied this letter to their high  
28 commands.

29 8 January 1999. 1 p.m. We attacked them again. In the

1 noon, 3 p.m., Heavy and thick enemy convoy left from Port Loko  
2 bombarding whilst the Alpha Jet was flying over as special  
3 escort. 3.45 p.m., the convoy, including the deployed enemies  
4 that were at Waterloo, evacuated Waterloo back towards Port Loko  
09:27:58 5 axis. We embarrassed them and, with the panic in them, because  
6 we tried them everywhere, they left behind some logistics, 120  
7 millimetre mortar gun, 40 barrel missile with some assorted  
8 rounds of AK rounds, G3, GMG, calibre, bombs. Indeed the  
9 capturing of surrendered soldiers is imminent also at Waterloo  
09:28:28 10 and more Benguema. We do capture materials almost every day.  
11 Casualties on the operation, overall operation at Waterloo, two  
12 killing in action, KIA, and around 15 wounded in action.

13 Date, 9 January 1999. We deployed at Hastings, we  
14 discovered enemies at Jui and Kosso Town earlier on their number  
09:29:04 15 was not much. From this said date until now, we every day attack  
16 the guys but the air raid is desperate on and we attack Jui and  
17 Kosso Town. However, the helicopter which landed every day at  
18 the point had reinforced the enemies with both armament and  
19 manpower.

09:29:26 20 Casualty on Jui operation, one killing in action, a good  
21 number of wounded in action."

22 Let's go to the second page, please:

23 "Date, 15 January 1999. It was agreed that the men in  
24 Freetown and the men at our point were to do joint operation on  
09:29:56 25 Jui and Kosso Town. The Freetown men were scheduled to attack  
26 Jui and we to attack Kosso Town that night. We attacked Kosso  
27 Town, clear the enemies, but the Freetown men never turn up,  
28 therefore the enemies with the support of the Alpha Jet drove us  
29 from Kosso Town.

1 Date, 18 January 1999. The Guinean troops from Port Loko  
2 entered vehemently at Waterloo with sporadic shelling and firing.  
3 In fact, two Alpha Jets escorted the troops consisting of five  
4 war tanks, two armoured cars, one 40 barrel missile and a series  
09:30:44 5 of AA one barrel and twin barrels. They occupied Waterloo from  
6 that evening on to the morning around 3 a.m.

7 Problems: For the main, while the only problems there at  
8 the front line are:

9 1: We have not yet connected physically with our brothers  
09:31:04 10 in Freetown.

11 2: Manpower indeed to be engaged on this urban warfare.

12 3: The strategic position of the enemies, mainly Port  
13 Loko, Lungi, Jui, Kabala area delaying our progress, these  
14 problems are to be looked into kindly and to find fast solution.

09:31:33 15 Suggestion: We suggested that as we are on urban guerrilla  
16 warfare that we use mainly artillery weapons, that we speedily  
17 recruit able and gallant men as population matters. All units to  
18 be active, especially at the front line, especially units like  
19 IDU, G5, G4, and S4."

09:31:57 20 Pausing there, Mr Sesay, IDU stands for what?

21 A. Internal Defence Unit.

22 Q. And what's the responsibility of G5?

23 A. G5 had no business at this time at the front line. Their  
24 responsibility was the welfare of the civilians.

09:32:22 25 Q. G4 has what responsibility?

26 A. G4 was for arms and ammunition, to store them.

27 Q. And S4?

28 A. They were in charge of the food.

29 Q. "That Tombo Road should be engaged while fighting force

1 enemies are at Tombo.

2 That military group should be formed, should assess and  
3 bring in situation report from at the flanks: Waterloo, Port  
4 Loko, Mile 91 and Kabala.

09:33:10 5 That the commander should give chance to we, the  
6 securities, to be reached to you with processed situation report.

7 All front lines to be reinforced with correct combat  
8 medics.

9 Recommendation: Anyway, the morale of the soldiers,  
09:33:30 10 especially at the point I have visited, is high. Bravo to  
11 Colonel Boston Flomo, Major Barkar, Lieutenant Colonel Victor,  
12 Lieutenant Colonel Amara Sallia, alias Peleto, and all Black  
13 Guards. Only the regards for one another is logging but I pray  
14 that we will put this together fastly. I beg, sir, that you look  
09:33:59 15 into my problem and you rectify it with General Sam Bockarie.

16 That is the conflicting position between Ben Kanneh and me."

17 Now we see that it's signed by Lieutenant Raymond Kartewu,  
18 Black Guard adjutant. Did you know that individual?

19 A. Yes, I knew Raymond, but I did not know him to be Black  
09:34:29 20 Guard adjutant or IO adjutant, no.

21 Q. What did you know him to be?

22 A. Raymond was with Kennedy Matthew Sesay at the mining unit  
23 in Kono.

24 Q. Do you know, going back to the last paragraph, a Major  
09:34:53 25 Barkar?

26 A. Yes, I knew Major Barkar.

27 Q. Who is he?

28 A. He was one of the AFRC guys that were with the group that  
29 I met in Kono.

1 Q. So you met him in Kono, did you?

2 A. Yes. That was the first time I knew him.

3 Q. Did he thereafter go with Colonel Boston Flomo to Waterloo?

4 A. Yes. They were in Waterloo later.

09:35:34 5 Q. What about Lieutenant Colonel Victor, do you know him?

6 A. Yes. Victor was my bodyguard.

7 Q. What was he doing with Boston Flomo at Waterloo?

8 A. They stayed in Makeni and --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness repeat  
09:35:59 10 that part of his answer.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Could you repeat that answer, please, Mr Sesay?

13 A. I said they stayed in Makeni and the others went with  
14 Boston Flomo to Waterloo, Masiaka to Waterloo.

09:36:14 15 Q. But did Lieutenant Colonel Victor go with Boston Flomo to  
16 Waterloo?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Who is Lieutenant Colonel Amara Sallia?

19 A. Amara Sallia is Peleto.

09:36:37 20 Q. Do you know him?

21 A. Yes, I know him.

22 Q. Who is he?

23 A. Well, he was one of the junior officers and he was a major  
24 - Victor was a major at this time.

09:36:53 25 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, if we go back to the beginning of this  
26 letter, or this memo --

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, I'm looking at the answer that the  
28 witness just gave. Mr Griffiths, you asked the witness who is  
29 Amara Sallia, Lieutenant Colonel Amara Sallia. And through the

1 interpreter the witness said Amara Sallia is Peleto. He says, "I  
2 know him. He was one of the junior officers. He was a major -  
3 Victor was a major." Are we talking about Victor or are we  
4 talking about Peleto?

09:37:44

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Let's clarify that, Mr Sesay, was Peleto a major?

7 A. Yes, Peleto was a major. And even Victor at this time, he  
8 was a major.

9 Q. So at this time, both Victor and Peleto were majors?

09:38:05

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thank you. Go back to the front of the document, please.

12 Now, you've told us, Mr Sesay, right at the outset, that you do  
13 not recall seeing this document before and the first time you saw  
14 it was in your trial in Freetown. Is that correct?

09:38:26

15 A. Yes, that's what happened.

16 Q. Let's look at this document now as a whole. You'll see,  
17 looking down the left-hand side of the page, that the document  
18 purports to recount events on the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, second  
19 page, please, 15th and 18th of January, yes? You see that?

09:38:57

20 A. Yes, I see it.

21 Q. And then below those - the references to those dates, there  
22 are suggestions as to what assistance is required. Do you see  
23 that?

24 A. Yes.

09:39:14

25 Q. But when we look at the beginning and end of the document,  
26 this document appears to have been signed and dated on 21  
27 January; so that is three days after the last date, the 18th of  
28 January, when events are recalled. So it's three days later that  
29 suggestions are being made for assistance. Do you see that?

1 A. Yes, I see it.

2 Q. Now, at this time, did Rambo, Superman have a radio?

3 A. Yes. They had radios.

4 Q. Did you have a radio?

09:40:04 5 A. Yes, I had a radio.

6 Q. If the individual in charge of the RUF forces at Waterloo  
7 wanted to seek assistance, what was the quickest way of  
8 communicating?

9 A. It was to send message through the radio because Superman  
09:40:25 10 had a radio and Rambo too had a radio, and Rambo communicated  
11 with me on a daily basis.

12 Q. So help us: Can you think of any reason why anyone would  
13 want to type up such a document as this and transmit it to you  
14 three days after assistance is apparently required?

09:40:52 15 A. Please repeat the question.

16 Q. Can you help us as to why anyone would want to type up a  
17 document like this, seeking assistance, addressed to you, three  
18 days after 18 January? Why?

19 A. Well, in the first place, where our men were at Waterloo,  
09:41:18 20 they never had a typewriter there to type a document like this.  
21 Ibrahim Mannah, who is alleged to have written this document, he  
22 was with me in Makeni. From - we captured Makeni in December -  
23 late December. Ibrahim Mannah was there until the time he got an  
24 accident with a vehicle and he died in Makeni. He got the  
09:41:42 25 accident in Makeni Town.

26 Q. When did he get the accident in Makeni?

27 A. In February, with a car.

28 Q. Was he involved - was he present with Rambo in Waterloo?

29 A. No, he was not in Waterloo. He was in Makeni.

1 Q. So what can you tell us about the authenticity of this  
2 document exhibited by the Prosecution?

3 A. This document is not correct.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I hand the original back, please, and  
09:42:21 5 get my document back.

6 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, just dealing at this stage in general  
7 terms - we will come to the particulars in a moment - after the  
8 events in Freetown and Waterloo, between then and January 2002  
9 was there any major fighting between the RUF and government  
09:43:27 10 forces after Freetown?

11 A. After January 1990 to when?

12 Q. After January 1999 - after the Freetown invasion up to  
13 January 2002, was there any major fighting between the RUF and  
14 government forces?

09:44:08 15 A. I can recall two occasions during this time that there was  
16 fighting, but it was between one and two months that those  
17 fightings took place and it stopped. There were certain  
18 locations in Sierra Leone, they were not - they were not an  
19 offensive or a fight like it was in '98 - like it was in '98. It  
09:44:33 20 was not a full-scale fighting like the previous fight before,  
21 like in January '99.

22 Q. And those two occasions were when?

23 A. Okay. One was when Superman attacked me in Makeni.  
24 I understood that the ECOMOG advanced from Jui to Waterloo, and  
09:45:05 25 they came to Mile 38 and attacked our men in Masiaka and Gberi  
26 Junction. That was the first time. That was in March to April,  
27 so after the ceasefire was declared.

28 Q. So March to April of which year?

29 A. 1999.



1 Q. And what was the second occasion?

2 A. The second occasion was after the abduction of the UNAMSIL,  
3 the government troops attacked the RUF position between May -  
4 using gunships, between May, June, July, and the fight ceased.

09:45:56 5 From August now right up to disarmament there was no fighting  
6 between the RUF and government troops.

7 Q. May, June, July of which year?

8 A. That is 2000. In fact, those fightings were between Gberi  
9 Junction and Waterloo. Those were the places the fighting took  
09:46:18 10 place. They were not in other places like Kailahun. It was just  
11 along the main road to Freetown and around the Gberi junction and  
12 Lunsar. Except when the gunship used to attack the RUF areas  
13 between June and July - to mid-July.

14 Q. Thank you for that. So after Freetown invasion, up to  
09:46:47 15 January 2002 those are the two instances of - only two instances  
16 of fighting thereafter?

17 A. Yes. Those are the times. Minus those minor Kamajor hit  
18 and retreats, but I was talking about the one between us and the  
19 government troops in Sierra Leone. Those are the occasions I can  
09:47:15 20 recall.

21 Q. That's what I was interested in, Mr Sesay. Now, having  
22 painted that general picture, I'd like to now take things in a  
23 little bit more detail. What was happening in terms of the RUF  
24 between February and March 1999 after the Freetown invasion?

09:47:41 25 A. Well, after the Freetown invasion, when the men came and  
26 ran the Freetown invasion I was in Makeni. During the course of  
27 the invasion, I continued staying in Makeni until Superman attack  
28 and others attacked me. In May, the Government of Sierra Leone  
29 and the leader of the RUF, they had declared a ceasefire at that

1 time, so this ceasefire was being observed by the two groups  
2 until the signing of the Lome Accord. And after the signing of  
3 the Lome Accord, the RUF became a part of the government of  
4 Sierra Leone because they had formed the Government of National  
09:48:31 5 Unity. So the RUF people were members and they were ministers in  
6 the government and they were running a Government of National  
7 Unity in part of 1999 to mid-2000. The only time --

8 Q. Finish that sentence and then pause, please. "The only  
9 time" what?

09:48:52 10 A. The only time that that stopped was when the abduction of  
11 UNAMSIL personnel took place. That was the time that the  
12 Government of National Unity was dissolved.

13 Q. Now, I just want to concentrate for now, Mr Sesay, on those  
14 initial months after the Freetown invasion. Those AFRC troops  
09:49:31 15 who you tell us, led by Gullit, were responsible for the Freetown  
16 invasion, what happened to them after that invasion ceased?

17 A. Well, they retreated to Waterloo through the hills of  
18 Freetown. The route that they used to go to Freetown was the  
19 same route they used to return - to retreat. So they were in  
09:49:58 20 Benguema whilst the RUF was in Waterloo at the initial stage. So  
21 there came a time when problems were erupting between the AFRC  
22 and the RUF in Waterloo, so Bockarie told me to withdraw Rambo,  
23 and I withdrew Rambo from Waterloo and he came to Makeni. When  
24 they attacked me, at that time they were at - when Superman and  
09:50:25 25 others attacked me in Makeni, before that time the government -  
26 the ECOMOG troops were attacking the AFRC positions in Hastings.  
27 You know, they were trying to advance towards Waterloo. So Rambo  
28 withdrew from that. When ECOMOG captured Waterloo, the AFRC  
29 withdrew to Mile 38 - that is Sumbuya, and they formed the West

1 Side Jungle and that was where they were. At the same time - it  
2 was almost at the same time that Superman and Gibriil Massaquoi  
3 attacked me in Makeni.

09:51:10 4 Q. Pause there. First, I want this detail. When was the  
5 attack on you in Makeni by Superman and Gibriil Massaquoi?

6 A. That was towards late March. Towards late March. Late  
7 March and early April. That was the time that the incident took  
8 place.

09:51:35 9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat the  
10 last bit of his answer.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. You gave a year at the end of that sentence, Mr Sesay.  
13 When was the year that this attack took place on you in March -  
14 late March, towards early, early April; which year?

09:51:48 15 A. 1999.

16 Q. Now, you described, at the outset of the long answer you  
17 just gave me, that they, those being the troops led by Gullit,  
18 retreated to Waterloo through the hills of Freetown, and they  
19 were in Waterloo with the RUF, and then there came a time when  
09:52:19 20 problems were erupting between the AFRC and the RUF in Waterloo.  
21 What problems were they?

22 A. Well, I had said that they were in Benguema whilst the RUF  
23 were in Waterloo. But from the time that they retreated to  
24 Benguema there was no unity between the AFRC and the RUF, so the  
09:52:45 25 problems continued. They used to shoot at each other and they  
26 used to have misunderstandings. Those are the types of problems  
27 I am talking about. The RUF were not subordinating themselves to  
28 the AFRC, and the AFRC too were not subordinating themselves to  
29 the RUF. The main grudge that the AFRC got - had was that we,

1 the RUF, were the cause of them being driven out of Freetown.  
2 Because they said that if we had reinforced them in Freetown,  
3 they wouldn't have left Freetown. So that was the main problem  
4 between them, the RUF and the AFRC.

09:53:29 5 Q. And then you go on to tell us that those AFRC members then  
6 went on to create a West Side Jungle. Is that right?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. Is the West Side Jungle the same as the West Side Boys?

9 A. Yes, that's the same group.

09:53:53 10 Q. Did Gibril Massaquoi go with them to the West Side Jungle?

11 A. No. Gibril went with Superman to Lunsar.

12 Q. And what about Gullit; what happened to him?

13 A. So when Superman and others attacked me in Makeni and Rambo  
14 was killed, he - he stayed around West Side and joined Brigadier  
09:54:26 15 Mani and Superman and others in Makeni. From that time he was in  
16 Makeni until around August to September, then he returned. In  
17 1999 he returned to the West Side Jungle. So it was Bazy who  
18 was in the West Side Jungle with his men during that period that  
19 Gullit was not there.

09:54:48 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, this answer is very  
21 ambiguous. You asked the witness, "What about Gullit; what  
22 happened to him?" So then the witness tells us that - he tells  
23 us about Superman, and then he begins to refer to someone who  
24 says, "he". "From that time he was in Makeni", et cetera,  
09:55:09 25 et cetera. I don't know who he's talking about.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Mr Sesay, your answer was this:

28 "So when Superman and others attacked me in Makeni and  
29 Rambo was killed, he stayed around the west side and joined

1 Brigadier Mani and Superman and others in Makeni."

2 Who is the "he"?

3 A. I'm referring to Gullit, sir.

09:55:41 4 Q. So just so that we are clear, just trace for us what Gullit  
5 did, what his movements were, immediately after the Freetown  
6 invasion.

7 A. After the Freetown invasion, Gullit was in Benguema when he  
8 retreated and - after he had retreated and based in Benguema.  
9 After that, they withdrew and created the West Side Jungle. It  
09:56:06 10 was at that same time that Superman and others attacked me in  
11 Makeni, so Gullit came with some of his forces and joined. He  
12 came to Makeni and joined Brigadier Mani and Superman and others.  
13 Since then he was in Makeni up to August and September, when he  
14 returned and joined his men again in the West Side Jungle, in the  
09:56:30 15 West Side base. So from April to August/September, he was in  
16 Makeni before he returned to the West Side.

17 Q. Why did he come to Makeni?

18 A. Well, because he had heard about the infighting. They  
19 sided with Superman because Superman had made them to understand  
09:56:56 20 that I and Mosquito had disagreed to reinforce them in Freetown,  
21 so because of that reason they decided to side with Superman  
22 against me and attacked me in Makeni. So he joined those people  
23 and they took over Makeni during that period.

24 Q. So on whose side was Gullit at the time of the attack on  
09:57:17 25 you?

26 A. He was on Gibril and Superman's side.

27 Q. Against who?

28 A. Against me, Kallon and Bockarie.

29 Q. And just so that we are clear, why did Gullit decide to

1 side with Superman against you, Kallon and Bockarie?

2 A. Well, Superman made Gullit to understand that I, Bockarie  
3 and Kallon did not - refused to reinforce or to come to Freetown  
4 during the January invasion.

09:57:57 5 Q. Now, I am going to come to deal with the issue of Superman  
6 in some detail, but before we come to that I want you to assist  
7 me with something else. At the time of the Freetown invasion,  
8 where was Foday Sankoh?

9 A. Well, later - at that time I did not know. I only knew  
09:58:35 10 that he was with the government, but later I was made to  
11 understand that Foday Sankoh was in a boat on the coast of  
12 Freetown, in an ECOMOG boat.

13 Q. And during this time, Mr Sesay, was there any contact with  
14 Foday Sankoh?

09:59:00 15 A. Yes. Foday Sankoh started calling from the field radio,  
16 talking to Sam Bockarie, he spoke to Superman, he called me in  
17 Makeni and spoke to me.

18 Q. And was he still on the boat at the time he was speaking to  
19 you on the radio?

09:59:26 20 A. Yes. That was what I understood later.

21 Q. And what did he have to say for himself during those radio  
22 contacts?

23 A. Well, he was talking about a ceasefire. He spoke to Sam  
24 Bockarie about a ceasefire and that we should not continue

09:59:49 25 attacking and that we should defend our positions, we should not  
26 carry on attacking. Those were the conversations that went on.

27 And he was inquiring about everybody, how everybody was doing.

28 Q. Now, taking things slowly, first of all, just give us a  
29 rough time when these conversations with Sankoh were taking

1 place.

2 A. Well, these conversations started in February, in February,  
3 and they continued up to around - up to late March when those men  
4 attacked me in Makeni. Then even in April he was still talking  
10:00:41 5 to us, when I left Makeni. But when Foday Sankoh used to call,  
6 there came a time when Sam Bockarie said we should not respond to  
7 those calls he said because Foday Sankoh was under duress. He  
8 was in the hands of enemy, so whatever Sankoh was saying he was  
9 not saying with his own free will. So let other stations stop  
10:01:12 10 responding to Sankoh, he alone should be talking to Sankoh.

11 Q. And as far as you were aware, did he continue to talk to  
12 Sankoh?

13 A. No. There came a time when he did not continue. He said  
14 until Mr Sankoh is taken out of Freetown, that he should be taken  
10:01:35 15 from --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this  
17 area, slowly.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Can you repeat that answer, please, Mr Sesay?

10:01:45 20 A. Bockarie told Mr Sankoh on the radio at another time that  
21 Mr Sankoh hasn't got his free will. He was in the hands of the  
22 Government of Sierra Leone and he won't talk to him. The only  
23 time that he would talk to Mr Sankoh was when Mr Sankoh was taken  
24 to a neutral ground. That was the only time that he would take  
10:02:05 25 instructions from Mr Sankoh, but as long as Mr Sankoh was in the  
26 hands of the government and the ECOMOG, Mr Sankoh was under  
27 duress. That was what Bockarie said.

28 Q. Now I want to come to the topic of Superman and I would  
29 like us, please, to look at this topic within the context of

1 command and control within the RUF. Do you understand? Do you  
2 understand, Mr Sesay?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, you've told us about the attack on you by Superman in  
10:02:57 5 late March, early April 1999. But I want to start off with the  
6 relationship between Bockarie and Superman. Had Bockarie and  
7 Superman always got along together?

8 A. No. Superman and Bockarie, I can recall from '93 they were  
9 people who did not see eye to eye.

10:03:37 10 Q. Why?

11 A. Well, Superman was looking at - regarded himself as a brave  
12 fighter and he did not like subordinating himself to Bockarie.

13 And Bockarie too was looking at Superman, regarding Superman -  
14 looked at Superman to be subordinating himself to him. That was  
10:03:59 15 the problem. That was one of the problems, but what Bockarie  
16 told me in 1993 was that Superman was with some NPFL fighters who  
17 raided his people in his village. That is Gbandiwulo. So that  
18 was one of the things that caused Bockarie and Superman not to  
19 see eye to eye.

10:04:28 20 Q. And when had that taken place?

21 A. That was in late 1991.

22 Q. Now, during the time of the AFRC junta, did the  
23 relationship between Bockarie and Superman improve?

24 A. Well, it did not improve because even before joining the  
10:05:03 25 AFRC, Superman arrested Mohamed Tarawalli's bodyguards and  
26 executed three of them. One escaped and surrendered to the  
27 government troops, so Bockarie was bitter with that situation  
28 even before the coup. So those things strained their  
29 relationship with the AFRC. And I can recall once that Johnny



1 Paul gave Superman 9 million leones to give to Sam Bockarie for  
2 it to be shared among the officers.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he repeat this last bit  
4 of his answer.

10:05:42 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Could you repeat that, please? Johnny Paul Koroma gave  
7 what?

8 A. Johnny Paul Koroma gave 9 million leones to Superman to be  
9 taken to Sam Bockarie. Johnny Paul had said that money was meant  
10:06:00 10 for the officers, but Superman used the money and that caused a  
11 serious problem between Bockarie and Superman in Benguema. It  
12 was Pa Rogers who settled that problem.

13 Q. Now, there was a time, was there not, when you and other  
14 members of the RUF were based at villas in Hill Station in  
10:06:27 15 Freetown? Is that right?

16 A. Yes. That's correct.

17 Q. At that stage were there any difficulties between Superman  
18 and Bockarie?

19 A. Yes. There were difficulties.

10:06:44 20 Q. What about?

21 A. Well, Superman looted one vehicle and the people who owned  
22 the vehicle took the complaints to Johnny Paul Koroma, so Johnny  
23 Paul instructed Sam Bockarie to retrieve the vehicle from  
24 Superman. Sam Bockarie called Superman at his villa at Hill  
10:07:11 25 Station, but Superman put up resistance to disarm so Johnny Paul  
26 sent that Superman and Bockarie should be taken along to his  
27 lodge. It was he himself who retrieved the vehicle from Superman  
28 because Superman refused to hand over the vehicle to Sam  
29 Bockarie.

1 Q. And in what year was that?

2 A. That was in '97.

3 Q. And this business about the 9 million leones, did Superman  
4 ever give that money to Bockarie?

10:07:52 5 A. No, no. Superman had used the money.

6 Q. How was that problem about the 9 million leones resolved?

7 A. Well, it was the late Mr SYB Rogers who spoke to Sam  
8 Bockarie for him to forget about that and he advised Sam Bockarie  
9 to tell Johnny Paul Koroma that whenever he has something for the  
10 RUF he shouldn't give that to Superman, and that was how Pa  
11 Rogers resolved the matter.

12 Q. In what year did that difficulty about the 9,000 leones  
13 arrive?

14 A. It's 9 million, 9 million leones.

10:08:43 15 Q. When did that problem arise?

16 A. That was in 1997.

17 Q. Now, you also told us, Mr Sesay, that following the  
18 Fitti-Fatta mission, which was led by Superman, there were  
19 further difficulties between Superman and Bockarie, weren't  
10:09:05 20 there?

21 A. Yes, that's what happened.

22 Q. And remind us, what were those difficulties that arose?

23 A. After the failed attack on Koidu, the Fitti-Fatta mission,  
24 Bockarie instructed Sam Bockarie - Bockarie instructed Superman  
10:09:37 25 to report to Buedu but Superman disobeyed Bockarie's instructions  
26 and he decided to go to the Koinadugu District. That was in  
27 August 1998.

28 Q. Now, at the time that Superman decided to disappear -  
29 disobey that order, did Bockarie remain in radio contact with

1 him?

2 A. No. Bockarie sent a message to all the stations in  
3 Kailahun and Kono then. He said nobody should contact Superman  
4 and if Superman's station contacts any other station, nobody  
10:10:34 5 should respond. Since then, there was no radio contact between  
6 Superman and the RUF until in late 1998.

7 Q. And during that time, Mr Sesay, did the RUF radio codes  
8 remain the same?

9 A. No, no.

10:10:58 10 Q. When they were changed, was Superman given a copy of the  
11 changed codes?

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. Why not?

14 A. Well, because at that time, he had broken away from the RUF  
10:11:18 15 so Bockarie didn't want Superman to know anything the RUF was  
16 doing under the command of Bockarie.

17 Q. Now, by that stage, August 1998, Mr Sesay, what did  
18 Bockarie say about Superman's status within the RUF?

19 A. Well, Bockarie said - he said nobody should talk to  
10:12:02 20 Superman. Superman was no longer part of the RUF because he had  
21 broken away, so everybody should have less to do with Superman.  
22 So Superman was not considered any longer within the RUF because  
23 all the operations that were going on, he did not report to  
24 Bockarie, nor did he take orders from Bockarie.

10:12:26 25 Q. Did Bockarie regard him as an enemy?

26 A. Yes. From August to part of December, yes, 1998.

27 Q. We come, then, to the attack on you in Makeni by Superman  
28 and Gibril Massaquoi aided by Gullit. Taking things slowly, how  
29 did that incident begin?

1 A. Well, that incident started when the two groups met in  
2 Makeni.

3 Q. Pause there. Which two groups?

4 A. The group from Kono and the group from Koinadugu under  
10:13:22 5 different commands, because three commands came from Koinadugu  
6 and we all met in Makeni. Superman - you get Superman RUF, Mani  
7 AFRC, and Bropleh STF, and our own group that came from Kono.  
8 When I say the two groups, there was the one group from Koinadugu  
9 to Makeni and our own group from Kono to Makeni.

10:13:49 10 Q. Just so that we are clear, Mr Sesay. The one group from  
11 Koinadugu was made up of more than one element. Is that right?

12 A. Yes. That's correct.

13 Q. Superman's group, Bropleh's group and Brigadier Mani's  
14 group. Is that right?

10:14:14 15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. And how did that coming together of those groups cause  
17 difficulties?

18 A. Well, the difficulty was that each group wanted to take  
19 instructions from their own commander, each group wanted to take  
10:14:36 20 instructions from their own commander. They were only to follow  
21 their own commander's instructions. That was where the problem  
22 started in Makeni.

23 Q. And how did the problems develop?

24 A. So the group that I was commanding from Kono down to  
10:15:02 25 Makeni, you know, we fought from Kono down to Makeni. There was  
26 no killing of civilians, no looting, no burning of houses, you  
27 know, no adoption. Each time we captured the civilians, they  
28 remained there until the war ended in Sierra Leone between Kono  
29 and Makeni. So, when we arrived in Makeni, Superman's group

1 started looting in Makeni, breaking into people's shops, those  
2 groups that came from Koinadugu. Then I told Superman that it  
3 would be better for them to control the soldiers, the fighters,  
4 because the way I saw Kono, I said it would not be good for that  
10:15:46 5 same thing to be repeated in Makeni, it would not be good for the  
6 reputation of the organisation. I said so it would be better if  
7 he told the other commanders to control the fighting troops. In  
8 my presence Superman would agree but, when he turns his back, he  
9 wouldn't implement what has been agreed, he wouldn't do it.

10:16:06 10 Q. Now, you said that --

11 MR KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, I just noticed, listening over the  
12 interpretation, that the witness was using, as I heard it, the  
13 word "adoptions" which was translated, at least on the  
14 transcript, as abduction and perhaps that is the correct  
10:16:23 15 translation, but I think it's important that we find that out.  
16 The witness seems to be using the word "adoption".

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: I absolutely agree. I also heard the  
18 witness say "adoption" and I heard the interpreter say  
19 "adoption".

10:16:39 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Mr Sesay, which is correct? Do you mean "adoption" or  
22 "abduction"?

23 A. Well, let me put it in my own understanding. When we  
24 capture a town, we do not capture the people forcefully. We  
10:17:00 25 would send them first to our control areas. Each time we capture  
26 a village between Kono and Makeni, the people, that is the  
27 natives of the town, they would stay there till the end of the  
28 war. That's what I mean.

29 Q. So that's your understanding of your use of the word

1 "adoption," yes?

2 A. That's my understanding.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Then that is very different from  
4 "abduction", Mr Griffiths. Mr Sesay, do you know the difference  
10:17:38 5 between "adoption" and "abduction"?

6 THE WITNESS: No, my Lord. I just think that when you say  
7 "adoption" like when you capture a town, you capture all the  
8 people, you take them out of their villages and you take them  
9 where you want them to be. That's what I feel. That's what  
10:18:02 10 I think.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: So he's clearly using the word "adoption" to  
12 mean the forceful taking of individuals. He said that now twice.

13 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, I find the previous answer  
14 somewhat contradictory. "We do not capture the people  
10:18:22 15 forcefully, we would first take them to our control areas." Then  
16 later in the same answer he says "that's the natives of the town,  
17 they would stay there until the end of the war." Stay where? In  
18 their native town or in the controlled area?

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:18:40 20 Q. Very well, Mr Sesay, we need to take some time to explain  
21 this. Let's start in this way: During your advance from Kono to  
22 Makeni, how were the civilians treated by your forces? What  
23 would happen to them?

24 A. The civilians, the troops from Kono used to meet the  
10:19:12 25 civilians in their towns and the civilians, we used to allow them  
26 to stay in their towns, including the paramount chiefs, like the  
27 paramount chief in Makeni was there, the one in Magburaka was  
28 there, they stayed and they controlled their chiefdoms, and the  
29 civilians were in their towns until the time for the disarmament

1 from December '98 to 2001. They stayed in their different towns  
2 and villages between Kono down to Makeni.

3 Q. And were they moved to any - to an RUF-controlled area?

10:20:01

4 A. No, we did not move them. We - they stayed where we met  
5 them until the end of the war.

6 Q. And where they stayed, were those areas under RUF control?

7 A. Yes. Because RUF captured those towns in December 1998.

8 Q. And did the RUF, during that time, the advance from Kono to  
9 Makeni, forcefully remove civilians from their homes or villages?

10:20:38

10 A. No, no. The civilians stayed in their villages, in their  
11 towns, until the disarmament.

12 Q. And, Mr Sesay, when civilians are forcefully taken from  
13 their villages, what is the word that you use to describe that?

14 A. I describe it as forceful adoption.

10:21:10

15 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you. I hope that's clear now. I see  
16 the Presiding Judge shaking her head. What's unclear about that  
17 now?

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is unclear, Mr Griffiths, is now

19 I realise two pages ago the witness actually used the word

10:21:27

20 "adoption", and you said on the transcript that should be

21 "abduction". You said it. But actually, the witness meant

22 "adoption".

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Used in the sense of the forceful abduction  
24 of people. He's now explained that three times.

10:21:45

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think so. I don't think so at

26 all. But you know what I think the witness should use, if he

27 means forceful taking away of people, he should use the word

28 "capture"; but, if he doesn't mean capture, then he should simply

29 not refer to the word "adoption" because adoption is meaningless

1 in any other sense.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Once it's explained it becomes very  
3 meaningful, Madam President, with all due respect:

10:22:24

4 Q. Mr Sesay, let's try once more, shall we? When you use the  
5 word "adoption" what do you mean?

6 A. Well, I mean that when we capture a town, and we capture  
7 the civilians and we forcefully move them from their respective  
8 homes to where we control, when we send them to where we want.

9 That's what I mean.

10:22:51

10 Q. Just so that --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is what you call "adoption",  
12 Mr Sesay, right?

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:23:01

15 Q. Well, help me, Mr Sesay, just so we don't have any more  
16 confusion, please don't use the word "adoption". Take the  
17 learned judge's suggestion and use the word "capture." Would you  
18 do that for us? I'm grateful.

10:23:21

19 Now that we have explained that, can we just go back to  
20 your original answer when you were talking about what you had  
21 said to Superman in Makeni. If we go back now a few pages, one  
22 moment, yes, this was the answer you gave at the beginning of  
23 page 39 which led to this most recent development:

10:23:59

24 "So the group that I was commanding from Kono down to  
25 Makeni, you know, we fought from Kono down to Makeni. There was  
26 no killing of civilians, no looting, no burning of houses, you  
27 know, no" - it says "abduction" but I'll say "adoption", but we  
28 now know what that means.

29 "Each time we captured the civilians, they remained there



1 until the war ended in Sierra Leone between Kono and Makeni. So  
2 when we arrived in Makeni, Superman's group started looting in  
3 Makeni, breaking into people's shops, these groups that came from  
4 Koinadugu. Then I told Superman that it would be better for them  
10:24:38 5 to control the soldiers, the fighters, because the way I saw  
6 Kono, I said it would not be good for the same thing to be  
7 repeated in Makeni. It would not be good for the reputation of  
8 the organisation."

9 Pause there. Reputation of which organisation?

10:25:01 10 A. The RUF.

11 Q. And then you went on: "I said so it would be better if he  
12 told the other commanders to control the fighting troops." My  
13 question: Who were these other commanders that you were  
14 cautioning Superman to take this message to?

10:25:25 15 A. I meant Brigadier Mani, General Bropleh and their  
16 commanders.

17 Q. And help us, Mr Sesay, did your words of caution to  
18 Superman have any effect?

19 A. No. Superman did not heed to what I was telling him.

10:25:49 20 Q. So how was Superman behaving in Makeni?

21 A. Well, it was not that he was looting, he himself, or he was  
22 harassing the civilians as the fighters were doing. But they  
23 were encouraging the fighters. They would see the fighters doing  
24 things out of the way and they wouldn't take action to stop them.

10:26:13 25 Q. And when was this going on, Mr Sesay?

26 A. This was at the time that we captured Makeni. That was the  
27 time that this was going on in December.

28 Q. And for how long did Superman stay in Makeni at that time?

29 A. Well, Superman was in Makeni for about a week, then he

1 moved to Lunsar.

2 Q. And did he thereafter return to Makeni?

3 A. No. Because the two of us did not have the same  
4 understanding. He did not return to Makeni. He was in Lunsar

10:26:59 5 until Bockarie gave orders to attack Port Loko. Then he  
6 continued to stay in Lunsar, then Bockarie gave orders to come by  
7 Waterloo. So he was based in Lunsar and he used to come to  
8 Waterloo and return to Lunsar since the - until the time they  
9 left there and attacked me in Makeni in March. Since that time,  
10:27:24 10 from March, April, he stayed in Makeni until around September  
11 when he went to meet Mr Sankoh.

12 Q. Now, so this attack upon you, Mr Sesay, where did Superman  
13 come from to attack you?

14 A. From Lunsar.

10:27:53 15 Q. So I want to understand what you're saying. Are you saying  
16 that he came with his men directly from Lunsar in order to attack  
17 you or what?

18 A. Yes. They came, because the incident first happened,  
19 Bockarie sent me to go and call Gibril Massaquoi from Waterloo.

10:28:18 20 So I went and I met Gibril and I told him but Gibril refused to  
21 come. When it was time for me to return to Makeni, Gibril  
22 escaped. So the second time Bockarie sent me to call Gibril  
23 because he said he understood that Gibril was in Lunsar with  
24 Superman. So when I went to Lunsar, Superman and others opened  
10:28:41 25 fire on me. So I used the route from Lunsar, Gberi Junction,  
26 then Masiaka, then I went to Mile 91 to Magburaka and arrived in  
27 Makeni. And by that time Superman and others have come from  
28 Lunsar to Makeni, they attacked my house and they took everything  
29 that was in my house. So from that, I stayed in Makeni. It was

1 at that time that they organised themselves, came with their  
2 troops from Lunsar and they attacked me in Makeni wherein Rambo  
3 was killed. It was at that time that I escaped from Makeni.  
4 Because they killed some bodyguards, civilians took me at night,  
10:29:27 5 because they attacked me at night, around 2 a.m. So it was  
6 civilians who took me and we used a bush path and we escaped and  
7 I continued up to Makali and I went to Kono, onward to Buedu.

8 Q. Now, did you report that incident to Bockarie?

9 A. Yes, Bockarie was fully aware.

10:29:57 10 Q. Having attacked you and caused you to flee to Buedu, did  
11 Superman remain in Makeni?

12 A. Yes. He remained in Makeni.

13 Q. And whilst in Makeni, was he now taking orders from  
14 Bockarie?

10:30:29 15 A. No. He did not take orders from Bockarie. From late March  
16 to early April, up to October, he did not take orders from  
17 Bockarie.

18 Q. Now, putting that together, Mr Sesay, you've told us about  
19 difficulties between Bockarie and Superman in 1993, in 1997  
10:31:00 20 during the AFRC times, in 1998 after Kono, Fitti-Fatta mission,  
21 in March, April 1999 when he attempted to kill you. Help us:  
22 During that period, let's just say from 1997 right through till  
23 1999, did Bockarie have any effective control over Superman and  
24 his men?

10:31:39 25 A. No. He did not have effective control over them.

26 Q. And was the RUF a unified fighting force under the command  
27 of one individual during that period?

28 A. No.

29 Q. How would you describe the RUF during that period,

1 Mr Sesay?

2 A. Well, during that period, there were times Superman with  
3 2,000 plus men did not take orders from Bockarie, from part of  
4 '98 and part of '99. And even - he even disobeyed Sam Bockarie's  
10:32:48 5 orders in '99, '98 and 1997. That used to happen and everybody  
6 knew that within the RUF. And even the civilians knew about it.

7 Q. So how would you describe the RUF as an organisation during  
8 that period? Was it a unified organisation or what?

9 A. No. The RUF was not thinking as one at that time and they  
10:33:27 10 did not have a single command structure during this period.

11 Q. And the period we are talking about is 1997 to '99, yes?

12 A. Yes, sir, you're right.

13 Q. And I want us to look - you having helpfully assisted us  
14 with those matters - at a couple of documents, please. The first  
10:34:03 15 document I'd like you to look at, Mr Sesay, is a document which  
16 we've looked at before but which I would now like to look at in a  
17 bit more detail with you and it's exhibit D-9.

18 I would like us to go first of all, please, to page 6  
19 because we've dealt with much of the preceding part of this  
10:35:25 20 salute report. This is the salute report bearing the name of Sam  
21 Bockarie, Mr Sesay. Do you recall us looking at it before?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Let's pick it up now, please, at page 6. Bottom paragraph,  
24 we having dealt with the previous part of that page:

10:35:52 25 "During your absence many contacts were made to  
26 sympathisers to promote the image of the movement, details of  
27 which will be presented to you in a manner so as not to cause any  
28 breach of security. Out of these contacts I was able to get the  
29 basic needs and facilitate our military move to Kono and onwards

1 towards - past Machine."

2 Now, first of all, Machine, what is that? Five lines from  
3 the bottom, "Our military move from Kono and onwards past  
4 Machine." What is Machine?

10:36:48 5 A. Well, maybe he wanted to say Masingbi, because it seems as  
6 if he wants to refer to a town, "onwards past".

7 Q. And then it continues:

8 "The entire move was under the command of the late Boston  
9 Flomo, Rambo, and supervised by Brigadier Issa. When Rambo  
10:37:16 10 captured Makeni I convinced Brigadier Issa on set to call on  
11 Superman to join in operation in order to ensure that the  
12 objectives of the RUF were placed in priority."

13 Pause there. You've just told us about the arrival of  
14 Superman, Brigadier Mani and Bropleh in Makeni. Was that as a  
10:37:38 15 result of a call from you to Superman?

16 A. No, I did not call Superman directly. Sam Bockarie told me  
17 that he had spoken with Superman to come and join Rambo in Makeni  
18 so that we could attack Teko Barracks, because he said Superman  
19 and his group had attacked Teko and they were afraid, so that we  
10:38:09 20 should put our differences aside and so that we would capture  
21 Teko Barracks. He himself spoke to Superman.

22 Q. Over the page, please:

23 "As usual, Brigadier Issa was supportive and I called  
24 Superman on set and instructed him to join in the operations.  
10:38:42 25 I told Superman that I had forgiven him and that the past was  
26 behind us and that we were all brothers in arms. Superman  
27 accepted the call and vowed to give his fullest cooperation. To  
28 have made this call was not an easy thing for me as Superman had  
29 been asked to provide manpower for the Kono-Makeni operations,

1 yet another order that he defied and still I was forced to  
2 exercise maturity and instructed Rambo to go and receive Superman  
3 and to continue normal operations with him. Rambo willingly  
4 complied with the order and went to meet Superman, providing  
10:39:26 5 vehicles for all his men. They then returned to Makeni and put  
6 the barracks under control.

7 Whilst the late Rambo was busy checking captured materials  
8 for proper accountability, Superman took the opportunity of  
9 diverting captured materials for his own use."

10:39:47 10 Did that happen, Mr Sesay?

11 A. Yes. That happened.

12 Q. And the material that he diverted for his own use, which  
13 material was that? Where had that material come from?

14 A. Those were the captured ammunition from the ammo dump in  
10:40:11 15 Teko Barracks from the ECOMOG. Those were AK rounds, G3 rounds,  
16 RPG rockets and some HMG rounds.

17 Q. Did he ask your permission or Sam Bockarie's permission  
18 before he took them?

19 A. No, no.

10:40:31 20 Q. "Brigadier Issa, who had taken - supervised the Makeni and  
21 had given instructions for the barracks to be put under full  
22 military control, whilst he was informed of the fact that  
23 Superman had illegally taken material from the barracks and was  
24 in possession of these materials. When approached on the issue,  
10:40:53 25 Superman claimed that I, General Mosquito and Brigadier Issa were  
26 using Rambo against him and with the aim of destroying him."

27 Is that true?

28 A. Well, yes, because when I got the information, I tried to  
29 meet him to ask him for the ammunition, and he put up resistance.

1 He said we wanted to use Rambo against him.

2 Q. "Brigadier Issa insisted that the materials be handed over,  
3 as Superman had not only misused large amounts of ammo in his  
4 failed attempt to capture Kono, but had also refused to give  
10:41:38 5 account of materials captured when the Koidu Town ammo dump of  
6 ECOMOG was captured."

7 That reference to Superman misusing large amounts of ammo  
8 in his failed attempt to capture Kono, which mission was that?

9 A. This was the Fitti-Fatta mission.

10:42:07 10 Q. During that Fitti-Fatta mission had Superman captured the  
11 Koidu Town ECOMOG ammunition dump?

12 A. They said he captured ammunition. That was the ammunition  
13 he used to go to Koinadugu when he disobeyed Bockarie's orders to  
14 send the ammunition to him.

10:42:32 15 Q. "Superman continued to refuse and Brigadier Issa,  
16 accompanied by Brigadier Kallon, entered his house and arrested  
17 all the materials found."

18 Did you do that?

19 A. Well, we went to Superman's house to search for the  
10:42:55 20 ammunition, but the ammunition wasn't there. Before he got the  
21 accident --

22 Q. Before who got the accident?

23 A. Superman, he had an accident. Because he attacked Kabala  
24 in late December, but he failed. So on his way back he was  
10:43:18 25 involved in a vehicle accident.

26 Q. And in which year in late December did he attack Kabala?

27 A. '98.

28 Q. Thank you:

29 "He invited Superman to the headquarters in Makeni so as to

1 make plans for moving the operation to Lunsar. Superman asked to  
2 enter his bedroom to prepare for the move and took that  
3 opportunity to escape."

4 Is that right?

10:43:54 5 A. This was not a move on Lunsar. The time when he - after  
6 the failed attack and he got in the accident, Kallon and I went  
7 to his house to see his condition. But he thought that we had  
8 gone to arrest him, so he escaped and went to Binkolo, and he was  
9 there until early January and came to Makeni and moved on to  
10:44:23 10 Lunsar.

11 Q. "Superman later returned and again was allowed to join the  
12 operation. At this point I instructed the late Rambo to advance  
13 to Port Loko, while Superman was to secure the Freetown Highway.  
14 Rambo was successful in capturing part of the town and in  
10:44:41 15 capturing a large quantity of materials. Superman then suggested  
16 that as he knew the terrain well, he should take over that axis  
17 and move to capture Lungi. Thinking that he was sincere, we  
18 agreed and Brigadier Issa gave him the opportunity to equip  
19 himself from the ammo dump for the mission. Upon taking over at  
10:45:05 20 Port Loko, Superman made no effective move to capture Lungi and  
21 also lost the valuable ground of Port Loko. Meanwhile, the  
22 troops that entered Freetown had been cut off from the rear and  
23 were being encircled, leaving them no way out. I was able to  
24 coordinate their operations over set and get them to combine  
10:45:27 25 their forces and bulldoze from the side, accessing them to the  
26 mountains through which they took a bypass to join our troops at  
27 Benguema and Waterloo as JOI was occupied by ECOMOG."

28 Now, the withdrawal of the AFRC troops from Freetown, was  
29 that coordinated by Bockarie?



1 A. No, it was not coordinated. When the AFRC failed the  
2 attack in Freetown, that was why they withdrew to the hills of  
3 Freetown to Benguema and Waterloo.

4 Q. "This is how the troops that entered Freetown were able to  
10:46:10 5 retreat. Still they sustained heavy casualties, including Steve  
6 Bio, the SLPP chairman, Manakpaka and many others. On learning  
7 that Gibril Massaquoi had been rescued from prison and had joined  
8 in the operation, I contacted him on set and gave him advice and  
9 encouragement for smooth operations. Another attack on Freetown  
10:46:37 10 was planned but was never implemented due to the actions of  
11 Gibril, Superman and some other SLA soldiers.

12 Later, I was to instruct Brigadier Issa to get Gibril to  
13 report to DHQ for proper briefing as he had been with you in  
14 prison and had information as to your condition. I was also of  
10:47:01 15 the conviction that Gibril would collaborate with Superman to go  
16 against the command that you left on the ground. I instructed  
17 Brigadier Issa to assure Gibril that all was forgiven and that  
18 I held no grudge for him.

19 Gibril refused to come to my call, saying that he was going  
10:47:23 20 to operate with Superman."

21 Is all of that correct about Gibril Massaquoi's behaviour,  
22 Mr Sesay?

23 A. Yes. It's correct.

24 Q. "Gibril refused to come to my call, saying that he was  
10:47:43 25 going to operate with Superman. Superman was asked to enforce  
26 the order for Gibril to report but he also was defiant and said  
27 that he, Superman, was not going to make Gibril do what he  
28 himself would not do. They went on with words of insult to me  
29 and the high command and said that they were not taking orders

1 from me or Kailahun."

2 Did they insult Bockarie in that way?

3 A. Yes.

10:48:24

4 Q. How did they insult him? What did they say to him? Can  
5 you remember?

6 A. Well, they called the operator, that is, Bockarie's set,  
7 telling the operator that they will never take orders from  
8 Bockarie and that he will not cooperate with any instruction from  
9 Bockarie, and in fact Bockarie wanted to hijack the leadership  
10 from Foday Sankoh. Those were the words they told Bockarie.

10:48:46

11 Q. "I sent Brigade Issa to the ground to invite Gibril to  
12 report to DHQ. On arrival Gibril was invited to report and he  
13 complied by entering the vehicle. At this point, Superman  
14 ordered his men to open fire on Brigadier Issa which they did,  
15 thus affording Gibril with the opportunity to not only escape but  
16 to take up arms against a superior command in the person of  
17 Brigadier Issa who was able to escape unhurt. Gibril and  
18 Superman went with their men to the home of Brigadier Issa and  
19 commanded all the materials that had been sent there by me for  
20 use in the planned re-attack of Freetown."

10:49:42

21 Did they take that material from your house, Mr Sesay?

22 A. Yes, they took materials away from my house. Those are the  
23 materials that had been brought from Kono and some of those that  
24 we had captured from Makeni.

10:50:03

25 Q. "They vandalised the house, looting all personal properties  
26 and government funds amounting to US \$9,000."

27 Is that correct?

28 A. Yes, that's correct.

29 Q. Where did the US \$9,000 taken from your house, where had

1 that come from?

2 A. Well, this money was what they had got from the captured  
3 Nigerians in Kono, because they had money on them in their  
4 pockets. This was the money. Because whenever they were  
10:50:43 5 captured, they would take the moneys from their pockets and they  
6 gave them to me.

7 Q. "The two together with their men then left and based  
8 themselves in Lunsar with the threat that any person, including  
9 me, that tried to get to them would be killed. I dispatched a  
10:51:01 10 team headed by Colonel Isaac, Major Benda, Lieutenant Colonel  
11 Moriba, Major Jackson, your bodyguard commander, and Lieutenant  
12 Colonel Sam Kpulleh with explicit instructions to go and  
13 investigate the issue and ensure that they contain the situation  
14 and report back to me at DHQ.

10:51:26 15 I was later informed that the delegation had not been given  
16 an opportunity to investigate and were under serious armed threat  
17 by both Gibril and Superman. In time, Lieutenant Colonel Moriba  
18 and Lieutenant Colonel Kpulleh returned to DHQ whilst the other  
19 three stayed behind and also began to put up acts of

10:51:52 20 insubordination against the high command. The enemy had taken  
21 this moment of internal turmoil to make advances against our  
22 positions at Benguema, Waterloo and Mile 47. The enemy then  
23 moved for Gberi Bridge. Again Superman pleaded for the  
24 opportunity to move to repel the attack on Gberi Bridge as enemy  
10:52:18 25 pressure was mounting I gave the go ahead to him to take up the  
26 said operation. Superman failed to move to Gberi Bridge and  
27 instead attacked Makeni late at night with the aim of killing  
28 Brigadier Issa and Rambo. The home of Rambo was attacked by  
29 Superman. The attack caught Rambo off guard as he was fast

1 asleep. He was captured, shot many times and it was reported  
2 that he was even stabbed to ensure that he did not survive the  
3 attack, remarking that he Rambo was the iron jacket to me,  
4 General Mosquito and Brigadier Issa and that he would die that  
10:53:02 5 night in the hands of Superman."

6 Is that the manner of Rambo's death, Mr Sesay?

7 A. Yes. That's what happened.

8 Q. "After killing Rambo, they attacked the home of Brigadier  
9 Issa, launching an RPG rocket at the house."

10:53:25 10 Is that what happened?

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. "They opened fire entering the house. Brigadier Issa was  
13 able to escape through a door from his bedroom leading to the  
14 back of the house. He was spotted as he manoeuvred towards the  
10:53:43 15 bushes and another RPG rocket was launched behind him."

16 Did that happen?

17 A. Yes, that's what happened.

18 Q. "The explosion caused a small rock to enter the toe of  
19 Brigadier Issa and against daybreak was able to make his escape  
10:54:04 20 to Makali where he dialogued with you on set while he was still  
21 in the custody of the SLPP in Freetown."

22 Is that true?

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. Dialogued with - who is the "you"?

10:54:17 25 A. With Mr Sankoh.

26 Q. How did you manage to do that?

27 A. Okay. On my arrival in Makali - because Makali had a radio  
28 set - and the operator came to me and said Mr Sankoh had called  
29 on the set, and so he wanted to talk to me. So I went to the -

1 to the radio room and I had a dialogue with Mr Sankoh. I spoke  
2 with him. So during that time, Superman and others in Makeni  
3 monitored our discussions together with Mr Sankoh, so they knew  
4 my location. So after the dialogue, while the paramount chiefs  
10:55:07 5 and the elders in the town had come to sympathise with me, they  
6 were preparing food for me to eat. Within in the next two hours,  
7 Gibril and others attacked Makali and people escaped with me  
8 through the bush paths, the civilians.

9 Q. What did you speak to Mr Sankoh about on that occasion?

10:55:25 10 A. Mr Sankoh called and said he had heard that there was a  
11 problem; that Superman and others had told him that I had said  
12 I was not going to talk to him. And I said no, that's not what  
13 happened. I said the day you called, that is, the day Mr Sankoh  
14 called my radio in Makeni, at that time I wasn't there. I had  
10:55:53 15 come to Matotoka and I said when I returned, my operator told me,  
16 and when your frequency was contacted at that time, the call did  
17 not go through. I said so after two days, Superman and others  
18 attacked me, and so I have escaped from Makeni and Rambo has been  
19 killed. And Mr Sankoh said okay, if that is the case he will  
10:56:17 20 talk to Sam Bockarie.

21 Q. Let's go back to the text, shall we?

22 "In that attack, Gibril, Superman and their men killed and  
23 wounded many soldiers, both RUF and SLA, who were performing  
24 various military duties on the ground."

10:56:37 25 Mr Sesay, what was the extent of the casualties suffered as  
26 a result of that attack on you by Superman and Gibril Massaquoi?

27 A. Well, they killed many people. They killed fighters, they  
28 killed up to 25 to 30 fighters. And some people's feet were  
29 broken, some people's legs were broken, and even some civilians

1 who had some --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat this  
3 part of the answer?

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:57:18 5 Q. "Even some civilians who" what? Start from there.

6 A. I said even some civilians whom they had said were working  
7 with me, they killed them, because I know of two drivers who were  
8 killed because they said they were my drivers, and those were  
9 civilians in Makeni. We met them in Makeni.

10:57:37 10 Q. And it was Gibril Massaquoi and Superman who did this?

11 A. Yes. And throughout the time they were in Makeni, the  
12 privilege that the civilians had before the attack was no longer  
13 the same. Things became difficult for the civilians now because  
14 before the infighting, the civilians, there were in Makeni more  
15 than 60,000, but after this infighting people abandoned Makeni,  
16 many of them. Some of them went to Port Loko and some of them  
17 crossed over to Guinea.

18 Q. "The next morning, Superman mobilised an armed force headed  
19 by Gibril to re-attack Brigadier Issa at Makali, having been  
10:58:30 20 alerted as to his location through his dialogue with the leader.

21 They also planned to attack Mile 91 with a view of taking command  
22 of both grounds. Again, Brigadier Issa was able to escape and  
23 move to Kono. Gibril chased him as far as Makali, vowing to kill  
24 him as he had done Rambo and to display his head in Makeni. I  
10:58:55 25 have as evidence a video cassette recording of the public display  
26 of the late Rambo's body."

27 Was such a videotape made of Rambo's body?

28 A. Yes. I saw pictures that were displayed in Makeni.

29 Q. Who by?

1 A. The pictures?

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. It was Superman and Gibril and their followers.

10:59:37

4 Q. "The same cassette will help to shed light on the death of

5 Rambo and the conspiracy and action of Gibril and Superman to

6 kill the high command of the RUF and assume its offices and

7 command. After Makeni had been captured and raised by Superman

8 and his troops, he called a meeting at the town hall and

9 confidently told the people that he was acting in compliance with

11:00:00

10 instructions received from the leader and that he had taken

11 effective command of the RUF and that I, Major General Sam

12 Bockarie, was no longer high command of the RUF, and that he,

13 Brigadier Superman, was taking over from Brigadier Issa in

14 Makeni."

11:00:22

15 Was there such a meeting, Mr Sesay?

16 A. Yes. At the town hall.

17 Q. And help us --

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, perhaps you'll find an

19 appropriate time to stop, in view of the clock.

11:00:40

20 MR GRIFFITHS: This is as good a time as any.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. We will take half an hour's

22 break and reconvene at half past 11.00.

23 [Break taken at 11.00 a.m.]

24 [Upon resuming at 11.30 a.m.]

11:31:32

25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Mr Sesay, can we go back, please, to page 9 of exhibit D-9

27 please. We were looking at the penultimate paragraph on that

28 page. Let us just remind ourselves:

29 "After Makeni had been captured and raised by Superman and

1 his troops, he called a meeting at the town haul and confidently  
2 told the people that he was acting in compliance with  
3 instructions received from the leader and that he had taken  
4 effective command of the RUF, and that I, Major General Sam  
11:32:23 5 Bockarie, was no longer high command of the RUF and that he,  
6 Brigadier Superman, was taking over from Brigadier Issa in  
7 Makeni."

8 Question, Mr Sesay: By what authority did Superman assume  
9 this role?

11:32:46 10 A. Well, he did not have authority from Mr Sam Bockarie. He  
11 just did this on his own, based on the plan that he had with  
12 Gibril Massaquoi.

13 Q. Help us, Mr Sesay: At this time, a quarter of the way or  
14 so through the year 1999, who did you regard as being the head of  
11:33:15 15 the RUF?

16 A. The head for the RUF was Mr Sankoh as leader.

17 Q. And did you still regard him as being the leader, even  
18 though he had been convicted of treason and was in prison?

19 A. Yes. I still regarded him as the leader.

11:33:42 20 Q. And, as far as you are aware, from your interaction with  
21 him, who did Sam Bockarie regard as being the head of the RUF at  
22 this time, late March/early April 1999?

23 A. It was Mr Sankoh.

24

11:34:04 25 Q. And as far as you're aware, at this time, from whom was Sam  
26 Bockarie taking instructions?

27 A. Well, during this time, Sam Bockarie was not taking  
28 instructions from any other person. Sometimes he would consult  
29 with JP, JP Koroma, he used to consult with him, but during this



1 time, he was not taking instructions, only to JP. He was only  
2 consulting with him.

3 Q. As far as you are aware, Mr Sesay, given your position  
4 within the RUF at this time, was Sam Bockarie at this time  
11:34:43 5 receiving instructions from Charles Taylor?

6 A. No. He was not getting instructions from Mr Taylor at all.

7 Q. Let's go back to page 9:

8 "Superman went on to accuse me on air of hijacking the  
9 leadership of the RUF, citing my call for all signal stations not  
11:35:07 10 to respond to your call as proof of my betrayal, a charge that I  
11 not only deny but take particular offence to."

12 Now, that reference, "my call for all signals stations not  
13 to respond to your call", what is that a reference to?

14 A. Well, it is talking about when Sam Bockarie told us, the  
11:35:39 15 other stations, that when Mr Sankoh calls we should not respond  
16 to Mr Sankoh's call and he should be the only one that would talk  
17 to Mr Sankoh and Mr Sankoh was in the hands of the enemies, he  
18 was under duress. So he was demanding the government of  
19 Sierra Leone to transfer Mr Sankoh to a neutral grounds before he  
11:36:03 20 talks to him. That is what he is referring to here.

21 Q. "Superman later went on air proclaiming that he was going  
22 to advance to Kono and further still to Kailahun, where he would  
23 kill me and display my head. He went on to name his assignment  
24 list."

11:36:24 25 Did Superman do that?

26 A. They were saying it, but they did not advance to Kono.  
27 They stopped at Makali, when they attacked me and returned.

28 Q. Now, at this stage of the game, Mr Sesay, is it the case  
29 that the RUF had broken down into two warring factions?

1 A. Yes. That was the situation then.

2 Q. Let's go to the next page:

3 "To contain the situation, I issued materials to Brigadier  
4 Kallon and instructed him to take command of Magburaka and to use  
11:37:13 5 the opportunity to search for Brigadier Issa, as he was missing  
6 in action as a result of Superman's ambush of him immediately  
7 after Issa had dialogued with you on air. Kallon took command of  
8 Magburaka and was soon under the attack of Superman and Gibril.

9 This time they did not only use RPGs and GMGs but launched mortar  
11:37:44 10 bombs and fired anti-aircraft guns against Magburaka. Kallon  
11 was, however, able to repel, only for Superman to re-attack, this  
12 time capturing the town. Three days later, Brigadier Kallon  
13 launched a successful counter-offensive, recapturing Magburaka.

14 Since then, the ground has been under our control but has come  
11:38:08 15 under a series of attacks by Superman, leading to loss of life  
16 and injury to numerous soldiers and civilians." We attacked  
17 Makeni twice with a view of re-taking command of the said ground.

18 This because of the strategic location of the township and the  
19 fact that Makeni was under command and control and law and order  
11:38:34 20 was in effect when Brigadier Issa was in command. Civilians

21 moved freely, knowing that their security was paramount. These  
22 same civilians were now crying to be rescued. We were in full  
23 occupation of the township when you instructed us to withdraw and  
24 await your arrival upon which the issue would be settled. Your

11:38:58 25 order was immediately enforced and troops loyal to the RUF high  
26 command left on the ground by the leader, were ordered by me to  
27 withdraw. The truth is, sir, that at the time the people of  
28 Makeni, including the soldiers needed to be rescued. Living  
29 conditions were dismal and it is reported that at the time

1 Superman was getting married at a costly ceremony soldiers were  
2 suffering and, in some cases, dying as a result of inadequate  
3 drugs."

4 Do you agree with that paragraph, Mr Sesay?

11:39:40 5 A. Yes, I agree with it.

6 Q. "Till this day Superman and Gibril are, contrary to my  
7 command and continue to flaunt the direct command of the leader.  
8 They still do not submit all reports to me for my necessary  
9 information and action and onward movement to the attention of  
10 the leader. They reserve the mandated line of command only for  
11 messages against me or to paint themselves pretty.

12 When we first retreated from Freetown, I contacted the  
13 government of the Ivory Coast and, in particular, the Foreign  
14 Minister, Mr Amara Essy - I also contacted the guarantors of the  
11:40:03 15 Abidjan Peace Accord to impress on them the fact that our leader  
16 was still illegally being held by the Nigerian government and  
17 that a negotiated settlement was the only way in which peace and  
18 security could return to Sierra Leone."

19 Pause there. Were you aware of this contact made by Sam  
11:40:52 20 Bockarie with the foreign minister of the Ivorian government?

21 A. Yes. Yes. Through Omrie Golley.

22 Q. Now, can you help us Mr Sesay, why Bockarie made the  
23 decision to contact the foreign ministry of the Ivory Coast?

24 A. Well, the foreign minister, during the early stages, he  
11:41:24 25 negotiated - he negotiated the peace talks, and it was his  
26 government that hosted the RUF delegation in Abidjan, and he come  
27 to collect Mr Sankoh from Zogoda.

28 Q. Whilst the RUF delegation were in Abidjan, were they  
29 provided with accommodation by the Ivorian government?

1 A. Yes, they gave them a house. Even before giving Mr Sankoh  
2 a house to stay, he and his delegation, it was the Ivorian  
3 government that was responsible for their hotel bills,  
4 medication, feeding, transportation.

11:42:10 5 Q. And, Mr Sesay, can you help us as to why it was that  
6 Bockarie contacted the foreign minister of the Ivory Coast and  
7 not Charles Taylor?

8 A. Well, Bockarie did it in respect of - because he knew the  
9 assistance that the Ivorian government had been rendering to the  
11:42:39 10 RUF, and even up to that time the house that had been given -  
11 that they had given to the RUF, the RUF members were still  
12 occupying that house. So that is why Bockarie had contacted him,  
13 and he knew that Amara Essy was Mr Sankoh's friend.

14 Q. At which time did Bockarie make this contact with the  
11:43:03 15 Foreign Minister, Mr Amara Essy?

16 A. I think this was in 1998.

17 Q. And you say that the RUF were still occupying the house.  
18 When had they first occupied that house?

19 A. This was from - they occupied that house from '96 when the  
11:43:34 20 government gave the RUF.

21 Q. In 1999 after the Freetown invasion, were the RUF still  
22 enjoying those facilities in Abidjan?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So you still had representatives in the Ivory Coast in  
11:43:55 25 1999?

26 A. Yes. Pa Kallon and the others were still there. The only  
27 time Pa Kallon - Pa Kallon and others were there. In fact, that  
28 house was still there for the RUF up to 2000.

29 Q. Now, help us with this then, Mr Sesay. In due course the

1 RUF had a guesthouse in Monrovi a, didn' t they?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. When did the RUF first have access to that guesthouse in  
4 Monrovi a?

11:44:35 5 A. Well, that was in October '98 when Sam Bockarie went to  
6 Monrovi a. That was when they said they had given him a  
7 guesthouse where he was lodged. He used to send radio messages  
8 to the RUF areas to me.

9 Q. And for how long did the RUF have that guesthouse in  
11:44:57 10 Monrovi a?

11 A. Well, the RUF used that guesthouse till 2000.

12 Q. So the RUF had it for two years from '98 to 2000; is that  
13 right?

14 A. Yes.

11:45:12 15 Q. And they had accommodation from the Ivory Coast from 1996  
16 through to 2000; is that right?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. So help me. What was the distinction between the help  
19 provided by the Ivory Coast in providing accommodation to the  
11:45:34 20 RUF, and the help provided by Charles Taylor in providing a  
21 guesthouse for two years? What was the distinction?

22 MR KOU MJIAN: Objection. It is a leading question. The  
23 witness has not testified that the Ivory Coast provided  
24 accommodation.

11:45:57 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Gri ffi ths, what is your response?

26 MR GRI FFITHS: He did say that. I am wondering whether  
27 Mr Koum jian is listening to the same testimony that I am. The  
28 witness has said on more than one occasion it was provided by the  
29 government of the Ivory Coast. So consequently, so ask the

1 witness - it being the case that the Prosecution's case is that  
2 Charles Taylor's provision of a guesthouse in Monrovia for the  
3 RUF is evidence of his control and command over the RUF - surely  
4 it is thereafter legitimate to ask what the distinction was if  
11:46:35 5 another government in West Africa had been providing similar  
6 facilities for a much longer period.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: I will rule on this.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Page 66 of the transcript.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am going to overrule the objection and  
11:47:10 10 allow the question in the way it was put.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

12 Q. Mr Sesay, help us. What was the distinction between the  
13 assistance provided by the Ivory Coast government to the RUF and  
14 the assistance provided by the government of Liberia to the RUF?

11:47:34 15 A. Well, the Ivory Coast government provided a house from '96,  
16 so they gave a longer time to the RUF that they give them  
17 provision than the Liberian government by Mr Taylor by then.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Sesay, from 1996 until when?

19 THE WITNESS: Up to 2000.

11:48:00 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: That is the house - the accommodation  
21 provided by the Ivorian government, yes.

22 THE WITNESS: Yes, Ma'am, in Cocody in Abidjan.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. And during that period up to 2000 who was staying at that  
11:48:17 25 address in Abidjan, Cocody?

26 A. It was Mr Sankoh who was there. When he went to Nigeria  
27 and was arrested, his advisor, Pa David Kallon, he was there in  
28 '97, '98, '99. Then he joined Mr Sankoh and they went to  
29 Freetown in '99. Then Mr Sankoh's wife Josephine Tengbeh was

1 there. She was there until 2000, and even Mr Sankoh's children  
2 were there and some wounded soldiers.

3 Q. Some wounded soldiers were there up until when?

4 A. Up to 2000.

11:49:05 5 Q. Those wounded soldiers, to which organisation did they  
6 belong?

7 A. To the RUF.

8 Q. Why were wounded RUF soldiers in Abidjan staying at the  
9 house provided by the Ivorian government?

11:49:26 10 A. Well, they went there for medical treatment because their  
11 injuries were serious. They were there taking treatment up to  
12 that time.

13 Q. Who permitted them to travel to the Ivory Coast to receive  
14 treatment?

11:49:47 15 A. Well, Mr Sankoh informed Amara Essy by then, and it was  
16 Amara Essy who said they should go. So Mr Sankoh's delegation  
17 went. When they were going, the wounded soldiers too were called  
18 for and they took them along, so they were all at the house there  
19 with Mr Sankoh.

11:50:09 20 Q. So those wounded soldiers were receiving treatment in the  
21 Ivory Coast with the full knowledge and approval and permission  
22 of the Ivorian government?

23 MR KOUMJIAN: Objection. That is leading.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all, given that the witness has just  
11:50:27 25 said that it was with the consent of the foreign ministry of the  
26 Ivory Coast.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I believe it's just seeking  
28 clarification. Please ask the question. The objection is  
29 overruled.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Were those soldiers - wounded soldiers being treated in the  
3 Ivory Coast with the knowledge and permission of the Ivorian  
4 government?

11:50:48 5 A. Yes. The foreign minister was fully aware of that,  
6 Mr Amara Essy.

7 Q. And how many wounded RUF soldiers received such treatment  
8 in the Ivory Coast?

9 A. Well, those who went at the time were three. Three of them  
11:51:10 10 had the serious cases.

11 Q. And during the time that the RUF had access to that house  
12 in Cocody in Abidjan, was there a radio operator based at those  
13 premises?

14 A. Yes.

11:51:30 15 Q. And was there a radio operator based at those premises from  
16 1996 through to 2000?

17 A. It did not continue up to 2000, but up to '98 an operator  
18 was there. It was the operator who left and went to Monrovia  
19 later in '98.

11:51:52 20 Q. And who - what's the name of that operator?

21 A. She was Memunatu Deen.

22 Q. And so Memunatu Deen left from Cocody to go to Monrovia to  
23 do what?

24 A. Well, Bockarie called her when he came to Kailahun --

11:52:21 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can the witness repeat this  
26 answer. The gender is not clear in that answer.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Could you answer that question again? Let me ask it again:  
29 Memunatu Deen left from the house in Cocody, Abidjan, to go to



1 Monrovia to do what?

2 A. To come through Monrovia to Kailahun - through Liberia to  
3 go to Kailahun.

4 Q. And then?

11:52:53 5 A. The purpose for her to come when Bockarie called her was to  
6 take me to escort me to meet with Ibrahim Bah. Because it was  
7 through --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, again the gender is not  
9 claimed in the second part of that.

11:53:10 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. The translator says he is not clear whether you are talking  
12 about a man or a woman, so let's start again.

13 "The purpose for her to come when Bockarie called her was  
14 to take me to escort me to meet Ibrahim Bah."

11:53:26 15 Go on. Take it on from there.

16 A. Is she.

17 Q. Right. So she was to take you to see Ibrahim Bah, for what  
18 purpose?

19 A. No. Bockarie sent a message to Memunatu Deen in Abidjan,  
11:53:47 20 for her, Memunatu Deen, to inform Ibrahim Bah, that he, Bockarie,  
21 was sending me to Monrovia so that Ibrahim Bah would pick me up.

22 So when Memunatu informed Ibrahim Bah in Abidjan, because  
23 Memunatu was in Abidjan, then Bockarie instructed Memunatu Deen  
24 to come to Kailahun in Buedu so that the two of us would travel  
11:54:12 25 to Monrovia. Ibrahim Bah was to meet us in Monrovia so we can go  
26 to Burkina Faso.

27 Q. When - did Memunatu Deen remain in Monrovia thereafter, or  
28 did she go back to the Ivory Coast or to Sierra Leone?

29 A. Well, after the incident, after I had gone to Monrovia when

1 I lost the diamond, she came to Buedu when Bockarie told her to  
2 come back, then she returned to Abidjan.

3 Q. And did she stay in Abidjan thereafter?

4 A. Yes, she was in Abidjan until '99. Then she finally came  
11:54:56 5 to Liberia.

6 Q. Where in Liberia?

7 A. At the guest house in Monrovia.

8 Q. And what role did she play at the guest house in Monrovia?

9 A. During the Lome Peace Accord, there was a radio at the  
11:55:15 10 house. She was the operator of that radio.

11 Q. Let's go back to page 10:

12 "I also contacted the guarantors of the Abidjan Peace  
13 Accord to impress on them the fact that our leader was still

14 illegally being held by the Nigerian government and that a

11:55:47 15 negotiated settlement was the only way in which peace and

16 security could return to Sierra Leone. I even contacted the

17 government of Tejan Kabbah in Freetown to convince them to

18 release you and to threaten that if they continued to exercise

19 the military option, we, the RUF, would push for total military

11:56:12 20 victory and would escalate the war to a point beyond imagination.

21 All this talk fell on deaf ears, as even the international media

22 refused our calls. With our capture of Kono and the raising of

23 four mechanised battalions of the Nigerian ECOMOG force, our

24 phones began to ring with calls from the world's elite press, and

11:56:42 25 the very people who only a few weeks back were ignoring our

26 calls, assuming that we were going to be flushed, as Tejan Kabbah

27 had vowed, were now virtually begging to talk. I knew that the

28 heat was on Kabbah.

29 Our attack of Freetown put Kabbah in a position where

1 he was forced to talk, as I had earlier promised he would. He  
2 fled the city, as did his cabinet, the latter with a view of  
3 regrouping in Conakry and launching a counter-offensive as they  
4 had done when ousted by the AFRC. On learning that his political  
11:57:24 5 strongmen such as Desmond Luke and others were in Conakry, I  
6 obtained their various hotel room numbers and systematically  
7 called each on the telephone, claiming that I was also in Conakry  
8 with a squad of my best commandos and that we were on our way to  
9 the hotel. Within 15 minutes of my first call, the hotel had  
11:57:45 10 been sealed off by Guinean security forces with tanks and  
11 armoured cars on every intersection. Desmond Luke and party beat  
12 a hasty retreat to secret safe houses and all boarded flights for  
13 different destinations the next day."

14 Did you know about that, Mr Sesay, Bockarie calling these  
11:58:09 15 addresses in Conakry?

16 A. Yes. At that time I was not in Buedu, but when I returned,  
17 I knew that Bockarie was making those calls - these calls because  
18 he was saying it, that he was talking to the retreated  
19 government, the government that had withdrawn to Guinea, some of  
11:58:32 20 the ministers.

21 Q. "This brought to a screeching halt the SLPP political  
22 stance during our Freetown attack and occupation. We now had the  
23 edge over Kabbah and his government and asked for talks to take  
24 place under the auspices of the OAU chairman, President Blaise  
11:58:56 25 Compaore, this on the grounds that it was in effect ECOWAS that  
26 had been fighting us and thus no troop-contributing member state  
27 could impartially host such talks. This basic premise for moving  
28 us to the table was eagerly accepted by Mr Francis Okello, Mr  
29 Moses Anafu of the Commonwealth Secretariat and even the

1 government of President Kabbah.

2 After the initial joy of hearing your voice on set  
3 for the first time in a long time, military instincts alerted me  
4 that you were under duress and that slowly the Kabbah government  
11:59:39 5 would use you to diffuse the explosive state of affairs and move  
6 us from our position of strength and seek to move the talks from  
7 our neutral ground of choice.

8 In my opinion, this would not only cause us to lose  
9 our military edge but would have put your life in danger.

11:59:59 10 In view of this, I took the painful but necessary  
11 step of instructing all signal stations to monitor but not to  
12 respond to on-air calls from the leader, explaining to all the  
13 reasons for such an order.

14 In due course, as a result of violations of this same  
12:00:21 15 order, the talks were moved from Burkina Faso to Lome."

16 Now, if you look at the beginning of that long  
17 paragraph, the first paragraph, Mr Taylor - I mean Mr Sesay,  
18 bearing in mind we are looking at what is supposedly a salute  
19 report from Sam Bockarie to the leader, dated 26 September 1999,  
12:01:03 20 where it says "our attack of Freetown", was Bockarie in charge of  
21 an attack on Freetown.

22 A. No. Bockarie was not the one in charge.

23 Q. So can you help us as to the use of that language "Our  
24 attack of Freetown"?

12:01:32 25 A. Well, I just consider it that he was like trying to make  
26 himself more powerful to the leader or that he was claiming that  
27 he took part in the attack in Freetown, but the attack in  
28 Freetown was mainly by the AFRC, and the troops who even carried  
29 out the attacks, who commanded the troops that carried out the

1 attacks, were not taking commands from Bockarie, and it was not  
2 the RUF, because he did not send any reinforcement to Freetown.  
3 He did not send ammunition there. He was not part of the plans  
4 for the invasion of Freetown, and there was no senior RUF  
12:02:17 5 commander who was present in Freetown, and no RUF troops went  
6 there. So he was just claiming.

7 Q. Now, was Bockarie the kind of man to make such false  
8 boasts?

9 A. Yes, because I recall during this attack on Freetown, he  
12:02:40 10 had an interview over the BBC, when he was speaking with Robin  
11 White, when he said - he was being boastful that his men were in  
12 Freetown, and he told Robin White that if there was any bush  
13 shaking, he would comb the bush and that - he asked his  
14 bodyguards to open fire. By then, in fact, he was far off from  
12:03:07 15 Freetown. He was in Buedu.

16 Q. Now, in the middle of that paragraph, where it says, "We  
17 now had the edge over Kabbah and his government and asked for  
18 talks to take place under the auspices of the OAU chairman,  
19 President Blaise Compaore," did that take place, that contact?

12:03:38 20 A. I am not aware of the talks taking place in Burkina Faso.  
21 I only heard about Lome, because during this time of the attack  
22 on Freetown, I was not on a daily basis in Buedu.

23 Q. Now, it says at the bottom of that passage we have just  
24 read, "In due course, as a result of violations of this same  
12:04:10 25 order, the talks were moved from Burkina Faso to Lome." Now,  
26 Mr Sesay, we will come on to deal with Lome in a moment - well,  
27 perhaps not in a moment, we have a few more documents to go  
28 first, okay - but you do recall those talks in Lome?

29 A. Yes, yes.

1 Q. And you told us right at the outset that you attended in  
2 Lome, didn't you?

3 A. Yes. I was in Lome.

12:04:46

4 Q. I will come to the details of that in due course. Let's go  
5 back to this document:

6 "On the military front, the ground has not only remained  
7 intact but huge gains were made against the enemy. As mentioned  
8 earlier in my report, four mechanised battalions of the Nigerian  
9 army were raised at Kono."

12:05:10

10 Who was responsible for the attack which led to the raising  
11 of four mechanised battalions of Nigerian soldiers?

12 A. I was the commander for that attack.

13 Q. "Resulting in the capture of" --

12:05:30

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, is "raising" merely  
15 misspelt in this letter?

16 MR GRIFFITHS: "Were raised".

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Meaning what exactly?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, let me ask the witness:

12:05:51

19 Q. What does - where it says, "Four mechanised battalions of  
20 the Nigerian army were raised", what does that mean?

21 A. Well, it is just like when you flush a group of troops from  
22 their position.

12:06:16

23 Q. "Resulting in the capture of a wide assortment of arms and  
24 ammunition, as well as armoured cars, war tanks were also  
25 captured and burnt. We successfully took the war from Kailahun  
26 to Freetown, putting military pressure on the SLPP government and  
27 the international community to effect your release. Huge amounts  
28 of arms and ammunitions were also captured by Brigadier Issa from  
29 the Guineans, including a 40 barrel missile and its bombs. The

1 overall G-4 commander is in place to report on all materials  
2 captured and on stock at hand."

3 Pause there. Who is the overall G-4 commander?

4 A. Augustine Mulbah, the one who was amongst the people whom  
12:07:09 5 Sam Bockarie had sent to go and investigate the issue between  
6 Superman and I that took place in Makeni.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 "Within the military structure of the RUF, promotions were  
9 encouraged as the only due reward for military accomplishment.

12:07:28 10 There was wide-spread recruiting and training of combatants to  
11 provide a beefed-up fighting force.

12 The medical unit has been enhanced with a regular  
13 supply of drugs and dressing materials, and the infusion of new  
14 talent has resulted in an efficient unit that now handles complex  
12:07:49 15 gynaecological cases and performs hernia and appendix operations  
16 to both soldiers and civilians."

17 Did the RUF set up such a medical unit, Mr Sesay?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. "A tanks and armoured division has been established within  
12:08:11 20 the artillery unit to utilise captured equipment from the enemy."

21 Is that true?

22 A. Yes, that is true.

23 Q. "Daru Barracks remains under siege with iron-gate  
24 defensives on all approaches to the township."

12:08:30 25 Is that true?

26 A. Yes, that is true, because Segbwema was under RUF control.

27 Q. Now, let's go and look at what he says about the political  
28 front.

29 "Our move to capture Kono earned marked gains for the RUF

1 in the political front. The international press was effectively  
2 used to educate the world as to the aims and objectives of the  
3 RUF.

12:09:08 4 The government of Tejan Kabbah was forced to negotiate with  
5 us, a move they had consistently refused to make vowing instead  
6 to execute the leader and flush the RUF out of Sierra Leone.

7 The United Nations and other international organisations  
8 were also forced to talk to us.

12:09:29 9 After much military pressure from us and diplomatic  
10 pressure from the onlooking world, the leader was released to  
11 Togo where along with a delegation from within the RUF on the  
12 ground in Sierra Leone, a peace agreement was reached between the  
13 RUF and the SLPP government.

14 Civilians and non-military issues

12:09:52 15 Knowing the love and respect that the leader has for  
16 civilians, I have ensured that the status of civilians and, in  
17 particular, civilians behind RUF lines has never been  
18 compromised. They are still represented on the War Council and  
19 continue to enjoy full rights and privileges."

12:10:13 20 Is it true that even up until this time, 1999, there was  
21 still civilians on the War Council?

22 A. Yes, the chairman was a civilian, yes.

23 Q. And who was the chairman of the War Council in 1999?

24 A. It was the late SYB Rogers.

12:10:37 25 Q. "A free primary school system was launched in the Kailahun  
26 District to address the educational needs of our children. This  
27 programme has been a huge success and has spread to other  
28 districts."

29 Is that true?



1 A. Yes, that's true.

2 Q. When was that free primary school system launched?

3 A. It was in late 1998.

4 Q. And for how long did it survive?

12:11:12 5 A. Well, it survived - it extended into other districts and up  
6 to 2001. And even after disarmament, those schools still  
7 continued and up to this moment they are still there.

8 Q. And into which further districts did the free primary  
9 school system extend after Kailahun?

12:11:41 10 A. Kono District, part of Koinadugu, Tonkolili District,  
11 Bombali District.

12 Q. "The RUF and civilians behind its lines have maintained a  
13 programme of self sufficiency and have recorded the highest  
14 production ever of rice, palm oil and produce. Proceeds from the  
15 sale of agricultural produce was used to provide much needed  
16 rations and materials for soldiers and civilians alike. With the  
17 diamond rich ground of Kono under our control a mining group was  
18 set up headed by Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy who is in place to  
19 give an account of all proceeds from mining operations."

12:12:09 20 Pause there. When was the mining unit set up headed by  
21 Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy?

22 A. July. It was in July that Kennedy became head of the  
23 mining unit after Bockarie had withdrawn him from Voinjama. He  
24 then sent him to Kono as the mining unit commander. It was in  
12:13:11 25 July 1998.

26 Q. And for how long did the RUF maintain a mining unit?

27 A. Well, from '98 to 2001. Because the RUF disarmed in Kono  
28 in August 2001, but in 1998 the mining still was low because  
29 throughout 1998 it was ECOMOG who controlled Koidu and the

1 surroundings. So the RUF were only based in jungles and there  
2 were always ECOMOG threats, Alpha Jets coming over to attack, so  
3 the mining unit was only there with about 60 miners that Kennedy  
4 was commanding until after the attack on Koidu Town in December  
12:14:14 5 '98.

6 Q. Now, when will come back to diamonds as a discrete topic in  
7 due course. Let's go back to the document.

8 "Sir, I most respectfully ask you to look into the numerous  
9 complaints of both Gibriil and Superman. From the execution of  
12:14:40 10 vanguards in Pujehun to the killing of the bodyguards of Colonel  
11 Mohamed Tarawalli, on to the killing of Colonel Boston Flomo,  
12 Rambo, this terrible duo have wreaked havoc on the RUF."

13 Pause. Who was responsible for the execution of vanguards  
14 in Pujehun?

12:15:05 15 A. It was Gibriil Massaquoi.

16 Q. And how many of them did he kill?

17 A. Twenty eight.

18 Q. Were they the only ones killed by Gibriil Massaquoi in  
19 Pujehun?

12:15:20 20 A. No, there was one special force among them called Patrick  
21 Lamin, and according to what I understood, because I was not in  
22 Pujehun, they said Gibriil even killed his own - his own sibling,  
23 his own brother - his elder brother. They said he killed him.

24 Q. And the killing of the bodyguards of Colonel Mohamed  
12:15:47 25 Tarawalli, who was responsible for that?

26 A. It was Superman.

27 Q. And we know from what we have recently looked at that  
28 Superman was also responsible for the killing of Colonel Boston  
29 Flomo?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. And the execution of the vanguards in Pujehun, in what year  
3 did that take place?

4 A. That was in late '91.

12:16:15 5 Q. So the behaviour being complained of in this report from  
6 Bockarie to the leader dates back to 1991, does it?

7 A. Yes.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Allow me to intervene and ask this.

9 Mr Griffiths, you said to the witness: And the killing of Boston  
12:16:35 10 Flomo was - rather, Superman, was also responsible for the  
11 killing of Boston Flomo. But I thought the witness said Boston  
12 Flomo came to attack - or when Superman came to attack, he can  
13 came along with Boston Flomo, and in the attack Boston Flomo was  
14 shot by - the witness didn't tell us. How Boston Flomo die? Who  
12:17:06 15 killed Boston Flomo?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, my Lord, it was Superman who went and  
17 attacked Boston Flomo in his house in Makeni. They met him  
18 sleeping. It was Superman who killed him. Superman and others  
19 came from Lunsar, and we were in Makeni.

12:17:23 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. That makes it clearer.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. "They continue to flaunt my orders and have extended the  
23 same acts of gross insubordination to the leader. I hasten to  
24 remind you, sir, that whilst I, along with Brigadier Issa and  
12:18:01 25 other loyal forces, have always obeyed your orders to the letter,  
26 this duo have rejected your orders and challenged the authority  
27 of the leader and his military high command. The actions of  
28 Gibril and Superman has gone great lengths to worsen the  
29 relationship between the RUF and the SLA by the indiscriminate

1 killing of SLA soldiers during their attacks on the RUF high  
2 command and in their bids to capture ground, and by inciting SLA  
3 soldiers against my command. The setbacks resulting in the  
4 actions of this duo are magnanimous and have far reaching  
12:18:50 5 consequences. I must also mention, sir, that all troops loyal to  
6 the leader and the high command of the RUF are in full readiness  
7 to take military action against Gibril and Superman and have only  
8 halted their action to await your arrival and handling of this  
9 situation. Sir, having obeyed all instructions given by you to  
12:19:14 10 me, and after diligently working to maintain the ground at all  
11 cost, I will not be pacified unless just and appropriate military  
12 action is taken by you. I, along with a vast majority of our  
13 troops, have borne the brunt of abuse and molestation, sabotaged  
14 and cold blooded murder, all in an effort to maintain the ground  
12:19:38 15 as per your instructions. Now that you are back and in full  
16 control of the RUF we anxiously await a speedy resolution of this  
17 problem."

18 Now, you see it is signed, "Respectfully yours, Major  
19 General Sam Bockarie".

12:19:59 20 Now that we have gone through that document at length,  
21 Mr Sesay, there are a few things I want to ask you about it.  
22 Could the witness please be shown the first page of this  
23 document?

24 Mr Sesay, when, after Lome, did Foday Sankoh return to  
12:20:25 25 Sierra Leone?

26 A. Foday Sankoh came back in October. It was in October that  
27 he arrived in Freetown.

28 Q. This report - this salute report which we have spent some  
29 time going through, first of all, within the RUF what was a

1 salute report?

2 A. Well, a salute report is normally prepared by the commander  
3 for the attention of the leader about activities that went on  
4 within the organisation, and this was what he was reporting  
12:21:15 5 about.

6 Q. Were you aware that in late September, shortly before  
7 Sankoh returned to Sierra Leone, that Bockarie was preparing a  
8 report such as this?

9 A. Yes. Bockarie said it, that --

12:21:35 10 Q. Did Bockarie consult you prior to preparing this report?

11 A. No. It was after he had prepared it and sent it. That was  
12 when he told me that he had prepared and sent the salute report  
13 to Mr Sankoh.

14 Q. Now, did you see a copy of this report after it was  
12:21:59 15 prepared by Bockarie?

16 A. I never saw a copy of it. It was only during the trials  
17 that I saw a copy of this.

18 Q. Now, the signature on the last page, whose signature is  
19 that?

12:22:26 20 A. This is Sam Bockarie.

21 Q. Now, help us with this, Mr Sesay - and I mean no disrespect  
22 to Mr Bockarie - but could Mr Bockarie read and write?

23 A. No. He cannot by himself compose this kind of language.

24 Q. So who wrote this?

12:22:58 25 A. Well, it was the general adjutant, because he was  
26 responsible for writing such documents for Sam Bockarie. That  
27 was Rashid Sandy.

28 Q. And help us: How would Rashid Sandy go about writing a  
29 document like this? Would it be dictated to him by Bockarie or

1 what?

2 A. Yes, Bockarie explains and then he puts it into English  
3 language and writes it down.

4 Q. And then he, Rashid Sandy, having written it down, what  
12:23:45 5 would happen to the document thereafter; would it be read out to  
6 Mr Bockarie for his approval or what?

7 A. After writing the document, he would read it and then,  
8 after reading it, Bockarie approves it.

9 Q. Okay. I would like us to put that document back into its  
12:24:13 10 folder, but I would like it to be left there for the moment, and  
11 ask that the witness now be shown exhibit D-84.

12 Mr Sesay, you will see that this document is headed  
13 "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, defence  
14 headquarters, to the leader of the revolution, from Brigadier  
12:25:29 15 Issa H Sesay, battlefield commander, RUF/SL salute report". Have  
16 you seen this document before, Mr Sesay.

17 A. Yes. The first time I saw this document was during my  
18 trial when they brought it. The lawyers brought it and showed it  
19 to me.

12:25:56 20 Q. Go to the end of the document please, page 13. Whose  
21 signature is that?

22 A. Well, I don't know because this is not my signature. This  
23 is not the way I sign. You can see the Y, the way it comes down  
24 this way and bends down this other way, this is not how I sign,  
12:26:37 25 this is not who how I write my Y. Normally mine comes down with  
26 a straight line at the back and then I send it up again. But  
27 this one is not mine. When you look at this Y, it is as bent as  
28 that - the one on the promotion paper. It is as crooked as the  
29 one on the promotion paper, the one done by Albert Saidu. And

1 during --

2 Q. Just pause for a minute. On that topic, leaving that on  
3 the projector, can we please have before us exhibit P-483. I  
4 wonder if I could have a word with the Court Manager before we go  
12:28:20 5 ahead.

6 Now, Mr Sesay, can you see two signatures in front of you?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Which of those is your signature?

9 A. The one on the right.

12:29:44 10 Q. What do you say distinguishes the signature on the right  
11 from the one on the left?

12 A. You see --

13 Q. I tell you what I would like you to do. Go and sit in that  
14 chair with a pen and indicate to us what it is you're saying.

12:30:10 15 A. You see the Y. The line comes down straight and then goes  
16 up again. But you see that other one, the way it has been  
17 written, they curve it this way, curve it the other way before  
18 going up, that is not the way I sign. It is not my signature.  
19 This is not my signature. My signature is this one.

12:30:41 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: For the record, the witness has  
21 identified the signature on exhibit - what exhibit is this?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Exhibit P-483.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit P-483 as the one containing his  
24 authentic signature.

12:31:24 25 MR GRIFFITHS: So can we put that one away so that we don't  
26 get confused, please. Now, what I would like us to do, please, I  
27 would like us to display the first sheet of exhibit D-9 and the  
28 first sheet of D-84, hopefully side by side on the screen as best  
29 we can:

1 Q. Now, Mr Sesay, do you note the following: D-9, the one  
2 bearing Bockarie's name, yes, headed "Revolutionary United Front  
3 of Sierra Leone, defence headquarters, to the leader of the  
4 revolution, RUF/SL, from Major General Sam Bockarie, subject  
12:32:58 5 salute report", the heading on that one is virtually identical to  
6 the heading on D-84, apart from the name, isn't it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Note also the dates --

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, what do you mean by the  
12:33:25 10 heading?

11 MR GRIFFITHS: "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,  
12 defence headquarters, to the leader of the revolution" --

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: You mean the letterhead, because the  
14 heading is this - in my understanding the heading is what is  
12:33:40 15 written as the subject.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, what I am talking about are the first  
17 six lines on both documents:

18 Q. The first six lines on both documents, apart from the  
19 difference in the name of the sender is virtually identical,  
12:34:02 20 isn't it?

21 A. Yes, both the same.

22 Q. The Bockarie report is dated 26 September and the other  
23 report is the very next day, the 27th. Mr Sesay, who wrote these  
24 two documents?

12:34:42 25 A. Well, these two documents, especially mine, the one that  
26 they allege is mine, it was not by me because at this time I was  
27 in Buedu and I was not capable to put such English expressions  
28 together. And my adjutant was not in Buedu. At this time he was  
29 in Magburaka. And Sam Bockarie himself was not in Buedu. Sam



1 Bockarie was in Monrovia waiting for Mr Sankoh there in this late  
2 September 1997 - I mean 1999. Bockarie was not in Buedu, he was  
3 in Monrovia waiting for Mr Sankoh's arrival, together with Johnny  
4 Paul Koroma. And at this time I was in Buedu and to say that I  
12:35:31 5 wrote such a salute report - in fact throughout the time, the  
6 time Mr Sankoh was in Lome until the time he came from Lome to  
7 the May incident when he was arrested I had never sent him a  
8 salute report. So this time they are talking about that I sent  
9 this salute report is a lie.

12:35:53 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is the witness discounting exhibit D-009  
11 also as being not a genuine document?

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Well help us, Mr Sesay. Exhibit D-9, the document  
14 allegedly from Sam Bockarie, forget about its contents, where was  
12:36:12 15 Bockarie on 26 September?

16 A. Bockarie was in Monrovia. He went to Monrovia. Mr Sankoh  
17 had asked him to go there and wait for him there. Bockarie was  
18 in Monrovia, Johnny Paul was in Monrovia and even Superman and  
19 others came from Makeni himself, Pa Binda, Ray and Jackson  
12:36:37 20 Swarray. They came from Makeni to Freetown, the government and  
21 ECOMOG got them a flight and they took them to Monrovia. They  
22 were all in Monrovia. They left me on the ground. They were  
23 there until Mr Sankoh came and met them there and from there they  
24 travelled to Freetown. So Bockarie was not in Buedu at this time  
12:36:59 25 of the year, at this time for this letter.

26 Q. Pause there. Now, Mr Sesay, did Bockarie write this salute  
27 report?

28 A. Well, I doubt it because even Rashid Sandy, who was Sam  
29 Bockarie adjutant, Rashid Sandy was in Buedu while Sam Bockarie

1 was in Liberia in Monrovia at this time, because Rashid Sandy had  
2 an assignment given to him by Mr Sankoh after the signing of Lome  
3 that he should come and educate the front line fighters and  
4 officers about the Lome Accord, so he was not with Sam Bockarie  
12:37:42 5 at this time.

6 Q. Were these two documents written by the same person,  
7 Mr Sesay?

8 A. I can't deny that because - I can't refute that because all  
9 the allegations in the document, there are people in the RUF who  
12:38:13 10 knew about these issues.

11 Q. Okay. Let's leave just D-84 on the overhead now, please,  
12 and put D-9 to one side, but we will be coming back to it.

13 "After working on the draft document of the Abidjan Peace  
14 Accord, you returned behind RUF lines to consult with the  
12:38:54 15 military high command and all combatants on the Accord and its  
16 implications. While in the Kailahun District, we received  
17 reports that Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli had been de-stabilised by  
18 Kamajors and SLA troops at your former base of Camp Zogoda. On  
19 hearing this news, I, and other officers convoyed from Giema to  
12:39:24 20 Buedu with the leader. The next day, before returning to Abidjan  
21 to conclude documentation and signing of the Accord, you  
22 instructed that General Sam Bockarie take over as battle group  
23 commander of the RUF."

24 So let's just pause for a minute and note this. In this  
12:39:51 25 first paragraph, the writer is speaking about the presence of  
26 Sankoh just before the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord in  
27 Sierra Leone, and also, right at the end, the appointment of Sam  
28 Bockarie as battle group commander. Let's now have a look at the  
29 first paragraph in D-9: "Before leaving the ground in November

1 1996..." that is when you came to discuss the Abidjan Peace  
2 Accord, D-84, second sentence, "...you placed me in command as  
3 battlefield commander of the RUF."

4 Same point made in the paragraph in D-84. Let's put D-84  
12:41:00 5 back on the overhead.

6 "The next day, after returning to Abidjan to complete the  
7 documentation and signing of the Accord, you instructed that  
8 General Sam Bockarie take over as battle group commander of the  
9 RUF. From Abidjan, the leader instructed that men should be sent  
12:41:24 10 across the Moa River to receive those of our troops who were  
11 fortunate enough to have successfully retreated from Zogoda and  
12 to actively go in search of Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli. This  
13 order was implemented in full and though we were able to" - I  
14 can't make out - I think it is "contact" - "both soldiers and  
12:41:54 15 civilians that had retreated from Zogoda, we were unable to  
16 locate Colonel Tarawalli. From Abidjan we received further  
17 instructions that General Mosquito was to take effective command  
18 on the ground in your absence and to assume the assignment of  
19 battlefield commander, RUF. I was assume the duties and  
12:42:26 20 responsibilities of battle group commander and together we were  
21 to work to maintain the ground by any means necessary."

22 Then this:

23 "General Mosquito was able to make positive contact with  
24 ULIMO and make all necessary arrangements to buy materials from  
12:42:45 25 them. The money that you had left with us on the ground  
26 US \$7,000 was utilised to buy materials from ULIMO and with these  
27 materials, we were able to resist enemy advances in the Kailahun  
28 district."

29 Now, let's just pause. We see in that paragraph the writer

1 - supposedly, you - having dealt with Sankoh's presence,  
2 appointment as battlefield commander, fall of Zogoda, the next  
3 topic the writer deals with is this US \$7,000. Let's go back to  
4 exhibit D-9. Paragraph 2:

12:43:36 5 "Upon your departure, I initiated contact with ULIMO, as  
6 per your instructions in a bid to buy materials to repel the  
7 vicious attacks of the Kamajors at a time when there was a peace  
8 document in place and we were not expecting to fight. At first  
9 ULIMO arrested me, thinking that I had come to them to surrender.  
12:44:01 10 Later I was able to convince them to release me and we commenced  
11 a mutually beneficial relationship. I used the US \$7,000 to  
12 purchase vitally needed materials that gave us the stance to  
13 fight and challenge the SLPP government until they were ousted by  
14 the AFRC coup."

12:44:30 15 Do you see the similarities between the two documents,  
16 Mr Sesay?

17 A. Yes, I've seen it. And?

18 Q. And you see in that paragraph in D-9:

19 "To repel the vicious attacks of the Kamajors at a time  
12:44:50 20 when there was a peace document in place and we were not  
21 expecting to fight."

22 Let's go back to D-84. The next paragraph in D-84:

23 "It became obvious to us on the ground that the Abidjan  
24 Peace Accord was nothing but paper, as the Kamajors were being  
12:45:12 25 used against us with vicious attacks on our positions. It was  
26 not long before we heard that the leader had been arrested in  
27 Nigeria."

28 Now, who had ousted the RUF from Camp Zogoda?

29 A. It was the Kamajors.

1 Q. I think we can put D-9 away now, please, and just have a  
2 look at the remainder of D-84, second page:

3 "It was not long before we heard that the leader had been  
4 arrested in Nigeria and, as we were trying to understand the  
12:46:17 5 circumstances of your arrest and implications to the RUF, we  
6 learnt that Philip Palmer, Fayia Musa and other members of the  
7 external delegation were now claiming leadership of the RUF."

8 I am sorry, Madam Court Manager, it's my fault, can we just  
9 briefly look now, please, at the first page of D-9 again. I am  
12:46:43 10 sorry.

11 So you see after dealing with the \$7,000, the next topic  
12 after is the external delegation. Have a look at D-9. The next  
13 paragraph after dealing with "purchases from ULIMO":

14 "It came as a surprise to learn that the leader had been  
12:47:16 15 arrested in Nigeria and an even bigger surprise when Captain  
16 Philip Palmer and others announced a change in the leadership of  
17 the RUF. I was able to lure them to Sierra Leone..." and it goes  
18 on to explain.

19 So exactly the same topic in exactly the same order as in  
12:47:34 20 D-84. Let's go back to D-84:

21 "General Mosquito contacted Palmer, telling him that since  
22 this was the action that they had taken, it was necessary for  
23 them to come back behind our lines and brief the military high  
24 command and combatants accordingly. Palmer and others eventually  
12:48:00 25 agreed to meet us at the Nongowa Crossing Point. There, amidst  
26 drumming and dancing to receive them, the general was able to  
27 persuade all of the coup plotters, including the Sierra Leone  
28 ambassador to Guinea, Lieutenant Colonel Djabi, to cross over  
29 into RUF zone. They were promptly arrested and their statements

1 revealed an international conspiracy, to which they were party,  
2 aimed at changing the leadership of the RUF. They have since  
3 been in custody until your recent instruction to release them.  
4 Soon after, we received information that Superman, who was  
12:48:42 5 operating as battalion commander for the Western Area Jungle, had  
6 arrested the bodyguards of Colonel Tarawalli and had executed two  
7 of them, namely, Emmanuel and Victor, without consulting with and  
8 obtaining such instruction from the military high command left on  
9 the ground by the leader. An investigation was launched and  
12:49:12 10 before action could be taken against Superman, the SLPP  
11 government was overthrown by the AFRC on 25 May 1997."

12 So you see following the arrest of Palmer and other  
13 external delegates, the next topic discussed in this is the  
14 actions of Superman in killing the bodyguards of Colonel  
12:49:39 15 Tarawalli.

16 D-9 again please, top of page 2. What is the next topic  
17 discussed in D-9, the Bockarie report, after dealing with the  
18 arrest of the external delegates? Guess what?

19 "Meanwhile in Bradford in the Western Area Jungle, Superman  
12:50:07 20 had killed two of Colonel Mohamed Tarawalli's bodyguards."

21 Both documents are written in exactly the same order, yet  
22 one is attributed to you, one is attributed to Bockarie.

23 Question: Can you help us as to who wrote these two documents,  
24 Mr Sesay?

12:50:30 25 A. Yes. It was Gibril Massaquoi who wrote these documents,  
26 because the reason I said it was Gibril Massaquoi who wrote these  
27 documents is that when Mr Sankoh came in November 1996, all of us  
28 were with Gibril Massaquoi in Buedu, and the money - before Foday  
29 Sankoh gave the money, the instruction that the person talked

1 about that Gibril wrote here that Mr Sankoh sent instruction for  
2 us to send people across the Moa, no, to go in search of Mohamed  
3 Tarawalli and the retreating men from Zogoda, it was the house  
4 where Foday Sankoh was lodged in Buedu that he told us --

12:51:25 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this  
6 area slowly.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Pause. "It was the house in Buedu where Foday Sankoh told  
9 us", pick it up from there. And, Mr Sesay, this is important, so  
12:51:37 10 please speak slowly.

11 A. I said the house where Mr Sankoh was lodged in Buedu, it  
12 was in the parlour that I was there, Gibril was there, Peter  
13 Vandi, Sam Bockarie, before Foday Sankoh gave the money. Then he  
14 said when he returned to Giema after he would have gone to  
12:52:01 15 Abidjan, he said I would be responsible to come to the river  
16 bank, that is the Moa River, and I was to dispatch people across  
17 the Moa in search of Mohamed Tarawalli and the retreating men  
18 from Zogoda. So it was not after Foday Sankoh had gone to  
19 Abidjan that he sent the message. It was in that room that he  
12:52:19 20 first told me before he gave the money to Sam Bockarie to contact  
21 ULIMO.

22 Q. So why do you say it was Gibril Massaquoi who wrote these  
23 documents?

24 A. Well, Gibril was present and he travelled with Foday  
12:52:40 25 Sankoh. And even before the Court arrested me, Gibril used to  
26 bring negative ideas to me, you know. And on the day of my  
27 arrest, we were arrested together with Gibril but the Prosecutor  
28 at the site headquarters, immediately after our arrest they  
29 called Gibril in the corner and took off the handcuff from him.

1 And when I was in I knew that Gibril was talking to these people  
2 just after the election in Sierra Leone, just after May, around  
3 June, Gibril had started talking to the Prosecutor. The  
4 Prosecutor and Gibril had started talking. And when I was in  
12:53:22 5 detention - June of 2000 - 2002 and before my arrest in 2003  
6 because they arrested the three of us but he was released. But  
7 the documents, I had been seeing statements from Gibril and this  
8 will letter that I have seen, I can conclude - and from what I  
9 was hearing while I was in detention, he used to go on in the  
10 newspapers writing.

11 Q. Let's go back to D-84. So the next topic discussed in  
12 D-84, as we see, is the killing of the bodyguards of Colonel  
13 Tarawalli. Then this:

14 "An investigation was launched and before action could be  
12:54:21 15 taken against Superman the SLPP government was overthrown by the  
16 AFRC on 25th of May 1997. A few days later, General Mosquito was  
17 instructed to move and join our SLA brothers in Freetown."

18 Let's have a look and see what's the next topic discussed  
19 in D-9 after the killing of Mohamed Tarawalli's bodyguards.

12:54:49 20 Guess what:

21 "On receiving instructions from the leader calling on the  
22 RUF to join the AFRC, I decided to put the Bradford issue to rest  
23 until the return of the leader and instructed Superman to head  
24 the advance to Freetown from the Western Jungle, later to be  
12:55:09 25 joined by Colonel Isaac and others from Kangari Hills. Thus  
26 begun the marriage of uneven and unequal partners between the  
27 AFRC and the RUF."

28 Exactly the same order. The same topic is being discussed  
29 in both documents in the same order. Would you agree with that,



1 Mr Sesay?

2 A. Yes. That's how I see it.

3 Q. "In accordance with the leader's instructions, General  
4 Mosquito postponed action against Superman and instructed him to  
12:55:44 5 lead the advance" - I'm back at D-84 now. Sorry, my fault.  
6 They're so similar it's easy to get confused. So let's look at  
7 D-84, page 3:

8 "General Mosquito postponed action against Superman and  
9 instructed him to lead the advance team from Bradford to Freetown  
12:56:10 10 whilst Colonel Isaac and Brigadier Kallon were to move to join  
11 the SLA forces in Makeni. After ensuring that the security of  
12 the high command was paramount, the general and I moved to  
13 Freetown. Once in place in Freetown we assessed the security  
14 situation and deployed our troops in all strategic areas of the  
12:56:34 15 capital and indeed the entire country. In accordance with the  
16 instructions of the leader we took all instructions from chairman  
17 JP Koroma and maintained the same sense of discipline and loyalty  
18 that we have developed growing within the ranks of the RUF.

19 Lieutenant Colonel Gibril Massaquoi arrived in Freetown  
12:56:58 20 from Nigeria where he had been under detention with the leader.  
21 He briefed us informally that he had been arrested together with  
22 the leader but that he had escaped all with the knowledge and  
23 consent of the leader. A few days later, Gibril would present a  
24 document to chairman Johnny Paul Koroma that he, Gibril, alleges  
12:57:20 25 was given to him by the leader. In the document, it was  
26 instructed that no member of the RUF was to accept any  
27 ministerial position or participate in politics in any way. It  
28 also endorsed the promotion of Gibril to the rank of a full  
29 colonel. These events were reported to General Mosquito as he

1 had not been in Freetown when Gibril arrived.

2 On the arrival of Steve Bio in Freetown he became very  
3 closely associated with Lieutenant Colonel Gibril and both seemed  
4 to be on their own agenda. I left Freetown for Kenema in order  
12:58:08 5 to distribute rations and morale boosters to the troops, as well  
6 as to organise the various deployments.

7 Whilst waiting for my jeep to be repaired, a vehicle pulled  
8 up with Steve Bio and Lieutenant Colonel Gibril within. Gibril  
9 greeted me and introduced Steve Bio to me. Though I knew Steve  
12:58:28 10 from a brief meeting in Abidjan at the signing of the peace  
11 accord, I had never really talked to him or knew much about him.  
12 They then began to discuss the AFRC and complained about the way  
13 in which the RUF was being marginalised and treated with

14 disrespect. We were in a public place and I advised that such  
12:58:49 15 talk from them was not to be done around civilians. On this  
16 advice, we, including Major Eddie Bockarie, who was with me,  
17 walked to a point out of the earshot of others. Gibril went on  
18 to say that our meeting was not a coincidence and that they had  
19 searched the entire town for me as they had an important issue on  
12:59:14 20 which they had to brief me.

21 Mr Bio then stated that had he come with a special mission  
22 and was seeking my support in launching a coup. I listened as  
23 both he and Gibril went into details of the numerous grievances  
24 held against the AFRC. He said that the AFRC had refused to  
12:59:39 25 share power with us and had even marginalised us in the military.  
26 I told them that the instructions that we had received from the  
27 leader called on us to join and take all orders from chairman JP  
28 Koroma. Steve Bio responded saying that I should disregard all  
29 that as we were all young men and this was an operation that was

1 necessary for the four of us, Gibril, Steve, General Mosquito and  
2 myself, to undertake and assume command of the government and  
3 State.

4 I asked them if they had already discussed this with  
13:00:16 5 General Mosquito as they had just left him in Freetown. Gibril  
6 replied they had left the general in Freetown but that he was  
7 afraid of General Mosquito and could not summon the courage to  
8 approach him on such an issue. In fact, it was this very reason  
9 that had made it necessary for them to search for me in Kenema,  
13:00:39 10 knowing that if I could be convinced, they were close to getting  
11 General Mosquito's support.

12 The two of them left Kenema that night for Bo. At around 4  
13 a.m. the following morning General Mosquito arrived in Kenema. I  
14 immediately informed him of my previous day's discussions with  
13:01:00 15 Gibril and Steve Bio. I told the general that they were asking  
16 us to overthrow the very government that the leader had  
17 instructed us to join and secure. I told General Mosquito that  
18 since that dialogue, I had been thinking of a secure way of  
19 informing him and was very relieved that he was in Kenema.

13:01:20 20 The general was shocked to hear this and in turn informed  
21 me that he had been called to the State House in Freetown where  
22 he was informed by chairman JP Koroma that some members of the  
23 RUF were planning a coup together with other SLA officers. The  
24 general informed me further that he had been given the  
13:01:41 25 instructions to investigate the situation and report back to him.

26 That day I moved to Bo and Gibril and Steve joined my  
27 convoy to Freetown. On arrival in Freetown I asked them in the  
28 presence of Brigadier Mike Lamin, Colonel Isaac and other  
29 security personnel to repeat their statements made to me in

1 Kenema. They repeated the same statements and they were detained  
2 and turned over to the army headquarters at Cockerill."

3 Now that account, Mr Sesay, of you meeting Gibril Massaquoi  
4 and Steve Bio in Kenema, you gave us a very similar account, did  
13:02:28 5 you not?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And the account contained in this document, is it accurate?

8 A. No, because I did not pick them up in Bo. They went back  
9 the following day to Kenema and they were at Eddie Kanneh's house  
13:02:55 10 when Bockarie sent me to call them to his own house in Kenema.

11 Q. Very well. Let's go back:

12 "On New Year's Eve I left home in search of a pharmacy that  
13 was still open for business as I was in poor health. I met the  
14 late Honourable Gborie who informed me that he had chairs for me  
13:03:19 15 and had been trying to get a hold of me for two days. I thanked  
16 him sincerely and accepted his gift. Despite all the allegations  
17 and testimonies against the character of this man, I say with no  
18 hesitation that he welcomed the RUF with all his heart."

19 Now pause there. Is that an accurate description as to how  
13:03:43 20 those chairs, which caused such a fuss, came into your  
21 possession, Mr Sesay?

22 A. Yes. They were given to me by Gborie. That's what  
23 happened.

24 Q. It was on New Year's Eve?

13:04:03 25 A. Yes, it could be around those times.

26 Q. Is it the case that you had bumped into this Honourable  
27 Gborie whilst you were on your way to the pharmacy?

28 A. No. I met with Gborie in town when he said he was going to  
29 my house to give me the chairs.

1 Q. "On numerous occasions he would provide rations and  
2 boosters to our troops and every RUF problem was his problem. I  
3 accepted his gift in good faith, only to be notified on SLBS  
4 radio the following day that I had looted the Iranian embassy  
13:04:51 5 and, as a result, I had been removed from the Supreme Council and  
6 that my arrest had been ordered.

7 Knowing that while we the RUF were securing the government  
8 of the AFRC, they were killing our soldiers with no action being  
9 taken and that the RUF high command had been targeted for  
13:05:11 10 elimination, and knowing that I was innocent and the measures  
11 taken against me extreme, I refused arrest and maintained the  
12 integrity of the high command of the RUF.

13 In general, we were not trusted or respected by the AFRC,  
14 even though they had called on us to join them. Our troops were  
13:05:37 15 the only ones committed to their assignments, while the AFRC high  
16 command rejected our war plans and strategies, referring to us as  
17 bloodthirsty bush colonels."

18 Is it the case, Mr Sesay, that in general the RUF were not  
19 trusted or respected by the AFRC?

13:06:03 20 A. Yes, in some cases they used to say that they did not trust  
21 us and they used to call us bush colonels. It is just the  
22 expression bloodthirsty that they did not use on us. But the  
23 expressions referring to us as bush officers and that they were  
24 scared of giving us ammunition because they thought we would open  
13:06:23 25 fire on them.

26 Q. "It became apparent to us in Freetown that Lieutenant  
27 Colonel Gibriil had leaked information to the AFRC pertaining to  
28 military equipment belonging to the RUF that the leader had kept  
29 in a safe place. Before we could confront Gibriil and arrest the

1 situation, he and the AFRC had arranged for the equipment to be  
2 delivered to them. They took delivery of the equipment without  
3 the concern or consent of the RUF high command and stored the  
4 equipment where we had no say or access to it. When we retreated  
13:07:20 5 from Freetown a large quantity of the said equipment was left in  
6 storage at the residence of chairman Koroma."

7 And if we just pause for a minute and go to exhibit  
8 D-9 page 4, third paragraph:

9 "Before Gibril was arrested, he exposed to the AFRC  
13:08:09 10 information on materials that the RUF held in stock. Unknown to  
11 me and the rest of the RUF high command, Gibril and the AFRC had  
12 made arrangements for the stock to be moved in place for their  
13 use. They then took control of the entire load, leaving the bulk  
14 of it stashed away at the residence of Johnny Paul Koroma, and  
13:08:33 15 fled the city whilst our troops fought the enemy from house to  
16 house with nearly empty magazines."

17 Can we go back to D-84 now, please, page 5? Two-thirds of  
18 the way down the page:

19 "Due to the lack of command and control, shortage of issued  
13:09:08 20 materials to our front-line troops and the total lack of support  
21 of the SLA soldiers, the enemy were able to move us from Freetown  
22 and ousted the AFRC government."

23 Would you agree with that sentiment, Mr Sesay, that it was  
24 due to a lack of command and control, among other things, which  
13:09:30 25 led to the success of the ECOMOG intervention?

26 A. No.

27 Q. You wouldn't agree with that?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Now, were you in Freetown at the time of the intervention,

1 Mr Sesay?

2 A. Well, I was not in Freetown when they attacked, but I was  
3 in Makeni. When I returned - when I returned to Four Mile at  
4 Hastings - Newton, sorry, Four Mile.

13:10:13 5 Q. I ask for this reason. Look how this report, which is from  
6 you, allegedly, continues:

7 "I remember the enemy were able to move us from Freetown  
8 and ousted the AFRC government. I retreated first to Waterloo  
9 and then to Masiaka."

13:10:33 10 Did you retreat from Freetown first to Waterloo and then to  
11 Masiaka?

12 A. No, no. I was not in Freetown when they attacked Freetown.  
13 I was in Makeni. I came for me to take my family. I was not  
14 there. Even where this report says that I and Bockarie did not  
13:10:57 15 know about the ammunition that Mr Sankoh had in stock, that's a  
16 black lie. And I was not - well, how would -

17 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, can he kindly repeat this  
18 last bit of answer slowly?

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:11:12 20 Q. Let's start with from where you say it was a black lie.

21 A. The document is alleging that I did not know about the  
22 ammunition, that Gibril leaked out to the AFRC when Mr Sankoh -  
23 that which Mr Sankoh had kept. That's the only ammunition - that  
24 is the only ammunition when we went together to Burkina Faso, and  
13:11:41 25 when Gibril brought the letters, he took Sam Bockarie's own to  
26 Kenema. When Johnny Paul called Sam Bockarie, I knew about it.  
27 When Johnny Paul sent to tell Gibril to call Ibrahim Bah, I knew  
28 about that. I knew about the money that Johnny Paul provided for  
29 the transportation, for the flight transportation. I knew about

1 all of those. When the ammunition came, Johnny Paul sent me and  
2 the chief of staff to receive them at the airfield at Mayagba,  
3 when we brought the ammunition and the arms at Johnny Paul's  
4 house in Freetown, I knew when Johnny Paul gave one of the BZT  
13:12:23 5 weapons and ammunition to be taken to Sam Bockarie, he gave that  
6 to Mike Lamin to take to Sam Bockarie. I knew of all those  
7 events.

8 Q. So where, in this report, reference is being made to  
9 "Gibril had leaked information to the AFRC pertaining to military  
13:12:48 10 equipment belonging to the RUF that it the leader had kept in a  
11 safe place" what's that a reference to?

12 A. Well, that proves that I did not write this report because  
13 these are events that I was aware of, and these are things that  
14 people in the RUF were aware of and they knew that Issa was aware  
13:13:10 15 of it. Documents, letters that Gibril had brought from Mr Sankoh  
16 about these ammunitions, and people knew that the coming of the  
17 ammunition and the receiving them, Issa took part in them and  
18 Issa knew, how could Issa write again to Mr Sankoh a report when  
19 Issa knew that even some of the commanders of the RUF knew about  
13:13:33 20 Issa's involvement or Issa's knowledge about this ammunition?

21 How could I have written a report like this to Mr Sankoh, a  
22 salute report? Then Mike Lamin knew that I went to the airfield  
23 to receive these arms and ammunition from Burkina Faso together  
24 with the AFRC army chief of staff. So it doesn't make sense to  
13:14:00 25 Mr Sankoh because something I was aware of and now I am saying I  
26 was not aware of it.

27 Q. So let's go back, page 5:

28 "I retreated first to Waterloo and then to Masiaka. By  
29 then, the ECOMOG force had taken Bo and Kenema and it was agreed



1 that I should attack Bo and begin to organise to move to attack  
2 Freetown. I was successful in capturing Bo but sustained an  
3 injury that forced me to retreat back to Mile 91 and then to  
4 Makeni in search of good medical treatment.

13:14:45 5                   Whilst in Makeni, I went to visit JP Koroma, who was  
6 in hiding in his village. JP Koroma asked me to arrange and  
7 supervise the movement of his entire family to Kailahun, as  
8 ECOMOG were advancing and the clandestine radio, 98.1 FM had  
9 accounted that he was hiding in his village."

13:15:14 10                  Now, what is this clandestine radio, 98.1 FM?

11 A. Well, this was the SLPP radio station. That is what they  
12 used when the AFRC and the RUF were in Freetown in '97.

13 Q. And where was that radio based?

14 A. This radio was based in Lungi.

13:15:40 15 Q. And who operated it?

16 A. Well, it was the SLPP who operated it.

17 Q. Do you know whether a foreign government funded that radio  
18 station?

19 A. No, I wouldn't know about that by then.

13:16:03 20 Q. Let's go to page 6 please.

21                  "I contacted General Mosquito and the order was given to  
22 escort the former head of state to our Kailahun base. First we  
23 had to open the road to Kono. This was done in conjunction with  
24 Superman and Brigadier Mike Lamin. Having put Kono under our  
13:16:31 25 control, we attacked Gandorhun with the intention of opening the  
26 road from Koidu Gieya to Sandialu but failed in our attempts. We  
27 were then ordered by General Mosquito to enter the jungle and use  
28 the cover of the jungle to secure JP Koroma and his family to the  
29 banks of the Moa River. Across the Moa, General Mosquito had

1 sent vehicles ahead of us, and we all reported to Buedu. All  
2 hospitalities were extended to JP Koroma and his family, and  
3 general turned over his bedroom to JP Koroma and his wife.

4 JP Koroma appointed General Mosquito as chief of defence  
13:17:23 5 staff, with overall command over both the RUF and the SLA, and  
6 promoted him to the rank of brigadier general. General Mosquito  
7 call on me and informed me that since he had been made chief of  
8 defence staff for both the RUF and the SLA by JP Koroma, he  
9 wanted to turn over his assignment of battlefield commander to  
13:17:49 10 me, and asked me to turn my assignment of battle group commander  
11 over to Superman. The general said that he was doing this to  
12 draw Superman within the high command structure of the RUF in a  
13 bid to encourage him. I accepted and assumed the assignment of  
14 battlefield commander, and Superman assumed the assignment of  
13:18:13 15 battle group commander.

16 One morning, the chief security officer to the former AFRC  
17 chairman, Johnny Paul Koroma, informed me that his boss was  
18 planning to escape to Ghana, along with his entire family. The  
19 CSO further told me that JP Koroma had a parcel of diamonds that  
13:18:37 20 he was planning on selling once out of the country.

21 This information came as a surprise to me and found it hard  
22 to believe that at a time when we were trying to put the fighting  
23 men under command and control and provide the necessary logistics  
24 to halt our retreat and move forward, Johnny Paul Koroma would  
13:19:00 25 keep diamonds for his own use and flee, leaving us with a problem  
26 that he had created.

27 Accompanied by Brigadier Mike Lamin and the CSO to Johnny  
28 Paul Koroma, I asked the latter to present the diamonds for the  
29 use of the revolution. He complied, and the matter was settled.

1           While in Buedu, Captain Michael Coomber of the mining unit  
2 reported with a parcel of diamonds from Kono. This parcel was  
3 placed in my care by General Mosquito, with the instruction to  
4 move with it to a transit point where I would be met by General  
13:20:32 5 Ibrahim and together we were to travel to a business associate of  
6 the leader for arrangements and procurement of military  
7 equipment.

8           I arrived at the transit point and booked into a hotel. On  
9 the evening of my third day at the hotel, Colonel Jungle and I  
13:20:58 10 went across the street to a tea shop. Whilst there, it started  
11 to rain, and Jungle and I ran from the shop across the street to  
12 the hotel. As we climbed the steps to enter, I touched my  
13 pockets, as I had gotten accustomed to doing since the parcel was  
14 put in my care. To my shock and dismay, my pockets were empty.

13:21:20 15 I screamed and put my hands on my head and cried. Jungle and I  
16 then retraced our steps from the tea shop to the hotel. We  
17 searched in the rain on our hands and knees. Staff from the  
18 hotel helped us in our search, all to no avail. For the first  
19 time in my life, I contemplated suicide. I above all knew the  
13:21:44 20 importance attached to the materials that the diamonds were to  
21 facilitate for the movement. How could I ever look my commander  
22 in the eyes and tell him that I, Issa, who could be trusted with  
23 the security of the nation, could not secure a small parcel of  
24 diamonds? As the days went by, I grew frustrated and could not  
13:22:07 25 eight or sleep."

26           That paragraph describing events in Monrovia, Mr Sesay, is  
27 it accurate?

28 A.    Yes, about the topic of the diamonds, the diamond dropped  
29 from me from the place where I was waiting for Ibrahim Bah. But

1 that was not on the third day. It was on the sixth day since I  
2 entered the hotel. It was on that day that the diamond dropped  
3 from my pockets that night.

4 Q. Did you feel suicidal after that loss?

13:22:42 5 A. No, no, no. I did not have such a plan.

6 Q. "Four days after the loss, Jungle and I were sitting on his  
7 bed when we monitored National Radio announcing that diamonds had  
8 been discovered on the very same street that I had suffered my  
9 loss. Jungle and I cried, knowing that the mentioned diamonds  
10 were the property of the RUF. Till this day, people still  
11 prospect this area, thinking that diamonds are underground.  
12 General Mosquito dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Moriba to meet me  
13 and escort me back to DHQ."

14 Pause there for a minute. Mr Sesay, a moment ago you said  
13:23:32 15 it wasn't - it was how many days after you had arrived in  
16 Monrovia that the diamonds were lost?

17 A. I said it was six days when the diamonds got missing.

18 Q. But, Mr Sesay, help us with this. What were you doing with  
19 the diamonds in your possession for six days? Surely you were  
13:24:01 20 meant to be taking them to Mr Taylor, so why didn't you take them  
21 straight to him?

22 A. No, Bockarie sent me. I should go and wait for Ibrahim Bah  
23 in Monrovia, and Ibrahim Bah was to come and pick me up and we'd  
24 go to Burkina Faso. I did not have any business with Mr Taylor,  
13:24:24 25 no.

26 Q. "On arrival I was met by an enraged General Mosquito who  
27 angrily chastised me for the loss. I was ordered to fall out,  
28 and for over a week the General would not talk to me or even  
29 respond to my courtesies. Finally one morning I was summoned by

1 the General and instructed that I should leave Buedu and make my  
2 base at Pendembu, from where I was to coordinate all front-line  
3 operations. I complied with this order and stepped up operations  
4 against the enemy at Daru. I also launched successful jungle  
13:25:07 5 missions to Joru and Nyeyama. General Mosquito left on a trip to  
6 secure materials for the movement and on his return I was issued  
7 a liberal quantity of ammunition and instructed to cross the Moa  
8 River and recapture Kono from the enemy. Prior to this the same  
9 instructions had been given to Superman who misused the materials  
13:25:35 10 given to him and failed to capture the target. On arrival in  
11 Kono, I called the brigade commander, Rambo and other senior  
12 officers, and together we arranged a forum in which general  
13 security issues were discussed and a war plan was made for the  
14 attack of Koi ndu Town.

13:25:59 15 I instructed Brigadier Kallon to move to Gold Town and cut  
16 off the enemy. I led the troops in the attack of Koi du Town,  
17 attacking the enemy at 6 a.m. They put up a strong resistance  
18 using their four mechanised battalions deployed to defend Kono  
19 and its diamonds. Our troops proved too aggressive for them and,  
13:26:24 20 after four hours of heated combat we captured Koi du Town. The  
21 Nigerians retreated to Bumpe. Very early the next morning we  
22 attack their positions at Bumpe and razed them from the town.  
23 The enemy were forced to retreat through the road leading to  
24 Masingbi, where they fell in Kallon's ambush. All in all, the  
13:26:52 25 enemy lost four war tanks, armoured cars, and a multitude of  
26 heavy artillery pieces, personal rifles, and huge amounts of  
27 ammunition. They also suffered heavy casualties, the likes of  
28 which they have never experienced in the history of ECOMOG. They  
29 were forced to retreat on foot with not even a bicycle being able

1 to pass our defences.

2 Our forces moved from Masingbi, Rambo and Kallon moving  
3 with the advance team whilst I moved to repel a Kamajor attack at  
4 Nimi koro. Our forces had by then captured Masingbi and Magburaka  
13:27:38 5 and were advancing to attack Makeni."

6 Pausing there, Mr Sesay, this description of the operation  
7 which you led in December 1998, is it accurate?

8 A. Well, to say I would never forget - to say - I will never  
9 forget that type of event in their life in the --

13:28:02 10 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, could the witness be asked  
11 to slow down and start it all over again.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Start again, please, Mr Sesay, and please, can we go  
14 slowly.

13:28:14 15 A. I said here the document says that ECOMOG would never  
16 forget the event that took place in Kono, as a result of the  
17 casualties that they suffered, they would never forget that in  
18 the history of ECOMOG, I said no, that is not true. Yes, I agree  
19 that the ECOMOG left their armour down, they left their tanks and  
13:28:41 20 ran away, but they withdrew. They retreated from Kono through  
21 Bumpe, Njaiama Nimi koro to Tongo Field. That was one group. And  
22 the other group also withdrew. They went to Sewafe. From Sewafe  
23 they crossed the Sew River and went to Konta Boama.

24 Q. How do you spell that name?

13:29:08 25 A. Konta Boama. K-O-N-T-A B-O-A-M-A.

26 Q. Going back to the report:

27 "I joined them taking with me all needed military materials  
28 for the attack. We quickly put the township under our military  
29 control. General Mosquito called me on set and instructed that

1 we allow Superman to join in the operations. The General  
2 explained that though Superman had earlier refused his orders,  
3 he, Mosquito, was man enough to put it behind him and accept  
4 Superman back, referring to him as a 'brother in arms'."

13:30:05 5 I note the time, Madam President.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths, we are going to take  
7 our luncheon break and reconvene at 2.30.

8 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

9 [Upon resuming at 2.35 p.m.]

14:32:16 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Can we go back, please, to exhibit D-84, page 8, two-thirds  
13 of the way down the page:

14 "Rambo proceeded to a village beyond Binkolo where Superman  
14:35:51 15 had been in hiding and brought him to Makeni. That morning the  
16 two of us met and had polite discussions. Together we attacked  
17 the barracks and captured it. At that point, I received  
18 information that the enemy were moving to attack Iljiama-Swafe."

19 I don't know if I've pronounced that correctly.

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Njaiama Sewafe.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you:

22 Q. "I moved to put the situation under control. Upon my  
23 return to Makeni, Rambo and Kallon reported that all military  
24 equipment in their care had been reported to the G4. They  
14:36:43 25 reported that Superman on the other hand had taken the materials  
26 he selected to his house. Accompanied by Kallon, I went to  
27 Superman's house and confronted him with the issue. I informed  
28 him that it was proper procedure to report all captured military  
29 materials to the G4 who would then file a comprehensive report to

1 DHQ and issue the said materials upon instructions. I asked that  
2 Superman present the materials so as to ensure proper  
3 accountability. Superman led Kallon and I into the house and  
4 showed us where he had kept the materials. I instructed that it  
14:37:32 5 be moved and reported to the G4."

6 That account, Mr Sesay, is it accurate, what I've just  
7 read?

8 A. It's a lie.

9 Q. What's wrong with it?

14:37:53 10 A. I said it's a lie because Superman did not report the  
11 materials that he had taken to his house to me, that he showed  
12 them to me, and I told him to take them to the -4. That's a lie.  
13 The materials remained with Superman, he did not give them back.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry, Mr Interpreter, the materials did  
14:38:25 15 what?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Remained with Superman.

17 THE WITNESS: I said the materials remained with Superman.  
18 He did not give them to me.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:38:36 20 Q. It then continues:

21 "Two days later General Mosquito again asked for  
22 understanding and allowed Superman to rejoin the operations.

23 Rambo was instructed to advance and attack Port Loko which  
24 he did, deploying his forward defensive at the Port Loko  
14:38:57 25 turn-table leading to Kambia. Rambo shared the town with the  
26 enemy for seven days.

27 Superman pleaded that, even though Rambo had done well, he,  
28 as battle group commander, knew the ground well and should take  
29 over the ground. He said that he had received intelligence that



1 the leader had been moved to Lungi and wanted to advance as far  
2 as Lungi and rescue the leader.

3 At this time our forces Freetown were under enemy cut off  
4 from the rear and were in danger of being boxed-in and either  
14:39:57 5 captured alive or killed.

6 Rambo was withdrawn from his operation in Port Loko and  
7 instructed to open a through-way to connect with our men in  
8 Freetown.

9 Rambo then attacked and captured Masiaka, advanced and  
14:40:23 10 captured RDF, and attacked the Guineans at Waterloo, engaging  
11 them in combat for four days and four nights.

12 The Guineans wrote us a letter asking for their safe  
13 passage back to Guinea, saying that they were taking their hands  
14 out of the war. I replied, denying their request."

14:41:01 15 Did you have such contact with the Guineans, Mr Sesay?

16 A. No, I was in Makeni. They wrote the letter to Rambo and  
17 Superman, and Superman and Rambo responded to the letter.

18 Q. Did you have any dealings with that letter whatsoever?

19 A. No.

14:41:23 20 Q. "I told them that if they wanted safe passage they should  
21 leave behind all their military equipment. A few days later I  
22 monitored the sound of heavy bombardment from the direction of  
23 Port Loko. On inquiring, I was informed that our troops had  
24 dissolved the ground and that the enemy were advancing towards  
14:41:57 25 Gberi Junction. I asked for Superman and was informed that he  
26 was in Lunsar and not on the ground that he had asked for and  
27 been given.

28 The Guinean convoy bulldozed all the way to Masiaka where  
29 my position was also bulldozed."

1 Is that true?

2 A. I wasn't there. I was in Makeni.

3 Q. But you see what's being said here, that the Guineans  
4 bulldozed a position held by you, the writer of this. Did that  
14:42:47 5 happen?

6 A. No, that did not happen.

7 Q. "Their mission was to rescue the Guineans at Waterloo.  
8 Upon reaching Waterloo they joined forces and made a U-turn,  
9 bulldozing my ambush for a second time at RDF."

14:43:15 10 Did that happen?

11 A. No, no.

12 Q. Were you at RDF at this time?

13 A. I wasn't at the RDF.

14 Q. Where were you?

14:43:28 15 A. I said I was in Makeni.

16 Q. Thank you:

17 "The Guinean convoy consisted of over four war tanks, eight  
18 armoured vehicles, a 40-barrel missile, four anti-aircraft guns  
19 and countless other mounted weapons."

14:43:47 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Sorry to interrupt, Mr Griffiths. Did  
21 the witness say he was in the RDF or he wasn't?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: He said he wasn't at RDF. "I said I was in  
23 Makeni":

24 Q. "The Guinean convoy consisted of over four war tanks, eight  
14:44:09 25 armoured vehicles, a 40-barrel missile, four anti-aircraft guns  
26 and countless other mounted weapons and over eight trucks full of  
27 personnel. As they moved, they bombarded and assaulted, clearing  
28 a path for themselves. I was extremely annoyed at my position  
29 being bulldozed and issued strong orders for an ambush to be set

1 ahead of them. They fell in the ambush and my bodyguard  
2 commander led a team of less than a squad of men in the capture  
3 of the 40-barrel missile and a large quantity of its bombs."

4 Did your bodyguard commander do that?

14:45:10 5 A. No.

6 Q. "I moved that I, Issa Sesay, moved to escort the missile to  
7 our rear." Did you?

8 A. No. It was Rambo who brought the 40-barrel to Makeni to  
9 me.

14:45:33 10 Q. "I moved to escort the missile to our rear, and on my  
11 return, Superman asked to join Rambo at Waterloo. He cited the  
12 fact that as the SLA commander had operated with him before, he  
13 would be able to consolidate them and exercise command and  
14 control over them. Taking into consideration his status as  
15 battle group and the logic behind his explanation, I gave the  
16 okay for Superman to join Rambo in Waterloo."

17 Pause. Mr Sesay, who --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- ordered Superman to join Rambo in Waterloo?

14:46:29 20 A. It was Sam Bockarie who ordered Superman to join Rambo  
21 before those ammunition were captured from the Guineans.

22 Q. "At Waterloo Superman incited SLA commanders and soldiers  
23 against Rambo and generally did his best to cause a breakdown in  
24 command on the ground. A few days later, General Mosquito, on  
14:47:03 25 hearing that Lieutenant Colonel Gibril had been rescued and had  
26 joined operations at Waterloo, called me and asked me to inform  
27 Gibril that he was welcome back and that no ill feelings were  
28 borne against him. Gibril was to also report to DHQ to brief the  
29 high command and all on the condition of the leader, as they had

1 been in prison together. Superman, monitoring the dialogue on  
2 field radio, responded that he would not allow Gibril to come to  
3 the call of the high command. A few days later, I received  
4 information from the Waterloo front line that Superman and Gibril  
14:48:25 5 had retreated to Lunsar and had moved with a good number of men.  
6 As a result, the enemy had advanced and were now at Yams Farm.

7 I informed Rambo who was at my location on a medical pass.  
8 Rambo asked for ammunition to be given to him so that he could  
9 collect the force from Lunsar and move to stop the enemy advance  
14:49:09 10 at Yams Farm. I arrived at Lunsar with only eight bodyguards and  
11 met Rambo and Gibril discussing."

12 Mr Sesay, did you go to Lunsar to meet with Rambo and  
13 Gibril Massaquoi, as suggested in this document?

14 A. No. Rambo and I were in Makeni. It was Bockarie who said  
14:49:45 15 I should go to Lunsar to call Gibril to go to Buedu. That was  
16 the time I travelled to Lunsar together with Rambo.

17 Q. "Gibril greeted me and we exchanged pleasantries. I told  
18 him that General Mosquito wanted him to report to DHQ, not to  
19 face any charges but to give account of the state and condition  
14:50:17 20 of the leader, as they had been in prison together. Gibril  
21 complied and entered my vehicle. At that moment, Superman and  
22 his men came from the back of the building, opened suppressive  
23 fire and launched RPG rockets against my position. Gibril left  
24 my vehicle and joined Superman in attacking me. I managed to  
14:50:56 25 escape with my life, but they had killed two RUF soldiers  
26 assigned to me as bodyguards."

27 Did such an attack on you take place, Mr Sesay?

28 A. Yeah, Gibril did not enter my vehicle. It was at the  
29 junction that Gibril, myself and Rambo were standing there.

1 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness repeat  
2 this part of his answer.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Could you repeat that answer, please Mr Sesay?

14:51:30 5 A. I said Rambo, myself and Gibril - we met Gibril at the  
6 junction going towards Superman's house, and we stopped, that is  
7 myself, Rambo and Gibril. And Gibril greeted us and I responded.  
8 Then I told him the message that Bockarie had told me to tell  
9 him, that is to go to Makeni and to go to Buedu. That is when  
14:51:53 10 Superman opened fire from his house towards the junction, but  
11 nobody was killed from my group.

12 Q. Where did that take place?

13 A. That is in Lunsar. That's what I said, that I had to pass  
14 through Gberi Junction, Masiaka, then Mile 91, I went to  
14:52:15 15 Magburaka.

16 Q. "I got in a vehicle with Major Kolo Mulbah and escaped  
17 through Gberi Junction, Masiaka, Mile 91 to Magburaka.  
18 Meanwhile, Superman and Gibril moved to Makeni and attacked my  
19 residence. They shot at my house, tied and beat up RUF soldiers  
14:52:43 20 and raised my compound. They entered my house, beating up my  
21 wife, undressing her and taunting her with rude and abusive  
22 remarks before she was able to escape under gunfire."

23 Was your wife treated in that way, Mr Sesay?

24 A. Yes, because they entered my house. They entered the room  
14:53:15 25 where the woman was and she was insulted, but some of the boys  
26 who came - some of the men who came with Superman, some of his  
27 bodyguards, had hailed from the same village together with my  
28 wife, so they were her brothers, so, in fact, they were the ones  
29 who made the way for her to escape.

1 Q. "Mr ET Samara and others, rescued from prison in Freetown,  
2 were staying with me in Makeni were also molested and raised."  
3 Is that true?

4 A. Yes, that is true. But the name is not Samara. It is ET  
14:54:04 5 Kamara. Mr ET Kamara, not Samara, because I know this person  
6 from 1987, even before the war. I knew him to be Minister of  
7 State and Party Affairs. At that time, I was a small boy. He is  
8 not Samara. He is Kamara. So all these things, if I had written  
9 that letter, this report, I know this person they are referring  
14:54:27 10 to even before knowing Foday Sankoh, so I wouldn't ever have  
11 forgotten to refer to him that way. ET Kamara, I knew him from  
12 1987 as Minister of State and Party Affairs during the APC. So I  
13 wouldn't go and write a name like this Samara.

14 Q. "RUF military materials given to me by the general for a  
14:54:51 15 planned re-attack of Freetown were looted along with \$9,000 US,  
16 also RUF property. That same day, Superman and Gibril attacked  
17 the home of Brigadier Kallon. The entire house was raised and  
18 his wife was stripped of all her clothing and made to sit on the  
19 ground. Her suckling child was snatched from her and repeatedly  
14:55:22 20 banged against a wall. This resulted in serious injuries to the  
21 child."

22 Did that happen to Kallon's wife?

23 A. Yes, yes, that happened.

24 Q. Who did it?

14:55:39 25 A. It was Gibril.

26 Q. Gibril Massaquoi?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. The one with whom you were arrested and later released,  
29 yes?

1 A. Yes, that's him.

2 Q. And what happened in due course to Morris Kallon's child?

3 A. Well, that child died later.

4 Q. How much later?

14:56:09 5 A. The child died in '99.

6 Q. And when the child was repeatedly banged against a wall, in  
7 which year did that happen?

8 A. That was in '98.

9 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, can I have explanation of the  
14:56:37 10 word "raised" that is used in that paragraph, R-A-I-S-E-D?

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Where it says, Mr Sesay, that the entire house was raised,  
13 what do you understand "raised" to mean?

14 A. Well, that is to take everything from the house, vandalise  
14:57:03 15 the house, and the person who had come to raise the house would  
16 take control of everything that was there. Everything would be  
17 scattered around.

18 Q. "I reported the incident to General Mosquito, who asked me  
19 to exercise restraint, and he dispatched a delegation headed by  
14:57:30 20 Colonel Isaac to calm the situation down and investigate the  
21 incident. The delegation obtained statements from me and  
22 proceeded to Lunsar to get a statement from my attackers.  
23 Superman and Gibril refused to cooperate and issued threats  
24 against the delegates.

25 During this impasse the enemy had advanced to Gberi  
26 Junction. General Mosquito instructed that in the interest of  
27 the revolution, we should put our differences aside temporarily  
28 and act to repel the enemy. Along with Kallon, Rambo and  
29 Brigadier Isaac, four trucks of armed men were mobilised and we

1 joined the force at Lunsar and moved for Gberi Junction. Four of  
2 Rambo's men were killed in that attack by friendly fire from the  
3 rear, suggesting foul play."

4 Did such an incident occur, Mr Sesay?

5 A. Yes, that happened.

6 Q. "Again the enemy moved against our positions advancing  
7 towards Mile 91. I sent Rambo, equipping him with a single  
8 barrel BZT. He met and joined Colonel Bai Bureh and they were  
9 able to push the enemy past Moyamba Junction to Tiama Junction  
10 where they deployed our troops.

11 Rambo proposed an attack of Bo and it was arranged that  
12 Kallon would hit Yele.

13 Kallon was dispatched to DHQ to receive logistics for the  
14 said mission. Two days later I made a day's trip to Matotoka as  
15 the area was under Kamajor threat. On returning to Makeni, Rambo  
16 visited me to inform me that he had repaired the BZT weapon and  
17 wanted to move to capture Bo the next morning. He left my house  
18 at around 9 p.m. and I stayed up past midnight. I stayed awake  
19 and, at 10 past 1 in the morning, I heard heavy fighting from  
20 outside. I entered my living room and my bodyguards were running  
21 from the direction of the firing. Some of them had been shot. I  
22 exited through a back entrance and ran for cover. An RPG rocket  
23 was launched against me and I was hit in the toe by fragment from  
24 the blast. I ran as guns blazed behind me. I got to a safe  
25 place and spent the night. The next morning with the aid of  
26 civilians, I escaped to Makali. The hunt was on for me and I had  
27 to bypass major towns on my way. At Makali I was at the signal  
28 station monitoring the network when the leader called. I  
29 responded and reported that I was faced with a serious problem.



1 Not wanting to let the enemy know that there was serious  
2 infighting going on within the RUF, I could not go into details.  
3 At the end of my dialogue with the leader I was attacked again by  
4 Gibril. They took me by surprise, as I had been very careful not  
5 to disclose my location. The people of Makali, including the  
6 paramount chief, Pa Alimamy Kanu, will testify that Gibril led  
7 the attack. He raised the town, shooting and wounding people on  
8 the ground. He swore that he would kill me and take my head to  
9 Makeni where he would put it on display.

10 Away from my ground at Makeni, Superman took the  
11 opportunity of calling a meeting at the town hall where he  
12 informed those assembled that General Mosquito and I had  
13 collaborated to hijack the leadership of the RUF and cited the  
14 general's advice not to respond to the call of the leader on  
15 field radio as proof. He informed the meeting that he had  
16 received instructions from the leader to take command of the RUF  
17 and to arrest and execute both General Mosquito and I, Brigadier  
18 Issa."

19 If we just for a moment, please, switch to D-9. D-9, page  
20 9. Let's have a look at the penultimate paragraph on that page:

21 "After Makeni had been captured and raised by Superman and  
22 his troops, he called a meeting at the town hall and confidently  
23 told the group that he has acted in compliance with instructions  
24 received from the leader and that he had taken effective command  
25 of the RUF and that I, Major General Sam Bockarie, was no longer  
26 high command of the RUF and that he, Brigadier Superman, was  
27 taking over from Brigadier Issa in Makeni.

28 Superman went on to accuse me on air of hijacking the  
29 leadership of the RUF, citing my call for all signal stations not

1 to respond to your call, as proof of my betrayal."

2 Let's go back to page 12 of D-84 and have a look at that  
3 same paragraph. We see four lines from the beginning, "And cited  
4 the general's advice not to respond to the call." Next  
5 paragraph:

6 "By then, I had manoeuvred to Kono after spending five days  
7 in the bush as a result of the attack on me in Makali.

8 Kallon moved to Magburaka to take command and was able to  
9 repel numerous attacks from Superman and Gibril.

10 Upon receiving instructions from the leader, through the  
11 general, calling for Kallon to take command at Makeni, I  
12 mobilised Kallon and the said operation was undertaken. We were  
13 almost in control of the entire township when the general  
14 informed us that the leader wanted us to abort the operation and  
15 for Kallon to return to Makeni.

16 A military order was passed and we withdrew the force to  
17 await the arrival of the leader on the ground."

18 Pause there. Who is the leader being referred to there,  
19 Mr Sesay?

20 A. The leader is Mr Sankoh, but here Gibril is lying because,  
21 when they attacked me, I had a wound on my toe so he went and  
22 opened fire at me again. When they attacked me in Makeni, I got  
23 wounded on my toe. So when he says there in the other paragraph  
24 and he said I bypassed all the other towns and I came out in  
25 Makali, it's a lie. When I left Makeni that night I went to  
26 Magburaka. I passed the night in Magburaka and the following day  
27 I went to Makali, and from that moment, when I left Magburaka and  
28 Makeni, I did not come there until October 1999. So even the  
29 people of Makeni and the RUF who were fighting from Superman's

1 side and from my own side, they know that I did not come on that  
2 attack in Makeni from that time.

3 Q. Let's go back to the document and conclude it:

4 "A military order was passed and we withdrew the force to  
5 await the arrival of the leader on the ground. Sir, if my report  
6 is centred on the activities of Superman and Gibril, it is not so  
7 merely because of their attack on me but, rather, because of the  
8 negative results their 'outlaw' actions have brought to the  
9 movement.

10 Superman sought the advice of ULIMO General Bropleh and SLA  
11 Brigadier Mani."

12 Now tell me, was Bropleh a ULIMO general?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "... both strong critics and self-confessed enemies of the  
15 RUF. Superman placed former President JS Momoh in the hands of  
16 Mani, who arranged for Momoh to escape to Guinea. Mani refused  
17 to hand Momoh over to me, stating that Momoh is SLA property and  
18 not RUF."

19 Is that true?

20 A. It's not a lie. Even Mani when, at the time he was ready  
21 to leave Makeni, he left Momoh there. He left Joseph Momoh there  
22 in the hands of - he left Momoh in the hands of one Mr Alie Major  
23 Sesay, so that was where Momoh was until the time I came to  
24 Makeni. And when Foday Sankoh visited Makeni in late '99 for the  
25 first time, he was the one who travelled with Joseph Momoh down  
26 to Freetown. He and Foday Sankoh travelled on board a helicopter  
27 to Freetown.

28 Q. So is that paragraph true or false?

29 A. No, it's not true.

1 Q. "He incited SLA soldiers to go against RUF command and,  
2 together with Gibril, sought to sabotage the progress of the  
3 movement thus delaying the release of the leader. Superman  
4 killed Rambo in cold blood and made several attempts on my life  
5 in a bid to eliminate the RUF high command left on the ground by  
6 the leader.

7 Sir, it is not has not been easy controlling my emotions  
8 and harder still controlling the men who witnessed the  
9 cold-blooded killing of Rambo. General Mosquito, I Brigadier  
10 Issa, and other senior officers have obediently taken all orders  
11 from you and at this time we await most anxiously your arrival  
12 when we look to have the matter resolved by you.

13 Lastly, sir, the vast majority of the men are in 'high  
14 spirit' and remain loyal to the leadership of the RUF. They have  
15 fought hard and longed for the return of the leader.

16 As battlefield commander, I pledge my loyalty to the leader  
17 and ask that he moves earliest to look into the internal affairs  
18 of the RUF.

19 The high command, officers, combatants, and civilians of  
15:13:06 20 the RUF are on the ground and on full alert waiting the 'last  
21 order' of the commander-in-chief of the RUF, Corporal Foday  
22 Saybana Sankoh."

23 Now, that's the report which is said to have been prepared  
24 by you for the leader, and you've made it quite clear that you  
15:13:41 25 know nothing at all about it.

26 Now can we have a look at another document now, please,  
27 Mr Sesay. It's document P-67.

28 Could I have a look at the original of that document,  
29 please. Madam President, I see that the original of this

1 document is a photocopy. I wonder if there is a true original  
2 available.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: What is the state of this letter?

15:15:02

4 MR KOUMJIAN: We'll have to research that, but generally we  
5 presented the best copy, but we'll double-check if there's  
6 another copy in Freetown or somewhere.

15:15:23

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I ask for this reason: I wonder if your  
8 Honours would like to have a look at the original, because much  
9 of the writing on the original and on the copy that I have is  
10 missing. So it's difficult to make sense of some of it.

15:15:55

11 MR KOUMJIAN: It will take some time to double-check but  
12 sometimes I have seen even if we originally have a copy, part of  
13 the writing is lost in scanning. So it could have another ERN  
14 number or we may have a copy not ERNed. So we'll check that, but  
15 that will take some time.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can we see, though, what is - the  
17 document that's in the custody of the Court Manager.

15:16:44

18 The document looks quite legible except for the margins  
19 that I think were copied in such a way as to eat off tidbits of  
20 the words. Some words were eaten in the margin, but otherwise  
21 the document is quite legible. In any event, we've admitted this  
22 document. We wouldn't have admitted it if we couldn't read it.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Mr Sesay, who are the Black Revolutionary Guards?

15:17:41

25 A. Well, they are Mr Sankoh's bodyguards. They were the ones  
26 who were called by that title.

27 Q. What is their title? What were they called?

28 A. Black Guards.

29 Q. Were they called Black Revolutionary Guards?

1 A. Well, I know them for Black Guards.

2 Q. Did you ever hear them referred to as the Black  
3 Revolutionary Guards?

4 A. No, they are Black Guards.

15:18:26 5 Q. Now, who was - as far as you're aware - the head of the  
6 Black Guards?

7 A. It was Jackson Swarray.

8 Q. If a report - a salute type report was being prepared for  
9 the leader by the Black Guards, who would you expect to prepare  
10 it?

11 A. Well, that was the Black Guard commander.

12 Q. So who would that be?

13 A. During this time it was Jackson Swarray.

14 Q. Now help us. The two salute reports which we have spent a  
15:19:36 15 little time this morning looking at, they are both typed reports.  
16 Would it be normal to present a report such as this in  
17 handwriting to the leader?

18 A. Well, it was dependent on the time. Because there were  
19 times when the RUF did not have a typewriter, but at this time  
15:20:14 20 there was now a typewriter because like at this time and around  
21 the time of those two reports, those two reports - those who were  
22 there on training, they had a typewriter. Those who were in  
23 Makeni had a typewriter and those in Buedu had a typewriter and  
24 by then the Black Guard commander was in Makeni, because they  
15:20:41 25 were the ones who Mosquito sent there in February to come with  
26 Isaac Mongor so from February - from February to September 1999  
27 Jackson Swarray was working with Superman and Gibriil Massaquoi.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, the witness's answer is,  
29 "Well, it was dependant on the time because there were times when

1 the RUF did not have a typewriter, but at this time there was now  
2 a typewriter." I would like to know what time he is referring to  
3 that there was a typewriter.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:21:32 5 Q. What time did the RUF have access to a typewriter,  
6 Mr Sesay?

7 A. Well, like in the year '99 there was a typewriter. There  
8 were typewriters.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Because this document is not - it doesn't  
15:21:47 10 have a date on it. At least not as far as I can see. So I'm  
11 just wondering.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: We'll look at the contents of the document  
13 in due course, which might assist as to when it was prepared:

14 Q. But just moving on for the moment, have a look at the last  
15:22:04 15 page of the document, please. Do you see any signature or name  
16 on the last page, Mr Sesay?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Mr Sesay, would you expect a report prepared by the leader,  
19 supposedly by the Black Guards, or Black Revolutionary Guards,  
15:22:36 20 whoever they are, would you expect such a report to be signed?

21 A. If the report was coming from the Black Guard commander, he  
22 will sign it and then pen down his name under the signature.

23 Q. So looking at this document in its entirety, have you - can  
24 you assist us as to who wrote it? Can you help us as to who  
15:23:16 25 wrote this?

26 A. Well, if we went through the document and I listened to the  
27 contents, then maybe.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, before we do that, could the witness  
29 please be shown exhibit P-362, leaving that document there,

1 please, for the minute.

2 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, let me take this opportunity to  
3 confirm that the copy that is in court is the best original we  
4 have. I also notice it does have the red ERN stamp. We've also  
15:24:02 5 checked to see if there is another copy that was obtained that  
6 was better in the margins than this one and we don't have a  
7 better copy than P-66.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

9 Q. Mr Sesay, here we have another handwritten report, yes?

15:24:30 10 Now, this is headed - this again is handwritten and it's headed  
11 "Revolutionary United Front, to the leader RUF/SL, from Jackson  
12 Ray Swarray, Black Guard commander" dated 25 September 1999.

13 "Subject: Suggestion and action." When we go to the last page  
14 of this three-page document, we see it's signed with the name of  
15:25:14 15 the writer and his rank, yes?

16 A. Yes, I've seen that. Which one is this?

17 Q. Well, we'll come to this one in due course. But what was  
18 Jackson Swarray's position within the RUF?

19 A. Jackson Swarray was the Black Guard commander.

15:25:46 20 Q. And if we look at this handwritten report, we see that it's  
21 dated 25 September 1999. Now, the two salute reports allegedly  
22 from you and Bockarie were dated 26 and 27 September  
23 respectively. So this one we're looking at now, P-362, is  
24 prepared a day before the Bockarie salute report. Do you follow  
15:26:18 25 me?

26 A. Yes, I'm following.

27 Q. Let's put this P-362 to one side - we'll come back to it  
28 later - and go back to P-67. By looking at this document P-67,  
29 Mr Sesay, can you help this Court in any way as to who prepared



1 it?

2 A. These documents, because the other exhibit that you have  
3 just showed me, that they have just taken off from the screen, at  
4 this time the Black Guard commander, who was Jackson Swarray, was  
15:27:07 5 with Sam Bockarie, Superman, Pa Binda. They were all in Monrovia  
6 awaiting Mr Sankoh's arrival. So you would know that Gibril, who  
7 prepared those documents, is the same Gibril who prepared these  
8 false documents just to - just to show people that he knows  
9 because Jackson Swarray was in Monrovia at this time. He was not  
15:27:40 10 in Makeni. He and Superman left Makeni together with Pa Binda.  
11 They travelled to Freetown, and from Freetown they were airlifted  
12 to Monrovia where Mr Sankoh met them. So --

13 Q. So Mr Sesay, this document P-67, who are you saying  
14 prepared this?

15:28:06 15 A. I said this is the handiwork of Gibril. It was Gibril who  
16 prepared these false reports in our names.

17 Q. Now, well, this one isn't in anybody's name, but let's have  
18 a look at it: "To the leader, from the Black Revolutionary  
19 Guards. Subject: Situation report." And we see it's headed  
15:28:38 20 "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone" and whereas - of  
21 Sierra Leone, and just as with D-84 and D-9, "To the leader, from  
22 the Black Revolutionary Guards. Subject: Situation report."  
23 However, on this document no name, no date.

24 Let's look at the contents:

15:29:21 25 "Sir, on behalf of the entire Black Guard" - I don't know  
26 what that last word is - "I hereby take this opportunity to make  
27 a summary."

28 MR KOUMJIAN: May I suggest, since we're all interpreting  
29 it's "unit": "On behalf of the entire Black Guard unit".

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. "Black Guard unit." Then we have another word missing at  
3 the beginning of the next line?

15:30:02

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's "we". It looks like, "We are  
5 hereby".

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. "We are hereby taking this opportunity to make a summary  
8 report, to let you know or understand the situation on the  
9 ground.

15:30:22

10 To start with we thank the almighty God as ever" - I don't  
11 know what that word is. "We thank the almighty God. Your  
12 previous consentisation programmes to the entire movement that  
13 this is a holy war, which everybody within the movement have  
14 realised because, in your absence, the struggle continues with  
15 lot of developments.

15:31:14

16 Sir, as you left us in 1996 to go and sign the Abidjan  
17 Accord, lot of enemy pressure (Kamajors) was mounted on us, but  
18 due to the dedication and loyalty of the command you left on the  
19 ground, we were abled to contain situation until the AFRC  
20 coup d'etat wherein you instructed the high command for us (RUF)  
21 to join the brothers in other to form the People's Army and  
22 defend the sovereignty of our motherland.

15:31:46

23 The external delegates who were with you in Abidjan also  
24 went over the media that they have toppled the leadership of the  
25 RUF and went to the extent of inciting people, but due to the"  
26 something "and the security experience of the high command, we  
27 were able to trick them to come on the ground for us to work out  
28 all necessary modalities. They came through the Guinea-Sierra  
29 Leone border (Nongowa ferry) and were finally arrested by us and

15:32:37

1 brought to the ground and locked up - in a locked up.

2 Furthermore, when we joined the brothers, some of our  
3 senior officers and elders were given ministerial positions in  
4 the AFRC government. All the same, things were not working well  
15:34:06 5 with the RUF members" something "in which the high command even  
6 decided to leave the city Freetown and decide to base in the  
7 provinces. Things were not put in a proper shape, as the  
8 so-called honourables were just doing things as they like. There  
9 was no proper command and control until ECOMOG decided to make a  
15:35:04 10 final strike into Freetown, in which they succeeded in driving  
11 the entire AFRC from the city."

12 Now, let's just pause there for a minute. I want us again  
13 to look at the pattern of this report. It starts with the  
14 departure of the leader in 1996. It then goes on to deal with  
15:35:44 15 the arrest of the external delegates. It then goes on to deal  
16 with joining with the AFRC in Freetown after the coup.

17 Mr Sesay, bearing in mind the documents we looked at this  
18 morning, do you see a pattern emerging here in this document as  
19 well?

15:36:11 20 A. Yes, I can see.

21 Q. "When Freetown fell in the hands of ECOMOG, the high  
22 command therefore decided at once, without any delayance, as  
23 there was no command and control, to move straight to our  
24 original base Kailahun and position the RUF combatants to the old  
15:36:46 25 former 1991 defensive points which were" --

26 Can you help me with that first word, Mr Sesay? A place  
27 name, Ni uma?

28 A. I don't understand this, because I can only see N-U-M-A. I  
29 don't know if it is Ni uma, N-I-U-M-A. I don't understand it.

1 But the second one is Bonbohun and Jojoima.

2 Q. Do you know Bonbohun and Jojoima?

3 A. Yes, very well.

4 Q. Where are they?

15:37:46 5 A. Bonbohun is just about a quarter mile, in fact less than a  
6 quarter mile, to Daru Town. And Jojoima is by Kui va. But this  
7 other town, the spelling is not clear.

8 Q. Thank you:

9 "These positions were seriously defended until when the  
15:38:18 10 ECOMOG advanced to Kenema and Daru. From then, the enemies had  
11 tried their level best to penetrate the defensive position, but  
12 no chance had been given to them. In the north, the enemies  
13 captured Makeni and tried to advance to Kono. Our men retreated  
14 and defended part of Kono. Due to the security situation, the  
15:39:06 15 high command therefore instructed the then battle group  
16 commander, Brigadier Issa Sesay, to try by all means to report  
17 with the former AFRC chairman, JPK, to Kailahun. As a result,  
18 JPK and his bodyguard were brought to Kailahun as per  
19 instruction. They were welcomed by the high command and elders.

15:39:45 20 Sir, at this stage, the high command, JPK, senior officers,  
21 junior officers, and the combatants held a forum and finally  
22 agreed to continue the struggle under one structure and command.

23 Immediately Freetown and the provincial headquarters fell  
24 in the hand of ECOMOG. The high command was called to report by  
15:40:21 25 the President of Liberia, Mr Charles Taylor, wherein the  
26 President seriously briefed the high command and gave him the  
27 confidence that he should not give up but to keep up the struggle  
28 and uphold the revolution until the leader returns. The  
29 President gave full assurance to the high command and promised to

1 give his maximum support to the RUF. The President also took an  
2 oath that he will never betray his brother (Corporal  
3 Foday Sankoh). From that point, the President gave huge quantity  
4 of logistics, ammunition to the high command for us to start  
15:41:20 5 repelling the ECOMOG advancement or to contain situation."

6 Now, understand what this document is saying, Mr Sesay:  
7 That after Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in Kailahun, a forum was  
8 held and immediately after the forum Charles Taylor summoned the  
9 high command to Monrovia. Taking things slowly. Who at this  
15:41:52 10 time was the high command?

11 A. Sam Bockarie was the high command for the RUF.

12 Q. When did Johnny Paul Koroma arrive in Kailahun after the  
13 ECOMOG intervention?

14 A. We arrived in Kailahun, that is myself, Johnny Paul, and  
15:42:17 15 Mike Lamin, in late February 1998.

16 Q. Did Sam Bockarie, immediately after the arrival of Johnny  
17 Paul Koroma in Kailahun, receive a message from Charles Taylor to  
18 go to Monrovia? Did that happen?

19 A. No, that did not happen at all.

15:42:41 20 Q. So what about the suggestion made in this unsigned,  
21 unidentified report that that happened; what do you say about  
22 that?

23 A. That is a lie. This document is telling a lie. Because  
24 when we got to Buedu, there was no forum held for senior officers  
15:43:03 25 or junior officers to decide what to do, no. It is not true.

26 MR KOUMJIAN: I believe, as I read the document, counsel  
27 misspoke. My understanding of the document is that Bockarie met  
28 Taylor before the arrival of JPK.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Let's go over the passage again and see. Let's start:

2 "In the north the enemy has captured Makeni and tried to  
3 advance to Kono. Our men retreated and defended part of Kono."

4 I don't think we're on the same - yes, we are:

15:44:03 5 "Due to the security situation, the high command therefore  
6 instructed the then battle group commander Brigadier Issa Sesay  
7 to try by all means to report with the former AFRC chairman JPK  
8 to Kailahun. As a result, JPK and his bodyguard were brought to  
9 Kailahun as per instruction. They were welcome by the high  
10 command and elders."

11 Then this:

12 "At this stage the high command, JPK, senior officers held  
13 a forum and finally agreed to continue the struggle. Immediately  
14 Freetown and the provincial headquarters fell in the hands of  
15 ECOMOG, the high command was called to report by the President of  
16 Liberia, Mr Charles Taylor, wherein the President seriously  
17 briefed the high command."

18 Just to cover all the bases, Mr Sesay, help us. When  
19 ECOMOG intervened and the AFRC and the RUF fled from Freetown,  
15:45:25 20 did Charles Taylor - did Charles Taylor to your knowledge at that  
21 time summon Sam Bockarie to Monrovia?

22 A. No, not at all.

23 Q. Covering the second possibility: After Johnny Paul Koroma  
24 arrived in Kailahun, did Bockarie receive a message at that stage  
15:45:53 25 from Charles Taylor to go to Monrovia?

26 A. No, Bockarie did not go anywhere. He did not go to  
27 Monrovia.

28 Q. When was the first time, as you recall it, that Bockarie  
29 went to Monrovia?

1 A. The first time Bockarie told me and others in Pendembu that  
2 President Taylor had invited him to Monrovia, that he had sent  
3 General Dopoe Menkarzon to pick him up at the border, was  
4 September 1998. That was the first time I heard that Bockarie  
15:46:31 5 went to Monrovia upon Mr Taylor's invitation through General  
6 Dopoe Menkarzon.

7 Q. Now, from that point - and I'm picking it up at the bottom  
8 of that page - "the President gave huge quantity of logistics,  
9 ammunition to the high command for us to start repelling the  
15:47:03 10 ECOMOG advancement or to contain situation."

11 Mr Sesay, in 1998, the year of the ECOMOG intervention, how  
12 many shipments of arms - as far as you're aware - came into  
13 Sierra Leone from outside of Sierra Leone; that is, any huge  
14 quantity of ammunition in 1998.

15:47:52 15 A. In 1998, the only time I saw Bockarie, when he said he had  
16 brought the ammunition from Lofa from the battalion commander and  
17 Benjamin Yeaten. Those were the only ammunition I saw that we  
18 used to attack Kono. But before that time, except the ammunition  
19 that Bockarie used to send Kennedy to buy from the ex-ULIMO  
15:48:22 20 fighters and the bartering that Mike Lamin, bartered the machine  
21 in exchange for ammunition from the battalion commander in Bomi  
22 Hills.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat the  
24 name of the battalion commander.

15:48:40 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. What was the battalion commander's name in Bomi Hills?

27 A. Bob Gibson, something like that.

28 Q. Let's go back to the document: It's something "this  
29 development". What could that word be?

1            "When the high command returned from Liberia he briefed JPK  
2            pertaining to the latest development and met him personally to  
3            give a helping hand with diamonds or any foreign currency he had  
4            brought from Freetown for him to impress President Taylor. As a  
15:49:38 5            result, JPK denied bitterly that he had brought no diamond with  
6            him, whereas the high command had gathered information that JPK  
7            has brought lots of diamonds with him, but he wants to keep it on  
8            his own without financing the movement, as we are now under one  
9            umbrella. Therefore, the high command gave instruction to  
15:50:02 10           Brigadier Issa Sesay and Brigadier Mike Lamin for them to  
11           properly search JPK for diamond. After the searching lots of  
12           large quantity of diamonds was taken from JPK and his bodyguards.  
13           Later the parcels of diamond were given to Mr Ibrahim, general,  
14           and sister Memuna for them to travel with the parcels directly to  
15:50:33 15           President Taylor."

16           Now, let's pause there, Mr Sesay, so that we can get the  
17           sequence of this. When the high command returned from Liberia,  
18           he briefed JPK. Then he asked JPK about diamonds. Then you are  
19           sent to search JPK for diamond, which means that before the  
15:51:06 20           diamonds were recovered from Johnny Paul Koroma's person,  
21           Bockarie had already gone to Monrovia. Do you follow?

22           A.     Yes, I do follow.

23           Q.     Did Bockarie go to Monrovia before Johnny Paul Koroma  
24           handed over those diamonds?

15:51:33 25           A.     No, before we arrived in Buedu, when Bockarie withdrew from  
26           Kenema he did not go to Monrovia, and, when we arrived in Buedu,  
27           together with Johnny Paul, Bockarie did not go to Monrovia, right  
28           up to the time Johnny Paul handed over the diamonds.

29           Q.     What happened to the diamonds that Johnny Paul Koroma



1 handed over?

2 A. Those were the diamonds which I said Bockarie spoke to  
3 Memunatu Deen in Abidjan, and he told Memunatu Deen to tell  
4 Ibrahim Bah to go to Monrovia in a week's time to pick me up and  
15:52:15 5 Memuna came to Buedu and the two of us moved. Those are the  
6 diamonds that I lost. Those are the diamonds that were taken  
7 from Johnny Paul.

8 Q. But listen to what is being said in this report:

9 "Issa Sesay and Brigadier Mike Lamin, for them to properly  
15:52:39 10 search JPK for diamond. After the searching."

11 Now pause there. Did you and Mike Lamin search Johnny Paul  
12 Koroma?

13 A. No, we did not search Johnny Paul Koroma. It was based on  
14 information Rambo had given to Bockarie, and Sam Bockarie invited  
15:53:01 15 Mike Lamin and myself, and it was based on that information that  
16 Sam Bockarie asked Johnny Paul to present the diamonds, and  
17 indeed Johnny Paul presented the diamonds without anybody  
18 searching him.

19 Q. Thank you. But then it goes on: "Later the parcels of  
15:53:18 20 diamond was given to Mr Ibrahim, general, and sister Memuna."  
21 Pause there. Mr Ibrahim, general, who is that?

22 A. I think the person is referring to Ibrahim Bah, because  
23 that's the only General Ibrahim that the RUF ever dealt with.

24 Q. And sister Memuna is who?

15:53:49 25 A. Well, Memunatu Deen. This person, he only - this person  
26 don't know the exact thing that happened, so they only gather  
27 information from bits. Because Gibril, at this time he was at  
28 Pademba Road so if he wanted to write information like this he  
29 will not ever get the perfect truth.

1 Q. Let me ask you this, Mr Sesay: The diamonds that were  
2 taken from - that Johnny Paul Koroma handed over, were they given  
3 to General Ibrahim Bah?

4 A. No. It was Bockarie, myself and Mike Lamin were the ones  
15:54:46 5 who went to Johnny Paul, and Johnny Paul handed the diamonds over  
6 to Bockarie, and Bockarie in turn gave me the diamonds later and  
7 instructed that I should travel to Monrovia with Memuna and  
8 Ibrahim Bah was to pick me up and take me to --

9 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak  
15:55:03 10 slowly, please, and repeat that part of his answer.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Ibrahim Bah, you tell us, was to go to Burkina Faso to meet  
13 who?

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: I really want to hear it from the  
15:55:15 15 witness. Mr Witness, you said you were to travel to Monrovia  
16 with Memuna and Ibrahim Bah was to pick you up and take you  
17 where, and to do what?

18 THE WITNESS: My Lord, I said Memuna and I travelled to  
19 Monrovia with the parcel that contains these diamonds, and  
15:55:35 20 Ibrahim Bah was to pick me up from Monrovia to take me to Burkina  
21 Faso where I should have given the diamonds to General Diendere,  
22 who Bockarie had said I should give the diamond to. And Ibrahim  
23 Bah was to arrange how to get fighting materials, ammunition.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: In the transcript the name will be  
15:55:59 25 Diendere not Deen-Jalloh. Diendere.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Mr Sesay, I am laboursing this because I want us to see how  
28 accurate, truthful, reliable this document is. The document  
29 states quite clearly that those diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma

1 were given to Ibrahim Bah. Were they ever given to Ibrahim Bah?

2 A. No, this document is false. Those diamonds were never  
3 given to Ibrahim Bah. I was given the diamonds for me to take  
4 them along, and Ibrahim Bah was to pick me up and to go with me.

15:56:43 5 Q. And the document goes on to then - to saying that they were  
6 given to him and sister Memuna, for them to travel with the  
7 parcels directly to President Taylor. Is that true or false?

8 A. That is false, because, one, Memuna was not Ibrahim's  
9 sister and the diamonds were not to be taken to Mr Taylor. If  
15:57:13 10 the diamonds were to be taken to Mr Taylor, then obviously they  
11 wouldn't have got missing from me because I was in Monrovia and I  
12 travelled for six days.

13 Q. "From this development, the high command" - and just remind  
14 us, who is the high command?

15:57:47 15 A. The high command was Bockarie.

16 Q. "Was enabled to receive his first satellite phone from  
17 General Ibrahim, which he was to use to do some important  
18 contacts with" blank.

19 Now, pause there. We discussed satellite phones last week.  
15:58:25 20 When did Bockarie get his first satellite phone?

21 A. October 1998.

22 Q. Was he in possession of a mobile phone at or around the  
23 time that Johnny Paul Koroma handed over the diamonds?

24 A. No. At that time, Bockarie had not had a phone yet.

15:58:44 25 Q. "After General Ibrahim returned back to Burkina Faso, the  
26 high command also received a good caratage of diamond from Kono.  
27 He also planned to send another good parcel to General Ibrahim in  
28 Burkina Faso for ammunition and arms, as he had started making  
29 some important contacts for material. The high command therefore

1 decided to hand over the said parcel of diamond to the battle  
2 group commander Issa Sesay in order for him to pass through  
3 Monrovia and make his way to Burkina Faso and meet General  
4 Ibrahim to work out fast modalities to get some needed materials  
16:00:10 5 for us."

6 Pause there. Do you understand what's being said here,  
7 Mr Sesay?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. There's one parcel of diamonds taken from Johnny Paul  
16:00:31 10 Koroma, taken by Ibrahim Bah and sister Memuna to Charles Taylor.  
11 Yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. There's another parcel from Kono given to you thereafter to  
14 take to Burkina Faso with Ibrahim Bah. Is there any truth to any  
16:00:50 15 of this?

16 A. No, there's no truth in this. That's a lie. The only time  
17 Memuna came was after we had arrived in Buedu. Those were the  
18 diamonds that we took from Johnny Paul, and that was the reason  
19 why Memuna came, to go with me. But no diamonds came from Kono  
16:01:13 20 that Bockarie gave to me to go with. No, that's a lie.

21 Q. But then it goes on:

22 "Brigadier Issa Sesay left the base and travel along with  
23 Colonel Jungle and some Liberian securities to Monrovia."

24 Did Jungle travel with you from the base to Monrovia?

16:01:36 25 A. No, no. Jungle did not travel with me. I travelled with  
26 Memunatu Deen from Buedu to Monrovia. Jungle met me in Monrovia  
27 from Abidjan.

28 Q. And did you travel with some Liberian securities to  
29 Monrovia?

1 A. No, no. We used a civilian vehicle from Foya to Monrovia.

2 Q. "He did not make his way through as he only stop in  
3 Monrovia and information was later received by the high command  
4 that the parcel of diamonds has dropped from Brigadier Issa. He  
16:02:33 5 therefore return on base and gave the same report to the high  
6 command.

7 The joint security therefore investigated the BGC (battle  
8 group commander) and took statement from him.

9 Later a" --

16:03:01 10 A. Nobody took statements from me. Nobody obtained statement  
11 from me. Nobody obtained statement from me. When I came, I  
12 explained what happened, and Pa Rogers and Mike Lamin asked me  
13 questions. But to say they obtained statements from me, no, it's  
14 a lie.

16:03:22 15 Q. "Later a forum was held pertaining this issue." Was a  
16 forum held?

17 A. No.

18 Q. "And the senior officers and elders suggested to suspend  
19 the issue until the arrival of the leader.

16:03:47 20 More so, President Taylor continues to give helping hands  
21 with logistics, which involves foodstuff and materials. The high  
22 command was called in every month to report to Monrovia for  
23 briefing. The high command later called Brigadier Dennis Mingo  
24 (Superman) on a forum for a mission to be carry out to capture  
16:04:28 25 the whole of Kono."

26 Go back. "President Taylor continues to give helping hands  
27 with logistics." Was this the case, Mr Sesay?

28 A. It's a black lie.

29 Q. Was the high command - remind us: Who is the high command?

1 A. Sam Bockarie.

2 Q. Was Sam Bockarie going to Monrovia every month to report to  
3 Charles Taylor?

4 A. It's a big lie. It's a lie. Sam Bockarie did not go there  
16:05:13 5 until in September that he went to Monrovia, September '98, but  
6 before September '98, Bockarie did not go to Monrovia.

7 Q. "To carry out to capture the whole of Kono. They came up  
8 with an agreement to apply some guerilla tactics to overrun the  
9 strategic positions in Kono District. A plan was drawn but  
16:06:04 10 Superman never went with the plan, and the mission fail without  
11 capturing Kono and over 30 missing in action on our side and also  
12 killed in action."

13 Are those figures accurate, Mr Sesay?

14 A. No. The men who died during that attack, according to what  
16:06:27 15 I heard, they said there were more than 70, more than 70 men, and  
16 those who were wounded, there were also many.

17 Q. And then this:

18 "After the said mission, Superman was able to put some  
19 manpower together and proceeded to Kabala axis and created a  
16:06:52 20 jungle there."

21 Is that accurate?

22 A. Superman went and joined SAJ Musa at the initial stage, so  
23 this is not accurate because he did not go to a separate Jungle.  
24 He went and joined SAJ Musa, but after a month or so, they had an  
16:07:21 25 infighting.

26 Q. "In September 1998, the high command called a vanguard  
27 forum. He addressed the forum and made all the vanguards to  
28 understand that they should tighten up their belts and officiate  
29 themselves as vanguards of this revolution, also as to how best

1 they should operate to promote the good image of the struggle.  
2 In this forum, the high command tried to constructively criticise  
3 the way Superman is behaving. The high command made Superman  
4 available over the communication for a dialogue. In their  
16:08:16 5 dialogue, he criticised Superman for putting a Lebanese woman  
6 behind him, which is delaying the operation. In fact, to this,  
7 the high command therefore instructed Superman to report for a  
8 better plan, but he responded that he will not report to the  
9 call. From that point, Superman started operating on his own."

16:09:01 10 Do you recall such a vanguard forum being called in  
11 September 1998, Mr Sesay?

12 A. Well, Bockarie used to call meetings in Buedu in August,  
13 September. He used to call officers, vanguards from Kono, to go  
14 and attend meetings. But the only thing is that this document is  
16:09:20 15 lying because in September 1998, Bockarie and Superman were no  
16 longer in communication. The communication between Bockarie and  
17 Superman stopped in August. It was in August that Superman broke  
18 away from Bockarie.

19 Q. "From that point, Superman started operating on his own,  
16:09:43 20 without taking any instruction or orders from the high desk. In  
21 October, the high command was again called by President Taylor.  
22 We therefore went along with him to Monrovia."

23 Pause there. You have told us, Mr Sesay, that Sam Bockarie  
24 did indeed go to Monrovia at or about this time. Is that true?

16:10:20 25 A. Yes, I said in September Bockarie went to Monrovia, and in  
26 October also he went to Monrovia.

27 Q. When in October - well, let's take it in stages. When in  
28 September Bockarie went to Monrovia, who travelled with him as  
29 members of the RUF?

1 A. Well, I think it was in mid-September that Bockarie went.  
2 It was around that time that he went to Monrovia. But at that  
3 time, he went with his bodyguards and JR. JR was one of the Black  
4 Guards that was assigned with Sam Bockarie since 1997 to '99,  
16:11:13 5 until the time Bockarie sent him to Abidjan. The commander, who  
6 was Jackson Swarray, he was based in Kailahun Town throughout  
7 1998 and part of '99 - and early '99. Throughout '98 to February  
8 '99, Jackson Swarray was based in Kailahun Town, before Sam  
9 Bockarie sent him to Makeni to go and conduct that investigation  
16:11:39 10 together with Isaac and others. But he did not used to travel  
11 with Sam Bockarie to go on those trips. He was based in Kailahun  
12 Town. So even if realistically he said - he had the right to  
13 write the report as a Black Guard commander, but he never used to  
14 go on those trips because he was not deployed with Sam Bockarie.

16:12:06 15 Q. So as far as you're aware, in September 1998, did any Black  
16 Guards travel with Bockarie to Monrovia?

17 A. September '98, no. Bockarie travelled with his bodyguards.  
18 It was the trip in December that Junior Vandi, who was the only  
19 Black Guard that went with Bockarie, went with him. But for the  
16:12:40 20 two trips, September, October, Junior Vandi did not go because,  
21 around October, Junior Vandi was around the Jojoima area.

22 Q. In either of the trips in September or October 1998, did  
23 Bockarie travel with any Black Guard?

24 A. No.

16:13:07 25 Q. Now, bearing in mind that this is supposedly a report from  
26 the Black Revolutionary Guard, when we see on this page, "In  
27 October the high command was again called by President Taylor.  
28 We therefore went along with him to Monrovia," is that true or  
29 false?



1 A. Well, it's false. Because Bockarie did not go with Black  
2 Guards during his October visit at the time President Taylor  
3 called him. It was in December when he travelled to Burkina Faso  
4 and Libya, that was the time Junior Vandi who was the only Black  
16:13:51 5 Guard who was with Bockarie travelled with Bockarie.

6 Q. Then we see this:

7 "The high command" - and remember this is in the context of  
8 a trip in October. "The high command was instructed by President  
9 Taylor to move to Burkina Faso and meet with the Burkina  
16:14:14 10 President. The high command, the War Council chairman, and the  
11 SLA representative, Colonel Eddie Kanneh took the trip to Burkina  
12 Faso. They met President Blaise Compaore and they were highly  
13 welcome."

14 Now, who was the War Council chairman?

16:14:42 15 A. That was SYB Rogers.

16 Q. When Bockarie went to Burkina Faso, did SYB Rogers and  
17 Eddie Kanneh travel with him?

18 A. Yes, SYB Rogers and Eddie Kanneh travelled with him on that  
19 trip and it was during that trip Lawrence Womandia and Rashid  
16:15:09 20 Sandy also went with him. But it was in November that they left  
21 Buedu and went for two weeks and then returned in December. It  
22 was not October.

23 Q. Thank you very much. That was going to be my next  
24 question:

16:15:23 25 "They met President Blaise Compaore and they were highly  
26 welcome. They took two weeks in Burkina Faso. They were given  
27 work of confidence and assurance by President Blaise that he will  
28 not let Corporal Foday Sankoh down at all. The President told  
29 the high command to be very hard in command to uphold the

1 movement until the arrival of the leader. In fact, he instructed  
2 the high command to forward the RUF issue to the OAU as he is the  
3 current OAU chairman. On their return they were given huge  
4 quantity of materials for serious offensives to start a campaign  
16:16:44 5 for the release of our leader. The delegation returned back to  
6 Monrovia in November."

7 So you see what the writer of this report is saying: In  
8 October, Monrovia, Burkina Faso. Come back with huge quantity of  
9 arms. The delegation then go back to Monrovia in November:

16:17:13 10 "The delegation returned back on base and held an immediate  
11 forum for a serious offensive to commence. All the combatants  
12 were happy and agreed to start the operation in capturing Kono.  
13 The said operation was given to the battlefield commander  
14 Brigadier Issa Sesay. Huge quantity of material was given to the  
16:18:14 15 battlefield commander and he immediately left for Kono. They  
16 also held a forum in Kono and succeeded in overrunning the entire  
17 Kono District and capture some artillery weapons and huge  
18 quantity of ammunition. The whole operation was therefore given  
19 to the late Colonel Rambo who further extended the operation to

16:18:46 20 Tonkolili and advanced to Makeni. After the fall of Makeni the  
21 late colonel as per instruction went and received Brigadier  
22 Superman to join the operation. They therefore extended the  
23 operation to Port Loko as far as Waterloo and Kambia axis.

24 Furthermore Colonel Rambo also tried his level best to link up  
16:19:15 25 with the other brothers that entered Freetown, but the Freetown  
26 operation was not coordinated as the said commander, Black Jah,  
27 was not going by the instruction from the high command."

28 Who is Black Jah?

29 A. Black Jah is Gullit.

1 Q. "When they retreated from Freetown, the battlefield  
2 commander met them and told them to present a comprehensive  
3 report pertaining the whole Freetown operation but they  
4 deliberately failed to do so."

16:20:17 5 Who was the battlefield commander at this time, Mr Sesay?

6 A. I was the one.

7 Q. So tell me, did you meet with the retreating AFRC from  
8 Freetown and request from them a comprehensive report which they  
9 deliberately failed to provide? Is that true?

16:20:36 10 A. It's a big lie. Those men were not under my control. They  
11 were not under my command. I did not send them on any mission.  
12 So how would I go and ask them to give me a comprehensive report  
13 when it was not Bockarie who sent them? This is a black lie.  
14 It's a lie.

16:20:53 15 Q. "According to the Black Guard security information, they  
16 brought some diamonds and lot of foreign currency from Freetown  
17 but they never presented anything to the high command. The late  
18 Colonel Rambo even arrested \$600,000 US from some of the men from  
19 Freetown and presented the said sum to battlefield commander  
16:21:39 20 Brigadier Issa and some diamonds."

21 So, Mr Sesay, you see here you were given by these - by the  
22 late Colonel Rambo \$600,000 US and some diamonds which had been  
23 taken from Freetown. What did you do with it, Mr Sesay?

24 A. This is false. It's a big lie. In my house in Makeni the  
16:22:11 25 only money that was there was the monies that they had taken from  
26 the surrendered ECOMOG soldiers. That was the money that was up  
27 to \$9,000 that was in my house. But Rambo never - how would  
28 Rambo take those sorts of money from the retreating AFRC who were  
29 retreating and well armed at the same time? So Rambo wouldn't

1 have been able to force them and take anything from them. This  
2 is a lie. This is a black lie.

3 Q. "Again there was instruction from the high desk for  
4 Lieutenant Colonel Gibril Massaquoi to report for important  
16:22:53 5 inquiry and briefing, but he refused the call for over four good  
6 times. As a result, there was an instruction from the high  
7 command to the battlefield commander for Lieutenant Colonel  
8 Gibril Massaquoi to be arrested and turned over. The battlefield  
9 commander further went along with the late Colonel Rambo and from  
16:23:17 10 Black Guards as per instruction to arrest Lieutenant Colonel  
11 Gibril and Major Nya."

12 Did you go to arrest both Gibril Massaquoi and a Major Nya?

13 A. No, I did not go to arrest Gibril. I went to invite  
14 Gibril. And Nya had no problem with Sam Bockarie and he had no  
16:23:44 15 problem with me, so he did not even ask me to invite Nya. So it  
16 was Gibril whom he sent me to invite.

17 Q. I'm asking you specifically, Mr Sesay, and I would like a  
18 simple answer: Were you ordered to arrest Major Nya?

19 A. No.

16:24:03 20 Q. "During this process Superman and his men put on stiff  
21 resistance and even opened fire and launched some RPG bombs,  
22 therefore scatter the whole group and kill some men and went to  
23 the extent of advancing to Makeni and attacked the residence of  
24 the battlefield commander and vandalised the whole compound and  
16:24:34 25 took everything in the compound including the materials for  
26 operations and enough foreign currency and diamonds. He even  
27 extended in raising the compound of some other senior officers."

28 Were diamonds taken from your house during the attack upon  
29 it by Gibril Massaquoi, Mr Sesay?

1 A. No, I did not have any diamonds with me. They did not  
2 collect any piece of diamond from my house because I was not in  
3 possession of any diamonds, so how could they have collected  
4 diamonds from there? You see, today I am a victim. Yes, because  
16:25:22 5 all of these documents are the handiwork of Gibril Massaquoi but  
6 the same Gibril Massaquoi - these were the same people who did  
7 not want peace in Sierra Leone and the international community  
8 and certain quarters of authorities know about this, and even  
9 during disarmament Gibril went and met a prominent businessman in  
16:25:43 10 Makeni whom he told - and he was a friend to me whom he told are  
11 you not warning Issa? Issa is just disarming boys and  
12 Foday Sankoh is still in the jail? He said that man should come  
13 and persuade me to hide weapons under the ground. Bury weapons  
14 under the ground. So he said after disarmament, if we realise  
16:26:04 15 that Tejan Kabbah was not going according to arrangement then we  
16 will start the war again afresh. And I said the same Gibril is  
17 setting a trap for me.

18 And I told the man that I will never fool the Salone people  
19 around. I said if ECOWAS and the international community have  
16:26:21 20 told me to disarm, I'm going disarm. I said if a pistol or just  
21 one shot of arm, I will not keep it anywhere. I said if Gibril  
22 at the time we were in arm, and after the disarmament Gibril was  
23 the man who was organising RUF men for Foday Sankoh's  
24 bodyguards --

16:26:39 25 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, could the witness be asked  
26 to slow down and repeat from where I stopped.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Gibril was the one organising Foday Sankoh's bodyguards to  
29 do what?

1 A. I said he went and told he went and met the UNAMSIL at  
2 Mammy Yoko, General Opande, General Adeniji; and the other time  
3 he went to the Pakistani general, who later became force  
4 commander for UNAMSIL; he told them that I buried arms and  
16:27:07 5 ammunition in the ground. So one day General Opande called me  
6 very early in the morning from my house. He said, "Young man, we  
7 want to see you, come to Mammy Yoko." And then I drove to Mammy  
8 Yoko. When I went, this is what he told me, he said, "Some of  
9 your brother RUF have been here on five different occasions,  
16:27:26 10 different groups telling me that you have buried arms and  
11 ammunition." And I said, "Oh", I said "I?" He said yes. And I  
12 told him, I said, "General Opande, if the United Nation Mission  
13 in Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers, if you investigate that, if  
14 you find any arms or ammunition buried in the ground and say that  
16:27:47 15 it is the RUF handiwork", I said, "just arrest me and hand me  
16 over to the Government of Sierra Leone for proper discipline."  
17 And I told them that, "I will not only be fooling you but as  
18 well, I'll be fooling the people of Sierra Leone", and I told  
19 them, "Just look, it's today that I'm seeing documents that  
16:28:05 20 Gibril and others have written." I told him, I said, "Look,  
21 Gibril Massaquoi and Mike Lamin and their followers did not want  
22 to see peace in Sierra Leone, they did not want me to disarm  
23 whilst Foday Sankoh was still in prison."

24 And the UNAMSIL authorities were fully aware of that, like  
16:28:21 25 the sector commander who was at Magburaka, General Alie Hassan,  
26 all of them were aware of that. General Opande even when he made  
27 this statement, he went and testified on my behalf. He confirmed  
28 that.

29 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the second name was not

1 clear to the interpreter. Could the witness repeat that.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause, Mr Sesay.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. You mentioned the making of a statement by General Opande  
16:28:53 5 and you mentioned another name. What was the other name you  
6 mentioned?

7 A. I said - you mean President Kabbah? Former President of  
8 Sierra Leone?

9 Q. You tell us.

16:29:06 10 A. Yes, President Kabbah made a statement. He came to court.  
11 He confirmed that, saying that Gibril Massaquoi and others did  
12 not want to see peace in Sierra Leone. And even during the  
13 disarmament President Kabbah, in a closed door meeting in Kono,  
14 he made that complaint to the ECOWAS Leaders, Obasanjo and Alpha  
16:29:30 15 Konare, who visited the RUF disarmament programme in Kono.

16 Q. Now, you said that President Kabbah made a statement saying  
17 that Gibril Massaquoi and others did not want to see peace in  
18 Sierra Leone. Who were the others?

19 A. Like the special representative of the Secretary-General  
16:29:52 20 for the peace mission in Sierra Leone, Ambassador Adeniji, made a  
21 statement in my Defence case. And all the UN authorities were  
22 fully aware of this.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I have an eye on the time.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I notice. That will be as good a time.

16:30:13 25 We'll finish looking at this document tomorrow.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I just wish to remind the parties that  
27 tomorrow we are sitting half day because the Special Tribunal for  
28 Lebanon requires the use of this courtroom in the afternoon. So  
29 we're sitting from 9 o'clock until 1 o'clock with the usual

1 breaks.

2 Mr Sesay, as usual, you are not to discuss your evidence.

3 The Court is adjourned until tomorrow, 9 o'clock.

4 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.31 p.m.

16:31:12

5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 13 July 2010 at

6 9.00 a.m.]

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**I N D E X**

**WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:**

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