



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Erica Bussey

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Thursday, 5 November 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:32:07 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours. This
8 morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura,
9 Christopher Santora, and our case manager Maja Dimitrova.

09:33:34 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Defence is not represented at all.
11 Oh, Mr Anyah, yes. Mr Anyah has just walked in the Court
12 representing the Defence.

13 What's the situation, Mr Anyah?

14 MR ANYAH: Good morning, Mr President. Good morning,
09:33:50 15 your Honours. Good morning, counsel opposite. I am trying to
16 catch my breath, because I have been running down the hallway to
17 get here.

18 Mr Griffiths apparently called the CMS case manager,
19 Ms Irura, and informed her that he had a problem with his
09:34:08 20 apartment. I haven't spoken with Mr Griffiths personally. I was
21 in the hallway trying call him because I could not receive
22 reception on my telephone in the courtroom.

23 I am told he is on his way. I had indicated to
24 your Honours' legal officer that I preferred speaking with him,
09:34:22 25 and I was assured that you would not take the Bench until I did
26 speak with him - well, she gave me assurances to that effect -
27 and that's why I wasn't in the courtroom. I was here before
28 your Honours arrived in the courtroom. I was here before
29 9.30 a.m.

1 In any event, Mr Griffiths is not here. I have not spoken
2 to him. I would like to speak to him so that we can better
3 apprise the Court about the possibility of proceeding, I suspect,
4 within the next half hour or an hour.

09:34:53 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Firstly, Mr Anyah, the legal officer did
6 convey to us what you said, but we didn't see any reason not to
7 convene the Court at the same time of 9.30. And the proper
8 approach is that having convened the Court, if there is any
9 application to adjourn for any reason, it should be made to the
09:35:15 10 Court, not to the legal officer. But, in any event, this is fate
11 accompli. If we wanted to proceed we couldn't anyway; is that
12 right, Mr Anyah?

13 MR ANYAH: That is entirely right, Mr President.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: What's the situation? Are we going to
09:35:32 15 wait until a plumber shows up at Mr Griffiths' place or --

16 MR ANYAH: Well, I do have an application to make in that
17 regard, and the formal application would be this: Given what I
18 had stated and the little bit of information I know, under the
19 circumstances, I would respectfully ask for an adjournment of 15
09:35:52 20 minutes or less to contact Mr Griffiths and then I could be
21 better placed to make a proper application, if necessary, and/or
22 advise the Court about the possibility of proceeding today.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you, Mr Anyah.

24 Do you have anything to say on the application?

09:36:14 25 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, I think we have no recourse but
26 to go along with that until Lead Defence Counsel appears.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis.

28 Yes, we will grant that application, Mr Anyah. We are
29 fully sympathetic with your own position in this issue. We

1 realise that none of this is of your making, but if you would be
2 good enough to find out what the situation is and we will
3 reconvene at 10 to 10 unless we hear from you in the meantime.

4 [Break taken at 9.35 a.m.]

09:42:48 5 [Upon resuming at 10.15 a.m.]

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I apologise to everyone
7 for the delay in starting today. It was entirely my fault.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths, I understand you had
9 some problems --

10:16:07 10 MR GRIFFITHS: A few domestic problems, but I am hopeful
11 that they will be resolved even though I am not there.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I must say, Mr Griffiths, as
13 somebody who's been in the same position as yourself, you've done
14 remarkably well to get any sort of service in this short amount
10:16:27 15 of time.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I managed to sort something out.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We will continue.

18 Mr Taylor, I just remind you you are still on that
19 affirmation you took to tell the truth.

10:16:36 20 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

21 [On former affirmation]

22 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can I remind everyone that we were
24 looking at the Sandline report, which is in volume 1 of 3,
10:16:49 25 disclosure for week 31:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you recall that yesterday when we adjourned
27 we were looking at this report - House of Commons report on the
28 Sandline incident, yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And we concluded yesterday having looked at, first the
2 introduction, and then certain aspects of the summary, yes?

3 A. Yes, we did.

4 Q. Now, I would like us now, please, to go to page 11. So
10:17:57 5 it's behind divider 18, Mr Taylor, and can we go, please, to page
6 11.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Page 11. There should be a subheading near the top of that
9 page, "Intelligent Reports and Assessments"?

10:18:40 10 A. That is correct, yes.

11 Q. I would like us to begin, please, at paragraph 216:

12 "We have seen 102 intelligence reports and assessments on
13 Sierra Leone during the period May 1997 to May 1998. They
14 comprise 47 GCHQ reports ..."

10:19:05 15 What is "GCHQ", Mr Taylor?

16 A. That you look in paragraph 214, it says "Government
17 Communication Headquarters".

18 Q. Right.

19 "... five SIS reports, 44 DIS reports and assessments,
10:19:23 20 mostly extracts from weekly summaries, and six JIC assessments
21 drawn from the foregoing. We have also seen 21 reports from the
22 British military liaison officer and 47 reports from HMS
23 Cornwall."

24 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor: Reports from
10:19:48 25 HMS Cornwall, the ship which we know was offshore at the time?

26 A. My understanding of the capabilities of a ship like that
27 would be intercepts of communication, that is, radio, telephone,
28 telegraph and that kind of stuff. Probably also they would look
29 at movements within the area offshore and even maybe surveillance

1 of air traffic and different things within the region. They
2 would - or may I say should - have such capabilities.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 "The GCHQ and SIS reports were copied to the Foreign and
10:20:41 5 Commonwealth Office, as were most of the DIS reports. All the
6 JIS assessments were copied to the FC0 and other departments.
7 These reports are secret and highly classified, and we cannot
8 reproduce or specify them. However, we are satisfied that with
9 only one exception, they contain nothing which bears
10:21:07 10 significantly on our investigation and which is not also
11 available from other official and less highly classified sources.
12 The exception is the report mentioned in paragraph 6.53."

13 Let us now, please, go to paragraph 6.53, which is on page
14 63. Now, it's the penultimate paragraph on that page:

10:21:47 15 "On or about 19 February, AD(E) ..."

16 And when one looks at the glossary at the back of this
17 report, that stands for Africa Department Equatorial of the
18 Foreign and Commonwealth Office which covers West Africa,
19 including Sierra Leone. So that's what that stands for.

10:22:10 20 "... received a copy of an intelligence report suggesting
21 that President Kabbah had engaged Executive Outcomes/Sandline to
22 prepare and lead a military force from bases in Liberia to oust
23 the junta. Sandline was described as heavily involved in the
24 plan, which was said to include the supply and training of troops
10:22:36 25 and the provision of military helicopters and supplies. This
26 report was marked for passing to Ms Drury. She does not recall
27 whether she saw it herself. She had instructed her staff to
28 be" - can't make it out - "in the intelligence reports they
29 showed her; however, this particular report was seen by

1 Mr Murray. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials have to
2 make judgements about intelligence reports. Mr Murray discounted
3 this one because, as he told us, it referred to arms and Kamajor
4 in the unlikely location of Liberia."

10:23:21 5 What do you understand by that paragraph, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Well, this is exactly what I told this Court before. I
7 come to office in July 1997. There are Liberians that have been
8 disarmed, whatever levels, from the civil war, from ULIMO, that
9 are being ferried back - into Sierra Leone. They are operating
10:23:51 10 from, I have told this Court, a base, Ricks Institute, just
11 practically inside the city on the road going to Sierra Leone
12 toward the Bo Waterside. I am all up in flames about this, and I
13 am stating that I do not want anything to do with forces being
14 armed from the Liberian civil war being taken into Liberia - I
10:24:16 15 mean, into Sierra Leone.

16 Also, there is this report where ECOMOG flies combatants
17 out of Roberts International Airport into Sierra Leone for this
18 whole thing. All of this is going on throughout late 1997 that
19 results to a conflict. So here we are, Sandlines - and I want to
10:24:38 20 say no one can say this is not without the knowledge, because
21 everything is happening here. All of these intelligence
22 agencies, the secret intelligence agencies, HMS Cornwall, the
23 collection of communication other things, all of these top
24 agencies are aware, and this operation out of Liberia is a
10:24:58 25 violation of our sovereignty, but I am not in control of the
26 situation over there. They are doing this inside Liberia. So
27 this simply is saying here that in fact, this whole operation
28 that occurs in February begins, is planned, and operated out of
29 Liberia, and this is beginning late 1997. And I made this point

1 to this Court before.

2 Q. So, Mr Taylor, when, in earlier testimony, you told us
3 about Hinga Norman's association with ECOMOG, the recruitment of
4 former Liberian combatants, and also the arming of the Kamajors,
10:25:43 5 were you aware at the time that was linked to this British-based
6 company Sandline?

7 A. No, not at all. Not at all. I was not aware, no.

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I am just seek a
9 clarification on time frame. In that paragraph they speak about
10:26:00 10 the 19 February. Now, in view of what Mr Taylor has just said,
11 should we mean that to read 1997?

12 THE WITNESS: No, no, no, no, no.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: '96?

14 THE WITNESS: This is 19 February 1998. But I am saying
10:26:12 15 the commencement, your Honour, starts in late 1997 going into
16 1998, because I recall - they received - he says on or about 19
17 February. This is 1998. But the origin of this is back in 1997,
18 as I detailed to this Court, OF my concern with Liberians being
19 armed, and it has its genesis in 1997.

10:26:43 20 MR GRIFFITHS: And can I say, your Honour, for future
21 reference, if needed, there is a very helpful chronology which -
22 appended to this report at annex B which begins at page 123,
23 which sets out not only the chronology of the matters dealt with
24 by this inquiry, but indeed other matters relevant to Sierra
10:27:11 25 Leone. And if we could just glance at that, we will get an idea
26 of what I am talking about. We see that it sets out when Sierra
27 Leone gained independence in 1961; the ousting of Momoh, so on
28 and so forth. So that is available for future reference.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, yesterday you told us that it was the

1 United Kingdom who took the lead in passing this UN resolution to
2 impose sanctions on Sierra Leone?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can we go, please, to page 14. Do you have it?

10:28:15 5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. Paragraph 3.1 - 3.7:

7 "The United Kingdom took the lead in promoting a resolution
8 of the United Nations Security Council to strike further at the
9 illegal junta.

10:28:33 10 Following the ECOWAS call for sanctions, the United Nations
11 department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office convened a
12 meeting in London on 14 July 1997."

13 Over the page, last paragraph:

14 "On 13 August, UKMIS" - that is the United Kingdom Mission
10:28:59 15 in New York - "sent the Foreign and Commonwealth Office a first
16 draft of the UN resolution incorporating an embargo on the sale
17 or supply of arms and related materials of all types to the
18 territory of Sierra Leone."

19 Over the page, please:

10:29:22 20 "In spite of the clear policy of a blanket ban, officials'
21 grasp of its implications seems from the first to have been
22 uncertain. For example, the minutes of a meeting of interested
23 departments, held at the Cabinet office on 22 September 1997,
24 after the blanket ban approach had been accepted, record as one
10:29:49 25 of the points made in discussion that:

26 'It would be possible to provide arms and ammunition to
27 Sierra Leone forces, but this incurred the risk that the arms and
28 ammunition would reach the Kamajor forces which could possibly
29 lead to an escalation of violence in the countryside and make

1 civil war a greater possibility.' "

2 An then it goes on to explain that the Kamajors are
3 traditional hunters used by the Kabbah government as irregular
4 fighters under the title of civil defence militia or civil
10:30:25 5 defence units.

6 And then finally when we go over the page we see at page 17
7 that on 10 September, top paragraph:

8 "The United Kingdom mission to the United Nations sent a
9 further draft of the provision, decides that all states shall
10:30:54 10 prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or
11 from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft,
12 of petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related material
13 of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles
14 and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the
10:31:18 15 aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territory."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, do you have any difficulty with the
17 language of that provision?

18 A. Well, difficulty - I don't have any difficulty with the
19 language.

10:31:36 20 Q. Do you understand what it means?

21 A. Yes, I understand what it means. They are trying to
22 prevent arms, ammunition, others, but there is something that is
23 very - in a way I would say very deceptive about the whole - this
24 whole scenario. And the dates here, I think the justice asked
10:32:01 25 something earlier and I think we can - we are talking about 10
26 September. I think it's important to look at what time we are
27 talk about. Obviously this is not 10 September 1998. If we are
28 going back now, all this thing is going on and if we go back to
29 what I said on yesterday, you see this language, we see who

1 drafts the resolution.

2 Q. Who drafts the resolution?

3 A. The British ministers in Whitehall draft the resolution.

4 And this is the way that UN resolutions go. Resolutions are

10:32:35 5 drafted and they are floated by governments, permanent members,
6 they are floated and very rarely are there any real changes. But
7 we see what the resolution is. But we get to know that arms get
8 in there. But those arms are available for this operation as of
9 February 1998, which means that if you look at the sequence and
10:32:58 10 the truthfulness of what they are telling this Parliamentary
11 committee, there is still some hidden parts of this because some
12 things are still secret.

13 If the reports get there 19 February, they have already
14 carried out the intervention earlier in February. So that means
10:33:22 15 that arms are sent in there before February to carry out this
16 thing. So this fact that people are saying, "Well, we didn't
17 know that it was going to be in violation", it's all a bunch of
18 hogwash. They knew, they approved it but that is still secret
19 just as some part of this cannot be secret. That's the point I'm
10:33:44 20 trying to make.

21 Q. Well, how do you explain this, Mr Taylor: That the British
22 drafted the resolution and then turned around in this report and
23 said they didn't understand what the resolution they drafted
24 meant?

10:33:56 25 A. Well, that's what beats me too and, you know - but then
26 again their argument would be that's a part of what you call
27 deniability. That's pure denial because the operation is still
28 secret and so what you are seeing here is a little strange. They
29 would claim that they are not lying. They would claim that they

1 are not authorised to describe the information. This is purely
2 what you call, you know - I don't know what English word to use
3 for it, but this is nonsensical that someone would say, "I
4 drafted the law, I sent it forward and approved it, but, hey, I
10:34:43 5 didn't know what it meant." Nonsense. That's begging the issue.
6 So I'd say the British ministers that provided this information
7 told the House of Commons delegation or committee, they lied. As
8 clearly as that, they are lying because they have to hold certain
9 things still secret.

10:35:03 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: So paragraph 3.14, 10 September refers to
11 1997?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes, because the resolution is passed before
13 the 1998 operation. So to say that we don't know how the arms
14 got there and we didn't know, when they have already passed the
10:35:30 15 resolution that they drafted, I am saying that they were aware
16 and they were supplying arms after the resolution which was in
17 violation of the resolution and those arms were going in. But
18 don't forget now they were accusing me in Liberia of sending arms
19 to Sierra Leone.

10:35:46 20 MR GRIFFITHS: And, your Honour, can I invite your Honour's
21 attention back at page to paragraph 3.16 for confirmation that
22 have year.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's also in the chronology.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: It's also in the chronology. So it's 10
10:36:03 25 September 1997 to which that paragraph refers:

26 Q. Mr Taylor, let us just briefly look at, please, at who
27 Sandline is or was. Page 23, please. Do you have it?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Paragraph 4.3:

1 "Sandline's senior employer is Mr Tim Spicer OBE, a
2 professional soldier who retired from the army in 1995 as a
3 lieutenant colonel in the Scots Guards.

4 Sandline's UK base was, until recently, at 535 Kings Road,
10:36:52 5 London, SW10.

6 Other associates of Mr Spicer in this context include
7 Mr Rupert Bowen, formerly of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 and now of Branch Energy, and brigadier Bert Sachse, formerly of
9 the South African Defence Force and now of Lifeguard, which
10:37:22 10 provides security services for various commercial enterprises,
11 including diamond mines in Sierra Leone."

12 Let's go to the next page, page 24, please. Paragraph 4.8,
13 five lines from the bottom of the page:

14 "Before Mr Penfold took up his appointment as High
10:37:57 15 Commissioner for Sierra Leone in March 1997, he went on the
16 Foreign and Commonwealth Office's advice to the Kings Road office
17 to visit Branch Energy, as one of the leading British companies
18 in Sierra Leone."

19 So that before Penfold took up his job, he already had
10:38:20 20 links with Sandline. Now, did you know this, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, I did not. I did not.

22 Q. When we jump to page 32, we see that Penfold, at paragraph
23 5.2, took up his appointment as High Commissioner in March 1997.
24 Paragraph 5.3:

10:38:52 25 "Only a few weeks after Mr Penfold took up his appointment
26 in Sierra Leone, the government to which he was accredited was
27 overthrown by the coup of 25 May 1997."

28 It then goes on at paragraph 5.5 to describe his transfer
29 to Conakry. Let's jump to page 34, paragraph 5.8:

1 "Whilst he was in Conakry, Mr Penfold kept in close touch
2 with President Kabbah and his government. He saw the President
3 two or three times a week and enjoyed his confidence. In late
4 October, Mr Penfold travelled with President Kabbah to London,
10:39:45 5 where both took part in the conference on 'Restoring Sierra Leone
6 to Democracy.' Mr Penfold then accompanied President Kabbah to
7 the Commonwealth Heads of State conference in Edinburgh."

8 Were you aware, Mr Taylor, that Mr President Kabbah
9 attended that?

10:40:11 10 A. In press reports, yes, I did hear about it.

11 Q. And then when we jump to page 43, just to complete the
12 chronology of events:

13 "On 1 March" - this is 1998 - "HMS Cornwall arrived at
14 Freetown and on 5 March its helicopter picked up Mr Penfold from
10:40:51 15 Conakry and took him on board. HMS Cornwall returned him to
16 Freetown that day, together with the Sierra Leone Foreign
17 Minister. Major Hicks, who was the new British military liaison
18 officer, and two members of the royal military police protection
19 team, also travelled with them. Mr Glass, the Deputy High
10:41:13 20 Commissioner, had gone back some days before to prepare the High
21 Commission for reopening. On 10 March, President Kabbah entered
22 Freetown to a jubilant welcome, accompanied by President Abacha
23 of Nigeria."

24 Now, Mr Taylor, during this whole episode, and we see that
10:41:38 25 the British government was involved initially in the autumn of
26 1997 in drafting this resolution, that their High Commissioner
27 was closely involved even whilst President Kabbah was in exile in
28 Guinea with that President and, indeed, that Kabbah was present
29 in the United Kingdom for the Commonwealth Heads of Government

1 conference. Now help us, through all of that, do you accept that
2 the British government didn't know that they were breaching this
3 resolution?

10:42:23 4 A. No, I don't. No, I don't. The British government - what
5 cannot be lost in this whole scenario, your Honours - for me why
6 is this important? I have no arms in Liberia following the
7 disarmament and my election as President. There are arms flowing
8 into Sierra Leone. The Kamajors are being armed and there is a
9 point that we must remember, the Nigerians that want to carry out
10:42:56 10 this major operation in Sierra Leone have an embargo of arms
11 against them, so --

12 Q. Who do?

13 A. Nigeria. By this time Nigeria is embargoed so Nigeria
14 cannot import arms. Nigeria has an arms embargo.

10:43:13 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: You mean ECOMOG?

16 THE WITNESS: No, Nigeria as a country. So because the
17 majority of their people are there, Nigeria cannot bring in the
18 extra supplies for this operation. It is stated further in this
19 report also about that. But what is interesting about this,
10:43:32 20 arrangements are made for the illegal transport of arms into
21 Sierra Leone, thus breaking a United Nations Security Council
22 resolution. But you need to find an alibi, so how are arms
23 getting into Sierra Leone? So I am saying the British are
24 involved in this lie that arms are coming from Liberia when they
10:43:56 25 know very well that I do not have arms, because these arms that
26 came into the Kamajors and for the Nigerians for the operation in
27 Sierra Leone definitely did not stay in just the hands of the
28 Kamajors and the Nigerians. Of course you are fighting a war,
29 arms are intercepted, there are ambushes and different things,

1 but the explanation as to how are arms getting into Sierra Leone
2 can only be made by saying it is coming from Liberia and
3 Charles Taylor. This is for me the whole genesis, 1997 when I
4 come into office, going on into 1998, they must show that arms
10:44:37 5 are coming there. They must hide the fact that it is Sandline
6 with the authorisation of and knowledge - and I want to say, even
7 though they are denying it, with the knowledge and/or
8 acquiescence of the British government, okay, with senior
9 ministers, okay, that they would bring in these arms and build
10:44:55 10 this lie that the only way that arms are getting into Sierra
11 Leone is because they are coming from the Charles Taylor
12 government when I do not have any arms in Liberia.

13 For me, this is the situation. So this whole thing that
14 the British say, "Well, we didn't know," it's impossible for them
10:45:11 15 not to have known when they drafted the resolution; they pushed
16 it through the Security Council; they got it accomplished; their
17 ambassador is meeting with Sandlines people or people associated
18 with Sandlines; their ambassador is in Guinea. They know what is
19 going on, and so to put this whole thing on me is to really -
10:45:34 20 this whole thing makes me really a victim of this whole
21 intelligence set-up. All of the agencies involved here, all
22 intelligence agencies, every one are from the British government,
23 all of them. So I do not accept that they did not know, and I
24 think they were aware. But to hide that fact, they put the blame
10:45:55 25 on Taylor. And I keep telling the world: How can I supply arms
26 to Sierra Leone in 1998, 1999 when I do not have arms in Liberia?
27 So to account for the arms in Sierra Leone, that's where - they
28 brought it into that country, and we still don't know the number
29 of shipments because that is still secret. But there had to be

1 many shipments. That's my statement on that.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, is there anything else that you want to tell us about
4 this report, Mr Taylor, before I move on?

10:46:29 5 A. Well, you know, I guess I have - just a little.

6 That - when we look at even this report, I do not think we read
7 that portion, but Sandlines - I think we touched it - is also
8 providing, through Executive Outcome, protection of diamond
9 fields in Sierra Leone. So the whole issue of diamonds is of a
10:47:02 10 greater scope. It is not just about arms, but it is about the
11 protection of this company that has its interest - the name of
12 the company was just read - in Sierra Leone. So this whole thing
13 - and how does Kabbah get the weapons paid for? He promises that
14 that company, through the working diamond, would pay for arms.

10:47:24 15 So this whole thing about the RUF mining diamonds, which I do not
16 dispute, but that it had to be controlled by an external force
17 and it is through the diamonds, okay, that arms are supplied by
18 Taylor, is based on this intelligence plot. And how they do
19 these intelligence things, they write them just like a movie
10:47:46 20 script. It's written out, it is played out. And this is why we
21 see - everything that is being played out for your Honours in
22 this case is all based on an intelligence plot with key players,
23 major senior officials in governments and intelligence agencies
24 to find a fall guy, and Charles Taylor had to be that fall guy.

10:48:10 25 That's what this report, for me, shows how arms got in; the
26 diamond interest that Sandline was protecting; Robin Cook, the
27 British Foreign Secretary's own knowledge of this and denial,
28 even to this Congressional committee - I keep saying
29 "Congressional" because of the American background - of the --

1 Q. The House of Commons?

2 A. The House of Commons committee, all of this is a careful
3 orchestration for my destruction, and it continued from '98, '99,
4 2000, and on. That's all I have to say about this.

10:48:46 5 Q. Well, I want to move on from --

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am not sure I caught the name of the
7 company that was supposed to benefit from the diamonds. It's
8 important. We need to get that name.

9 THE WITNESS: You read it out here. When Mr Penfold went
10:49:06 10 to the offices, that was read by you.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. This is page 23; yes, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Let me just see it, counsel, for just one minute.

14 Q. Have a look at paragraph 4.5.

10:49:41 15 A. Okay. Let's - I think 4.2 and 4.5 would set out the --

16 Q. Have a look also at the other paragraph to which I drew
17 your attention, 4.8, over the page.

18 A. Okay. So one of these companies associated with Sandline
19 is involved in diamond operation. That's the whole point. So
10:50:10 20 Sandlines is not just supplying weapons to the Government of
21 Sierra Leone, but they are also protecting an interest. That's
22 the point.

23 Q. And we see at paragraph --

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: For the record, it's Lifeguard and
10:50:25 25 Diamond Works and Branch Energy.

26 THE WITNESS: Yes.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Yes.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: 4.2.

29 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Right. Well, Mr Taylor, I - unless there is anything
3 further that you would like to direct our attention to, I
4 appropriate that we leave this report behind now.

10:50:56 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So let's put that away. Right. Now, the other matter,
7 Mr Taylor, which you told us you wanted to look at yesterday was
8 diamonds, okay?

9 A. That is correct.

10:51:38 10 Q. And what I would like us to do, please, is to carefully
11 trace the history of this issue of diamonds. Do you follow me?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, where I would like to start, please, is exhibit D-15,
14 please. I wonder if we could have that one up on the screen. Do
10:52:46 15 we have it now?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Sorry, I am having difficulty bringing it up on my screen.
18 Now, do you recall, Mr Taylor, us looking at this Mohamed Talibi
19 letter before?

10:53:17 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. I just want us, please, to quickly remind ourselves of its
22 contents. You see it's dated 26 June 1996, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Where is Foday Sankoh at this time?

10:53:35 25 A. June 1996, Foday Sankoh should be in La Cote d'Ivoire. He
26 is in La Cote d'Ivoire.

27 Q. "I want to thank you and the other brothers back home again
28 very much for the \$500,000 US which I received through you for
29 the purchase of needed material to pursue the military mission.

1 However, I wish to let you all be informed that my business
2 partners for these materials are here with me, and we have had
3 extensive discussions on this subject. Attached to this letter,
4 you will find a list of materials and their costs for your
10:54:16 5 serious and urgent attention. I now need \$1.5 million US in
6 order to purchase twice the listed materials for effective and
7 smooth operation.

8 My representative, Captain Phillip Palmer, will elaborate
9 on this all-important and urgent mission as he is expected to
10:54:39 10 travel, along with my business partners somewhere for these
11 materials if, and only if, the above mentioned amount is
12 available. These materials will be given to me at discount rates
13 and of the requested amount, plus the one already to hand, will
14 cover, in addition, all transportation costs for airlifting these
10:55:06 15 materials.

16 The airlifting of these materials to our controlled
17 territory will be done before any payment for this mission is
18 done by me. This is why I am urgently appealing to you and the
19 other brothers back home for your usual cooperation in providing
10:55:24 20 this time the \$1.5 million US to be at hand with me so that my
21 business partners and my representative can proceed for these
22 materials very quickly for fast and smooth operation."

23 Can we just go back to the title on the first page, please.
24 Now, we see it's addressed to "Brother Mohamed Talibi, Libyan
10:55:54 25 Arab Peoples Jamahiriya, Accra, Ghana".

26 Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall yesterday when we were
27 looking at the testimony of Moses Blah, Blah expressing the view
28 that Gaddafi was not particularly impressed with Foday Sankoh.
29 Do you recall that?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Now, were you aware of that?

3 A. No. Gaddafi and I never discussed Foday Sankoh. I was not
4 aware.

10:56:21 5 Q. Did you ever discuss the Sierra Leone situation of Foday
6 Sankoh with Gaddafi?

7 A. Yes. Later years when I become President, what Gaddafi
8 states is that he really felt that Sankoh did not have any
9 revolutionary credentials and that, you know, I was right for
10 staying far away from him.

10:56:48 10
11 Q. Now, the other thing that we need to note about this
12 letter, Mr Taylor is this: This is a request to the Libyans for
13 money and not arms.

14 A. Yes.

10:57:05 15 Q. Because if you look, "I wish to let you all be informed
16 that my business partners for these materials are here with me."
17 So the letter is a request for money, but the persons who the
18 materials are coming from are there with him in Cote d'Ivoire.
19 Do you see that?

10:57:31 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Now, can we now, please, have a look at exhibit P-272,
22 which is the second of the Talibi letters. Now, we see now this
23 letter is dated 4 December 1996. So this is a week after the
24 Abidjan Peace Accord signed on 30 November, yes, Mr Taylor?

10:58:29 25 A. That is correct, yes.

26 Q. We see it's addressed to the same individual:

27 "I received the \$29,000 US through Mr Daniel Kallon, for
28 which I am very grateful to you and the other brothers back home.
29 We have signed the peace accord on November 29, 1996, just so as

1 to relieve our movement of the enormous pressure from the
2 international community while I will use this opportunity to
3 transact my business in getting our fighting materials freely and
4 easily.

10:59:08 5 I have already finished negotiations with my business
6 partners, and I have so far paid \$300,000 US. Our agreement is
7 that they should receive \$700,000 US from me in Sierra Leone upon
8 their arrival with the materials into my controlled territory.
9 The total cost of the material is \$2 million US. The balance
10:59:42 10 amount will be paid when the operation is completed.

11 I am therefore asking you and your brothers to urgently
12 provide the needed US \$700,000 so that I will be in a position to
13 live up to my commitment to my business partners, who will be
14 coming very soon with these materials. As I have always learnt
11:00:11 15 from you people, there is some money with the Burkina
16 government for the provision for our needed materials. But as
17 you might have known by now, that government have really not
18 shown that keen interest in assisting us as a movement. I even
19 had conversation with Commandant Diendere these few days, but
11:00:37 20 with no positive results.

21 I would therefore suggest that you prepare a letter for me
22 to meet President Compaore on this issue, as we never received
23 anything from them, and even my delegates at Ouagadougou have
24 returned ever since to my location here. Please advise on this
11:00:55 25 issue.

26 When I went in last week, I was able to organise serious
27 mining operations in precious minerals which I believe will help
28 us to generate the needed foreign exchange for our mission."

29 Now, pause there. Mr Taylor, do you recall after Abidjan

1 Sankoh made a helicopter visit to RUF held territories in Sierra
2 Leone. Do you recall that?

3 A. Yes, I do. Yes.

4 Q. "When I went in last week, I was able to organise serious
11:01:36 5 mining operations in precious minerals which I believe will help
6 us to generate the needed foreign exchange for our mission. For
7 now I am highly in need of this \$700,000 US in order to go in and
8 be waiting for the arrival of my business partners. Please help
9 me in this great hour of need and I promise not to let you down.

11:02:01 10 Palmer will give you the rest of my message. My best regard to
11 you and your family."

12 Let's just go back to the first page, please, and remind
13 ourselves of the date of this letter. We see the letter is dated
14 4 December 1996, so this is the end of 1996. Now, just jumping
11:02:32 15 forward briefly, Mr Taylor, what happens to Foday Sankoh in March
16 1997?

17 A. In March 1997, Foday Sankoh is arrested.

18 Q. Where?

19 A. In Nigeria.

11:02:47 20 Q. In Nigeria?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. So a couple of months after this letter, Sankoh is
23 arrested, yes?

24 A. Yes.

11:02:55 25 Q. Now, let's bear in mind, please let's go back to the last
26 paragraph, in December he is saying, "I was able to organise
27 serious mining operations in precious minerals last week." So
28 that's the end of November, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. The next document I want us to look at, please, is
2 Prosecution exhibit 18, which is the panel of experts report. I
3 would like us to look at page 16 of that report, please,
4 paragraph 67:

11:04:02 5 "The Revolutionary United Front initiated the war in 1991.
6 Until 1995, RUF diamond mining and digging was probably done on a
7 sporadic and individual basis."

8 So that's the first four years of the conflict, it's
9 sporadic and individual.

11:04:27 10 "By 1995, however, the RUF and its patrons were clearly
11 taking a much greater interest in the diamond fields of Kono
12 District, and had to be removed forcefully at that time by the
13 private military company, Executive Outcomes. From then on, the
14 RUF interest in diamonds became more focused, especially with the
11:04:54 15 1997 imprisonment of Foday Sankoh in Nigeria. During his
16 imprisonment and subsequently, the diamond areas of Kono and
17 Tongo Field became a primary military focus of the RUF, and
18 diamond mining became a major fundraising exercise."

19 Let's put it together. The letter to Mohamed Talibi is
11:05:24 20 December 1996, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. When he had gone in, as he said in the letter, to put the
23 diamond mining business on a more organised business, yes,
24 Mr Taylor?

11:05:38 25 A. That is correct, yes.

26 Q. Now we have the report saying that by the time of his
27 arrest in 1997, concentration of the RUF on diamond mining has
28 become more focused. Yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. At the time of his arrest in March 1997, Mr Taylor, where
2 were you?

3 A. March 1997, I am in Liberia. I am working very, very hard
4 on my campaign to be elected as President.

11:06:19 5 Q. Now, bearing in mind what is said here about the period
6 1991 to 1995, mining is sporadic and on an individual basis.
7 Help us, Mr Taylor, during that period, did you have anything to
8 do with diamonds in Sierra Leone? Let's just limit it to '91 to
9 '95 to begin with?

11:06:46 10 A. I had nothing to do with Sierra Leone. No contacts with
11 diamonds. Nothing. I had no contacts up to the period in
12 question here of 1995.

13 Q. Right. Let's extend it a little further. In 1997,
14 when, according to this report, diamond mining becomes more
11:07:09 15 focused, at or about the time of Sankoh's arrest and
16 imprisonment, at that stage, Mr Taylor, did you have any links
17 with the RUF?

18 A. None whatsoever.

19 Q. Were you aware that diamond mining in RUF held territories
11:07:29 20 had become more focused by that time?

21 A. I had no idea whatsoever. No.

22 Q. Did you have any hand in causing it to become more focused,
23 as the report suggests?

24 A. No. I had nothing to do with it and I would suggest in
11:07:49 25 adding to my "no" that if there were any connections whatsoever,
26 and looking back at the nature of the hypothesis as produced by
27 the Prosecution, at least Foday Sankoh in one or both of those
28 letters that he wrote to Mohamed Talibi would have alluded to the
29 fact that - some allusion would have been made to the fact that

1 my friend or my brother or someone I know, Mr Taylor in Liberia,
2 you know, is helping me to do this or would do this or that. I
3 would think that by this time Sankoh, like I say, would have
4 mentioned it in one or both of his letters. My answer is no,
11:08:41 5 there was no contact whatsoever.

6 Q. Now moving forward. So now we have reached 1997.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Let's jump a couple of years and go to 1999. Can I ask,
9 please, that MFI-82, which your Honours will find behind divider
11:09:14 10 19 in disclosure for week 32 - now, Mr Taylor, do you recall this
11 Downes-Thomas code cable that we looked at some time earlier?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Now, you recall, this was Downes-Thomas's somewhat critical
14 report to Prendergast at the United Nations about the behaviour
11:10:04 15 of his counterpart in Sierra Leone, Mr Okelo, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And when we look at the second page of the code cable, yes,
18 paragraph 3:

19 "It was wrong and improper for special envoy Okelo to have
11:10:40 20 sent a junior officer to, in effect, snoop around Monrovia."

21 Let's go to the next page, please, paragraph 8:

22 "With regard to your request for comments on the officer's
23 note, I should state that I found it reckless and somewhat
24 amateurish. My suspicion is that he could have benefitted from
11:11:14 25 proper instruction and sound guidance. It is therefore not
26 surprising that he failed to confine himself to strictly Sierra
27 Leone-Liberia matters. By and large, his note is an amalgam of
28 chatty cocktail gossip, gratuitous observations and dangerous
29 subjective speculations. Special envoy Okelo's view that his

1 officer makes perceptive observations on the Liberian situation
2 and the leadership of President Taylor is probably a result of
3 him being stationed in Sierra Leone. From my vantage point,
4 however, there is a degree of irresponsibility on the part of
11:11:54 5 special envoy Okelo in forwarding and widely distributing the
6 note officially. That note, albeit journalistic in nature,
7 contains dangerous and in my view unverified pieces of
8 information. Be that as it may, the somewhat inconvenient truth
9 is that the note now officially advises the United Nations that
11:12:18 10 one of its staff members has confirmation that President Taylor
11 is a business partner to Mr Radcliff, a British diamond dealer
12 believed to be one of the many diamond dealers with connections
13 in Sierra Leone."

14 Mr Taylor, did you have any connection with that man?

11:12:38 15 A. No. In fact, Mr Radcliff is the very individual that was
16 arrested and deported from Liberia back to, what do they call
17 this, Down Under, what they refer to as Down Under.

18 Q. Australia?

19 A. Australia. How a partner of mine would be arrested. We
11:13:00 20 had - the Liberian security arrested Mr Radcliff, confiscated a
21 military uniform and other things he had at his office. He was
22 expelled from Liberia. But there is a greater context here and I
23 think I need to note it here. We are now talking about 1999.

24 Q. March?

11:13:24 25 A. March 1999. But let's look back '98 and probably a little
26 bit of 1997, what do I mean? Mr Okelo has written a report in
27 1998 following the February intervention. We already know now
28 that the operations that brought the intervention in Sierra Leone
29 were carried out, we know they were carried out now by Sandlines,

1 we know Executive Outcome is involved and we know that there is
2 the protection of commercial interest which is diamonds. So for
3 me to bring in a British citizen that is supposed to be in
4 Monrovia - and in fact the reason why we expelled Mr Radcliff,
11:14:19 5 because we considered him a British intelligence officer. So I
6 see this as another little piece of that plot.

7 Here you have diamond interest in Sierra Leone that's being
8 protected through the Sandlines operation which Kabbah promises
9 that these materials are going to be paid for. Now we have Okelo
11:14:41 10 having written the first note saying that there are Liberians
11 fighting.

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: It's not Kabbah promising. Oh, Kabbah.
13 Okay, yes, you're right. Beg your pardon.

14 THE WITNESS: I beg your pardon. I didn't hear you, your
11:14:50 15 Honour.

16 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Just ignore the comment. I was mistaken.
17 Ignore the comment, please.

18 THE WITNESS: Okay.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:15:05 20 Q. What were you saying, Mr Taylor?

21 A. I got thrown off a little but, well, the point I am trying
22 to make and I guess the justice caught it even though the justice
23 withdrew her statement, but the point is when you look at
24 the - there are other documents in that House of Commons report
11:15:22 25 that talks about how Tejani Kabbah will pay for the operations as
26 conducted by Sandlines. It involves diamonds. That's also a
27 part of that report, that's why I made the reference to it.

28 So this is the second report now, the second action. First
29 action by Okelo is to say that Liberians are involved in fighting

1 in Sierra Leone. Second memo now is going - is that there
2 is - he sends someone to Monrovia to supposedly to identify
3 someone that is involved in diamonds. This is strike number two
4 from Okelo and I think Okelo is being guided. I wanted to just
11:16:07 5 raise it's the second attack from Okelo. It's not the first.

6 Q. Now, it goes on, looking at this document:

7 "Sam Bockarie resided in Monrovia at the house of Liberian
8 senator Kpoto."

9 Did you know that senator, Mr Taylor?

11:16:34 10 A. Oh, very well. Yes.

11 Q. Senator for what part of Liberia?

12 A. He is a senator from Lofa County.

13 Q. To your knowledge, was Sam Bockarie living at his address?

14 A. Never. Never lived there. Never.

11:16:54 15 Q. Did the senator have a home in Monrovia, to your knowledge?

16 A. Oh, yes, he had a home in Monrovia and Senator Kpoto was
17 President pro tempore of the Liberian Senate.

18 Q. To your knowledge, did Sam Bockarie ever reside with him?

19 A. Never. And mind you we are talking about 1999. When does
11:17:17 20 Sam Bockarie get into Liberia? Late December 1999. Every

21 witness that has come before this Court has said where he lived,
22 he lived at the ELWA Junction, what they call Four Houses. Never

23 lived with - Senator Kpoto had his wife and children and family,
24 how would he house Sam Bockarie? Sam Bockarie was given a house

11:17:37 25 by the Liberian government. He arrives in Liberia the last week
26 of 1999 December. So he could not have lived with him prior to

27 that, at the period in question here of 1999. That's blatantly
28 incredible.

29 Q. Can we put that document away now, please. Now still on

1 this issue of diamonds, Mr Taylor, the next thing I would like us
2 to look at, please, is to remind ourselves of the contents of
3 General Jetley's report, MFI-131, week 33, behind divider 43.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

11:18:52 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Mr President. Mr President, I
6 know you have given great leeway to the examination of this
7 witness, but it appears for the last several documents we have in
8 fact been engaged in closing argument about this. These
9 documents have been read into the record. They are again being
11:19:08 10 read into the record. So in terms of - and the accused is being
11 asked to say yes or no to things. So in relation to the real
12 questioning of this witness, we would suggest it's not
13 questioning, it's basically a continuation of an ongoing theme of
14 closing argument and we would object to it and we think it's also
11:19:29 15 a waste of time in that these documents have been read word for
16 word into this record.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, what's your reply, Mr Griffiths?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Very simple, Mr President, and it's this: I
19 am setting the foundations for further documents that we will be
11:19:47 20 looking at in due course which this Court has not yet looked at
21 and in order to properly appreciate the significance of the
22 documents I am coming to, we need to lay the historical
23 foundation to remind ourselves of what the factual matrix is
24 within which certain events which I am directly coming to now
11:20:09 25 occurred. It's simply that.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, on the basis that you
27 are laying the foundation for further documents, I will allow the
28 question.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now, do you recall, Mr Taylor, in the Jetley report,
2 reference being made to Nigerian involvement in diamond mining in
3 Sierra Leone? Do you recall that?

4 A. That is correct, yes. I recall their involvement in
11:20:43 5 diamonds, yes.

6 Q. And let us just remind ourselves, please, page 1 of that
7 report. Let's just have a look at paragraph 3. Do you have it?

8 A. Yes, do I.

9 Q. "It is well known that public opinion in Nigeria was
11:21:09 10 against the continued deployment of Nigerian troops as part of
11 ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, however the Nigerian army was interested
12 in staying in Sierra Leone due to the massive benefits they were
13 getting from the illegal diamond mining. Brigadier General
14 Maxwell Khobe was commonly known as Ten Million Dollar Man. It
11:21:30 15 is alleged that he received up to ten million dollars to permit
16 the activities of the RUF. The ECOMOG force commander Major
17 General Kpamber was also involved in the illegal diamond mining
18 in connivance with RUF leader Foday Sankoh."

19 Let's put that away. Okay?

11:21:50 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, remember the overall topic we are looking
22 at is diamonds, yes, and your answer to this allegation, yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Now, help me, were you sharing the proceeds of diamond
11:22:04 25 mining with the Nigerians?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Were you involved in diamond mining with the RUF?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we know that Foday Sankoh was arrested on 8

1 May 2000, yes?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this issue of diamonds and Sierra Leone, to
4 your knowledge, did it attract the interests of the Wall Street
11:23:13 5 Journal?

6 A. Yes, it did.

7 Q. What do you recall now?

8 A. Well, there was a publication in the Wall Street Journal
9 that linked the trade of diamonds with me in Liberia.

11:23:30 10 Q. I would like us, please - and this is what we were coming
11 to - to look in week 33, binder 2 of 4, behind divider 69. Do we
12 have it?

13 A. No, not yet. Just a minute.

14 Q. Do you have it now, Mr Taylor?

11:24:36 15 A. Just one minute.

16 Q. It might be easier to remove it from the file so you can
17 turn it the right way round. Is this the article you are talking
18 about, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Oh, yes, this is it here.

11:24:49 20 Q. Now this is from the Wall Street Journal for 3 August 2000:

21 "De Beers announced with great fanfare in July that it was
22 abandoning its policy of buying diamonds in African conflict
23 zones, occasioning both applause and predictions of De Beers'
24 demise, but the diamond cartel, whilst modifying its tactics, has
11:25:18 25 not changed its basic strategy.

26 Almost since its inception at the end of the 19th century,
27 the diamond cartel has had a singular strategy: Stifling by any
28 means necessary the flow of gem diamonds from sources not under
29 its ownership or control. The problem with diamonds isn't their

1 scarcity but their abundance. They are found not only in
2 geological formations like volcanic pipes that can be fenced off
3 and mined, but also in vast alluvial areas like riverbeds or
4 beaches, places that can't be restricted.

11:26:00 5 When Europe ruled Africa, the cartel had little problem
6 making arrangements with colonial administrators to police or
7 close down freelance diamond gathering. After African colonies
8 got their independence, the cartel came to terms with dictators
9 like Mobutu Sese Seko, whose police kept out - and occasionally
11:26:26 10 massacred - suspected smugglers.

11 Where governments were less cooperative or capable, the
12 cartel commissioned mercenaries to suppress, often by maiming or
13 killing, prospective diamond hunters. At one point in 1965, the
14 cartel gave bounties to remnants of the Katanga gendarmerie to
11:26:53 15 hunt down smugglers in Angola. It also paid a Lebanese mercenary
16 named Fred Kamil in Sierra Leone to arrange ambushes that would
17 persuade Mandingo tribesmen to quit the diamond trade. Since
18 these measures didn't fully eliminate the leakage to diamond
19 cutting centres in Belgium, Israel and India, it also acted as a
11:27:19 20 buyer of last resort to keep prices from falling.

21 But that is history. The cartel now has found an ingenious
22 new mechanism for achieving its ends: the United Nations, after
23 spending months laying the conceptual groundwork in the media, as
24 well as working through the Clinton administration and human
11:27:43 25 rights communities, it has convinced the UN Security Council to
26 impose a global ban on undocumented gem diamonds from conflict
27 zones.

28 Undocumented diamonds are of course just those diamonds
29 picked out of riverbeds that De Beers wants eliminated. The

1 conflict zones, Angola and Sierra Leone, are the alluvial areas
2 in which De Beers previously depended on paid gems. Instead of
3 using colonial administrations, dictators or mercenary gangs to
4 stop Africans from gathering and selling stones, the United
11:28:30 5 Nations will use its resources (backed, no doubt, by the cartel's
6 own contingent of lawyers and detectives) to accomplish that
7 task.

8 The cartel managed this favourable outcome by playing on
9 the guilt of the West. The idea that blood diamonds were
11:28:49 10 responsible for ferocious civil wars in Africa was too much for
11 altruists and activists in developed nations. Mr Clinton,
12 meanwhile, saw diamonds as an opportunity to enhance his own
13 standing among these groups. On 21 July he called for an
14 international conference to consider practical approaches to
11:29:13 15 breaking the link between the illicit trade in diamonds and armed
16 conflict.

17 Mr Clinton's press release made no secret of the liaison
18 with the diamond cartel, noting that at a May conference in South
19 Africa, the United States, Britain and Belgium, among others, had
11:29:34 20 agreed with De Beers upon the importance of establishing a global
21 certification scheme for diamonds.

22 Like all persuasive ideas, the concept of blood diamonds is
23 not without a basis in reality. Diamonds, like any resource, can
24 be converted to money. Money can be used to buy arms and
11:29:57 25 ammunition. What the concept neglects, however, is that
26 governments are the principle means by which warriors get funded
27 and armed. Countries such as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somali,
28 Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia have managed to sustain ferocious
29 civil wars for years without having or selling diamonds.

1 Even countries rich in diamonds have found alternative ways
2 to finance their warfare. In Angola, UNITA rebels were armed by
3 the Central Intelligence Agency, South Africa's intelligence
4 service and Zaire. In the Congo, at least seven African
11:30:46 5 governments are presently intervening in the civil war with arms
6 and troops.

7 A regime backed by the United Nations and the United States
8 that inhibits the sale of uncertified diamonds, diamonds that in
9 practice come from fields the cartel doesn't control, probably
11:31:06 10 won't stop civil wars, then. It will, however, make it far less
11 costly for De Beers to control the diamond market. Another
12 brilliant coup for the cartel."

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, despite the delayed start I
14 won't interpret our normal schedule.

11:31:25 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will have the short break now and
17 resume at 12 o'clock.

18 [Break taken at 11.31 a.m.]

19 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

12:02:55 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Mr Taylor, just before the break we looked at that Wall
22 Street Journal article. What do you say about that article,
23 Mr Taylor?

24 A. Well, I would say that this is a very important article.

12:03:24 25 The author of this, Mr Epstein, has written, apparently,
26 extensively in dealing with the issues of diamonds. He is the
27 author, as is suggested at the bottom of the page, of a book:
28 The Rise and Fall of Diamonds. He is knowledgeable of the
29 trading in diamonds and what not, so I take what he said here

1 very seriously.

2 But I would like to draw the Court's attention to what
3 Mr Epstein is talking about here, and I believe in the beginning
4 of this trial when I talk about a conspiracy and lies and deceit,
12:04:12 5 I think Epstein's explanation here regarding diamonds must be
6 looked at very seriously. This whole issue of diamonds beginning
7 seriously at this particular time comes as a result, really, of
8 De Beers losing ground in the international diamond activities
9 because they are no longer having their so-called - as I say,
12:04:45 10 when these governments control African countries, they no longer
11 have their boys out there working for them. And so this whole
12 thing that - of causing this change and raising all these red
13 flags that all these conflicts are because of blood diamonds,
14 when we know we do not have blood oil - and we've seen this
12:05:05 15 around the world, where countries have been invaded that have oil
16 - is because De Beers is trying to protect her business
17 interests. As simple as that.

18 Let's look at the connection. De Beers, we see Sandline,
19 we see Executive Outcome, the companies that were just named in
12:05:24 20 the transcript a few minutes ago and read out by - well, we were
21 assisted by the Honourable Justice Sebutinde. You look at South
22 African connection, British connection, this is protecting De
23 Beers's commercial and financial interests. This is what all of
24 this is about, but they need a fall guy, Charles Taylor and
12:05:45 25 diamonds in Liberia.

26 And I say this for the following reasons: If we look very
27 carefully at a document that we've read through here, we see a
28 report coming out, paid for by NGO. The heart of the matter, Ian
29 Smiley. At the search of Foday Sankoh's house in May 2000, a

1 document is supposed to be found. There's a Charles mentioned
2 that is explained who Charles is, not Charles Taylor. But by
3 June 2000, Douglas Farah, a journalist at the Washington Post,
4 writes an elaborate article in the Washington Post saying that
12:06:32 5 the documents found at Foday Sankoh's house in May 2000 with
6 Charles show that Charles Taylor was receiving 90 per cent of --

7 Q. Mr Taylor, can I interrupt you there. We will come to that
8 in a moment.

9 A. But I'm trying just to draw the connection of what
12:06:45 10 Mr Epstein is talking about. This is a conspiracy. This is -
11 this whole fall guy Taylor and is linked to all of these things
12 that are being shown here right now, the final fall guy.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I just pause for a moment
14 because I was helpfully reminded during the break that I hadn't
12:07:04 15 asked for the Sandline report, if I can style it such, to be
16 marked for identification. So could I ask then, please, that the
17 report of the Sierra Leone arms investigation - the House of
18 Commons report of the Sierra Leone arms investigation/Sandline,
19 can I ask that that be marked for identification MFI-277.

12:07:41 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I had that already marked in my records
21 as 277. Perhaps I've gotten ahead of myself.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't think I had formally asked for it to
23 be.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: The House of Commons report is marked for
12:07:53 25 identification 277.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, a moment ago you mentioned the Charles
28 letter. Now, I would like us, please, to remind ourselves of
29 what the Charles letter said.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

2 MS HOLLIS: Yes. I don't believe there's been a foundation
3 established for reading this, which would be leading the witness.
4 Nor do I believe, based on Mr Taylor's comments yesterday, if
12:08:49 5 it's the same Charles letter, that the connection that your
6 Honours have indicated must be made before an exhibit can come in
7 under 89C can be made. This is not, as I understand it, a letter
8 that was directed to the accused, directed to be written by the
9 accused. The fact that there may be a name in there that is the
12:09:12 10 same first name as the accused does not create a connection, a
11 link, a personal relationship between this accused and this
12 document.

13 And we're not talking about hearsay, so that I'm very
14 clear. We're talking about the requirement that your Honours
12:09:27 15 have imposed of a connection. Nor do we believe that this is a
16 connection, in the very liberal sense, of it having been part of
17 his archive and having been read by him. So we would object to
18 this document being put to him until a sufficient foundation can
19 be laid.

12:09:47 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, this is a document which has
22 already been put in evidence. It is MFI - one moment. It is the
23 Charles letter - I can't put - I can't put my hand on the MFI
24 number at present. But, Mr President, the point is this:

12:10:31 25 Mr Taylor has made quite clear both yesterday and today of a link
26 between the finding of this particular letter, a reference in it
27 to a Charles, and a later Washington Post article in June 2000 in
28 which the Charles referred to in the letter is said to be
29 Mr Taylor. And we say this is germane to the link between - the

1 alleged link between Taylor and diamonds and, consequently, it's
2 a matter relevant to the issues raised on the indictment.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Has Mr Taylor ever seen that document or,
4 better still, read it?

12:11:15

5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, have you read the Michel letter?

7 A. Yes. Your Honour, the document that I refer to is a
8 document from Michel to the leader disclosed to the Defence by
9 the Prosecution, a document found at Foday Sankoh's house during
10 the search in May 2000, that it goes from Michel to the leader
11 that describes the whole issue of diamonds. It deals with the
12 fact that they are having problems with Charles who is receiving
13 90 per cent of the profit. It goes further to even state who
14 Charles is. It was disclosed by the Prosecution, stamped by the
15 Prosecution. It is a Prosecution document.

12:11:37

12:12:02

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just to make that clear, in answer to my
17 question --

18 THE WITNESS: I have read it.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: -- did you read the document or not?

12:12:18

20 THE WITNESS: That's the detail, your Honour, yes. I have
21 given you the - I have read it and that's the detail of the
22 letter, verbatim - well, I can't say verbatim - as I have
23 summarised it.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think Mr Taylor's established a
25 foundation for that document. He's able to describe it and give
26 evidence as to its relevance, and therefore I'll allow you to
27 question him on it, Mr Griffiths.

12:12:30

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

29 Q. But before we do that, Mr Taylor, it's my fault, I'm

1 getting ahead of myself. In that Wall Street Journal article, it
2 said, amongst other things, this:

3 "Like all persuasive ideas, the concept of blood diamonds
4 is not without a basis in reality. Diamonds, like any resource,
12:13:07 5 can be converted to money. Money can be used to buy arms and
6 ammunition. What the concept neglects, however, is that
7 governments are the principal means by which warriors get funded
8 and armed. Countries such as Liberia have managed to sustain
9 ferocious civil wars for years without having or selling
10 diamonds."

11 Now, help me, Mr Taylor. Did you at any stage during the
12 Liberian conflict rely on the sales of diamonds to fund the
13 activities of the NPFL.

14 A. Not at all. No.

12:13:55 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Again, Mr President, before I get ahead of
16 myself can I ask, please, that that Wall Street Journal article
17 on diamonds dated 3 August 2000 be marked for identification
18 MFI-278, please.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-278 for
12:14:20 20 identification.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. Mr Taylor, let us now then go to the letter. Your Honours
23 have this letter behind divider 142, disclosure for week 33.
24 This is the letter that was disclosed to us by the Prosecution.

12:16:05 25 Is that right, Mr Taylor?

26 A. This is the document, yes.

27 Q. It is a document allegedly found at Foday Sankoh's address
28 in Spur Road following his arrest on 8 May 2000. Is that right?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Now just to remind ourselves, from Michel to The Leader:
2 "Good morning. I'm back in Washington. I got your fax on
3 Thursday and I will go to the embassy of Sierra Leone this Monday
4 morning for this visa. As soon as I will get the visa I will fly
12:16:36 5 to Freetown to meet you.

6 Let me take a few minutes of your time to explain to you
7 what I last week in Antwerp. As you already know I met my partner,
8 you met his employee in Freetown ten days ago. My partner has
9 now decided to work with us without any restriction. As I told
12:16:57 10 you already, with him involved in the picture money is not an
11 issue any more.

12 Important: The American during the meetings in Freetown
13 offered him to open a buying office in Sierra Leone. They would
14 like to see three buying offices working in Sierra Leone.
12:17:13 15 However, as my partner told me last week, all of this could take
16 X weeks or months. You do not have any time to waste any more,
17 neither do I. This is what we suggest, he will come with me to
18 see you next week, we will bring with us what you know.

19 Dear Foday, this meeting is very important if Charles (my
12:17:37 20 partner) meets you and gets the confirmation of what I told him
21 already, based on our agreement, he will be ahead full speed
22 immediately.

23 The problem: At this time, and after one year of efforts,
24 I did not get anything, yet you and I know it. But, what is done
12:17:56 25 is done. Let's forget it and move forward. With Charles we can
26 buy, I am not talking about receive for free, the 10 per cent
27 going to Freetown but also the remaining 90 per cent in Kono. In
28 short, if we put together what we have, yourself, Charles and
29 myself, we can start immediately what we were supposed to start

1 months ago and all of us would finally make money instead of
2 losing money every day. At this time, you and I are the big
3 losers. I don't know about you, but as far as I'm concerned I'm
4 tired of it.

12:18:36 5 What we have to solve: 1. How will you convince the
6 people in charge in Kono to bring everything to you instead of 10
7 per cent and it is not possible how are you going to convince
8 them to sell those 90 per cent to us instead of keeping it or
9 selling it to the Lebanese or whoever?

12:18:57 10 2. The other point, if we can buy it how are we going to
11 ship it outside? Through Freetown is probably out of the
12 question, through Monrovia is not safe either, we cannot trust
13 those people.

14 Charles has the financial ability to do anything, a private
12:19:15 15 jet from Belgium to Kono or to Monrovia or to Freetown or any
16 other solution. With Charles we can do whatever is possible. It
17 is now up to you and me to find the solution.

18 Today, what I am saying is this: The money if finally on
19 the table, you make sure that the merchandise is available one
12:19:37 20 way or another and all of us will be okay. At the minute the
21 commission will be in place and we will have the final contract,
22 everything will be easier for all us but please let's do
23 something in the meantime. The ambassador of Sierra Leone went
24 to see Charles's father in Antwerp yesterday. Don't forget he is
12:20:02 25 the president of the association for all the diamond buyers in
26 Antwerp. Following our advice, Charles's father told the
27 ambassador that Antwerp was not ready to do anything until the
28 commission is in place. Charles is already preparing the
29 equipment you requested last week. "

1 Mr Taylor, are you the Charles referred to in this
2 document?

3 A. No, I'm not.

12:20:34 4 Q. You said that later the Washington Post published an
5 article, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. On what was that article based?

8 A. That article was based in - I would say at most to this
9 document. In June - a month later, this is in May. In June
12:20:53 10 Douglas Farah of the Washington Post writes an elaborate piece
11 quoting this letter - this document found at Foday Sankoh's house
12 as stating that Charles Taylor is involved in diamond operations
13 in Sierra Leone and is demanding 90 per cent of the profits. In
14 June 2000, written by Douglas Farah, published by the Washington
12:21:25 15 Post.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I seek some assistance
17 here? I'm not sure, and it's entirely my fault, whether when we
18 first looked at this letter I asked for it to be marked for
19 identification.

12:21:41 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Manager, could you help us on
21 that? Has that been marked for identification?

22 MS IRURA: Your Honour, it appears not to have been marked.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Could I ask then, please,
24 Mr President, that this letter from Michel to The Leader,
12:22:06 25 Foday Sankoh, recovered from Foday Sankoh's address following his
26 arrest be marked for identification MFI-278, please.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's MFI-279.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: 279. My fault.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked for

1 i denti fi cati on MFI -279.

12:22:56 2 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, there appear to be memoranda that
3 are attached or are on the same pages here that do not indicate
4 they are part of the letter. So I'm not sure what to do. Those
5 haven't been referred to, they are not part of the letter.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you for that, Ms Hollis. Yes,
7 that's quite correct. There's some additional documents on the
8 tail end of that letter.

12:23:09 9 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, yes, and when I first referred
10 to this letter we did go through those additional - the two
11 additional messages. We went through them on the first occasion
12 and I would like the whole document to be marked for
13 i denti fi cati on, please.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. There's some evidence already
12:23:26 15 regarding the tail end document?

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, there is.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document then is marked MFI-279.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

19 Q. Now let's come then, Mr Taylor, to the next stage which
12:23:45 20 you've already alerted us to which is the Douglas Farah article,
21 yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I invite everyone's attention, please,
24 to disclosure for week 37 behind divider 1:

12:24:36 25 Q. Mr Taylor, do you have it?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. Who is Douglas Farah?

28 A. Douglas Farah is a reporter for the Washington Post in
29 Washington, DC, that served also as I think the bureau chief in

1 Abidjan sometime in the period up to I would say about 2000,
2 2001.

3 Q. Is he still working for the Washington Post, Mr Taylor?

4 A. No, to the best of my - what limited information I have is
12:25:21 5 that Douglas Farah no longer works for the Washington Post. He
6 now runs his private web page or something like that.

7 Q. Let's look at this article, bearing in mind the contents of
8 that Michel Letter:

9 "Sierra Leone's rebels have been freshly reinforced by
12:25:42 10 Liberia with arms and recruits and are preparing to fight rather
11 than let UN peacekeeping forces take over their diamond mining
12 strongholds, say Western intelligence officials and West African
13 sources with direct knowledge of the events.

14 In the past two weeks, Liberian President Charles Taylor
12:26:06 15 has sent several convoys of trucks loaded with weapons, food and
16 medicine across the border to the rebels of the Revolutionary
17 United Front (RUF) in the Kono region of north eastern Sierra
18 Leone according to the sources."

19 Now, Mr Taylor, did you in late May/June in 2000 do that?

12:26:31 20 A. Never. No. No.

21 Q. "Taylor has also sponsored military training for several
22 hundred RUF fighters at his own security force's main camp, they
23 said. Most of the reinforced RUF units are led by Sam Bockarie,
24 a long time rebel leader, better known as Mosquito, who is now
12:26:54 25 living in Monrovia under Taylor's protection. For months Western
26 military and intelligence officials have reported Taylor's tacit
27 support for the rebels and friendship with their leaders. But in
28 recent days intelligence officials, diplomats and sources with
29 direct knowledge of RUF activities say his support has become

1 more active and the threat of a wider regional war is growing.
2 These sources say Taylor's recent reinforcement of the rebels is
3 due to his determination to either maintain RUF control over the
4 bulk of Sierra Leone's diamond fields, or back a new RUF
12:27:40 5 escalation of the war. While Taylor acknowledges a friendship
6 and historical ties with RUF leaders, he denies that he is arming
7 the rebels now.

8 The rebels' support from Taylor and from the President of
9 nearby Burkina Faso is the latest turn in nearly two decades of
12:28:02 10 intertwined West African wars-conflicts that, at their inception,
11 pitted brutal, corrupt US-backed governments against
12 revolutionaries trained and armed by Libyan leader Muammar
13 Gaddafi. In the 1980s and 90s Gaddafi backed the rise of Taylor,
14 RUF leader Foday Sankoh and the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise
12:28:30 15 Compaore. While Libya's influence has waned in recent years, its
16 proteges still cooperate closely, intelligence analysts said.

17 The current crisis arose last month when Sankoh refused to
18 disarm the RUF as called for in a July 1999 peace agreement. The
19 situation deteriorated when the rebels kidnapped about 500 UN
12:29:04 20 peacekeepers and Sankoh fled the capital. Taylor, under
21 international pressure, secured the peacekeepers' release.
22 Sankoh was arrested by government troops and remains in prison.

23 Last week, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told
24 Parliament that 'there is continuing evidence establishing close
12:29:25 25 links between the rebels in Sierra Leone and supporters in
26 Liberia.' The European Union suspended \$48 million in aid to
27 Liberia to pressure it to halt what another British foreign
28 office minister Keith Vaz called 'the flow of illicit weapons to
29 the rebels from outside.'

1 Scholars and diplomats say Taylor backs the RUF because he
2 profits from the sale of diamonds they mine, and because the
3 rebels employ many of Taylor's impoverished former militia
4 fighters who otherwise would be a threat to his regime. 'If you
12:30:15 5 can't give Taylor what he gets from Sierra Leone you can't give
6 him anything and he won't stop,' said Ibrahim Abdullah, a
7 historian at South Africa's University of the Western Cape who
8 studies the RUF and Liberia. 'What he is getting from Sierra
9 Leone is jobs for his boys around diamonds?'

12:30:34 10 Confidential RUF documents found in Sankoh's house after he
11 fled show he was shipping diamonds out of Sierra Leone through
12 Liberia with Taylor's knowledge. The documents also show that
13 Sankoh was growing increasingly angry at Taylor because Taylor
14 was taking 90 per cent of the profit."

12:30:58 15 Where does that figure of 90 per cent come from Mr Taylor?

16 A. In the letter from Michel to the leader.

17 Q. Now, were you the Charles referred to in that letter?

18 A. No.

19 Q. So were you, as this journalist in the United States in the
12:31:15 20 Washington Post was claiming, that important newspaper, were you
21 getting 90 per cent of the profits, Mr Taylor?

22 A. No. No.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help us. As a former President, what kind
24 of influence does the Washington Post newspaper have worldwide?

12:31:36 25 A. Extraordinary. Extraordinary influence. The Washington
26 Post, extraordinary.

27 Q. Now, the Charles referred to in the Michel letter,
28 Mr Taylor, the one who is receiving 90 per cent, according to
29 that document, do you now know who that Charles is?

1 A. It is explained in the letter. He is the son of the head
2 of the diamond buyers' association in Antwerp, and I have to
3 assume he is Caucasian.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

12:32:18 5 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Mr President. That is a
6 mischaracterisation of what has been marked MFI-279. Nowhere in
7 this letter does it say that a person named Charles is getting 90
8 per cent of the profits of diamonds. In fact, it says that
9 Charles is the partner of Michel and that Charles and Michel and
10 others can try to get the 90 per cent that is not coming to them
11 from Kono. So that is a mischaracterisation of the plain
12 language of this letter.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that seems to accord with my memory
14 of the document too, Mr Griffiths.

12:32:55 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, this Washington Post article
16 makes quite clear that the source of that reference to 90
17 per cent is confidential RUF documents found in Sankoh's house.
18 Of the documents recovered from Sankoh's house, the only document
19 which refers to 90 per cent is that Michel letter. So the source
12:33:21 20 of that reference to 90 per cent could only have come from that
21 document and from nowhere else.

22 If my learned friend can point to a single document
23 recovered from that Spur Road address which makes a different
24 reference to 90 per cent, then I would like to see it. So that's
12:33:40 25 the clear connection between the two, in our submission.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think you are saying, Ms Hollis, that
27 if that's the reference to 90 per cent, then the Washington Post
28 author has got it wrong.

29 MS HOLLIS: Not at all, Mr President. What I'm saying is

1 this: Defence counsel is taking 90 per cent, which is in this
2 letter, and he is attributing that to being given to Charles.
3 The letter doesn't say anything about Charles receiving 90
4 per cent. The letter says, "Charles is my partner, and if we get
12:34:15 5 together with Charles, we can all get the 90 per cent that now,
6 Mr Sankoh, you're not getting from Kono." So there's nothing in
7 that letter that says a Charles is getting the 90 per cent.
8 That's the mischaracterisation of the letter.

9 The letter does contain 90 per cent, but it does not say
12:34:31 10 this person Charles, whoever that is, is getting 90 per cent.
11 Instead it says, Charles is the partner of the one writing the
12 letter and so is one with Michel and Foday Sankoh to try to
13 rectify the situation so the 90 per cent they are not now getting
14 they can find a way to get. That's the mischaracterisation.

12:34:52 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand.

16 Just to put this in context, Mr Griffiths, I'm correct, am
17 I not, in saying that the question objected was this one: "Q.
18 Now, the Charles referred to in the Michel letter, Mr Taylor, the
19 one who is receiving 90 per cent, according to that document, do
12:35:19 20 you know who he is?" Or do you know who that Charles is? That's
21 the question objected to, isn't it?

22 MS HOLLIS: And it's the linkage of the Charles and
23 receiving the 90 per cent that is the basis of the objection and
24 the mischaracterisation.

12:35:36 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's what's objected to.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. I'll rephrase the question:

27 Q. Mr Taylor, this reference in the Douglas Farah article
28 linking you to Taylor and 90 per cent - I'm looking at the
29 Washington Post article, the paragraph we've just read, linking

1 the name Taylor with taking 90 per cent of the profits, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Mr Taylor, help us. First of all, that reference to
4 90 per cent, where, other than in this article, have you seen
12:36:20 5 such a reference in a document --

6 A. I have not seen it in any other document.

7 Q. -- apart --

8 A. Apart from the Michel letter that was obtained from
9 Sankoh's residence in May 2000.

12:36:40 10 Q. Now, bearing in mind my learned friend's objection to the
11 link, Mr Taylor, can you help us - can you help us, to your mind,
12 as to where this linkage of you and 90 per cent comes from?

13 A. My understanding, counsel, your Honours, of the allegations
14 made here - well, the allegation made here by the writer,

12:37:14 15 Mr Farah, links directly to his misunderstanding or deliberate
16 attempt to smear my name by deliberately misunderstanding the
17 linkage between Charles as stated in the May document versus
18 Charles Taylor of Liberia. I think this is deliberate and I
19 think it is mischievous, because, in fact, that letter does not

12:37:44 20 say that Charles Taylor is receiving 90 per cent, but I think
21 this is due to the conspiracy that I talk about and the
22 deliberate mischief of Douglas Farah, who subsequently I
23 understand the Washington Post had to get rid of - by

24 deliberately trying to malign my name by associating Charles
12:38:09 25 Taylor with the Charles that is mentioned in the May document
26 taken from Foday Sankoh, which is misleading in the first
27 instance.

28 So to the extent of what the Prosecution is talking about,
29 the Prosecution has a point that it does not say Charles Taylor.

1 But this link of referring to the May document as what he calls
2 it confidential, I think is deliberate, it's mischievous and it
3 does misstate what the Michel document says and I think he is
4 trying to smear my name. So the link here is the deliberate
12:38:47 5 smear of my name linking me to the document and Foday Sankoh
6 mischievously.

7 Q. Now, let's go back to this article, shall we:

8 "In an effort to protect his interests without escalating
9 the war, Taylor, with Compaore's backing, has pushed for a truce
12:39:09 10 in Sierra Leone that would leave the rebels in charge of the main
11 diamond fields. That has been rejected by Sierra Leone and the
12 region's major power, Nigeria and tensions are growing."

13 Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind the date of this article,
14 which is June 2000, at that stage were you pushing for a truce in
12:39:37 15 Sierra Leone?

16 A. Well, yes. ECOWAS is pushing by June 2000. We have a
17 situation where we've just gotten the UN hostages released.
18 There's chaos in Sierra Leone. We are all pushing for some
19 stability in Sierra Leone by June 2000.

12:40:03 20 Q. "Last week senior officials in both Liberia and Sierra
21 Leone warned that the war could spill into Liberia. Sierra Leone
22 deputy Defence Minister Hinga Norman said his troops would take on
23 Taylor if necessary to finish off the rebels. Daniel Chea,
24 Liberia's Defence Minister, responded by warning Sierra Leone not
12:40:25 25 to 'threaten this country with war, especially one that you can
26 cannot win ... stop blaming your war on Liberia.' Intelligence
27 analysts and sources close to Taylor said he cannot allow the
28 rebels to lose the war, in part because he has taken millions of
29 dollars from foreign investors in the form of licensing fees to

1 allow them to mine Sierra Leone diamonds. 'That is why he is
2 pressing for a cease-fire, where the rebels control the mines, or
3 there will be all-out war,' said one source familiar with RUF
4 operations. "

12:41:07 5 Now, Mr Taylor, where are these millions that you obtained
6 from foreign investors for licensing fees? Where are they?

7 A. There are no millions. There are no millions. And this is
8 why - there are no millions, there are no diamonds, but this is
9 why this report by the Washington Post must be looked at in a
10 greater context of what is going on in what I describe as this
11 conspiracy, okay. There are no - we have phantom accounts,
12 phantom bank accounts. And Douglas Farah, I wonder, at the
13 beginning of this letter in 2000 - and it may have escaped us -
14 Sam Bockarie is supposed to be training a rebel force in Liberia.
15 False. He is not there. Now we're seeing monies, bank account -
16 all a part of a mischievous plan.

17 And the fact that this writer states even in the paragraph
18 that I explained very carefully here the confidential nature and
19 Taylor receiving 90 per cent, it is not in isolation. It is all
12:42:21 20 part of a plan, and this is another link of that deliberate
21 attempt to spread disinformation to destroy me, okay. So this is
22 deliberate and it is - it does not exist as he explains it.

23 Q. "Liberian Information Minister Joe Mulbah denies the
24 allegations telling the BBC recently that his government 'has
12:42:47 25 never sanctioned the traffic of diamonds or guns. We are not
26 involved (in Sierra Leone) ... and I challenge anyone to prove us
27 wrong when we say we have nothing to do with diamond deals in
28 Sierra Leone.' Sources with direct knowledge said mercenaries
29 from South Africa and Burkina Faso who are working for Taylor

1 have trained fighters under rebel leader Mosquito's command at
2 Taylor's training camp at Gbatala, 90 miles northeast of
3 Monrovia. They said Mosquito's men are equipped with
4 surface-to-air missiles, assault rifles, anti-tank weapons, and
12:43:37 5 other arms from a 66-tonne shipment that moved through Burkina
6 Faso."

7 Now, Mr Taylor, who are these South Africans and Burkinabes
8 who are training Mosquito's fighters?

9 A. There are no one training Mosquito's fighters. All
12:44:00 10 evidence led in this Court, including one of those that trained,
11 testified here there was a South African general hired by the
12 Liberian government in 2000 to train the ATU of the Republic of
13 Liberia, and all of this stuff is just all a makeup using real
14 situation with disinformation. There's no one training any Sam
12:44:26 15 Bockarie forces.

16 Q. Now, who are these Burkinabes who are involved, Mr Taylor?

17 A. There are no Burkinabes whatsoever.

18 Q. And where did you get the surface-to-air missiles from and
19 the anti-tank weapons to equip these soldiers?

12:44:44 20 A. There was no such thing. There was no surface-to-air or
21 anti-tank. None of that.

22 Q. What about the 66-tonne arms shipment from Burkina Faso,
23 how did that enter Liberia? Help us?

24 A. There was none of such. There was no amount of 66 tons or
12:45:00 25 any other ton from Burkina Faso that entered Liberia. No.

26 Q. Page 3:

27 "In Burkina Faso earlier this month Compaore played host to
28 senior RUF commanders to plan military and political strategy,
29 diplomats and intelligence analysts said. In return for their

1 support, Taylor and Compaore received diamonds from the RUF,
2 which are then sold on the international diamond market,
3 intelligence sources and UN investigators said."

4 Now help us. In June 2000, Mr Taylor, who were the RUF
12:45:46 5 commanders who went to Burkina Faso to plan military and
6 political strategy?

7 A. None that I know. In June 2000 we know what is going on in
8 Sierra Leone. There is no such, that I know of, of commanders.
9 Foday Sankoh is in jail. We know that. We know that the UN
12:46:07 10 hostages are released and we know that Sam Bockarie - excuse me,
11 Issa Sesay is the most senior commander and he surely is not in
12 Burkina Faso. There's no such thing. It's a lie.

13 Q. "Taylor, Sankoh and Compaore have been linked since the mid
14 1980s, according to academics, intelligence analysts and
12:46:33 15 participants in the early days of the revolutionary fervour that
16 swept the region. Liberia's US-backed dictator, Samuel Doe,
17 accused Taylor, then a senior Liberian bureaucrat, of stealing
18 government funds. When Taylor fled to the United States, he was
19 arrested at Doe's request but escaped to Burkina Faso."

12:46:57 20 Did you?

21 A. I did not escape to Burkina Faso. That's not true.

22 Q. "According to historians and regional experts, Compaore
23 enlisted Liberian aid in the killing of then President Thomas
24 Sankara, after which Compaore seized power in Burkina Faso."

12:47:17 25 What Liberian aid was there in the killing of Thomas
26 Sankara, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Have no idea. When Thomas Sankara died I was in prison
28 in Accra, Ghana, being held by the then government of Jerry
29 Rawlings when Thomas Sankara was killed.

1 Q. "Taylor launched his revolt against Doe in 1989 then helped
2 Sankoh found the RUF in 1991. Compaore, Taylor and Sankoh, as
3 well as many of their senior commanders, trained at Libya's World
4 Revolutionary Headquarters in the 1980s. The Reagan
12:47:57 5 administration regarded Libya as a primary sponsor of
6 international terrorism and saw Doe as a reliable ally. It
7 poured \$500 million in aid into Doe's Liberia and pressured
8 Nigeria and other pro-Western governments to intervene militarily
9 using Sierra Leone as a base to fight Taylor. But Taylor
12:48:22 10 ultimately fought to a draw, signed a ceasefire and won a
11 presidential election in 1997.

12 Troops sent by Taylor and Compaore fought alongside the RUF
13 in Sierra Leone, and the RUF helped Taylor's troops, while
14 Compaore supplied both with a secure arms pipeline, according to
12:48:44 15 investigators."

16 Now, Mr Taylor, what's your knowledge of Burkina Faso
17 sending troops to fight alongside the RUF?

18 A. I have no knowledge of that. And I don't think there are
19 any reports anywhere that showed that there were any Burkinabes.
12:49:08 20 The more I listen to this I'm convinced that Douglas Farah was
21 put up to this and that's why he doesn't work for the Washington
22 Post any more, but it bears all of the trappings of an
23 intelligence plot. Every bit of it. Real situations and lies.
24 There was no such thing. You go through the truth commission
12:49:29 25 report in Sierra Leone. I don't recall as I've read that report
26 the presence of any Burkinabe troops in Sierra Leone. All lies
27 he was put up to.

28 Q. And then we come to this, the penultimate paragraph:

29 "' The deal was that the RUF would help Taylor liberate

1 Liberia and afterward would provide a base for the RUF to enter
2 Sierra Leone,' said Abdullah. 'When the RUF entered Sierra Leone
3 there was a Burkinabe force under their command that Taylor
4 arranged to send in.' "

12:50:04 5 Who were they, Mr Taylor?

6 A. There was no such thing. All of the Prosecution witnesses
7 have never said there was one Burkinabe. All a lie. No such
8 thing.

9 Q. "All the arms for Taylor and the RUF came from Burkina
12:50:17 10 Faso and were bought in Ukraine. The payment for all this was
11 diamonds that went through Liberia, Burkina Faso and the Ivory
12 Coast.' That basic route still works, intelligence officials
13 said."

14 What's the position on that, Mr Taylor?

12:50:37 15 A. Total, total lie.

16 Q. Now that part "the deal was that the RUF would help Taylor
17 liberate Liberia and afterward provide a base for the RUF to
18 enter Sierra Leone", that sounds a bit like the Prosecution
19 allegation against you, Mr Taylor, in the indictment?

12:50:53 20 A. Well, except that - yes, it sounds like it but except that
21 there is no evidence of any RUF army fighting in Liberia, so that
22 would fall flat on its face. That would just be just what it is,
23 maybe a hypothesis or something where these cases are developed.

24 All of their witnesses, no one has come here and said that we
12:51:16 25 were fighting in Liberia and after we got through fighting we
26 were helped. There's no evidence of any Sierra Leonean force
27 fighting in Liberia to help liberate Liberia, so that wouldn't
28 work. So again, Abdullah, you check from now until hell freezes,
29 you would never find an Abdullah. When you see according to

1 intelligence sources, according to diplomats without names, this
2 is all some intelligence write-up. That's all it is. Designed
3 to cause confusion and stir up things when they want to smear
4 someone. You never get the source because they do not exist.

12:52:00 5 They use some real situations. All lies, this Douglas Farah.

6 Q. "'Until that iron triangle is broken there will be turmoil
7 in the region,' said one intelligence official. 'There is too
8 much history, too much money and too much blood for them to stop
9 now and they view losing the RUF as the beginning of the end.'"

12:52:26 10 Now, Mr Taylor, this is June 2000, 18 June.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. On the following day, 19 June 2000, did anyone contact you?

13 A. On 19 June 2000?

14 Q. The day after this article was published?

12:53:05 15 A. I can't quite recall.

16 Q. Did anyone contact you in relation to this article?

17 A. Well, yes, there were several individuals but they were
18 internal to Liberia that I recall.

19 Q. At this time were you in contact with President Tejan
12:53:20 20 Kabbah?

21 A. Yes, in June of 2000 Kabbah and I are working very closely.
22 In fact, to give the Court an idea of June 2000, we're still - up
23 until June 2000 we're still arranging for the rest of the UN
24 hostages that are taken, so I'm in communication with Kabbah and
12:53:50 25 everybody else.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I forget, could I ask, please, that
27 that Washington Post article by Douglas Farah dated 18 June 2000
28 be marked for identification, please, MFI-280.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-280 for

1 i denti fi cati on.

2 MR GRI FF I THS:

3 Q. Mr Tayl or --

4 A. Counsel , the questi on you just asked me, there's a letter
12:54:23 5 later from Tejan Kabbah asking me if I read the Washi ngton Post
6 document now. So, I mean, I do not know if that's the directi on
7 of your questi on, but the questi on is asked by Kabbah as to
8 whether I saw the Washi ngton Post document and he was tryi ng to
9 alert me of it.

12:54:41 10 Q. Right. If we go to week 33 behi nd di vi der 59. Mr Tayl or,
11 this is a document di sposed to us by the Prosecuti on. It is a
12 letter from Presi dent Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to you and we were only
13 di sposed this one page of the letter, but if we look we see that
14 the letter is dated 19 June 2000. Is that right?

12:55:50 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. So it's the day after the Dougl as Farah letter was
17 published in the Washi ngton Post?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You see that it's addressed to you, yes?

12:55:59 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. First paragraph:

22 "Mr Presi dent and dear brother, I thought I should, in
23 accorda nce with the agree ment between us, share with you
24 i nformati on contained in the attached documents reflecti ng recent
12:56:18 25 reports carried by the Washi ngton Post. My main i nterest in the
26 report relates to the alleged movement of arms i nto Sierra Leone
27 terri tory whi ch our i ntelligence agenci es have been noti ci ng. I
28 should rei terate that I have full confi dence in your
29 determi nati on to conti nue to work for a speedy and peaceful

1 settlement of the Sierra Leone conflict.

2 On my part, I want to reassure you of my firm commitment to
3 furthering the close, peaceful relations between our two
4 countries and peoples, particularly in the context of the 2000
12:56:55 5 Mano River declaration we recently adopted in Conakry.

6 Thank you for the video cassette. I have seen it and
7 discussed it with the Deputy Defence Minister, Chief Hinga
8 Norman, who has assured me that he has no intention of either
9 inciting the Liberian people or casting aspersions on your
12:57:17 10 person. He has further assured me that he will avoid making such
11 statements again. I regret this situation and will see to it
12 that there is no repetition in the future."

13 What video cassette was that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Of a press conference - or at least a statement made to the
12:57:37 15 press in which Chief Norman made some bellicose remarks and I
16 sent him a copy that had come from our mission down there,
17 telling him that I did not feel it was proper what he had said in
18 that particular press conference about threatening to - as
19 mentioned, to deal with the Liberian situation. Even if he had
12:58:02 20 to move on Liberia, he would do and that kind of stuff.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, what was the effect on you of receiving
22 this letter from your brother President, President Kabbah,
23 mentioning this report in the Washington Post?

24 A. Quite frankly, I'm not sure as to whether I should describe
12:58:38 25 it as being angry. I just felt it was foolish. Because Kabbah
26 and I were working together and he is going to ask me about a
27 Washington Post article published by Douglas Farah. And what I
28 gathered from this was a type of - well, like, you know, there
29 you are, there appears to be some proof. You are on the ground,

1 you're President of Sierra Leone, you know how closely we are
2 working together. If he did not mean anything negative in
3 regards to Douglas Farah's lie, he would have said, you know, "My
4 brother, I have seen this document in the Washington Post. I do
12:59:22 5 not agree with it" and maybe suggest what should be done. But I
6 look at it with a degree of disdain that Kabbah would in some, I
7 would say, low level inference try to give this report any
8 credence. So I was a little bit I would say upset.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you take any steps to address what was
12:59:57 10 said in this report by Farah?

11 A. Oh, yes. The press offices, we did whatever we could.
12 Douglas Farah, we complained about this. Because, in fact, I can
13 remember, we also raised this issue with the Washington Post
14 because we had - I had refused, at least on three or four
13:00:20 15 occasions, to grant Douglas Farah an interview when he came to
16 Liberia several times after being stationed at La Cote d'Ivoire,
17 and so I just felt that this was a part of his mischief and I
18 complained to even the Post about it. And if I can recall
19 properly, I think the Ministry of Information dealt with it as we
13:00:43 20 would deal with any other innuendo coming from the press.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I ask, please, that the
22 one-page letter from President Kabbah to Charles Taylor, dated 19
23 June 2000, be marked for identification, please, MFI-281.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is so marked.

13:01:15 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in the summer of the year 2000, bearing in
27 mind the date of this Douglas Farah Washington Post article, was
28 there any other further reports linking - in the international
29 media linking you as an individual and Liberia to diamond

1 smuggling in Sierra Leone?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And what was that?

4 A. There was a BBC report done by Mark Doyle. Mark Doyle

13:02:03 5 wrote an extensive piece, some three, four pages, in - detailing
6 diamonds and my involvement with diamonds. He makes reference to
7 what Kabbah makes reference to in his letter. There are supposed
8 to be two reports that are done by the so-called Sierra Leonean
9 Special Branch. Mark Doyle makes a reference to those reports.

13:02:38 10 He ties it all in. Mark Doyle even states in that particular
11 written report, he even goes to Monrovia and interviews a senior
12 official of the United States embassy accredited near Monrovia to
13 ascertain the authenticity of these accusations.

14 In fact, he reports in that document that the senior United

13:03:05 15 States government official says, "Well, look, we never said that
16 Taylor was directly involved in diamonds or diamond smuggling,
17 but it's up to Mr Taylor to clear it up." And this is where they
18 put it, so it's like, "Hey, you know, it's up to him to clear up
19 whatever is being said. We've never said it directly or accused

13:03:23 20 him directly, but it's up for him to clear it up." So - but Mark
21 Doyle ends with a general picture that there appears to be some
22 truth to this thing because all of these reports are coming out
23 and we know the sequence of these reports that are coming out.

24 This is about his writing now constitutes the third or fourth

13:03:49 25 document in what I call the whole conspiratorial move, and this
26 is the document that Mark publishes in July 2000.

27 Q. Right. Can we have a look, please, behind divider 64,
28 disclosure for week 33, please. Is this the article, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, this is the article by Mark Doyle. This is it, yes.

1 Q. Now, we see it's dated 18 July 2000, so it's a month after
2 the Washington Post article by Douglas Farah, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. "BBC West Africa correspondent Mark Doyle reports from
13:05:18 5 Monrovia on the links between diamond smuggling and Liberia's
6 backing of Sierra Leone rebels. Liberia has close relations with
7 rebels in neighbouring Sierra Leone trying to overthrow the
8 internationally-recognised government in Freetown. The British
9 government has roundly and publicly condemned Liberia for
10 smuggling Sierra Leonean diamonds out of the rebel held areas and
11 using the proceeds to supply the rebels with arms. So if Liberia
12 is smuggling diamonds and running guns to the Sierra Leone
13 rebels, a diamond dealer seemed a good place to start looking.

14 Riad Shour is a fully licensed legal trader in Liberian diamonds.
15 He believes that if Sierra Leonean gems are being smuggled they
16 are leaving via Sierra Leone's other neighbour Guinea. 'In
17 Sierra Leone, most of the diamonds from there are white,' says
18 Mr Shour. 'In Liberia, they are all greenish, yellowish
19 diamonds. However there is a problem. The world's main importer
13:06:56 20 of diamonds is Belgium, and the trade body there, the Diamond
21 High Council, says Liberia exports millions of dollars worth of
22 diamond every year, stones which experts say it could not
23 possibly produce and must, logically, come from neighbouring
24 Sierra Leone.' "

13:07:20 25 Mr Taylor, have you ever denied that Sierra Leonean
26 diamonds may have passed through Liberia?

27 A. I've never denied that.

28 Q. "I met, in Liberia, with one of the main figures in the
29 Sierra Leone rebel movement, Major General Sam Bockarie.

1 Mr Bockarie lives in Liberia and says he has retired from
2 fighting."

3 Now, pausing there. Of course, bear in mind this article
4 is dated 18 July 2000.

13:07:58 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Bockarie would have been in Liberia since December '99. Is
7 that right?

8 A. That is right.

9 Q. And whilst in Liberia, Mr Taylor, was he prohibited from
10 meeting with the international media?

11 A. No, he was not.

12 Q. "Mr Bockarie lives in Liberia and says he has retired from
13 fighting. Coincidentally, he was listening to the British
14 Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, speaking on the BBC World
13:08:29 15 Service Radio about his campaign to ban blood diamonds. I asked
16 Mr Bockarie about illegal diamond mining during his time as the
17 rebels' military commander. 'That is wrong because I was in
18 charge up to the moment that they became convinced that Liberia
19 was receiving diamonds selling them for arms and ammunition,' he
13:08:51 20 said. I asked him to confirm that his men were not digging for
21 diamonds. 'We were restricting it because the leadership had
22 believed that if that happens then everybody would concentrate on
23 mining and would not concentrate on war,' he said. 'It would be
24 difficult for us to gain military victory over the enemy.' I
13:09:20 25 watched a helicopter fly into Monrovia from the Sierra Leone
26 border. This particular flight was uncontroversial, but
27 Liberia's critics, including the British government, say the
28 border is regularly breached by air and by land for diamond
29 smuggling and gun running."

1 Pause. Mr Taylor, breached by air and by land. Were you
2 sending air shipments into Sierra Leone?

13:10:06 3 A. No, we were not. I don't know what Mark means by - if he
4 says the flight was uncontroversial in 2000, he is talking about
5 normal helicopters. The only helicopters that are going across
6 that border are UN helicopters. Maybe that's what he means by
7 uncontroversial.

8 Q. "Proof is hard to get. However, I have obtained secret
9 Sierra Leonean police files which record detailed allegations of
13:10:31 10 the movement of guns and diamonds between Liberia and Sierra
11 Leone. The files were obtained directly from Sierra Leonean
12 police intelligence officers and did not appear to be part of any
13 political propaganda effort against Liberia."

14 Pause. Mr Taylor, has any such report ever been brought to
13:10:56 15 your attention?

16 A. No, it has not been brought to my attention, no.

17 Q. Have you seen any document disclosed by the Prosecution in
18 this case which purports, as this - firstly, to come from Sierra
19 Leonean police intelligence?

13:11:15 20 A. No, I haven't seen any disclosed.

21 Q. Or any police files as alleged by this journalist detailing
22 allegations of the movement of guns and diamonds, have you seen
23 any?

24 A. No. If it exists, I haven't seen it.

13:11:31 25 Q. "However, these interesting documents remain allegations,
26 not proof. What is curious is that if Britain or the United
27 States do have evidence to prove Liberia's involvement, why do
28 they not publish it?"

29 Mr Taylor, have you ever seen any evidence published by

1 either the United States or Britain proving your alleged
2 complicity in diamonds and arms smuggling?

3 A. None. I not seen any published, neither with all of the
4 meetings that I met with British and American officials did they
13:12:34 5 ever give me any evidence. Neither. No. I haven't seen any
6 published, no.

7 Q. "A question I have put to Walter Greenfield, the charge
8 d'affaires of the United States embassy in Liberia."

9 Do you know him, Mr Taylor?

13:12:50 10 A. Not personally, but I have heard the name, yes.

11 Q. "'What we have said is that there are many reports out
12 there that allege that the Government of Liberia is involved
13 through illicit diamonds and the flow of weapons and were
14 concerned by them,' he says. 'We think that if they are not
13:13:16 15 involved in this activity they have a real public relations
16 problem on their hands because they have to dispel that notion.'
17 Some powerful countries believe that Liberia may be gun running
18 and smuggling diamonds. However, the Liberian President, Charles
19 Taylor, remains his usual, confident self, challenging the West
13:13:39 20 to publish evidence of any arms or diamond convoys crossing the
21 border. 'When someone gets up and says that Liberia is involved
22 in diamond smuggling and gun running like a movie, you've got to
23 be joking,' he says. 'But what we have said is, with all of the
24 western intelligence - for God's sake. These people have
13:14:09 25 satellites focused on Sierra Leone.' 'Could somebody please
26 bring me one photograph of a convoy going.' The Liberian
27 President may well be doing what Britain says, but on the current
28 available evidence, he may well get away with it."

29 Now, Mr Taylor, have you ever seen a satellite photograph

1 of a convoy either then or now?

2 A. None whatsoever. None. And this is the whole problem.

3 This is the whole problem. I am in jail and here is a US
4 official saying, "They've got a public relations problem." They

13:14:56 5 joke with people's lives and they published these things since
6 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, diamond smuggling, gun running, and what
7 do we have, we have a host of witnesses coming up here now

8 saying, "We took diamonds to - we heard that diamonds were
9 going." How do you play with somebody's life like this on a

13:15:15 10 public relations problem that the person has? There's been no
11 such thing. None.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've looked at that article by Douglas
13 Farah in the Washington Post. Was that the only occasion that
14 Mr Farah touched this topic of diamonds?

13:15:38 15 A. Oh, no. Mr Farah went further. Upon being - and I may be
16 describing it in a way that may not be 100 per cent correct.

17 Upon being thrown out of the Washington Post, because I
18 understand that he was asked to leave because of several
19 controversial reports that he did linking me with more than

13:16:10 20 diamonds --

21 Q. Linking you with what?

22 A. Douglas Farah did publications linking me with Al-Qaeda.

23 Q. With Al-Qaeda?

24 A. Oh, yes, he did publications. But Douglas Farah, in your
13:16:23 25 question, published a document under an organisation Coalition
26 For International Justice where he goes even deeper in detailing
27 movements of arms, diamonds, bank accounts, billions and millions
28 of dollars. Oh, all kinds of things. So he doesn't stop there.

29 He goes further.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Now before we go any further, could I ask,
2 please, that the BBC article by Mark Doyle dated 18 July 2000 be
3 marked for identification MFI-282, please.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is so marked.

13:17:06 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Mr Taylor, you made mention of Douglas Farah linking you
7 with Al-Qaeda, yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And did he do that in a publication?

13:17:16 10 A. Yes.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I invite attention to disclosure for
12 week 33, binder 4 of 4 behind divider 148:

13 Q. Do you have it, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, I do.

13:18:33 15 Q. Now, we see that this article is a bit later. It's 24
16 October 2003. Yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. And we see it's by Douglas Farah entitled "The role of
19 conflict diamonds and failed states in the terrorist financial
20 structure."

13:18:53

21 "In 1998, following the Al-Qaeda attacks on the US
22 embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the
23 Clinton administration froze some \$240 million in assets
24 belonging to Afghanistan's Taliban government and Osama bin
13:19:18 25 Laden, the rogue regime's guest. They caught both the Taliban
26 and Al-Qaeda by surprise because they apparently did not realise
27 the money, mostly held as gold reserves in the United States,
28 could be targeted. Because it was so costly a miscalculation and
29 because Al-Qaeda constantly reviews both successful and failed

1 operations to find and correct their own vulnerabilities, a
2 far-reaching review of the terrorist financial structure was
3 undertaken.

4 Adapting to the US response and determined not to be caught
13:19:57 5 in the same position again, Al-Qaeda began a systematic
6 withdrawal of its funds from the formal banking sector, where its
7 assets were vulnerable and traceable. Instead, the decision was
8 made to begin shifting money into commodities that would hold
9 their value over time. Chief among these were diamonds and
13:20:19 10 tanzanite.

11 Diamonds and tanzanite offered an additional advantage for
12 terrorists. The infrastructure needed to acquire and trade in
13 the gemstones was easy to set up because the commodities were
14 available in states that exercised little control over much of
13:20:41 15 their national territory. Tanzanite is only found in a small
16 corner of Tanzania where the government has virtually no presence
17 and the diamond trade Al-Qaeda tapped into in West Africa was
18 centred in Liberia, where the corrupt regime of Charles Taylor
19 also controlled diamonds mined by his allies in neighbouring
13:21:07 20 Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone the diamond fields were under the
21 control of the notoriously brutal rebels of the Revolutionary
22 United Front. The RUF earned international notoriety for its
23 signature atrocities of hacking off the arms, legs and ears of
24 civilians, including children as young as two years old; mass
13:21:32 25 rape; and the abduction of thousands of children who were forced
26 to become fighters.

27 Al-Qaeda had long-standing ties to the gemstone trade.
28 Documents and testimony presented during 2000 the trials of Wadih
29 el Hage and Mohamed Sadeek Odeh show that Al-Qaeda even before

1 the US embassy bombings was dealing extensively in diamonds,
2 tanzanite, amethyst, rubies and sapphires, mostly as money making
3 ventures. According the trial transcripts, senior Al-Qaeda
4 leaders were deeply concerned about the possibility that Al-Qaeda
13:22:26 5 operative was carrying a large quantity of stones when he drowned
6 while crossing a lake.

7 After the embassy bombings the use of gemstones accelerated
8 rapidly but with an added purpose. Rather than being viewed
9 solely as a business venture, gemstones and diamonds in
13:22:45 10 particular were used as a way to store the value of Al-Qaeda's
11 financial resources outside the formal financial sector. A
12 premium was no longer placed on turning a profit, but rather
13 acquiring as many stones as possible with money that was being
14 siphoned out of banks and businesses.

13:23:03 15 The Al-Qaeda leadership through Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed,
16 one of its senior financial operators, contacted an old Al-Qaeda
17 friend who had fought with the mujahideen and now ran most of the
18 illicit or blood diamond trade for West Africa, Ibrahim Bah. Bah
19 is a Senegalese who trained in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, then
13:23:33 20 went to fight in Afghanistan in the early 1980s. After about two
21 years there, he briefly returned to Libya before joining
22 Hezbollah fighters combating Israeli forces. Finally he returned
23 to Libya in the late 1980s, just in time to train and become
24 friends with the long list of Libyan-backed leaders who would
13:23:58 25 wreak havoc on West Africa: Charles Taylor of Liberia;
26 Foday Sankoh, founder of the RUF in neighbouring Sierra Leone;
27 Blaise Compaore, now President of Burkina Faso, who assassinated
28 his best friend, Thomas Sankara, in order to assume the
29 presidency. "

1 Pause there. Mr Taylor, did you know about Ibrahim Bah's
2 connection to the mujahideen in Afghanistan?

3 A. Not at all. Never. I don't even think he did.

4 Q. Mmm?

13:24:34 5 A. Never knew of it, but I say I don't even think he did.
6 That's a far right lie.

7 Q. Do you know about Bah fighting with the Hezbollah fighters
8 in the Middle East?

9 A. No. No, I do not know and when it comes to the Hezbollah
13:25:03 10 activities, Liberian intelligence did a lot with working to - if
11 anybody had known that Bah was connected to Hezbollah he never
12 would have gone to Liberia. No, don't know.

13 Q. Why not?

14 A. Because the Liberian intelligence agency is wholly and
13:25:28 15 solely connected and assisted by all of the major the Western
16 intelligence you can talk about, whether we're talking about the
17 CIA or you're talking about Mossad which is Israeli - and my
18 government got a lot of assistance in terms of security training,
19 we had good relationship with Israel. Hezbollah would have never
13:25:47 20 entered Liberia ever. And so Bah would not have been able to
21 stay around Liberia, no.

22 Q. "The contacts between Bah and Al-Qaeda began in 1998 just
23 weeks after the embassy bombing and continued until after 9/11."

24 Now I want to pause there, Mr Taylor. What's your
13:26:14 25 knowledge of the relationship between Gaddafi and Al-Qaeda?

26 A. To the best of my understanding or my knowledge of Gaddafi,
27 I think Gaddafi would have dealt in a harsher manner with
28 Al-Qaeda than even the United States of the West. From all of my
29 knowing of Gaddafi and the ideological leaning of Al-Qaeda,

1 Gaddafi hated that line of ideology, from my discussion with him,
2 and knowing him, he would have dealt even harsher with Al-Qaeda
3 than even the United States. So this is a lie.

13:27:01 4 Q. The reason I'm asking, you see, Mr Taylor, is this: The
5 contacts between Bah and Al-Qaeda began in 1998. Now, you
6 remember we looked at two letters from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed
7 Talibi this morning, did we not?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Dated June and December respectively 1996?

13:27:24 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And we thereafter looked at the UN panel of experts report
12 which mentioned diamond mining becoming more focused in Sierra
13 Leone in 1997, yes?

14 A. That is correct.

13:27:37 15 Q. Now, here what is being suggested is that by '98 Ibrahim
16 Bah has established this link with Al-Qaeda. Now what do you say
17 about that?

18 A. I say it's got to be a lie. I mean, I wouldn't know the
19 details, but I can tell you the Americans would not have missed
13:27:58 20 it and they would have never - Bah would be linked to Al-Qaeda as
21 explained here beginning 1998 and he would not be in custody of
22 the Americans after they investigated and this whole thing and
23 even talked to Bah and interrogated Bah about this matter, this
24 is Douglas Farah's lie. It is not true. I doubt it very much.

13:28:25 25 Q. "But what is important and instructive are the conditions
26 ideal for terrorists that allowed the relationship to prosper.
27 Bah had access to diamonds mined by the RUF, among the most
28 prized in the world. He was also a key player in Liberia."

29 Was he?

1 A. No. No. Never.

2 Q. "A corrupt state that, while retaining the valuable
3 trappings of nationhood, was in fact a functioning criminal
4 enterprise."

13:29:04 5 You were the head of a criminal state, Mr Taylor, according
6 to Farah, and no doubt as President you were the arch criminal,
7 weren't you?

8 A. Definitely not. Definitely not.

9 Q. "Among the benefits accrued to the Taylor regime, despite
13:29:25 10 its criminal status, were the right to issue internationally
11 recognised diplomatic passports, the ability to register
12 aircrafts and ships, control of the formal entry points, and
13 access to a central bank. Bah's close relationship with Taylor"
14 - did he have such a relationship with you, Mr Taylor?

13:29:48 15 A. No, he did not.

16 Q. "And the Liberian security apparatus guaranteed that his
17 guests, while wanted as terrorists elsewhere in the world, could
18 come and go unmolested to Monrovia." Was that the case?

19 A. That was never the case. Never the case.

13:30:26 20 Q. "Armed thugs from the presidential guard escorted Mohamed
21 and later Al-Qaeda visitors to and from the airport, allowing
22 them to circumvent immigration formalities and lessening the
23 paper trail. As long as Taylor was apprised of the situation and
24 was able to take" - there you go again - "his percentage of each
13:30:55 25 deal neither Bah nor his guests had anything to fear."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, who are these armed thugs who were from
27 your presidential guard?

28 A. I have no idea who this boy is working for and who paid
29 this Douglas Farah. There are no armed thugs escorting any

1 Al -Qaeda or anything. That's not true. No armed thugs.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'll take our lunch break now.

3 It's almost right on 1.30.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

13:31:24 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn until 2.30.

6 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

7 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. All right, Mr Taylor. Can we pick up, please, where we
14:32:12 10 left off on that Douglas Farah article.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "Bah also had access to the official state apparatus of
13 neighbouring Burkina Faso, due to his long-standing personal and
14 business relationships with President Blaise Compaore. Compaore
14:32:43 15 also had close ties to Taylor. Compaore and Burkina Faso offered
16 a valuable asset that Liberia, under a United Nations-mandated
17 arms embargo could not: The ability to produce internationally
18 recognised end-user certificates for the purchase of large
19 quantities of weapons from around the world. For many years Bah,
14:33:11 20 with Compaore's knowledge and blessing, coordinated arms
21 shipments for Taylor and the RUF through Burkina Faso's capital,
22 Ouagadougou."

23 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Totally false. That's not true.

14:33:25 25 Q. "Al-Qaeda was not the only terrorist or criminal group to
26 operate under the protection of Taylor, Compaore and Bah. Victor
27 Bout, one of the world's largest illicit weapons dealers,
28 registered his fleet of aircraft in Liberia ..."

29 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

1 A. That is not true. Victor Bout, from what I understand, his
2 aircrafts were registered in Niger.

3 Q. "... because he could do so with no questions asked and no
4 inspections required. With those aircraft, he shipped tons of
14:33:59 5 weapons, including combat helicopters, surface-to-air missiles
6 and anti-aircraft guns to Taylor ..."

7 Did he?

8 A. No, he did not.

9 Q. "... and the RUF through Burkina Faso." Did he?

14:34:18 10 A. No, he did not. No.

11 Q. "At the same time, Bout was supplying UNITA rebels in
12 Angola and several sides of the civil war that was shattering the
13 Democratic Republic of Congo. He often accepted diamonds as
14 payment for his weapons.

14:34:36 15 There is an intriguing link between Bout and Al-Qaeda. US
16 and UN investigators found that while supplying African wars with
17 weapons, Bout was also providing goods and services to the
18 Taliban and Al-Qaeda. From his base in the United Arab Emirates,
19 Bout and a partner, a member of the royal family, flew weapons,
14:34:58 20 medicines and other commodities to the outlaw regime and its
21 supporters.

22 Another world-class criminal, Lenoir Menin of an important
23 Russian organised crime family, also set up shop in Monrovia ..."

24 Did he?

14:35:17 25 A. Lenoir Menin did have a business in Monrovia, yes.

26 Q. Doing what?

27 A. He was doing timber business in Liberia.

28 Q. "... buying diamonds and exploiting timber. Protected by
29 the Taylor's son Chucky ..."

1 Is that true?

2 A. That is not true. Lenoir Menin registered a business in
3 Liberia doing timber. He did. He's never been arrested. He's
4 in Israel. And I'm sure if Douglas Farah had any - if there was
14:35:48 5 any important thing about Menin, it's easy to get him. He's an
6 Israeli citizen. He lives openly in Israel. That's a lie.

7 Q. "... Menin also delivered weapons in exchange for the
8 chance to reap millions of dollars in illegal profits. Despite
9 an international arrest warrant, Bout lives peacefully in Moscow.

14:36:11 10 Minin also remains free.

11 Terrorists and criminals chose their commodity well.
12 Diamonds, like tanzanite and other gemstones, carry a high value
13 in small bulk, yet are easily convertible to cash in an industry
14 that is largely willing to ignore the origin of the stone. The
14:36:30 15 stones cannot be detected by dogs and set off no metal detectors
16 at airports, making them easy to transport. Sales of small
17 amounts are impossible to detect on the world market. They cause
18 no undue fluctuations. For years, Bah and others made extensive
19 use of grey market networks in Antwerp and elsewhere to sell
14:36:59 20 millions of dollars worth of diamonds, with part of the proceeds
21 going to personal enrichment and part going to keep the RUF and
22 Taylor armed and at war."

23 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

24 A. That is not true.

14:37:15 25 Q. "By early 2001, Al-Qaeda was moving more aggressively into
26 the diamond trade with the clear intent of putting their assets
27 beyond the reach of international investigators. Two top
28 Al-Qaeda operatives who were believed to have been heavily
29 involved in the US embassy bombs and other high profile attacks,

1 - Ahmed Khal fan Ghail ani and Fazul Abdul lah Mohammed - were
2 dispatched to Monrovi a to set up greatly expedited mi ning
3 operations, offering to buy all the di amonds the RUF could
4 produce. They lived in a safe house tucked between buil dings
14:38:00 5 housi ng Li byan diplomats and securi ty forces in downtown
6 Monrovi a. "

7 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

8 A. That is not true. You know, that is so much a lie. These
9 are the - in fact, in 2003 - these kinds of lies - the Liberian
14:38:19 10 government, in cooperati on with the United States government, had
11 consignments of FBI and everything, my government, before I left
12 office, with these kinds of lies, cooperated fully with the
13 United States government. All these matters were cleared up.
14 There were no such thing. This is why it never went any further.

14:38:41 15 My government working with the United States government in 2003
16 went through a thorough, thorough investi gati on.

17 Q. Investigation of what?

18 A. Of these lies that there were these people from Al-Qaeda
19 that had been going through Liberia, had been living in hotels
14:38:57 20 and had been moving di amonds. The FBI of the United States spent
21 months in Liberia investigating this. All lies.

22 Q. And what was the outcome of the investi gati on?

23 A. All lies. The same - all these issues contained in here
24 were also subject of the 9/11 commi ssi on that investigated this
14:39:16 25 in Washi ngton DC. All lies. All. The 9/11 commi ssi on set up by
26 the United States government looked into all of these lies.
27 Lies, lies, all of them.

28 Q. Now, you said that your government cooperated with the FBI
29 before you left offi ce, Mr Tayl or.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, just remind us, when did you leave office?

3 A. I left office in August 2003.

14:39:43 4 Q. This article is published October 2003, after you left
5 office.

6 A. After I left office.

7 Q. By October 2003, had this alleged Al-Qaeda link been
8 properly investigated by the American authorities?

9 A. Properly investigated by the American authorities, yes.

14:39:58 10 Q. And dismissed?

11 A. And dismissed.

12 Q. So let's go back to this October article, shall we:

13 "In this effort, Al-Qaeda leaders, while devoutly Sunni
14 Muslims, showed their willingness and ability to work across
14:40:29 15 religious divides. In order to move the diamonds quickly, the
16 Al-Qaeda operatives turned to Aziz Nassour, a Lebanese diamond
17 merchant with decades of experience in the blood diamond trade.
18 Nassour is a devout Shi'ite Muslim and a supporter of Lebanon's
19 Amal militia.

14:40:50 20 Nassour, who was a close business associate of Mobutu Sese
21 Seko in the former Zaire and owner of a host of diamond companies
22 in Antwerp with overlapping directorates, met with the RUF high
23 command in Monrovia in July 2001, promising to buy all the
24 diamonds they could produce. The rebels promised to step up
14:41:11 25 production to the maximum."

26 Mr Taylor, do you know about such a meeting in July 2001?

27 A. No, I don't know.

28 Q. Behind the RUF high command and this man Nassour?

29 A. No, I do not. And if we look at the dates, and this draws

1 my attention, by 2001, Issa Sesay is a leader then of the RUF.
2 I'm not aware of any such meeting in Monrovia, but I'm sure that
3 if such a meeting had occurred, I would have been told that Issa
4 Sesay had - I don't remember Issa being in Monrovia in July 2001.

14:41:52 5 Q. "Several factors contributed to the RUF being able to dig
6 out the stones at unprecedented levels. Since the RUF had driven
7 most of the civilians out of the diamond mining areas after
8 taking over the region in 1997, production was limited to what
9 the rebels themselves could mine. But things were changing at
10 the same time Al-Qaeda was scrambling to acquire the stones.

11 Because a fragile United Nations-backed peace process was
12 taking hold and the RUF was gradually disarming, the rebels were
13 able to move their cadres directly from the demobilisation camps
14 to mining. And because the war was winding down, miners who had
14:42:42 15 stayed out of the diamond mining region for fear of the RUF
16 poured into the area as United Nations peacekeepers offered a
17 modicum of security for their labour.

18 Nassour's monopoly also created a shortage among
19 traditional RUF clients, one of the tip-offs that something
14:43:11 20 unusual was happening, diamonds buyers who normally bought stones
21 from the RUF were unable to buy diamonds during the summer of
22 2001 because some unknown buyers were paying 10 per cent to 15
23 per cent more than the market rate. They said that premium,
24 being paid by their competitor, made it virtually impossible for
14:43:29 25 them to buy high quality stones. The lack of diamonds was severe
26 enough to prompt United States Ambassador Joseph Melrose to write
27 a cable to Washington about it, although he did not have an
28 explanation for the unusual market happenings. The cable
29 received no response from headquarters.

1 At the same time, according to Belgian diamond experts,
2 despite the fact that in the summer of 2001 more diamonds were
3 being mined than at any time in the past decade, the stones
4 didn't show up in Antwerp or any of the other world markets.

14:44:10 5 That showed, one investigator said, that someone bought and, is
6 hoarding, a large stock of diamonds worth many millions of
7 dollars.

8 The paradigm shift in terrorist financing, although similar
9 methods have been used for decades by Hezbollah and other Middle
14:44:33 10 Eastern groups, was missed entirely by western intelligence
11 agencies. The CIA lost almost all of its operatives in West
12 Africa after the Cold War, leaving the agency with virtually no
13 resources on the ground. French and Belgian intelligence, active
14 in their former colonies in West Africa, knew of the Middle
14:44:58 15 Eastern connection to diamond sales over the past two decades,
16 principally to Hezbollah and Amal militia supporters, but viewed
17 them as relatively harmless. In the 1980s, the Israelis, aware
18 of the financial boon diamonds provided to its enemies, sent in a
19 large number of its own diamond dealers in an attempt to cut into
14:45:22 20 the trade. Remarkably, by the end of the 1990s Israeli and known
21 Hezbollah and Amal dealers were doing business with each other
22 across Africa.

23 Because of the lack of understanding of the terrorists' use
24 of commodities, the United States government, in the immediate
14:45:46 25 aftermath of 9/11, did not look for terrorist funds where they
26 were hidden. The initial hunt for Al-Qaeda funds focused almost
27 exclusively on trying to freeze the few assets that remained in
28 western banks and were traceable to terrorist funding. The
29 initial reporting on terrorist ties to gemstones, by me on

1 diamonds, and Bobby Block of the Wall Street Journal and
2 tanzanite in particular, were met initially with deep skepticism
3 in the United States intelligence community.

4 This largely continues today. Because it had such a
14:46:20 5 limited understanding of Al-Qaeda's financial structure before
6 the September 11 attacks, the government was slow to recognise
7 and begin to act on the host of non-traditional financial methods
8 used by terrorists. These include the use of charities, the
9 hawalla system of transferring assets, and the vital role that
14:46:43 10 gold plays for these groups. Some US intelligence agencies
11 remain reluctant to acknowledge even the possibility that
12 Al-Qaeda moved significant assets into commodities, especially
13 gemstones, despite the growing evidence beyond anecdotal evidence
14 and eyewitness testimony to support the veracity of the
14:47:14 15 reporting. Much of the evidence has been uncovered by European
16 law enforcement and intelligence officials, who have followed
17 leads the United States has chosen not to. The Swiss
18 Attorney-General, in a recent interview, said it was now accepted
19 conventional wisdom among European investigators and intelligence
14:47:31 20 agencies that Al-Qaeda had put most of its wealth, estimated by
21 United Nations experts to be between \$30 and \$300 million, into
22 commodities for safekeeping.

23 The Belgians in particular have uncovered a wealth of
24 information on the diamond nexus to Al-Qaeda, flowing through
14:47:52 25 Antwerp. Other eye witnesses, unavailable when I did my initial
26 reporting, have come forward to confirm the presence of the
27 Al-Qaeda operatives in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Most
28 significantly, the United Nations backed Special Court for Sierra
29 Leone has uncovered witnesses and other evidence that not only

1 corroborated my initial findings, but placed other senior
2 Al-Qaeda operatives in Monrovia at the same time."

3 Have you seen any such evidence in this Court, Mr Taylor?

4 A. No, I haven't. I haven't.

14:48:27 5 Q. "For reasons that remain unclear, United States officials
6 have given little importance to the findings.

7 The terrorist ties to the diamond and tanzanite trade were
8 uncovered by reporters on the ground in Africa. Given the lack
9 of human resources the CIA and other intelligence gathering
14:48:56 10 agencies have on the ground in West and Central Africa
11 particularly, it is not at all surprising the activities were
12 undetected. Perhaps more than any other region, Africa was
13 abandoned by US intelligence services following the Cold War,
14 often leaving a single station chief to cover two, or even three,
14:49:15 15 countries with almost no support personnel.

16 Given the dearth of assets on the ground and the fact that
17 so little of the illicit trade is detectable through electronic
18 intercepts or other high tech tools, it seems to me highly
19 probable that similar transactions by Al-Qaeda and other
14:49:44 20 terrorists groups have transpired in other countries. Countries
21 across Africa, from the Central African Republic to the Congo and
22 Chad, offer many of the same conditions that Liberia and Sierra
23 Leone have offered: The trappings of a state, but in reality
24 states rife with corruption, coupled with an almost complete lack
14:50:05 25 of investigative capabilities and no tradition of confronting
26 criminal elements.

27 There is strong anecdotal evidence that Al-Qaeda bought
28 gems in Congo-Kinshasa and Angola, as well as Sierra Leone and
29 Liberia. The DRC, with its host of different armies dividing up

1 the country for the purpose of looting, coupled with a long
2 history of a rapacious state and corruption, is long known to be
3 a major financial centre Hezbollah and other armed groups.
4 Private armies control vast swaths of the extensive nation, and
14:50:41 5 neither the central government nor intelligence agencies have any
6 clear idea of what transpires outside of the capital. For
7 example, there are direct, twice-weekly flights from the diamond
8 mining centre of Mbuji-Mayi in southern DRC to Dubai. The
9 flights pass through no customs regime, file no flight manifest,
14:51:13 10 and are uninspected on both ends of the flight. In Angola, Jonas
11 Savimbi maintained strong ties to Compaore in Burkina Faso and
12 the corrupt dictatorship in Togo, often using diamonds as a
13 medium of exchange for weapons. The only serious investigations
14 into the activities and their possible ties to terrorist
14:51:36 15 organisations have been carried out by the United Nations panel
16 of experts and a handful of private, non-governmental
17 organisations. Neither the host states nor counter-terrorism
18 bodies from other countries have dedicated significant resources
19 to unraveling the diamond trade there. Until resources and
14:51:57 20 attention are brought to bear in this area, Al-Qaeda and other
21 terrorist organisations will continue to use diamonds and other
22 commodities to finance their actions."

23 Now, Mr Taylor, have you heard a single witness in this
24 case link you to Al-Qaeda?

14:52:17 25 A. No, no.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, you made reference earlier to a Belgian report,
27 did you not?

28 A. Yes, I did.

29 Q. Help us, when did you first see that report?

1 A. That report, I first saw it here - by "here" I mean since
2 my incarceration. It is a document that was provided to the
3 Prosecution by, apparently, the Belgian authorities upon request
4 of David Crane, the Prosecutor, and that document was made
14:53:10 5 available to the Defence. I have read the entire document.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move to that document, can I ask
7 please, that the Douglas Farah article, "The Role of Conflict
8 Diamonds and Failed States" be marked for identification MFI-283,
9 please.

14:53:30 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
11 identification MFI-283.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I invite attention, please, to behind
13 divider 150 in this same binder.

14 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, for purposes of the record, we
14:54:47 15 wish to raise the same objection to this document that we have
16 raised earlier. The fact that this accused read a document after
17 it was disclosed to him does not establish the relationship of
18 this accused with this document sufficient to provide the
19 foundation that your Honours have indicated is required before
14:55:06 20 such a document can be admitted pursuant to 89C or, in fact, even
21 shown to the witness. So we wish to put that objection on the
22 record.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, it's on the record, Ms Hollis. Do
24 you want to --

14:55:23 25 MR GRIFFITHS: No, thank you, Mr President.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: We are going to allow the question,
27 Ms Hollis.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the first page of this document should bear

1 the ERN number 00102148. Does it?

2 A. It does.

3 Q. Now, we see it's headed "Federal Criminal Investigation
4 Department" and then a date. Then it's addressed to the Public
14:55:57 5 Prosecutor, Antwerp, and then we see subject of the report,
6 "Criminal organisation committed between 1 January 2000 and 31
7 December 2001." Then it goes on to list various things and it
8 also mentions at the bottom Nassour Aziz. Now, remember that
9 name appearing in the Douglas Farah article we just looked at?

14:56:24 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And Ossaily Samih, yes?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Can we look at this next page, please.

14 "Further to the request from the Special Court for Sierra
14:56:48 15 Leone I can provide the following information.

16 Further to the investigation into Nassour Aziz, Ossaily
17 Samih, ASA DIAM and others, it has been demonstrated clearly that
18 this organisation had direct contacts with the RUF rebels in
19 Sierra Leone, for the transport of rough diamonds through
14:57:18 20 Monrovia (Liberia) to Antwerp (Belgium). This was done under the
21 supervision and with the support of the regime of the former
22 President Charles Taylor."

23 What do you say about that assertion, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I'm saying that is totally untrue, and as we go into the
14:57:38 25 report we will get to see that the report does not contain any
26 factual evidence of the conclusion reached in that paragraph.
27 But as we go through it - I have read the entire report. In
28 their conclusions 1 and 3 - conclusion 1 going from, I think,
29 page 6 through 14-18 and conclusion 3 there's nothing mentioned

1 about Charles Taylor receiving diamonds or being involved. So
2 this conclusion, I disagree with it. Because even as we go down
3 and they refer to it, there's nothing linking me to anything. So
4 I don't understand, and I'm sure the Court will get to see the
14:58:19 5 reading of how they reach that conclusion.

6 Q. And now:

7 "I am attaching a copy of the summary report which clearly
8 demonstrate this link. You are specifically referred to
9 conclusion 1, see pages 6 to 14, and conclusion 3, see pages 18
14:58:45 10 to 27."

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, we should make clear that that numbering appears at
13 the top of the pages we'll be looking at subsequently?

14 A. That's correct.

14:58:54 15 Q. "Please note that this information has already been sent to
16 the investigators of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. I am
17 referring to the response to an international legal assistance,
18 reference and file of examining magistrate Bogaerts, at Antwerp.
19 The request for legal assistance concerned a question of 12 March
14:59:19 20 2003 by then prosecutor David Crane of the Special Court."

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So this report is prepared, Mr Taylor, do you understand
23 this, at the request of David Crane, a request he made in March
24 2003, yes?

14:59:41 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Can we go to page 10 of 49 at the bottom, please. That's
27 the numbering at the bottom of the page. Do you have it,
28 Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, I do.

- 1 Q. Now, we see there a list of the suspects, okay?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Aziz Nassour, do you know him?
- 4 A. No, never met him. Don't know him.
- 15:00:30 5 Q. Ossaily Samih?
- 6 A. No, don't know him. Never met him.
- 7 Q. Nora?
- 8 A. No.
- 9 Q. Macky Abbas?
- 15:00:39 10 A. No.
- 11 Q. Ahmad Ali-Said?
- 12 A. No.
- 13 Q. George Mario Zanos?
- 14 A. No.
- 15:00:47 15 Q. Over the page. LY Samba?
- 16 A. No.
- 17 Q. Tsoukaladakis?
- 18 A. No.
- 19 Q. Vanda Nowa Di N' soyo?
- 15:01:09 20 A. No.
- 21 Q. Or Asa Diam?
- 22 A. No.
- 23 Q. Now, picking up under those photographs:
- 24 "Start of the investigation.
- 15:01:23 25 On 6 December 2001, the Financial Information Processing
- 26 Section at Brussels reported a number of suspect money transfers
- 27 to the Antwerp prosecutor's office.
- 28 The transfers were linked to potential money laundering
- 29 transactions by ASA DIAM NV diamond company based at Antwerp.

1 The following individuals were mentioned: Nassour Aziz,
2 Ossaily Samih, Ahmad Jaafar, Ahmad Ali-Said.

3 The suspect transactions were also linked to the illegal
4 trade in conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone, with respect to
15:02:12 5 which the CFI refers to the Court investigation underway at
6 Antwerp.

7 This concerns a list of national and international press
8 items about Ossaily Samih who is allegedly involved in illegal
9 diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone which is related direct or
15:02:28 10 indirect funding of the Al-Qaeda network."

11 Now, let's go over the page. Now, we see at the end of the
12 second paragraph that the authorities carried out various
13 searches and seized various documentation, including documents
14 relating to arms trading with Western African were selected from
15:03:05 15 the seized documents. Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. "An initial analysis of the seized documents, various
18 payment slips, numerous telephone contacts and the links between
19 Ossaily Samih and Nassour Aziz gives the impression that there
15:03:23 20 are clear indications that Ossaily and Nassour are involved in
21 illegal diamond trading with RUF rebels from Sierra Leone to
22 Antwerp through the ASA DIAM NV company. This confirmed the
23 statements in the article of the Washington Post of 2 November
24 2001."

15:03:51 25 Now, are you aware of that Washington Post article,
26 Mr Taylor?

27 A. November 2001, no.

28 Q. And following that on that page, we see that there were
29 further searches carried out as a consequence.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Let's go over the page, please:

3 "The term 'blood diamonds' refers to the illegal diamond
4 trade with countries where bloody conflicts are being fought
15:04:18 5 between rebel movements and governments.

6 You are referred to the international embargoes introduced
7 by the Security Council of the United Nations on the diamond
8 trade with countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola.

9 To end the conflicts, the United Nations Security Council
15:04:35 10 passed a resolution concerning diamond trade with Angola, Sierra
11 Leone and Liberia. The resolutions distinguish between Angola
12 and Sierra Leone, from where diamonds may be exported with
13 certificates of origin, and Liberia, which is subject to a
14 complete ban on diamond exports.

15:04:57 15 These resolutions were adopted by the European Community
16 after which the member states incorporated them in their national
17 legislation, known as the sanctions on violations of the act of
18 11 September 1962 on the import, export and transit of goods,
19 related technology - violations on the United Nations embargo on
15:05:23 20 diamond imports."

21 And then let's go to the bottom:

22 "The conclusions of this investigation are based on the
23 following facts:

- 24 1. Analysis of the evidence and documents seized during
15:05:39 25 the searches of the home of Ossailey Samih.
- 26 2. Analysis of contacts based on the requested retroactive
27 traffic data for satellite telephones, GSM mobile
28 telephones and landline connections used by the individuals
29 covered by the investigation.

1 3. Analysis and expert report on the accounts and
2 financial movements of the ASA DIAM company.
3 4. Interviews with and confessions by the relevant
4 individuals.
15:06:21 5 5. Air travel by the relevant individuals.
6 6. Results from the rogatory commissions.
7 7. Analysis of the documents seized during the search of
8 the offices of the ASA DIAM company.
9 8. Analysis of the documents seized during the search of
15:06:40 10 the offices of the Artesia Bank in Antwerp.
11 9. Expert investigation of the accounts of ASA DIAM by the
12 appointed accountant."
13 So now we come to:
14 "Conclusion number 1: Illegal trade in conflict diamonds.
15:07:02 15 Nassour Aziz, as the actual manager of the ASA DIAM diamond
16 company and as a leading figure of the organisation, has
17 developed a mechanism for smuggling rough diamonds, known as
18 conflict or blood diamonds, from the Kono region (Sierra Leone),
19 via Monrovia to the Antwerp diamond market.
15:07:23 20 Nassour's right-hand man and his key figure in Africa is
21 Ossaily Samih."
22 And then we see that it's explained that Kono is a diamond
23 region in the eastern part of Sierra Leone bordering Liberia and
24 is controlled by rebels of the RUF. And it also explains who the
15:07:46 25 RUF is. And then this:
26 "We can divide the illegal diamond activities of the ASA
27 DIAM company and Nassour Aziz into three periods.
28 Period 1: 1999 - December 2000 - the diamond route was
29 Kisangani (Congo) - Antwerp. According to the statement by Vanda

1 Guy, one of Nassour Aziz's employees, in 1999 Vanda Guy proposed
2 to Nassour Aziz to engage in diamond transactions with the RCD
3 rebel movement in Congo who were in conflict with the Kabila
4 regime at that time.

15:08:28 5 After some meetings in Belgium, Nassour Aziz give \$25,000
6 US to Vanda Guy to pay key figures in Kigali (Rwanda) and
7 Kisangani (Congo) to get a monopoly on the diamond mining
8 activities in Kisangani.

9 Vanda Guy manages to arrange this and subsequently, from
15:08:57 10 early 2000, millions of USD are taken to Kisangani to fund the
11 diamond trade.

12 The couriers take the diamonds from Kisangani (Congo) via
13 Kigali (Rwanda) to Belgium, where they are cleared through
14 customs as originating from Kinshasa (Congo).

15:09:15 15 The diamond route Kisangani - Antwerp operated until about
16 the beginning of 2001 and then came to a standstill.

17 Although the diamonds indisputably come from the Kisangani
18 region, all bookkeeping documents state the origin to be
19 Kinshasa."

15:09:33 20 Over the page, please. Let's pick it up at the number 2:

21 "Period 2: October 2000 - May 2001 - diamond route
22 Monrovia (Liberia) - Antwerp.

23 In Antwerp, at the offices of the ASA DIAM company, Nassour
24 Aziz introduces Ossaily to Darwish Ali, an American of Lebanese
15:09:59 25 origin.

26 According to Nassour, Darwish had good contacts in Liberia
27 for setting up a diamond line."

28 Pause. Mr Taylor, Darwish Ali, do you know him?

29 A. No, I don't. No.

1 Q. "Ossaily Samih was given \$2,000 US to cover expenses and
2 was instructed to inspect a batch of rough diamonds in Liberia.

3 In December 2000, Ossaily travels to Liberia with Darwish
4 to start up the diamond activities. In Liberia, Darwish
15:10:36 5 introduces Ossaily to Bah Ibrahim, an RUF leader.

6 Ossaily moves into Hotel Boulevard in Monrovia (Liberia)
7 where he also pays for several other rooms, for example, for
8 Darwish, Bah and others."

9 Mr Taylor, Hotel Boulevard, we've come across that hotel
15:11:03 10 before, haven't we?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Was Hotel Boulevard used to accommodate members of the RUF?

13 A. Yes. During the peace process, yes.

14 Q. Were you aware of this meeting at Hotel Boulevard involving
15:11:22 15 Darwish, Bah and others?

16 A. No.

17 Q. "From January 2001 several couriers with cash from ASA
18 DIAM, at the instructions of Nassour Aziz, are sent to Liberia to
19 hand the banknotes to Ossaily Samih in person.

15:11:42 20 Various loose notes made by Ossaily in Monrovia show that
21 through payments, in Liberia, Ossaily Samih made it possible,
22 under the protection of the Liberian security services, the SSS
23 (Special Security Service) or the ATU (Anti-Terrorist Unit), to
24 have diamonds from the rebel areas in Sierra Leone transported to
15:12:05 25 his hotel in Monrovia."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware of the SSS and the ATU
27 playing such a role?

28 A. No, but it's possible that individuals could have done
29 that. I'm not aware of it.

1 Q. "Sami h then hands the rough di amonds to the money couriers,
2 some di amonds are packed in a condom which they hide in or on
3 their body to smuggle them to Antwerp where they deliver the
4 goods to Nassour Azi z. "

15:12:50 5 Let's go over the page:

6 "The review of the accounts of ASA DIAM clearly show that
7 Nassour Azi z made every effort to hide hi s il legal di amond
8 suppli es from Li beri a.

9 For example, there is not a single reference on paper to
10 hi s di amond li ne from Li beri a. Again, we refer to the expert
11 report drawn up by the appointed accountant.

12 In this report we also read that the details of the
13 telephone invoices of ASA DIAM were carefully removed to hide any
14 link to Li beri a.

15:13:30 15 However, the investigation of the retroactive telephone
16 traffic of the landline phones, as well as the personal GSM
17 phones of Nassour Azi z, indicate regular contacts with satellite
18 phones used by RUF leaders and responsible personnel of the
19 presidential securi ty regi me of Li beri a. "

15:13:58 20 Now, what do you know about that, Mr Tayl or?

21 A. I don' t even know what he means by "the presi denti al
22 securi ty regi me of Li beri a." What is that?

23 Q. What he' s saying, Mr Tayl or, is that there is some link
24 there between the presi denti al securi ty regi me and thi s man Azi z
15:14:22 25 Nassour. Now, what do you know about that?

26 A. Nothi ng. But, I mean, I don' t know what he means by
27 "presi denti al securi ty regi me", okay? If we' re talki ng about
28 i ndi vi dual s li ke he sai d, SSS or ATU i ndi vi dual s, but, you know,
29 when you' re look at these thi ngs when people are tryi ng to

1 destroy people, why does somebody have to talk about a
2 presidential security regime? Is he talking about a personal
3 aide-de-camp of Charles Taylor? I mean, this is an intelligence
4 operation going on. Somebody says the Secret Service regime;
15:14:55 5 what does that mean? So, I mean, he has already said here that
6 there are SSS, okay, and some ATU personnel, and in fact later in
7 the reports he even mentions their names. But what does that
8 have to do with the presidential security regime? What does that
9 mean? I mean, you know, for me it doesn't have any real meaning
15:15:18 10 except somebody is trying to do something like a nexus that you
11 later on call the names. So, I mean, I don't know what it really
12 means.

13 Q. Help me with this as well, Mr Taylor:

14 "Regular contacts with satellite phones used by RUF leaders
15:15:39 15 would suggest RUF leaders are in direct contact with Nassour
16 Aziz, the diamond dealer."

17 Yes? So help me, Mr Taylor: What was your role then?

18 A. None. What are we talking about, 2001? That would not
19 even be a role for me. The RUF individuals, whoever these people
15:15:57 20 are talking to, are talking directly to them. What does that
21 have to do with the President of Liberia? Nothing. It's not to
22 say that I'm talking to President Taylor, or President Taylor
23 sent me the leaders to talk to. He is in contact with the RUF,
24 whoever he's talking to, in 2001. That is what? We're talking
15:16:18 25 about a period - 2001, we're talking about the RUF now. We're
26 talking about the leadership in Sierra Leone. There's, as far as
27 I'm concerned disarmament, demobilisation is going on in Sierra
28 Leone. What they are doing in Sierra Leone is none of the
29 business of Charles Taylor. Why does it have to be Taylor?

1 That's what I'm talking about and the nexus. I have nothing to
2 do with who he is talking to, and he says the RUF leader.

3 Q. Now we come to:

4 "Period 3: June 2001-December 2001 - diamond route
15:16:58 5 Monrovia (Liberia) Beirut (Lebanon).

6 In the course of May 2001, the cooperation between Ossaily
7 Samih and Nassour Aziz ends. Ossaily returns to Belgium and
8 there is a serious incident with Nassour. According to Nassour,
9 Ossaily has held money back and he refuses to pay Ossaily for the
15:17:22 10 work done in Monrovia. We refer to a sound recording which
11 Ossaily stored on his computer.

12 After Ossaily was essentially dismissed by Nassour, he
13 tries himself to set up a diamond line with Monrovia, from the
14 Baeckelansstraat. From June 2001 Ossaily made numerous phone
15:17:45 15 calls from Belgium to the individuals he cooperated with in
16 Monrovia, such as Bah, Issa."

17 Now, Mr Taylor, what do you know about that contact?

18 A. I don't know. Ibrahim Bah, I don't even --

19 Q. Issa?

15:18:03 20 A. Issa? I'm not sure if it's Issa Sesay. I don't know.
21 Maybe that's who he's talking about, the leader of the RUF. I
22 have no - and it's very plain who he is talking to. I don't know
23 anything about who these people are talking to or what they are
24 doing. Now, I'm in no position to deny that individuals came to
15:18:20 25 Monrovia and were doing their business. That's what - I cannot
26 deny it. I don't know what they are doing, but I am not
27 involved. Neither have I authorised anyone to be involved with
28 them and they are doing - somebody comes, checks into the
29 Boulevard Hotel - and let me clear. We've heard about this

1 hotel. This is not a government hotel. Boulevard is a
2 privately-owned hotel where - it's one of the best hotels in
3 Monrovia. People come and go. That's not - I know nothing about
4 what is going on between these private people.

15:18:57 5 Q. "In this statement Ossaily also admits that he wanted to
6 arrange diamond transactions with the RUF. In his view, there is
7 nothing wrong with buying diamonds from the RUF and then to sell
8 them in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone.

9 Ossaily's flight details show that in the second half of
15:19:14 10 2001 he travels at least three times to Abidjan (Ivory Coast)
11 from where, according to his own account, he travels once to
12 Monrovia to do diamond business there.

13 Ossaily's activities continue in this way until January
14 2002, after which the links with West Africa are greatly reduced.

15:19:35 15 We cannot demonstrate that in the third period Ossaily
16 actually managed to buy diamonds in Monrovia or from the RUF in
17 Sierra Leone.

18 Similarly, the import of rough diamonds by Nassour Aziz
19 through ASA DIAM ceased completely from June 2001. We refer to
15:19:59 20 the expert report by the accountant on the records."

21 Over the page, please:

22 "In the period of July 2001, Nassour held an airport visa
23 for Liberia, valid for three months. This visa states that
24 Nassour is the guest of Bah Ibrahim."

15:20:35 25 What do you know about the issue of a visa to this man
26 Nassour, Mr Taylor?

27 A. I don't know. The man has a three - you know, this is the
28 difficulty of this case. The President of Liberia, some
29 immigration officer, it's a normal procedure. He's a Lebanese

1 national. You can see three months visa. That's normal. People
2 get three months visa all the time. That would not even come
3 near me, not even - this is not even a minister who would look at
4 something like this. I wouldn't even know who is given a visa by
15:21:08 5 immigration. I don't know. I have no idea.

6 Q. And then we see below, Mr Taylor, in schematic form, the
7 three routes which we've just looked at in writing. Do you
8 follow?

9 A. Yes, I see it and --

15:21:24 10 Q. And if you notice, to the right of that box your face
11 appears, President Charles Taylor, do you see?

12 A. That's the problem. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Now help me. During that period 3, do you see any mention
14 in this report of you being involved in that particular route for
15:21:43 15 the transfer of diamonds?

16 A. There is no mention. But my picture shows up here, and
17 anybody seeing this will say: Oh, Taylor. There's nothing
18 mentioned here that what they call Nassour or something while in
19 Liberia talked to President Taylor or documents that we found
15:22:03 20 when we searched President Taylor - how does Charles Taylor's
21 name get in this only God knows, and this is the problem with
22 this whole Taylor business. Here is my picture.

23 Q. Let's go over the page, page 18 of 49:

24 "Indications of diamond trading with the RUF:

15:22:21 25 The investigations clearly indicate that Ossaily Samih in
26 Monrovia is the key figure for the purchase of rough diamonds by
27 Nassour Aziz and ASA DIAM and that he also manages the funds sent
28 to Africa by Nassour. Various evidence indicates that in
29 Monrovia Ossaily negotiates directly with senior members of the

1 RUF rebel army, with the general approval of the regime
2 associated with President Taylor. "

3 Now, what do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

4 A. How does one deal with this kind of matter? Somebody is in
15:23:06 5 Monrovia dealing with whoever, and somebody draws a conclusion
6 that this person is dealing with individuals, as he puts it, with
7 the general approval of the regime associated with President
8 Taylor. These are the things that got me four years in jail.
9 Some are just - what does this mean in the English language that
15:23:30 10 somebody is --

11 Q. But, Mr Taylor, hold on. Look, the Prosecution have called
12 several witnesses who have given evidence in this Court that they
13 knew of diamonds being taken from Sierra Leone and given directly
14 to you, yes?

15:23:55 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Many of it in mayonnaise jars, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So, Mr Taylor, if that is right, can you help us as to why
19 this man Nassour was negotiating directly with senior members of
15:24:12 20 the RUF; should have been negotiating with you?

21 A. You see, that's the whole point. That's the whole point,
22 because all those things you were talking about, there's diamonds
23 coming in mayonnaise jars, nobody is standing there, but diamonds
24 are leaving Sierra Leone, but they are designated for Taylor, and
15:24:33 25 they want to say that Taylor received them, when they are not
26 there and not know. And like you say, why would anybody want to
27 be negotiating directly with RUF people? I should have all the
28 diamonds and they should just come to me.

29 Q. "The names of the individuals found on various notes by

1 Ossaily, and with whom Ossaily has had extensive contacts in the
2 Hotel Boulevard in Monrovia, can be placed in the RUF of Sierra
3 Leone, given various UN reports and further to statements by the
4 couriers. We refer to Bah Ibrahim, Issa Sesay, Denis Mingo, Sam
15:25:16 5 Bockarie, Eddie Kanneh. The seized documents and photographs
6 also clearly show that Ossaily has very close connections with
7 senior figures in the presidential regime, ie, the Special
8 Security Service and the ATU."

9 Help me, Mr Taylor, where's your name?

15:25:38 10 A. I don't see it because it's not there. I don't know these
11 people. Never heard of them or talked to them. It's not there.

12 Q. Now, you note that the particular names given, the report
13 says, were found on various notes by Ossaily. Now, Mr Taylor,
14 did you ever have any dealings with this man Ossaily?

15:26:04 15 A. Never. Never had any dealings with him. Never.

16 Q. "The meetings with RUF members in Hotel Boulevard in
17 Monrovia. Ossaily pays for various rooms in this hotel.

18 Macky Abbas, Ly Samba, Vlasselaerts Nora, all confirmed in
19 their statements that RUF members regularly visited Hotel
15:26:32 20 Boulevard. Ossaily also admits to have been in contact with RUF
21 members.

22 The numerous telephone contacts with RUF members, ASA DIAM
23 buys a number of satellite telephones from the Belgian company
24 GT&T at Louvain, La Neuve. These telephones are then distributed
15:26:56 25 in Monrovia to Ossaily and other important individuals. Further
26 to Ossaily's seized telephone directories - meaning contact list or
27 call register - we can determine who used which phones.

28 Satellite phones were provided to senior RUF members such as Bah,
29 Issa, Mingo, Eddie (alias Falcon)."

1 Did you get a phone, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No, no, never got a phone. If I had gotten one, he would
3 have said. Never.

4 Q. Let's go over the page:

15:27:53 5 "Transmitters are bought and made available to the RUF
6 and/or members of the regime associated with President Taylor.

7 Call credits are purchased for satellite phones used by the
8 RUF in Sierra Leone and for the SSS and ATU in Monrovia. For
9 example, at Ossaily's a document was found with the note 'special
15:28:20 10 request from RUF Sierra Leone 2IC (General Denis Mingo-Superman),
11 please help with 500 units'. This note includes a clear
12 reference to the RUF Sierra Leone and '2IC' refers to second in
13 command.

14 When Ossaily is confronted with this document, he states
15:28:42 15 that he has received this request via the reception of Hotel
16 Boulevard but not to have done anything further to it.

17 The evidence shows that Hamed Abdul purchased call credits
18 in Belgium for the satellite phone ending 725. Hamed Abdul is an
19 uncle of Ossaily.

15:29:06 20 Several Western Union transfers are made to various
21 individuals, including a money transfer on 14 December 2000 of
22 approximately 5,000 euros from Ossaily Samih to Ibrahim Bah.

23 During the search at Ossaily's various notes are found with
24 references to payments to RUF members such as Bah, Issa and Eddie
15:29:37 25 and payments to the members of the SSS and ATU, such as Colonel
26 Adams."

27 Who is Colonel Adams?

28 A. Colonel Adams was a Ghanaian former military officer that
29 also was used to help to train the ATU. He's Ghanaian. In fact,

1 he lives in Ghana.

2 Q. What do you know about him being involved in this,
3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. I did not know that Adams - he was there helping to train
15:30:11 5 the ATU. I didn't know he was involved in diamond business. He's
6 a Ghanaian and he was on assignment there. I mean, that
7 assignment is on contract there working.

8 Q. And then they give an example of the note. And if we go
9 over the page, you see an example of the note, and if we look,
15:30:39 10 for example, in the right-hand column, do you see the name Eddie
11 and Issa in brackets behind it, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. And then you see in the same line at the bottom Bah Hotel,
14 Bah Personal. Do you see that?

15:30:57 15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. And just to the left of that, do you see Adams?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Yes?

19 A. Yes. Actually, it's right over Bah Hotel. At the top of
15:31:15 20 Bah Hotel, Colonel Adam.

21 Q. It appears there as well, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then the report goes on to note --

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm just wondering if that's the same
15:31:28 25 person. The one appearing directly overhead is Adam without an
26 S.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: And the one on the left is Adams with an S.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: And it doesn't refer to the one on the
29 left as a colonel.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, it might be two different people,
2 Mr President.

3 THE WITNESS: It's true. The President is right. I mean,
4 the one I know is Colonel Adams, to the right, so the President
15:31:55 5 has a point.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. "During the search, photographs of diamond mines were found
8 on Ossaily's personal computer. The photographs were stored on
9 the file name 'Min' or 'Mining area' or 'Kono'."

15:32:15 10 And then there were also photographs of individuals, okay?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And then it goes on over the page:

13 "Further to the seized documents and various statements we
14 can make a reconstruction of the illegal route for rough diamonds
15:32:30 15 from Sierra Leone to Hotel Boulevard."

16 Now we see your picture again, Mr Taylor, yes?

17 A. Yes, I see it.

18 Q. And the route is Sesay, Eddie Kanneh with an arrow going to
19 Hotel Boulevard where they would meet Ossaily, yes?

15:32:53 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Who would then take the diamonds up to Antwerp, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in the description so far, have you
24 featured at all?

15:33:05 25 A. Well, to my understanding of this report, I don't see how I
26 feature, but my picture keeps showing up. It would have been
27 easier to say - even say Liberia or Monrovia, but, no, it has to
28 tie to Charles Taylor, tie in at any cost Charles Taylor. Even
29 after they name an individual, it's still tied to Charles Taylor.

1 Q. And then over the page. It's explained that there's a
2 reference to helicopter, yes?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. Now, let's go over the page, shall we, to page 23 of 49.

15:34:07 5 Now, Mr Taylor, you will note, of course, that the pages we've
6 looked at to date relate to the first conclusion, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Which was referred to right at the beginning of the
9 document, yes?

15:34:21 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now, when we go now to page 23 of 49:

12 "The funds to finance the diamond smuggling come from the
13 account of ASA DIAM company with the Artesia Bank in Antwerp.

14 The revenues from the sale of the illegally procured diamonds on
15:34:48 15 the Antwerp market are systematically used for the purchase of
16 new goods.

17 Cash is taken from the company using cheques in the names
18 of Nassour Aziz and Zanos Mario. At the instruction of Nassour
19 the cheques are written by the authorised representative Ossaily
15:35:09 20 Najla and signed, after which she or secretary Claus use these
21 cheques to withdraw cash from the Artesia Bank."

22 And then it goes on to show how they prove that.

23 "Zanos Mario states that the cash withdrawals in 2001 made
24 using cheques in his name were largely taken to Monrovia by other
15:35:35 25 couriers. He mentioned Macky Abbas, Ly Samba, Tsoukaladaki
26 Michel as couriers."

27 Now, there's that name Michel, yes?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. "Zanos Mario also states that he signed blank documents

1 which were then used by ASA DIAM or Nassour to make purchase
2 invoices, purchase invoices to support the millions of US dollars
3 withdrawn from the ASA DIAM account with the Artesia Bank. With
4 respect to this, Zanos' statements include verbatim with respect
15:36:18 5 to the various invoices in my name in the accounts of ASA DIAM, I
6 again confirm that Aziz and, more specifically, Katrien got me to
7 sign a number of blank documents which were later used to make
8 purchase invoices. Hence you will find invoices in my name
9 stating 'BUREAU ZANOS GEORGE MARIO'. I repeat that I never sold
15:36:40 10 these goods to ASA DIAM and this was only an accounting device to
11 import the diamonds into Belgium.

12 3. The statements by couriers Macky Abbas and Ly Samba and
13 also the statements by Vlasselaerts Nora indicate that these
14 funds were given to the couriers Macky Abbas and Ly Samba, who
15:37:07 15 travel to Monrovia with the money and give it to Ossaily Samih.
16 After handing over this money, the named couriers receive
17 diamonds from Ossaily which they have to smuggle via Monrovia to
18 Belgium, for which purpose they finally hide the diamonds in their
19 body. Vlasselaerts Nora even states on 15 March 2002 that her
15:37:35 20 boyfriend took a number of 100 USD banknotes with him when he
21 left Monrovia. The quantity of banknotes was similar to a shoe
22 box full."

23 Let's go over the page, please:

24 "4. Ossaily only admits buying several lots of diamonds in
15:38:17 25 Monrovia and to have handed them over at the same location to a
26 cousin of Nassour Aziz and to have sold part of the diamonds to
27 overseas buyers on his account, in contrast to the statements of
28 Macky Abbas and Ly Samba. He denies exporting diamonds outside
29 Liberia. During the confrontation on 29 April 2002 with Macky

1 Abbas, he confirms that on one occasion he received a sum of
2 money from Macky Abbas.

3 5. The expert report written by the appointed accountant
4 indicates that during the period studied, 1 January 2000 to 31
15:38:52 5 August 2001 inclusive, 89.8 per cent of the total imports
6 concerned rough diamonds. During this period, 99.47 per cent of
7 the rough diamonds purchased are sold on the Belgian market. The
8 revenues are withdrawn in full in banknotes or transferred to
9 accounts in other countries in the name of Nassour. Practically
15:39:30 10 all the rough diamond purchases are associated with invoices from
11 Nassour Aziz himself.

12 Tote of the money laundering operation.

13 The report by the Financial Information Processing Section
14 notes a number of suspect transactions by Nassour. The
15:39:43 15 information obtained from the Artesia Bank, the ASA DIAM accounts
16 and the expert report by the accountant can be used to determine
17 the total amount of Nassour's suspect transactions. This shows
18 that the Financial Information Processing Section was aware of a
19 number of the suspect transactions, but by no means all of them.

15:40:08 20 With reference to the expert report by the accountants, we
21 can determine the total of the international transfers and cash
22 withdrawals in banknotes. During the period 1 January 2000 to 31
23 August 2001 inclusive, a total of \$19,057,400 US worth of
24 international payments is made."

15:40:39 25 Now, Mr Taylor, what do you know about all of those
26 dollars?

27 A. Not a dime do I know about nothing. Nothing is made
28 payment to me. I don't know anything about what they are doing,
29 no.

1 Q. Let us skip a couple of pages, please, and go to page 26 of
2 49, which is headed:

3 "Conclusion 3: Arms trading.

4 The conclusions about the arms deliveries are based on a
15:41:17 5 number of important documents seized during the searches of
6 Ossaily Samih's home, the analysis of a number of telephone
7 contacts, admissions and results obtained further to rogatory
8 commissions.

9 Together these conclusions clearly show that Nassour Aziz
15:41:33 10 and Ossaily Samih engaged in a number of activities to facilitate
11 the delivery of arms to African war zones such as Liberia and
12 Sierra Leone. Two specific periods, January 2001 and July 2001
13 are particularly notable in these conclusions.

14 During the searches at Ossaily Samih's home address among
15:42:08 15 the documents we find an envelope marked 'SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR
16 L'AMBASSADEUR SALAME' with a stamp with the text 'Ministere
17 d'Etat de la Defense et la protection civile'. It contains a
18 letter in the French language signed by Lida Kouassi Moise,
19 Ministre d'Etat. It concerns an 'authorisation pour livraison'
15:42:36 20 for the supply by the Nataco Holding Company in Bulgaria of a
21 range of arms to the Republic of the Ivory Coast.

22 Ossaily admits that this document was given to him at the
23 offices of ASA DIAM by Darwish Ali. Originally it was intended
24 to Nassour Aziz but Darwish proposed to Ossaily that he himself
15:43:08 25 should try to arrange the arms transaction. If Ossaily could
26 manage this then it would result in a generous commission for
27 him. Later Darwish gave the same document to Nassour.

28 The further investigation of the End User document provided
29 the following outcome:

1 In the reports related to United Nations resolution 1343
2 (2001) of 26 October 2001, in appendix 4 to the resolution, there
3 is a document which closely resembles the document found with
4 Ossaily.

15:43:45 5 The contents of the published document indicate that it is
6 a 'certificat d'achat' whereby the Minister of Defence of the
7 Republic of Ivory Coast gives permission to the Avia Trend
8 Company to supply arms and ammunition.

9 According to several international newspapers, the Avia
15:44:08 10 Trend Company, a cargo company in Moscow, is owned by Valery
11 Cherny, a soviet test pilot. Cherny is associated with Leonid
12 Minin, an arms trader of Ukrainian/Israeli nationality.

13 On 5 August 2000, Minin was arrested by the Italian police
14 in connection with international arms trading and drugs dealing.
15:44:33 15 At the time of his arrest, a large quantity of diamonds and a
16 significant number of documents were found."

17 Now let me pause there. Mr Taylor, do you know anything
18 about this arms transaction involving the Republic of the Ivory
19 Coast?

15:44:54 20 A. No, no, no. I do not know.

21 Q. "During the execution of the rogatory commission in Italy,
22 we obtained access to information from the Italian investigations
23 concerning Leonid Minin which shows that there are several
24 documents indicating that Minin supplied arms made in Russia to
15:45:18 25 both the regime of President Charles Taylor of Liberia and to the
26 Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, have you seen any such document?

28 A. No, I haven't seen it, and it's not even attached to this
29 report. I haven't seen it, because Minin did not supply any

1 weapons to Liberia. I haven't seen it.

2 Q. What do you know about him supplying weapons to the RUF?

3 A. No, I don't know. Because he was in Liberia, and how would
4 he get the weapons to the RUF at this time in 2001? What would
15:45:54 5 he be doing? No.

6 Q. "The investigations in Italy indicate that Minin in this
7 period was an important contact of Nassour and Ossaily in
8 connection with arms supplies to the regime of President Taylor.
9 Minin was paid with rough diamonds."

15:46:12 10 What do you know about that?

11 A. No, that is not true. Minin did not supply any weapons to
12 Liberia, and they should have provided the copies of that. No,
13 he did not provide any weapons to Liberia at all. And I guess
14 that's why the Italians did not hold him.

15:46:28 15 Q. Why? What happened to Minin?

16 A. Minin's in Italy. He was investigated and he went back to
17 - I mean, he went back to Israel. He's in Israel.

18 Q. Now over the page, please:

19 "We support these conclusions with a document with
15:46:57 20 handwritten notes by Ossaily Samih. The document is illegible,
21 but analysis of the document: At the bottom of the document in
22 Ossaily's handwriting '10 Dragonov 7.62 millimetre, 30 charges
23 1000'. A drawing of a pistol is made around this note. A
24 Dragonov is a war weapon, a sniper rifle, made in Russia.

15:47:25 25 With respect to this note, Ossaily states: 'This is my
26 handwriting. I note that document in Monrovia. A director of
27 Liberian Special Security, General Yeaten, asked me if I could
28 supply 30 Dragonovs with 30 magazine clips/charges. I made a
29 note of his question out of politeness, but I did not undertake

1 any further steps to it. I did not supply this. Generally, if I
2 was asked something I could not do anything about, I gave them
3 money to keep them happy.' "

4 What to you know about that?

15:48:07 5 A. Oh, Benjamin. No, I don't know about this, and it's good
6 that he didn't do anything about it. Maybe talking to him and
7 find out if he could supply sniper rifles. But I'm not aware of
8 this discussion with him, and it's good he didn't do anything
9 about it.

15:48:25 10 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Taylor, when you say "he did not do
11 anything about it", are you referring to Ossaily or to Mr Yeaten?

12 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour, he is saying here the - this
13 is Ossaily's handwriting. Ossaily is saying that this request
14 was made to him but he could not --

15:48:48 15 JUDGE DOHERTY: He, Ossaily, did not.

16 THE WITNESS: He, Ossaily, did not do anything about it,
17 your Honour.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Now over the page, page 29 of 49:

15:49:04 20 "However, further investigation shows that Ossaily
21 undertakes several steps to meet General Yeaten's request."

22 And reference is made to some reports. Then halfway down
23 the document on the left we need the note "Ouga 00226356005, room
24 523."

15:49:36 25 "Alpha Zulu is Nassour Aziz's call sign. The phone number
26 is the number of the Sofitel Hotel in Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou.
27 Both Ossaily and Nassour state that on 17-18 and 19 January 2001,
28 Nassour Aziz was staying in the Sofitel Hotel in Burkina Faso
29 where he had a meeting with Ibrahim Bah."

1 Now, do you know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No, I don't.

3 Q. And we can jump a few lines and look at the sentence just
4 before we see that box:

15:50:19 5 "We can conclude that the number 00226356005 was called by
6 Ossaily five times in total on 18 and 19 January.

7 4. Analysis of the retroactive telephone records on 17, 18
8 and 19 January. The full telephone records of satellite
9 telephone used by Ossaily on the days 17, 18 and 19 January 2001

15:50:52 10 show that Ossaily is constantly calling Nassour Aziz, Liberia and
11 Baba Jobe." Who is Baba Jobe, Mr Taylor?

12 A. I don't know him. I don't know him.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you note that they were able to get hold of
14 the telephone records retroactively of these satellite phones,
15:51:31 15 yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, as far as you're aware, were any attempts made by this
18 Prosecution to obtain records of any satellite phone you made
19 have used?

15:51:49 20 A. Not that I know of, no. They may have made efforts, but I
21 haven't seen any.

22 Q. Over the page:

23 "Bah is also called by Ossaily on the number starting 226,
24 the country code of Burkina Faso, which indicates on 17, 18 and
15:52:10 25 19 January 2001, Nassour Aziz and Bah are both in Burkina Faso.

26 In Ossaily's telephone contact list we find a number with
27 the note 'Bah Burkina,' " and then they go on to deal with
28 telephone contacts with Baba Jobe.

29 "He's on a United States travel ban document. Baba Jobe is

1 identified as a significant arms manufacturer and director of the
2 New Millennium Air Company in The Gambia."

3 Do you anything about that company, Mr Taylor.

4 A. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. I misled the Court. When
15:52:57 5 you say Jobe, I know a Baba Jobe, okay? I do know Baba Jobe.
6 Baba Jobe is - the Baba Jobe that I know is the personal
7 assistant to the President of The Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. That's
8 the Baba Jobe that I know. He's the personal assist to the
9 President of The Gambia. I think he also got into some trouble
15:53:27 10 with the President and I think he's in prison right now. I think
11 Baba Jobe is in prison in The Gambia. But it's Jobe. I think
12 it's pronounced Jobe.

13 Q. Have you ever had any contact with him, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Well, to the extent that he is an assistant of the
15:53:41 15 President. He and I have no relationship, but I know him because
16 I visited Yayah a few times, and he is very close to Yahya
17 Jammeh. That's the extent of my knowledge of him.

18 Q. Now, let's go over the page, shall we. Now we get an idea
19 of the thoroughness of this investigation, Mr Taylor, where it
15:54:07 20 says that through the internet, the investigators discovered that
21 the number which appears above is the fax number of the courtyard
22 by the Marriott Hotel in Aventura in the US. Let's just jump
23 further down the page - halfway down the page:

24 "Further to the implication to the request for
15:54:33 25 international legal assistance from Detroit, the unknown Mr Simon
26 was identified as Yelinek Shimon with an address in Panama City.
27 From 15 January through to 20 January, Yelinek Shimon was staying
28 at room 416 of the Marriott Hotel in Miami.

29 The FBI in Detroit identified Yelinek has a known arms

1 dealer who was mentioned in connection with an illegal arms deal
2 with between Panama and Nicaragua. "

3 Then it goes on to describe a 10-page list of contacts
4 which Ossaily made with his satellite telephone with Nassour
15:55:22 5 Aziz, Ibrahim Bah, Baba Jobe, Issa Sesay, Vlasselaerts Nora,
6 Ossaily Najla, and that was only for the month of January 2001.

7 Let's go over the page, Mr Taylor. Middle of the page:

8 "During another interview, Ossaily states: 'You have to
9 know that in Monrovia I was not working exclusively for Aziz.

15:55:59 10 What I mean is that there were others who received money and
11 bought diamonds. I already mentioned Nassour Zein, but there
12 also a Keneme, a certain Abu, Soley, Ly, and a certain Mamadou.
13 They were all Senegalese. I only discovered later that these men
14 were also buying for Aziz.' "

15:56:20 15 Do you know any of those individuals, Mr Taylor?

16 A. None of them. I do not know any of them, no.

17 Q. Let's go over the page. Let's go to the number 13, please:

18 "Statement by Pel eman Johan: Pel eman Johan has been
19 appointed on several occasions by the Security Council of the
15:57:08 20 United Nations as an arms expert for the Liberia investigations
21 panel. Further to his appointment, Pel eman personally undertakes
22 investigations and fieldwork in Africa into violations of United
23 Nations sanctions. The results are summarised in the United
24 Nations reports.

15:57:24 25 We interviewed Mr Pel eman twice and on one occasion
26 confronted him with Ossaily Samih.

27 During the interviews Pel eman spoke directly about the
28 involvement of Ossaily in the illegal trade in diamonds from
29 Sierra Leone in the Boulevard Hotel in Monrovia. We quote:

1 'During our investigation it became clear that for its
2 supplies the RUF (Revolutionary United Front, rebel army in
3 Sierra Leone) was dependent on the regime in Liberia, Monrovia.
4 This is because years ago the RUF was set up in Monrovia to
15:58:04 5 provide a buffer zone between Liberia and Sierra Leone and to
6 keep control over the diamond rich areas in Sierra Leone.

7 Couriers take the diamonds mined in Sierra Leone to the
8 Liberian capital, where they are traded.

9 This is done under the supervision of the presidential
15:58:24 10 troops of Liberia. The most important are the SSS and ATU.

11 In this context, the panel concluded that Ossaily Samih at
12 the Boulevard Hotel was an important buyer of the diamonds
13 offered for sale there by the RUF rebels or their couriers.

14 Samih was staying in the largest suite in the hotel, which
15:58:50 15 indicates that he may be considered to be a man of significance.

16 What I remember is that Samih had a larger room than
17 Ibrahim Bah. Bah could be described as a key figure between
18 President Taylor and the RUF.' "

19 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

15:59:09 20 A. That is not true. And Bah should have told them, the many
21 times that he has talked to them, that it is not true.

22 Q. '"Hotel personnel of the Boulevard Hotel and Samih himself
23 have confirmed during interviews with the panel that senior RUF
24 people offered batches of RUF diamonds to Samih at this hotel.

15:59:32 25 Oddly enough, the hotel personnel told us that Samih could
26 even permit himself to refuse certain RUF members.' "

27 Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware of such a trade going on at
28 the Boulevard Hotel?

29 A. Not at all. I don't dispute that it went on, but I was not

1 aware. I was not aware that they were buying and selling
2 diamonds at the hotel, no. And then let's reflect on what the
3 investigation shows; that the diamonds that are taken out of
4 Liberia are smuggled out in ways that they describe. That is
16:00:11 5 surely not a situation where things are being done, you know,
6 within the - you know, with the knowledge of anybody at a very
7 high level in government. So I think there was - I doubt very
8 much if such a thing would not be going on at - I mean, in a
9 hotel in Monrovia and in other parts of Monrovia. The fact that
16:00:38 10 individuals bring diamonds from Sierra Leone, sell it on the
11 streets, or sell it to individuals in Liberia, I'm in no position
12 to say that it did not go on. But what strikes me is that these
13 little transactions going on in hotel rooms where it is stated
14 here that RUF people come, they take diamonds to the hotel, it
16:00:58 15 has to be Charles Taylor doing it. That's what strikes me. I
16 don't know how they can come up with these things. This does not
17 involve me or any senior member of my government.

18 Q. Then it continues:

19 "These men then had to come back later at a time which
16:01:21 20 suited Samih. Another piece of information is that Samih's
21 driver in Monrovia was the brother-in-law of the President."

22 Who is that, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Never. Never had a - can you imagine? Who they are
24 referring to here is this other boy, Cindor Reeves, the other
16:01:49 25 crook that testified here in the Netherlands that they threw out.
26 My brother-in-law, the brother-in-law of the President, would be
27 a chauffeur for somebody in town; can you believe that?

28 Q. Is Cindor Reeves related to you in that way?

29 A. Not at all. Not at all.

1 Q. Because it goes on:

2 "'The hotel staff confirmed that on several occasions Sami h
3 was collected to go to the presidential palace.'"

4 A. Total nonsense. Total, total nonsense.

16:02:27 5 Q. Mr Taylor, you realise that they're quoting from a
6 conversati on they had with this chap Johan Peleman, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And then it goes on:

9 "This also creates a link to the associated arms trading.

16:02:40 10 For example, Peleman states that he interviewed a certain CR,
11 Ci ndor Reeves. "

12 Do you know a Ci ndor Reeves, Mr Tayl or?

13 A. I know Ci ndor Reeves.

14 Q. Who is he?

16:02:52 15 A. Ci ndor Reeves is a fellow that claims to have been the half
16 brother of my first wife Agnes Reeves, which turned out not to be
17 the case, and Agnes Reeves and I broke up back in 1993. This boy
18 turned out to be a liar, not the brother of this woman claimed to
19 be, but this man - if this man is so important, the Prosecution

16:03:25 20 [i ndi scernible] they know Ci ndor Reeves very well. This is a
21 liar that has been paraded all around and in the Dutch
22 i nvestigati on they i nvestigated that boy. They got to know: (1)
23 he was a liar; he was not the brother of Agnes Reeves. They went
24 to Liberia. All the claims that he made were all lies. Ci ndor

16:03:44 25 Reeves through our i nvestigation, in fact, was a chauffeur of
26 I brahi m Bah. That was Ci ndor Reeves. Now, the President of a
27 country would not have hi s brother-in-law being a chauffeur or a
28 driver for I brahi m Bah. Ci ndor Reeves was just one of these
29 local moving-about boys that has not been considered credible.

1 I'm not sure if I can say this other part, because there may be
2 an outstanding court order about certain things, I don't know.
3 So I don't want to go too much into that part unless I get some
4 guidance from the Court.

16:04:24 5 Q. Well, don't.

6 "For example, Peleman states that he interviewed a certain
7 CR, ie, Reeves. Cindor Reeves stated that he was personally
8 involved in a number of arms deliveries in Liberia. We quote:

9 'Reeves told me freely about this involvement in a number
16:04:46 10 of arms deliveries. He also confirmed arms deliveries in January
11 2001 and July 2001. Reeves told me that the arms deliveries were
12 organised under the coordination of Bah. Reeves confirmed that
13 he knew about the existence of the end user document for arms
14 from Bulgaria and that certain items on this list were actually
16:05:07 15 delivered. With respect to the types of arms, Reeves mentions
16 "ammunition and rifles, also sniper rifles". I'm assuming that
17 he refers to Kalashnikovs and Dragonovs. Reeves confirmed to me
18 that Ossaily was aware of the end user certificate concerning the
19 arms from Bulgaria.

16:05:35 20 As far as the arms deliveries were concerned, Reeves told
21 me that they were loaded on to trucks and brought to the border
22 with Sierra Leone, where the arms were handed over to the rebel
23 army in return for diamonds.' "

24 January 2001 and July 2001, Mr Taylor, what do you know
16:05:55 25 about these arms deliveries?

26 A. Never. 2001 arms delivery to Sierra Leone? How would that
27 be possible? To do what in July 2001? Sierra Leone is disarming
28 by July of 2001. But just to make a comment, since - Reeves
29 turned out - Reeves is the centre of comments made initially when

1 the indictment was issued that insider, his brother-in-law - you
2 want to tell me this Prosecution will have an important witness
3 as that lying Cindor Reeves, the impostor, they would not - they
4 have now found out, I know, that he's no use to them. My
16:06:43 5 brother-in-law who was used, okay - who is supposed to be my
6 brother - who was used in this case in the Netherlands, and in
7 other instances this Prosecution would not have brought him here?
8 This boy is an imposter and a liar. He did public - I can talk
9 about it. He did public interviews in Canada, different reports,
16:07:04 10 a total, total - I guess they themselves couldn't take him.
11 That's why he's not here. Complete impostor, a liar. He's what
12 we call in Liberia a drifter, just moving from place to place
13 trying to survive, pass himself off. He's been brothers to
14 people, brother-in-laws to others. That's - this boy is one of
16:07:30 15 these little trickster, gangster type. That's what Cindor Reeves
16 it.

17 Q. "Reeves confirmed to me that he knew both Aziz Nassour and
18 Ossaily Samih, but that he considered Nassour to be more
19 important than Ossaily.

16:07:46 20 Reeves told me that the arms delivery in January 2001 came
21 from Gambia, (Banjul) and was made by the New Millennium Air
22 Company. This is an aviation company set up by Baba Jobe.
23 Apparently Baba Jobe has a brother named Joe Baba. Reeves told
24 me Joe Baba worked for President Taylor."

16:08:12 25 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

26 A. That is not true.

27 Q. Do you know a Joe Baba?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Then when we go over the page, "Notes concerning 'CR' or

1 Cindor Reeves: Ossaily's handwritten documents include the
2 initials CR in several places. CO refers to Cindor Reeves."

3 Jumping a few lines:

4 "Among the files on Ossaily's personal computer we find two
16:08:57 5 photographs. Vlasselaerts Nora, when shown this photographs,
6 states, 'The man on this photograph is the driver of Mr Bah; his
7 name is CM (phonetically). This photograph was taken in one of
8 the salons of the hotel.'"

9 A. This is Ibrahim Bah's little bagboy, Cindor Reeves, who is
16:09:19 10 supposed to be my brother-in-law. He's a chauffeur for Bah.

11 Q. Over the page, Mr Taylor.

12 "Statement by Macky Abbas:

13 Macky stated: 'During my second period in Liberia, I saw
14 that Samih had a list of arms. I remember that Samih had this
16:10:01 15 list in his room and discussed it with Bah. It was a long list
16 with different weapons and the price on the other side. The
17 following people were present in the room: Samih, Bah, Eddie and
18 Ali Darwish; however, I am not completely certain about Darwish.
19 The satellite phone was on and Aziz followed the discussion in
16:10:20 20 this way. I happened to be in the room, but Samih asked me to
21 leave the room. I saw the list was held by both Samih and Bah.
22 On the table there was a catalogue or photographs - I cannot
23 remember that properly - with pictures of weapons.'"

24 I'm going to ask, Mr Taylor, that we jump to page 40,
16:11:03 25 please, of 49:

26 "Elements relevant to charges against Nassour Aziz - arms
27 delivery July 2001.

28 In connection with the further investigation into illegal
29 arms transports organised by Nassour Aziz, in addition to the

1 arms delivery he organised in or shortly after January 2001, on
2 the basis of the conclusions listed below, we conclude that
3 Nassour Aziz made another arms delivery to Liberia in July 2001.

4 We base this on the combination of the following
16:11:48 5 conclusions, which are similar to the arms delivery in January
6 2001.

7 Telephone contacts with Russia.

8 With respect to the arms delivery in January 2001 or
9 shortly thereafter, we observe that during the period around the
16:12:00 10 delivery Nassour Aziz had numerous telephone contacts with
11 Russian telephone numbers. His last call in this connection was
12 on 23 February 2001. After this date there were no further
13 contacts with Russia until 8 January 2001. When the arms
14 delivery of July 2001 enters the start-up stage, we see that
16:12:24 15 Nassour is again contacting the same Russians.

16 Nassour's visit to West Africa, specifically Ivory Coast
17 and Liberia.

18 With respect to the arms delivery of January 2001, the
19 retroactive telephone call records and Nassour's flight details
16:12:41 20 are used to determine that he is in Burkina Faso on 18 and 19
21 January.

22 In the period of the approaching second arms delivery (July
23 2001) Nassour Aziz is again in West Africa, this time in Liberia.
24 We can determine this on the basis of his GSM telephone calls.

16:13:04 25 Using the information provided by Proximus about GSM number
26 0478/400000 we can use the roaming data to determine that Nassour
27 Aziz was in the Ivory Coast on 19, 20 and 24 July, from where he
28 made numerous contacts.

29 We also noticed that he used his GSM telephone to contact

1 the satellite telephones used by: Ibrahim Bah, Issa/Eddie,
2 Issa/Ossaily Samih/X Gibril/Mingo Denis.

3 On 21, 22 and 23 July 2001 there were no calls from that
4 GSM number 0478/400000. In that period it was not possible to
16:14:14 5 use a GSM telephone in Liberia due to a lack of GSM
6 infrastructure. Hence, this GSM silence indicates that Nassour
7 Aziz travelled from the Ivory Coast to Liberia on 21, 22 and 23
8 July.

9 Assuming that Nassour Aziz must have called his contacts
16:14:34 10 and could not use his GSM for this given the lack of
11 infrastructure we look at the retroactive telephone records of
12 the relevant satellite telephones. This analysis confirms this
13 assumption. As he could not use his GSM telephone in Liberia on
14 21, 22 and 23 July, he had access to satellite telephone
16:14:59 15 871.762.677.737. In Ossaily Samih's telephone register this
16 number refers to 'FALCON SM/Mingo Denis/Eddy/Edy'.

17 The [conclusion] that Nassour Aziz used this satellite
18 telephone during these three days is based on the fact that
19 individuals in Nassour's confidence and his personal contacts
16:15:26 20 were called.

21 Airport visa issued in Liberia.

22 The fact that Nassour Aziz was indeed in Liberia on 21, 22
23 and 23 July 2001 is also confirmed by the airport visa issued in
24 his name by Liberia in July 2001 with a validity of three months.
16:15:50 25 This airport visa also states that Nassour Aziz will be the guest
26 of Ibrahim Bah.

27 The information above also shows the contacts between
28 Nassour Aziz and Ibrahim Bah, Mingo Denis and Issa/Eddy, all
29 individuals who can be connected to the RUF and the associated

1 illegal trade in diamonds.

2 These conclusions and striking similarities with the arms
3 delivery of January 2001 support the arms delivery in July 2001.
4 All the conclusions so far clearly show that Nassour Aziz
16:16:32 5 arranges all this and that at the time of the actual delivery
6 and/or payment he arrives on site as the chief."

7 Now, Mr Taylor, arms deliveries to Liberia in January and
8 July 2001?

9 A. No. These people, I'm surprised that the Belgian and Dutch
16:16:55 10 police would be so silly, because this - look, I have told this
11 Court, I ordered arms in 2001 from Serbia. I wrote the Security
12 Council. There were no weapons delivered by these people, and I
13 do not deny that I imported weapons in 2001. The letter was
14 written to the Security Council. I told them I was going to do
16:17:21 15 it. I gave the list. They went to Serbia and verified.

16 This report is just - you know, I must be honest. I don't
17 know what's going to happen to me, but this gives all the sign of
18 a well orchestrated set of lies and disinformation. For the
19 Belgian police - they're supposed to be professional - to do a
16:17:45 20 report like this - 2001, there is GSM infrastructure in Liberia.
21 Who told them that there was no GSM infrastructure in Liberia in
22 2001? Who said that? There is GSM infrastructure. The fact
23 that you call somebody and you don't get him on the phone, you
24 say, "Well, he's got to be Liberia." What type of nonsense is
16:18:08 25 that? How can professional people behave like this, where you
26 accuse people and got them suffering, come up with conclusions
27 where there's nothing evidential about what they've said about me
28 and talking this thing. There's no weapons brought in.

29 In fact, when you read this about January and July weapons,

1 there's no real, real - there's nothing here. Weapons come into
2 Liberia. The United Nations is aware of how they come. I write
3 them. I send the list. They go to Serbia. They verify it.
4 They close the factory down. No weapons came from no Russia or
16:18:43 5 nowhere else. This is a very amateurish report here just to
6 destroy people. No weapons came from Russia, no.

7 Q. Now, when we go to page 42 of 49, we come to the fourth
8 conclusion, yes, and what those who prepare the report do is,
9 they go through each individual suspect. Nassour Aziz is

16:19:11 10 described as the leader. Let's go over the page:

11 "... Ossaily Samih may be considered as the essential key
12 figure for Nassour Aziz. Without the assistance of Ossaily,
13 Nassour would not have been able to commit the crimes.

14 In the period that he was in Monrovia, Ossaily may be
16:19:40 15 considered to be the local chief. It is clear that Ossaily has
16 to account for his actions to Nassour. This is demonstrated by
17 the fact that on his return to Belgium, Ossaily brought all his
18 notes from Monrovia with him. This was probably to account for
19 the amounts paid by him.

16:20:01 20 Ahmad Ali-Said is Nassour Aziz's brother-in-law. The
21 conclusions show that Ahmad Ali-Said gave Nassour Aziz the
22 opportunity to commit crimes through the ASA DIAM company."

23 We won't deal with that. Let's skip to page 46 of 49 where
24 they deal with other named individuals. And I'm only interested
16:20:33 25 in numbers 4, 5 and 6:

26 "Macky Abbas.

27 At the instruction of Nassour Aziz, Macky Abbas carries
28 banknotes to Monrovia (Liberia), hands them to Ossaily in person
29 and then receives rough diamonds in return.

1 The rough diamonds are illegally transported to Belgian
2 (smuggled) and delivered to Nassour Aziz and/or ASA DIAM.

3 Macky Abbas also takes money to Kisangani.

4 Ly Samba.

16:21:05 5 At the instructions of Nassour Aziz, Ly Samba takes
6 banknotes to Kisangani (Congo) and Monrovia (Liberia) on several
7 occasions. In Monrovia he hands the banknotes over to Ossaily in
8 person. Ly then receives rough diamonds and illegally smuggles
9 them to Belgium and delivers them to Nassour Aziz.

16:21:50 10 Tsoukaladakis Michel.

11 At the instructions of Nassour Aziz, Tsoukaladakis Michel
12 takes banknotes to Kisangani (Cong) and Monrovia (Liberia) on
13 several occasions. In Monrovia he hands the banknotes over to
14 Ossaily and Colonel Adams in person. However, Tsoukaladakis

16:22:14 15 Michel receiving diamonds."

16 And let's go over the page to conclusion number 5, where
17 they deal with the alleged link with Al-Qaeda. And I mention it
18 for completeness. Now, Mr Taylor, we've gone now through this
19 document, yes?

16:22:38 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, remember, this was a document requested by David Crane
22 in March 2003.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, we've gone through it in detail. Do you see any
16:22:54 25 reference to you being involved in diamond dealing?

26 A. No. And I don't think he saw it either, that's why he
27 didn't use it.

28 Q. So having gone through the report now, that reference at
29 the start of the document "this was done under the supervision

1 and with the support of the regime of the former President
2 Charles Taylor", have you seen any information in this document
3 to confirm that?

4 A. Well, from my layman's point of view, I have seen nothing.
16:23:34 5 Maybe the investigators saw it. I have seen nothing in this
6 report that - from a legal evidentiary standpoint to suggest that
7 I was involved in masterminding the trading in diamonds and the
8 smuggling of diamonds in and out of Sierra Leone. There's no
9 such thing. You know, this has been one of those things that has
16:24:00 10 really - each time I've read this document, I've just been asking
11 maybe I've been missing something. I have seen nothing.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, before I move on, could I ask,
13 please, that that document, Belgian investigation into diamonds,
14 made at the request of David Crane, be marked for identification
16:24:30 15 MFI-284, please.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-284.

17 Tell me, Mr Griffiths, just before you get on to your next
18 topic, I see we've got approximately five minutes, are you still
19 on track to complete your examination-in-chief on Monday?

16:24:52 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, yes.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

22 JUDGE DOHERTY: Just to clarify, Mr Griffiths, this MFI-284
23 is a synopsis of many other documents, is that correct? That's
24 the way it comes across to me.

16:25:13 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, it would appear so. Apparently there
26 must have been other documents appended to this report, but this
27 is all that was disclosed to us by the Prosecution. So this is
28 all we have access to.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

1 MS HOLLIS: I just want to clarify for the record the
2 assumption Defence counsel makes that we had additional documents
3 we did not disclose is not true. We gave them what we got. And
4 the summary may have been extracted for our purposes or others,
16:25:53 5 but the investigation certainly was not at our request.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Well, that's now a matter of
7 record, Ms Hollis.

8 Mr Griffiths.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:26:12 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you remember the UN Security Council
11 resolution 1306 in relation to Sierra Leone and the alleged
12 conflicts about diamonds? Remember that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, who was - we noted in the presidential papers that you
16:26:57 15 had a minister called Jenkins Dunbar. What was he in charge of?

16 A. Jenkins Dunbar was the Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy
17 in my government.

18 Q. Now, did he prepare any report for you with regard to the
19 issue of diamonds?

16:27:21 20 A. Yes, he did. Jenkins Dunbar, at the height of the
21 activities and accusations against Liberian, Jenkins Dunbar was
22 dispatched to Belgium to work along with the then ambassador to
23 Belgium, Dr Othello Brandy, to work with the World Diamond
24 Council in trying to set up a mechanism of certification of
16:27:56 25 Liberian rough diamonds because an embargo had been issued and
26 working along with other diamond producing countries including
27 the Southern African region and what not. He cooperated with the
28 World Diamond Council and the various trips that he made to
29 Belgium, South Africa and others, a letter was written to me

1 giving a full report and accounting of; one, the meetings; two,
2 the possibilities and probabilities of putting together a
3 certification regime, those countries that were interested in
4 assisting Liberia put this regime together; and fourthly, what
16:28:36 5 Liberia had to do to meet the diamonds of the Security Council.
6 That letter was written to me.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Now I don't think we have time enough,
8 Mr President. It will take me perhaps 10 minutes on Monday and
9 then I hope to be concluding sometime by Monday afternoon.

16:28:55 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. That does seem an appropriate
11 time to adjourn now.

12 Mr Taylor, I just remind you of the order in place
13 regarding not discussing your evidence. We will adjourn until
14 9.30 Monday morning.

16:29:10 15 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.29 p.m.
16 to be reconvened on Monday, 9 November 2009 at
17 9.30 a.m.]

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	31207
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	31207