



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 27 OCTOBER 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Tuesday, 27 October 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:22 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll take appearances, please.

6 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
7 opposing counsel. Today for the Prosecution, Brenda J Hollis,  
8 Christopher Santora and our case manager Maja Dimitrova.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

09:31:41 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
11 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself Courtenay  
12 Griffiths, with me with Morris Anyah and Mr Terry Munyard of  
13 counsel.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Taylor, I'll remind you  
09:31:54 15 you are still on your oath. Go ahead please, Mr Griffiths.

16 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

17 [On former affirmation]

18 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

19 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday when we concluded for the today we  
09:32:06 20 were still looking at the testimony of a witness Jabaty Jaward,  
21 do you recall that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. And we had reached a stage where he had flown from Roberts  
24 International Airfield to Ouagadougou and then taken by bus  
09:32:22 25 across the border into La Cote d'Ivoire, yes?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. I want to continue with this account now, because he was  
28 asked thereafter, and this is at page 13508, where he went to in  
29 La Cote d'Ivoire, and he told the Court that he went to Seguela.

1 Do you know of that place, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No, I don't.

3 Q. And he was asked if he met Sam Bockarie there, line 28 on  
4 that page, and he said yes, and then the examination went on in  
09:33:12 5 this way:

6 "Q. And at this time we are still within December of 2002?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Now, when you got to Seguela did anything happen there?

9 A. Yes, sir. We were welcomed by Sam Bockarie and the  
09:33:35 10 others whom we had met earlier.

11 Q. When you say 'the others whom you had met earlier', who  
12 were these others that you had met earlier?

13 A. At that time I came to know that some other military  
14 personnel from the Charles Taylor government had been there  
09:34:04 15 before with Sam Bockarie.

16 Q. Who were these military personnel that you talk about?

17 A. I can remember one T Zimmi. He was a Gio man."

18 Now pause there, Mr Taylor. What are these other military  
19 personnel from the Charles Taylor government who were already in  
09:34:32 20 La Cote d'Ivoire in December 2002?

21 A. Who are they?

22 Q. Yes, please.

23 A. I don't know who they are, because I didn't send anyone  
24 from my government into La Cote d'Ivoire in the town that he  
09:34:47 25 called Seguela. No, I didn't.

26 Q. But you appreciate that he's being quite specific there,  
27 Mr Taylor. He is suggesting that not only was your hand behind  
28 the transfer of these former ATU personnel, but in addition other  
29 members of personnel from your government were already present in

1 La Cote d'Ivoire. So help us with that, please.

2 A. But that's his account. I did not send anyone from my  
3 government in La Cote d'Ivoire. Based on the map that he showed  
4 here, this town that you mentioned is on the border with Burkina  
09:35:35 5 Faso so, I mean, that's maybe 1,000 miles from Liberia. So there  
6 is no way that somebody would be on the other side waiting as  
7 though I'm supposed to be carrying out some activities in La Cote  
8 d'Ivoire, no. I did not send anyone over there. If he met any  
9 Gio man over there, he was not a member of my government, no.

09:36:00 10 Q. Help us, Mr Taylor. Who was the leader of the rebels in La  
11 Cote d'Ivoire at this time?

12 A. The only person I know is Soro Guillaume, who is presently  
13 Prime Minister of Cote d'Ivoire.

14 Q. Who was the President of Cote d'Ivoire at the time?

09:36:23 15 A. Laurent Gbagbo is still President.

16 Q. What was the nature of your relationship with him?

17 A. Gbagbo and I were very good friends.

18 Q. Were you anxious in 2002 to oust him from power?

19 A. No. In fact, in so many ways I showed Gbagbo being in  
09:36:43 20 power at that time of the conflict between he and Guei Robert  
21 after elections when I was the only West African President that  
22 went there and made the first announcement from ECOWAS when South  
23 Africa and Nigeria were threatening to send in forces to remove  
24 him from power and said no, we concluded that he should remain  
09:37:07 25 there to avoid any confusion. So no, there was no problem with  
26 between Gbagbo and myself.

27 Q. Very well. The witness continues in this vein, line 29:

28 "Q. Do you know what Sam Bockarie was doing at this time  
29 in Seguela?

1 A. He was preparing at that time to contribute to the  
2 fighting in Ivory Coast, I mean the rebel war on the side  
3 of the rebels.

4 Q. What sort of fighting was going on in the Ivory Coast?

09:37:40 5 A. At that point in time I was made to understand that  
6 some disgruntled government soldiers of the Ivory Coast  
7 attempted a coup but failed, so they decided to continue  
8 their disgruntledness in the form of a rebellion against  
9 the government at that particular time.

09:37:59 10 Q. And what was Sam Bockarie doing in relation to this  
11 rebellion?

12 A. The whole thing was that he - that being Bockarie -  
13 told me together with others in the gathering that he was  
14 instructed by President Charles Taylor for him to join the  
09:38:20 15 other people in Ivory Coast, I mean the rebels, to fight  
16 and he said he cannot only fight amongst the Ivorians to  
17 whom he was not used except that his brothers, that is he  
18 was now referring to us, to come and join him so that he  
19 could effectively fight. So he said that was why they  
09:38:42 20 brought us to join him."

21 "Instructed by President Charles Taylor" is what Bockarie  
22 is saying, Mr Taylor. What do you say about that?

23 A. I'm saying that this boy is lying. In the first instance -  
24 in direct answer to your question, this boy is lying. But let's  
09:39:01 25 be reminded: The Prosecution brought a witness before this Court  
26 who said that he escorted Sam Bockarie into exile, a protected  
27 witness that I cannot reveal. That witness detailed how he took  
28 Bockarie to east Africa and other places and how he was  
29 abandoned. Listen, I had absolutely no contact with Sam Bockarie

1 after he left Liberia. And if this account of that witness is to  
2 be believed by any stretch of the imagination, Sam Bockarie felt  
3 abandoned because I had nothing to do with him. This witness  
4 details how Sam Bockarie went first to Ivory Coast. From Ivory  
09:39:41 5 Coast he left and flew into - I think he said Ethiopia and he  
6 brought pictures to this Court of where they sat at some airport  
7 in Ethiopia and how Sam Bockarie was abandoned. I had nothing -  
8 absolutely nothing to do. And if this witness is saying that Sam  
9 Bockarie, who is dead, who cannot come and testify to the  
09:40:02 10 contrary, is saying that I instructed Sam Bockarie to go into La  
11 Cote d'Ivoire where Sam Bockarie, from all information that my  
12 government, United Nations and others received had been living in  
13 Burkina Faso, is a blatant lie. That's what it is.

14 Q. Well, I think the witness you're referring to --

15 A. Is protected.

16 Q. -- who gave that account is TF1-579, for reference  
17 purposes.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, going on further. When we go next then to page 13522,  
09:40:58 20 the witness goes on in this vein at line 21:

21 "There were journalists in our midst, and even a lady who  
22 was very close to Sam Bockarie. So it was not too long  
23 that we later monitored in the international media, even  
24 the Radio France International which said at one time that  
09:41:21 25 they had known that the notorious Sam Bockarie who is in  
26 Sierra Leone is presently behind rebel lines in Ivory  
27 Coast. So his movement to Burkina Faso that I was just  
28 trying to tell you about, like he said, it was engineered  
29 by some of these authorities and they said if Sam Bockarie

1 had remained there that was going to cause a serious  
2 problem with their war, so he went.

3 Q. Now, when you said it was engineered by those  
4 authorities, what do you mean?

09:41:53 5 A. When I mentioned engineered, I said the  
6 misunderstanding that happened caused the authorities - I  
7 mean the Ivorian authorities who suggested that he should  
8 go to Burkina Faso and stay there for some time, because  
9 they were expecting more international media to come and  
10 investigate about the matter.

11 Q. Now, how did you learn all of this, Mr Witness?

12 A. Before Sam Bockarie left he called us in Danane at his  
13 residence where he expressed most of these points that I  
14 have made mention of into details, the causes of his  
09:42:25 15 leaving, and it was there that he even advised that when we  
16 stay we should maintain discipline because he said people  
17 were monitoring to know about our presence and he said the  
18 Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters who were within the  
19 rebellion in Ivory Coast."

09:42:50 20 And then he continues, missing a few lines:

21 "I can remember that High Command was amongst the  
22 delegation that came to investigate about the death of Busy Boy,  
23 that was the name of the brother who died and he was a bodyguard  
24 and a relative to Benjamin Yeaten."

09:43:09 25 Pause there. Busy Boy, Mr Taylor, know him?

26 A. No, I didn't know Busy Boy.

27 Q. "Q. How long was Sam Bockarie away in Burkina Faso, do you  
28 know?"

29 A. I cannot remember the exact time he spent in Burkina

1 Faso, but when he left at this time that I have just  
2 explained about here he remained in Burkina Faso until  
3 early May when he came and said that he had been called by  
4 Charles Taylor to go back to Liberia and contribute to  
09:43:42 5 defending his government as he was under pressure from  
6 various rebel attacks."

7 Now, pause there. Firstly, did you know about Bockarie  
8 leaving la Cote d'Ivoire to go to Burkina Faso?

9 A. I had no idea of it, no.

09:44:03 10 Q. Furthermore, when he returns in May, it's said by this  
11 witness that he'd been called by you to go back to Liberia to  
12 contribute to defending your government. What do you say about  
13 that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. That would be very, very silly. Why would I call Sam  
09:44:30 15 Bockarie back to defend my government and he comes with maybe  
16 close to a thousand well-armed men and I stop them at the border  
17 and attack them? I mean, is somebody supposed to be stupid? If  
18 I have called Sam Bockarie to come back and he comes well  
19 equipped, why don't I just quietly let him into the country? It  
09:44:56 20 is not true.

21 Q. Well, the overriding suggestion is quite clear, Mr Taylor,  
22 that effectively Sam Bockarie is your boy. He does your bidding.  
23 He was doing your bidding in Sierra Leone, he did your bidding in  
24 going to Ivory Coast, and he was now further seeking to do your  
09:45:18 25 bidding by returning to defend your government. That's the case.  
26 What do you say?

27 A. I will say that is incorrect and it's wrong and it's a very  
28 silly case because Sam Bockarie leaves Liberia in late 2000,  
29 we're talking about 2002. The allegations now, I'm supposed to



1 call him back. Where Sam Bockarie lives after he leaves Liberia,  
2 I really don't know. In fact, there are speculations in the  
3 international media. Some people say that he's in Congo. Some  
4 people say he - I mean, there are all kinds - some had said he  
09:45:59 5 had gone to Libya. I am not in contact with Sam Bockarie at all.  
6 And, in fact, if this other witness is to be believed, which that  
7 section of his testimony is true, once Sam Bockarie left Liberia,  
8 I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, or my government had nothing to do  
9 with him.

09:46:15 10 Now, here is another situation: He's supposed to be  
11 fighting in la Cote d'Ivoire; I'm now sending for him to come to  
12 help me fight, only for him to come to the border for me to stop  
13 him and attack the forces trying to arrest and disarm him and he  
14 gets killed. So what sense does it make that you would send for  
09:46:36 15 a man to come with all of his equipment and then stop him from  
16 entering? There is no contact that I have with Sam Bockarie from  
17 the time he leaves Liberia. What he does outside, where he  
18 lives, I have no idea of what he's doing. And this is why when  
19 he comes to the border with Liberia, my orders that if he wants  
09:47:01 20 to enter Liberia, he has to disarm, and that is what caused the  
21 problem at the border.

22 So now, someone planning to bring in forces, aren't there a  
23 million ways that I could do it? If Sam Bockarie is being sent  
24 for by me and I have this much control over Sam Bockarie, then I  
09:47:23 25 should receive him very quietly at the border and integrate  
26 whatever forces he has within the fighting force. Sam Bockarie's  
27 arrival at the border was fully announced by my government. The  
28 fracas at the bord was very well known. When Sam Bockarie first  
29 reached that border, it was all on the news announced by my

1 government that Bockarie had arrived at the border and that  
2 security forces had been dispatched to stop him from entering  
3 Liberia. This was public. There's nothing secret about what  
4 happened at that border and it was announced by my government.

09:48:00 5 And, in fact, Sam Bockarie's activities were also followed by  
6 international media also. So it is totally erroneous. I mean, I  
7 fully, fully disagree with this witness's account that Sam  
8 Bockarie told him this or that because that is totally false.  
9 No.

09:48:19 10 Q. Well, let's look at an alternative suggestion then,  
11 Mr Taylor. As you rightly accept and as the witness in the  
12 passage I just read out noted, international media were paying a  
13 lot of interest in Mr Bockarie's activities, weren't they?

14 A. Yes, yes. They knew he was fighting in La Cote d'Ivoire.

09:48:42 15 Q. Precisely. And it may well be suggested that the high  
16 profile nature of his activities had become something of an  
17 embarrassment which is why you were calling him back in May 2003  
18 to silence him, do you follow?

19 A. I mean, anybody --

09:49:01 20 Q. That's the alternative.

21 A. Yeah, but that alternative would not have any traction. My  
22 God, how does Charles Taylor in 2000 expel Bockarie, he's  
23 involved in a war in La Cote d'Ivoire that starts - the war in La  
24 Cote d'Ivoire starts early 2000. He is thrown out in late 2000.

09:49:24 25 He goes and he lives in Burkina Faso and I have control over Sam  
26 Bockarie in Burkina Faso. I arm him in Burkina Faso. I provide,  
27 what, certain officials that - a name is mentioned, Zimmi, and  
28 I'm supposed to be having - does Burkina Faso have any - is there  
29 any complicity? So I'm running Burkina Faso, I'm running Ivory

1 Coast and I'm running Sierra Leone? I mean, how can people be so  
2 silly, I mean, to believe all this nonsense just to make a case?  
3 That would be silly.

09:50:01 4 Sam Bockarie has nothing to do with Charles Taylor. And,  
5 in fact, the attack on La Cote d'Ivoire comes from where? It  
6 doesn't come from Liberia. In fact, the Liberian borders is the  
7 last area. In fact, who did the Ivorian government accuse of  
8 complicity in the attack on La Cote d'Ivoire? It was Burkina  
9 Faso, not Liberia. So it would be very silly for anyone to try  
09:50:24 10 to - you know, if I was maybe Bill Gates or something, you know,  
11 with money. Here's a little poor country, Charles Taylor can't  
12 pay his security and government officials but is running wars in  
13 three countries. How silly can that be? That's very silly for  
14 anybody to believe that. I have nothing to do with that war in  
09:50:46 15 La Cote d'Ivoire at all.

16 Q. Before I forget, Mr Taylor, can I ask you about one detail  
17 in respect of this. As far as you're aware, when Bockarie was in  
18 La Cote d'Ivoire and, indeed, Burkina Faso, did he maintain  
19 contact with Benjamin Yeaten, to your knowledge?

09:51:12 20 A. Not to my knowledge. It's possible, but I don't know.  
21 Just to help with that answer, if you look at the response given  
22 by - I forgot the number you just called, TF 5 something.

23 Q. 79.

24 A. 79. He was running in and out of Liberia, I think,  
09:51:31 25 bringing messages from Bockarie. I think at one time he said he  
26 came in with a message to Bockarie's wife for money or something  
27 like that. So I can just, in helping the Court, say it's  
28 possible that he did probably - he could have called Benjamin or  
29 he was in touch with certain elements in Liberia, but from an

1 official standpoint in my government, we had nothing to do with  
2 him, no.

3 Q. Now, moving on on this same topic. The witness continued  
4 in this vein, page 13532, line 25:

09:52:09 5 "Q. You said that Sam Bockarie came back from Burkina Faso  
6 to Danane and he told you in a meeting that he had been  
7 called by Charles Taylor to go and assist with fighting in  
8 Liberia. Do you recall that?

9 A. Yes, sir.

09:52:24 10 Q. Do you know what fighting was going on in Liberia at  
11 this time?

12 A. Yes, sir. At this point there were two rebel groups  
13 fighting against the Charles Taylor government at that time  
14 and they had the LURD rebels, which was an acronym, LURD,

09:52:44 15 they crossed in from Guinea and they were closing in on  
16 Monrovia from the Tubmanburg, the Bomi Hill highway and at  
17 that time Sam Bockarie was talking to us that these LURD  
18 rebels had also captured Ganta from Guinea into Liberia and  
19 also they had another rebel group which was also fighting

09:53:08 20 against Charles Taylor's government at that time from the  
21 Ivory Coast. They called them the MODEL, which is also an  
22 acronym for their movement. I don't really know the actual  
23 name, but it was commonly known as MODEL. It was an  
24 acronym. They had already crossed in that Nimba County  
09:53:31 25 area fighting so he said he had been called upon for us to  
26 go and help with the situation."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, is it correct that in or about May 2003,  
28 Liberia was under attack in a pincer movement from both LURD and  
29 MODEL?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. MODEL were attacking you from the east that would be across  
3 the Ivorian-Liberian border, weren't they?

4 A. That is correct.

09:54:13 5 Q. Were they receiving support from the government of La Cote  
6 d'Ivoire?

7 A. Well, I could very well say yes. I don't have any proof,  
8 but they should have. I can put it to: They should have been  
9 receiving.

09:54:32 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if we go back in time, a decade, we will  
11 recall that your motivation behind supporting the RUF was because  
12 of ULIMO's activities on the Sierra Leone-Liberian border, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Now, is it a case of deja vu here that now in 2003, because  
09:55:00 15 of possible Ivorian support for MODEL, you had unleashed your  
16 dogs of war in the shape of Sam Bockarie in La Cote d'Ivoire? Do  
17 you follow?

18 A. Yeah, but - yes, I follow, but that would be out of - the  
19 war in La Cote d'Ivoire is going on about a year and a half  
09:55:23 20 before 2003, so that would not hold. The fact of the matter and  
21 the reason why I'm saying that I don't have proof, because I do  
22 not - and I say this genuinely - I do not believe that President  
23 Gbagbo of La Cote d'Ivoire would have given assistance to MODEL.

24 And I say this because, again, throughout the war in La Cote  
09:55:44 25 d'Ivoire, Gbagbo and I were in contact, even Ivorian soldiers  
26 that were attacked and fled into Liberia were received by the  
27 Armed Forces of Liberia and I can remember Gbagbo sending an  
28 aircraft to Monrovia and we flew them back. So there was  
29 cooperation between Gbagbo and myself. But there are - because

1 of the tribal affiliation in that border area, you have Krahn  
2 across the border that were senior members of the Ivorian armed  
3 forces. I believe that MODEL received assistance from elements  
4 within the Ivorian army but not from the Ivorian government per  
09:56:25 5 se because Gbagbo and I were in constant contact. In fact,  
6 Ivorian military officials visited Liberia several times to  
7 discuss that area. So that would not hold that deja vu, so to  
8 speak, maybe he was trying to pay back or something, no. I don't  
9 really believe that. Maybe I'm wrong, but I don't believe  
09:56:50 10 because Gbagbo and I remained very close during that particular  
11 period.

12 Q. Moving on, same topic, page 13534, line 4:

13 "Q. Where did you have the meeting with Sam Bockarie where  
14 he told you about the request from Charles Taylor for him  
09:57:08 15 to go to Liberia and assist with the fighting? Where was  
16 this meeting?

17 A. He said this to me in the evening when I came from the  
18 front line in Danane at the residence of one of the SSS  
19 representatives that was in Danane at that time, Kemoh.

09:57:28 20 Q. This was in the Ivory Coast?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Following this request, did Sam Bockarie leave the  
23 Ivory Coast?

24 A. Yes, sir."

09:57:36 25 Pause. SSS representative in Danane, was there such a  
26 thing?

27 A. No, no. I don't - how would the SSS in Liberia have a  
28 representative? That's not true, no. Kemoh, I don't even know  
29 the name. But that would not be probable, no.

1 Q. "Q. When did he - that being Sam Bockarie - leave Ivory  
2 Coast?

09:58:17

3 A. After he had spoken to us that evening, the following  
4 morning all the Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters that  
5 were in Ivory Coast at that time were ordered to withdraw  
6 immediately across the border and we started moving.

7 Q. About what time was this?

8 A. This was I think early - in early May 2003.

9 Q. And where did you go from Danane?

09:58:34

10 A. Those of us who were in the Danane area, Danane,  
11 Bangolo, in that region that I have mentioned, we are  
12 withdrew through the Loguato border.

13 Q. And at Loguato border where are you? Which country is  
14 that?

09:58:56

15 A. Loguato is the customs town on the side of Liberia - on  
16 the side of Liberia."

17 Now, you accept, don't you, Mr Taylor, that the re-entry  
18 point was at Loguato?

09:59:14

19 A. Yes, the re-entry point in Liberia is Loguato. I'm not - I  
20 mean, from my understanding of his explanation here, he is  
21 describing Loguato, because from information that reached me,  
22 they did not enter Loguato. There is a river and a bridge  
23 across. I think he's referring to the question here where is  
24 Loguato. But maybe if we go further we get to know, because they  
25 did not - they were not permitted to cross to Loguato.

09:59:40

26 Q. Now, thereafter once they'd been disarmed, Mr Taylor, where  
27 did they go to within Liberia?

28 A. Well, I'm not too sure. Those individual civilians that  
29 disarmed, came in and dispersed themselves in the Nimba County

1 area. The military people that refused at that particular time,  
2 I don't know how they got in because there was a massive exchange  
3 - there was some exchange of fire at the border. Some of them  
4 fled back. Those that came in voluntarily were trucked further  
10:00:24 5 into - I think it's a town - I forgot the name of the town. It's  
6 about 25 miles from the border. They were brought into Liberia.

7 Q. Those Sierra Leoneans whose had been former members of the  
8 ATU, were they welcomed back into the ATU on their return?

9 A. No. Not to my knowledge, no. No. Now, let's look at the  
10:00:57 10 time that he's talking about now: May of 2003. Let's look at  
11 the period. By May 2003 there is virtually total - I can almost  
12 say total chaos in Liberia. We are still - we are in - I go to  
13 Accra, I think, in about May/June of 2003, where I volunteered to  
14 step down, but there is fighting inside the capital city. I'm

10:01:38 15 just trying to give the Court an image of what is going on at  
16 this time. There's virtually no government, and things are in a  
17 chaotic situation. I leave Liberia in August of 2003. So we are  
18 talking about a period of extreme chaos. Nobody - in fact, the  
19 ATU, virtually most of the people, the armed forces are dispersed  
10:02:03 20 in different places, but they are not permitted back into the  
21 ATU.

22 Q. I ask for this reason. Page 13526:

23 "Q. You talked about an order which was given to you the  
24 Sierra Leoneans who were from the RUF and you said this was  
10:02:21 25 an order which had been given for you to go to Gbarnga. Do  
26 you recall that order?

27 A. Yes, sir."

28 Page 13527, line 27:

29 "Q. Mr Witness, simply the question is what kind of order



1 was this that you referred to? The order which was given  
2 at the ATU headquarters for you to go to Gbarnga, what kind  
3 of order was that?

10:02:48

4 A. At that point in time we referred to that order as an  
5 executive order which meant that it was an order directly  
6 from Charles Taylor, sir."

7 Do you follow?

10:03:03

8 A. Yeah, but don't let's forget now on yesterday when we dealt  
9 with this order, he's referring to 2002 - I mean, 2000. He's  
10 referring to the order - remember, in the testimony he's talking  
11 about they are ordered and told by Joe Tuah to go to Gbarnga,  
12 where they will receive pay. So he's not talking about the time  
13 of re-entry.

10:03:30

14 Q. Very well. Now, one other matter - well, about four other  
15 matters to deal with in relation to this witness. On 14 July  
16 2008 the transcript at page 13568 records the witness as giving  
17 the following testimony, line 2:

10:03:58

18 "A. From my discussion with Akim Turay at that particular  
19 time I saw them with vehicles. A truck was loaded with  
20 logistics. But the one I can really identify was that  
21 there was a machine in a truck which Akim described as a  
22 mining plant. He said they were carrying it to Sierra  
23 Leone to mine diamonds with it in Tongo.

10:04:24

24 Q. Did Akim tell you who gave them the mining plant that  
25 they were taking along, as well as the other logistics as  
26 you described them that you were taking to Tongo?"

27 I should interject to say this is in December 1999.

28 "A. Specifically, you know, he did not say this person  
29 had taken this mining plant and given it to us, but at that

1 particular moment when they came he only said that they  
2 were from Charles Taylor in Monrovia and that they were  
3 going to Sierra Leone. He described this machine to me as  
4 a diamond mining plant that they would be carrying to Kono.  
10:05:05 5 To be specific, you know, he only said Kono. He said they  
6 were carrying the plant to Kono to go and mine.

7 Q. Did he say who they were taking the plant to in Kono?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. Now, you mentioned the name General Ibrahim. Did you  
10:05:23 10 know this person called General Ibrahim?

11 A. General Ibrahim, I knew him before this time as one of  
12 the delegates that used to go to Sam Bockarie behind the  
13 rebel lines, you know, as someone who had been sent by  
14 Charles Taylor before this time."

10:05:41 15 So Voinjama, December 1999, witness meets Akim Turay and  
16 General Ibrahim transporting a mining plant to Tongo; a mining  
17 plant sent by you, Mr Taylor.

18 A. To Sam Bockarie?

19 Q. What do you say?

10:06:06 20 A. To Sam Bockarie? Here we are - you know, that's the  
21 complex nature of these witnesses. You get witnesses come in,  
22 they are dealing with some truth, a whole bunch of lies, and mix  
23 up things. Now, these things are just so mixed up. Here I am in  
24 December of 1999 while I'm extracting Sam Bockarie from Sierra  
10:06:44 25 Leone. One witness says that I am sending arms in in December.

26 Now I'm sending a mining plant being escorted by Ibrahim Bah, who  
27 has never worked for me, who all evidence before this Court has  
28 shown Ibrahim Bah has been with Sankoh all these years, and I'm  
29 sure Ibrahim Bah, who the Prosecution have been in touch with,

1 will be brought here. I didn't have nothing to do with no  
2 Ibrahim Bah sending no - Bah never worked for Charles Taylor  
3 beyond the time he came to Liberia in 1990 with Dr Manneh and  
4 left around the time that Manneh left around 1991 or so.

10:07:36 5 Now we have me again - and this is where another lie comes  
6 in - we have me again sending for an army to help me to fight off  
7 rebels in Liberia and attacking the army at the border and  
8 announcing that they are there. How silly can one be? Now we  
9 have me here now sending a mining thing at the time that Sam  
10:08:06 10 Bockarie - to Sam Bockarie or whoever when Sam Bockarie is coming  
11 out and Ibrahim Bah is taking it in. Taking it in to whom? It's  
12 blatantly, blatantly untrue that I sent any mining plant. Maybe  
13 Ibrahim Bah took whatever, I don't know. Ibrahim Bah never  
14 worked for Charles Taylor since he left Liberia at the time he  
10:08:32 15 left. Never. All the years that this Bah that everyone knows  
16 from - because - and I'm speaking from evidence and documents  
17 that have been given by the Prosecution. Ibrahim Bah has spoken  
18 to the CIA, he has spoken to Dutch intelligence, he's spoken to  
19 Belgian intelligence from documents the Prosecution have provided  
10:08:56 20 us, and if he was that - if he had the information that would  
21 incriminate me, they would have brought Bah to this Court. It's  
22 a lie that I sent any - a machine by Bah. It's a lie that Bah  
23 ever worked for me or dealt with diamonds. All lies. And if  
24 they really, really are serious, they should bring him. They  
10:09:16 25 know where he is. They are talking to him. So they should bring  
26 him to this Court and not try to destroy me on these little boys  
27 coming in and trying to connect things. To connect me with arms  
28 and ammunition they have to show Sam Bockarie, that is expelled  
29 from Liberia in 2000, that goes wandering around the world

1 wherever he goes, that they bring a witness here to tell this  
2 Court that Sam Bockarie is annoyed that I abandoned him abroad,  
3 only to bring another witness to say: No, he sent for him to  
4 fight, only to attack him at the border. Total nonsense. Then  
10:09:56 5 after he gets attacked, failure for the security to arrest him.  
6 Oh, he killed him because he was trying to hide something. Where  
7 does this all end? It's not true. Bah never worked for me.  
8 Never. So he could not have even been escorting a machine for  
9 me. If he did, maybe he went through Liberia. Liberia - the  
10:10:20 10 movement between those countries are very, very, very open.  
11 Going from Liberia to La Cote d'Ivoire, coming back, going to  
12 Guinea, these are open movements. This is why it's so difficult  
13 in West Africa, because everybody knows everybody almost. All  
14 the tribes along those borders are open. You stop a guy coming  
10:10:39 15 from Guinea, all he has to do is speak Mandingo. He speaks  
16 Mandingo and says that I'm from Ganta, he's in. If you're coming  
17 from Liberia, you cross into Guinea, all you have to do is to  
18 speak Mandingo and Guinea will accept you, you speak Mandingo in  
19 Ivory Coast. So this whole thing about trying to differentiate,  
10:11:02 20 it's so different in our region. So different. I mean, very,  
21 very different. So in direct answer to your question, I never  
22 sent any mining plant by a human being called Ibrahim Bah, ever,  
23 and I'm sure that this Prosecution knows that very well.  
24 Q. Following their arrival back from La Cote d'Ivoire, the  
10:11:33 25 witness continues on page 13569 to explain that he was arrested  
26 and taken to a location called the CNC Logging Company, where he  
27 was tied up and blindfolded and then he was asked this, line 21:  
28 "Q. Did anything happen at that point after you'd been  
29 tied and blindfolded?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. What happened?

3 A. At that time I was crying, after I had been tied up, I  
4 heard the sound of a vehicle coming behind afterwards - I  
10:12:10 5 mean those who carried us, there was a vehicle that  
6 followed them later. I heard somebody saying, 'Stop it.  
7 Stop it. Don't go ahead. The chief has spoken for that  
8 particular boy.' Later I heard the voice - I recognised  
9 the voice of one Sylvester who was at one time in Ivory  
10:12:27 10 Coast, and he was a close ally to Benjamin Yeaten."

11 Pause. Sylvester, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No, I don't know who - no, I don't know of Sylvester.

13 Q. Very well.

14 "... Later when I was cut loose he said he had been sent to  
10:12:45 15 rescue me, to move me from where I was and to take me to  
16 any place that he felt was safer for me.

17 Q. Did he tell you who had asked him to come and rescue  
18 you?

19 A. According to what he told Salami and others that were  
10:13:02 20 with me at that time, he said since we crossed from Ivory  
21 Coast he had - he mentioned some senior officers from Ivory  
22 Coast and also those that were still in Liberia at that  
23 time. He said they had been discussing matters concerning  
24 me, that no matter what the conditions are, because of one  
10:13:21 25 reason or the other, they would want to spare me. He said  
26 he had come to take me to some place so that they will  
27 continue to persuade the authorities about my issue.

28 Q. Now, you mentioned in your earlier testimony that there  
29 was somebody else with you who was also being tied up.

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Did anything happen to him?

3 A. The only thing I can explain to you pertaining to the  
4 person I'm referring to here is that there was a boy called  
10:13:54 5 Morris Foday. He too was tied and blindfolded. He was  
6 part of our Sierra Leonean group as well. He was with me  
7 in the car. But when they wanted - when they asked whether  
8 he too was included in the permission they had taken from  
9 me, whether he was excluded, I admitted that he had been  
10:14:17 10 one of my closest brothers. If they were trying to help me  
11 they should also help him, so he and I were taken together  
12 to the jail. Right opposite the CNN compound that I had  
13 been talking about. Sylvester put me in the jeep, in  
14 the pick-up, which brought me for the execution. For all  
10:14:40 15 this time that I'm talking about I never knew what was  
16 going on or what I had done that had caused them to take  
17 this kind of action against us. But later in the day when  
18 we were in jail, Sylvester only came up to me and said, 'I  
19 will explain something to you later. You have done some  
10:14:59 20 things that you thought were not important, but now they  
21 are important. They will be important when I explain to  
22 you'.

23 But before he could explain everything to me, in the  
24 afternoon there was a vehicle which was parked on the side  
10:15:12 25 of the jailhouse. They tuned to a radio on the BBC  
26 frequency. Somebody was speaking as the Sierra Leonean  
27 ambassador to Liberia. He was confirming on the BBC that  
28 the body that he had seen at the mortuary was indeed the  
29 body of Sam Bockarie and that they will be flying with the

1 corpse to Freetown that day.

2 So when I got this information I became more afraid as if

3 maybe they had killed Sam Bockarie. That was why such

4 thing was - I said maybe the Charles Taylor government

10:15:50 5 wanted to just pretend as if they were trying to hide Sam

6 Bockarie so that the United Nations would not focus on them

7 that much about this Sam Bockarie issue, but I was still

8 convinced.

9 Later Jungle came to me together with Sylvester. They

10:16:09 10 explained to me exactly what had gone wrong. They

11 confirmed that they had killed Sam Bockarie, his wife and

12 all the groups that were - at that time they said they had

13 carried them towards that area when they went to Gbankoi.

14 They said all of them had been killed. In fact they had

10:16:30 15 even given an order for all of us that had come with him

16 from Ivory Coast that whenever they saw any one of us they

17 should kill us and they were - they had presently put

18 people at the various checkpoints to hunt for us, but they

19 said I with the other brother that was with me were the

10:16:48 20 lucky ones. They had seen us and they will help us to

21 survive."

22 Now, Mr Taylor, were you seeking to destroy the evidence?

23 A. No, if I were seeking to destroy the evidence, then he

24 would not have survived and the many others that survived. There

10:17:14 25 was no - but there are several angles to this. No. How do you

26 have him survive and the others? If you are destroying evidence,

27 you would destroy everybody.

28 But there's another twist to this. We can't have it the

29 two ways now. The Prosecution can't have it the two ways. On

1 the one hand, the whole picture they're trying to present to this  
2 Court is that, from the questions that you have asked, here is a  
3 man who has sent a force into La Cote d'Ivoire to fight; Sam  
4 Bockarie and his cohorts are there to fight. The reception that  
10:17:52 5 they receive upon coming back to Liberia is not the type of  
6 reception that you give to a gallant man that you sent out on a  
7 mission. This should show anybody that there is confusion here.  
8 There is a failure on the part of our government to permit any  
9 armed individuals to come in to connect us with the war in La  
10:18:14 10 Cote d'Ivoire. And I say this very, very strongly: That my  
11 government wanted to do everything possible that we would not be  
12 associated with the war in La Cote d'Ivoire. This is why we  
13 insisted that before anyone enters Liberia, they should be  
14 disarmed.

10:18:31 15 Now, the account of this witness, I don't know what  
16 happened over there. When this group arrived at the border, I  
17 sent the Vice-President, General Blah, in the region to try to  
18 get Bockarie to surrender to be brought to Monrovia. And in a  
19 way he confirms that it is open that the arrival at that border  
10:19:00 20 and Sam Bockarie becomes public knowledge because we announce it  
21 on the radio and that my government announced that we will arrest  
22 Sam Bockarie and have him brought to Monrovia.

23 So even his hearing on the BBC, let's get this straight,  
24 Sam Bockarie is not killed on the very day that he arrives at the  
10:19:21 25 border. He forcibly enters along with some other men and I think  
26 it's a few days afterward before he is killed. So we can't have  
27 Taylor sending troops out to go and do something, come back, and  
28 instead of having them to rejoice, he tries to "destroy evidence"  
29 but a lot of them survive. I mean, this is not the case.



1           How many people were killed along with Sam Bockarie? I  
2 know the government lost about 810 of our soldiers. I think  
3 about three or four people died in that exchange. We lost men  
4 too. We lost many in that exchange of fire with Sam Bockarie and  
10:20:03 5 his personal bodyguards that were with him.

6           I think his account here, I'm not prepared to deny his  
7 account of being arrested, tied up and put in jail. I can't say  
8 with any factual basis that he's lying about that. I wouldn't  
9 dare say that. I don't know the accounts over there. The only  
10:20:20 10 thing I can say to this Court, I ordered that they be disarmed  
11 before they entered. I ordered that no one would enter Liberia  
12 with an arm. I ordered that Sam Bockarie should be not just  
13 disarmed but he should be arrested and brought to me in Monrovia.  
14 And, in fact, I was doing it for his own good, to have him  
10:20:40 15 brought to Monrovia. And I have also said to this Court very,  
16 very clearly, I was not going to turn him over to Tejani Kabbah.  
17 I will say that from now until I go to glory and I have my  
18 reasons for not wanting to turn him over to Tejani Kabbah. There  
19 are reasons, but - they can't have me supporting the people,  
10:21:00 20 sending them out gallantly, they coming back and I attacking them  
21 and then leaving some of them. If you want to destroy evidence,  
22 you will kill everybody. Why would he be left?

23 Q.       What were the reasons why you didn't want to hand him over  
24 to Tejan Kabbah?

10:21:18 25 A.       Because Kabbah had lied to me and killed King and I was not  
26 prepared for him to kill another person. By King, I'm talking  
27 about the air forces, the Sierra Leonean air forces officer that  
28 came in I think it was on 14 February 1998 that I had refused to  
29 let go back to Sierra Leone and he had pleaded that nothing would

1 happen to him, and King was one of the Sierra Leonean officers  
2 that he executed. And I said to him that he would not have that  
3 opportunity again, that I would expel any Sierra Leonean from  
4 Liberia, but I would not turn anyone over to him. That was the  
10:22:04 5 simple reason.

6 Q. Now, the witness continues on the same topic in this vein,  
7 Mr Taylor, page 13573, line 15:

8 "Q. You said that you were informed by Sylvester and  
9 Jungle that they had killed Sam Bockarie and all those  
10:22:21 10 people with him. Did Sylvester and Jungle tell you who  
11 killed Sam Bockarie and all those people with him?

12 A. Yes, sir, they only mentioned Benjamin Yeaten, you  
13 know, as the overall boss for the execution that was  
14 conducted.

10:22:42 15 Q. Now, you further said that they had orders to - your  
16 Honours, I just need to check the exact words. You said  
17 that they had given orders for all of you who came from  
18 Ivory Coast that wherever or whenever they saw any one of  
19 you they should kill you and that people were at various  
10:23:00 20 checkpoints to hunt for you. Now, who are 'they' that gave  
21 the order?

22 A. At that particular time, you know, they were referring  
23 to Charles Taylor, because whenever this kind of order  
24 comes especially for our group at that time to be generally  
10:23:18 25 executed in that form it was directly from Charles Taylor."  
26 You see what he's suggesting, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yeah, but Jabaty is - really, he's a trained soldier, and  
28 what he's talking about here is that an order for execution will  
29 come from the commander in chief. I guess this is what he's

1 referring to. But if I had given such an order, then my next  
2 question would be to those people: Why wasn't he executed? So  
3 there was no such order for any execution and there were no ones  
4 that got executed at that particular time. To the best of my  
10:24:04 5 knowledge, my orders were very, very strong and strict: Disarm  
6 every man or woman with an arm at that border, arrest Sam  
7 Bockarie and bring him to me. Those were my orders. Beyond  
8 that --

9 Q. Now, the witness goes on to give a reason for this order  
10:24:20 10 being given, Mr Taylor, because he continues in this vein, page  
11 13576, line 5:

12 "Q. Now, you said that the order that had been given was  
13 for all of you who came from the Ivory Coast to be killed.  
14 Now, when you say all of you who came from the Ivory Coast,  
10:24:39 15 who were you referring to?

16 A. I'm referring to those who were connected, you know,  
17 to Sam Bockarie, especially the Sierra Leoneans, the Sierra  
18 Leonean group.

19 Q. Now, you said earlier that Jungle and Sylvester  
10:24:52 20 explained to you what had happened to Sam Bockarie, do you  
21 recall that, and the people around him?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Did they explain why Sam Bockarie was killed?

24 A. Yes, sir.

10:25:06 25 Q. What was explained to you by these two people?

26 A. Well, Jungle in particular, I had a long discussion  
27 with him pertaining to this issue and at one point in time  
28 he emphasised two points for the cause of Sam Bockarie's  
29 death. One of the points he said, he said the old man, he

1 was referring to Charles Taylor as old man - he said Sam  
2 Bockarie's presence in the sub-region, I mean in Burkina  
3 Faso and Ivory Coast was very alarming that he was still  
4 around that area and that the United Nations mission was  
10:25:49 5 still looking for him for the indictment that was given to  
6 Charles Taylor for his involvement with the RUF. So since  
7 he had no way to hide Sam Bockarie he had decided to just  
8 get rid of him.

9 He also expressed concern that there were certain - there  
10:26:07 10 was a certain information that they got about Sam Bockarie  
11 before he came across that Charles Taylor was not satisfied  
12 with him, Sam Bockarie, anymore. If Sam Bockarie had been  
13 used by other people - Sam Bockarie had been used by other  
14 people to overthrow him. So he said these were the points  
10:26:28 15 for which he had killed him."

16 Motive spelt out.

17 A. Yeah, but how does this connect? Which comes first, the  
18 death of Sam Bockarie or the opening of the indictment against  
19 Charles Taylor? You know, when the - you see how they pump these  
10:26:49 20 little boys up to lie. This looks - I can see where it's coming  
21 from. So which comes first, his death or the unfolding of the  
22 indictment? So if Sam Bockarie is killed after my indictment is  
23 unfolded, then you can make up this kind of stuff. So for  
24 anybody to make this up, it simply means he's being told to say  
10:27:20 25 this type of nonsense that cannot hold water, except he knew that  
26 I was indicted even before myself. So how does this work? You  
27 can tell the lie. You can see the lie.

28 Q. But he continues in the same vein, line 26:  
29 "As I was saying concerning the reasons Jungle used to

1 complain to me about, he said one of the points was the  
2 involvement of Charles Taylor with the RUF which the United  
3 Nations had always been accusing him of and which he had been  
4 denying. That is one of the areas why he decided to kill Sam  
10:28:03 5 Bockarie, because his presence in that area was causing some  
6 alarm that Charles Taylor was in connection with him. Secondly I  
7 said the times - the first time Bockarie entered Liberia,  
8 according to Jungle, he said they had been getting some rumours  
9 which they said - whereby they said he had been used to come and  
10:28:25 10 overthrow Charles Taylor. He said these were the two reasons  
11 that they had been getting about the death of Sam Bockarie.  
12 They said this was the reason really that made Charles Taylor to  
13 kill him because he was very close to him and he - there was  
14 still that alarm that he had connection with Sam Bockarie in the  
10:28:45 15 sub-region."

16 It's quite plain, Mr Taylor: That is the case being put  
17 against you.

18 A. Sam Bockarie is coming to overthrow me?

19 Q. Yes, so you decide to murder him. So it's being suggested  
10:29:00 20 you're a murderer, do you see?

21 A. No, I don't. I can see what you're talking about, but  
22 there's no many things. First, don't let's forget this now, I'm  
23 trying to destroy the evidence because I'm indicted, which I  
24 don't even know of and nobody knows of, on the one hand. On the  
10:29:25 25 other hand, it's being suggested that he's killed because he's on  
26 his way to overthrow me. So, I mean, really I don't understand  
27 how he could have been led to this kind of thinking. Sam  
28 Bockarie, on the third hand, is sent out by me to destabilise la  
29 Cote d'Ivoire. So which is it now? Is he sent out and he's my

1 boy that is doing my bidding, or is he coming in now to overthrow  
2 my government that I kill him, or am I now killing him because of  
3 an indictment that is still unsealed? Except he probably met  
4 with David Crane, Sam Bockarie or he, this boy, to get to know  
10:30:16 5 that an indictment was going to be unsealed for me. But how do  
6 you kill somebody before the unsealing of the indictment because  
7 you expect that this - that would happen? I mean, it just  
8 doesn't come together, and this is how these lies are put  
9 together.

10:30:29 10 Look, Sam Bockarie, if there is anything that is  
11 acceptable, no matter who says it, Sam Bockarie was someone that  
12 I liked very much. I threw him out of Liberia under very intense  
13 pressure from the international community and trying to convince  
14 Kabbah that he would not pose any harm to the Sierra Leonean  
10:30:59 15 government. I had no reason for this young man to die, not one  
16 bit of reason. He left and to make sure I was not accused, I had  
17 no contact with him while he was outside. When I heard that Sam  
18 Bockarie had come to Liberia - I don't deny I did hear that Sam  
19 Bockarie was fighting in La Cote d'Ivoire, that he had come from  
10:31:22 20 Burkina Faso and he was fighting on the side of the rebel  
21 movement in La Cote d'Ivoire. When he arrived at the border with  
22 those men, because he wanted to re-enter Liberia I said no, that  
23 Sam Bockarie would not re-enter Liberia, he should be disarmed  
24 and arrested and brought to me in Monrovia. This is the factual  
10:31:44 25 matter. This issue of he was coming to overthrow my government  
26 or I was trying - Sam Bockarie is outside of Liberia long enough  
27 not to want to return. The question is why would Sam Bockarie  
28 want to return to Liberia? If Sam Bockarie feels threatened by  
29 me that he is holding important information, he has been out of

1 Liberia for two years and that his life is threatened by me, why  
2 would he come back to Liberia and force his way back into the  
3 country? I mean, except logic doesn't really matter in these  
4 cases. Why would Bockarie - Bockarie - if the use that Bockarie  
10:32:26 5 was to the international community or to anybody, he was outside  
6 of Liberia. I didn't go and kidnap him in La Cote d'Ivoire or in  
7 Burkina Faso and bring him. Sam Bockarie came back to Liberia  
8 voluntarily. So there could have been no threat to his life that  
9 he was coming to overthrow me. How does a little Bockarie come  
10:32:50 10 to Liberia to overthrow my government? Under what condition?

11 So all of these things about the Jungle saying and this,  
12 all of these interpretations of the situation are totally,  
13 totally unfounded. After the death of Sam Bockarie, the Liberian  
14 soldiers and whoever, all the people that came into Liberia,  
10:33:11 15 whether it is Jabaty Jaward or all the other people, no one was  
16 touched. No one was touched. And if we look at the different  
17 accounts, his account is different from another witness's account  
18 even about how Sam Bockarie got killed and why. Remember, there  
19 are at least two other witnesses that have come before this  
10:33:32 20 Court, both of them protected, okay - both of them protected -  
21 the 57 something that you called and another one that have all  
22 given different accounts of the entry and what ensued following  
23 his entry. So --

24 Q. TF1-375, for reference purposes.

10:33:48 25 A. Okay. So, I mean, these are just little guesswork these  
26 boys are doing trying to explain the unexplainable, and really if  
27 - you know, sometimes I don't know the relevance of some of these  
28 witnesses that the Prosecution brought, because you've got three  
29 witnesses dealing with the entry and the death of Sam Bockarie,

1 and each of them explain in three different ways. I would think  
2 that if you wanted some consistency, you would bring one. But, I  
3 mean, they can't have three different, take any one you want.  
4 This is just not the case. I mean, you know, you destroy me - so  
10:34:28 5 which lie do we take? The one who said he shot him in the head  
6 and he was sent with a group where Sam Bockarie ran to a river  
7 and he killed? Or do you - in fact, the fourth one - or Moses  
8 Blah, who says he was just sitting and he saw bodies that were  
9 brought to him; or the other protected one that says that the  
10:34:50 10 commander sent to him. There are four different witnesses here,  
11 okay: Blah, the two protected and Jabaty. Each one with the  
12 same situation; different, different accounts far apart. So  
13 which one now am I supposed to be destroyed with? Which one?

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, could I seek a  
10:35:08 15 clarification from the witness, please?

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, of course.

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: You've mentioned, Mr Witness, that you  
18 wanted to Sam Bockarie arrested. May I ask why you wanted him  
19 arrested?

10:35:19 20 THE WITNESS: Well, when Sam Bockarie - because he was  
21 expelled from Liberia and he had come to Liberia leading a  
22 massive force and entered the country forcibly, I wanted him  
23 arrested to account for why he led - because he had become an  
24 enemy.

10:35:45 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: When you said he had become an enemy,  
26 what do you mean? An enemy of who?

27 THE WITNESS: He had become an enemy of the Republic of  
28 Liberia by bringing in force of arms and forcibly entering the  
29 country. He forcefully led a force into the country and the



1 orders were to arrest Sam Bockarie, who was the leader of that  
2 force that entered Liberia.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. I want us to leave --

10:36:25 5 A. May I just add something? I know the learned Justice  
6 asked - the area of entry from la Cote d'Ivoire that we're  
7 talking about is what we call a creek. It's not a river, it's a  
8 creek. You can walk across. Even though we are talking about  
9 the town Loguato, but it's a creek you can walk across. So there  
10:36:45 10 was a part of that force that forced their way in. The civilians  
11 didn't follow them. The military people actually forced their  
12 way in. You can walk in the creek almost at ankle deep and walk  
13 across. So this is why I said he should be arrested. So we're  
14 talking about a border area that is not - there are no real  
10:37:07 15 obstacles at the border. There are bush paths that you can enter  
16 as long as the paths with Liberia and Sierra Leone.

17 Q. Right. Let's leave Mr Jaward and I'd like us now, please,  
18 to deal with another witness. I want us to move on and deal with  
19 Isaac Mongor, okay?

10:37:40 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Why do you smile, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Because I know the quantity of lies that Mongor told here  
23 and I'm delighted to start dealing with it.

24 Q. Very well. His account begins in Liberia when he was at a  
10:38:07 25 training camp, Camp Gborplay, page 5650 testimony of 10 March  
26 2008. Pausing, was there a training base camp at Gborplay,  
27 Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, there was.

29 Q. Question from Mr Koumjian:

1 "Q. Sir, did the trainers indicate what country you were  
2 fighting for?

3 A. Yes. They said it was Liberia. It was in Liberia that  
4 we were to fight. The trainers who were there, they were  
10:38:51 5 many, the ones who used to train us.

6 Q. Did they indicate who their leader was?

7 A. Yes, they told us it was Mr Taylor. They used to call  
8 him CIC" - meaning commander-in-chief, is that correct?

9 A. That's the meaning of CIC, but I was not called CIC as a  
10:39:12 10 name. But almost every Head of State is called  
11 commander-in-chief.

12 Q. Now, he went on to say at page 5654 that he became a member  
13 of the Executive Mansion Guard and he was asked this question,  
14 line 12:

10:39:34 15 "Q. When you were with the Executive Mansion Guard how  
16 often would you see the commander-in-chief, the person you  
17 said was Mr Taylor?

18 A. Well, I used to see him every day because those of us  
19 who were Executive Mansion Guards, we had access to him and  
10:39:52 20 we were the ones who escorted him. We were also the ones  
21 at any one time we went to the front line, if he never went  
22 with us we will explain to him what was happening on the  
23 front lines. So I can say I used to see him always.

24 Q. At the Executive Mansion was there a routine?

10:40:15 25 A. We used to have a morning parade on the ground there."  
26 Was that the function of the Executive Mansion Guard,  
27 Mr Taylor?

28 A. I don't know if they had a morning parade. That would be  
29 normal for military people to have like a roll call or something.

1 I don't recall that happening in Gborplay, you know, where I  
2 lived, no.

3 Q. And, Mr Taylor, help us. During the course of the war in  
4 Liberia, as commander-in-chief did you give military commands?

10:41:03 5 A. No.

6 Q. Did you make decisions as to who should go to the front  
7 line, which targets should be attacked, and the like?

8 A. No, that was - the military people, what happened - I do  
9 not know how it is done in other areas - they draw up the plans.

10:41:20 10 I have never taken any military training in my life. They draw  
11 up the plans and I would be informed what areas, you know, there  
12 are obstacles and what areas are going to be attacked. But as  
13 far as the planning, no. The military did the planning.

14 Q. Well, Mr Mongor disagrees, because he told this Court at  
10:41:44 15 page 5656, testimony of 10 March 2008, line 20:

16 "Q. Mr Witness, did you yourself ever witness Mr Taylor  
17 giving military commands?

18 A. Yes, he used to give military commands wherein he will  
19 tell people to go to the front line to fight.

10:42:10 20 Q. Did you observe how the forces of the NPFL were  
21 supplied with ammunition?

22 A. The ammunition that they supplied us on the ground  
23 where the CIC was, that is the Executive Mansion Ground,  
24 that was where the ammunition were and it was Mr Taylor -  
10:42:27 25 at any time he was ready to move to the front line, the  
26 ammunition will be in the vehicle that was at the rear  
27 following him, that was going together with him, because at  
28 the time we were fighting to go to the city, when we  
29 captured the Coca-Cola factory that was where he

1 established his base, so that was where he used to bring  
2 the ammunition and where he would keep them, and that was  
3 where he used to take them and give them to us, the  
4 fighters, to go and fight."

10:43:04 5 Very hands-on commander, Mr Taylor.

6 A. I have never done any military training in my life. I have  
7 never fought or fired a rifle in my life and never went "to the  
8 front line". In fact, even the most serious witness I think  
9 brought here, General Blah, would say, and he never mentioned in  
10:43:34 10 his testimony, that Taylor would be on the front line. Even he  
11 hardly went to the front line. So this nonsense about me going  
12 to the front line and giving orders - and let's just look at - if  
13 he's talking about Coca-Cola factory, he's talking now about - I  
14 would say about August 1990. So he has advanced from Gborplay  
10:44:04 15 very fast. So he's talking now - because we take Buchanan and by  
16 July we are in that general area. We are around Monrovia around  
17 the time that ECOMOG comes in. So that's around - I'm putting it  
18 to around August 1990.

19 The Coca-Cola factory is not the front line. I did visit  
10:44:29 20 the Coca-Cola factory several times, but this was the most secure  
21 far rear where I would drive sometimes and sit with - where some  
22 of the senior commanders could come and tell me what was going  
23 on, but I never went on the front line, no.

24 Q. Now, the witness went on that he was given a new assignment  
10:44:59 25 and he was asked what was that new assignment:

26 "A. Well, the new assignment that I had was to go and  
27 train people who were to go and fight in Sierra Leone."

28 He is asked when was he given that assignment:

29 "A. In 1990. That was the time I was given the assignment

1 to go and train those people. I can say it was in March or  
2 April 1990. I cannot say exactly, but it could be within  
3 that period. I was one of the Executive Mansion Guards  
4 I've told you and I was able to get this assignment from  
10:45:41 5 the commander-in-chief to help his friend who was Pa Morlai  
6 who was called Foday Sankoh. But at that time we were in  
7 Liberia we never knew that Foday Sankoh name. The name we  
8 used to call him was Pa Morlai. So he called me. The Pa  
9 called me. The commander-in-chief who is Mr Taylor, he  
10:46:05 10 called me, together with Foday Sankoh, who was Pa Morlai,  
11 when he told me that I should go with that of his brother  
12 to help him train his people.

13 I want you to know that at the time we were fighting in  
14 Liberia, Mr Taylor used to talk over the BBC and at that  
10:46:25 15 time he did say to the Sierra Leonean people that one day  
16 they will experience the bitterness of war, because at that  
17 time we were fighting, the Alpha Jets used to fly over  
18 Sierra Leone and then bombed in Liberia. So the CIC who  
19 was Mr Taylor passed an order that you should arrest the  
10:46:52 20 Sierra Leoneans and the Nigerians, so those Nigerians and  
21 Sierra Leoneans who were in Liberia, most of them were  
22 arrested and put in jail and they even killed some people.  
23 So he called me to go and train people who will go and  
24 fight in Sierra Leone, so he handed me over to his friend,  
10:47:07 25 that is Pa Morlai, for me to go and assist train his  
26 people."

27 Now, nothing could be clearer, could it, Mr Taylor?  
28 Because you say you were not involved in planning the invasion of  
29 Sierra Leone. You knew about it after the fact. Mr Mongor is

1 saying you selected him and met with him and Pa Morlai, aka Foday  
2 Sankoh, and gave him this assignment to train. So consequently  
3 he's saying you were in on it right from the very start. Do you  
4 follow?

10:47:54 5 A. I follow very well.

6 Q. What do you say?

7 A. I say it's a blatant, blatant lie and I'll tell you why it  
8 is a lie. And because - as I'm hearing this testimony, we will  
9 have to take our time because there are just so many things tied  
10:48:17 10 up in this lie. Let's go back to the first section of it that in  
11 March or April --

12 Q. 1990.

13 A. -- 1990 he is elected. I am not in Liberia - and there  
14 will be tons of witnesses that will come here to testify I'm not  
10:48:40 15 in Liberia in March 1990. I am still in la Cote d'Ivoire across  
16 the border. It is in April/May that I come in after the Prince  
17 Johnson episode that I bring the Gambians with me for my  
18 protection. That's the first part.

19 The second part that he is talking about and confused here  
10:49:02 20 about, then he jumps to the issue of Alpha Jets. This Court as a  
21 factual matter has seen evidence of when ECOMOG entered Liberia.  
22 ECOMOG entered Liberia in August/September 1990. So we've got a  
23 long period now between March and all the way September 1990 and  
24 then he combines the famous statement that all of the Prosecution  
10:49:35 25 witnesses, or most of have them have made, taste the bitterness  
26 of war, that this Prosecution can't find the BBC tape to, but  
27 they all were told talk about bitterness of war. Such an  
28 important piece of evidence, one would think that they would  
29 bring it here. So we've got that part.

1 But let me just tell this Court: Your Honours, in 1990, at  
2 the time this gentleman is talking about, not even a year into  
3 the war, I have in Liberia Special Forces that I have brought  
4 from Libya. A little Isaac Mongor, who claims to have been  
10:50:19 5 trained in Gborplay for three months, would have hardly been an  
6 individual that I Charles Taylor would have selected to go and  
7 train for an invasion in another country. It would have been  
8 likely for me to send one or two Special Forces that Foday Sankoh  
9 would have known. Why am I going to train a trainee to send to  
10:50:44 10 go and train somebody in March, March/April, of 1990.

11 But let's look further at other testimonies that witnesses  
12 have talked about as to when they went for this training. We're  
13 talking about a vast difference of months. There has been no  
14 witness that has come before this Court, and I stand corrected,  
10:51:15 15 that said that they even entered any training in March or April  
16 of 1990. Most of the witnesses have talked about 1991. So this  
17 lying Mongor is doing just that, lying. He was not selected. He  
18 would have been the last person on the planet that would have  
19 been selected.

10:51:32 20 Now, as to whether he was a part of the Executive Mansion  
21 Guard, in fact, at this particular time in 1990 when I enter  
22 Liberia in April, we don't have an Executive Mansion Guard. What  
23 we do have are most of the Gambians and a few of the other  
24 Special Forces and their immediate relatives that we could trust.  
10:51:56 25 Now, it is very possible, and I will give him this benefit, that  
26 Isaac Mongor could have been working or even a part of the  
27 security unit. I did not know him, but I doubt it very much that  
28 a trainee that had just gone through three months training in  
29 Gborplay when I entered in April would have been put on my

1 immediate security force. No, no, no, no, no.

2 What happened when I got in Gborplay, those Special Forces  
3 that I felt very comfortable with who had some of their families  
4 and relatives that had been engaged in combat, some of those

10:52:38

5 peoples - those individuals were brought to assist with the  
6 security. And if we remember, one of the things that one of the  
7 witnesses got right, the commander, the deputy commander and all  
8 of the senior individuals in my security force were all Special  
9 Forces. So Isaac Mongor being selected in March/April of 1990 to  
10 go for training is a blatant, blatant, blatant lie.

10:53:03

11 Q. Well, let me ask you a separate question then, Mr Taylor.  
12 When was the Executive Mansion established in Gbarnga?

13 A. In 1991.

14 Q. When in 1991?

10:53:23

15 A. I moved to Gbarnga around July 1991.

16 Q. You sure you weren't there in 1990, Mr Taylor?

17 A. I am as sure as I live. I was never, never, never living  
18 in Gbarnga in 1990 at all.

19 Q. Bear March/April 1990 in mind. Page 5662, line 11:

10:53:55

20 "Q. The commander-in-chief Mr Taylor gave you this  
21 assignment. Was that face-to-face in person or how was  
22 the message given to you?

23 A. Well, this business of the assignment, it was when  
24 Foday Sankoh, who is the same time Pa Morlai, they had  
10:54:14 25 already started discussing, the two of them, before they  
26 invited me to go there. But what I know was that it was  
27 Mr Taylor who told me to go with his brother, who was Pa  
28 Morlai, for me to assist him train his people. He was the  
29 one who told me.



1 Q. Where exactly were you when Mr Taylor told you to go  
2 train Foday Sankoh's people?

3 A. I was on the ground where Taylor was, that is his  
4 Executive Mansion Ground, that is Gbarnga. That was where  
10:54:51 5 I was when he handed me over to Foday Sankoh for me to go  
6 and train his people."

7 Do you follow?

8 A. Yes. But now there is something basically wrong with this  
9 and we have to be - you see, in other words, what this witness is  
10:55:10 10 saying, that I am in Gbarnga. I'm in Gbarnga in March/April of  
11 1990, this is what this witness is actually saying.

12 Q. It follows from what he said previously. He got the order  
13 in March/April 1990.

14 A. And he got it while we were in Gbarnga? So, now, if we  
10:55:36 15 look at that, anybody from any planet will know that this is a  
16 lie because to be in Gbarnga in March 1990, it simply means I  
17 have captured from the border into Gbarnga. By March 1990, we  
18 have not even reached Buchanan. We have not even reached  
19 Buchanan in March 1990. But if this Court looks through every  
10:56:09 20 witness who claims that he took training at Naama, doesn't even  
21 talk about March/April of 1990. So where he is coming from - so  
22 he alone went through - March 1990, the Armed Forces of Liberia  
23 are still in control of Camp Naama. So where did he get there  
24 from? Where did he get there from?

10:56:35 25 All of the evidence that has come before this Court,  
26 including statements from Ambassador Nyaki, who was the UN  
27 special representative at the time of this ECOMOG arrival in  
28 August, the NPFL had come there by August 1990. March 1990, we  
29 have not even captured in fact Tappita. We are just still

1 fighting within Nimba County. So where is he seeing  
2 Charles Taylor giving him orders in March/April 1990? It's a  
3 lie. And no other witness that this Prosecution brought here  
4 talks anything about beginning any training anywhere at this  
10:57:15 5 time. No.

6 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let's be quite clear what the witness is  
7 saying. We know from other evidence the Liberian revolution  
8 starts Christmas Eve 1989.

9 A. That is correct.

10:57:32 10 Q. This witness is trained at Gborplay.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Becomes an Executive Mansion Guard, and within, what, three  
13 and a half months you're sending him to train Sierra Leoneans at  
14 Camp Naama. Do you follow?

10:57:50 15 A. Yes, but there is another point that we have to also look  
16 at here. But, your Honours, the training in Gborplay is for  
17 three months. The training in Gborplay runs through to four  
18 months, so this man gets an assignment before he's through with  
19 the training.

10:58:14 20 Q. He's probably a fast learner, Mr Taylor.

21 A. So when - because - according to this witness, because by  
22 January, okay, the first training base in is, Tiaplay, so  
23 Gborplay training base is opened around February/March of 1990.  
24 So this man gets an assignment in Gbarnga, he's through - but  
10:58:43 25 it's impossible. It's impossible. It's incredible that he would  
26 say this. When you look at the time line, he gets recruited in  
27 early 1990 and he's trained for three months. The third month in  
28 1990 is March, so that means even before this boy is through  
29 training, he's already in Gbarnga. It's not possible for him to

1 have been even selected or even through with training. So the  
2 time frame that he's talking about in March or April, he is still  
3 in training. He must be in training in Gborplay. So he's a  
4 liar. He must be in training in Gborplay.

10:59:25 5 Q. He continues:

6 "Q. Who was present at that time?"

7 That's when he's given the order.

8 "A. I have told you that when they called me, I went and I  
9 met himself and Foday Sankoh sitting together before he  
10 told me that.

10:59:57 10

11 Q. Thank you. Was this the first time that you saw Foday  
12 Sankoh?

13 A. No. I used to see Foday Sankoh. I knew him. I used  
14 to see him, before I never knew he was a rebel leader. But  
15 I only knew that he was a member of the special forces and  
16 he himself was with Mr Taylor and they were the bosses that  
17 we used to guard."

11:00:13 15

18 Do you follow?

19 A. Yes.

11:00:29 20

21 Q. So what is being suggested there, Mr Taylor, is that by  
22 March/April, when he's given this assignment, you know Foday  
23 Sankoh's identity, you're, in effect, with him, being guarded  
24 with him by Isaac Mongor and others. Do you follow?

25 A. Total, total lie. Now again, as bad as this

11:01:12 25

26 whatchamacallit boy that came here that Zigzag Marzah is -  
27 because at the period that he's talking about, Zigzag Marzah  
28 covers that. He was arrested, put in a container, released.  
29 Nobody talks about any Foday Sankoh being in Gborplay and  
whatchamacallit of all of their so-called witnesses. This boy is

1 lying, this man. There is no such thing as me and Foday Sankoh  
2 being together. But he's in training that he is supposed to be  
3 guarding Foday Sankoh and myself. It's a blatant lie. Total,  
4 total lie.

11:01:52 5 Q. Well, he implicates you further, Mr Taylor, and I have to  
6 give you the full detail so you can deal with it:

7 "Q. After Mr Taylor turned you over to Foday Sankoh where  
8 exactly did you go to do this training?

9 A. I went through the training at Camp Naama and that was  
11:02:10 10 the AFL military base. That was the area and we had  
11 already been in control of that area, so that was the area  
12 where they sent me to train the people because that was  
13 where Mr Taylor had given to Foday Sankoh for his men to be  
14 trained there.

11:02:32 15 Q. What county is Camp Naama in?

16 A. Camp Naama is in Bong County.

17 Q. Can you describe the camp?

18 A. The camp was a military camp and it was is a big place.  
19 They have a field there for the training. They had houses  
11:02:52 20 there where people live and even the NPFL used to train  
21 there. They also had their own base there where they used  
22 to train and those were people who were trained heavy  
23 weapons. That was where they trained them.

24 Q. Who were the people that were training there?

11:03:08 25 A. Well I was training people there who were Sierra  
26 Leoneans and I have already told you that Mr Taylor had  
27 passed an order that they should be arrest Sierra Leoneans  
28 and Nigerians, and who had already been jailed. So at the  
29 time when the issue of the training came up, those Sierra

1 Leoneans who were already in jail, we used to go to their  
2 cells and then take them to the base. We will take them  
3 from there to the base. So Mr Taylor had given us one  
4 Toyota truck that was what we used to transport the  
11:03:47 5 recruits to the base."  
6 Do you get it?  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. You couldn't be more involved than that, Mr Taylor. You  
9 gave a truck?  
11:03:58 10 A. Even a bigger lie. But we have to be very careful with  
11 really taking our time with this Mongor lie. The Sierra  
12 Leoneans, Nigerians and other arrests that were being made, we  
13 have the proof before this Court. When were these done? After  
14 the arrival of ECOMOG. After the arrival of ECOMOG. And ECOMOG  
11:04:33 15 arrives in Liberia in August of 1990. Here is this man now in  
16 March/April of 1990 taking people to go to Naama for training.  
17 This man is lying. There is no such thing, okay? And as we go  
18 further, again Charles Taylor would take one man, Isaac Mongor.  
19 But no, no, not one, because there are other individuals that  
11:05:11 20 have claimed that I sent them, but they were not brought here,  
21 but we have the documents before us who testified in Sierra Leone  
22 but still haven't been brought before us here that said that no,  
23 I sent him, okay? But here is a man that is collecting Sierra  
24 Leoneans that were locked up in jail even before they went to  
11:05:34 25 jail, okay? Because these people - I have told this Court that  
26 we did pick up individuals after ECOMOG started assaulting and  
27 the ECOMOG attacks did not come until late in 1990. Here he is,  
28 while he is still in training about March or April of 1990,  
29 already recruited. It is when they are fed so much information

1 they don't know how to put the lie together. There is no way he  
2 could have been involved, one, in any training sent by me;  
3 neither would he have been told by me in March or April to go and  
4 do something that was impossible. No, that is not the case.

11:06:21 5 Q. Now on the same topic Mr Mongor continues. Page 5667, line  
6 9:

7 "Q. Now you mentioned that Foday Sankoh was at Camp Naama.  
8 Did you hear Foday Sankoh speaking to the recruits?

9 A. Yes, Foday Sankoh used to speak to the recruits.

11:06:50 10 Q. Do you recall now anything that he would tell the  
11 recruits at Camp Naama?

12 A. He used to tell them that Sierra Leone had a one-party  
13 system at that time, so the country was corrupt and that he  
14 was training them for them to go and free the people from  
11:07:04 15 that one-party system and for them to take over power and  
16 rule the country. So those were the things that he used to  
17 tell the men during parade, and that they should be strong  
18 and that they should be courageous.

19 Q. Did he ever indicate that you can recall how he would  
11:07:28 20 accomplish this task of taking over the country in Sierra  
21 Leone?

22 A. Well, he used to say that when you are here and you are  
23 training I can say I am a poor man, I don't have money, but  
24 all that I am doing here it is my brother, who is  
11:07:45 25 Mr Taylor, that is doing it. So that was what he used to  
26 tell the men.

27 Q. Would you yourself ever talk privately with Foday  
28 Sankoh?

29 A. Yes, I used to talk with Foday Sankoh.

1 Q. Did Foday Sankoh ever mention Mr Taylor in your  
2 discussions with him?

3 A. Yes, he used to talk about Mr Taylor. He said that  
4 Mr Taylor was his brother and that what he was doing, that  
11:08:11 5 is when he was training those men, it was Mr Taylor who was  
6 doing it for him and that after the completion of the  
7 training, for them to go, it was Mr Taylor that he depended  
8 on to do everything, and so even myself, he used to  
9 encourage me and he used to tell me that the job I was  
11:08:31 10 doing, I should exercise patience and bear with him.

11 Q. Did Foday Sankoh ever tell you how he met Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, he said Mr Taylor and himself had met for a long  
13 time. He said at one time he was in prison in Ghana and it  
14 was Mr Taylor who fought hard for him to be released and  
11:08:54 15 that they all had gone to Libya and undergone training, so  
16 those were the things he told me."

17 That's the plan, Mr Taylor. That's the plan. Now help us.  
18 When did you assist Mr Sankoh to get out of jail in Ghana?

19 A. Never did. I was in jail in Ghana myself. How could I  
11:09:21 20 assist him? I entered Ghana and was arrested and locked up. I  
21 didn't even know that there was a Foday Sankoh. I was in jail in  
22 Ghana in '87 and how would I help Foday Sankoh or anybody to be -  
23 I entered Ghana and was accused of being a CIA spy. That's how I  
24 got arrested in Ghana. I was kept in jail because I had escaped  
11:09:53 25 from the United States and they said I could not have gotten out  
26 except I was a CIA spy. At the time when Ghana and the United  
27 States were at serious loggerheads where the cousin of Jerry  
28 Rawlings, Mike Susidis, had been arrested by the FBI in the  
29 United States and accused of espionage. The Ghanaian government

1 arrested some Americans in Accra. There was an eventual exchange  
2 of prisoners. I was looked at in Ghana and that's why I stayed  
3 in jail in Ghana and on the day I was released from Ghana I was  
4 given 48 hours to leave Ghana. How could I help anybody? I  
11:10:41 5 didn't even know that Foday Sankoh would have been arrested in  
6 Ghana or whatever.

7 This is a blatant, blatant falsehood that is just beyond  
8 thinking of. No such thing that ever happened about me helping  
9 Foday Sankoh. I needed all the help I could get myself in Ghana.  
11:10:58 10 I don't even know if Foday Sankoh was in fact arrested at any  
11 time in Ghana. I doubt it very much.

12 Q. How long were you in jail in Ghana for, Mr Taylor?

13 A. A total of about I would say nine - eight to nine months.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before you go on, Mr Taylor,

11:11:18 15 mentioned a name Mike Susidis, I'm not sure there's a spelling of  
16 that on record, Mr Taylor.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't think there is. I apologise for  
18 overlooking it. We'll look it up:

19 Q. Let's continue until such time as we can find a spelling  
11:11:34 20 for it, Mr Taylor. Now deal with another detail contained within  
21 that answer, because remember the witness is saying Foday Sankoh  
22 tells him that you had gone to Libya with him, Foday Sankoh, for  
23 training.

24 A. I never went with Foday Sankoh to Libya. As a matter of  
11:11:59 25 fact, the fact of the matter is the Sierra Leoneans arrived in  
26 Libya long before the Liberians arrived. When I did get out of  
27 jail in 1987 from Ghana I finally went up to Libya to begin to  
28 get my people into place where some of them had already arrived.  
29 While I was still in - in fact I was still in jail in Ghana and



1 that part of Blah's testimony, Moses Blah, covers it and I agree  
2 with that part because the first and second groups had gone to  
3 Libya while I was still in prison in Ghana. Blah covers that in  
4 his testimony before this Court and I acknowledge that section of  
11:12:55 5 his report.

6 I get out of jail and then before I proceed, so - and when  
7 I get there I meet Ali Kabbah, the Sierra Leonean leader, at the  
8 Mataba. Not Foday Sankoh. I did not know him. I meet  
9 Ali Kabbah. I meet Dr Manneh, Kukoi Samba Sanyang. I meet other  
11:13:24 10 leaders from different factions around the world. From, you name  
11 it, Ghana, Uganda, South Africa, Namibia. All the revolutionary  
12 groups are there. I do not meet a Sankoh. I meet Ali Kabbah.  
13 So Sankoh and I did not, and I mean not go to Libya together.  
14 That's a blatant lie.

11:13:52 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Spelling, Mr President - I'm sorry, we  
16 haven't located it.

17 Q. We're moving on, Mr Taylor. Page 5668, line 25:

18 "Q. After your assignment training at Camp Naama, can you  
19 tell us the next assignment that you received?

11:14:21 20 A. My next assignment was to move with the men to the  
21 place where we trained for.

22 Q. What do you mean move to the place that you trained  
23 for?

24 A. Well, I told the Court that I was training the men for  
11:14:52 25 the Sierra Leone mission. So after their passing out we  
26 had some people to go to Pujehun. The other ones were to  
27 come to Voinjama. We were to come and enter through the  
28 Koindu/Bomaru end, so we came to Voinjama.

29 Q. Can you explain what you mean by the passing out?

1 A. After we had completed the training, that is what we  
2 call passing out. I went to Voinjama with these men whom I  
3 had trained and Foday Sankoh too went with us and we had  
4 other people who had come from Gbarnga who came with some  
11:15:30 5 trucks, we came to Gbarnga. That is where we met  
6 Mr Taylor, at Gbarnga. They were soldiers, some of the  
7 Special Forces.

8 A. I think he said Voinjama.

9 Q. Voinjama.

11:15:49 10 "Q. Can you tell us who these people were? Not  
11 necessarily their names but what kind of people came with  
12 trucks.

13 A. There were soldiers, some of the Special Forces. They  
14 came with the materials that we were to use. The  
11:16:06 15 ammunition and arms that we were to use. That was what  
16 they brought. Those soldiers were NPFL soldiers."

17 And then he goes on to say that he met you there in  
18 Voinjama, and then he's asked:

19 "Q. Can you describe to the Court the meeting that you had  
11:16:33 20 with Mr Taylor in Voinjama?

21 A. Yes, when we got to Voinjama I had told you that we got  
22 there at night. Mr Taylor was on the ground which was  
23 referred to as the Executive Ground, because wherever he  
24 was based there was we referred to as the Executive Ground.  
11:16:50 25 So he was there. Then I brought my men, put them on parade  
26 and later Foday Sankoh and Mr Taylor were in the house  
27 together with some other Special Forces and they invited me  
28 and I went inside. Then I was able to talk to Mr Taylor  
29 that night. And when Mr Taylor saw me he thanked me for

1 the job that I had done, but he did not just stop there.  
2 We still had some other mission that we were to accomplish,  
3 so he said we were to come to Sierra Leone to fight and we  
4 should make sure that the mission that we were to come for  
11:17:26 5 should be accomplished. We should keep the ball rolling."

6 In Voinjama with Foday Sankoh, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Never. Never went to Voinjama with any Foday Sankoh. And  
8 one of the good things is that we will have an opportunity  
9 because there are so many witnesses that trained at that  
11:17:51 10 particular base that have a totally different account of this  
11 nonsense that this boy is talking. But there are other  
12 witnesses.

13 Now, we see here trucks coming with ammunition being  
14 brought by Special Forces, but I'm reminded that one of the  
11:18:09 15 witnesses brought here by this Prosecution who is also protected  
16 was supposed to have met me escorting the ammunition on the road  
17 going to Voinjama and we stopped and all that kind of stuff  
18 because he was supposed to just have been coming from a mission.  
19 But he's protected, we can't talk about that. But there is no

11:18:30 20 way that Isaac Mongor was involved with me. But Isaac Mongor  
21 sent to train, now he meets me in Voinjama. Isaac Mongor does  
22 not see me from the time he is sent on this training. He finally  
23 meets me in Voinjama. An important man like Isaac Mongor that is  
24 carrying out a major training finally sees me in Voinjama where

11:19:11 25 he is invited to sit in the meeting with me. That's what you  
26 call wishful thinking that Isaac Mongor at his level, even if he  
27 was with the NPFL - but then in going further, which is just a  
28 side comment I'm making, we will get to know as we go deeper -  
29 because from other follow-up information that we have really

1 gotten to find out who Isaac Mongor really is and what he's been  
2 doing, Isaac Mongor was himself a physical ed trainer - trainee  
3 at the base in this place and never had any contact with me. But  
4 it's a lie that Isaac Mongor meets me in Voinjama and sits in the  
11:20:00 5 meeting with me. I do not go to Voinjama. In fact, one of the  
6 witnesses goes beyond to tell where he stayed, but we will get to  
7 that because we have all those people. We will find them. It's  
8 a lie.

9 Q. But this is somebody else placing you in Voinjama at this  
11:20:22 10 critical time, Mr Taylor, because remember you're also supposed  
11 to have attended a planning meeting in Voinjama along with Foday  
12 Sankoh and Dr Manneh at this time.

13 A. Exactly. Exactly. Which never happened. And I don't know  
14 how they got these people to say this. I mean, it amazes me that  
11:20:43 15 these people are able to say this, even call names of people that  
16 they stayed with. And through the grace of God, I'm sure those  
17 people will come. Those people never saw them. So, I mean, it's  
18 just amazing how - you've got to - in order for this whole lie to  
19 stick, Charles Taylor has to be involved in this, so you get the  
11:21:06 20 least of the pack.

21 But then at the issuing of this indictment and at the  
22 principal, principal statements made at the time, there was a  
23 general that I sent who did the training. All of a sudden that  
24 general doesn't show up in this Court. He doesn't show up in  
11:21:33 25 this Court because at the beginning of this whole episode of  
26 Charles Taylor training there was a General Tarnue that conducted  
27 all of this, a General Tarnue that went into Freetown court and  
28 testified. And documents received by me and this Defence from  
29 Tarnue's statement, this NPFL general that was a former AFL

1 officer, that was supposed to conduct this training all of a  
2 sudden has disappeared. A little insignificant Isaac Mongor who  
3 was a trainee himself I would sent to what do you call it,  
4 because the Tarnue lie would not stick. So you bring someone and  
11:22:17 5 feed him with this lie. Where is Tarnue?

6 It's a lie, your Honours. I never met any Isaac Mongor  
7 anywhere to do anything. He never met me in no Voijnama. Never.  
8 A career soldier like John Tarnue would have probably been the  
9 best person to bring here and we would have dealt with him  
10 because they knew that Tarnue lie would never pass. You bring an  
11 Isaac Mongor where Tarnue speaks nothing about any human being  
12 calling himself Isaac Mongor. Isaac Mongor is a liar. He is  
13 just that, a liar.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, the court reporters ask you to  
11:22:57 15 please slow down. They are having trouble recording everything.

16 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I'm sorry, your Honours.  
17 Sometimes I - you know, I apologise. You know, these things,  
18 sometimes they get to you. I apologise. I'll slow down.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I have a phonetic spelling for that name,  
11:23:08 20 Mr President. Michael, normal spelling, Susidis,  
21 S-A-U-C-E-D-E-S.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, the witness goes on to talk about his entrance into  
11:23:32 25 Sierra Leone and then continued at page 5676 to give this  
26 account, line 3:

27 "After we had captured Pendembu we got a radio. Foday  
28 Sankoh brought a radio man called Foday K Lansana. He was also  
29 called Mr Nya. They brought a radio set. He was the first

1 communication man whom Mr Taylor - Mr Sankoh said his brother,  
2 Mr Taylor, had given to him to set up the communication and  
3 operate."

4 Did you send Nya?

11:24:21 5 A. Never sent Nya. But we have Nya's testimony. We have  
6 Nya's testimony here. Nya Lansana. We have the Nya testimony,  
7 and I don't recall Nya saying that he met me and I sent him to  
8 Sierra Leone, because Nya Lansana, if I recall, Nya Lansana got  
9 caught up, he went into Sierra Leone, and these are all Sierra  
11:24:44 10 Leoneans, that's the funny part about it. Isaac Mongor, part  
11 Sierra Leonean; Nya Lansana, part Sierra Leonean. All these  
12 Sierra Leonean boys that had parentage, sometimes half Liberian,  
13 half Sierra Leonean, I want to believe - as Foday Sankoh was  
14 sneaking around doing whatever he did in Liberia, I'm sure he  
11:25:06 15 found these Sierra Leoneans and hooked up with them. And so what  
16 we're saying that these are the Sierra Leoneans. Nya Lansana is  
17 half Sierra Leonean, half Liberian; Isaac Mongor, half Sierra  
18 Leonean, half Liberian. And I guess that's how they arrange  
19 their business. I never sent Nya on any mission into Sierra  
11:25:27 20 Leone. I never did. And I don't think Nya says that either.

21 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor, in light of that, what the witness  
22 said, help us. When you were organising the entry as alleged,  
23 why didn't you from the outside assign a radio operation to this  
24 team?

11:25:48 25 A. Well, that's the whole point, because - I mean, I didn't  
26 send them because that would be the logical thing to do. If  
27 you're going through all this thing, and we have radios, and I'm  
28 supposed to be supplying, personally, arms, ammunition and  
29 everything, of course the logical thing to do would be to supply

1 a radio at the very start of the mission. It simply means that  
2 it was nothing of my doing.

3 Q. I move to page 5677, line 13:

4 "Q. Now, Mr Witness, did you stay in Sierra Leone after  
5 entering and you mentioned Voinjama was March of 1991?

6 A. Yes, I stayed in Sierra Leone.

7 Q. For how long did you stay in Sierra Leone?

8 A. I stayed in Sierra Leone when - since when we came, I  
9 was in Sierra Leone. I used to go back, but at that time I  
10 would only go to fight. I used to go there to fight in  
11 order to return, but I did not go there to stay.

12 Q. When you say you would go there to fight, you would go  
13 where to fight?

14 A. I will go to Liberia to fight.

15 Q. Do you recall what year it was when you went to Liberia  
16 to fight?

17 A. It was in 1993 when the ULIMO occupied Voinjama, so  
18 Foday Sankoh called me and said his brother said I should  
19 send troops to clear the place. When I was talking about  
20 Foday Sankoh's brother I am referring to Mr Taylor. So I  
21 went with troops, and NPFL too were coming from the Gbarnga  
22 end, fighting to come to Voinjama where we were all to meet  
23 at that place to ensure that we had cleared the place. So  
24 I fought there and I captured Voinjama from the ULIMO.

25 That was the fight I went for that I told you about.

26 Q. Who were you reporting to in Liberia?

27 A. Because the time we were fighting I joined with one  
28 other NPFL man who is called General Fayia."

29 See the time, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. 1993.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Foday Sankoh, your brother and co-conspirator, sends troops  
11:28:22 5 to assist you to fight ULIMO in Voinjama. Is that correct?

6 A. That is not correct.

7 I will have to stop now. I see the judge - do you want me  
8 to continue, your Honour?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we've got about two minutes,  
11:28:40 10 Mr Taylor.

11 THE WITNESS: This is totally incorrect because, mind you,  
12 this man is suggesting that May 1992 there is no cut off, there  
13 are still links between the RUF and --

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:29:01 15 Q. In 1993?

16 A. No, because May 1992, all relationship is severed in May  
17 1992. He is now entering Liberia fighting in 1993, which is a  
18 lie, okay, because there were no contacts, because after that May  
19 Top 20, Top 40, Top Final situation when we withdrew our people  
11:29:27 20 in May 1992, how did he get in Liberia to fight in 1993? From  
21 where? How did he get in? From where? He is lying.

22 But then again there's a little thing before we get back.  
23 He's saying that Voinjama meeting occurred in March 1991 and he  
24 was ordered to start training in March/April of 1990. So that  
11:29:55 25 means that the RUF trained for one year before they entered. But  
26 there is evidence before this Court here that in fact the RUF  
27 only trained for a few months, could not get finished because  
28 something happened and they were urged to leave quickly. There's  
29 evidence to that here, that the training was not completed and it



1 only lasted for a few months. Because if he's saying that he met  
2 me in Voinjama in 1991 where we did this final planning to enter  
3 Sierra Leone and he had gotten an order in March/April of 1990,  
4 that means they had a full 12 months of training, which is a  
11:30:32 5 blatant, blatant lie. It just is a lie, okay, because if that is  
6 to be believed, then that means all the other witnesses that said  
7 they only did a few months of training and they had to rush out  
8 because an alarm had blown are all lying.

9 Q. Pause there, Mr Taylor.

11:30:53 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that's the end of the tape.  
11 We'll take the morning adjournment now and resume at 12 o'clock.

12 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

13 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:02:16 15 Q. Right, Mr Taylor. Now, had you concluded the answer you  
16 were giving us before lunch, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes. The point had been made, yes.

18 Q. Very well. Let's move on then, shall we. Now, Mr Taylor,  
19 did you at any stage speak directly by radio to anyone in Sierra  
12:03:11 20 Leone?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. Did you at any stage use a radio to communicate with anyone  
23 in Sierra Leone?

24 A. No.

12:03:30 25 Q. If you wanted to communicate some information to an  
26 individual in Sierra Leone, how would you do that?

27 A. I would instruct my radio operator, Butterfly, to transmit  
28 a message.

29 Q. But would you physically sit before a radio, this is what I

1 want to clarify, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Sit before a radio with headphones or whatever on and speak  
4 into a microphone directly to anyone in Sierra Leone?

12:04:07 5 A. Never. No. No.

6 Q. Mr Mongor claims you did. Page 5680, line 28:

7 "Q. Did you ever communicate with Mr Taylor using that  
8 radio?"

9 A. Yes, I can remember I did it once when I requested for  
12:04:30 10 some ammunition to be sent for us because at that time the  
11 ones that we were getting to depletion levels so we asked  
12 for some more.

13 Q. How do you know it was Charles Taylor that you were  
14 talking to on the radio?

12:04:44 15 A. I had been with Mr Taylor and I spent a long time with  
16 him so I knew him and I knew his voice. He promised that  
17 he would send and some ammunition was sent for us."  
18 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor? It's quite  
19 categorical, isn't he? He spoke to you on the radio.

12:05:09 20 A. Yes, it's categorical, but it's categorical as a lie,  
21 that's what it is. Now, this witness just said that Nya Lansana  
22 was the individual that I sent with a radio for communication and  
23 that was the radio that they had. So, just on the assumption  
24 level, one must assume that if a radio message was going through,  
12:05:43 25 it would have to go through Nya, depending on the time that he is  
26 talking about here. But if we - if we go back and we crosscheck  
27 - cross-reference that with his allegations as to his movement  
28 and the time that Nya is supposed to get a radio from Liberia and  
29 who is Nya assigned with now? Is Nya assigned with him or is Nya

1 assigned with Foday Sankoh, depending on which one he wants to  
2 choose?

3 But in direct answer to your question, I never spoke to him  
4 or anyone else on a radio from Liberia at any time. Even during  
12:06:32 5 the period August 1991 through '92 May when I have told this  
6 Court that I invited Foday Sankoh to Liberia, I never spoke on  
7 the radio even during that time to anybody, including  
8 Foday Sankoh. If there was a message - if I had a message, I  
9 would give it to my operator, Butterfly would pass it. I did not  
12:07:01 10 speak on the radio, no.

11 Q. Now, I'm just trying to - now, the witness at some stage,  
12 beginning at page - and I begin at page 5681, tells us that he -  
13 and I'm looking at line 14 - that he left Lofa County and he was  
14 replaced by Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay. He was asked this

12:08:01 15 question:

16 "Q. Do you know if they were engaged in fighting in Lofa  
17 against ULIMO?

18 A. Yes, they too were fighting against ULIMO. Well, Issa  
19 Sesay was taken from there and he came back to Sierra  
12:08:15 20 Leone. Morris Kallon was there then. Morris Kallon was  
21 still there, but they fought - but they couldn't - they  
22 couldn't dislodge the ULIMOs. Since they could not  
23 overpower the ULIMOs, he planned to take a bypass to go to  
24 Gbarnga, but they couldn't make it up and the manpower that  
12:08:32 25 he had all of them were killed and Morris Kallon was able  
26 to escape. He survived that attack."

27 Then he asked this:

28 "Q. Did he return immediately to Sierra Leone, do you  
29 know?

1 A. He returned but not immediately after the incident. It  
2 took him some time before he came."

3 Then he goes on. He is asked:

12:09:01

4 "Q. Were Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay fighting along with  
5 any other forces in that fighting in Lofa?

6 A. Yes, I want to tell you, I want to tell the Court, that  
7 the RUF was the NPFL's younger brother and whenever the  
8 NPFL would get any attack from ULIMO, their younger  
9 brother, which was the RUF, will go there and fight  
10 together."

12:09:20

11 Is that right, Mr Taylor?

12 A. That is not right. I really don't know what he means by  
13 younger brother. Maybe that's how he is told to explain it, but  
14 that's not right. And I can't see him or anybody else, Issa  
15 Sesay or Morris Kallon, being in Lofa in 1993, except they were  
16 ghosts, but there is no way that they were fighting in Lofa  
17 County in 1993 by the accounts of all the Prosecution witnesses  
18 that did say here that relationship was severed in 1992. So I  
19 don't know how he got there.

12:09:36

12:09:55

20 Q. And he continues, line 12:

21 "A. The NPFL together with the RUF could not occupy the  
22 position where the ULIMO were. They could not occupy the  
23 position which was Voinjama. They could not take it from  
24 the ULIMO. So the NPFL too had come from Gbarnga end and  
25 were fighting. They could not dislodge the men from there.

12:10:17

26 Q. Where did the various NPFL forces go after ULIMO  
27 occupied Lofa?

28 A. Well, some came to Sierra Leone who were with the RUF.

29 Q. Do you recall the name of a commander of these forces

1 of NPFL that retreated from Lofa to Sierra Leone?

2 A. Yes. One of them came who was Colonel Jungle.

3 Q. To the best of your recollection now, do you recall  
4 what year it was then that Colonel Jungle and some NPFL

12:10:59 5 forces retreated into Sierra Leone?

6 A. It was in the year 1993 that they came into Sierra  
7 Leone."

8 Pause there. Do you know about that, Mr Taylor? Note the  
9 date, '93.

12:11:14 10 A. No. This is totally - the knowledge that I have of this  
11 retreat back into Sierra Leone when ULIMO cut the NPFL off was  
12 not in 1993. So he is talking about something that I'm not aware  
13 of.

14 Q. He is asked:

12:11:35 15 "Q. Do you recall what his" - that's Colonel Jungle's -  
16 "assignment was, if you know, within the NPFL?

17 A. Jungle was a commander who too was with General Fayia  
18 at that Lofa.

19 Q. How long did Colonel Jungle stay with the RUF in Sierra  
12:12:02 20 Leone after being pushed out of Lofa County?

21 A. Well, Colonel Jungle was with the RUF right up to the  
22 end of the war in Sierra Leone.

23 Q. Did he ever return to Liberia or make trips to Liberia?

24 A. When he was with the RUF he used to go to Liberia but  
12:12:20 25 at that time the ULIMO were not armed. The time we started  
26 going to Liberia the ULIMO were not armed anymore.

27 Q. You've indicated that ULIMO pushed RUF and NPFL out of  
28 Lofa in 1993."

29 Then he continues, page 5685:

1 "A. Well, they did not leave the place. I cannot tell you  
2 that they left the place, but what I know about, because I  
3 was not at that end from 1993 up to the time ULIMO were  
4 without arms, because it came to a time when we ourselves,  
12:13:02 5 we the RUF, were having pressure from the SLA soldiers.  
6 That was the time the NPRC were advancing on the RUF  
7 positions, so I was in the jungle. I was not along the  
8 border end anymore, but Colonel Jungle was with us.  
9 I learnt that the RUF too had been in contact with the  
12:13:25 10 ULIMO because the ULIMO too were trying - were about to be  
11 disarmed, so the RUF was in contact with them. According  
12 to what I heard, they used to come to Sierra Leone and  
13 return and our men would come to them at Foya and return to  
14 Sierra Leone."

12:13:44 15 Mr Taylor, were you aware of that relationship?

16 A. Between the RUF and ULIMO?

17 Q. Yes, please.

18 A. No, I was not aware. I heard of it here in this Court.

19 Q. Now, it continues, page 5686, line 9:

12:14:04 20 "Q. You indicated that the RUF was pushed into the jungle  
21 by the NPRC. Can you tell us what year you think that this  
22 occurred?

23 A. Yes, in late 1993 those men pushed the RUF to the  
24 border. At that time the ULIMO too were not at the border.

12:14:22 25 Q. When the RUF was pushed by the NPRC to the border,  
26 did the strategies of the RUF change in any way?

27 A. Yes, we changed our strategy to fight. We divided  
28 ourselves into groups at different locations and at that  
29 time he was not in Liberia when the border was closed. He

1 was with us in Sierra Leone when the NPRC pushed us. We  
2 decided to have different jungles.

3 Q. When you are talking about being pushed to the jungle,  
4 can you explain what I mean?

12:14:59 5 A. I mean the bush. We went there and I want you to know  
6 because I had spoken about Jungle before now. That was the  
7 name of somebody who has taken up that name. He was a  
8 commander. He was a NPFL member. But the time that I'm  
9 referring to - referring now to, this jungle that I'm  
10 talking about, means the bushes that we went to."

11 Then he was asked for some clarification:

12 "Q. When you say the border was closed, what do you mean?

13 A. What I mean, because the road is the one from Sierra  
14 Leone to the Liberian border, the road at Lofa. That was  
12:15:40 15 what we used to go to Gbarnga and our leader Foday Sankoh,  
16 that was the road he used to go and bring ammunition for  
17 us. But he had come with us in Sierra Leone when the ULIMO  
18 occupied the border, when they took Foya. So he had no  
19 chance to return to Liberia. He was with us when the NPRC  
12:16:03 20 in turn were advancing on us and pushed us."

21 Then he goes on. He was asked:

22 "Q. You've indicated, is it correct, that this happened  
23 until ULIMO disarmed? Is that correct?

24 A. Yes, ULIMO was there right up to the time the  
12:16:22 25 disarmament went on in Liberia."

26 Then he goes on to say this:

27 "Q. Mr Witness, during the time that the border was closed  
28 was there any communication going on with Liberia?

29 A. Yes, communication used to go on with Liberia because

1 we had a communication set and the one that had been sent  
2 to us by Mr Taylor. After that particular one we already -  
3 we had already - we had also captured some other  
4 communication sets that were now with us.

12:16:58 5 Q. Do you know if Foday Sankoh was using the radio?

6 A. Yes, Foday Sankoh used the radio.

7 Q. Do you know who he communicated with on the radio?

8 A. Well, he used to talk to his brother who was called  
9 Mr Taylor."

12:17:18 10 Nothing could be clearer, Mr Taylor. After the border is  
11 closed, even though Foday Sankoh cannot get access to you by  
12 road, he was still communicating with you by radio. What do you  
13 say?

14 A. That's totally untrue. In fact, if we look at some of the  
12:17:43 15 radio operators and what they have said here, he had to be with  
16 Foday Sankoh everywhere Foday Sankoh to even know I was  
17 communicating with Foday Sankoh if at all I was communicating  
18 with Foday Sankoh, okay.

19 There was no - look, I was in communication with  
12:18:01 20 Foday Sankoh during the time that I invited him to come to  
21 discuss and were together for that time. I was never on a radio  
22 with Foday Sankoh. Messages were sent by me through my radio  
23 operator during the period between May 1991 and August of '92 and  
24 - excuse me, August 1991 and May of 1992 and there were no direct  
12:18:33 25 talks by me on the radio.

26 Now, during the period that Foday Sankoh is coming to  
27 Liberia and going out, for God's sake, if I was speaking to him  
28 on the radio why wouldn't I say I spoke to him when he is coming  
29 to Liberia. He is going out. I never got on the radio because



1 of so many reasons. In fact, all of the NPF things that we were  
2 sending out were all done through special coded arrangements, so  
3 nobody could just get on the - you did not really know. I even  
4 as leader of the NPFL did not know the interpretation of the  
12:19:14 5 codes. I didn't know them. I will give a message. The operator  
6 would take it, code it and send it out. So if you bring - I  
7 heard them speaking about codes here. You bring them before me,  
8 I don't know them.

9 The same thing occurs across the world with militaries,  
12:19:32 10 with intelligence and whatnot. The President or senior people  
11 don't know how to code and decode. That's not their job. But  
12 for me, Charles Ghankay Taylor, to get on the radio even during  
13 that period to speak, zero, no. No, I never spoke to any  
14 Foday Sankoh on the radio and this boy - this man does not know  
12:19:54 15 what he is talking about, okay.

16 I guess it is - you know, it is just - wow. It's just  
17 amazing how this whole contraption is. It's a very - I mean,  
18 this is - you know you feel like it's a deathtrap. I mean, to  
19 get so many - how these people did this thing to get so many  
12:20:20 20 people to tell so many lies it's amazing. Here is this man  
21 trying hard, putting together these lies, okay. I'm sending him  
22 to train, he's listening to me communicating on radio, okay. In  
23 my case it is he that is the principal officer. In the RUF case  
24 Tarnue is the principal officer who is sent for training. How  
12:20:50 25 these people meant I swear I don't know, but this is all a bunch  
26 of lies.

27 There is a Fayia. There is a General Fayia. There is a  
28 General Fayia at the time that ULIMO cuts off NPFL forces in  
29 Nimba. There is a General Fayia. They take that information and

1 Fayia is cut off. Some of the people retreat into Sierra Leone  
2 including this little boy we keep hearing about, Jungle, who was  
3 not a principal commander, understand? Okay. Fayia eventually  
4 finds his way back. Jungle being a Kissi boy attaches himself to  
12:21:27 5 another Kissi, Sam Bockarie, and they become very close and  
6 Jungle stays and then becomes RUF. They have taken that and have  
7 pumped it and pumped it that Jungle is an intermediary between  
8 Taylor and the RUF. God knows it's a lie.

9 Who is Jungle? Jungle is not even a commander in Lofa at  
12:21:44 10 the time of the war. All of a sudden he is a principal link  
11 between me and these people. So I don't know. You know, these  
12 little pieces of truths, half truths, misinformation tied up.

13 But going back to your question, I did not ever talk on the  
14 radio to Foday Sankoh. I sent Foday Sankoh messages between '91  
12:22:10 15 and '92 when we were together, but he and I did not speak with my  
16 voice on the radio and any human being that says so God knows he  
17 is lying through his teeth. He is lying through his teeth.

18 Q. He continues, Mr Taylor, to give an account of a specific  
19 conversation he overheard Foday Sankoh having with you. This is  
12:22:37 20 important so let me deal with it. Page 5688, testimony of 10  
21 March 2008:

22 "Q. Do you recall elections in Sierra Leone?"

23 Now bear in mind that the elections which brought to power  
24 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah took place in late February 1996 with Kabbah  
12:23:01 25 taking over in March of that year.

26 "A. Yes, I recall that there was an election in Sierra  
27 Leone.

28 Q. Do you recall the year of the elections?

29 A. '96. They have an election in Sierra Leone and at that

1 time we were still in the bush.

2 Q. Now, Mr Witness, at the time of the elections did the  
3 RUF have any plans because of the elections?"

4 Then the question is rephrased:

12:23:32 5 "Q. Did Foday Sankoh speak about the elections?"

6 A. Yes."

7 Over the page to page 5689:

8 "A. When we started getting the information that there was  
9 going to be an election, at that time Foday Sankoh was in

12:23:51 10 the jungle. That is a bush where we had established a

11 jungle for him and the place was called Zogoda. That was

12 where he was. So he called we the commanders to tell us

13 what the plans were that the government had with regards

14 the elections.

12:24:13 15 So Foday Sankoh said that it appeared to him as though the

16 government never wanted to recognise us because whilst the

17 fighting was going on they were pushing on with the

18 elections and they did not even call our attention to that.

19 So he said we were also going to carry out some kind of

12:24:32 20 offensive that will not allow the elections to hold. So we

21 were called upon and we came to Zogoda. I came there and I

22 was there when his radio man came to call him and he said

23 to him that his brother, Mr Charles Taylor, wanted to speak

24 to him and then Foday Sankoh got up and then I joined him

12:25:02 25 and we both went to the radio house. So when we went there

26 we entered and then he sat down and he started talking to

27 his brother. That is Mr Taylor. And when they spoke

28 the talk lasted up to 20 to 25 minutes during which

29 Foday Sankoh explained how we had been cut off and that we

1 were not even getting supplies from Liberia any longer and  
2 what the plans were on the government side, that they had  
3 decided to carry on with the elections, and so he had  
4 called on his commanders to meet him and that he wanted to  
12:25:46 5 give them a plan that we shall go on an offensive to make  
6 sure that the elections does not hold at all and that the  
7 offensive that we were to undertake we should make fearful  
8 and that anybody who we will capture we will have to  
9 amputate that person and we will ask that person to take  
12:26:09 10 his hands off the elections.

11 So he was telling him that these were the plans that I had  
12 put together, that was why I called my commanders to come  
13 so that I will explain to them the offensive that we were  
14 to undertake. And then his brother told him in his reply  
12:26:28 15 that the plan is not a bad one, that is Mr Taylor, and so  
16 two days after they had spoken to each other we went on the  
17 offensive."

18 Quite specific, Mr Taylor.

19 A. Yes.

12:26:44 20 Q. During the election campaign in Sierra Leone, you radioed  
21 Foday Sankoh, asked to speak to him, then spoke to him for 20 or  
22 25 minutes whilst he explained a plan to stop elections;  
23 Operation Stop Election. Yes?

24 A. Yes, I hear you.

12:27:14 25 Q. Did you?

26 A. Never. Never. Never. 1992, your Honours, was the last  
27 time I, Charles Taylor, was in touch with Foday Sankoh. 1992,  
28 May. I never, ever spoke to Foday Sankoh again until in 1997  
29 when I met him in Lome, July. Never, ever.

1 This particular second lie - the first lie being that in  
2 1994 I ordered an attack at Sierra Rutile which could not have  
3 happened. In 1993 here is this man fighting in Voinjama. Not  
4 possible. ULIMO is occupying Lofa in 1993. Here I am out of the  
12:28:19 5 clear blue skies calling in 1996 and acquiescing with  
6 Foday Sankoh to cut people's hands and to stop elections. I mean  
7 it's a lie from - I don't even want to tell you where it's coming  
8 from, you understand me? It's just impossible for what I'm  
9 confronted with in this kind of thing here. Where is it?

12:28:47 10 Foday Sankoh and I have no relationship beyond May of 19 -  
11 and he demonstrates that throughout. He demonstrates that very  
12 much throughout. There is no contact. Because don't forget, if  
13 there is this contact with Foday Sankoh where, what are we  
14 talking about, 1996 early or whatever, he is supposed to get my  
12:29:14 15 agreement to stop elections and cut off hands, Foday Sankoh  
16 leaves maybe about an month or two later for where? For La Cote  
17 d'Ivoire in 1996. He leaves for La Cote d'Ivoire for the peace  
18 talks. He is there. He goes in, based on testimony we've seen  
19 here. He comes out. Foday Sankoh is in La Cote d'Ivoire. There  
12:29:38 20 is not one witness that has come to this Court and say - and he  
21 had a lot of his boys there with him, including testimony before  
22 this Court - that Jungle was also with him in La Cote d'Ivoire.  
23 He sends nobody to me. He is in an area now where he can place a  
24 phone call to me in Monrovia. He doesn't speak to me at all. No  
12:29:59 25 contact with Foday Sankoh whatsoever while he is in La Cote  
26 d'Ivoire for almost a year before he's arrested in 1997.

27 What kind of - what kind of relationship is this between me  
28 and this man that ends in May of 1992. One morning I get up in  
29 1994 and say, "Guess what, go and attack some place called Sierra

1 Rutile." He doesn't hear from me again until 1996. I get up one  
2 day and I call him on the radio just when there's elections,  
3 "Guess what, stop the election. I agree with you, go cut off  
4 hands." My God. My God, it didn't happen.

12:30:37 5 Q. Well, on that note, Mr Taylor, help us with this, because  
6 if we go back to page 5688, you recall the witness saying that  
7 Foday Sankoh used to talk to his brother on the radio, yes?

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. When we come now to page 5689, look again at the passage  
12:30:56 10 which deals with this radio conversation in February/March 1996.  
11 Note the content of the conversation. "Foday Sankoh explained  
12 how we had been cut off." Now, this witness told us that the  
13 cut-off had taken place in 1993.

14 A. Yes. Yes.

12:31:19 15 Q. So help us. Can you help us as to why Foday Sankoh waited  
16 until the elections in 1996 to inform you that he had been cut  
17 off?

18 A. And he also adds another one where that - and that they  
19 were not getting ammunition anymore, because it just didn't  
12:31:36 20 happen. In trying to put together these lies, some stitches are  
21 lost. The stitches are lost. Because he says, in addition to  
22 that, that they had been cut off, he says, and they are no longer  
23 receiving arms and ammunition from Liberia, along - in another  
24 passage you just read. Because that - he just couldn't get it.

12:31:56 25 They forget when they are putting together these lies. It's  
26 impossible.

27 All of this time, nothing goes wrong. But mind you, let me  
28 remind the Court, this lie about 1996 Stop Election, other  
29 Prosecution witnesses have said in this Court that I instructed

1 Foday Sankoh - I instructed Foday Sankoh to cut off anybody's  
2 hands that participated in the election. Now, he is saying that  
3 I acquiesced, okay. Now - but others have said - now - and I  
4 guess this is going to be good for the future. He says that he  
12:32:39 5 followed Foday Sankoh to the radio room. He. And maybe he  
6 forgot, he did not say a few of us went. So apparently he is the  
7 one going to the radio room. Now, we must guide that against  
8 another witness that said here that he went to the witness - to  
9 the radio room too and heard me instructing Sankoh, okay, to stop  
12:33:03 10 the election and cut off anybody's hands that will participate to  
11 take their hand out of the election. So for the future, I'm sure  
12 we'll be able to compare some of these different accounts of what  
13 happened. So there is now - the closest man to Foday Sankoh, who  
14 is he? Mansaray or Mohamed Tarawalli. The Special Forces are  
12:33:29 15 not important at this point. He is the only man that is so close  
16 that walks with Foday Sankoh into the radio room.

17 So when we get to others that say that they were there too,  
18 I will see if they mention Isaac Mongor, which is not true.  
19 There is no such conversation that ever took place between me and  
12:33:51 20 Foday Sankoh any time after May 1992. Never. Never. Never.

21 Q. Now, another specific allegation made by the witness is  
22 this: Following the coup in May 1997, he says this, and I'm  
23 looking at page 5705:

24 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie come to Freetown after the coup?

12:34:23 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. How long did he stay in Freetown?

27 A. He did not spend a long time in Freetown. He spent  
28 some weeks in Freetown and then he later went to Kenema  
29 where he was based.

1 Q. At the time that you were a member of this council" -  
2 because Mongor becomes a member of the council - "did  
3 anyone come from another country come to meet with the  
4 council?

12:34:50 5 A. Yes. When another person who came from a different  
6 country to meet us.

7 Q. Who was that?

8 A. It was Mr Ibrahim Bah that I had spoken about before.  
9 He came and met us because he met first those of us in the  
12:35:09 10 RUF because we knew him before. We had fought alongside  
11 with him before in Sierra Leone. So he brought a message  
12 that Mr Taylor gave him for him to give to us. So when he  
13 came and met us, told us that the Pa, who is Mr Taylor,  
14 sent me to come and talk to you so that you and the  
12:35:28 15 brothers whom you have come to join, that is the AFRC men,  
16 he is asking that you work together."

17 Why did you send Mr Bah with that message, Mr Taylor?

18 A. I never sent Ibrahim Bah anywhere. But - not at all, and  
19 in stitching this up again, let's review the records on Ibrahim  
12:35:56 20 Bah's activities. We know from evidence before this Court that  
21 Ibrahim Bah is in Abidjan with Foday Sankoh. When Foday Sankoh  
22 goes to Abidjan in 1996, he and Bah together. Remember, Bah  
23 comes to him and they are - and, in fact, one of the Prosecution  
24 witnesses stated here, Bah was introduced to him, a protected  
12:36:19 25 witness, as one of the senior - I mean, as Foday Sankoh's old  
26 friend. So Bah and Foday Sankoh are together in 1996 before the  
27 AFRC coup, they are together.

28 And as far as being together, we also know here factually  
29 that the being together between the AFRC and the RUF was a result



1 of Foday Sankoh's own intervention. So I never sent Ibrahim Bah  
2 anywhere to speak to anyone at all. If Ibrahim Bah went there -  
3 and I don't know as to whether he went there; there has been  
4 testimony that he did go there - he went there on either under  
12:37:00 5 Foday Sankoh's instruction or to assist his brothers as he saw  
6 them. Had no contact with Bah. None.

7 Q. Were you aware, as indicated by the witness on line 21 on  
8 that page, that Bah had fought alongside Mongor in Sierra Leone?

9 A. No, I'm not aware of that. I'm not aware of that. I'm not  
12:37:26 10 aware of that.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, this witness - and I want us to deal with the  
12 next two points briefly - also suggests that you sent ammunition  
13 via Jungle to the RUF. Yes or no?

14 A. No.

12:38:10 15 Q. That's page 5745. He also suggests that Jungle reported to  
16 you. True or false?

17 A. Totally, totally false.

18 Q. He also says, page 5793 - again, let's deal with this  
19 swiftly - that Bockarie travelled to Liberia to exchange diamonds  
12:38:44 20 for ammunition. True or false?

21 A. Totally false.

22 Q. And that he, in fact - that's page 5793. And that Bockarie  
23 returned with such ammunition from Liberia. True or false?

24 A. Well, I can't - I cannot say false. I don't know. He  
12:39:02 25 probably - he probably did. Now, if the question is was I aware  
26 that he did? No, I was not aware that he did. But he probably -  
27 because they were buying ammunition from - in the Lofa region  
28 anyway. So I'm not sure if that's actually false, that Bockarie  
29 returned with ammunition. But not with my knowledge.

1 Q. And then moving then to the next point I want you to deal  
2 with at page 5794, beginning at the foot of the page. The  
3 witness is asked this question with regard to the ammunition  
4 Bockarie returned with from Liberia:

12:39:41 5 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie indicate where the ammunition came  
6 from that you saw in the storeroom?

7 A. The ammunition which he brought he told me he had  
8 brought them from Liberia and that it was Mr Taylor who  
9 gave them to him.

12:39:55 10 Q. After your conversation with Sam Bockarie where he  
11 showed you the ammunition, what happened then in Buedu?

12 A. Well, after he had shown the ammunition to me, he told  
13 me the plan that he had come with with respect to those  
14 ammunitions. He told me that he and Mr Taylor sat together  
12:40:15 15 and planned to come and run an operation. He said he sat  
16 with the Pa, Mr Taylor, who took out a map and showed the  
17 locations where the RUF and the SLAs, where we occupied.  
18 He showed that to him. He came with a plan for us to  
19 launch an operation whereby we'll capture Kono, Makeni and  
12:40:45 20 advance to Freetown. And we were also to attack Joru. So  
21 those were the areas we were to capture. We were also to  
22 launch another attack on Kenema. We were to attack Kenema  
23 as well."

24 So there you are, Mr Taylor. You sat down with a map,  
12:41:12 25 showed Bockarie where the RUF positions were located, and gave  
26 him a plan which was to lead to the invasion of Freetown. Do you  
27 follow? You're the mastermind mind it all, aren't you,  
28 Mr Taylor.

29 A. No, I'm not. And even those that put him up to that in

1 their consciences must know that it was not so, and whoever  
2 helped to fabricate this lie, it's just that. Destroy Taylor  
3 and, fine, maybe they will be happy. This is a lie out of - I  
4 don't know where to say. That I sat down - what I know about  
12:41:54 5 Sierra Leone to know positions of RUF to say, get from here, go  
6 to this and do this? This is all blatantly, blatantly, blatantly  
7 a lie. I don't know why Mongor would put this up, but that's all  
8 it is. I had nothing to do with this.

9 But if you watch this very carefully, he is talking about  
12:42:16 10 the operation that is launched together. I'm not sure if he is  
11 talking about - when he said the RUF and the SLA as to whether he  
12 is speaking about the junta by referring to SLA here. Because  
13 when - my understanding of RUF and SLA together comprise the  
14 junta. And if we're talking about the junta, we're talking about  
12:42:39 15 prior to February 1998 because the junta is what? Is pushed out  
16 in February 1998. So he is talking about an operation being  
17 planned between the RUF and the junta at that particular time.

18 But don't let's forget that after February 1998, based on  
19 testimony here by another witness and maybe other witnesses,  
12:43:06 20 Johnny Paul Koroma, upon retreating from Freetown in February  
21 1998, is supposed to hold a meeting, and a part of that  
22 discussion is the occupation of Kono and making sure that Kono is  
23 held to sustain the process. So the RUF/SLA, then he is talking  
24 to pre-February 1998. That's what he is talking about. I have  
12:43:31 25 nothing to do with these people that I would sit with him - and  
26 why would Bockarie - he is talking about Sam Bockarie coming now,  
27 that would be Sam Bockarie coming to Liberia, somewhere in late  
28 1997, okay, to early 1998. And by early I mean before February.  
29 Because there's no RUF/SLA operating together except they operate

1 as a junta and that ends in February 1998. So I don't see the  
2 possibility of what he is talking about. I don't know Sierra  
3 Leone sufficiently to take a map and tell them, oh, go here, do  
4 some military strategies. I'm not.

12:44:13 5 Q. Well, not according to the witness, Mr Taylor. Because not  
6 only were you indicating geographical locations, you were also  
7 indicating the disbursement of personnel, because on the same  
8 page "Bockarie discussed with Mr Taylor for I and Superman, one  
9 of us should attack Joru, but Superman was in Koinadugu District.  
12:44:42 10 So Mosquito told the Pa, that is Mr Taylor, that Superman was far  
11 away from the Buedu end, so I was close to the place and they  
12 said I should attack Joru and advance." Do you get it?

13 A. Yes, but that's a lie. Here is a man - oh, my God. Here  
14 is a man who I send, as he alleges, to train men for an invasion.  
12:45:15 15 Throughout the period of his training he doesn't make any  
16 reports. Foday Sankoh is coming to Liberia for months, does not  
17 bring him not once. An important man like this that has carried  
18 out an important function, there is not one witness and he  
19 doesn't say either that he is brought to Liberia during the time  
12:45:37 20 that we're working together with the RUF in this security  
21 operation on the border against ULIMO. He is not brought to  
22 Liberia one day. He does not even talk about he being in contact  
23 with me, except he says one time he called for ammunition to give  
24 me reports, an important man like him. All of a sudden I'm  
12:46:02 25 supposed to identify him as being such a strategic important  
26 commander that I would say specifically, "Let Mongor and let  
27 Superman go and do this." My God, it's a lie.

28 Q. But he goes on:

29 "... When I would have captured Joru I should advance on

1 Zimmi because I was to receive some other people from the  
2 NPFL who were to come from Liberia. I was to receive them.  
3 I was to receive them in Zimmi. I should be in Zimmi when  
4 they came. That was the reinforcement that would have  
12:46:42 5 arrived.

6 Q. Now you indicated that Mr Taylor had told Bockarie that  
7 you or Superman should attack Joru and advance to Zimmi in  
8 order to receive some NPFL who were to come from Liberia.  
9 Do you know why it would be you or Superman who would have  
12:47:01 10 been chosen for that assignment?

11 A. Yes, because the two of us used to be NPFL fighters and  
12 we were familiar with the NPFL brothers."

13 Pause there. So here we have somebody else, Mr Taylor,  
14 speaking of you sending Liberian fighters - well, specifically  
12:47:27 15 NPFL fighters to Sierra Leone to assist in that plan of action  
16 dreamt up by you which was to culminate in the Freetown invasion.  
17 You get it?

18 A. I got it. Oh, this boy. It is just so untrue. But  
19 there's a little point here where he says that he was a former  
12:47:57 20 NPFL fighter and he was acquainted with the brothers. Your  
21 Honours, this man told this Court that in March of 1990 -  
22 March/April - he was selected to go and train for this invasion  
23 in Sierra Leone in March/April of 1990. And from all  
24 intelligence - I mean from all of our intelligence who tell us,  
12:48:30 25 he is connected with this operation from about March of 1990 if  
26 we believe this story. So that means that the only end he was  
27 trained now - he was trained at Gborplay.

28 We know that I launched the attack in December - on 25  
29 December 1989. So if we look at the training period in Gborplay,

1 that means that let's assume that this man trained January,  
2 February and March, okay. Let's assume that he trained those  
3 three months. But immediately following his training, according  
4 to his testimony, he is selected to go and do this training in  
12:49:16 5 Naama. If we took that story and we look at the statement now  
6 that he had fought alongside the NPFL and was familiar with the  
7 brothers, who does he really know? Because he enters Sierra  
8 Leone. He is on this training. He trains people and he is  
9 supposed to lead this attack in and he comes back. He stays in  
12:49:38 10 Sierra Leone. So who does he really know? If his story is even  
11 true, who does he know?

12 So in other words, he hasn't really fought in Liberia, not  
13 even for a month. He knows nobody. And between this time that  
14 he is talking about from 1991 we are now all the way up to 1999,  
12:50:02 15 who does he know in Liberia? Nobody. He is lying that he was  
16 supposed to go to Zimmi to go and receive people in 1998 to carry  
17 out an operation. This is total, total, total nonsense. That's  
18 a blatant, blatant lie. He doesn't know anybody; nobody knows  
19 him. There is no such thing as any reinforcement coming from  
12:50:30 20 Liberia.

21 Now, even thinking about it another way, Zimmi is on  
22 another - is toward the western part going to the Liberian  
23 border. But when we hear about this reinforcement, we've heard  
24 another story about reinforcement. We have heard about Abu Keita  
12:50:50 25 and Senegalese that were supposed to be leading reinforcement  
26 from the Kailahun side. Come on. Come on. It's a lie. There  
27 is no such thing. It's a blatant fabrication. That's all it is.  
28 Q. Now he, Mr Taylor, continues in this vein, line 14, page  
29 5796:

1 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie indicate what the purpose of this  
2 attack was going to be? What was the ultimate purpose?

3 A. The reason for this attack for this advance on the  
4 various places and for us to take those places, you can  
12:51:33 5 remember that at that time Foday Sankoh had been moved from  
6 Nigeria and he was in jail in Freetown so we were to attack  
7 Kono and take there. We were to attack Freetown in order  
8 to free Foday Sankoh and the others who were in jail there.  
9 We were also to ensure that we seized power.

12:51:55 10 Q. Did Sam Bockarie indicate to you in his discussions  
11 with Mr Taylor if there was any discussion about how the  
12 attack should be carried out in order to free Sankoh?

13 A. Yes, he said they discussed it. After he had shown  
14 those places to him they discussed that we should run that  
12:52:18 15 mission to ensure that we free Foday Sankoh and others and  
16 on the operation we should ensure that the ammunition is  
17 not wasted. We should make the operation fearful than all  
18 the other operations that we had undertaken because we want  
19 to make sure that we take Freetown and hold on to power."

12:52:42 20 Do you see the implications of that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. We all know the Freetown invasion was in many ways the  
23 highlight of that civil war in Sierra Leone, an orgy of violence  
24 in which thousands of people lost their lives. Now were you the  
12:53:04 25 one who instructed Bockarie to carry out such a fearful  
26 operation, Mr Taylor? You understand where this is going, don't  
27 you?

28 A. Oh, I understand. I never instructed Bockarie to do  
29 anything and if Bockarie was given such instruction then he sure

1 didn't carry it out. Then he was a failed officer, because we  
2 know that Bockarie was not involved in the Freetown invasion. We  
3 also know what led to the Freetown invasion and the desire on the  
4 part of SAJ Musa to lead the SLA back into power. So this - all  
12:53:50 5 this thing - they have really been put up to this. It's not  
6 true. It's not true and he knows that there was no way that such  
7 a thing was ordered by me or spoke to Bockarie or anything.  
8 That's not true because --

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, speaking of that Freetown invasion, and I  
12:54:13 10 do not detail for the purposes of this question Mr Mongor's  
11 accounts of his involvement in that invasion, but at page 6162,  
12 line 28, he was asked this question by Mr Koumjian:

13 "Q. Mr Witness, in general from your observations as an  
14 RUF commander and from your monitoring of communications  
12:54:40 15 during the period January 1999 can you tell us what the  
16 relationship between RUF and the AFRC forces during that  
17 month January 1999?

18 A. Yes, the relationship that was between the AFRC - the  
19 AFRC and the RUF was cordial and we had understanding. We  
12:55:09 20 were together as one. We had no problems amongst  
21 ourselves."

22 You do see where that's going, don't you, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Where?

12:55:27 25 A. He is trying to link the SLA and the RUF as being together  
26 in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January.

27 Q. An invasion which you planned?

28 A. Which I planned and he would have a lot to do, because I'm  
29 sure there's substantive evidence before this Court, one, that



1 RUF was not involved in that invasion and, number two, the tons  
2 of evidence here that there was not, quote unquote, cordial  
3 relationship between the RUF and the SLA at the time. So how he  
4 makes this lie float, I don't understand it. Maybe I'm sure they  
12:56:05 5 could have corrected him because there's just so much evidence  
6 here that in fact the relationship was not cordial. It was  
7 definitely not cordial because we know of all of the clashes from  
8 evidence that I have seen in this Court that occurred between  
9 them and why SAJ Musa had to do what he did. The clash between -  
12:56:23 10 mind you the very Superman he is talking about, if I'm not  
11 mistaken, there is a clash or some little conflict between  
12 Superman and these people before. So I don't know how they put  
13 these lies together. But there is no connection from my part in  
14 the invasion of Freetown on 6 January, and he knows that.

12:56:51 15 Q. Another point. Same page, line 27:  
16 "Q. During '99 in the period after the Freetown invasion  
17 and before the Lome accord was signed, was the RUF engaged  
18 in any operations outside of Sierra Leone?"  
19 Note the time scale, Mr Taylor.

12:57:14 20 "Q. During '99 in the period after the Freetown invasion  
21 and before the Lome accord was the RUF engaged in any  
22 operations outside of Sierra Leone?

23 A. Yes. Yes. They involved in another operation that did  
24 not take place within Sierra Leone.

12:57:37 25 Q. Tell us about that operation.

26 A. That operation was in Liberia. That was where the RUF  
27 went on an operation to fight.

28 Q. Who was the RUF fighting against in Liberia in that  
29 operation?

1 A. Well, they had one man who was called Mosquito Spray.  
2 That was his operation and they were fighting to kick  
3 Mr Taylor out of power, so those were the people that the  
4 RUF went to fight against.

12:58:08 5 Q. Do you know under whose orders RUF forces went into  
6 Liberia to fight against Mosquito Spray?

7 A. The order came from Liberia, according to Mosquito,  
8 because he did say that Mr Taylor asked him that he should  
9 send some people to go and fight against Mosquito Spray and  
10 his men in the Lofa area."

12:58:29

11 Did you?

12 A. Never asked Mosquito to do anything. In fact, this  
13 Mosquito Spray, from all the evidence before here, attacked  
14 Liberia. The first - Mosquito Spray, that's before 1999 when  
15 Mosquito Spray attacked. In 1999 around the time of the movement  
16 to Lome there is an attack around the Voinjama axis but that's  
17 not by Mosquito Spray and our security people handled it. In  
18 fact the UN man report here about Voinjama was read before this  
19 Court as prepared by - where they talk about Liberian forces --

12:58:51

20 Q. 26 April 1999.

12:59:17

21 A. -- and what they did wrong by looting certain NGOs and  
22 different things. So this boy is lying about anyone - and I'll  
23 tell you something, these are NGOs on the ground and the man that  
24 wrote that report that was read before this Court is a United  
25 Nations - I mean, is an NGO fellow. I think he was working for  
26 one of the agencies. It was read before here. It was a damning  
27 report about what Liberian securities did. He was on the ground.  
28 Very much. If he had seen Sierra Leoneans, he would have said it  
29 because this man - the name he carries looks like a typical Jula

12:59:34

1 name and we know that Jul as are from West Africa. He would have  
2 identified the Sierra Leonean. I forget his name, who wrote that  
3 report, but that's a Jula name. It's from West Africa. He never  
4 mentioned in that report the presence of any Sierra Leoneans  
13:00:12 5 there. That's the official report brought before this Court.

6 So I don't know where he got this one from. But during  
7 that particular period, yes, there is an attack, but there are no  
8 Sierra Leoneans. I don't speak to Sam Bockarie, don't need him  
9 to do anything. No. And, mind you, we're again talking about a  
13:00:30 10 period, okay, when we are working very closely, and in that  
11 region - we're very careful because there are United Nations  
12 people in the Vahun area, in the Kolahun area, in the Voinjama  
13 area. The entire time that we are putting this thing together,  
14 they are all there. No.

13:00:56 15 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor, with this: In August 1999, Johnny  
16 Paul Koroma comes to Monrovia, does he not?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Later Foday Sankoh came to Monrovia. Is that right?

19 A. That is correct.

13:01:23 20 Q. Now, the witness tells us at page 6166, line 6:

21 "Q. Did Foday Sankoh tell you whether he and Johnny Paul  
22 Koroma met with anyone else in Liberia?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Who did he say that they met with?

13:01:43 25 A. He said they met with Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor spoke to  
26 both of them for the two of them to join hands and to work  
27 hand in hand and for Johnny Paul to forget about all the  
28 past that things that happened in the past whilst Foday  
29 Sankoh was not around and that they should come together as

1           one since the peace was now signed and that they should  
2           work according to the dictates of the peace accord, so  
3           those were the advices he gave to them and that was what  
4           Foday Sankoh told us."

13:02:21 5           Does that accord with your recollection, Mr Taylor, as to  
6           what you told Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma?

7           A.     Well, it's - no, I can't fight with this one because I  
8           guess maybe he is trying to paraphrase what happened, because I  
9           do meet with Foday Sankoh and I do tell him that the past has got  
13:02:38 10          to be the past with the conflict with the West Side Boys and what  
11          they did. So I don't have a quarrel. Even though he doesn't  
12          know the details, the way he is putting it, for his level, I  
13          would say that's a reasonable way - that's the only way he can  
14          put it. But there is advice where I give them that they have got  
13:02:58 15          to - that the peace must go on, they must come together. So I  
16          wouldn't fight with that. I would think that at his level I  
17          think he is correct.

18          Q.     Another little detail. When Foday Sankoh left Liberia  
19          after that meeting in the autumn of 1999, did you provide him  
13:03:18 20          with a satellite phone?

21          A.     No, no, no. Foday Sankoh already was well equipped with  
22          satellite phones he had. From 1996 Foday Sankoh had phones. No.

23          Q.     Page 6176, line 4:

24                "Q. Do you know where Foday Sankoh got the satellite phone  
13:03:39 25                from?

26          A.     He brought that satellite phone with him the time he  
27          came from Liberia - I mean the time they had signed the  
28          peace - when he went through Liberia and when he came he  
29          brought the satellite phone with him.

1 Q. Were you ever present when Foday Sankoh was talking to  
2 someone on that satellite telephone?

3 A. Yes. I was present at the time when he spoke to  
4 somebody.

13:04:03 5 Q. Who was he speaking to when you were present?

6 A. He spoke to Mr Taylor. That is his brother. Because  
7 that is how he used to call him."

8 Do you recall such a conversation, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Well, I - he could be right. This I can't - he could be  
13:04:24 10 right that he may have been with Foday Sankoh when I spoke to  
11 Foday Sankoh while Foday Sankoh was in Sierra Leone. Where he is  
12 wrong is that I did not speak to him on a satellite phone. I  
13 spoke to him on a landline in Sierra Leone. And he very well  
14 could have been - if he was at Foday Sankoh's house, maybe. I

13:04:48 15 don't know on his side. But I did speak to Foday Sankoh a few  
16 times after he left in 1999. In fact, many times, because there  
17 were constant conflicts during that particular time. So he very  
18 well could have been around Sankoh. I can't say so. I'll give  
19 him the benefit that if he - if Sankoh - he was so close and he  
13:05:12 20 was living with Sankoh that he claims, I can't dispute that. I'm  
21 in no way - I'm in no position to dispute that he was with him.

22 Q. Now, we all understand what your case is with regards to  
23 the trade in diamonds, Mr Taylor.

24 A. Yes.

13:05:30 25 Q. But I think it appropriate nonetheless to put a particular  
26 passage of this witness's testimony to you. Page 6193, line 26:

27 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie ever tell you what he did with the  
28 diamonds that he obtained?

29 A. Yes. He told me that the diamonds that he had been

1 receiving were always taken to Monrovia to Mr Taylor in  
2 exchange of ammunitions. In fact it was the issue of the  
3 diamonds that brought a problem between Mosquito and  
4 Foday Sankoh and if you can recall, I had said that when  
13:06:12 5 Foday Sankoh came from Lome to Monrovia, Mr Taylor showed  
6 him some diamonds that were taken to by him Mosquito but he  
7 did not take them from him and according to Foday Sankoh,  
8 he said that Mr Taylor showed him the diamonds that  
9 Bockarie had been taking to him in exchange of ammunition.  
13:06:33 10 So Foday Sankoh went angry and on his return he blamed some  
11 of us who were the commanders especially me. He blamed me,  
12 saying that the diamonds that we have been getting we have  
13 not given any up-to-date report to him with regards all the  
14 diamonds that we have been getting - that we have been  
13:06:55 15 gathering. We have all taken the diamonds and taken them  
16 and handed them over in Liberia and so he was angry with  
17 us, but I tried to clear my own hands in it - I tried to  
18 clear my own area because I told him that I never went to  
19 Liberia so I had no hands in it. And then he said, 'Well,  
13:07:18 20 when I am saying that you have been taking diamonds over to  
21 Liberia I am not accusing you specifically but I am  
22 accusing all of you because it is your commander who took  
23 these diamonds to Charles Taylor in Liberia.'"  
24 So Mr Mongor covers that as well, Mr Taylor, yes? Did you  
13:07:41 25 have an angry exchange with Mr Sankoh before he left Liberia  
26 about his missing diamonds, Mr Taylor?  
27 A. No, I never had any angry exchange with Sankoh, no.  
28 Q. Thank you. Another matter I need your specific assistance  
29 with, page 6227, commencing at line 13:

1 "Q. Were you ever present when Sam Bockarie was  
2 communicating with Charles Taylor or did you ever learn  
3 about communications between Bockarie and Charles Taylor?

13:08:34

4 A. I think I had said here some time ago something that  
5 has to do with the communication that went on between  
6 Mr Taylor and Sam Bockarie. And I did say that the  
7 communication between Charles Taylor and Mosquito went on  
8 on a daily basis. I think I have said that. Because he  
9 used to give reports about all the things that happened at

13:08:54

10 the battle front and other command points and all the  
11 reports that came from the defence headquarters he always  
12 reported it to Mr Taylor and I had said that at one time I  
13 came and saw some of the reports that Sam Bockarie had  
14 written that he had been sending out and he had the copies  
15 in his hand. I have spoken about that I think. And those  
16 were some of the reports - those were some of the daily  
17 reports about the activities that used to take place in the  
18 field."

13:09:15

19 Nothing could be clearer, Mr Taylor. You were  
20 micromanaging the war in Sierra Leone, weren't you?

13:09:31

21 A. Never. Never, ever. He was one of the ones - this was  
22 supposed to be one of the insiders, so they really pumped him up.  
23 They really pumped him up. Nothing but air. There is no such  
24 thing that Sam Bockarie have got nothing to do that Sam Bockarie  
25 is on a radio or something --

13:09:54

26 Q. Daily.

27 A. - daily talking to me. And I have mentioned this to the  
28 Court, it's just a reminder, because if he is saying daily, he  
29 must be talking about up until the time Sam Bockarie left in

1 December 1999.

2 And just to reiterate what I said, there is no way this  
3 gifted Prosecution team, knowing very well that on a daily basis,  
4 for more than two years, would be on - and I'm saying two years  
13:10:33 5 because I'm talking about from the time that Bockarie takes over,  
6 which is at the arrest of Foday Sankoh, and maybe almost three  
7 years - that this Prosecution will not find one copy or bring out  
8 one voice track of Taylor over three years on a daily basis  
9 talking to Bockarie. This Prosecution is too smart for that.

13:10:59 10 This boy is lying. I never got on - I spoke to Sam  
11 Bockarie many times on the telephone and mostly, mostly beginning  
12 1999. That's when I spoke to him. During crisis time, there  
13 would be messages, but I would also - if it was very important, I  
14 would say - I would talk to him myself. When it had to do during  
13:11:26 15 the Lome time, I spoke to him on a few occasions on the  
16 telephone. During the conflict with he and Sankoh later in 1999,  
17 after Sankoh had returned, I did speak to him. Never on the  
18 radio.

19 And like I say, this Prosecution would never let that pass,  
13:11:43 20 because like I said, there were assets in that area since 1989  
21 the United States had a whole flotilla of ships out there in the  
22 ocean, the British had, and there's no way these two countries  
23 that brought me here would not have information and not bring it.  
24 He's a liar. He's lying. I never spoke to anybody on the radio.  
13:12:03 25 And if they had it, they would surely bring it here because they  
26 had the capacity to intercept, and they would love to bring my  
27 voice before this Court about what I said or didn't say. He is a  
28 liar.

29 Q. But he goes on, Mr Taylor, that - he is asked this:



1 "Q. Do you know how Charles Taylor and Sam Bockarie were  
2 communicating in 1998?

3 A. Mr Taylor and Mosquito - in fact, Mosquito had a  
4 satellite phone that he mostly used to communicate with  
13:12:36 5 Mr Taylor, and I've told you that I was not based in Buedu,  
6 but Sam Bockarie had been explaining to me things regarding  
7 his movements with Mr Taylor. And sometimes when he was  
8 talking with Mr Taylor over the radio mostly, my own radio  
9 communicators would monitor what they said and sometimes  
13:12:57 10 they will call on me, myself, I will go to the radio room  
11 and I will monitor their discussion."

12 So you were communicating with him by radio, according to  
13 Mr Mongor.

14 A. But Mr Mongor is lying. But I'll just raise another  
13:13:13 15 interesting point here. Maybe I missed this during the trial and  
16 I stand corrected on this. The logbooks for the RUF were brought  
17 here and I think in those logbooks they recorded conversations.  
18 X said this, Y said this. X said this. And I stand corrected.  
19 And I'm sure, if there was a daily basis of discussion, there  
13:13:44 20 should be in the logbook that this Prosecution brought - there  
21 must be one of those days, even the transcript of Mr Taylor said,  
22 Bockarie - I don't know what code they were using for Sam  
23 Bockarie. There must be something in his logbook detailing a  
24 conversation, even with other intercepts. There's got to be, if  
13:14:07 25 it was on a daily basis. And the logbook that I saw here covered  
26 a period of time, okay. There was no such thing about no  
27 communication.

28 But then again, we will lead factual evidence before this  
29 Court that shows that there was no communication with Sam

1 Bockarie before September - August/September of 1998. But I fail  
2 to see why the logbook would not show - and, you know, they must  
3 have some direct note on a day or days of the level of  
4 conversation between us. It never happened.

13:14:55 5 Q. Now, the final matter dealt with by Mr Mongor in his  
6 evidence-in-chief when he was being asked questions by  
7 Mr Koumjian was this, page 6228, line 25:

8 "Q. My question for you first of all is within the RUF,  
9 how did you refer to Charles Taylor?

13:15:18 10 A. Well, we called Charles Taylor as the CIC. He was the  
11 CIC. He was the commander-in-chief. We called him CIC at  
12 the time he was fighting. At the time he now became  
13 President we were calling him Mr Taylor.

14 Q. My final question, what does the term  
13:15:46 15 commander-in-chief mean? When the RUF called Charles  
16 Taylor commander-in-chief what did that mean?

17 A. It means he had command over the RUF and we took it  
18 that the RUF belonged to him. Although he sent somebody to  
19 head the RUF, but he was the owner of the RUF. What I mean  
13:16:14 20 by saying that he sent somebody to help the RUF, that was  
21 Foday Sankoh. Because he was the one that prepared  
22 Foday Sankoh to carry out the mission. So the RUF was in  
23 the hands of Mr Taylor."

24 And there his evidence-in-chief ended. Now, Mr Taylor,  
13:16:37 25 it's quite clear. Sankoh is your boy. You sent him. You  
26 trained him and sent him.

27 A. Well then Foday Sankoh is a very disrespectful individual  
28 and by even querying, if we believe this witness's testimony - by  
29 querying his men after he returns as to why did they give me

1 diamonds, why would you want to query the commander-in-chief?  
2 Why would Foday Sankoh ask these people, according to his  
3 account, "Why did you give Taylor diamonds?" But there's another  
4 account that somebody was supposed to give me diamonds and I kept  
13:17:20 5 them until Foday Sankoh came. But this other one here is that I  
6 keep them for exchange of arms and ammunition. So what is what  
7 now? Foday Sankoh returns and he's angry that somebody is giving  
8 me diamonds. If I'm the commander-in-chief and there are  
9 diamonds I'm entitled to the diamonds. Why would Foday Sankoh,  
13:17:42 10 my under man, be annoyed?

11 All this thing is just a farce. These people have built up  
12 these cases as I have mentioned, bringing the little Isaac Mongor  
13 here to talk about things that he does not know what he is  
14 talking about, explaining - I do not dispute that Isaac Mongor  
13:17:59 15 trained in Naama. I do not dispute that Isaac Mongor fought in  
16 Sierra Leone. That's not my case here. I'm saying that I did  
17 not send Isaac Mongor to Naama. In fact if I were involved I  
18 would have sent individuals that were capable of training, at  
19 least one, two or three of my Special Forces and not a trainee  
13:18:24 20 like that. Even the things he is talking about, March and April  
21 of 1990 when he is sent is a lie. He lies and lies and lies. So  
22 it's very difficult to deal with these except to try to point out  
23 where he has, you know, gotten it all wrong.

24 And I see Isaac Mongor here and I'm saying this, because  
13:18:45 25 I'm the accused, as a fill-in. As a fill-in. This is a last  
26 minute fill-in by this Prosecution because I swear I still can't  
27 understand why General Tarnue was used in Freetown as the man  
28 that I had sent to train the RUF and was not brought here to  
29 confront me as the man - as the General that I sent. I will send

1 a little non-entity. So you leave the General and you bring the  
2 non-entity here to say that I sent this and Tarnue disappears  
3 from the picture as the man that I sent to train in Naama. So  
4 who actually trained these RUF people in Naama? Is it Tarnue  
13:19:24 5 that I sent or is it Mongor? So this fill-in really did his job  
6 with his lies about - I mean here is a man that goes, never  
7 returns and he says here in earlier statements that in trying to  
8 what he called clear his hand he says, "I have never been to  
9 Liberia." You are so important you are sent on this mission,  
13:19:47 10 operation is going on, you never come back to Liberia. And so  
11 you claim and you say, "No, no, no, I have never been to  
12 Liberia." Of course you've never been to Liberia because you  
13 were never sent anywhere.

14 So it's just one of the - this is really the saga of  
13:20:06 15 Charles Taylor and what I'm confronted with with these different  
16 fabrications, and that's what they are, and where he has been  
17 right I will say he is right and where he is wrong - Isaac Mongor  
18 is nowhere near any individual I would have sent on any mission  
19 to do anything. This is half Sierra Leonean. In fact he lives  
13:20:27 20 in Sierra Leone. He has done everything in Sierra Leone and he  
21 is the fill-in for the other liar, Tarnue, that could not be  
22 brought to this Court and he did his job by filling in the lies.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, were you ever based in Gborplay?

24 A. Yes, I was based in Gborplay.

13:20:46 25 Q. And whilst in Gborplay was there a training base there at  
26 the time?

27 A. Yes, there was a training base in Gborplay when I reached  
28 in Gborplay in April of 1990, yes.

29 Q. And were you a regular visitor to the training base?

1 A. The training base was - yes. It was right in the town so  
2 it was not a matter of visiting. It was right - here is the  
3 town, here is the training base. Yes.

13:21:20 4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, could we at some stage have  
5 the spelling of the full name of General Tarnue.

6 THE WITNESS: He is General John Tarnue, T-A-R-N-U-E. He  
7 testified in the Special Court.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. In which trial?

13:21:35 10 A. I think it's the RUF trial.

11 Q. And do you know General John Tarnue?

12 A. Very well, yes. General John Tarnue was - in fact when I  
13 became President I named him at one point as commanding general.  
14 He was a very well trained, US trained military personnel with  
13:21:55 15 great experience. I know him personally.

16 Q. And as far as you're aware is he still alive and well?

17 A. General Tarnue to the best of my knowledge is alive and  
18 well in the United States. He has been - to the best of my  
19 knowledge he was taken there by the Court. And this was the  
13:22:26 20 General that was alleged that trained the men who was supposed to  
21 have met my ex-wife that was a former schoolmate of his and how I  
22 instructed him and he went to Naama and he trained them and he  
23 led them for the attack in Sierra Leone. Never mentioned any  
24 human calling himself Isaac Mongor as being there. And Isaac  
13:22:47 25 Mongor has never mentioned Tarnue. So I don't know which of  
26 these generals - if anybody was telling the truth, General Tarnue  
27 at the time of - he was in the AFL, he was one of those that  
28 surrendered somewhere I think in '91 to the NPFL. He is a  
29 trained soldier. He is a trained soldier. Not very educated,

1 but he is a trained soldier. I do not know why he is not here  
2 for us to find out which one of them did this training. Both of  
3 them are liars because I never sent either of them to do any  
4 training. So Tarnue now is the trainer in Sierra Leone for that  
13:23:25 5 case and Mongor is the trainer for Charles Taylor case in The  
6 Hague. Where is Tarnue?

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, there's a name that keeps  
8 appearing on the LiveNote record, Dgiba or something like that.  
9 Is this part of the name of this person?

10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Could you tell us what the Tarnue's full name is,  
12 Mr Taylor?

13 A. I only know John Tarnue. That's all I know.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't know where the D-G-I-B-A comes from,  
13:24:03 15 your Honour, and perhaps we ought to correct it.

16 THE WITNESS: D-G-I-B-A is supposed to be Dgiba. That's a  
17 Jula name. And Tarnue is Loma, so it doesn't relate to Tarnue.  
18 So if it's in the record it's not from my testimony.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:24:19 20 Q. So we need to correct that. The name is John Tarnue,  
21 nothing else?

22 A. Nothing else. It's General John Tarnue, yes.

23 Q. Now a specific allegation. Did you used to go to the front  
24 line while based in Gbarnga with Foday Sankoh?

13:24:35 25 A. Never. Never.

26 Q. I asked for this reason, page 6322:

27 "A. I knew Foday Sankoh from Gbarnga on the executive  
28 ground. That was where I came to know him and I used to  
29 see him go to the front line together with Mr Taylor. But

1 at that time I never knew his name was Foday Sankoh because  
2 that was not how we used to call him."

13:25:27 3 A. These people. It's impossible. I moved to Gbarnga in July  
4 of 1991 by this time what is going on? They are already fighting  
5 in Sierra Leone. They are already fighting in - the attack in  
6 Sierra Leone was launched in when? March. They are already  
7 fighting in Sierra Leone. Where is this Mongor seeing  
8 Foday Sankoh in Gbarnga in July of 1991? How? It's impossible.  
9 Impossible. That is not true. And even, your Honours, after I  
13:26:01 10 have told you that I invited Foday Sankoh, he came to Gbarnga in  
11 August of 1991. Foday Sankoh and I never rode together in one  
12 vehicle, we never went to any front line together. At the time  
13 that I'm telling you that I invited him to Liberia under security  
14 arrangement to fight ULIMO we never went out any place together.  
13:26:23 15 Never. If we were together there would be at least some  
16 photograph of that. Never. It's not true.

17 And what is he doing in Liberia in August of 1991 when he  
18 is supposed to be in Freetown - I didn't mean to say Freetown.  
19 Excuse me. In Sierra Leone fighting and he says he's never been  
13:26:44 20 to Liberia. So where is he? That is not true.

21 Q. Mr Taylor, the withdrawal of NPFL forces from Sierra Leone  
22 upon your order, was that as a result of an amicable agreement  
23 between you and Foday Sankoh?

24 A. Oh, no. Oh, no. There was a bloody, bloody clash that led  
13:27:20 25 to the withdrawal. A bloody clash between the - in fact what  
26 made that clash terrible in that the Isaac Mongor and the  
27 Supermans of this world, the Liberians that were trained as  
28 vanguards, okay, with them from information that reached us were  
29 a part of that attack that attacked and killed their own Liberian

1 brothers also. It was a very, very touchy thing that was about  
2 to start a new war on that front. No, there was nothing amicable  
3 about it. There was a very angry reaction on my part and I said,  
4 "Well, this is it. We'll fight but we'll withdraw the people to  
13:28:07 5 prevent any furthest escalation." No.

6 Q. Page 6617, testimony of 3 April 2008:

7 "... He" - Foday Sankoh, that is - "was not annoyed with  
8 the NPFL that he would do anything to them.

9 Q. He wasn't annoyed but you drove them out in a military  
13:28:28 10 operation, didn't you?

11 A. Well, he told - he said that they were to be withdrawn  
12 and it was an agreement between himself and his brother.  
13 What Foday Sankoh said was the outcome of an agreement that  
14 was between himself and Mr Taylor. The two of them agreed  
13:28:44 15 and that's why they brought vehicles so that those men  
16 would use the vehicles to go back."

17 Is that the case?

18 A. Well, then that means he's already knocked out all of the  
19 other witnesses that talk about the operation in Sierra Leone,  
13:29:03 20 Top 20, Top 40, Top Final. They sure haven't described to this  
21 Court a friendly agreement for withdrawal. They have described  
22 to this Court what happened; that the Liberians were accused of  
23 atrocities against Sierra Leoneans, they were fed up with it and  
24 they attacked them. Now this is hardly anything friendly. So  
13:29:24 25 that is totally, totally - his assessment here is totally untrue.  
26 There was no agreement. I withdrew those people from there after  
27 that clash to avoid any furthest escalation of combat. That's  
28 why it was called Top Final. When the final assault occurred and  
29 a lot of people got killed. So it was not - he doesn't know. He



1 doesn't know.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: But surely this piece of evidence in my  
3 understanding is to the effect that when you withdrew your men  
4 from Sierra Leone it was with the acquiescence or agreement of  
13:30:03 5 Foday Sankoh.

6 THE WITNESS: Yeah, but it was not --

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is that true?

8 THE WITNESS: No, your Honour. It was not with the  
9 acquiescence. When the attack occurred I blamed Foday Sankoh for  
13:30:15 10 the death of a lot of our people that were over there and I  
11 withdrew them on my own without discussing with him or with any  
12 acquiescence. It did not require his acquiescence, okay. I just  
13 said, "This is it. My men come out and that is it." He didn't  
14 have like - I would say an agreement would be we would sit down  
13:30:36 15 and say, "Well, for the best of everything let's do this." No.  
16 It was an angry response on my part.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,  
18 Mr President?

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We'll take the lunch break now and  
13:30:49 20 resume at 2.30.

21 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

22 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Isaac Mongor, Mr Taylor. Now, just to round off, there are  
14:32:03 25 one or two particular matters I would like to put to you for your  
26 comment. On 4 April of last year the witness told this Court the  
27 following - page 6658 of the transcript. He is asked this  
28 question: "Are you talking about the Magburaka air shipment?"  
29 And then he goes on:

1 "The Magburaka air shipment was from Libya and the aircraft  
2 left and it passed through Lib Liberia. Through the help  
3 of Mr Taylor, it came to Magburaka and it was Ibrahim Bah  
4 that came to Johnny Paul Koroma and they made the  
14:32:55 5 arrangements before he left.

6 Q. Were you there when this happened?

7 A. Well, I went with Ibrahim Bah because we were the ones  
8 who took Ibrahim Bah to Johnny Paul Koroma's house and  
9 after we had all spoken together, they later had a  
14:33:15 10 closed-door meeting and then after that JPK told us what  
11 the arrangements were that they had made for us to get  
12 something for supplies to come."

13 Mr Taylor, did you have a hand in that Magburaka shipment?

14 A. No, I did not. Did not have a hand in Magburaka or no  
14:33:41 15 other shipment out of there. And just to help with the know,  
16 Magburaka, from evidence I led here, is in late 1997 and he is  
17 saying it came through Liberia? Well, both Roberts International  
18 Airport and Spriggs Payne Airport, the two airports, the only -  
19 only - places in Liberia that are equipped to land planes, were  
14:34:16 20 occupied by ECOMOG, and we are talking about not too far after I  
21 am elected President in 1997. ECOMOG and the international  
22 community are still at full strength in the country and the  
23 situation in Sierra Leone, by this time a meeting had has been  
24 held and dates are given for the junta to you, you know, leave  
14:34:48 25 power, and in fact we are participating in those discussions. So  
26 an aircraft, and in fact - ah. In fact, the air traffic control  
27 at Roberts International Airport during the war is destroyed.

28 Q. We looked at a report which dealt with that.

29 A. Yes. And what happens, there is - in fact, ECOMOG brings

1 in a mobile air traffic situation. That is, it's a mobile unit  
2 that is as used during this period for the military for jets  
3 coming in and going. Any aircraft coming into Liberia in 1997  
4 with arms and ammunition would have never - and could not - have  
14:35:39 5 escaped the attention of ECOMOG and all of the people that are at  
6 the airport. There are Alpha Jets, there are French Mirages that  
7 the Nigerians using. Mirage is a jet fighter, French made. It's  
8 called the Mirage. They are all there.

9 Anybody bringing in weapons in 1997 at that airport, it  
14:36:09 10 would not escape their attention. I am not involved, neither am  
11 I aware of any shipment of arms through Liberia in an aircraft en  
12 route to Sierra Leone at Magburaka. It is clear that arms  
13 apparently arrived. It had nothing do with my government and me.  
14 None whatsoever. I had nothing to do with it. Maybe Ibrahim Bah  
14:36:33 15 was successful and that's why they got a plane to fly it through.  
16 Because why would they want to fly through if - you know, if I am  
17 involved they could have is just driven across the border from  
18 Robertsfield - go to Roberts, load up and drive, as they had been  
19 claiming. But, no, it had nothing to do with me, and there are  
14:36:54 20 so many other witnesses that are not even sure of what happened  
21 with Magburaka. It had nothing to do with me, no.

22 Q. Let's deal with one final topic, please. 4 April 2008,  
23 page 6662:

24 "Q. What was it that they went for to Burkina Faso?"

14:37:23 25 That being Bockarie and others.

26 "A. Well, what Sam Bockarie told me was that he had  
27 received a call to go to Mr Taylor and at that time when he  
28 was going he went with SYB Rogers and some other people.  
29 And he said it was during that time that the Pa, Mr Taylor,

1 made a connection between Sam Bockarie and the Libyan  
2 leader, so he said after they went there they spoke with  
3 the man and then they later came back to Liberia.

14:38:12 4 Q. Did you mean to say the Pa, Mr Taylor, made a  
5 connection between Sam Bockarie and the Libyan leader? Did  
6 you mean Libyan leader or did you mean Burkina Faso leader?

7 A. I said Sam Bockarie told me that when they got to  
8 Liberia the Pa, who is Mr Taylor, he connected him with the  
9 Burkina Faso President."

14:38:40 10 And then he goes on, page 6663:

11 "Q. You have told us that Mr Taylor made a connection for  
12 them with the President of Burkina Faso and they went and  
13 stayed in a hotel there.

14 A. Yes.

14:39:00 15 Q. And the point of the connection was for them to try and  
16 get arms, materials from Burkina Faso, yes?

17 A. It was to go and establish contact to talk with the  
18 Burkina Faso leader. To discuss on the issues of  
19 materials, that is arms and ammunition.

14:39:24 20 Q. And if the Burkina Faso leader was going to give them  
21 arms, how were they going to pay for them?

22 A. If he was supposed to give them - if he had given them  
23 arms and ammunition we would have used diamonds to pay for  
24 them."

14:39:41 25 Now, note the sequence: Bockarie and others travel to  
26 Liberia, and then in Liberia you make a connection between him  
27 and Burkina Faso. Is that true?

28 A. That's not true. When Bockarie and the group came to  
29 Liberia, they had already made contact with Burkina Faso. And I

1 would suppose that contact was done using the satellite telephone  
2 that I gave Bockarie in October when he made the second trip to  
3 Liberia. And the purpose of that phone was for other members of  
4 ECOWAS and the committee to be able to get in touch with him.

14:40:37 5 Because up until this time, I am not sure, I think Bockarie had  
6 had a phone. But the problem that they were having was that  
7 recharging the phone was impossible from where they were, so I  
8 gave them a phone that could be recharged in Liberia. And in  
9 fact, the aircraft that Bockarie travelled with from Liberia to  
14:41:01 10 Burkina Faso was provided by themselves. Didn't provide the - I  
11 don't know --

12 Q. Provided by themselves being?

13 A. The RUF provided their own aircraft. I think they made  
14 arrangement and I think Bah may have come with the plane. But  
14:41:20 15 they did go to Burkina Faso on a plane provided by them, the RUF,  
16 and connections had been made already. And - so his assertion  
17 here that they were supposed to be going for arms to be paid for  
18 with diamonds, I doubt it. Blaise Compaore, with all of the  
19 difficulties that he and I have - Blaise Compaore was chairman of  
14:41:48 20 the OAU at the time and I doubt very much Blaise would have  
21 succumbed to a process, as chairman of the OAU, to supply arms  
22 and ammunition to the RUF when the RUF trip was known by  
23 everybody. The United Nations authorised the RUF trip, and we  
24 read a document here from the Secretary-General's report where  
14:42:15 25 certain members of the junta and the RUF were granted permission  
26 to travel. So that trip that Bockarie took to Burkina Faso was  
27 not a secret trip. It was approved. The United Nation knew  
28 about the trip, and it's contained in that report that we read  
29 here. Everybody knew when they were going and when they were

1 coming back. There was nothing hidden about that trip. And so  
2 his limited knowledge of what they went for, I have no idea. I  
3 cannot speak for the government of Burkina Faso, but I can just  
4 say that I do not think that - Blaise Compaore, as chairman of  
14:42:49 5 OAU, would have been stupid to do such a thing, and I don't think  
6 he did, because no such report reached me that they received arms  
7 and ammunition.

8 Q. Right. That's all I want to ask you about Mr Mongor, and  
9 then I am going to move on to another witness, Mr Taylor.

14:43:09 10 Now, this witness gave evidence in open session but with a  
11 pseudonym, screen, and image distortion. For everyone's  
12 assistance, it's TF1-516.

13 Now, the first point I want to deal with is this, the  
14 witness having given evidence in April 2008. First point, page  
14:43:43 15 6827, line 5:

16 "On the training base, they told us that the group fighting  
17 in the RUF were divided into two at that time. They told us  
18 about Special Forces and they said those were NPFL,  
19 Charles Taylor's rebels. And they had the vanguards who were  
14:44:06 20 mainly trained to fight the RUF war in Sierra Leone. And that  
21 the NPFL fighters, the Special Forces were to help the RUF, the  
22 vanguards, to open the road and that in fact the leader was on  
23 the way coming, he was Foday Sankoh. But that Foday Sankoh  
24 hadn't much money, but they had their leader who was Ghankay  
14:44:29 25 Taylor, that they were using in fact his materials, his arms and  
26 ammunitions. He is supporting them. That Sankoh hasn't  
27 anything. In fact, they are only answerable to questions to  
28 their leader, Ghankay Taylor."

29 So that was what was being said at the training base,

1 Mr Taylor. That you, despite your assertion that you knew  
2 nothing at all about this event until afterwards - that you were  
3 seeing as being in charge from the training base, Camp Naama. Is  
4 that the case?

14:45:08 5 A. That's not the case, no. There will be many other witness  
6 that have a different version. That's not the case of this, no.

7 Q. Now, the next point I want to take up with you is this  
8 assertion by the witness, page 6854, line 15:

9 "In Buedu, as we arrived, Sam Bockarie called a muster  
14:45:34 10 parade right to the MP and told us that he was promoted to the  
11 rank of a general. He said, and I quote, 'I am now a general.  
12 Everybody should take instructions from me.' And he said that he  
13 had been promoted by the chief, Charles Taylor, to the rank of a  
14 general. We saw him with the new combat fatigue and with the  
14:45:56 15 insignia of a general with the military vehicle. So he addressed  
16 us and told us we should work together. But just after that the  
17 station commander who ordered me to go in search of acid but  
18 failed to report on time ordered my arrest and I was arrested by  
19 the MPs and locked up."

14:46:16 20 Promoting Sam Bockarie to general, yes or no?

21 A. No. Never promoted Sam Bockarie to general, no. Never  
22 did. I didn't even know the young man. Depending on the time he  
23 is talking about - I didn't even know Sam Bockarie at the time he  
24 is talking about because when Foday Sankoh was arrested he  
14:46:41 25 apparently promoted all of his people and so I have no idea how  
26 Sam Bockarie - the only second promotion that I know of that was  
27 what we heard about in this Court was from Johnny Paul. So the  
28 two people that promoted Sam Bockarie were his bosses, Foday  
29 Sankoh first and Johnny Paul Koroma second. Never promoted. How

1 would I promote Sam Bockarie? And Sam Bockarie and who? Never.  
2 Never promoted anybody called Sam Bockarie.

3 Q. Next point, page 6868, beginning line 12. No, let's put it  
4 in context. Line 9:

14:47:24 5 "Q. Do you recall any communications at this time whilst  
6 you were at Zogoda with the other side, any specific  
7 communication?

8 A. Yes, at that time they used to just come on the net and  
9 identify themselves as 35B. They said, '35B, 35B' and the  
14:47:54 10 station commanders could be called to come and talk to  
11 them. I can remember during the time we were

12 communicating or facilitating the movement of Corporal  
13 Sankoh from Zogoda to Yamoussoukro, there was a call from  
14 that station, 35 Bravo. At that time the station sergeant  
14:48:15 15 told me that the station was located in Gbarnga and that  
16 was the station of Charles Taylor. He had not yet been  
17 elected as President. There was a call from the radio  
18 operator requesting the radio operator on our side to make  
19 available Toyota, that Ebony was on the radio to talk to

14:48:40 20 Toyota. In the code I went through Ebony was referring to  
21 Charles Taylor and Toyota was referring to Corporal Sankoh  
22 and they had that radio conversation and in their  
23 conversation Ebony told Toyota to make use of, or take  
24 advantage over that peace accord which was he was supposed  
14:49:02 25 to attend in Yamoussoukro to move outside to get more  
26 dancing materials. Dancing materials, they were referring  
27 to ammunition and some other materials relating to combat."  
28 Pause there. Yamoussoukro, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, Yamoussoukro is the political capital of Ia



1 Cote d'Ivoire. I know Yamoussoukro.

2 Q. Now, tell me, do you recall conversation with Corporal  
3 Sankoh at a time when he was moving from Zogoda to Yamoussoukro?

14:49:47

4 A. No, not at all. But look at where he puts me, he places me  
5 in Gbarnga in 1996.

6 Q. Why do you say 1996?

7 A. Well, that's what - because 1996 is the time that they are  
8 going to la Cote d'Ivoire for the meeting.

9 Q. Yes.

14:50:02

10 A. What am I doing in Gbarnga in 1996? I am not in Gbarnga.

11 I move to Monrovia in 1995, I am on the council of state at the  
12 time. What am I going to be doing? You know, the only way we

13 can catch these little lies, what am I doing in Gbarnga in 1996

14 that somebody is calling me on a radio in 1996? When I am on the

14:50:21

15 council of state in Monrovia what am I doing on a radio in

16 Gbarnga? Not so. I am not in Gbarnga in 1996, point number one.

17 There is no contact between Foday Sankoh and myself at this

18 particular time in 1996 or no other time. It's a blatant,

19 blatant lie. No.

14:50:40

20 Q. When had you joined that council, Mr Taylor?

21 A. I joined the council in 1995.

22 Q. When in 1995?

23 A. I go to Monrovia in July 1995 on the council of state.

24 Q. And for how long do you remain in Monrovia thereafter?

14:51:00

25 A. Oh, I continued in Monrovia until my elections.

26 Q. So were you in Gbarnga speaking to Foday Sankoh on the

27 radio in 1996?

28 A. Not at all. Not at all. I am a member of the council of

29 state, the collective presidency, up until December of 1996 when

1 I leave to start my campaign in early - in January for the  
2 presidency, leaving Victoria Refell in my place on the council of  
3 state. I do not even - in fact headquarters, everything moved.  
4 So if somebody wants to talk me and I am actually talking on the  
14:51:42 5 radio I have to be talking from Monrovia and not from any  
6 Gbarnga, headquarters of the NPFL. And in fact by this  
7 particular time the NPFL no longer exists as, quote unquote, an  
8 NPFL because we have to, what, dissolve - disarmament is through  
9 by this particular time, dissolve all warring factions in the  
14:52:03 10 political parties. So if there is - according to anybody's  
11 calculation there are discussions going on on the radio with  
12 Charles Taylor, then it has to be in Monrovia and not in Gbarnga.

13 Q. Next point. Page 6872, line 26:

14 "There was a mission run in Liberia. A particular man  
14:52:46 15 identified himself as Mosquito Spray. That man captured  
16 Voinjama in Liberia and Sam Bockarie was mandated,  
17 according to him, by his chief and he organised armed men  
18 within the RUF and instructed them to cross into Liberia to  
19 capture Voinjama and they succeeded in capturing Voinjama.  
14:53:11 20 That operation was code named Operation Vulture. So it was  
21 from that operation that the RUF combatants who were  
22 mandated to cross into Liberia captured two vehicles and in  
23 those vehicles they had radios mounted in them, so when  
24 they brought those vehicles to Buedu the station then  
14:53:39 25 changed from Bravo Zulu 4 to Marvel and Planet 1  
26 respectively."

27 Line 22:

28 "Q. You mentioned earlier that Bockarie said he was  
29 instructed by his chief."

1 Line 28:  
2 "Q. Who was his chief?  
3 A. I was referring to Charles Taylor."  
4 True or false, Mr Taylor?  
14:54:07 5 A. Totally false. I was not Sam Bockarie's chief.  
6 Q. Let's move to page 6883, line 4:  
7 "Q. You mentioned in your earlier testimony that when you  
8 retreated from Kono after the intervention along with  
9 Gullit and his group you got to Buedu and Bockarie was  
14:54:51 10 there and he had just been promoted by his chief?"  
11 So that's 1998, Mr Taylor, yes?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. "... Is that correct?  
14 A. Yes, sir.  
14:55:01 15 Q. Now apart from Bockarie, do you recall any other  
16 person who received a similar promotion from anybody else?  
17 A. Yes, sir, General Issa Sesay also was promoted.  
18 Q. Who by?  
19 A. By his chief also according to him. He met us in  
14:55:18 20 Kolahun.  
21 Q. And who was his chief?  
22 A. He was referring to Charles Taylor and he was the  
23 chief everybody knew in the RUF in the absence of Foday  
24 Sankoh."  
14:55:33 25 So there you go again, Mr Taylor, another promotion, Issa  
26 Sesay.  
27 A. But this is the first witness now that has added another  
28 name to this allegation of promoting now Issa Sesay. Never  
29 promoted Issa Sesay to nothing. First time even knowing that man

1 was in 2000. I had never seen him in my life before, Issa Sesay.  
2 First time in 2000. Never. That's a lie.

3 Q. Now, quickly again, just to deal with this swiftly, page  
4 6911, line 20:

14:56:26 5 "Sam Bockarie brought those satellite phones. He brought  
6 the mobile satellite phone and told us he had been given  
7 that phone by his chief.

8 Q. Who do you refer to?

9 A. The President Charles Taylor. He was the one he used  
14:56:40 10 to refer to as the chief. The one I saw him in Kenema I  
11 cannot confirm but at some point in time in Buedu he told  
12 us that he got the satellite phone from Liberia, his chief  
13 gave him one. The one he had previously was blocked  
14 because of not paying his bills. That's what he told us."

14:56:58 15 True or false, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Well, that's true. I gave Sam Bockarie a satellite phone,  
17 like I said, in October, because of the charging problem of his  
18 phone. So if this witness is talking about October, yes, I did  
19 give Sam Bockarie a phone because the old phone he had had been  
14:57:25 20 blocked. That is true.

21 And I am not sure if I can help with this, chief, chief,  
22 chief. I have a chieftaincy title, so if somebody refers to me  
23 as chief, a lot of people, all over Liberia, everybody calls me  
24 chief. It doesn't mean that I am their boss commanding them. I  
14:57:45 25 have told this Court and I can repeat it, my name is Dankpannah,  
26 which means chief. It's a chieftaincy name. So people refer to  
27 me as - just as they did with Hinga Norman as chief Norman -  
28 chief Taylor. So that chief doesn't apply to somebody who gives  
29 command. It's a chieftaincy title that I still own, that I still

1 have. So I would just think that this is what - if he said that  
2 chief Taylor gave me a phone, I can agree with that. I did give  
3 Bockarie a phone in October 1998.

4 Q. Now, another point, page 6951. Listen to this account,  
14:58:39 5 please, Mr Taylor, and then I am going to invite your comment:

6 "Dopoe Menkarzon was said to be a special force in the NPFL  
7 but at one point in time crossed into Sierra Leone. He was  
8 asked to return because they carried out certain operation  
9 which led to the killing of civilians in Sierra Leone.

14:59:03 10 That was early 1992. The operation was code named Top 20.  
11 They killed our people and the people grew annoyed. They  
12 had to in turn go on the rampage to fight against them. In  
13 fact, they were saying that Corporal Sankoh was nobody,  
14 that they were only answerable to Charles Taylor. And a  
14:59:23 15 particular group came. After Top 20 that was resisted.

16 They again carried out another operation called Top 40.  
17 They killed our people. We could not bear it up, you know.  
18 There was that confrontation between the Liberians and the  
19 junior commandos. So they told us that their chief was  
14:59:44 20 working out modalities to send or dispatch a particular  
21 group that was to calm down the situation. So we received  
22 a group. They referred to them as Special Forces, SBUs.  
23 They came into Sierra Leone and they had Dopoe and others  
24 disarmed. They were sent back to Gbarnga.

15:00:06 25 Q. So Dopoe Menkarzon had been in Sierra Leone long before  
26 this time.

27 A. Yes, they were the ones that entered into Sierra Leone  
28 in 1991, but because of their mischievous attitude, he was  
29 deported. He started coming in again with arms and

1 ammunition at the time Sam Bockarie was in Buedu."

2 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor, that account?

3 A. This is a long span of time he is talking about here, but  
4 Dopoe Menkarzon was never in Sierra Leone. I don't think all of  
15:00:46 5 these people, including the infamous Isaac Mongor, doesn't talk  
6 about Dopoe Menkarzon fighting in Sierra Leone. Dopoe Menkarzon  
7 goes to Sierra Leone, yes. He goes to disarm - I mean, excuse  
8 me, to remove our fighters from over there in 1992.

9 Now, for some of these people, "early" could mean something  
15:01:10 10 different, but it's not early. He finally goes in there in May  
11 with my orders to withdrawal our people, and that's what he does.  
12 But he is not in Sierra Leone fighting at any time before then,  
13 no. That operation is strictly commanded, I have told this  
14 Court, by Sam Tuah. Sam Tuah is in charge. Dopoe goes in and  
15:01:32 15 withdraws them. Now, he is not in there before that time.

16 Q. Now page 6962, beginning line 4:

17 "During the time of the Freetown operation, Zedman - I  
18 could remember travelling to Foya, myself, Zedman and one  
19 operator, Tolo, were on board one of those communication  
15:02:18 20 vehicles.

21 Q. Which one of the communication vehicles?

22 A. The one we had Marvel planted in. We went to Foya. In  
23 fact at first he travelled to Foya and then he was flown  
24 into Monrovia. He told us he was called by the chief. So  
15:02:35 25 he went to Monrovia. After 72 hours he came back and we  
26 were called to receive him at Foya. So those  
27 materials - in fact, what we saw coming from the helicopter  
28 were bales of jeans, were bales of jeans, but when we got  
29 to Buedu on the contrary we saw the content of those bales

1           were ammunitions and the ammunitions were handed over to  
2           the G4 in Buedu called Captain Felix."

3           Yes, Mr Taylor?

4           A.    Totally no. At the time - except the helicopter he is  
15:03:14 5    talking about is a bird, as in a real bird. Because by this time  
6    in 1999, early - because the invasion of Sierra Leone is January  
7    1999 - the Liberian government, my government, does not have a  
8    helicopter at this time. So I don't know what helicopter he is  
9    talking about. We do not, N-O-T, do not have a helicopter at  
15:03:41 10   this time, so that's got to be a lie. We don't have a helicopter  
11   at this time, no.

12          Q.    Well, there is a couple things there, Mr Taylor. Did you  
13   receive a visit from Sam Bockarie at or about the time of the  
14   Freetown invasion, January 1999?

15:04:02 15    A.    No, did not receive a visit from him in January.

16          Q.    And did you provide Bockarie with ammunition in or about  
17   that time?

18          A.    No, not at all. No.

19          Q.    And again with this witness, Mr Taylor, when we go to page  
15:04:41 20   6976, line 17 of the transcript, we see this allegation again  
21   being made against you:

22                "Q. When you say he", that being Sam Bockarie, "could  
23   come on the radio and give instructions, what do you mean  
24   by 'could'?"

15:04:58 25    A.    Bockarie used to come on the radio to issue  
26   instructions relating to strategy.

27          Q.    Do you recall specifically what orders Bockarie gave at  
28   any particular time?

29          A.    Yes. When the forces of the AFRC/RUF entered Freetown,

1 after some time they went under serious pressure by the  
2 ECOMOG forces and they were out of ammunition, so the  
3 commander who was leading that group, Gullit, decided to  
4 retreat a little bit to a particular location and to  
15:05:35 5 collect materials, ammunition. So the other forces were  
6 left at a particular position in Freetown and reported that  
7 they were persistently attacked and Sam Bockarie came on  
8 the radio and told Gullit to instruct the men to burn down  
9 areas, in fact the government buildings, so that will raise  
15:05:58 10 alarm in the international community."

11 Now, what do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing.

13 Q. Because it continues, you see, this vein:

14 "Q. Now, this communication which Bockarie had with  
15:06:29 15 Gullit, my question was, do you recall a situation where  
16 after communicating on a two-one with 020 in Liberia, do  
17 you recall a situation where Bockarie came back and gave an  
18 order?

19 A. Yes, sir.

15:06:46 20 Q. Do you recall any other communication that Bockarie had  
21 during this period with 020?

22 A. Communication was going on with 020 and base 1 and some  
23 of those communications were like one I have explained and  
24 the other was the instructions to Gullit to report with the  
15:07:06 25 POWs who were released were the prison. I mean the  
26 prisoners who were released from Pademba Road prison, that  
27 they were to be taken to Bockarie's location."

28 Now, Mr Taylor, was it you ordering Bockarie to do all of  
29 those things?"



1 A. No. I was not in contact with Bockarie at all, no.

2 Q. Now, going on to page 6999, line 8:

3 "Q. You mentioned a name this morning as one of those who  
4 also brought supplies from Liberia, Sampson Weah. Do you  
15:08:06 5 recall?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Who was he?

8 A. Sampson Weah was assigned to Benjamin D Yeaten.

9 Q. As what?

15:08:15 10 A. He was a soldier assigned to Benjamin Yeaten and  
11 besides Sampson Weah was a brother of Benjamin Yeaten, that  
12 was what I got to know when I crossed into Liberia."

13 Now, you have told us that to be true, haven't you,

14 Mr Taylor?

15:08:32 15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. Now, the witness goes on:

17 "Q. Now, who else was assigned to Benjamin Yeaten of the  
18 men who brought supplies across to Liberia apart from  
19 Sampson Weah? Was there anybody assigned to Benjamin  
15:08:50 20 Yeaten?

21 A. He had bodyguards that I knew, but those who came with  
22 materials to - I mean with ammunitions to Buedu, the only  
23 person I can recall is Sampson.

24 Q. Now these are other names that you mentioned of men who  
15:09:07 25 brought material to Buedu, do you know on whose instruction  
26 they were acting when they brought this material? You  
27 mentioned Zigzag Marzah, you also mentioned Dopoe Menkarzon  
28 and you mentioned Roland Duoh?

29 A. Those were Liberian soldiers and they operated under

1 command."

2 Now, Mr Taylor, was Dopoe Menkarzon and Roland Duoh  
3 carrying arms for you to Sierra Leone?

4 A. Never. Never.

15:09:42 5 Q. Now, we know about the allegations involving Zigzag Marzah  
6 and Sampson, but now to that list of names we must now add Dopoe  
7 Menkarzon and Roland Duoh. Who was Roland Duoh?

8 A. Roland Duoh was the one of the most senior generals in the  
9 forces in Liberia. In fact, he was the chief of staff of the  
15:10:11 10 Navy division, a colleague of Benjamin Yeaten, really, not of  
11 Special Forces before, one of the most respected. In fact,  
12 Roland Duoh served during the transitional government of Julie  
13 Bryant and since the election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the  
14 present President, he's Assistant Secretary of Defence, one of  
15:10:36 15 the most respected army officers in Liberia. Never carried one  
16 round of ammunition across that border. He is presently  
17 Assistant Secretary of Defence in Liberia. Never.

18 Dopoe Menkarzon, also a very senior officer. In fact,  
19 during my presidency Dopoe Menkarzon returned to the university.  
15:10:59 20 He was mostly in school after my election as President, received  
21 a B Sc degree in agriculture and is now doing his master in  
22 university. So most of the time he is talking from 1997 Dopoe  
23 Menkarzon returned to school, was not even involved in anything  
24 in '98, '99. He went back to school.

15:11:26 25 Q. Let's move now to page 7001, line 24:

26 "Q. You said that 50 you knew took command from his chief  
27 and when you say 'his chief', who do you refer to?

28 A. 50 referred to the President, at that time  
29 Charles Taylor as the chief.

1 Q. How do you know this?

2 A. He made reference of this several times addressing  
3 muster parade. When Voinjama was captured he made mention  
4 of that, that whoever fails to comply with the instructions  
15:12:07 5 issued by the President, he will be executed.

6 Q. Yesterday we were at a point where you had arrived in  
7 Liberia to take duty under 50. Do you recall?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. And you said that from Foya, where you first reported,  
15:12:25 10 you flew on a helicopter with 50 to Gbarnga. Is that  
11 right?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. And set up communications - set up communication there  
14 at Gbarnga?

15:12:37 15 A. Yes, sir. There was a place referred to as the Papay's  
16 farm. That was the President's farm. There was a house  
17 there and that house, according to 50, was his house.

18 Q. Whose house?

19 A. 50's house in the farm.

15:12:59 20 Q. Let us be clear. You said there was a house referred  
21 to as Papay's?

22 A. No, the farm. The President's farm in Gbarnga. There  
23 was a concrete house there which, according to 50, was his,  
24 and there the radio was installed. We remained there and  
15:13:22 25 contacted base 1 to facilitate the movement of the  
26 helicopter with arms and ammunitions for the operation in  
27 Voinjama."

28 Do you understand what's being said, Mr Taylor? That  
29 Benjamin Yeaten, director of SSS, transports this RUF radio

1 operator to set up a radio on your farm in a house to facilitate  
2 the transport of arms and ammunition. Do you see that?

3 A. Yes, I see it.

4 Q. This is after you are President.

15:14:04 5 A. All of the technical people that we have in Liberia, we are  
6 supposed to bring an RUF man to set up a radio on my farm? I  
7 don't know - in fact I can't associate this number with the name  
8 and - because I don't go through these. But it's unlikely. And  
9 then the time frame, there is a farm. Helicopter, we are talking  
15:14:31 10 about very late 1999, okay, because we don't get a helicopter  
11 until very late in 1999. So this particular person then, I don't  
12 see how he can associate this with this particular situation  
13 because if we look at it, even going into the Lome discussions in  
14 1999 we are using UN helicopters. The government doesn't have a  
15:15:03 15 helicopter as coming on we are talking about April/May of 1999 to  
16 go on to Lome. So we don't have a helicopter. So he must be  
17 talking about late 1999.

18 But the attack in Voinjama does not occur anytime except  
19 around - that's around the time that we are moving people.

15:15:31 20 That's early in 1999. So it's really not true that he went on my  
21 farm to set up a radio. Look, on my farm, the SSS - the Secret  
22 Service controlled my farm. We had a trained radio expert that  
23 installed radios during my presidency. That was total different  
24 from the NPFL. And on my farm if a radio had to be installed it  
15:15:58 25 would not have taken - do you know how many radios the Government  
26 of Liberia had after my presidency. Maybe a hundred or more.  
27 And we would have to bring someone from Sierra Leone? No. I  
28 doubt this story very much. I fully disagree with what he has  
29 said here, no.

1 Q. Now, page 7165, line 16:

2 "Eddie Kanneh was en route with parcels to meet the chief  
3 because that was what Sam Bockarie would say, that Eddie Kanneh  
4 had a code name, was en route with the parcel and thereafter upon  
15:16:39 5 his arrival we would be informed that he was in Monrovia. Sam  
6 Bockarie stated or told us that Eddie Kanneh was moving to see  
7 with his chief Charles Taylor."

8 Did Eddie Kanneh bring diamonds to you, Mr Taylor?

9 A. No. Eddie Kanneh did not bring any diamonds to me at all.  
15:17:02 10 Not at all, no.

11 Q. One other matter on the same topic, page 7171, line 21:

12 "Eddie Kanneh still used to go Monrovia and he used to  
13 make reference to his movements. And he got to Monrovia  
14 and reported and told me to inform General Issa Sesay that  
15:17:41 15 he was in Monrovia. In fact at some point in time I think  
16 in Foya - I was in Foya when Eddie Kanneh came together  
17 with some white men and he told me to inform General Issa  
18 Sesay that he was in Foya and that a team was to collect  
19 him from a particular point to General Issa's location.

15:18:05 20 Q. When you say he came with some white men what did you  
21 understand from Eddie Kanneh or did you learn anything from  
22 Eddie Kanneh about what these people came to do?

23 A. According to him the white men were going to talk to  
24 Issa. That they were traders. They were traders. They  
15:18:22 25 traded in diamonds."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, were you involved in that?

27 A. No. And I must assume here that the period he is talking  
28 about must be in 2000 now. It's got to be. I am assuming this  
29 because he is apparently alleging Issa Sesay, Issa Sesay. So

1 this has got to be about 2000. And it's easy to - it would be  
2 easy to verify this information. This is blatantly, blatantly  
3 untrue that Eddie Kanneh was dealing in diamonds with me or  
4 anything of this sort, no.

15:19:06 5 Q. Well, in terms of a date, I can assist to this extent,  
6 because the witness continues:

7 "Q. When Eddie Kanneh came to Monrovia at this time, who  
8 was he coming to see?

9 A. Eddie Kanneh travelled to Monrovia?

15:19:21 10 Q. Under the leadership of Issa Sesay you said he  
11 continued to come to Monrovia and he would bring diamonds.  
12 Who was he coming to see?

13 A. To see the chief Charles Taylor.

14 Q. How did you know that he continued to come and see the  
15:19:36 15 chief?

16 A. Before his movement, we received information or I used  
17 to get a message from General Issa's station that Eddie  
18 Kanneh was travelling with a parcel to see with the chief.

19 Q. Now, up to what time would you say that diamonds  
15:19:52 20 continued to come from Sierra Leone into Liberia?

21 A. Messages about diamonds remained coming.

22 Q. Up until when?

23 A. Until the last day that I left Vahun. That was late  
24 2001."

15:20:11 25 A. Okay. So that's what I am saying, it has to start at  
26 around 2000 because that's when Issa Sesay takes over lead.  
27 Well, you know, there will be a lot I am sure this Court will get  
28 to know as we get into this trial - there will be a lot more they  
29 will get to know. These things are totally untrue. We have

1 diamonds that are supposed to be coming to me that Sam Bockarie  
2 says nothing about in his report to Foday Sankoh in 1999 and  
3 diamonds have been at the centre of this case.

4 And I have, to the best of my knowledge, gone through - I  
15:20:50 5 have read Issa Sesay's testimony before this Court. I have read  
6 Issa Sesay's testimony, you understand me. Why would Issa Sesay  
7 not tell the world about any transaction that he had with me?  
8 This is all a bunch of nonsense. It is not true. These boys  
9 don't - these men just try to guess, but I am sure, as we go into  
15:21:15 10 this, more people will come that will lay more - you know, a  
11 clearer view on these matters. It's all a bunch of lies.

12 Eddie Kanneh - I do not dispute that diamonds went through  
13 Monrovia. I think diamonds did go through Monrovia and people  
14 carried diamonds in Monrovia from Sierra Leone I must believe,  
15:21:37 15 and from Guinea. The US dollar was something that attracted a  
16 lot of businesses to Liberia and still will do that even today.  
17 So if Eddie Kanneh went there, I don't know. Eddie Kanneh is a  
18 Sierra Leonean. I remember the name. I don't have any direct  
19 dealing with Eddie Kanneh and, you know, I don't know why he  
15:22:02 20 would make this up that Eddie Kanneh is supposed to be bringing  
21 diamonds to me. No, he doesn't bring not one single piece of  
22 diamond to me, no.

23 Q. All right. Let's leave that witness. I am moving to  
24 another witness now, Mr Taylor. This is one Foday Lansana,  
15:22:30 25 TF1-275. And this is the CO Nya who gave evidence in February  
26 2008. Near the commencement of his testimony he told us this,  
27 page 4328, commencing line 24:

28 "Special Forces were the trained commandos, fighting men  
29 who were trained out of Liberia and who facilitated the training.

1 They were the bosses of the entire fighting that went on under  
2 the control of Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor."

3 Do you agree with that?

4 A. 100 per cent, I do.

15:23:38 5 Q. Now, was there a time, Mr Taylor, when the NPFL captured  
6 the Coca-Cola factory in Liberia?

7 A. Yes. I would say that's around August 1990 or thereabouts.  
8 August/September of 1990.

9 Q. And did the Coca-Cola factory have any kind of strategic  
15:24:11 10 importance, Mr Taylor?

11 A. No, not really. It was just at a point where the  
12 United States trading company, Coca-Cola, did their manufacturing  
13 of Coca-Cola for distribution I think in most of these little  
14 areas around Liberia and I think Guinea and Sierra Leone. And it  
15:24:36 15 was just a point where, you know, you could go and sit and we  
16 were sure - and quite frankly the reason why I went to Coca-Cola  
17 factory is because at the time I started going ECOMOG had already  
18 come into the country and crisis had started that - they knew  
19 that this was United States government property and wouldn't bomb  
15:24:55 20 the facilities and so that's where I would go and sit. Coca-Cola  
21 factory is in the suburb of Paynesville which is about, I would  
22 put it to a minimum of 10 - I would say 8 to 10 kilometres from  
23 Monrovia city on the highway going to Kakata. So it's a little  
24 way off. I would go and sit there.

15:25:25 25 Q. And was it used by you as a base to attack Monrovia?

26 A. No, no. Coca-Cola factory was just what it says, a  
27 Coca-Cola factory. And I sat there and we would not even keep a  
28 large force around because we didn't want the aircrafts to know  
29 that we were there. And the second thing, like I said, it was a



1 United States company property and I think ECOMOG knew it and  
2 wouldn't bomb it. But it was not - that's 10 kilometres behind  
3 the fighting line. I did not use it as a base because the men at  
4 that time are in Bomi Hills near Monrovia and they are on this  
15:26:05 5 side near Monrovia, so no. We had different different areas  
6 where people had surrounded Monrovia, so no.

7 Q. Page 4330, line 11:

8 "The NPFL was in control of the Coca-Cola factory and they  
9 used there as a base in order to go on at the fighting front in  
15:26:26 10 Monrovia town."

11 Do you agree?

12 A. Well, I am not sure if I can fight with this man about  
13 understanding - with their understanding of everything. He says  
14 go and use it as a fighting front in Monrovia. Well, I sat at  
15:26:48 15 Coca-Cola factory and Coca-Cola factory like I say is about some  
16 10 kilometres outside of Monrovia. And so probably if he means  
17 that where I sat was a base, but I mean it was not a fighting  
18 front. We made sure that we did not do anything out of that  
19 factory because it would have exposed it to danger. So we  
15:27:12 20 used - I used it as a cover, knowing that the ECOMOG would not  
21 bomb the facilities. But our men were in Monrovia. I mean  
22 Coca-Cola is - we don't have a - anyway, it may not be necessary.  
23 But the Coca-Cola factory was about a very short - maybe I will  
24 call it a few hundred yards from the American Omega station, and  
15:27:40 25 Omega, we have talked about these Omega towers that it was a  
26 major strategic installation of United States. And so Coca-Cola  
27 factory is not far from the Omega tower. So that area was a  
28 secure zone. And so while the forces are some 8 to 10 kilometres  
29 away, I would drive in the rear with a very small unit, drop me

1 and all the vehicles would leave the area not to expose the fact  
2 that I was there. So it was never used as a base.

3 Now, if he means in his way that I went there and that was  
4 supposed to be a base, well, that's his understanding. But I  
15:28:22 5 think the Court understands that I am not denying that I went to  
6 Coca-Cola factory, but we did not use it as a military base, no.

7 Q. Well, he describes a visit you made to the Coca-Cola  
8 factory in this way, he was in the radio room at the Coca-Cola  
9 factory - pause, was there such a radio room located at the  
15:28:44 10 factory?

11 A. No, there was no radio room at the Coca-Cola factory, no.  
12 I had a radio, but the radio I was using was a special radio that  
13 had been provided me, the Fly Away, in the briefcase, whip up.  
14 It was a very sophisticated radio given me by the - anyway I know  
15:29:05 15 you are going to ask me to tell you who.

16 Q. Yes, please.

17 A. Given to me by the CIA at that particular time and we used  
18 it. It's called the Fly Away. And it was a little, you just  
19 whip up an antenna and you can call almost anywhere. I didn't  
15:29:25 20 have any radio installed at that place, no.

21 Q. And then he continues, line 26. So this is at the  
22 Coca-Cola factory whilst he is in the radio room:

23 "I saw a large group of people coming in and then he  
24 whispered to me, this is one Roosevelt, that is chief was coming  
15:29:47 25 in and that they were going to be having a meeting in this radio  
26 room. As I looked towards the entrance I saw a bright huge  
27 person. In the past I used to know him by photograph, but that  
28 was the first day that I saw him and he was  
29 Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor."

1 You have obviously shrunk, Mr Taylor.

2 "And he was coming walking along with Special Forces who,  
3 together with him, entered into the radio room."

4 And he is then asked at page 4332, line 14:

15:30:25 5 "Q. What happened at this point after these individuals  
6 arrived in this room?

7 A. Like I said, I was informed by Roosevelt that there was  
8 going to be a meeting, and as he entered everybody sat into  
9 their individual positions and at that time

15:30:39 10 Mr Charles Taylor started addressing them. According to  
11 what he said, he said that it has come to his notice that  
12 the Alpha Jet is killing the people of Liberia and that it  
13 was coming from Sierra Leone from a base known as Lungi,  
14 and that was Lungi International Airport. The Special  
15:30:58 15 Forces joined him in his discussion and at the end of the  
16 meeting he said he would inform the world that Sierra Leone  
17 has been used as a base to kill his people."

18 Do you recall such a meeting, Mr Taylor, at the Coca-Cola  
19 factory?

15:31:17 20 A. Well, yes, we - why at the Coca-Cola factory? Most times  
21 there are some of the top generals will know when I am there and  
22 would come to talk to me. But as he describes it as a meeting  
23 this and all this thing, I don't look at it that way. Maybe  
24 General Musa would stop by me and see me, but we wouldn't have a  
15:31:44 25 meeting. I wouldn't have a meeting at an exposed place like  
26 this, no. But the fact that why at Coca-Cola factory? Some of  
27 the senior generals would visit me, it's true. Some of the  
28 senior generals would visit me. Some of them, they were:  
29 "Chief, you can't stay here. Get out of this place. Don't stay

1 here. We don't trust this thing."

2 And mind you, I want to reflect on something else. This  
3 fear of ECOMOG bombardments starts about late 1990. This is Nya  
4 Lansana. This is the man that - a witness testified that was  
15:32:27 5 supposed to be operating the first radio that I am supposed to  
6 give them. I just want us to bear on this because - but this is  
7 the same witness that - I am talking about Mongor that we just  
8 got through with - that is supposed to - by March, April of 1990  
9 is in Naama training, okay? So maybe as we go along we will

15:32:50 10 verify whether there was a radio with this Nya Korto operating  
11 it, and we will soon see. Because I am trying to put a time on  
12 what Mongor just said about being sent to train people in Naama,  
13 March/April of 1990, and here we see the operator is at Coca-Cola  
14 factory with me - he is alleging at Coca-Cola factory in very  
15:33:17 15 late 1990, because ECOMOG doesn't come in and start bombarding  
16 all over the place. They come in around August/September. The  
17 conflict starts around October/November. So I am sure we will  
18 fish out certain lies in this sooner or later, because I see  
19 where he is going and probably we will catch up with him.

15:33:37 20 Q. Well anyway, about this meeting, let's just complete  
21 sequence. He continues in this vein at page 4333:

22 "Like for Isaac Musa he did say that on several occasions  
23 he had been informing the chief (Mr Charles Ghankay  
24 Taylor), for proper action into the issue of the killing of  
15:34:03 25 the civilians by the Alpha Jet coming from Sierra Leone.

26 Q. Did Mr Taylor say anything else with relation to Sierra  
27 Leone at that meeting?

28 A. Yes, he concluded that he was going to inform the world  
29 about the role of Sierra Leone into his country."

1 Line 24:

2 "Q. Can you tell the Court what happened after this  
3 meeting in the radio room?

4 A. Yes. At the end of the meeting Mr Charles Taylor  
15:34:29 5 addressed the entire body and told them that he was going  
6 to speak with the BBC to inform the whole world of the Alpha  
7 Jet which was flying from Sierra Leone into Liberia and was  
8 killing his people. So he brought the meeting to an end  
9 and everybody went out. At exactly 6 minutes past 5,  
15:34:50 10 whilst listening to the BBC, Mr Charles Taylor was being  
11 interviewed by Mr Robin White. I heard him say to the  
12 world that if Sierra Leone or ECOMOG does not stop using  
13 Sierra Leone or the Alpha Jet from destroying his people in  
14 Liberia, Sierra Leone will also feel the bitterness of  
15:35:10 15 war."

16 Yes, Mr Taylor?

17 A. That's the accusation. That's not true.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I have a moment, please?

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

15:36:27 20 MR GRIFFITHS: I am just trying to find a date,  
21 Mr President.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, I am looking for something in light of the point  
23 you just made about Isaac Mongor and dates.

24 A. There is a section where he says in March/April 1990 in  
15:37:42 25 Gbarnga he is given this assignment after meeting me and Sankoh  
26 to go and train people in Naama. He spoke about that in his --

27 Q. Actually, what I will do is I will move on, research the  
28 matter overnight, I think, and come back to it.

29 Now, taking matters generally, Mr Taylor, did you send CO

1 Nya to Sierra Leone?

2 A. No. No. Never did.

3 Q. Do you know a CO Nya?

15:38:52

4 A. No, I didn't even know him, no. I saw the gentleman here  
5 in the court. I didn't know him, no.

6 Q. Now, what he told the Court - and we will come to the issue  
7 of date later - was this. On 20 February 2008, page 4362:

15:39:23

8 "Q. Now, you said the instruction was for you to go and  
9 install the radio at his ground. Explain what you mean by  
10 'his ground'?

11 A. Like I said, the ground, I mean where he used to sleep,  
12 where he was based. And where he did everything in Sierra  
13 Leone at that particular time and where his troops were  
14 based. The areas that he organised and fortified with  
15 armed men and that was the area where we referred to as his  
16 headquarters ground.

15:39:42

17 Q. When you say 'he', are you referring to Foday Sankoh?

18 A. Yes, sir.

15:39:59

19 Q. Now the instruction to install a radio set, this  
20 instruction, where exactly were you going to install it?  
21 Was there any - an instruction as to that?

22 A. Yes. He said we should go with the radio together with  
23 Mekunagbe and upon our arrival in Sierra Leone we were  
24 handed over to Foday Sankoh in order that he should show us  
25 the place where we should install the radio.

15:40:21

26 Q. And where was that place that Foday Sankoh was to show  
27 you?

28 A. There was a house in Koindu at the entrance of Koindu  
29 Town. That was where he had his ground. The area was

1 known as Baidu."

2 What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Nothing. Absolutely nothing. I am not sure on line 19 who  
4 is he referring to when he says, "He said we should go"?

15:40:54 5 Probably he may have described this here before here or maybe  
6 sometime after here, but that "he" definitely cannot be  
7 Charles Taylor. I did not know Nya at this particular time, and  
8 let's see if we can again maybe put in a timeline here. This has  
9 to be after March 1991. He must be talking about after they have  
15:41:24 10 entered Sierra Leone, but I - no, I am not - I don't know Nya and  
11 I do not know who is this "he" that he is referring to. I don't  
12 know nothing about it.

13 Q. Right. Let's see if we can put a time frame here now.

14 Let's go to page 4337, line 19 first of all, please.

15:42:09 15 "Q. Can you give us an approximate time frame as to when  
16 you were in Gbarnga in terms of the year and the month? I  
17 need to start here.

18 A. Yes. In 1990 from September to October. They  
19 conducted the advanced training and at the end of October  
15:42:31 20 we were dismissed and we were told to standby for further  
21 instructions.

22 Q. Now you describe what you mean by advanced training?

23 A. Yes. We were called upon by the deputy for all signal  
24 commanders of the NPFL, Mr Galakpalah. According to him,  
15:42:58 25 there were some misunderstandings in the encoding system,  
26 how to encode, decode and transmit messages, and there were  
27 a series of different communications in the NPFL at that  
28 time. So we were called in order to acquaint ourselves  
29 with those sets and how to master the encoding system."

1 Now, moving on to page 4339:

2 "Q. Now, you said this lasted for approximately a month,  
3 is that correct?

4 A. I said one month, that is from September to October.

15:43:42 5 Q. And after that time you took leave and went back to  
6 Ganta. Is that correct?

7 A. Not Gbarnga, I said Ganta.

8 Q. Ganta. That's what I understood as well."

9 Page 4340:

15:43:53 10 "A. I went to visit my grandfather in Bomaru in 1991 in  
11 January.

12 Q. Before you go on, Mr Witness, where did you cross from  
13 Liberia into Sierra Leone? Where was that? Do you  
14 remember the border crossing?

15:44:15 15 A. I used the bush path from Vahun on to Bomaru Town.

16 Q. And do you know what district Bomaru is in Sierra  
17 Leone?

18 A. Yes. Bomaru is in the upper Bambara, Kailahun  
19 District.

15:44:31 20 Q. How long did you remain in Bomaru?

21 A. I was in Bomaru from January to June, July when I was  
22 recaptured by the NPFL/RUF fighters who were in Sierra  
23 Leone.

24 Q. You said you were captured by the NPFL and RUF in  
15:44:48 25 June, July 1991. Is that correct?

26 A. Quite correct. At this time in Sierra Leone the  
27 combined forces of NPFL as well as the group called  
28 Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, they were  
29 fighting side by side in Sierra Leone."



1           So we have a time frame now, Mr Taylor, for when he arrives  
2 in Sierra Leone. Do you follow?

3           A. Yes. That I can agree with. That sound likely, yes. This  
4 is okay, where July - by July 1991 - I would say July/August  
15:45:35 5 1991 - no, he is a little off. He is a little off by about a  
6 month or two, okay, because our people begin to move into Sierra  
7 Leone by August 1991. That's when we actually begin the special  
8 ops with the RUF.

9           But what is interesting about this witness here, I am not  
15:46:01 10 sure if we have covered this part, but I think what we missed is  
11 this training in Gbarnga in 1990 and their being in Gbarnga may  
12 help to even - if we dug a little deeper may help to establish my  
13 presence in Gbarnga, whether it is '91 or '90, because don't  
14 forget again the witness that we just left is placing me in  
15:46:28 15 Gbarnga in March 1990, okay. But he is now in Gbarnga doing  
16 training in late 1990, around September. So I think this may  
17 help us to establish that I am not in Gbarnga in 1990 by any  
18 stretch of the imagination. But his assertion that by 1991 he is  
19 in Sierra Leone and is recaptured, I would put it to August/  
15:47:00 20 September 1991, which would be true.

21           Q. Now, you will note, Mr Taylor, that the witness said that  
22 he had voluntarily gone to see his grandfather in Bomaru, you  
23 recall that?

24           A. Yes.

15:47:31 25           Q. And then he was captured by NPFL/RUF forces. Do you follow  
26 that?

27           A. Yes, I do.

28           Q. Now, help us, which is correct then; that account, or were  
29 you the one who sent him?

1 A. Oh, no, I didn't send him. I didn't even know the man. I  
2 mean here is Nya that has just gotten through with some serious  
3 training on radio operation by Galakpalah, he says he leaves and  
4 he goes back to Ganta, Nimba to visit his people and then he  
15:48:01 5 leaves and he enters into Sierra Leone via Vahun, so he really  
6 used a bush path. So I didn't send him to Sierra Leone as he  
7 says. So that version is correct. I did not send him. He went  
8 over there voluntarily.

9 Q. Now, he went on to give this further explanation at page  
15:48:24 10 4363, line 25:

11 "Q. Do you know the name of the nearby station that was  
12 used as a test?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Where was that?

15:48:36 15 A. He tested with Treetop, Butterfly and the nearby  
16 station that was in Vahun and it was called Alpha Charlie  
17 and the other one that was in Voinjama was Delta Bravo.

18 Q. Do you know what the code name Treetop referred to?

19 A. Yes. The radio station called Treetop was the overall  
15:48:59 20 station for the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.

21 Q. Do you know where this station was based?

22 A. In Gbarnga. Butterfly was the radio station. It was  
23 given that code name for Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor.

24 Q. Do you know where this radio station was located?

15:49:17 25 A. Yes, at that time it was in Gbarnga at the Executive  
26 Mansion Ground. Butterfly was a radio station and it was  
27 operating under the command of Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor."  
28 Do you agree with all of that?

29 A. In 1991, yes, I agree that Butterfly - it was my radio

1 operator and he is right that Treetop is the military command  
2 post of the NPFL which were at two separate places. So to that  
3 extent he is correct if he is speaking about 1991, but not  
4 before.

15:50:08 5 Q. The witness goes on to give this description, Mr Taylor,  
6 page 4365:

7 "Roosevelt used to go to the front line together with  
8 Mekunagbe, Francis Mewon and would return to the base or to that  
9 ground until the other radio stations were installed later."

15:50:35 10 Jumping a few lines:

11 "Roosevelt and other operators like Francis Mewon used to  
12 go together with Anthony Mekunagbe, they would go to the war  
13 front and later return to Koindu or to that particular ground at  
14 Baidu. They would return because there was no other radio  
15 station apart from that station in order to give - send the  
16 reports to the Gbarnga station which was Butterfly."

17 So you note that, communications between Mekunagbe through  
18 this radio station established in Baidu to Butterfly in Gbarnga.  
19 Do you agree with that, Mr Taylor?

15:51:18 20 A. If he is talking about 1991 it's possible. But an  
21 interesting - a very interesting point to this, don't forget  
22 Isaac Mongor just said to this Court in the testimony that you  
23 read that there was a radio with him and he called me for  
24 ammunition. And here is a man talking about the complexity of  
15:51:45 25 only a radio in all of the long procedures. So it's just a  
26 marker that we will know because that's how these lies come up.  
27 Mongor said, and we read it here, that he communicated with me.

28 Q. Through a field radio?

29 A. Through a field radio, you understand me. So I don't know

1 who was this operator because the only person now who was  
2 captured over there that really knows operation of radio besides  
3 Foday Sankoh is now Lansana. So maybe Lansana may be that  
4 operator, I guess we will get to see. But in direct answer to  
15:52:19 5 your question, there is a possibility after the connection  
6 that - because they really have no radios over there, that there  
7 is communication in Liberia, with whom I don't know.

8 Q. Well, can I put the question in this way then, Mr Taylor:  
9 What in due course happened to Anthony Mekunagbe?

15:52:44 10 A. Anthony, he gets arrested.

11 Q. And?

12 A. Tried.

13 Q. And?

14 A. He dies in jail before he is executed.

15:52:55 15 Q. Right. Now you have told us that before. Now the reason  
16 why I am asking is this: You have suggested to this Court that  
17 the launch of this invasion of Sierra Leone involved a conspiracy  
18 to which you were not party involving Mekunagbe, Varney and  
19 Sankoh, yes?

15:53:18 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. That's why I am asking this: This witness, a radio  
22 operator, is speaking then of communications between you - well,  
23 between Gbarnga and Mekunagbe, yes?

24 A. Yes.

15:53:36 25 Q. Now, help us, was there a time when you were, in effect,  
26 supervising or speaking to the Mekunagbe who had been carrying  
27 out these clandestine activities whilst he was still in Sierra  
28 Leone? Do you follow me?

29 A. I follow you. No, to put it in perspective - I get your

1 question. If we focus on the period that he is talking about  
2 here, I am looking at the period that he describes in what he is  
3 saying here, June/July of 1991 when he is captured by NPFL/RUF  
4 forces. Now if we zero in on that period, which I am saying I  
15:54:33 5 disagree with, it has to be August or September, Mekunagbe and  
6 these guys are still around. They have not been - remember, the  
7 invasion in Sierra Leone occurs in March 1991. So Mekunagbe and  
8 these guys are still around. Mekunagbe is still a commander over  
9 there. It is late - it is after this particular period that they  
15:54:56 10 get into this trouble.

11 So the fact that Mekunagbe could be in some contact, I  
12 wouldn't argue with that. It's possible that Mekunagbe and  
13 Varney and them are still in contact. We are talking about,  
14 what, three or four months into the Sierra Leone thing.

15:55:13 15 Q. Well, let me pose the question differently, Mr Taylor, so  
16 that we can understand clearly what you're saying. After you, as  
17 leader of the NPFL, make the decision officially to assist the  
18 RUF, thereafter were you in contact with Mekunagbe despite his  
19 previous clandestine activities?

15:55:44 20 A. Well, we can - the way the question is posed, I need some  
21 help because by this time I have not discovered the clandestine  
22 activities of Mekunagbe, okay. It is discovered later. It is  
23 bringing Mekunagbe and these guys to investigation for Black  
24 Kadaffa that the whole Sierra Leonean situation comes out. So  
15:56:10 25 it's sometime later. So of course the period, if we zero in on  
26 this period, he is still a principal commander in the NPFL. We  
27 haven't unmasked Mekunagbe yet.

28 Q. Yes, but was there a point where you were communicating  
29 with Mekunagbe whilst he was in Sierra Leone?

1 A. No, no, no. I don't have any communication with Mekunagbe,  
2 no. Personally, no. You know, Mekunagbe is a commander and if  
3 there is a message that comes through the chain of command I  
4 would know what he is doing, but I am not sure if - in fact, what  
15:56:50 5 this witness is alleging, I don't - I doubt very much if  
6 Mekunagbe was inside Sierra Leone. I doubt it. Is this what he  
7 is saying?

8 Q. Yes, it's directly what he is saying, page 4366, that's why  
9 I am asking you this. Page 4366, line 6:

15:57:13 10 "Q. You said that Anthony Mekunagbe would go to the front  
11 line and later return to Koindu and send reports to  
12 Gbarnga. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What do you mean by this?

15:57:28 15 A. Anthony Mekunagbe was the overall commander who  
16 supervised every military operation that took place in  
17 Sierra Leone at that time. He had only one communication  
18 under his command at that particular time. So he had to  
19 give a report to his boss, who was Mr Charles Ghankay  
15:57:49 20 Taylor, on a daily basis in Sierra Leone. Based on that he  
21 would go to the various front lines, like Kailahun, Koiya,  
22 Mobai, Bunumbu, Daru Town, which were all under the control  
23 of the RUF/NPFL fighters in 1991, but all of those areas  
24 never had communication sets."

15:58:16 25 A. No, no.

26 Q. You understand the point I am getting at now?

27 A. Uh-huh.

28 Q. Because what the witness is describing is that Mekunagbe is  
29 on the ground in Sierra Leone supervising military activities and

1 communicating on a daily basis through this single communication  
2 set with Gbarnga, hence with you. Do you follow me?

3 A. Yes, now I follow. Total nonsense. No, no, no. Mekunagbe  
4 is not in any contact with me from Sierra Leone. Even while he  
15:58:55 5 is in Liberia he is never in contact with me. I never spoke to  
6 any commander on the radio. No. Oh, no, I just got the - no,  
7 no, no, no, no. Oh, no. Because if - I will tell you what  
8 happened. If I had known that Mekunagbe had crossed the border  
9 into Sierra Leone at the time - don't forget when this operation  
15:59:17 10 in Sierra Leone started and it was announced in March, we closed  
11 the border. Mekunagbe would have been removed from his place and  
12 arrested. No, no, that is totally, totally untrue. No.

13 Q. But he continues at page 4367, line 20:

14 "Q. How do you know that Anthony Mekunagbe would send  
15:59:40 15 these reports to Gbarnga?

16 A. I knew that because of the way he addressed the  
17 message. He always said from Mekunagbe, Anthony, in  
18 brackets Dry Pepper, to Ebony, which was a code name known  
19 for Charles Ghankay Taylor.

15:59:59 20 Q. Were you present when these reports were sent?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can you describe the content of these reports, if you  
23 know?

24 A. Yes, the content was information."

16:00:13 25 Page 4368, line 11:

26 "Q. What do you remember about the situation reports that  
27 were sent?

28 A. Among the lot that he sent he used to inform  
29 Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor about the frequent

1           misunderstanding between the NPFL fighting troops in Sierra  
2           Leone and the RUF vanguards who were trained purposefully  
3           to lead the war into Sierra Leone, also the relationship  
4           between the NPFL fighting forces in Sierra Leone and the  
16:00:48 5           civilian population in Sierra Leone.

6           Q.   And how do you know he was reporting to Charles Taylor?

7           A.   Like I said previously, according to the way the  
8           message was addressed. It would always show that this  
9           message was meant for Charles Taylor.

16:01:10 10          Q.   Can you describe some of these responses?

11          A.   Amongst the lot that were sent back to Anthony  
12          Mekunagbe, once Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor sent a directive,  
13          or an instruction, that should be with immediate effect and  
14          within 10 days that General Anthony Mekunagbe should make  
16:01:35 15          sure, alongside his Special Forces, that he sent - that he  
16          should evacuate all the NPFL fighting forces from Sierra  
17          Leone back to the Liberian soil."

18          So, first of all, you see the time frame, Mr Taylor? He is  
19          talking about now in that last passage about events which we know  
16:01:58 20          well about, Top 20, Top 40, Top Final, okay? What he is saying,  
21          in effect, is that throughout this period Anthony Mekunagbe is on  
22          the ground in Sierra Leone with your knowledge and he is  
23          communicating with you regularly. Now, what do you say about  
24          that?

16:02:18 25          A.   Total nonsense. Total lie. If Mekunagbe is on the ground  
26          in Sierra Leone at this time, why am I sending Dopoe Menkarzon to  
27          withdraw people? I could have just ordered him to withdraw the  
28          people, because Sam Tuah is a junior to Anthony Mekunagbe. But  
29          then let's look at the beginning of it. Because when we go back



1 to some of the clarifications that he tried to make, there was  
2 one portion that was naming - he said there was one radio back in  
3 about '91 that dealt with Kuiuva and he calls other towns. Now,  
4 is he working with Mekunagbe at this time to even know that there  
16:03:06 5 is one station and Mekunagbe is communicating with me? Because  
6 everybody is supposed to be in the radio room where there's one  
7 radio and this man is taking them from place to place. So I am  
8 not sure if he is working with Mekunagbe at all, but in 1992 when  
9 this situation occurs, why would I have to be in communication  
16:03:28 10 with Mekunagbe when Foday Sankoh is in Gbarnga? He has come to  
11 report matters to me. Foday Sankoh is in and out of Gbarnga as  
12 from August 1991 throughout, so why would in May 1992  
13 Anthony Mekunagbe - in fact, Anthony Mekunagbe was not the  
14 individual that brought this particular thing to my attention in  
16:03:52 15 May 1992; it was Foday Sankoh himself.

16 So why would I have a commander on the ground in Sierra  
17 Leone, okay? Either we agree that Sam Tuah as commanding the  
18 forces, who was a junior man, or we have to agree that it was  
19 Anthony Mekunagbe. In any case, it was not Anthony Mekunagbe.  
16:04:17 20 He was not on the ground in Sierra Leone. It was Sam Tuah. And  
21 all the OTP witnesses have said here that the commander was Sam  
22 Tuah. So 1992 that he is talking about, he has gotten it all  
23 wrong, all mixed up, that - he has gotten it wrong. Because  
24 Foday Sankoh is in and out, he reports this matter and we deal  
16:04:37 25 with it. No, that's wrong. That's wrong.

26 Q. Because you do appreciate the significance of this,  
27 Mr Taylor. Because your case is there is this conspiracy in  
28 which Mekunagbe is implicated and it is all done behind your  
29 back, yet according to this witness, Foday Lansana, you were busy

1 communicating with Anthony Mekuagbe whilst he is in Sierra Leone  
2 supervising matters. So you see the two accounts can't match,  
3 can they?

4 A. Yeah, but his account don't even match OTP witnesses'  
16:05:20 5 accounts. I don't know in this Court before these judges of any  
6 witness that have come before these judges and say, "Ah the  
7 principal NPFL commander during this Top 20 before then inside  
8 Sierra Leone was Mekuagbe who was stationed inside." No, no,  
9 no, no, no, no, no. There is no Mekuagbe inside Sierra Leone in  
16:05:41 10 1992. No, no, that is totally wrong.

11 Sam Tuah, I admit, commanded our special operations people  
12 in Sierra Leone; not Mekuagbe. That is totally, totally false.  
13 Totally false. Now, maybe Nya Korto knows Mekuagbe very - he  
14 must know him, because Mekuagbe is Mano and Nya Lansana is Mano.  
16:06:09 15 I am sure they know each other because he is from the Ganta area  
16 just like Mekuagbe. But in 1992 this Mekuagbe man is not  
17 around during that Top 20, Top Final. This is why I have to  
18 say - and by the way, let's - in fact, not too long after this  
19 situation, Mekuagbe and these guys fall into this trouble in  
16:06:37 20 1992. No, it is Sam Tuah and not Mekuagbe. This is why I sent  
21 Dope Menkarzon to withdraw the men.

22 Q. Well, the witness continues in this way, Mr Taylor, at page  
23 4371, line 13:

24 "I said in May 1992 there was an instruction from  
16:06:57 25 Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor to Anthony Mekuagbe that all the  
26 generals of the Special Forces, the battalion commanders,  
27 that they should evacuate all the NPFL fighting men from  
28 Sierra Leone back to Liberia.

29 Q. Why was this instruction issued?

1 A. Based on the information we used to have and the  
2 confusion that always took place amongst the NPFL  
3 commanders and the vanguards of the RUF, which resulted to  
4 too much fighting amongst them, was the reason for the  
16:07:38 5 instruction of the NPFL troops going back to Liberia.

6 Q. What do you mean by 'confusion'?

7 A. There was a power struggle in which the vanguards of  
8 the RUF thought that the leadership of the RUF should be  
9 directly under their command and that the NPFL should be  
16:08:01 10 exempted or removed from all other appointments within  
11 Sierra Leone. At that time the NPFL commanders, like  
12 Anthony Mekunagbe, Francis Mewon, Dopoe Menkarzon, were  
13 fully in control of supplies and monitoring and dispatching  
14 of everything that went on in Sierra Leone. That resulted  
16:08:25 15 to in-fighting between the NPFL fighting troops and the RUF  
16 vanguards in a series that was referred to as Top 20, Top  
17 40 and Top Final. It was serious bloodshed took place  
18 during those times."

19 So he is being quite clear, Mr Taylor. Dopoe - you give an  
16:08:49 20 order to Anthony Mekunagbe to evacuate all the NPFL men fighting  
21 from Sierra Leone back to Liberia. That's what he is saying.  
22 Couldn't be clearer.

23 A. Yeah, but he is wrong. Well, if he is right, then  
24 everybody else is wrong. Because then that means the OTP has a  
16:09:12 25 problem, because most of their witnesses have said the commander  
26 in Sierra Leone was Sam Tuah. They said that Sam Tuah was the  
27 commander. So if this boy is saying that information that they  
28 used to get - again, this appears to be someone now that I don't  
29 know whether he is in the area. Because as a radio man - I don't

1 know where he is about this time, because he says based on  
2 information we used to get. So apparently this is somebody that  
3 has tried to explain a story to this Nya Korto man. Because we  
4 got to know he is actually Nya Korto. He calls himself Lansana.  
16:09:55 5 But we went to his home and found he is Nya Korto. This is what  
6 he is saying, based on information they used to get.

7 I don't know if I can be any clearer than this. The  
8 operations in Sierra Leone - the special operations were ordered  
9 and agreed upon between Foday Sankoh and myself. Foday Sankoh  
16:10:16 10 came to Liberia many times between August and May - August 1991  
11 and May 1992. This conflict developed. There was - really he's  
12 right - bloodshed, and I sent General Menkarzon to go and  
13 withdraw Sam Tuah and his men from Sierra Leone. This guy is  
14 totally off the track. No, that's not true.

16:10:42 15 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, he goes into even greater detail at page  
16 4373, line 18:

17 "How about the phrase 'Top Final', that was the last stage  
18 that finally concluded before Mr Taylor gave the directive or  
19 instruction to the NPFL troops for them to be evacuated from  
16:11:02 20 Sierra Leone."

21 Over the page to page 4374, line 24:

22 "The directive was written by Charles Taylor to Anthony  
23 Mekunagbe and all the Special Forces battalion commanders  
24 that were under the NPFL in Sierra Leone that a special  
16:11:25 25 copy which was read out to all the NPFL fighting men who  
26 were in Sierra Leone for immediate action. It was sent  
27 through radio communication message, documented, and  
28 brought over by the Special Forces and finally, upon their  
29 arrival, they went into the radio station in Baidu.

1 Mr Charles Ghankay Taylor spoke to Anthony Mekunagbe one to  
2 one over the set before they departed to Kailahun,  
3 Pendembu, and all other sub bases where NPFL soldiers were  
4 based.

16:12:05 5 Q. Were you present when this conversation occurred over  
6 the radio?

7 A. Affirmative.

8 Q. You said there was a message send over the radio from  
9 Charles Taylor.

16:12:19 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. There was also a written directive?

12 A. Yes. The same message was copied to Anthony Mekunagbe  
13 and all the other generals who were responsible for the  
14 conduct of this particular exercise and upon their arrival

16:12:35 15 in Baidu, whilst they were on their way to Pendembu,  
16 Kailahun and the other areas like Kuiiva, et cetera,  
17 Mr Charles Taylor spoke with them in the radio station to  
18 confirm whether they had received the message and he sent  
19 to them for them to take action."

16:12:57 20 Page 4376:

21 "Q. Who sent the radio communication?

22 A. The radio communication was sent by Charles Taylor.

23 Q. Who was it sent to exactly, first of all?

24 A. It was sent to Anthony Mekunagbe.

16:13:20 25 Q. What happened next?

26 A. The generals who were to come on the ground and carry  
27 out this action, followed the message and upon their  
28 arrival to Baidu, Mr Charles Taylor spoke to them in my  
29 presence whilst each and every one of them was in the radio

1 room.

2 Q. When you say the generals arrived after the radio  
3 message, what generals are you talking about exactly?

4 A. Francis Mewon was one of the generals, Anthony  
16:13:56 5 Mekunagbe, Dopoe Menkarzon and followed by other generals  
6 that were around. They were all Special Forces from the  
7 NPFL in Liberia."

8 Page 4377, line 9:

9 "Q. You said there was a conversation between  
16:14:14 10 Charles Taylor and who exactly?

11 A. He spoke directly to Anthony Mekunagbe whilst the other  
12 generals, Mewon and Dopoe Menkarzon, were close to the  
13 radio communication set.

14 Q. Were you present when this communication took place?

16:14:35 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What did Mr Taylor say during this communication?

17 A. He said, 'Based upon the unaccountable number of  
18 communications I have received with regards complaints  
19 about infighting, the bad treatment given to civilians in  
16:14:54 20 Sierra Leone, cocoa and coffee issues', he said he was  
21 hereby ordering the evacuation of NPFL troops back to  
22 Liberia and that should be put into effect within ten  
23 days."

24 Mr Taylor, he is saying it repeatedly?

16:15:14 25 A. Well, he is just repeating the lie. I don't know  
26 what - look, your Honours, the fact of the matter is this: There  
27 are troops in Sierra Leone, troops are ordered out, Foday Sankoh  
28 comes to Gbarnga, there is no need to send a radio message. I  
29 send General Menkarzon with transport equipment from Gbarnga to

1 go and do not return until he withdraws everybody. This man here  
2 talking about other people, Mekunagbe, there's a withdrawal. If  
3 I had sent Mekunagbe to withdraw these people I would say I sent  
4 him. If I had sent Mewon I would have said. I sent Dopoe  
16:15:59 5 Menkarzon, and I know that very clearly, to go into Sierra Leone  
6 and bring back every NPFL man that had been sent on special  
7 operations. So he has got it totally wrong.

8 The only thing factual about what he's saying here is that  
9 a withdrawal occurred. As to who did it, he is dead wrong. I am  
16:16:20 10 as certain today as I was certain at the time I gave the orders  
11 to Dopoe Menkarzon. So this nonsense about Anthony Mekunagbe is  
12 just that. Mekunagbe was not the man ordered to withdraw the  
13 forces from Sierra Leone. It was Menkarzon. So I don't know how  
14 he picked up this.

16:16:39 15 Now here is a man - you know these people, they prolong  
16 these things. Senior NPFL generals go and the President is  
17 supposed to be talking to them. Here is someone who is an RUF  
18 person would be in the room. Even - I tell you something, if  
19 this were true, if this were true, that means those senior  
16:17:03 20 generals - that would be a disrespect to me that a total stranger  
21 and not a part of NPFL operation would stand in the radio room to  
22 listen to it. Nonsense. That's where these men place themselves  
23 into everything to try to make a point that they are so  
24 important. Here is Nya Korto who is with the RUF is now another  
16:17:25 25 single man in the radio room with senior generals from the NPFL  
26 who are going to carry out a mission and are waiting to hear from  
27 the commander-in-chief, he is now the lone ranger standing in  
28 there listening. Nonsense. Even if those generals were in  
29 there, he would not have been inside that room.

1           So I mean, it's very clear in my mind, as clear as day, I  
2       withdrew my men, General Menkarzon went in with transport from  
3       Gbarnga. It did not take a radio message. General Menkarzon had  
4       the orders and he went with the transport to the border. Went  
16:18:02 5       in, collected the people and drove them back into Liberia. And  
6       that's what happened.

7       Q.     He continues, page 4378:

8           "Q.   As a result of this communication and directive, what  
9       if anything happened?

16:18:21 10       A.    The generals addressed the troops and evacuation  
11       started taking place within the ten days and I was part of  
12       that group that went to Vahun based on that instruction.

13       Q.    Did you remain in Vahun?

14       A.    Yes. I was in Vahun for two weeks when I received  
16:18:46 15       another instruction from the deputy signals commander,  
16       Galakpalah, to return with one radio set to Pendembu.

17       Q.    When you say you received an instruction from the  
18       deputy signal commander, how exactly did you receive this  
19       instruction?

16:19:11 20       A.    He sent a radio message to the commander who was in  
21       Vahun, Colonel Wesseh, that I should go to Sierra Leone  
22       with a radio set for Mr Sankoh. He said he received  
23       instruction that the entire Sierra Leone had no  
24       communication sets, so I was promoted to the rank of major  
16:19:33 25       and I was told to go back to Pendembu and install another  
26       radio set for Mr Sankoh for him to be using it to  
27       communicate with Charles Taylor."

28       Now I thought, Mr Taylor, that following Top Final and the  
29       order to withdraw NPFL forces, I thought that was the end of any



1 communication between you and Mr Sankoh?

2 A. Oh, definitely, it was. But there is something that just  
3 struck me about this lie. He is saying that there was no  
4 communication set in Sierra Leone, so he was ordered to go. We  
16:20:17 5 are talking about 1992. So if I am right, and I stand corrected,  
6 this witness is suggesting that between March 1991, which is the  
7 entry, up until now May 1992, they have no communication.

8 Q. Apart from the one set that he had installed at Sankoh's  
9 ground.

16:20:44 10 A. Which is at Pendembu now, right? But then that can't be  
11 true because there is supposed to be another set that Mongor has  
12 communicating with me.

13 Q. A field radio.

14 A. A field radio that he is communicating with me. There is a  
16:21:01 15 field radio. So it can't be - if he is right then Mongor is  
16 wrong and if Mongor is right then he's wrong. So again these  
17 accounts are questionable, okay. They are questionable because  
18 at this particular time here is a gentleman who says that he is  
19 captured around June/July 1991. He is captured by NPFL/RUF  
16:21:28 20 forces. I disagree with that date. Now here he is and he says  
21 now that at the withdrawal of Top 20, Top Final he withdraws to  
22 Liberia.

23 Q. Vahun.

24 A. He comes to Vahun. Then now he is given an order by  
16:21:48 25 Galakpalah that I know very well to go back and install - is this  
26 another or one radio at a place that Sankoh can communicate with  
27 me. So now if Sankoh already has a radio this is the second  
28 radio at Foday Sankoh's place. You see that? So there cannot be  
29 - this cannot be happening because there is no need to install a

1 second radio at Foday Sankoh's place because Foday Sankoh is  
2 supposed to have a radio. So he cannot be going to install this  
3 radio at Foday Sankoh's house again. So if this is the case,  
4 then there is a big disinformation going on here that cannot be  
16:22:32 5 right.

6 Q. You say you know this individual, Galakpalah?

7 A. I know Galakpalah, yes.

8 Q. Was he a member of the NPFL?

9 A. Oh, yes. He was the deputy chief of radio operation that -  
16:22:51 10 as he said, that trained them, yes, Galakpalah. The chief of  
11 communications at that time was one of the Special Forces called  
12 William Gensen. He is on the Special Forces list. Yes, I know  
13 Galakpalah.

14 Q. What about Colonel Wesseh?

16:23:06 15 A. No, I do not know him.

16 Q. W-E-S-S-E-H?

17 A. It's pronounced Wesseh.

18 Q. You don't know him?

19 A. No.

16:23:18 20 Q. So Mr Lansana has got Galakpalah right at least then?

21 A. Oh, Galakpalah is - but he says that he is trained in the  
22 NPFL and he leaves and goes to Sierra Leone. Remember he says he  
23 is trained in September 1990, okay. This is one of those - and I  
24 believe him because Nya Korto, this Mano boy is from Nimba and as  
16:23:47 25 he came down I am sure he was one of those that was trained. And  
26 to be trained in Gbarnga in September 1990 I would say yes,  
27 because what we did at that particular time, William Gensen was a  
28 radio specialist and after he trained people, Galakpalah - you  
29 would not just get on the radio. You would be trained before you

1 get on it. So he is right about Galakpalah.

2 But what I am disagreeing with here is that after he is  
3 withdrawn by my orders in May 1992, that Galakpalah would order  
4 him to take a radio back to Foday Sankoh as if Foday Sankoh does  
16:24:26 5 not have a radio by 1992. And it is impossible for the RUF to  
6 have been operating, okay, between March 1991 to - an entire year  
7 without communication. So I am saying he is lying. He was not  
8 given an order by Galakpalah to take a radio back into Sankoh.

9 If he went back to Sierra Leone, he went back on his own. This  
16:24:53 10 is the point I am advancing. Because I mean what is being  
11 described here, we are describing a year of maybe one, at most  
12 two radios, in the entire RUF. That's not possible. If that is  
13 possible, then that means to Mongor didn't have a radio and he is  
14 lying about talking to me directly. So where does he get his  
16:25:13 15 radio from? And who is his operator? So, no, that is not true.  
16 I don't think that Galakpalah ordered him to, what - so that  
17 means he could trump my orders? No, I don't think so. I don't  
18 think so. I don't think so.

19 Q. Well, he goes on, Mr Taylor:

16:25:33 20 "Q. This instruction you received to go back to Sierra  
21 Leone, can you give an approximate time?

22 A. Yes, I received the instruction to go back to Sierra  
23 Leone to install the radio and that was in June 1992."  
24 Do you follow?

16:25:50 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. "I was in Sierra Leone at that time and to do an  
27 installation for Mr Sankoh at Pendembu.

28 Q. As a result of being given this instruction, what did  
29 you do?

1 A. I moved immediately with an escort to Pendembu.

2 Q. Who went with you to Pendembu?

3 A. Mr Sankoh sent some securities from the RUF side to  
4 receive me on the borderline.

16:26:15 5 Q. When you entered Sierra Leone this time when Mr Sankoh  
6 sent these securities to the borderline, do you remember  
7 what area of the border this was?

8 A. Yes. I was received in Bomaru and going towards  
9 Pendembu.

16:26:33 10 Q. Now, just before we proceed you said you received this  
11 instruction to go and install a radio set for Foday Sankoh.  
12 Was there any other information given with regards to this  
13 instruction?

14 A. The only instruction that I received, besides going  
16:26:50 15 with the radio, was that I was promoted and that I was now  
16 going there as the overall signal commander by  
17 recommendation made by Mr Sankoh for me to work with him in  
18 Sierra Leone.

19 I received this promotion based by a recommendation made by  
16:27:13 20 Mr Sankoh for me to go to work with him and he did say that  
21 I was a peaceful person and that I was not part of the  
22 dispute that took place between his men and the others, so  
23 he said I should go back to Sierra Leone and work with  
24 him."

16:27:35 25 And then he goes on, having mentioned the promotion, do you  
26 recall, to major:

27 "The promotion was given to me from Gbarnga and based on  
28 the communication that I received from the deputy overall  
29 commander for signals and radios in Liberia."

1 And then he goes on over the page to mention that he was  
2 given - the instruction came from Galakpalah.

3 Now, Mr Taylor, let us just pause for a minute and consider  
4 part of the logic of this. He is going back to Sierra Leone  
16:28:17 5 because there is no communication available to Mr Sankoh, yes?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. He receives that instruction from Galakpalah. It means  
8 then, doesn't it, logically, that the decision to send him back  
9 must have come directly from you because Sankoh would have had no  
16:28:42 10 means of communicating such a request. Do you follow?

11 A. Yes, I do, which would be totally, totally nonsensical.  
12 And he would be lying. Because when you put this together now,  
13 the only thing I can say this boy did, this boy stole an NPFL  
14 radio and bolted across the border. Here is a man taking a radio  
16:29:05 15 and he goes with the radio by himself on the other side,

16 securities are sent for him. This boy is a Sierra Leonean at  
17 heart. He remains so. And if he carried a radio over it has to  
18 be stolen because we are talking about two weeks after the  
19 withdrawal of all of my people. And this nonsense he talks  
16:29:24 20 about, maybe Foday Sankoh did give him a rank as appreciation for  
21 what he had done. How in the world do we withdraw forces from

22 Sierra Leone and two weeks later he is given a radio to take back  
23 into Sierra Leone where Foday Sankoh sent forces to the border to  
24 receive him? He doesn't mention one Liberian that accompanied

16:29:47 25 him back to the border. The only thing I can put to this boy is  
26 that he stole this radio because he is Sierra Leonean more than  
27 Liberian. He had - remember, he had gone to see his grandfather,  
28 he had come back, he was - he had gone back there, he was  
29 captured, he is now withdrawn. He is a Sierra Leonean at heart,

1 and God bless him. But if anything of this nature - the only  
2 thing I can propose here is that Nya Korto took this radio and  
3 used it as a way - as a goodwill just to return to Sierra Leone  
4 and do his work as a trained man. This is the thing. But there  
16:30:23 5 is no way that Galakpalah would have trumped my orders two weeks  
6 to take a radio back to install it for Sankoh, no.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we have got to call time on that  
8 now.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we will adjourn now.

16:30:36 10 I will remind you of the order not to discuss the evidence,  
11 Mr Taylor.

12 We'll adjourn till 9.30 tomorrow morning.

13 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 28 October 2009  
16:31:21 15 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	30343
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	30343