



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 1 OCTOBER 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

---

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Erica Bussey  
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Thursday, 1 October 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:42 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll take appearances, please.

6 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
7 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J  
8 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora, and Maja  
9 Dimitrova.

09:31:57 10 Also, Mr President, the Prosecution has a trial management  
11 issue that it would like to raise today. We could either do that  
12 before the accused begins his testimony this morning or later in  
13 the day, as your Honours wish, but I did want to alert you to  
14 that matter.

09:32:13 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Thank you, Ms Hollis. We'll  
16 deal with that before we start the evidence. Appearances,  
17 please, Mr Griffiths.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
19 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself, Courtenay  
09:32:28 20 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah of counsel, Mr Silas Chekera  
21 of counsel, and we're also joined again today by Ms Haydee  
22 Dijkstal, one of our interns.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. What's the  
24 trial management issue, Ms Hollis?

09:32:46 25 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Mr President. Mr President, on 8  
26 June, when we were discussing estimates for testimony, the  
27 Defence indicated that for this witness their estimate was that  
28 the testimony, both for direct and cross-examination, would be  
29 six to eight weeks. Now, I believe we're either on the 10th or

1 11th week of direct examination and the Prosecution would like to  
2 know - would like to have a realistic time frame for when the  
3 direct examination will be finished. And that is our request,  
4 Mr President.

09:33:19 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis.

6 Mr Griffiths, I do note that on 8 June you did estimate the  
7 evidence of Mr Taylor would take between six and eight weeks and,  
8 in fact, you said that would be both in chief and  
9 cross-examination. However, we recognise that the estimates of  
10 counsel on the length of testimony of their witnesses is  
11 notoriously inaccurate. So, obviously, at that stage, on 8 June,  
12 it was impossible to be precise. But, nevertheless, in the light  
13 of what Ms Hollis has said, is there any estimate you can give as  
14 to the anticipated continued length of this testimony?

09:34:13 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, yes. Your Honours, as you  
16 rightly observed, Mr President, it's notoriously difficult to  
17 provide an accurate estimate of the length of time testimony will  
18 take, and at the stage at which I gave that time estimate, I  
19 anticipated that six to eight weeks would be entirely adequate.  
09:34:37 20 Unfortunately, we need to bear in mind that we've effectively  
21 lost a week due to my own illness and also because, quite  
22 properly, your Honours have decided not to sit on a Friday.  
23 Again, the estimate I've given, bearing those factors in mind, is  
24 at this stage not that widely inaccurate.

09:35:02 25 Nonetheless, taking all of those factors into account, I  
26 estimate that when we resume after the recess that we should be  
27 able to conclude Mr Taylor's testimony in chief in the order of a  
28 couple of weeks. Thereafter, it's impossible for me to  
29 anticipate how long the Prosecution will take in terms of

1 cross-examination. And given the breadth of the issues, that is  
2 also likely to last some weeks, bearing in mind, of course, that  
3 on resumption we have, on my estimation, some seven weeks before  
4 we rise for the Christmas vacation, and then we also have to  
09:35:54 5 factor in possible re-examination and also what I anticipate will  
6 be a substantial amount of time devoted to the exhibition of the  
7 263 plus documents which we have already identified - marked for  
8 identification. And from the reaction of counsel opposite  
9 yesterday, when the issue as to whether or not that process  
09:36:22 10 should be begun before the recess was raised, I anticipate that  
11 there will be much argument regarding those 263 documents.

12 Bearing all of those factors in mind, bearing also in mind  
13 the fact that we have an extended Christmas vacation because of  
14 the move, it seems to me likely that the testimony of Mr Taylor  
09:36:45 15 will run into the New Year.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

17 Ms Hollis, I think Mr Griffiths has answered your immediate  
18 inquiry, which was a realistic time frame for when the direct  
19 examination will be finished. Leaving aside the other  
09:37:09 20 considerations, Mr Griffiths has said a couple of weeks after  
21 resumption after this Court recess. So I think from then on it's  
22 going to be a question of perhaps legal arguments on the  
23 documents marked for identification and, of course, your  
24 cross-examination.

09:37:29 25 MS HOLLIS: Yes. Thank you, Mr President. Now we do,  
26 hopefully, have a realistic estimate for the remainder of direct.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, hopefully so.

28 Mr Taylor, before there are any questions asked, I'll  
29 remind you, you are still bound by your oath to tell the truth.

1 Yes, please, Mr Griffiths.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, may it please your Honours.

3 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

4 [On former affirmation]

09:37:52 5 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

6 Q. Mr Taylor, I now propose for us to move on to deal with  
7 another witness who testified in November of last year in open  
8 session, a witness, TF1-045, Augustine Mallah. Now, on 12  
9 November 2008, the witness told us this, at page 20075: He was  
09:38:32 10 asked about one Patrick Lamin and described him as a Sierra  
11 Leonean Special Forces.

12 Now, I pause to make this inquiry: Do you know of a  
13 Special Forces of Sierra Leonean origin called Patrick Lamin?

14 A. No, I have - no, I don't know him.

09:38:53 15 Q. He was then asked this question:

16 "Q. You have told the Court that while you were training  
17 Foday Sankoh came to the training base. During the time  
18 you were in Pujehun District" - now, note these dates  
19 - "from 1991 to 1994, during that time did you have any  
09:39:15 20 other contact with Foday Sankoh?

21 A. Yes, I had seen him beside the time I was at the base  
22 undergoing training. After my graduation, I later saw him  
23 again in Zimmi and later I also saw him in Bo Gendema.

24 Q. When you saw him in Zimmi, do you remember the year?  
09:39:41 25 What year?

26 A. It was in 1991.

27 Q. And did you learn why he was in Zimmi?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Why?

1 A. He came to see soldiers, according to what he said,  
2 because at any time he came he will call most of the  
3 soldiers or all of the soldiers to speak to them and he  
4 will inform them that he has brought some arms and  
09:40:01 5 ammunition and some medicine for us.

6 Q. When you saw him in Zimmi at that point in time, did he  
7 bring arms and ammunition and medicines?

8 A. Yes, that was what he himself said.

9 Q. And did he tell you where he obtained the arms and  
09:40:21 10 ammunition and medicines?

11 A. Yes, he said he brought them from Gbarnga. He said  
12 they were from his brother, Charles Taylor. That was what  
13 he used to say.

14 Q. Do you know where he was based when he was not at  
09:40:41 15 Pujehun District?

16 A. He was based in Gbarnga."

17 Now, bearing in mind the time frame given, in 1991, is that  
18 true or false?

19 A. Well, I will qualify it this way: It could be both true or  
09:40:57 20 false. If it's - and he's just said 1991 now. Foday Sankoh is  
21 in Gbarnga late 1991. If this reference is regarding I would say  
22 at about August 1991, then this will be right. If it's before  
23 then, it would be wrong, but because he's generalised the 1991,  
24 it's a little tricky. But, you know, I'm here to help the Court  
09:41:33 25 and tell what I know. This could be right, if he's referring to  
26 any time after August 1991.

27 Q. This is why I'm putting these propositions to you,  
28 Mr Taylor, to give you an opportunity to put your position as far  
29 as such testimony is concerned.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Second matter. Page 20083:

3 "Q. In addition to the times that you were pushed out of  
4 Pujehun District into Liberia, while you were in Pujehun  
09:42:12 5 District were there any other times that the RUF went into  
6 Liberia?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And do you recall when that was?

9 A. It was in 1992.

09:42:25 10 Q. And why did they go to Liberia at that time?

11 A. Well, at that time too - at that time we too had  
12 blocked the road, that is the main route leading - that was  
13 between the Sierra Leone-Liberian border. So the ULIMO and  
14 the Sierra Leone soldiers crossed using another angle and  
09:42:51 15 entered into Liberia and so they too were trying to cut off  
16 our supply line and the supply link between the RUF and the  
17 NPFL and so General Devon came. At that time CO Patrick  
18 Lamin was now in charge of the RUF in Sierra Leone so he  
19 came to us and they went to the combat camp - the combat  
09:43:21 20 camp in Gong where we were based. So they called for a  
21 formation and he told us that Charles Taylor had sent him  
22 for them to come and tell Patrick Lamin to give some  
23 manpower for Patrick Lamin so that they would go and help  
24 the NPFL fighters to stop the ULIMO from cutting off our  
09:43:47 25 supply line."

26 Bearing in mind the time frame, 1992, what do you say about  
27 that?

28 A. That's also possible, yes. Depending on again the period.  
29 If this is anywhere between January and I would say about late

1 April/May of 1992, there's a very strong probability that this is  
2 correct that - but I don't - this matter of Taylor sending, I  
3 have not heard this name Patrick Lamin. I didn't hear it at that  
4 time. So I wouldn't have sent a Patrick Lamin.

09:44:32 5 Q. No, he is not suggesting that you sent a Patrick Lamin.

6 A. Okay. He says --

7 Q. He is suggesting that a General Devon came?

8 A. Devon. No, I think he really means General Degbon. There  
9 is a General Degbon. I think he just mispronounced it and I'm  
09:44:49 10 not trying to change his evidence. If it helps the Court, fine.  
11 We do have a General Degbon. So he may be mispronouncing this,  
12 but there is a Degbon. And if it's anywhere between January like  
13 I say and late April/May of 1992, in fact there's a strong  
14 probability that he could be right.

09:45:09 15 Q. Now, two follow-up questions: Firstly, what was General  
16 Degbon's area of responsibility within Liberia?

17 A. General Degbon did not have - again Degbon, as I've  
18 explained to this Court, was one of those guys who was one of the  
19 most educated among - he had a masters degree. He was not a  
09:45:36 20 fighting man in the field. He had a masters degree from here in  
21 Europe in geology. So we used him to go into areas, see what  
22 people were doing, because he was from Nimba County and had gone  
23 also to Libya with the boys and so he was also used to pick up  
24 arms and ammunition that were captured, bring them to central  
09:46:03 25 places. So as far as your question of area of responsibility, he  
26 did not have a specific area of responsibility. He was something  
27 like, you know, a roving inspector I will call it like. This is  
28 what - or roving coordinator I may say.

29 Q. The second follow-up question I want to ask you is this:



1 Bearing in mind the time frame you have now imposed upon this as  
2 a possibility, so we're talking January to late April 1992, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

09:46:47 4 Q. Was there ULIMO activity which resulted in the route from  
5 Liberia to Sierra Leone being cut in that part of the border at  
6 or about that time?

7 A. Oh, yeah, they were fighting. The area he is talking about  
8 now, they have just about taken - this is Cape Mount, Bomi area.  
9 They had practically taken there and --

09:47:11 10 Q. By what stage, Mr Taylor?

11 A. I would say by the beginning of 1992 ULIMO had practically  
12 cut off Cape Mount and Bomi. So there was this fight to keep it  
13 open and there was still a struggle on Lofa side. But as for  
14 that side, it's understandable that this is a strong probability,  
09:47:37 15 yeah.

16 Q. Now moving on, Mr Taylor. There is a third specific matter  
17 I want to deal with and it's a matter which goes to the heart of  
18 the allegation you face. At page 20097, beginning at line 12 we  
19 find this passage:

09:48:16 20 "Q. What was this mission that you were given to go to  
21 Sierra Rutile?"

22 Now you've heard that name before, haven't you?

23 A. Yes, I have.

24 Q. And you've earlier indicated it's not a location you were  
09:48:30 25 aware of?

26 A. That's correct.

27 Q. "A. Well, at one time before CO Mohamed Tarawalli came  
28 Foday Sankoh had almost told us that he had been receiving  
29 advice that we should go and attack Sierra Rutile. He said

1 that we were to await CO Mohamed Tarawalli. He said that  
2 when he comes he will tell us exactly what we were to do to  
3 go to Sierra Rutile. So after that, four or five days  
4 afterwards CO Mohamed Tarawalli came, alias Zino. He  
09:49:16 5 called a formation and said that he had received advice  
6 from the other side that we should attack Sierra Rutile and  
7 terrorise the area, starting with the civilians, the towns,  
8 and to capture if possible the white employees who were  
9 there.

09:49:39 10 Q. Who called this formation and told you these things?

11 A. It was Foday Sankoh.

12 Q. And when he said he received advice from the other  
13 side, did he tell you what he meant by that?

14 A. Yes, he later told us that it was from Charles Taylor.

09:50:03 15 Q. Did he tell you why it was you were to go and terrorise  
16 the area?

17 A. Yes. He said we would not just be in the bush doing  
18 things but he was not talking about - but which was going  
19 over the air. He said we needed to do something which

09:50:26 20 would be of concern to the Sierra Leonean government and  
21 the international community. He said by so doing, Sierra  
22 Rutile was one of the companies on which the Sierra Leonean  
23 people relied. He said what we were to do was to stop the  
24 work. He said by doing that we would attack that

09:50:50 25 particular town and when we were going, when we were  
26 approaching there on our way going, we should not capture  
27 any civilian. He said a civilian who runs away whom you  
28 did not see should go. He said that the one that you will  
29 see, you should kill and pass by. He said and the town

1 around Sierra Rutile, all the villages, he said they should  
2 not be normal because the soldiers whom we are going to  
3 fight against, he said we should burn there so if they find  
4 that the town has been burnt, civilians would not stay  
09:51:29 5 there. They too would not be brave to stay there. That is  
6 the soldiers. He said we should burn the entire area. He  
7 said the machine that was working for that company and the  
8 company issues and property, he said we should destroy most  
9 of them so that the company would cease to exist. He said  
09:51:52 10 if possible we should capture the white people who had been  
11 employed there and we should send them to him.

12 Q. Did he explain why you should capture white people  
13 working at this company?

14 A. He said that would raise concern to the international  
09:52:10 15 community. He said it would raise some concern so that  
16 they would - they would concentrate on peace which was  
17 needed in Sierra Leone. He said that as long as we do not  
18 capture the white people, the employees, that company would  
19 continue to exist. He said but if we captured them they  
09:52:32 20 would be with him and they will know what to do - what the  
21 international community would do.

22 Q. What kind of company was Sierra Rutile?

23 A. Sierra Rutile was a mining company that was mining  
24 rutile. We have a mineral in Sierra Leone called rutile."  
09:52:55 25 Then he was later asked:

26 "Q. Did you go on this mission?

27 A. Yes, ma'am.

28 Q. Did you carry out the instructions?

29 A. Exactly. Until we reached - we went to Sumbuya, we

1 attacked Sumbuya, we crossed the river and went to Tikonko,  
2 we entered Bo and went to Njala University. We went all  
3 the way to Kambaima and entered Monkanji which was one of  
4 the company's bases but there was the Sironco Company  
09:53:26 5 there. We captured four of the white employees there. We  
6 slept there. We slept there and the next day we entered  
7 Sierra Rutile. We captured three of their employees at  
8 Sierra Rutile, four at Monkanji and three at Sierra Rutile.  
9 Seven of them. Then we sent them to him. We sent the  
09:53:52 10 white employees whom we captured, seven of them, to  
11 Foday Sankoh at Zogoda."

12 Now, Mr Taylor, I want to take that passage - and you  
13 recognise its importance, don't you?

14 A. Yes, I do.

09:54:11 15 Q. Let's take it in stages. First of all, do you know a  
16 commanding officer called Mohamed Tarawalli also known as Zino?

17 A. Never knew him, never met him in my life, no.

18 Q. Secondly, did you provide such advice to Foday Sankoh?

19 A. No, I did not. In fact, not only did I not but what are we  
09:54:42 20 talking about here? We are talking about - this is what? 1994?  
21 This is 1994. Based on evidence led in this Court this attack  
22 led on Sierra Rutile was supposed to be conducted in 1994. Now  
23 if that is true there is no way that I am in contact with  
24 Foday Sankoh as of May of 1992. But, I mean, to show you what I  
09:55:14 25 called originally the deceit in this, maybe if you don't mind, to  
26 put this in context, page 20097 there is something - 20097.

27 Q. Yes?

28 A. When it says the advice from the other side. Apparently,  
29 C0 - this so-called C0 Mohamed Tarawalli, if you read that you

1 will see in that statement - my understanding of that statement  
2 is that I am in contact with Mohamed Tarawalli. 20097.

3 Q. Well, I'm not sure. There's another possible reading,  
4 because if you look at line 25:

09:56:00 5 "Q. Who called this formation?

6 A. It was Foday Sankoh."

7 A. Okay. But 20097.

8 Q. There's two possible interpretations I agree with you,  
9 Mr Taylor, because starting at line 12, "Mohamed Tarawalli came.

09:56:23 10 Foday Sankoh had almost told us that he had been receiving  
11 advice", and then it goes on, line 19, "CO Tarawalli came, he  
12 called a formation and said that." Then line 25 to 27:

13 "Q. Who called this formation?

14 A. It was Foday Sankoh."

09:56:41 15 So on the face of it it can be quite confusing. But what  
16 was the point you wanted to make?

17 A. Yeah, but that's the whole point. CO Mohamed Tarawalli  
18 called this - okay, he called - so after that four or five days  
19 afterwards, CO Mohamed Tarawalli came, alias Zino. He called a  
09:57:03 20 formation and said that he had received advice from the other  
21 side. So this must be referring to this, but - so he can't - in  
22 my reading of this English, it is Mohamed Tarawalli in this first  
23 instance that is supposed to be calling this particular formation  
24 and says that he has received information from the other side,  
09:57:25 25 which means now that Mohamed Tarawalli is in touch with me, if  
26 we're looking at the other side.

27 As we go further down, then now he is asked now, apparently  
28 to catch himself, who called the information? And he says,  
29 "Well, it was called by Foday Sankoh." But when you go just a

1 few lines above, so who called the formation? So the other side  
2 that is being referred to is either - if it is Mohamed Tarawalli  
3 calling the formation, then the other side must be Sankoh. If  
4 it's Sankoh calling the formation, then it's got to be alluding  
09:58:00 5 to Liberia. Okay? So, depending on how it is interpreted here  
6 as to who called this formation, the fact of the matter is, I  
7 never saw or never met Mohamed Tarawalli in my life and never  
8 spoke to him in my life.

9 1994, based on evidence I remember in this Court here - in  
09:58:19 10 fact, this whole issue of 1994 is raised in the Rule 98 filings.  
11 That's how I remember it very well. Okay? Our Rule 98 filings  
12 and the response of the Prosecution deals with Sierra Rutile at  
13 length in their response to this particular issue in this 1994.  
14 I am not in contact with the RUF after May 1992, by no means. So  
09:58:46 15 how from May 1992, okay, I'm not talking to the people, then all  
16 of a sudden in 1994, I jump up, "Guess what? Go and attack  
17 Sierra" - total nonsense. There is no such thing. There is  
18 absolutely no such thing.

19 I don't speak to Foday Sankoh, nevertheless to talk about  
09:59:05 20 Mohamed Tarawalli. And all the while that Foday Sankoh came to  
21 Gbarnga, he never brought the Mohamed Tarawalli or the other  
22 Special Forces mentioned in this Court, Rashid something, I  
23 forgot his name, or the Sam Bockarie. None of these people were  
24 brought to Gbarnga with Foday Sankoh. If he had brought them, I  
09:59:26 25 would have said he brought them. If I can say Foday Sankoh came,  
26 why would it be impossible to say who he brought? None of - I  
27 have never - had never spoken to anybody.

28 And, besides, I don't think there's any witness that I led  
29 any information in this Court or any testimony to the fact that

1 he heard me speak to anybody called Tarawalli or whatever.

2 That's not true. I never spoke to Mohamed Tarawalli, and we have  
3 never told them to go and attack a place called Sierra Rutile.

4 So you break off communication May 1992. Nobody hears from you

10:00:00 5 until 1994, and what happens again? Nobody hears from you again.

6 1995, nobody hears from him. 1996, they go to Sierra Leone -

7 excuse me - they go to La Cote d'Ivoire for the peace talks. No

8 contacts with Foday Sankoh. So only this one contact that I had

9 to make in 1994 because a place called Sierra Rutile? It is a

10:00:24 10 blatant lie. Never spoke to Sankoh or anyone called Tarawalli.

11 That's not true.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you understand from this testimony that the

13 thinking is: Acts of terrorism will attract the attention of the

14 international community and thus progress the peace process.

10:00:48 15 Yes?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. And so, consequently, the more high profile the act of

18 terrorism, i.e., burning, looting, kidnapping white people, might

19 achieve the desired results. Do you see that?

10:01:05 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. Was that a tactic you sponsored?

22 A. I don't have any hang up with white people. I have never

23 felt inferior to any white man, then or now, so this is not a MO

24 for Charles Taylor. I've never been intimidated by white people

10:01:25 25 or yellow people, whatever. So that would have never been my

26 mode. Never been intimidated by anyone, so no.

27 Q. Was it ever brought to your attention, Mr Taylor, that

28 seven white employees of this company had been taken prisoner and

29 taken to Zogoda by the RUF?

1 A. Never. I was never in contact with the RUF after 1992.  
2 Never, ever, and didn't want to even know what they were doing  
3 over there.

4 Q. Now, you recall the date 1994. Let us proceed with the  
10:01:58 5 testimony at page 20100:

6 "Q. ... When you went to those towns what did you do in  
7 those towns?

8 A. Well, most of the villages were burnt. The towns that  
9 we entered, most of the towns. Civilians who came our way,  
10:02:19 10 whom we saw, we killed them. Those who were able to  
11 escape, escaped. We entered Sierra Rutile. We captured  
12 there. We burned down there and destroyed the company  
13 equipment that were there.

14 Q. Now after you had captured Sierra Rutile, sent these  
10:02:38 15 people back to Foday Sankoh and burned and destroyed Sierra  
16 Rutile what did you do after that?

17 A. Well, I said after that we sent the employees whom we  
18 had captured, the white employees - we sent them to Zogoda  
19 to Foday Sankoh.

10:02:54 20 Q. Were the results of this mission reported to  
21 Foday Sankoh?

22 A. Yes, we were reporting to CO Mohamed Zino and Zino  
23 directly reported to CO Mohamed - sorry, to Foday Sankoh.

24 Q. How did you know that?

10:03:10 25 A. We had communication. We as commanders had radio sets.  
26 Whenever CO Mohamed was talking to Pa Sankoh all of us  
27 listened and all of us monitored it. He sent messages  
28 directly to the Pa that we had captured so and so village.  
29 Some people died, civilians, we burnt this town, we had



1 captured Sierra Rutile, we had captured the white  
2 employees, we have captured the mining implements. The  
3 villages around Sierra Rutile had been burnt down and we  
4 were in a defensive in so and so areas in Sierra Rutile.  
10:03:50 5 So that was how he was sending the reports which we  
6 monitored.  
7 Q. How long did you remain at Sierra Rutile?  
8 A. I was there for up to eight months.  
9 Q. And where did you go from Sierra Rutile?  
10:04:04 10 A. I went back to Zogoda.  
11 Q. What were your duties once you went back to Zogoda?  
12 A. He assigned me to the same Strike Force because before  
13 I went to Sierra Rutile we had the security place which I  
14 had created there. It was called the Kenema bypass. That  
10:04:19 15 was close to Zogoda. So he assigned me there again, that I  
16 should stay there.  
17 Q. How long did you have your job at the Kenema bypass?  
18 A. I was there up to 1995 ending going up to 1996".  
19 So we are talking about that kind of time frame, aren't we?  
10:04:45 20 A. Uh-huh.  
21 Q. Now, a few further questions on this, Mr Taylor.  
22 Mr Taylor, do you recall us recently reviewing evidence that  
23 Foday Sankoh, that experienced soldier in Special Forces, had  
24 been in tears at the activities of NPFL forces in Sierra Leone  
10:05:08 25 and the killing of civilians?  
26 A. Yes.  
27 Q. Do you remember that?  
28 A. Yes, I remember that.  
29 Q. And that he had complained to you about the activities of

1 Liberian/NPFL forces in Sierra Leone, yes?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Now, according to this witness, that same Foday Sankoh  
4 accepts advice from you to do exactly what he was deploring of  
10:05:38 5 you back in 1991/'92. Do you follow?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. So, help me: How do you deal with this piece of evidence?

8 A. Well, you know, there are several things. Number one, if  
9 you look at one of the - I would call it the nicest things that  
10:06:01 10 have been said about Foday Sankoh throughout my sitting in this  
11 courtroom is that he did not tolerate abuse of people and, quite  
12 frankly, he did not accept it. So to see, on the one hand, so  
13 many witnesses coming here and saying that Foday Sankoh did not  
14 support atrocities and to only come hear him saying this - but  
10:06:23 15 this is not - you know, this is the way how this goes.

16 And, interestingly, if you look at it, he is supposed to be  
17 monitoring, I think, further to the top of this page, one of the  
18 things that he is monitoring, what he says to Zino and Zino says  
19 to Sankoh. Well, now, if Sankoh is supposed to be receiving this  
10:06:48 20 - these instructions from me, how does he get the information to  
21 me? So, obviously, he must be able to monitor Foday Sankoh  
22 reporting to me about what's going on at this Sierra Rutile, if  
23 there's any truth to my involvement in the Sierra Rutile. All he  
24 monitors is what he says to Zino and what Zino is reporting to  
10:07:11 25 Foday Sankoh. That's further at the top of the page.

26 So with this kind of information, it is just so irregular  
27 that I would just say there's nothing serious or factual about  
28 what he is saying here regarding some of his accounts on this  
29 because, on the one hand, most of the witnesses that have come

1 here have not described Foday Sankoh as being this cruel  
2 individual that was ordering massacres and killings all over the  
3 place. So I have serious questions about his accounts here and  
4 how he has put it.

10:07:48 5 Q. Now, the other matter is this, Mr Taylor: Given the time  
6 frame suggested here, 1994/'95, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What access did you have at that time to Sierra Leone,  
9 bearing in mind this same witness has already made mention of

10:08:07 10 ULIMO?

11 A. I have no access whatsoever. Their roads are cut off.

12 Q. So help me: On one possible interpretation of that passage  
13 on page 2097, how would C0 Tarawali, also known as Zino, have  
14 received advice from you or anybody else, for that matter?

10:08:31 15 A. I don't know how he would have received any. If I had  
16 given such advice, he should have been able to monitor this  
17 advice. But maybe it may help, counsel, if we look at what I'm  
18 doing in 1994. What am I doing at this particular time,  
19 depending on what time he is talking about? 1994, I'm at war.

10:08:52 20 I'm at serious war. I lose my headquarters in 1994, Gbarnga. I  
21 lose Gbarnga in 1994 while I'm at a peace - there's several,  
22 several clashes in 1994. I finally leave and go to Akosombo.  
23 The capital is taken.

24 1995, that he is talking about, 1995, there's another very  
10:09:14 25 important period, because it is 1995 that ECOMOG and the United  
26 Nation forces, based on documents Ied here, begin their  
27 deployment I go to Monrovia at that particular time and join the  
28 Council of State. So, I mean, really, what time do I have to -  
29 you know, I know the Prosecution has tried to point me as this

1 superman. I'm doing all these things. I'm hiding behind my  
2 association with ECOWAS and the UN and then using that as a  
3 screen to do devilish thing because I'm controlling the RUF. I  
4 know that's the line that they want to take, but that would be a  
10:10:00 5 blatant lie, okay. So I am not involved with the RUF in 1992  
6 late, 1993, 4, 5, 6, or 7. That is totally, totally out of the  
7 question.

8 Q. Now, on that same vein, Mr Taylor, events during this  
9 period, '94 to '97, the witness, having described Operation Stop  
10:10:31 10 Election in Sierra Leone, goes on to say this in response to this  
11 question, and I'm looking at page - the foot of page 20108:

12 "Q. Now after you had come back from Sierra Rutile and you  
13 were sent on this mission in 1996" - that's Operation Stop  
14 Election - "can you tell us how long did you remain at  
10:10:54 15 Zogoda?

16 A. Yes. I was there until the time Zogoda fell, that is  
17 1996 when Foday Sankoh went to the Ivory Coast to the  
18 Yamoussoukro Peace Accord, when he left CO Mohamed in  
19 charge for him to take care of the soldiers - the RUF  
10:11:17 20 soldiers - and we based at Zogoda, where he was, and until  
21 the Kamajors and the Sierra Leone soldiers attacked the RUF  
22 and finally dislodged them from Zogoda."

23 Now, you remember that event, Mr Taylor.

24 A. Yes, I do.

10:11:34 25 Q. "Q. During the time you were at Zogoda and Foday Sankoh  
26 was still at Zogoda, were you aware of any communications  
27 Foday Sankoh had outside of Sierra Leone?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. What were these communications?

1 A. Repeat the question.

2 Q. During the time you were at Zogoda with Foday Sankoh,  
3 1994 to sometime in 1996, were you aware of any  
4 communications Foday Sankoh had outside of Sierra Leone?

10:12:12 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And what were those communications?

7 A. The communication, because I myself had access to  
8 Foday Sankoh at any time, at any hour, as a Strike Force  
9 commander, so I was there when a radio man came to call  
10 Foday Sankoh. He said they wanted to talk to him.

10:12:32

11 Q. Who wanted to talk to him?

12 A. Charles Taylor. I myself will be there. And where we  
13 would take Foday Sankoh and we would sit," and then he

14 indicates how far away he would be sitting. "That used to take

10:12:53

15 place for over a day every day or sometimes once or twice a

16 day. We used to see him asking and they would greet each

17 other. He would ask for Foday Sankoh. He would inquire

18 about Foday Sankoh's health. Foday Sankoh too would

19 respond in the same way to Charles Taylor. Foday Sankoh

10:13:12

20 would explain about his health or explain about some

21 security operations, everything. I used to hear those when

22 I was there at Zogoda with him."

23 Were you involved in such radio communications inquiring

24 after brother Foday's health in '94 to '96, Mr Taylor?

10:13:39

25 A. Never. No. Never. And again let's look at the period

26 that he is talking about, especially in 1996, and these boys when

27 they are packing these things together they forget. When does

28 Foday Sankoh leave in 1996 for La Cote d'Ivoire? Evidence led in

29 this Court, it's very early in 1996 he leaves. There's also very

1 clear before this Court that throughout that stay that  
2 Foday Sankoh had in la Cote d'Ivoire he did not contact me by  
3 telephone, by radio, nothing.

10:14:25 4 I said before, you know, and this is what - I took notice  
5 of the ruling of this Court on Rule 98 because this comes into  
6 question - this whole 1996 situation comes into question based on  
7 the Court's ruling. There is no contact between Foday Sankoh and  
8 myself while he is in la Cote d'Ivoire. Now, if Foday Sankoh and  
9 I are so close and the only contact prior to Foday Sankoh going  
10:14:51 10 to la Cote d'Ivoire - the only means of communication that is  
11 even possible at this time is radio. It's radio. Now, that  
12 means that Foday Sankoh would have had to contact me by radio as  
13 this man is saying which is totally not true. But a better means  
14 of communication would be by telephone.

10:15:16 15 And based on the evidence, if we go through it,  
16 Foday Sankoh goes to la Cote d'Ivoire. He obtains satellite  
17 telephone based on evidence led in this Court. When he does come  
18 back after the signing of the agreement in 1996 he brings a  
19 telephone back. Foday Sankoh knows that I have a telephone.  
10:15:37 20 There is no contact with me throughout the almost year that  
21 Foday Sankoh spends in la Cote d'Ivoire. He is there when Zogoda  
22 falls and all of this kind of stuff.

23 So if one were to even believe of the possibility that this  
24 happened that Foday Sankoh is supposed to be receiving advice  
10:15:56 25 from me between 1994 and 1996, he is one ungrateful man that when  
26 he gets an opportunity in the free world outside then not to  
27 contact me. It's a blatant lie.

28 Look, I have told this Court that I contacted Foday Sankoh  
29 in 1991. I invited him. If I'm going to die for this, that's

1 the truth. I invited him. '91 he was with me, all the way up to  
2 May 1992. We had this conflict. I swear on my life if I was in  
3 contact with Foday Sankoh via radio after ULIMO cut off the road  
4 I would tell this Court, "Yes, I talked to him." There would be  
10:16:44 5 nothing - nothing - I would have to hide about it.

6 The fact of the matter is I was not in contact with  
7 Foday Sankoh after that particular period. If Foday Sankoh,  
8 while he was in La Cote d'Ivoire, had contacted me, I would have  
9 spoken to him. I would have spoken to him to hear what he wanted  
10:17:08 10 to say. I would have spoken to him. He never did and there was  
11 no contact. And I would not mislead anybody about it. That's  
12 the plain and simple truth. Never. So it is blatantly false  
13 that between 1994 or 1995 or 1996 or 1997 that I'm in contact  
14 with Foday Sankoh or 1998. No. None of those years.

10:17:36 15 Q. Well, let's explore another possibility bearing in mind  
16 Foday Sankoh's sojourn in La Cote d'Ivoire in 1996. Musa Cisse  
17 is somebody you know, is he not?

18 A. Oh, yes.

19 Q. He was based in Cote d'Ivoire at or about this time, was he  
10:17:57 20 not?

21 A. Yes, he was.

22 Q. Did you use Musa Cisse as a conduit to keep in touch with  
23 Foday Sankoh whilst he was in La Cote d'Ivoire?

24 A. No, and if that were true one of the witnesses brought here  
10:18:12 25 by the Prosecution would have said that Musa Cisse even visited  
26 us in Abidjan. Never happened. None whatsoever. Never. No.

27 Q. Very well. Let's move on. This is page 20111, line 20:

28 "Q. Mr Witness, you have said that you remained at Zogoda  
29 until Zogoda was overrun. What happened when Zogoda was

1 overrun?

2 A. Well, after that while Pa Sankoh had gone to the Ivory  
3 Coast and left CO Mohamed Zino to take over, the Kamajors  
4 and the Sierra Leone soldiers attacked the RUF there and  
10:19:14 5 Zogoda came under some suppression. We hadn't enough  
6 ammunition to fight the Kamajors and the Sierra Leone  
7 soldiers so CO Mohamed contacted Foday Sankoh.

8 Foday Sankoh ordered him that the armed group that was in  
9 Zogoda should be divided into two. CO Mohamed should take  
10:19:38 10 one group to Kailahun for us to defend the place where we  
11 had been before he opened Zogoda. The other group should  
12 be taken by Mike Lamin to Pujehun District. So that was  
13 how it happened."

14 Pause. Mr Taylor, you're supposed to be in contact with  
10:19:58 15 Mr Sankoh during this period. You were his benefactor, we are  
16 told. Why did you allow him to run out of ammunition in Zogoda?

17 A. Because I was not in contact with him. There was no -  
18 there was no contact. But this witness's account here differs  
19 very strangely from other accounts. I see this individual Mike  
10:20:21 20 Lamin leading, by Foday Sankoh's instructions, this group to  
21 Pujehun District. But I know that in 1996 there's a gentleman  
22 called Mike Lamin that ended up in Liberia. So I don't know  
23 where this information now is coming from because I don't know  
24 where Pujehun District - but he ended up in Liberia and the group  
10:20:50 25 that he led were disarmed and turned over to the International  
26 Committee of the Red Cross. So there's a problem here with how  
27 they put it together, this account. I don't know what  
28 instructions were given, but he ends up in Liberia.

29 Q. Well, according to this man like Lamin is leading half of



1 the Zogoda force in 1996 to Pujehun?

2 A. No. Well, there's a gentleman that I remember - I was on  
3 the Council of State at that particular time - that led a unit in  
4 Liberia of hundreds and hundreds of people that were disarmed by  
10:21:23 5 ECOMOG and - so that was not Pujehun District. It ended up in  
6 Cape Mount County. In fact they finally ended up at Lofa Bridge  
7 in Liberia.

8 Q. Anyway, it continues:

9 "The other group should be taken by Mike Lamin to Pujehun  
10:21:44 10 District. So that was how it happened.

11 Q. Let me ask you how was Mohamed Tarawalli able to  
12 contact Foday Sankoh?

13 A. He had a radio station and even Foday Sankoh when he  
14 went to the Ivory Coast, he took a radio along, a  
10:21:58 15 communication man with him, and they were always - he  
16 always spoke with Mohamed Tarawalli and other commanders  
17 every day, every hour that communication went on.

18 Q. Were you yourself in one of those two groups?

19 A. Yes.

10:22:13 20 Q. Which group were you in?

21 A. I was with the group that Mike Lamin was with, my  
22 commander, to go to Pujehun District.

23 Q. And you said that the instruction was given to divide  
24 into two groups to go to Kailahun and Pujehun District and  
10:22:31 25 that is how it happened, so did you go to Pujehun District?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. How many people went to Pujehun District?

28 A. It was over eight to nine hundred armed men.

29 Q. And what happened after you arrived in Pujehun

1 District?

2 A. When we got to Pujehun District we met the other  
3 soldiers, the RUF soldiers, who had been assigned there.  
4 We met them there. It was Captain Bonday who was taken  
10:23:04 5 care of there. He was one of the vanguards who had trained  
6 with Mosquito, Issa Sesay. He was a Sierra Leonean.  
7 Michael Rogers, he was called Michael Rogers, that was his  
8 real name, but his war name was Captain Bonday. So when we  
9 got to Pujehun they too had come under threat by the  
10:23:23 10 Kamajors and the Sierra Leonean soldiers. So we heard -  
11 we always saw Mike Lamin talking to Foday Sankoh in the  
12 Ivory Coast. And Foday Sankoh was telling him that he had  
13 sent Major Kposowa through Gbarnga to Monrovia for him to  
14 try so that we can get ammunition at the border by Liberia,  
10:23:52 15 Sierra Leone by the Liberian border."

16 Pause. Who is Major Kposowa?

17 A. I don't know him.

18 Q. 1996, Mr Taylor. And there's clear evidence before this  
19 Court that this Zogoda incident takes place in late 1996, yes?

10:24:16 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In late 1996 what are you engaged upon in Liberia?

22 A. I'm on the - late 1996, not only am I on the Council of  
23 State but we are beginning the disarmament process to prepare -  
24 but in order to give the proper answer to help the Court with  
10:24:45 25 this, I can't say it publicly because there is some - there is  
26 one little piece of information about this man going to Pujehun  
27 that in order to --

28 Q. Don't worry about that, Mr Taylor. We'll come to it.

29 A. Okay.

1 Q. We'll come to it. Hold that thought. But I'm just asking  
2 you at this point in time what was going on in Liberia at the  
3 time?

4 A. Disarmament.

10:25:07 5 Q. And help me: This possibility of someone being sent  
6 through Gbarnga to Monrovia to try and get ammunition to the  
7 border by Liberia at this time in 1996, is it a realistic  
8 possibility? Help us.

9 A. Totally impossible.

10:25:28 10 Q. Why?

11 A. The United Nations observers and ECOMOG have deployed  
12 throughout the country on every major road, seaport, airport  
13 border entry. Totally. We are engaged in a major process of  
14 disarmament. Nothing - in fact, soldiers - I mean former

10:25:54 15 combatants cannot even move from one point to the other with a  
16 rifle. It is an impossibility, I can say. Total impossibility.

17 Q. Well, line 8, page 21113:

18 "A. Well, CO Kposowa was a vanguard and he was the  
19 secretary to Foday Sankoh at the time he was in Zogoda.

10:26:27 20 Q. How was it that Mike Lamin was communicating with  
21 Foday Sankoh?

22 A. Mike Lamin too had a communication set by himself as a  
23 commander and he spoke directly to Foday Sankoh in the  
24 Ivory Coast.

10:26:43 25 Q. How did you know about these communications?

26 A. Every hour whenever Mike Lamin was ready to contact  
27 Foday Sankoh or Foday Sankoh wanted to contact Mike Lamin,  
28 I would be there, I was with him. In fact when I am  
29 standing there and they are talking, it was about just a

1 yard that I would give to them. Just like six feet or four  
2 feet. I was there whilst they were talking and I would  
3 hear.

10:27:21 4 Q. Did Foday Sankoh explain where Kposowa was to get this  
5 ammunition?

6 A. Yes, he said he was passing through Gbarnga to get  
7 ammunition from there."

8 Remember when this was, Mr Taylor, yes?

9 A. Yes.

10:27:35 10 Q. "He said he had sent Kposowa to Charles Taylor in Gbarnga  
11 for him to help him so that we can get ammunition at the  
12 borderline. He said so we should try and resist the  
13 enemies, that is the Kamajors and the Sierra Leonean  
14 soldiers, so that we can receive that consignment at the  
10:27:55 15 borderline.

16 Q. Did you receive this ammunition?

17 A. We did not receive it because the time that was shown  
18 that the ammunition was to arrive the Kamajors were still  
19 pressurising us. They were killing some civilians that we  
10:28:14 20 had. Our civilians, who had been with us for long, and our  
21 own brother fighters the Kamajors were killing them and we  
22 hadn't anything to defend us with. That is arms,  
23 ammunition. So Mike Lamin told me that the only thing we  
24 were to do was to go to the borderline and contact the  
10:28:42 25 ULIMO who were there so that we can talk to them."

26 Pause. Late 1996, does the NPFL have access from Gbarnga  
27 to the Sierra Leone-Liberia border at that stage?

28 A. None whatsoever.

29 Q. Why?

1 A. ULIMO is still there as of 1992.

2 Q. As the witness describes.

3 A. ULIMO is there. So how would - whoever they are talking

4 about, how would they come to this Gbarnga to get the - this

10:29:17 5 ammunition? Besides ULIMO being deployed there, at this

6 particular time, the international community has deployed its

7 ECOMOG and UN forces throughout the country. How would this

8 human or number of human beings get through to come to Gbarnga?

9 Then he lies so much. I'm not even in Gbarnga. 1996, I'm not in

10:29:44 10 Gbarnga. I'm in Monrovia, a member of the Council of States. So

11 there is no access on two counts, two counts: One, the ULIMO

12 count; the second, the peacekeepers that are deployed carrying

13 out disarmament.

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we're told that this man, Mike Lamin, had

10:30:10 15 his own communication set or was in contact with Foday Sankoh,

16 and as a consequence of that, that's why this emissary, Kposowa,

17 is being sent to Gbarnga to get arms from Gbarnga to take to the

18 borderline. And remember also at this time, you're in contact

19 with Foday Sankoh, according to this evidence. So help me: Why

10:30:39 20 didn't you say to Foday Sankoh, "Listen, bro, I can't help you

21 out here. ULIMO control the border. So don't even bother

22 sending Mr Kposowa"? Why didn't you tell him that?

23 A. Because I never talked to him. I never talked to him.

24 This is all a pack of lies. That's all it is. Never spoke to

10:30:54 25 anybody. It was - this is an impossible, impossible situation.

26 And I'll tell you where he corrects it a little bit, who is

27 closer to these people as an ally to give them ammunition?

28 ULIMO. They have been dealing with ULIMO since the borderline

29 was cut off. They have said how Sam Bockarie went, contacted the

1 ULIMO commanders they had been dealing. So now ULIMO is still in  
2 that area. They will jump over ULIMO and come to try to come all  
3 the way - passing where? I don't know. Maybe flying - to get to  
4 us, only to say, oh, later on, "Oh, let's try ULIMO." So who is  
10:31:38 5 the probable - which group is the probable group to contact  
6 immediately? It's ULIMO. So, I mean, he missed it. Oh, he  
7 missed it by miles. There's no contact whatsoever. None.

8 Q. Back to page 20114, line 18:

9 "THE WITNESS: He" - that being Mike Lamin - "said we  
10:32:09 10 should go to the bridge. That is Mike Lamin and I and him  
11 and another commander like Manawa should go to the bridge  
12 and contact the ULIMO commander who was there so that he  
13 would be able to talk to them so that the civilians who  
14 were with the RUF and the fighters, so that all of us will  
10:32:30 15 be able to cross over to them to rescue ourselves on a  
16 rescue mission.

17 Q. When you say on a rescue mission, do you know what Mike  
18 Lamin meant when he said that?

19 A. Yes. He told us that what we really wanted - not that  
10:32:54 20 we were going to surrender. He said we were just going to  
21 talk to them so that they will go there as our colleague  
22 fighters so that they will rescue us, so that they will  
23 find a way to return."

24 Colleague fighters, Mr Taylor? Were you aware that the RUF  
10:33:11 25 had colleagues in ULIMO?

26 A. No, I was not aware of that.

27 Q. "Q. Now, before Mike Lamin had this conversation with you  
28 about what his plan was had you learned anything about what  
29 happened with the group that left Zogoda for Kailahun?

1 A. Yes. The group that left, so many of them died. Then  
2 like CO Mohamed who was the commander who Pa Sankoh had  
3 left in charge, he himself went got missing. Up until now  
4 we do not know where he is. We heard later that he had  
10:33:51 5 died.

6 Q. And did you learn who became the commander in Sierra  
7 Leone after CO Mohamed went missing?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Who was that?

10:34:04 10 A. That is Sam Bockarie, Mosquito.

11 Q. And how did you learn that?

12 A. Well, after we had crossed with Mike Lamin to Liberia  
13 with all the armed men that Mike Lamin had taken to Pujehun  
14 District and those whom we met there, the RUF fighters, all  
10:34:16 15 of us crossed, and those who had gone along with CO Mohamed  
16 to Kailahun most of them - most of them died and CO Mohamed  
17 himself died. So the Pa became concerned, that is  
18 Foday Sankoh, and he contacted Mosquito over a radio  
19 communication which all of us listened to and he said that  
10:34:36 20 Mosquito should immediately take over as commander for the  
21 RUF in Sierra Leone.

22 Q. And what happened with your group after you crossed  
23 over into Liberia?

24 A. They took all the RUF fighters and most of the  
10:34:52 25 civilians who we had crossed with - the ULIMO soldiers -  
26 and they disarmed us and sent us to a place called Bopolu  
27 in Liberia for us to go and stay there.

28 Q. And what happened after you went to Bopolu?

29 A. When we had gone to Bopolu, I and Mike Lamin, the ULIMO

1 commander who was there they called him General Charles  
2 Julu. General Charles Julu gave access to Mike Lamin  
3 because Mike Lamin hadn't any of his radio communication  
4 sets any longer. It was now in the care of ULIMO. But  
10:35:36 5 where we went, which was Bopolu, the commander who was  
6 there, Charles Julu, still had a radio communication set,  
7 so Mike Lamin told him for him to give him access so that  
8 he will speak to Foday Sankoh in the Ivory Coast. At that  
9 time we had crossed with some radio communication men.  
10:35:59 10 That is the RUF communication men. And so they gave that  
11 access. General Charles Julu gave access to Mike Lamin.  
12 Mike Lamin took the radio communication man whom he had  
13 gone with and we went to the radio communication room. The  
14 ULIMO radio communication room. The radio man tuned in to  
10:36:24 15 Foday Sankoh's frequency and Foday Sankoh answered. Then  
16 he asked for Mike Lamin. Then the radio man said it was  
17 Mike Lamin who wanted it talk to him, so I saw Foday Sankoh  
18 and Mike Lamin talking to each other. Foday Sankoh ordered  
19 Mike Lamin that he was a very big man. 'If you had crossed  
10:36:44 20 somewhere which is not safe for you and if you are not  
21 under arrest, try and find your way out of that place and  
22 get to Monrovia so that you can meet me in the Ivory  
23 Coast.' "

24 Note that, Mr Taylor.

10:36:58 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. "Q. When you say that Foday Sankoh ordered Mike Lamin that  
27 he was a very big man, who is it that is being referred to  
28 as a very big man?

29 A. Mike Lamin. He was one of his senior men that he



1           relied on. He said that where we had crossed, if he really  
2           knew that he was not under arrest he said he should try and  
3           find his way out of that place and go to Monrovia and go  
4           and meet him in the Ivory Coast."

10:37:32 5           Now, Mr Taylor, let's pause there. Were you aware that  
6           there was that level of cooperation between ULIMO and RUF --

7           A. No.

8           Q. -- such that General Charles Julu, no less, allowed access  
9           to his radio communication set for Mike Lamin to get in touch  
10:37:52 10          with Foday Sankoh?

11          A. No, I did not. I did not know. I did not know.

12          Q. That same General Charles Julu who died this week in  
13          Liberia.

14          A. Oh, Charles finally died? Well, you know, counsel, you  
10:38:14 15          know, as - if you put this in some context, now - and, really,  
16          for this Court, the way this story goes, Mike Lamin is in trouble  
17          and he is, first of all, told that someone called Kposowa is  
18          supposed to be coming to Gbarnga to get ammunition to the  
19          borderline. That doesn't happen, so he's in trouble. He falls  
10:38:52 20          into this trouble and he finally advises his men to "talk to the  
21          ULIMO across the bridges so we can get across." That happens. He  
22          comes and he meets General Julu.

23                 Now, if there is this contact with Foday Sankoh, wouldn't  
24          it have been prudent for Foday Sankoh to say to Mike Lamin before  
10:39:22 25          he leaves, "But what are you worried about? I will get in  
26          contact with Mr Taylor in Monrovia. Mr Taylor, you're going to  
27          Liberia. He will seek your welfare for you. Cross on over. I  
28          will make contact"? These boys are lying. They don't know how  
29          to lie. Wouldn't that be the prudent thing to do? Mike Lamin is

1 supposed to operate on his own? And you can see the total  
2 disconnect. Why wouldn't Foday Sankoh say to his people, "Oh,  
3 listen, don't worry about it. Cross over into Liberia. I will  
4 get in touch" - because I'm on the Council of State. I have some  
10:39:56 5 authority. I'm a member of the collective presidency. I'm on  
6 the Council of State. "I will get in contact with Mr Taylor in  
7 Monrovia, since you people are having problems. Cross the border  
8 and go."

9 Now, Mike Lamin comes in. He comes in and finally he meets  
10:40:11 10 with Charles Julu. And by the way, General Julu - the ULIMO on  
11 this part of the country, it's important for the Court to  
12 understand, is not ULIMO-K. This is ULIMO-J. They are the ones  
13 that are holding that section of the country. But now look at  
14 what happens again. Foday Sankoh does not even tell this Mike  
10:40:31 15 Lamin, after he's in Liberia, "Now that you're in Liberia and you  
16 are not under arrest, proceed to Monrovia to Mr Taylor and take  
17 his orders or what." He said, "Find your way to me in Ivoire."  
18

19 So, I mean, how these people just tolerate these kinds of  
10:40:48 20 lies from these people. Even the people that interviewed these  
21 people would know that this boy is lying. So where is the  
22 contact? Oh, I'm giving orders in 1994. I'm giving orders in  
23 1996. I'm giving recommendations. I'm ordering them to attack  
24 Sierra Rutile. I'm giving them advice. So when they enter  
10:41:08 25 Liberia, there's a disconnect. How is that prudent? It just  
26 isn't prudent. So it shows that there is no contact.

27 So Mike Lamin fumbles his way, whatever happens, and I'm  
28 sure maybe he finds his way to him. So why is Charles Taylor not  
29 contacted from the time they get in trouble to enter Liberia on

1 their way to Monrovia? Foday Sankoh then is a very bad leader.  
2 He could have told Mike, say, "Look, don't worry yourself. Cross  
3 on into Liberia." So there's a total disconnect here and it's  
4 because it is not true, okay?

10:41:46 5 I mean, there are people that cross from Zogoda. They  
6 arrive there. Charles Julu is with ULIMO-J in this Bopolu, Lofa  
7 Bridge. That's the same area. Bopolu is the county. Lofa  
8 Bridge is the main area there where I know that they are sent,  
9 they are disarmed and go on to Monrovia. But I raise the point  
10:42:07 10 to show that there is no connection of contact, and if there is,  
11 then Foday Sankoh surely does not utilise it when it is  
12 appropriate to utilise it. Instead of coming out with this  
13 fantasy of going to Gbarnga in late 1996 to try to get arms, a  
14 total impossibility, and all this type of nonsense. It just  
10:42:31 15 doesn't happen.

16 Q. Now, bear in mind, Mr Taylor, this is late 1996, when Mike  
17 Lamin, according to this witness, is leading this exodus from  
18 Pujehun District to Zogoda. You follow?

19 A. Yes.

10:42:50 20 Q. Let's go back to page 20117:  
21 "Q. Now before we go on from there I just want to clear up  
22 something you said. 'He said that where we had crossed, if  
23 you really knew that he was not under arrest, he said he  
24 should try.' So when you say where he said 'where we  
10:43:12 25 crossed', who is saying that.

26 A. It was Foday Sankoh who was speaking to Mike Lamin. He  
27 said he had crossed with the armed men into Liberia and  
28 they have taken us up to Bopolu. He said - Foday Sankoh  
29 said if Mike Lamin really knew that he was not under

1 arrest, he said Mike Lamin should try to go to Monrovia,  
2 onward to the Ivory Coast where he would meet him, that is  
3 Foday Sankoh, in the Ivory Coast.

4 Q. So what happened after this conversation?

10:43:45 5 A. Well, after that when we returned home Mike Lamin  
6 suggested.

7 Q. When you say 'we returned home', what do you mean?

8 A. That was we had come to the radio communication room  
9 where the general was but they had given us a place where  
10:44:04 10 Mike Lamin was staying. That was where we returned from  
11 the radio room."

12 So they had been provided with accommodation by ULIMO,  
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes.

10:44:14 15 Q. "Q. You said Mike Lamin suggested. What did Mike Lamin  
16 suggest?

17 A. So Mike Lamin told me, he said, 'Oh, gee. The only  
18 thing from what Pa Sankoh had said that I should move to go  
19 and meet him in the Ivory Coast. I want you to move with  
10:44:34 20 me from here now for Monrovia so that the two of us move  
21 from Bopolu to Monrovia.'

22 Q. What happened when you went to Monrovia?

23 A. When we got to Monrovia in fact that was my first time  
24 of going to Monrovia town. He told me - we were at Duala  
10:44:59 25 when he told me that he was going to Congo Town to meet  
26 Charles Taylor. That was what Mike Lamin told me. The two  
27 of us got into a vehicle and went to the Red Light, a place  
28 called the Red Light. He showed me the places, he Mike  
29 Lamin, and then we took the other road on our left-hand

1 side. We went and we got to Congo Town. He said that was  
2 Congo Town and that was where we disembarked. There was a  
3 house by our left where I got off, a compound. We entered  
4 there, the two of us, and he left me outside in the veranda  
10:45:40 5 and he entered. He said he was going to see Charles  
6 Taylor.

7 Q. Before you continue, did Mike Lamin tell you why he was  
8 going to see Charles Taylor?

9 A. Well, he told me. He said because we had come and we  
10:45:58 10 do not have anything and he has not got anywhere to get  
11 money. But he said Charles Taylor knows him. That was  
12 what he told me. We went to that place in that compound  
13 and he entered the room. I did not know whether it was a  
14 room or an office. I was on the veranda. I saw securities  
10:46:17 15 outside and I stayed with them there. He was there for up  
16 to close to an hour. Then he came back and he said we  
17 should go and we went. He said we were going. He said  
18 they had shown him a place where we should go and lodge" -  
19 and then he gives an address - "with an individual called  
10:46:38 20 the Pa Jacob Tarawulu."

21 For completeness let's go over the page:

22 "Q. Now when Mike Lamin came back did he say anything  
23 about who he had met with?

24 A. Well, he told me that he spoke with Charles Taylor. I  
10:46:55 25 did not know whether he met him, whether they spoke on one  
26 to one, but he told me that he spoke with him. He said he  
27 had spoken with the Pa. That was what he said. That is Pa  
28 Charles Taylor. That is what he told me. I did not know  
29 whether he met him or they gave him access for him to talk

1 to Charles Taylor. That he did not tell me directly and I  
2 did not ask that question, but he told me that he had  
3 spoken to Charles Taylor."

4 Let's pause there. Now to recap, Mr Taylor, let's get the  
10:47:29 5 picture. Zogoda is suppressed. Radio communication is made with  
6 Foday Sankoh in the Ivory Coast. Split the forces. One under  
7 Tarawalli goes to Kailahun, the other under Mike Lamin goes to  
8 Pujehun, yes?

9 A. Uh-huh.

10:47:51 10 Q. Tarawalli en route is killed, Bockarie takes over. Mike  
11 Lamin suggests that contact be made with ULIMO which is duly  
12 done. Thereafter ULIMO provide him with accommodation and access  
13 to a radio where he is then instructed by Pa Sankoh, from the  
14 security of the Ivory Coast, to make his way to Monrovia and from  
10:48:18 15 there to the Ivory Coast?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Of course, given that you're the patron of the RUF, on  
18 arrival in Monrovia he necessarily goes to visit you. Okay?  
19 Now, you said earlier that you had something to say, Mr Taylor.

10:48:37 20 I wonder, Mr President, if we could go into private session  
21 for ten minutes?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is going to protect the identity --

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Identity of a protected witness.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. To those members of the public,  
10:48:59 25 we're going to go into what is called a private session which  
26 will last for ten minutes. That means that you will still be  
27 able to see the proceedings but will not be able to hear  
28 anything. The reason for this is that the identity of a witness  
29 who is the subject of a protective measures order of this Trial

1 Chamber could be in jeopardy if the evidence continues in open  
2 session. So for approximately ten minutes we will go into a  
3 private session. Madam Court Manager, could you please put the  
4 Court in private session.

5 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of  
6 the transcript, pages 30077 to 30079, was  
7 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as  
8 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we're in open session.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

4 MS HOLLIS: I'm grateful:

10:55:47 5 Q. Now I'm going back to page 20119, Mr Taylor:

6 "Q. Mr Witness, you said that Mike Lamin told you that  
7 they had shown him a place where you should go. Did he  
8 tell you who the 'they' were who had shown him this place?

9 A. Yes, he said it was Charles Taylor's Special Forces,  
10:56:09 10 one of them. He said he told him but I do not know the  
11 name. He said they had given him a place for him to stay.  
12 They directed him to a place but he knew there because he  
13 said he had stayed long in Monrovia.

14 Q. Now did you go to this Pa Jacob Tarawalu? How long did  
10:56:35 15 you lodge at Pa Jacob Tarawalu's place?

16 A. Within two days.

17 Q. And what happened within two days?

18 A. Well, when we went there and stayed there, the next day  
19 we went to his office because he was - at that time there  
10:56:51 20 was an interim government in place. He was the Deputy  
21 Education Minister. We went to his office at the education  
22 ministry. Whilst we were there, later Mike Lamin said we  
23 should come down and we came down. The street was going  
24 up Mike Lamin said we should use it and we used it. Now we  
10:57:13 25 were three in number, Mike Lamin, his wife that he had, a  
26 Liberian woman and I. Her name was Jessica Robertson. All  
27 of us went to the Foreign Ministry. They left me down  
28 there and he went up. He went there and later he came down  
29 and he said we should take a snapshot. He came down and we



1 took a snapshot and he went and left it and we came back to  
2 Pa Jacob. From there we came back to the house where he  
3 had been lodged.

4 The next day we went back there, that office at the Foreign  
10:57:52 5 Ministry. They gave us the Liberian laissez-passer. That  
6 was what they gave to us. That was what I saw, which was  
7 to take me from Monrovia to the Ivory Coast. So we came.

8 The next day Mike Lamin hired a car from Monrovia, Gbarnga,  
9 to Loguato border. We went in a car. I, Mike Lamin,  
10:58:21 10 Jessica Robertson and the driver; four of us were in the  
11 car.

12 Q. And where did you go from Loguato?

13 A. We went to Danane.

14 Q. Why did you go to Danane?

10:58:38 15 A. Well, at the time that the RUF went for that peace talk  
16 to the Ivory Coast, Foday Sankoh and others made a  
17 self base where Philip Palmer was. Philip Palmer was based  
18 in Danane. Fayah Musa and his family were also based in  
19 Danane. So the place that they took for the RUF that was a  
10:58:58 20 place where we went. That was where Philip Palmer was.

21 They called the place Bellevue One Protocol Yard. That was  
22 where we went.

23 Q. How long did you remain in Danane?

24 A. We just passed a night there. Then the next day in the  
10:59:18 25 afternoon hours we boarded a bus to go to the Ivory Coast.

26 Q. And what happened when you arrived in Abidjan?"

27 He having corrected that they had boarded the bus to go to  
28 Abidjan.

29 "A. We went to where Foday Sankoh was. We were there with

1 him for up to a week, but there was a programme at hand  
2 whereby he told us that according to the peace that he had  
3 gone to sign, he was to pay a visit to the Nigerian  
4 President. So he said, because since the peace it was only  
10:59:55 5 the Foreign Minister, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, whom  
6 they called Tom Ikimi, he was the peace mediator. He said  
7 they will be making arrangements for him to go and meet the  
8 Nigerian President, for them to meet one on one,  
9 face-to-face.

11:00:14 10 We were there one morning and we accompanied him to the  
11 airport. He boarded a plane to the Nigeria. He went with  
12 a Black Guard adjutant, who was Augustine. He went with  
13 his spokesman at that time Gibriil Massaquoi plus  
14 Foday Sankoh. Then they went, three of them. When they  
11:00:33 15 arrived at the Lagos airport we heard at five minutes past  
16 3 over the BBC that Foday Sankoh was under detention, the  
17 reason being they said he had gone with arms and ammunition  
18 which they said was against their security in Nigeria.  
19 Whilst we were wondering what was happening next, then at  
11:00:58 20 five minutes past 5 we heard Fayah Musa over the radio,  
21 over the air, that the leadership of the RUF had totally  
22 changed. Foday Sankoh is no more leader of the RUF. He  
23 said the leadership may be Deen-Jalloh or Philip Palmar.  
24 Then Mike Lamin became concerned. He said these people  
11:01:21 25 were the people whom we have been sending out since the  
26 time we were in the bush, this Fayah Musa, and they were  
27 the people whom we had regarded as peace mediators for the  
28 RUF. They had caused Foday Sankoh to come to the Ivory  
29 Coast. We had sent them as representatives to Freetown to

1 represent the RUF on the peace accord. He said so they  
2 have come and they have not told us anything. They have  
3 met the Pa under arrest. They have arrested the Pa."

4 He then goes on to describe who Fayah Musa was which need  
11:02:01 5 not detain us and who the other individuals were and then he  
6 continues, line 13:

7 "Q. After Mike Lamin said these things about these men  
8 what happened then?

9 A. After he said that, after he had called them, Fayah  
11:02:18 10 Musa, Deen-Jalloh, Dr Barry, Philip Palmer, he asked them,  
11 he said, 'Why is it that you are the people whom we have  
12 relied on for peace as representatives of the RUF? You all  
13 knew about Foday Sankoh's travel from here to Nigeria. He  
14 has gone there and he has been arrested, he is in  
11:02:38 15 detention. Then you, Fayah Musa, has gone over the air and  
16 said that the leadership of the RUF has changed.' He said,  
17 'Tell me really what that meant. What you people mean.'  
18 Then from there Fayah Musa called the gendarme as that is  
19 the securities in the Ivory Coast. From that meeting Mike  
11:02:57 20 Lamin too was arrested right there."

21 So that is the situation on the ground in La Cote d'Ivoire:

22 "Q. What did you do after Mike Lamin was arrested?

23 A. I escaped and returned to Danane.

24 Q. How long did you remain in Danane?

11:03:29 25 A. I was in Danane about a week.

26 Q. While you were in Danane were you aware of any  
27 communications being received in Danane?"

28 This is the point we're coming to now, Mr Taylor.

29 "A. Yes.

1 Q. What were you aware of?

2 A. After I had left Abidjan and had come to Danane, the  
3 house where Philip Palmer was at Bellevue One Protocol  
4 Yard, the reason why it was referred to as protocol yard,  
11:03:55 5 according to what I was told by Philip Palmer and others,  
6 there was another house nearby, just about 15 yards off the  
7 house where Philip Palmer was. There was a man there  
8 called Pa Musa Cisse. This Musa Cisse man was the protocol  
9 officer for Charles Taylor. So the house where Pa Musa

11:04:15 10 Cisse was in relation to where the RUF base was where  
11 Philip Palmer was was a short distance. That's why I said  
12 I estimated it to be a 15-yard distance. So this Pa Musa  
13 Cisse had a radio man and that radio man, we referred to  
14 him as Action Man. He was a Sierra Leonean, this Action

11:04:37 15 Man, but he had left the RUF for a long time and he was  
16 there - he was then with the NPFL. So Action Man had been  
17 with Pa Musa Cisse as a radio operator. Just when  
18 Foday Sankoh and Mike Lamin were arrested when I came to  
19 Danane, the following day at night Action Man went to us at

11:05:00 20 the house and he invited us at Musa Cisse's house and he  
21 told me that in fact he had had communication with  
22 Foday Sankoh. That was two days after - after Foday Sankoh  
23 had been arrested in Nigeria. He was then in detention.

24 He said he had heard information. He said he had had  
11:05:21 25 contact with Foday Sankoh and Foday Sankoh had told him to  
26 contact Mosquito so that the two of them would be linked up  
27 and he would give him some piece of advice and order. And  
28 he told him that he should tell Mosquito to take advice  
29 from the other side and we came. After that he told us

1 this. We were there and the following night - the  
2 following night" - he was then asked who the various  
3 individuals were and he describes them, indicating that Mosquito  
4 was a Sierra Leonean, and then this:

11:06:07 5 "Q. Who was it who said to take advice from the other  
6 side? Who said that?

7 A. It was Foday Sankoh.

8 Q. And who was it who was to take advice from the other  
9 side?

11:06:21 10 A. Mosquito, Sam Bockarie.

11 Q. Who spoke to Mosquito?

12 A. Foday Sankoh. He told Mosquito that."

13 Bottom of that page:

14 "He told Mosquito that Mosquito should not take anything  
11:06:37 15 from Fayah Musa and others. He said even the detention  
16 that he was in, Fayah Musa and others had hands in that so  
17 the only thing that he was telling him was that he should  
18 take advice directly from Charles Taylor in Liberia.

19 Q. Who was saying to take advice directly from Charles  
11:06:58 20 Taylor in Liberia? Who said that?

21 A. Foday Sankoh told Mosquito, Sam Bockarie. He said Sam  
22 Bockarie should take advice from Charles Taylor in Liberia.

23 He said even before he was arrested in Nigeria, he said  
24 he had spoken to Charles Taylor. That is Foday Sankoh. He

11:07:20 25 said he had spoken to Charles Taylor for his Sierra Leonean  
26 fighters who had been with the NPFL and fought alongside  
27 the NPFL. He said being that Mike Lamin had crossed over  
28 with a lot of his fighters into Liberia, he will want  
29 those fighters who had been fighting for a long time

1 alongside the NPFL to find ways to be transported back to  
2 Sierra Leone to Mosquito to continue the fight and  
3 therefore he should take advice from Charles Taylor."

4 That's a fairly long passage, Mr Taylor, but it's important  
11:07:58 5 in order that we have the context. Now, this suggestion that  
6 Mosquito take advice from you, do you know anything about that?

7 A. Absolutely nothing about that. And I don't think any other  
8 witness have said that Foday Sankoh while he was in - at this  
9 particular time he is either in Ivory Coast or in detention spoke  
11:08:27 10 to me. Foday Sankoh never did.

11 Q. Now, this suggestion that those fighters who had been  
12 fighting alongside the NPFL, i.e. those fighters who had entered  
13 Liberia with Mike Lamin, that you must find a way for them to be  
14 transported back to Sierra Leone to Mosquito, Mr Taylor, were you  
11:08:59 15 in a position to do that?

16 A. No. Did not know them and these people that came and were  
17 disarmed, they were given International Red Cross cards. But  
18 this witness is not the only one of those disarmed people that  
19 testified before this Court and I'm sure they would have  
11:09:19 20 clarified that too. He is just one of the individuals that is  
21 bringing up this thing. But there was no contact between those  
22 people and myself. They were disarmed. They were given  
23 International Committee of the Red Cross cards and they dispersed  
24 themselves throughout Liberia in whatever way they felt like.

11:09:43 25 Some of them ended up here testifying. So there was no contact  
26 whatsoever.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, you appreciate of course, don't you, that if  
28 this testimony of this witness is correct, Sankoh is advising  
29 Mosquito, now in charge, to take advice from you. Now, one would

1 assume that prior to such an instruction being given, you had  
2 been contacted and agreed to provide such advice. So help me,  
3 when had that contact taken place?

4 A. Never. No contact. There had been no contact whatsoever.

11:10:40 5 I have seen and it probably would not be helpful to the Court,  
6 but one of the individuals - it's so tricky in these matters.  
7 I'm not a lawyer so I don't know how to put this. But one of the  
8 individuals named by this witness as being present with

9 Foday Sankoh in Nigeria at the particular time, I have seen  
11:11:05 10 statements from one of the individuals who did not appear before  
11 this Court that gives a - so it would not be helpful to the Court  
12 - that gave - the man who was there, his written account is  
13 totally different from what this man is saying. But I'm not sure  
14 - it's not going to be helpful because he did not appear as a

11:11:25 15 witness before this Court. But based on the statements released  
16 by the Prosecution that I have read and have in my custody, the  
17 man who was there gives a totally different account where  
18 Foday Sankoh writes letters that he brings back from Nigeria  
19 designating what he wants, promoting Sam Bockarie and setting out  
11:11:46 20 everything he wanted to do. That witness that was not brought  
21 here by the Prosecution, that statement is available supplied by  
22 the Prosecution.

23 So I don't know how they could have seen - maybe that's why  
24 they didn't bring him, because he who was present when the arrest  
11:12:05 25 occurred in Nigeria and the instruction that he brought, the  
26 number of letters are all detailed in his account which are  
27 totally at variance with what is being stated here. But I'm not  
28 sure it it's going to be helpful because he did not appear  
29 anyway.

1 Q. Now the witness continued, Mr Taylor. I'm now at page  
2 20128:

3 "Q. You said were you in Danane for about a week. How did  
4 it happen that you left Danane?

11:12:33 5 A. Well, we had been in Danane within those few days this  
6 protocol, that is Musa Cisse, called CO Brown. According  
7 to CO Brown, Pa Musa Cisse gave him money and I saw the  
8 money. He said it was from - it was Charles Taylor who had  
9 sent the money for us, those of us who were in the Ivory  
11:13:03 10 Coast after Pa Sankoh had been arrested and those of us who  
11 were in Danane. So we could use the money to sustain  
12 ourselves. So CO Brown even before nightfall on that day,  
13 he escaped with the money and went to Gbarnga in Liberia  
14 and he left us there and went. It was only one lady who  
11:13:24 15 was at the house who told us that CO Brown had gone to  
16 Gbarnga. That was what she told us. And we too said CO  
17 Brown went to Gbarnga without telling us and he has  
18 something for us. So while we were there Action Man also  
19 told us that the money that had been taken away that  
11:13:43 20 Mosquito said that he had told Jungle, CO Jungle, for him  
21 to pick you guys up from there to go with you so we will  
22 look for ways to go with you to Sierra Leone where he was,  
23 Mosquito, and we were happy."

24 Now, Mr Taylor, were you sending money to RUF  
11:14:10 25 representatives in the Ivory Coast via Musa Cisse?

26 A. No. Two individuals claimed to be in Monrovia. I don't  
27 help them to go. I know nothing about their going. Now I'm  
28 supposed to be sending money to them in Danane to help them. I  
29 don't even know these people, what they are doing. While they



1 were in Monrovia why don't they come to me to get this so-called  
2 money? They hustle whatever way they can, get their money and  
3 go. So I'm supposed to be now supplying them in Danane.

4 It just doesn't stop. This is a blatant, blatant lie.

11:14:53 5 Never sent them any money, did not know that they were there or  
6 what they were doing. Had no idea of what they were doing.  
7 Foday Sankoh had never contacted me.

8 But now this is an interesting statement that now Mosquito  
9 is telling Jungle what to do. So apparently now - I don't know.

11:15:15 10 Jungle now is taking instructions apparently here, line 22, 23,  
11 from Mosquito where Mosquito said that he had told Jungle to go  
12 and pick them up. I know nothing about this foolishness that  
13 these boys are doing. I have no idea that they are in Danane. I  
14 hear myself about the arrest of Foday Sankoh just like everybody  
11:15:39 15 else. No.

16 Q. Let's move on. On that same topic of Jungle, page 20148  
17 starting at line 20:

18 "Q. The times that you went to Mosquito in Kenema, do you  
19 recall any visitors with Mosquito when you saw him?

11:16:07 20 A. Well, it was at one time when I went there this same  
21 Colonel Jungle, I met him there. He was sitting together  
22 with Mosquito at NIC where Mosquito was residing in Kenema  
23 and I also saw Eagle there. I saw Manawa there together  
24 with other soldiers and officers and, like I said, I saw  
11:16:38 25 Jungle there. He was sitting there and when we entered  
26 there Manawa and I, I saw them there. All of us sat there  
27 and Mosquito told us. He said, 'Have you seen this man who  
28 has come here?' He said, 'It is Charles Taylor who sent  
29 him for us to give him some parcels of diamonds.' I met

1           them there and I had seen this Jungle before. So from  
2           there we stayed there when Mosquito, Colonel Jungle,  
3           Captain Eagle, they boarded a vehicle and went towards  
4           Tongo. So that was what he told us."

11:17:29 5           You're runner, Mr Taylor, Jungle?

6           A. I beg your pardon?

7           Q. Your runner, Jungle?

8           A. Mind you here there's another witness that came before this  
9           Court and I think a very good witness, protected, that told this

11:17:53 10          Court when Jungle entered Sierra Leone and that Jungle had been  
11          in Sierra Leone since ULIMO cut off. Here is the man who is  
12          supposed to be there throughout this period, Jungle who ends up  
13          in Abidjan with Foday Sankoh, here is a man who is saying that -  
14          well, he didn't say in so many words that he has just seen him

11:18:13 15          but he is acting as though he's never known this Jungle before.

16          And a protected witness came before this Court and told this  
17          Court when Jungle entered that place there after the cut-off his  
18          relationship with Sam Bockarie and Sankoh.

19                 So if Jungle is in Abidjan with Foday Sankoh, he goes there

11:18:29 20          during the time of the 1996 peace. So this guy, he is just  
21          meeting him now behind there with a Sam Bockarie? So he doesn't  
22          know Jungle? I mean when they just develop these falsehoods, if  
23          he doesn't know Jungle then he is not with the RUF because he  
24          cannot say that - and the individual that testified is a very

11:18:54 25          important witness I would think for the Prosecution and one that  
26          I think was very, very intelligent - very intelligent - and he  
27          well, maybe his eyes misled him and this man is just - I'm not  
28          trying to characterise him saying that this is his first time but  
29          there is the appearance here that this is someone that he is just

1 meeting, even though he doesn't say that here in his evidence,  
2 but it gives the appearance of, oh, this is somebody that Charles  
3 Taylor just sent, which is a lie.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: You've told us what some other witness  
11:19:31 5 said, but what do you say, Mr Taylor? The question was: Was  
6 Jungle your runner?

7 THE WITNESS: No, I just said, your Honour, that is a lie.  
8 He is not.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: This is somebody Charles Taylor just sent  
11:19:45 10 which is a lie?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: You mean that it's a lie that Jungle was  
13 your runner.

14 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour.

11:19:57 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. What do you say to this proposition, page 20158, testimony  
17 of 13 November 2008. The witness was reminded of some evidence  
18 he had given on a previous occasion and he was asked this  
19 question:

11:20:19 20 "Q. And you said that one of those latter times was at  
21 Gendema in late 1991. You said towards the end of 1991.  
22 And you testified that Foday Sankoh brought ammunition when  
23 you met with him at Gendema. Do you remember that?

24 A. Yes, ma'am.

11:20:42 25 Q. On that occasion did Foday Sankoh tell you from whom he  
26 had obtained the ammunition?

27 A. Well, he said he got it from Gbarnga, where Charles  
28 Taylor was, from Charles Taylor.

29 Q. In addition to the ammunition did Foday Sankoh bring

1 anything else with him at that meeting in Gendema?

2 A. Yes. Ammunition, arms, medicines and food, rice.

3 Q. Did Foday Sankoh tell you where he obtained these other  
4 items that he brought to you?

11:21:14 5 A. He said he got it from Gbarnga from Charles Taylor. "

6 Is that true; late 1991, towards the end of 1991?

7 A. Yes. It's true on the arms - I mean on the ammunition.

8 The food and other things, Foday Sankoh always brought what he  
9 needed. So late 1991 if Foday Sankoh went there and if he

11:21:40 10 actually saw him with ammunition that he said came from me, by  
11 late 1991 that's probable, yes.

12 Q. What do you say about the other items, so we're clear?

13 A. No, I'm saying that he bought them. Foday Sankoh would buy  
14 food, other condiments when he came. How he got the money I  
11:21:59 15 don't know, but he always bought things in Gbarnga, what he  
16 needed.

17 Q. Okay. Moving on. Page 20164, line 25. Again he is  
18 reminded of his earlier testimony:

19 "Q. Mr Witness, you also testified yesterday that during  
11:22:21 20 the time you were at Zogoda with Foday Sankoh you heard  
21 Foday Sankoh communicate with Charles Taylor. You  
22 testified that Foday Sankoh would explain about his health  
23 or explain about some security operation, everything.  
24 What security operations did Foday Sankoh explain to  
11:22:52 25 Charles Taylor if you remember?

26 A. From what I used to hear and to my understanding it  
27 was from the enemies advance and how far he had gone with  
28 the operations and where his men still occupied. That is  
29 the RUF soldiers in Sierra Leone. There was some weapons

1 which were heavy weapons. If RUF captured those he would  
2 tell him.

3 Q. And, Mr Witness, when you said that Foday Sankoh would  
4 explain everything, what do you mean by everything?

11:23:24 5 A. That is what I meant by everything. That is what I  
6 have said. He would ask about his health. They would say  
7 hello to each other. He would tell him about the defensive  
8 positions of the RUF and the weapons. And if we had  
9 captured heavy weapons that would be relayed to him. He  
10 would explain to Charles Taylor that one."

11 This is in Zogoda, Mr Taylor, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Whilst there in their jungle hideout you were being given  
14 regular updates of the situation on the ground in Sierra Leone.

11:24:10 15 What do you say about that?

16 A. That's not true. Never, no. I had no contact with  
17 Foday Sankoh after 1992. No, that's not true.

18 Q. Were you the guiding hand, Mr Taylor?

19 A. No, I --

11:24:25 20 Q. Remotely from Gbarnga?

21 A. No. Never.

22 Q. Let's move on. Page 20194, line 22:

23 "Q. Now, Mr Witness, you said it was in the same month and  
24 you mentioned the coup. It was in the same month that what  
11:25:15 25 took place?

26 A. Sorry, when ECOMOG dislodged the AFRC from Freetown."  
27 Now we know when we're talking about, don't we, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, we do.

29 Q. "Q. So did you eventually yourself travel to Buedu?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And what happened when you arrived in Buedu?

3 A. When we got to Buedu, the next day Johnny Paul called a  
4 meeting in Mosquito's veranda, the house where he was  
11:25:48 5 lodged. At this meeting Johnny Paul was there because he  
6 called the meeting and honourable Sammy was at this  
7 meeting. Major Dumbuya was there, CO Kallon - sorry, CO  
8 Issa Sesay was at this meeting. Mike Lamin was at this  
9 meeting and many other commanders including myself within  
11:26:11 10 the AFRC and the RUF. Johnny Paul thanked Mosquito and  
11 praised him for the effort he had applied in saving his  
12 life and his family up to the time he has got to Buedu to  
13 Mosquito. Then he told Mosquito that in fact since AFRC  
14 took over, when he was chairman for the AFRC he had been  
11:26:39 15 receiving parcels of diamonds which the AFRC and the RUF  
16 had been mining in Kono and Tongo so he had these parcels  
17 of diamond. "

18 So this is Johnny Paul Koroma speaking, yes, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes.

11:26:59 20 Q. So he, Johnny Paul, has got these parcels of diamonds and  
21 he is telling Bockarie about it.

22 "So really what he wanted to happen to the diamonds, he  
23 said really he hadn't much contact with Charles Taylor. "

24 Pause. Was that right? He, Johnny Paul Koroma, hadn't  
11:27:21 25 much contact with Charles Taylor. Do you see that?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. "That is Johnny Paul. But Mosquito had contact with  
28 Charles Taylor. So he said he wanted these diamonds - he wanted  
29 Mosquito to take him, Johnny Paul, and some few other commanders

1 so that they can go to Monrovia to meet Charles Taylor with these  
2 diamonds so that Charles Taylor will help them to find ways and  
3 means by which we can get arms and ammunition, medicines and  
4 other things in order to continue attacking the ECOMOG that had  
11:28:03 5 dislodged, that has removed us from power."

6 Now pause there. There are a number of things there we  
7 need to examine. Firstly, Johnny Paul Koroma is in possession of  
8 diamonds and he is openly telling Bockarie with them in this  
9 meeting, yes?

11:28:21 10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. He is suggesting to Bockarie, "Look, I don't really know  
12 Charles Taylor. You do. Let's all go up there and see him."  
13 Help us, remember this is February 1998. Had you any contact  
14 with Bockarie at that stage?

11:28:39 15 A. No contact with Bockarie whatsoever at that stage. No.

16 Q. Had you any contact - however limited - with Johnny Paul  
17 Koroma at that stage?

18 A. None whatsoever.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,  
11:28:55 20 Mr President?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we're almost at the end of the tape,  
22 Mr Griffiths. We'll take the morning break now and resume at 12  
23 o'clock.

24 [Break taken at 11.29 a.m.]

11:59:30 25 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please, your Honours:

28 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were looking at  
29 an account of a meeting held - well, called by Johnny Paul Koroma

1 in Buedu following the ECOMOG intervention, and we got as far as  
2 line 21 on page 20195, and I would like to pick it up from there,  
3 please:

4 "We discussed that. Mosquito thanked him for all that he  
12:02:19 5 had said and then he told - then Mosquito told Johnny Paul that,  
6 'One thing I am telling you now is that I am the leader taking  
7 care of both the AFRC and the RUF from today's date.' He said,  
8 'That is what you should know.' He said, 'Because the power that  
9 you had when we made you chairman,' he said, 'you do not make any  
12:02:49 10 effort in keeping that power in existence that would have  
11 retained you in power as chairman. Now that you are here in this  
12 bush where we are, I am going to do everything that you need not  
13 you any longer.'

14 He said, 'What you should do right now, from how you are  
12:03:12 15 sitting down and what you have been talking about that you had it  
16 from the AFRC and the RUF,' he said, 'you are to hand over  
17 everything now, money, diamonds that you had directly to me.' He  
18 said, 'If you had to go and see Charles Taylor or what you have  
19 to do, I will tell you whether you should do that.' He said,  
12:03:36 20 'But in this meeting I will never assure you that I will take you  
21 and your other officers to go to Monrovia to meet Charles Taylor  
22 with the diamonds.' He said, 'Hand over the diamonds to me.'

23 You know, the way Johnny Paul saw, he still thought that he  
24 had some powers. He wanted to resist in giving the diamonds - in  
12:03:58 25 handing over the diamonds. Mosquito and Issa, they took their  
26 arms, that is their pistols, and pointed them at Johnny Paul.  
27 They put him under gunpoint and they said whether he was willing  
28 or not willing, he should hand over those particular diamonds  
29 that he had. Johnny Paul was afraid where he was sitting. He



1 wanted to sit on the floor and he showed where the diamonds were  
2 in the room. Mosquito and his bodyguards, like Shabado and one  
3 SBU boy, Junior, who was with Mike Lamin, they entered and took  
4 the diamonds. The diamonds were in a bag ..."

12:04:39 5 and he goes on to indicate a potential size.

6 Now, Mr Taylor, bear in mind this passage relating this  
7 meeting has to be looked at in the context of Foday Sankoh,  
8 according to this witness, having sent instructions that Bockarie  
9 must take advice from you. You follow?"

12:05:11 10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. So when Bockarie is saying now, I am the man in charge of  
12 the AFRC and the RUF, he is now, by that statement - when we put  
13 the rest of the equation together, he is now the conduit from you  
14 to both those organisations. You follow?

12:05:35 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. And what he is saying is, I am the one who controls access  
17 to Charles Taylor and diamonds. Do you see that?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. Now, help me. First of all, did you know about this  
12:05:47 20 meeting?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. And recalling that this meeting takes place in the  
23 immediate aftermath of the ECOMOG intervention, tell me, did you  
24 receive any visits from Sam Bockarie immediately thereafter?

12:06:04 25 A. No.

26 Q. So if we are to put together this particular version of  
27 events, Bockarie is in possession of a large quantity of diamonds  
28 from Johnny Paul Koroma in the immediate aftermath of the ECOMOG  
29 intervention in February 1998. Do you follow that, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Now, help us. When do you say you first saw him; Remind  
3 us?

4 A. September 1998, my first meeting with Bockarie.

12:06:47 5 Q. So that's some six months, on this version of events, after  
6 he comes into the possession of this large quantity of diamonds,  
7 yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The large quantity which, we are told, paid for two of the  
12:07:00 10 three major shipments of arms to the RUF.

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. Now, let's move on. Now, let's go to page 20210, and it's  
13 speaking about trips Bockarie made to Monrovia. Line 1:

14 "Q. When Sam Bockarie went on these trips do you know why  
12:07:38 15 he went on those trips?

16 A. Well, most of what he told me, and what I saw myself,  
17 that is to say he went to Monrovia to Charles Taylor for us  
18 to be supplied our needs, that is, ammunition, arms,  
19 medicines. That was what he used to tell us always, that  
12:07:58 20 he was going to get those in Liberia from Charles Taylor.

21 Q. And do you know if there was any payment made for these  
22 materials?

23 A. Well, he did not tell me that directly, but like  
24 Shaba, with whom they used to travel, that is Shabado, like  
12:08:17 25 Ofoh, Foday, who was his bodyguard commander, sometimes  
26 they would say they had gone with diamonds together with  
27 Master and at that time they had assigned C0  
28 Kailondo - sorry, C0 Kennedy in Kono. He was mining  
29 diamonds for the RUF. And we too used to see them take the

1 diamonds and brought them to Mosquito at times in my  
2 presence.

3 Q. Now, did Foday or Shabado tell you what Mosquito did  
4 with these diamonds that he brought to Liberia?

12:08:56 5 A. Yes. He said most of the times they put in for  
6 ammunition and they would bring us US dollars, which I saw  
7 myself with Mosquito. He used to send some people to the  
8 riverside to buy some condiments, some food and some  
9 clothing at the Guinea border.

12:09:17 10 Q. Who did that?

11 A. Mosquito himself. I used to see him give money to  
12 Salim, who was an RUF contractor. They would go with it to  
13 the Guinea border. Salim would go and buy those things  
14 that I have just mentioned and would bring them.

12:09:33 15 Q. And what type of currency did they use to buy those  
16 things?

17 A. They would go with US dollars and exchange it for  
18 Guinean francs.

19 Q. Did Foday or Shabado tell you to whom Sam Bockarie gave  
12:09:51 20 the diamonds to get these materials?

21 A. Always he himself, Sam Bockarie, used to tell us -  
22 whenever he was leaving Buedu to Monrovia, he told us that  
23 he was going to Charles Taylor. That one happened many  
24 times. Whenever he was going, that was what he told us."

12:10:09 25 Now, I am not going to ask you about receiving diamonds,  
26 because we've dealt with that. There is one aspect of this I  
27 want to deal with, and it's this: Here we have a situation  
28 where, on page 20210, lines 19 to 21, it is being suggested that  
29 in addition to arms and ammunition and other things like

1 medicines, et cetera, you're also providing payment in cash to  
2 Sam Bockarie, US dollars, which are thereafter used for purchases  
3 along the Guinean border. Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

4 Now, dealing with that particular aspect, what do you say?

12:10:59 5 A. Never. Never gave Sam Bockarie any money for anything that  
6 he gave to me, no. That's - the only thing I can put to this is  
7 that if Sam Bockarie at the time - and not the time he is  
8 mentioning here - goes to Monrovia with diamonds, which I would  
9 not say is out of the ordinary, and sold them, of course he would  
12:11:21 10 have gotten cash for them, because Liberia is the US dollar zone.  
11 So I can understand how he would have dollars, but not from me,  
12 no.

13 Q. Now, there is a further reference to this man Jungle on  
14 page 20214. Can we go to that, please, line - let's pick it up  
12:12:01 15 at line 22:

16 "Q. Now, you have mentioned that Jungle before. Is this  
17 the same Jungle or a different person?

18 A. It's the same Jungle that I'm talking about.

19 Q. How many times did you see him in Buedu?

12:12:18 20 A. I saw him for up to three times."

21 Now over the page.

22 "Q. And what happened this first time that you saw him in  
23 Buedu?

24 A. He brought arms and ammunition in a vehicle. He said  
12:12:33 25 he had brought them from Gbarnga. It was Charles Taylor  
26 who gave him. It was Charles Taylor who ordered him to  
27 take those ammunition from Gbarnga and bring them. That is  
28 what he told us."

29 The second time:

1 "A. He still came to Mosquito. He brought a vehicle that  
2 was a Hilux. I saw ammunition in it in RPG boxes, AK  
3 boxes. They were the GPMG rounds, the box was in it. He  
4 brought them.

12:13:04 5 Q. You said he came with RPG boxes. Do you know where  
6 these - the RPG weapons or the ammunitions, the bombs for  
7 the RPGs?

8 A. I said the rockets, the bomb.

9 Q. And the AK boxes, what was in those AK boxes?

12:13:19 10 A. AK rounds."

11 Over the page. Line 20:

12 "Q. And what happened this third time that you saw Jungle?

13 A. Well, he said - then I heard that he had brought  
14 ammunition for us, but at that time I did not see it. I  
12:13:38 15 did not see the ammunition, but I saw Jungle himself. He  
16 said he had brought some ammunition for us, so he himself  
17 said it. So whenever he comes, all of us would be sitting  
18 down, just like we are sitting here discussing?

19 Q. Now, these three times that Jungle brought ammunition,  
12:13:56 20 do you know if any payment was made for that ammunition?

21 A. Yeah. He said Mosquito was giving diamonds, money, for  
22 that, but I did not directly see where Mosquito was handing  
23 over those things, but Mosquito himself used to tell us  
24 that I am paying with diamonds, for those things that were  
12:14:18 25 coming, money.

26 Q. Now, you said that he said Mosquito was giving  
27 diamonds. Who was it who said Mosquito was giving  
28 diamonds?

29 A. He said he was giving them to Jungle. Jungle always

1 said he took these diamonds directly to - for those things  
2 to Charles Taylor. I never went with them in Monrovia, but  
3 I used to see what was happening and what they used to tell  
4 me. "

12:14:48 5 Now, Mr Taylor, how is it that you keep suggesting that you  
6 don't know this Jungle when, on this account, this is someone who  
7 is seeing you on at least three occasions, according to this  
8 witness, bringing you diamonds? How come you have forgotten him?

9 A. Counsel, I don't know this Jungle boy. Never met Jungle.  
12:15:24 10 Jungle never brought any diamonds to me. Sam Bockarie never  
11 brought any diamonds to me. Issa Sesay never brought any  
12 diamonds to me.

13 You know, it's just so hard. This is a very - it's a very  
14 hard situation. It's very hard - this, I don't know. It's a  
12:15:50 15 very, very, very, very well organised orchestration. As I am  
16 listening to this witness, what does one say in this case? This  
17 Court has heard accounts after accounts after accounts about what  
18 happened to Johnny Paul Koroma with this diamond business from  
19 some of the people that were involved in taking the diamonds from  
12:16:18 20 him. I mean, how can you explain one incident, several people  
21 come, the identical incident and they all have their own  
22 tentacles. Now, this witness's whole account of things, I mean,  
23 this - I don't know Jungle in direct answer to your question. I  
24 don't know Jungle.

12:16:46 25 So all this orchestration here is just - it's very sad.  
26 It's very sad that you go through this case, this long case, and  
27 witness after witness, they come up with these stories. I  
28 practically feel like a fool now sitting here telling these  
29 judges it's not true. This is not true. They probably all are

1 tired of listening to me with these liars after- this one  
2 diamond business. We were told here by other people how a  
3 particular witness took a pistol and fired between his foot, how  
4 that particular witness was accused of raping the man's wife.

12:17:23

5 All of these different things we have heard about this one  
6 diamond thing. This man come was his own story about him being  
7 present. Is he there or is he not? So all the other people,  
8 what, Johnny Paul Koroma never voluntarily gave no diamonds from  
9 what has been told this Court. Johnny Paul lied. Another

12:17:42

10 important witness who said he was with Johnny Paul Koroma where  
11 this witness that Johnny Paul Koroma, they went into the place,  
12 they took the diamonds, this witness claims he was beaten up and  
13 all this kind of stuff. We have heard - I really, really,  
14 really, really - it's a terrible thing for me. It's a terrible

12:17:58

15 thing for me.

16 But in direct answer, I don't know this boy. I don't know  
17 this boy. But everyone has been really tuned into saying Jungle,  
18 Jungle, Jungle, Jungle. If I know this young man called Jungle,  
19 I would have said I knew Jungle. What's left with all these  
20 lies? I don't know Jungle and it's not true. But we know the  
21 different versions of this same tale. This tale has gone on and  
22 on.

12:18:19

23 We also know that in this meeting - remember, Sam Bockarie  
24 is supposed to be promoted as what? Chief of defence staff. By  
25 who? By Johnny Paul Koroma. But in this meeting now what this  
26 witness says, we see now that as soon as - when Johnny Paul  
27 Koroma explains, Sam Bockarie stands up and tells him, "Guess  
28 what. I'm the man now." How does he get promoted as a chief of  
29 defence staff according to another witness? So, that's where we

12:18:42

1 are. But it's not true. I don't know this boy.

2 Q. Let's pick up the account shortly thereafter, page 20217,  
3 line 12:

4 "Q. While you were in Baiima, did you attend any meetings  
12:19:26 5 in Buedu?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What meetings did you attend?

8 A. Well, like in the morning, all of us would assemble at  
9 Mosquito's place because all of us were senior men,

12:19:40 10 officers, and he was head of all of us as commander. So at  
11 one time, it was at the end of 1998 and we were going

12 towards 1999 then, he told us he himself was tired of

13 staying like that in Buedu. He said he was fed up with all

14 of us staying in Kailahun District. He said he's got

12:20:13 15 something at hand. He said he was trying to go to Liberia

16 to Charles Taylor where he will get our needs. When he

17 comes back he said we will try to do what really he wanted

18 to do, he Mosquito. He was going to seek advice from

19 Charles Taylor in Liberia. Then from there and the meeting

12:20:40 20 was over, I went to my assignment and then he went. He,

21 Mosquito, we heard that he went to Liberia. That was - it

22 was a long time. We were now in 1999 because it took some

23 time before he went. I cannot just estimate the time, but

24 it was now in 1999.

12:21:10 25 We saw him come back from Liberia. He sent an information

26 to all deployment areas around the Kailahun District and

27 those who were across to Kono. He said we should send in

28 two or three representatives to come to Buedu for a

29 meeting. From our own target where we were in Baiima I was



1 designated to come for that meeting, together with Major  
2 Kailondo and Major Lamin. Then all the other areas  
3 designated two or three people just like we did in  
4 Baiima."

12:21:53 5 Now, let us pause there because there is a bit of a -  
6 another topic is dealt with before we come back to the sequence.  
7 Now, let's go back to page 20217, please. "This meeting" -  
8 Mr Taylor, note - "it was at the end of 1998 and we were going  
9 towards 1999 then", okay?

12:22:21 10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. Now, from the evidence we know this to be a critical  
12 period, don't we?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What's going on in this period, Mr Taylor, at the time this  
12:22:33 15 meeting is alleged to have taken place?

16 A. Well, if we are talking about late 1998, this is the  
17 period, going into 1999, that we have the Freetown invasion.

18 Q. Right. Now, at that period Bockarie is saying he is "fed  
19 up with all of us staying in Kailahun District. He said he was  
12:23:04 20 trying to go to Liberia to Taylor where he will get our needs."  
21 Now, had you not arranged for them to go to Burkina Faso in early  
22 December 1998 to obtain the arms which had been used for the  
23 Freetown invasion? Do you follow?

24 A. According to other versions of that, I had - but I had done  
12:23:32 25 more than that before. I had ordered the Fitti-Fatta. I had  
26 ordered the taking of Kono. I had ordered them to go to Burkina  
27 Faso to get weapons to go and invade Freetown. I had done all of  
28 that according to the various concoctions.

29 Q. He was going late 1998 to seek advice from Charles Taylor

1 in Liberia. But, Mr Taylor, had you not already instructed him  
2 in October 1998 on the Fitti-Fatta mission?

3 A. Of course. That's what --

4 Q. Had you not already given instructions for the Freetown  
12:24:06 5 invasion?

6 A. Now we see where the story goes.

7 Q. So help us, why is he in late 1998 coming to you for  
8 advice? Can you help us?

9 A. Because he never got any advice for any of those things  
12:24:22 10 that these allegations have alleged, that's why maybe he forgot  
11 his line. This is a play. You know, he forgot his line so he  
12 has to do a take two I guess on this. He forgot his line.

13 Q. "He, Mosquito, we heard that he went to Liberia. We were  
14 now in 1999 because it took some time before he went. It was now  
12:24:47 15 in 1999."

16 We then have this interjection at the bottom of page 20218,  
17 line 24:

18 "Q. When you were talking about payments being made for  
19 the ammunition that Jungle was bringing, you said that  
12:25:07 20 payment was being made with diamonds. Was payment being  
21 made with anything other than diamonds?

22 A. Yes, I said US dollars."

23 Now, Mr Taylor, you will recall, do you not, a couple of  
24 pages earlier that US dollars were coming in the opposite  
12:25:36 25 direction, from you, for use in purchasing goods on the Guinea  
26 border. Let's remind ourselves, page 20210, line 19:

27 "He said most of the times they put in for ammunition and  
28 they would bring us dollars. They would go with it to the Guinea  
29 border."

1 Do you remember that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. That's page 20210. Eight pages later:

12:26:15 4 "Q. Was payment being made with anything other than  
5 diamonds?

6 A. Yes, I said US dollars."

7 So we've got US dollars now going in the opposite  
8 direction. Help us, Mr Taylor. Were you handing out US dollars  
9 or were you receiving them, which is right?

12:26:27 10 A. Neither. Neither is right.

11 Q. "Q. Now, Mr Witness, after you, Major Lamin and Major  
12 Kailondo had been selected as representatives, what  
13 happened then?

14 A. And all other deployment areas under the control of the  
12:27:04 15 RUF, all of them provided the same, two or three  
16 representatives. All of us came to Buedu. We came to  
17 Buedu. We were many in Buedu. Mosquito called a meeting.  
18 This meeting, some civilians who had been with us for a  
19 long time in Buedu, plus we the soldiers who had come, we  
12:27:29 20 were over 80 - 60 to 70, above that. We were all in the  
21 compound. We, the officers, were sitting in Mosquito's  
22 place. He told us he had come from Liberia to

23 Charles Taylor. He said he had received arms and  
24 ammunition and he brought some reinforcement that had been  
12:27:54 25 begin to him for a particular mission that he wanted to  
26 undertake. This reinforcement that he brought were all  
27 Liberians. Their commander was one former ULIMO commander  
28 whom I knew before when I and Mike Lamin crossed over to  
29 Liberia. This commander was called Abu Keita. Abu Keita

1 was the commander for the reinforcement that had come from  
2 Liberia. We met them in Buedu.  
3 Mosquito told us that - he said, 'Now, I had told you that  
4 I was going to Charles Taylor for me to be able to get our  
12:28:40 5 needs and get ways to fight. Now I have brought arms and  
6 ammunition from Charles Taylor in Liberia.' He said, 'We  
7 would not only sit by and just control Kailahun and still  
8 call ourselves RUF.' He said, 'We need to fight against  
9 the ECOMOG,' and he said, 'I am ready to supply you with  
12:29:01 10 arms and ammunition and medicines. I will support you in  
11 whichever way that you would need to fight these people.'  
12 He said, 'I would want to tell everybody this operation is  
13 Operation Free Sankoh.' He said it in the presence of all  
14 the civilians, everybody. He said all this?"

12:29:25 15 Pause. Mr Taylor, you note this prior connection between  
16 Abu Keita, ULIMO commander, Mike Lamin, and you recall the story  
17 of them crossing over, of giving accommodation, access to Charles  
18 Julu's radio, don't you?

19 A. Yes, I do.

12:29:54 20 Q. And we can put a time frame to this, can we not?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Because even though in that earlier passage we looked at,  
23 which said this discussion took place in late 1998, Bockarie is  
24 now stating, after he has been to Liberia, this is Operation Free  
12:30:19 25 Sankoh. So when must that be: 1999?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. So when in 1999 must that be?

28 A. Well, he is talking about January 1999.

29 Q. When is Sankoh in custody, thus the need to free him? When

1 is he in custody?

2 A. Sankoh is arrested in 1997, and so I don't - I mean, he is  
3 in Freetown, so maybe they are trying to free him. That's what  
4 he is saying.

12:30:53 5 Q. Now, did you provide Sam Bockarie with all this material in  
6 1999 in order to launch Operation Free Sankoh?

7 A. No, I didn't. And I think this Court knows who entered  
8 Freetown, for what reason. I didn't.

9 Q. Now --

12:31:25 10 A. It may be interesting to add here, counsel, that this  
11 knowledge of Abu Keita that this witness is talking about goes  
12 back to 1996. So Abu Keita is no stranger to these people,  
13 because this crossover from Zogoda happens in 1996. So these are  
14 all colleagues. They know each other. He has known him for a  
12:31:47 15 long time.

16 Q. Three years?

17 A. Yes. Here is a man that in September 1998, who was  
18 arrested for attacking the government in Monrovia, I am supposed  
19 to be sending him, an enemy, a soldier, as commander to go with  
12:32:08 20 reinforcement just a few - two months later to go to lead  
21 Liberians into Sierra Leone on a war.

22 Q. But, Mr Taylor, help us. Why were you sending this further  
23 group? Had you not already received and retrained and re-armed  
24 the group of SLA?

12:32:39 25 A. That's what it said, yeah, that I.

26 Q. So help us, why is there any need to send further  
27 reinforcement in the form of Liberians led by Abu Keita? Help  
28 us, why were you doing that?

29 A. It just never did. Just never did. It's all a

1 fabrication. All a fabrication.

2 Q. Now, moving on. Page 20235. I am picking up a long answer  
3 at line 6 of that page:

4 "The following day we saw Issa arrive with about four to  
12:33:17 5 five vehicles loaded with arms and ammunition, including  
6 manpower. And on his arrival we asked him what was the  
7 matter. He said he was going to advise his brother. We  
8 asked who the brother was and he responded 'Mosquito', but  
9 he said that he knew Mosquito very well. He said, '  
12:33:40 10 Mosquito alone on his own will not be able to corrupt the  
11 whole RUF system'. He said that they were going to advise  
12 him, and if he said he was not going to take orders from  
13 Foday Sankoh and maybe he will want to resort to attacking  
14 us, he said that we will fight against him. So he told  
12:34:02 15 Mosquito.

16 Q. How did he tell Mosquito?

17 A. This is the point I am trying to arrive at. Issa  
18 informed Mosquito through the radio. He told Mosquito. He  
19 said the problem between him, Mosquito and Foday Sankoh, he  
12:34:23 20 said they were going there to advise him. He said, 'But  
21 the advice we are about to bring to you is a military  
22 advice and it is accompanied by violence.' He said that if  
23 Mosquito refused to take Foday Sankoh's orders, he said he,  
24 Issa Sesay, including all the RUF members, will force him  
12:34:44 25 to take orders from Foday Sankoh. And Mosquito too told  
26 Issa - we were all sitting by him and he was communicating  
27 through the radio. He said, 'One thing. I had been leader  
28 on behalf of Foday Sankoh.' He said not that he was  
29 actually trying to resist, not wanting to take Foday

1 Sankoh's command, but he said the attitude that he had put  
2 up, if he had now realised that all RUF soldiers, together  
3 with Issa Sesay himself, and all other RUF senior officers,  
4 if we do not see that his attitude is a correct one and  
12:35:22 5 that all of us had gone against him for that, he said he  
6 was not ready at all to fight against anyone amongst his  
7 RUF brothers or companions. But he said the only thing he  
8 would want to tell the RUF and the leadership was that all  
9 that the RUF had fought for at the time he was in control  
12:35:41 10 of the RUF and that he had with him at that present moment  
11 in Buedu, or the things that Issa knew that both of them  
12 got from outside Sierra Leone, he said he was going to take  
13 everything from with him to Charles Taylor in Monrovia in  
14 Liberia. He said he was going to seek refuge to  
12:35:59 15 Charles Taylor in Monrovia.

16 Q. So what happened after this conversation?

17 A. So from there Issa said we should rush up and meet that  
18 guy in Buedu. That was now at night. Before we arrived,  
19 they told us that Mosquito had moved, he had left the  
12:36:25 20 place, because we arrived early in the morning in Buedu,  
21 and they said, 'That very afternoon that you had that  
22 conversation with Mosquito, he crossed over with everything  
23 that he had into Liberia.'

24 Q. Now, you say they told you he crossed over with  
12:36:45 25 everything that he had. Did they tell you what it was that  
26 he crossed over with?

27 A. Yes. Mosquito himself had said that all the diamonds  
28 we knew that we had for the RUF, all the monies that we  
29 accrued on ... "

1           Pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, I want to ask you one or two  
2 questions here. Firstly, pausing there, were you aware that the  
3 circumstances in Kailahun at or about this time - and we know  
4 what we are talking about here. This is December 1999, yes?

12:37:30 5       A.     Uh-huh.

6       Q.     Were you aware in Monrovia that the circumstances had  
7 reached the point where Issa Sesay was travelling with four to  
8 five vehicles loaded with arms and ammunition to go to "advise"  
9 his brother and impose some military advice? Did you know this?

12:37:55 10     A.     No, I really didn't know. No.

11     Q.     Did you know it had reached that level of antagonism?

12     A.     Well, yes, I knew that Issa Sesay, who I - at that time was  
13 one of the more senior commanders and most of the other  
14 commanders were backing Foday Sankoh for disarmament and that  
15 they had shown all their loyalty to Foday Sankoh. So Sam  
16 Bockarie really did not have any support, I was aware from what  
17 Foday Sankoh had said in two meetings that we held, yes.

12:38:19 18     Q.     Now, it continues. Picking up at the bottom of page 20236:  
19           "A. Yes. Mosquito himself had said that all the diamonds  
20 we knew that we had for the RUF, all the monies that we  
21 accrued on behalf of the RUF and that he had with him as  
22 leader, at the time Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF,  
23 was not present, he said he crossed with everything.

24           Together with vehicles, the generators that we had in Buedu  
12:39:09 25           to electrify there. We had a radio station that he brought  
26           and referred to as Radio Freedom. He crossed with  
27           everything into Liberia?"

28           Is that true, Mr Taylor?

29     A.     I know Sam Bockarie - I don't know what all he brought, but



1 he did cross into Liberia with a lot of people and items, but I  
2 don't know the - this account of what he is giving. But he did  
3 come with a few things, yes.

4 Q. "Q. Who was it who was telling you this?

12:39:43 5 A. After Mosquito had left and on our arrival - on our  
6 arrival in Buedu it was a radio man called Zedman that we  
7 met there. All of them should have crossed over, but  
8 Zedman decided to hide. So he returned one of the  
9 vehicles, in fact. He was the one that we met in Buedu, and  
12:40:04 10 he explained all of those to us. All the things that I've  
11 explained, he was the one who told us about all of those  
12 things, that Mosquito had crossed over with all of them  
13 into Liberia."

14 Now, Mr Taylor, we know your version of events on that, and  
12:40:22 15 I am not asking you to repeat it, okay? Which is why I have  
16 limited my question to the simple question whether or not you  
17 knew that things had reached this pitch between them, okay?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. Now, let's move on to another topic. Page 20248:

12:40:47 20 "Q. After Issa became interim leader you said that you  
21 presented everything to him. Do you know what he did with  
22 the diamonds you presented to him?

23 A. Yes. He took most of the diamonds to Liberia to  
24 Charles Taylor.

12:41:02 25 Q. How is it that you know that?

26 A. He told us that such and such a diamond or diamonds -  
27 in fact, even at a time he took diamonds, about 51 carats  
28 in Kono, we heard it over the radio - I mean, our  
29 communication set. We were told that. Even Issa told us

1 that they had found such a diamond. Then one of our brothers  
2 who was in Togo found a diamond and it was Colonel  
3 Ranger's, the deputy brigade commander, and the diamond  
4 weighed 52 carats, 60 per cent, but he wanted to hide it  
12:41:35 5 away from people. But those who had found the diamond for  
6 him, there were a lot of them. At that time Beneto was  
7 there so they told the brigade commander, the mining  
8 commander, they said they had found a big diamond. And  
9 they asked Colonel Ranger about the diamond, and he denied  
12:41:54 10 knowledge about it, but Beneto passed an order and he was  
11 beaten to near death and he presented the diamond, that 52  
12 carats, 60 per cent, plus 52 carats which we heard about in  
13 Kono. I did not see it. All of these went to Issa. Issa  
14 told us that he was going to take the diamonds to  
12:42:12 15 Charles Taylor in Liberia, and Issa took the diamond to  
16 Liberia.

17 Q. Mr Witness, do you know if Issa received anything for  
18 the diamonds that he took to Liberia to Charles Taylor?

19 A. Yes. Issa brought back some ammunition, which I saw,  
12:42:27 20 and he brought a lot of US dollars, and he told us that we  
21 were raising funds for the RUF because we had to disarm and  
22 we had to go into politics, and politics will never go  
23 without money."

24 Now, Mr Taylor, did you provide US dollars to Issa Sesay  
12:43:00 25 for the political campaign the RUF were now about to embark upon  
26 during this period of disarmament?

27 A. No, I didn't. I didn't. It would have been a good idea  
28 to, but I didn't have the means at that time to contribute to  
29 him. No, I didn't.

1 Q. But, Mr Taylor, had other individuals not come to you and  
2 asked for assistance saying, "Well, look, you have had all these  
3 diamonds in safekeeping for Foday Sankoh. Give us some money now  
4 because we need it to transform ourselves into a political  
12:43:44 5 party", and they weren't given any. So did you give or didn't  
6 you, which is right?

7 A. No, I didn't. I didn't give any money to Issa. I should  
8 have been able to contribute, but I couldn't. I didn't have any  
9 funds at the time, no. I never gave him any money for the party  
12:44:05 10 or to assist him of this magnitude, no.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the other detail, because I am not going to  
12 ask you about receiving diamonds from Issa, you have already  
13 answered that, but there is a particular aspect of that I want to  
14 ask you about. Based on this account, this is the second  
12:44:25 15 unusually large diamond you have received. The 51 carat, 60  
16 per cent. Now, remember the passport size one in the shape of a  
17 body. So help me, what did you do with this one?

18 A. Nothing. I never received any diamonds from Issa, no.  
19 Never received.

12:44:43 20 Q. Well, these are two large diamonds, Mr Taylor, pretty  
21 unmissable. What happened to them?

22 A. I never received them. Nobody brought them to me. And if  
23 you check it, I am sure they never existed. Because those sizes  
24 of diamonds, it's very hard to hide them. Even if you sold them  
12:45:02 25 on the international market, there would be such publication of  
26 such a large diamond.

27 Q. And this is said to have occurred, you see, when we go to  
28 page 20259, line 6:

29 "Q. You talked about Issa going to Liberia with diamonds.

1 Can you tell us, during what time period did he go to  
2 Liberia with diamonds?

3 A. From the time Foday Sankoh was arrested 2001, 2002,  
4 right up to the time we disarmed he used to take diamonds  
12:45:45 5 to Liberia. Once in a while. Anytime he used to go there  
6 he would tell us that he was going to Liberia to meet with  
7 Charles Taylor with this and this thing. That was  
8 diamonds. He used to tell us that."

9 Now, in that time period, do you agree, 2001, 2002, did you  
12:46:14 10 see Issa Sesay?

11 A. Oh, yes, yes.

12 Q. How regularly?

13 A. Not very regularly. Issa was so involved with the peace  
14 process. After the disarmament it really got underway in 2001.  
12:46:34 15 If we remember, by early 2002, the period that he mentions here,  
16 you know, Kabbah declares the conflict over in Sierra Leone early  
17 2002. So the period in question here, Issa is very busy in  
18 Liberia and he makes more trips late 2000, I think, than all of  
19 2001 in question. So very few. Very few.

12:47:08 20 Q. Final matter in relation to this witness, Mr Taylor, page  
21 20447, and I am going to go - can we not put that up on the  
22 screen just yet, please. Mr Taylor, before we look at this  
23 passage, who killed Sam Bockarie?

24 A. Who killed Sam Bockarie?

12:47:31 25 Q. Yes, please?

26 A. Liberian government forces.

27 Q. Who in particular?

28 A. I don't really know in particular which soldier, but it was  
29 the government forces.

1 Q. Did you send Zigzag Marzah to kill Sam Bockarie?

2 A. Never, no. I don't even know if there was a Zigzag Marzah  
3 with that group. The individual that was sent to Nimba to make  
4 sure that Sam Bockarie was arrested was Moses Blah that I asked  
12:48:04 5 to go up there and supervise the arrest of Sam Bockarie and have  
6 him brought to me.

7 Q. Now, did you hear Zigzag Marzah tell this Court that he was  
8 sent by you to go and kill Sam Bockarie?

9 A. That's the Zigzag Marzah did not tell the truth about that,  
12:48:22 10 no, never --

11 Q. No, did you hear him tell this Court that he was sent by  
12 you to kill Sam Bockarie?

13 A. I cannot recall that directly in his statement.

14 Q. Well, it may well be, being involved in so many killings,  
12:48:39 15 he had forgotten that one, but do you recall him saying anything  
16 about that?

17 A. No, I can't really. There is another witness I recall.  
18 No, I don't recall Zigzag Marzah's involvement in that, no.

19 Q. Well, let's go now to page 20447, shall we:

12:49:02 20 "Q. Mr Witness, what did you hear Zigzag Marzah say about  
21 the death of Sam Bockarie?

22 A. Well, he said it was Charles Taylor who sent him to go  
23 and kill him.

24 Q. Did you hear him say anything about how Sam Bockarie  
12:49:20 25 was killed, what was used to kill him?

26 A. Well, I did not listen to that area because for me as  
27 long as he had confessed that he was the one who killed him  
28 and that it was an order given to him by Charles Taylor, we  
29 had forgotten about that and we knew finally that the man

1 was dead and he had died through orders given by  
2 Charles Taylor. "

3 Now, Mr Taylor, think carefully. Was it your favourite  
4 executioner who you had sent to kill Sam Bockarie, based on  
12:49:56 5 Zigzag Marzah's account, which we went through in detail  
6 yesterday. Which is right?

7 A. Zigzag Marzah was no executioner of mine. I didn't even  
8 know him and I didn't send him any place to kill anybody. To  
9 kill Sam Bockarie, no, I didn't.

12:50:17 10 Q. Now, that is all I ask you in relation to that witness.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

12 MS HOLLIS: Thank you, Mr President. We would simply note  
13 for the record that we believe that portions of this witness's  
14 testimony have been mischaracterised and we will deal with it on  
12:50:53 15 cross-examination.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Once more your  
17 objection has been noted on the record.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Mr Taylor, we are moving on to another witness now,  
12:51:24 20 {Redacted}.

21 MS HOLLIS: We may have an issue here with this witness.  
22 We are checking it right now, but this may be a protected  
23 witness.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Partial or?

12:51:37 25 MS HOLLIS: I think that the name was not public.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

27 MS HOLLIS: I don't know where the name is on my your  
28 screen. On mine it's at page 90 and on my line it is lines 2 and  
29 3 where the name is given and we would ask the name be redacted.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that is a protected witness so we  
2 will order redaction of the name mentioned. That reference to  
3 the name of that witness on my LiveNote is page 90 line 2. In  
4 any event, we rule that it be redacted from the transcript and  
12:53:38 5 also any member of the public who has heard that name is ordered  
6 not to repeat it outside the courtroom.

7           Yes, Mr Griffiths.

8           MR GRIFFITHS: My apologies for that. It was totally  
9 inadvertent:

12:54:02 10 Q. Now, this individual, Mr Taylor, gave testimony to this  
11 effect and I am picking up the account at page 15576, testimony  
12 given on 5 September 2008 and he speaks in these terms:

13           "Q. After your town was attacked, did anything happen to  
14 you yourself?

12:54:34 15 A. Yes, they captured me and my family in Kailahun Town.

16 Q. And when you were captured did anything happened to you  
17 after that?

18 A. Yes, they assembled all of us and talked to all of us,  
19 myself, my family and other civilians, and they told us  
12:54:53 20 that they did not come for us, the civilians. They did not  
21 come for us, the civilians. They said they came to free  
22 us. They said we shouldn't run to anywhere else. They  
23 said we shouldn't be afraid of anything. They said they  
24 did not come to kill us. They had not come to do us  
12:55:24 25 anything bad. They said they came to free us.

26 Q. Were you taken anywhere after that?

27 A. Yes, we were there for three months, all of us. We  
28 used to do some domestic jobs for them and within that  
29 three months they used to abduct us and other civilians

1 from the surrounding villages and they took us to the  
2 training base and it was the RUF training base."

3 Now, taking things in stages, Mr Taylor, from the  
4 standpoint of a self-confessed former rebel leader, such words,  
12:56:09 5 "They did not come for us, the civilians, they came to free us,  
6 we shouldn't run away, we shouldn't be afraid of anything, they  
7 did not come to kill us", what do you say about that?

8 A. As regards if it sounds like something that a group  
9 entering a place would say to the people?

12:56:36 10 Q. Yes.

11 A. That's reasonable. I am sure people will try to allay  
12 their fears and tell them, say, "We didn't come to harm you, we  
13 came to liberate you." They would say something like that.

14 Q. Now, the reason why I draw your attention to that,  
12:56:54 15 Mr Taylor: You recall that it's later said that in 1994 in  
16 Sierra Rutile you advised Foday Sankoh - we went over it this  
17 morning, didn't we?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. To terrorise the civilian population. So help me, which  
12:57:13 20 tactic had you advised Mr Sankoh to adopt, the terrorist one or  
21 this one?

22 A. Well, actually I had not advised him to adopt any tactic.  
23 If anything, Sankoh could have advised me. But in any case, you  
24 would want to use a non-terrorising tactics in meeting civilians  
12:57:38 25 like that. Of course you would want to do that.

26 Q. Now, the period here we are talking about is 1991 in  
27 Kailahun. Now, in fairness, the witness does go on to say that  
28 they were used to do some domestic jobs for them and they used to  
29 abduct us and other civilians from the surrounding villages. Now



1 I want to pause and deal with that, Mr Taylor. So far as the  
2 NPFL were concerned, because you were supposed to have set the  
3 template, was the abduction of civilians part of NPFL philosophy?

4 A. No. Oh, no. No, no, no.

12:58:33 5 Q. When you entered Nimba County on Christmas Eve 1989,  
6 Mr Taylor, was there any need to abduct civilians in Nimba?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Why not?

9 A. Because this was the hotbed of trouble that Doe had caused  
12:59:00 10 in that part of the country. I mean, people - this was an area  
11 ripe for trouble. So in fact, we couldn't stop the people from  
12 volunteering to fight. No, we didn't have to abduct anyone.

13 Q. And thereafter when you entered other districts in Liberia  
14 not so subject to the prior depredations of Doe's armed forces,  
12:59:27 15 did you in those other districts abduct civilians?

16 A. No, we never did. In fact, the popularity of the NPFL move  
17 towards Monrovia was so great, that's why we moved so fast. By -  
18 we know in this the Court by July 1990, we are just about around  
19 Monrovia. Some individuals actually waited for us. I mean,  
12:59:57 20 people were waiting by the thousands and volunteering. No, no,  
21 there was no such tactics used, and that is evident again in the  
22 results of the election. There were no terror tactics whatsoever  
23 used by the NPFL.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind that what we are talking  
13:00:17 25 about here are events in 1991, albeit you had not adopted such  
26 tactics in Liberia, had you nonetheless advised Foday Sankoh to  
27 adopt such tactics of civilian abductions in Sierra Leone?

28 A. No, I never did. Quite to the contrary, if there was going  
29 to be any advice, it was going to be the advice that any

1 revolutionary leader would use: That without the civilians, you  
2 cannot successfully run a revolution. That's period. It's known  
3 all over the world. No.

4 Q. Page 15577:

13:00:56 5 "Q. Do you know who these rebels were?

6 A. At the time they used to tell us - the rebels used to  
7 tell us that they, the rebels, were the Charles Taylor's  
8 rebels.

9 Q. Do you know what nationality they were?

13:01:12 10 A. Well, they were Liberians.

11 Q. And how did you know that they were Liberians?"

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

13 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, this evidence that's being

14 elicited was elicited in private session when the witness

13:01:29 15 testified. So far it has been general in nature, but we are now

16 moving as building blocks for one fact after another which, to

17 the people with whom this witness may have associated, will

18 identify this witness. Perhaps not somebody in Holland or

19 elsewhere, but the people with whom this witness associated. So

13:01:48 20 we would ask that specific identifying facts, such as the one

21 that's about to be given, would be given in private session so we

22 don't have this cumulative effect of identifying information.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths. This evidence that

24 you are quoting now was given in private session. So unless you

13:02:13 25 can couch your questions --

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I tell you what we can do, Mr President. In

27 order to provide a reference without making the matter public -

28 it's on the screen - I can ask the witness: Have a look at line

29 so and so on page so and so. We have got the reference then

1 without making anything public.

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the difficulty with that would be  
3 that the screen in front of the witness would be viewable from  
4 the public gallery, so I would not be able to show the private  
13:02:46 5 session transcript.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, that's the problem there,  
7 Mr Griffiths. I think that --

8 MR GRIFFITHS: All right. All right, very well. There is  
9 another way we can deal with this. There is another way we can  
13:02:56 10 deal with this.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you instruct any NPFL soldiers in 1991  
12 who entered Sierra Leone to abduct civilians?

13 A. No. You know, the question, I have - I disagree that NPFL  
14 soldiers entered Sierra Leone in 1991 in dealing with this  
13:03:39 15 witness's testimony. I disagree with the fact that NPFL fighters  
16 entered Sierra Leone in early 1991. What I agree with:  
17 Liberians entered; but NPFL, for me, I disagree. So in answer to  
18 your question, I want to allay that mark. I disagree that NPFL  
19 fighters entered Sierra Leone early 1991.

13:04:04 20 Q. Very well. Now, in order to get the context of this,  
21 Mr President, I apologise, but I think we will have to go briefly  
22 into private session for the next passage.

23 THE WITNESS: May I ask, Mr President --

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I wonder if the witness could  
13:04:34 25 be excused for a moment for an obvious reason.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Certainly. Please make sure the witness  
27 is escorted out.

28 The Court now is going to go briefly into private session.  
29 For members of the public, that means that you can continue to

1 watch the proceedings, but you won't be able to hear them. And  
2 this move is necessary to protect the identity of a witness who  
3 is the subject of a protective measures order given by the Court.

4 Madam Court Manager, please put the Court into private  
5 session.

13:07:04

6 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of  
7 the transcript, pages 30125 to 30136, was  
8 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as  
9 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. We have about two minutes,  
4 Mr Griffiths.

13:29:07 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Let's see if we can touch upon another topic and it may be  
7 that we have to deal with the question itself after the break.

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. Page 15599, it's a topic we touched on yesterday, but I  
13:29:25 10 think we need to deal with it afresh in light of certain aspects  
11 of this testimony:

12 "Q. Madam Witness, you just mentioned 448, what do you  
13 mean?

14 A. That is the ECOMOG jet. That was the code name for the  
13:29:40 15 ECOMOG jet that used come from Liberia.

16 Q. Now, you said that whenever 448 would be coming in  
17 Buedu can you explain that? What is the link with Mike  
18 November?

19 A. Well, that particular station was there for whenever  
13:30:05 20 448 would be taking off from" - I am sure it should be RIA  
21 Monrovia, Roberts International Airport. "We had an  
22 operator there who was called Sky 1. He would come on the  
23 net and tell us that 448 had just left my location and  
24 during that time Planet 1 would instruct Mike November 5,  
13:30:34 25 saying that he should tell the MP commanders in Buedu to  
26 ring the bell. That was for Buedu, inside of Buedu.

27 So Mike November 5 would pass the information on to MP  
28 commanders so they would ring the bell. When they would  
29 ring the bell, everybody who was in the RUF in Buedu at

1 that time and the surrounding, would know that ECOMOG jet  
2 was around and so everybody would go into hiding. "

3 The aspect of that I want to ask you about, and you can  
4 answer after lunch, is Sky 1 operator based at RIA, okay? All  
13:31:07 5 right, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,  
8 Mr President.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We will adjourn for lunch and  
13:31:26 10 reconvene at 2.30.

11 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

12 [Upon resuming at 2.32 p.m.]

13 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please you, your Honours:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch I had drawn  
14:33:19 15 your attention to a passage on page 15600 of testimony heard by  
16 this Court on 5 September 2008, and there was a particular aspect  
17 that I wanted to ask you about, so let me remind you:

18 "That particular station was there for wherever 448" -  
19 which we know to be the Alpha Jet - "would be taking off from  
14:33:51 20 Roberts International Airport. We had an operator there who was  
21 called Sky 1. He would come on the net and tell us that 448 had  
22 just left my location."

23 I.e. someone was based at RIA on a clear reading of this, a  
24 radio operator called Sky 1, who would give advanced warning of  
14:34:18 25 air strikes by the Nigerian Air Force. Did you know about this?

26 A. No, I did not know about it and I doubt very much if it  
27 happened that the RUF will have a radio operator at Roberts  
28 International Airport. No.

29 Q. Sky 1?

1 A. No. There may be a radio station. I wouldn't know the  
2 different radio stations. There probably is a Sky 1 at Roberts  
3 International Airport. The RUF would never have a radio station  
4 inside Liberia besides the period in question the radio that is  
14:34:58 5 installed in Monrovia at the guesthouse. There is no way that  
6 the RUF would have a radio station installed or at Robertsfield,  
7 no.

8 Q. Now, apart from that, Mr Taylor, we're also told this - and  
9 we must be careful not to get lost in the minefield of the  
14:35:28 10 various call signs, so I'm just picking out the relevant ones.  
11 There's another radio station called Foxtrot Yankee, line 24 of  
12 the same page. "Foxtrot Yankee was based in Foya, Foya  
13 Airfield."

14 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

14:35:50 15 A. I don't know. I don't know. I'm sure as we go along maybe  
16 a radio operator coming here will be able to help this Court.  
17 The President of the Republic of Liberia, knowing of the more  
18 than maybe 150 radio call signs around? No, I really don't know.  
19 But I'm sure we're going to get some help along with this when  
14:36:14 20 those that come will know. I really don't - it's very possible.  
21 There are radios installed in every city in every - maybe  
22 especially he's talking about Foya. Now, Foya is near the Sierra  
23 Leonean border. I'm sure there would be a radio station there,  
24 and it very well could be Foxtrot, but based on your - no, I  
14:36:37 25 really don't know personally. I don't - I'm not disputing for  
26 the future before someone says: Well, you said that there was  
27 not a radio station there. I'm not saying that. But I as  
28 President didn't know that call sign. I didn't know that that  
29 was the call sign for there.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I think although I was anxious to avoid  
2 mentioning a host of different call signs, only those that are  
3 relevant, I think in fairness to you I ought to read out the  
4 question which leads to this answer for a reason I'll come to.

14:37:09 5 The question, line 22 on page 15600:

6 "Q. Madam Witness, you started giving us names of call  
7 signs of radios you said on the other side, that means  
8 Liberia."

9 Now, it's not clear from the question whether these are  
14:37:30 10 Liberian radios or whether they're RUF radios. So bearing that  
11 in mind, the answer comes:

12 "A. Well Foxtrot Yankee was based in Foya, Foya Airfield,  
13 and we had another radio station that was called Victor 1.  
14 That was in Vahun."

14:37:52 15 Now, Mr Taylor, I appreciate what you're saying, that as  
16 President of Liberia you would not expect to be a radio ham,  
17 knowing all the call signs around the country. But cumulatively,  
18 what we see on this page is this: On the face of it what is  
19 being suggested is that the RUF had one radio station at Roberts  
14:38:21 20 International Airfield, one at Foya Airfield, one in Vahun. Now,  
21 bearing that cumulatively into account, how have the RUF, on the  
22 face of things, penetrated Liberia to that extent without you  
23 knowing?

24 A. They haven't. They haven't. I don't believe this one bit,  
14:38:44 25 that the RUF will have radio stations installed in Liberia.  
26 That's total foolishness that she's talking about. That's not  
27 possible. Even at the time there were contacts between the RUF  
28 and the NPFL it didn't happen, and I'm talking specifically about  
29 '91, '92. They did not have radio stations all over the place.



1 I'm President of Liberia. I'm involved in the peace process and  
2 the RUF - you know, the way these people talk, sometimes we have  
3 to be very careful with what she's trying to - now, with the  
4 number of Sierra Leoneans - I don't know how these people speak.

14:39:23 5 We have an operator - do they know an operator over there and  
6 sometimes they get information? Maybe that's what she's talking  
7 about. I don't know. But for the RUF, how would the RUF have  
8 radios installed at the international airport of the Republic of  
9 Liberia? That's total nonsense she's talking. That's not  
14:39:45 10 possible. Even if I don't know the call sign, it's impossible  
11 for that to happen. It doesn't happen. It can't.

12 Q. But what about just across the border then in Foya and in  
13 Vahun?

14 A. They wouldn't have a radio station there. Now, they may  
14:40:02 15 know somebody that works at the radio station. That's one thing.  
16 But there is no - she's talking about 1998, right? 1999. That's  
17 after - excuse me, not even 1998. She's talking about after Sam  
18 Bockarie comes to Liberia in 1999. So she's talking 2000, 2001.  
19 It's impossible. It never, never could - what would - then we  
14:40:30 20 are not talking about the RUF. We're talking about Sam Bockarie  
21 having radio stations installed, okay? Because if she's saying  
22 "we" and she has come out with Sam Bockarie --

23 Q. No, this is - no, Mr Taylor, perhaps I ought to put you in  
24 the picture. The witness's testimony began in private session,  
14:40:56 25 and certain details which might potentially have identified her  
26 were dealt with. She was then brought into open session, and in  
27 open session she's dealing with events in 1998 before she leaves  
28 to go to Monrovia with Sam Bockarie. Do you follow me?

29 A. Okay. That's not possible.

1 Q. So what she's talking about here are events in 1998 which  
2 one glean from line 2 on page 15599, okay? And this is the  
3 situation she's describing in 1998. Now, I have to ask you some  
4 further - we're talking about her suggesting some three RUF radio  
14:41:37 5 stations in Liberia at the time.

6 A. No, that's not possible. Impossible. I don't even have to  
7 know the call sign. It is impossible. Impossible. I disagree.  
8 She is totally, totally fabricating this. No. The only RUF  
9 station that is in Liberia that I say to this Court, and I have  
14:42:03 10 said it a million times, is installed in late 1998 at the  
11 guesthouse. No more. No more.

12 Q. Now, let's move on from that then. Further along the  
13 witness was asked this. Page 15603, line 15:

14 "Q. You mentioned that there was communication also with  
14:42:42 15 Liberia, is that correct, at this time?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you recall who was communicating with who at this  
18 time?

19 A. Yes, communication went - there was a communication  
14:42:58 20 there which was a satellite communication from Liberia. We  
21 had a Liberian radio operator. He was a senior radio  
22 operator. A senior officer. His name was Sellay. He had  
23 a satellite phone and he spoke with 50 on the satellite  
24 phone."

14:43:22 25 Now details, please. Know anybody by the name of Sellay,  
26 Mr Taylor, S-E-L-L-A-Y?

27 A. No, I don't.

28 Q. Did 50, that being Benjamin Yeaten, we know that from  
29 earlier references, have a satellite phone in 1998?

1 A. Yes, Benjamin had a satellite phone, yes.

2 Q. In 1998, was there satellite phone communication between  
3 Monrovia, I put it generally, and the RUF?

14:43:54 4 A. In 1998 September, I've said to this Court, I gave Sam  
5 Bockarie a satellite phone in October. I personally gave him a  
6 satellite phone. If he gave it to someone called Sellay, that's  
7 possible. But I gave Sam Bockarie a satellite phone in October  
8 1998.

9 Q. Very well. Move on. Now, this Sellay, we are told at page  
14:44:15 10 15604, line 13, was a Liberian radio operator who was based in  
11 Kenema. Line 15:

12 "Q. Why was he based in Kenema?

13 A. To coordinate between Sam Bockarie and 50 who is  
14 Benjamin Yeaten.

14:44:42 15 Q. Do you know who sent him to Kenema?

16 A. At that time I didn't know who sent him to Kenema.

17 Q. And how did you know that it was - he was there to  
18 coordinate between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten?

19 A. It was at that time that I came to understand that or I  
14:45:05 20 started understanding that there was communication between  
21 Liberia and Sierra Leone because they would come on and  
22 when Base 1 would come on, that is Benjamin Yeaten's radio  
23 station, they will come on and when they come on the  
24 station the station would come on, and whenever the station  
14:45:29 25 would come on they would call on 35B, that is 35 Bravo. At  
26 that time that was our call sign in Kenema. So when they  
27 will come there they will always ask for Sellay and when  
28 Sellay was available they will talk with Sellay and they  
29 would instruct Sellay to put Two-One on. But whenever

1 Sellay was not there they will not further the  
2 communication with us. "

3 Now, Mr Taylor, you appreciate, don't you, that this  
4 suggests that a Liberian radio operator is in Kenema sent to  
14:46:19 5 coordinate communication between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin  
6 Yeaten. Did you know anything about that?

7 A. I didn't know anything about it and I don't think it  
8 happened.

9 Q. Why not?

14:46:32 10 A. Because that would have been an impossible - why would  
11 Benjamin Yeaten send a radio operator to - in fact, where is Sam  
12 Bockarie? Is he in Kenema? He's in a different - I don't know  
13 where Sam Bockarie is at this time, where he's living. But the  
14 radio operator, if he's not in Kenema, the radio operator who is  
14:46:50 15 coordinating is in Kenema and probably he's in another where. I  
16 don't know where Sam Bockarie is. I mean, I haven't seen any  
17 testimony of him living in Kenema. So Benjamin would send a  
18 radio operator to Kenema to coordinate between Benjamin and Sam  
19 Bockarie in another place?

14:47:10 20 Q. Now, it may be that in due course it might be suggested  
21 that one possible reason for that was this, let's go to page  
22 15606, line 16:

23 "Q. Do you recall any visitors that came to Kenema during  
24 that time there - during your time there?

14:47:36 25 A. Yes. I recall that Jungle used to come to Kenema at  
26 the time I was there.

27 Q. Who was Jungle.

28 A. Well, Jungle was an SSS.

29 Q. When you say SSS, what do you mean?

1 A. Special Security Service.

2 Q. For where? Special Security Service where?

3 A. For Liberia. In Liberia for Charles Taylor.

14:48:07 4 Q. Do you know where Jungle came from when he came to  
5 Kenema, usually?

6 A. Well, he used to come from Monrovia to Kenema.

7 Q. And do you know who he came to in Kenema?

8 A. Yes, he used to come to Sam Bockarie in Kenema.

14:48:32 9 Q. And do you recall when he came to Kenema? Was it only  
10 one time or was it many times?

11 A. Well, at the time I was in Kenema I recall that he came  
12 there three times.

13 Q. Do you recall when these three visits occurred?

14 A. Well, I do not recall the actual times now.

14:48:48 15 Q. Did Jungle come from Monrovia alone on these trips?

16 A. Well, at that time I used to see three of them, Jungle,  
17 Sampson and Junior, they were all triple S."

18 Now, that might be a good reason to have a radio operator  
19 in Kenema, mightn't it, Mr Taylor?

14:49:20 20 A. We didn't have any radio operator in Kenema whatsoever. If  
21 there's a telephone that Bockarie has, which I have given him,  
22 why would a radio operator be in Kenema? And when there's a  
23 radio, you can just call. Why would somebody send a radio  
24 operator to Kenema? There was no radio operator in Kenema.

14:49:40 25 Q. Well, to coordinate the movement of Sampson, Junior and  
26 Jungle.

27 A. But that would not be true. That's not true. There's a  
28 telephone --

29 Q. Because the testimony goes on, line 13, same page:

1 "Q. Do you recall what they came to do in Kenema, the  
2 purpose of the visit?

3 A. Well, at that time I used to see them come. At one  
4 time they came and they travelled to Tongo together."

14:50:10 5 Now, we know what Tongo is famous for, don't we?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. "Q. Do you recall who they travelled to Tongo with?

8 A. Well, they went to Tongo with Sam Bockarie.

9 Q. Do you recall other visits that they made? Did

14:50:28 10 anything happen on those visits?

11 A. Well, on the other occasion on which they visited they  
12 went to Kono, as far as Freetown."

13 Another mining district.

14 "Q. Can you be clear, Madam Witness, you have mentioned

14:50:42 15 Kono, as far as Freetown. These are two different

16 locations. Where did they go to on one of these other  
17 visits that you were referring to?

18 A. At that time we never used to use the main road, that  
19 is the highway going towards Freetown, because we had men

14:51:00 20 deployed in Kono. So they travelled through Kono and there  
21 they were joined by Issa and then they went to Freetown.

22 That was the route they used to go.

23 Q. Apart from these three that you have mentioned, Jungle,  
24 Sampson and Junior who came from Liberia, was there any

14:51:26 25 other visitors that you recall during the time that you  
26 were in Kenema?

27 A. Well, at a point in time I saw Senegalese, a Liberian  
28 soldier."

29 Now, we go back to the point I was making, Mr Taylor. We

1 now have this situation: A Liberian radio operator in Kenema  
2 coordinating calls between Benjamin Yeaten and Sam Bockarie and  
3 then we have these three visits by the deadly trio, Jungle,  
4 Sampson, yes?

14:52:07 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. What's going on, Mr Taylor?

7 A. I don't know what she's talking about here, really. And  
8 then there's Senegalese, and we know a lot about -

9 Q. And then they're joined by Senegalese.

14:52:20 10 A. And we know a lot - maybe that's the time that Senegalese  
11 carried the reinforcement, as other witnesses have said. These  
12 people will just never stop. There's no Senegalese that I send  
13 or any Jungle and Sampson and all this kind of thing. Because  
14 they have all this information, "Don't forget this, don't forget  
15 that," they just bring it up whenever. So Senegalese now is  
16 going down, he's all the way in Kenema, she sees him now, what is  
17 he doing there now? So is that the reinforcement time?

18 Q. Well, it appears from evidence we are coming to shortly  
19 that we're talking about 1997 here.

14:53:03 20 A. 1997?

21 Q. Yes. And let me explain why I say that, because it goes  
22 on, line 17, page 15608:

23 "Q. Now you mentioned that in one of these visits Jungle  
24 and the others with Bockarie went to Kono and then they  
25 were joined by Issa and they went as far as Freetown. Do  
26 you know who they went to see in Freetown?

14:53:24 27 A. Well, they went to see Johnny Paul.

28 Q. How did you know this?

29 A. Well, it was Sam Bockarie who said it, that he and

1 Jungle and others were travelling to Issa in Kono and from  
2 there Issa would join them and they would go to Freetown.  
3 But at that time I did not actually know what the things  
4 were that they went to discuss at that time, or what they  
14:54:02 5 discussed even.

6 Q. You have testified that you left Kenema in the company  
7 of Sam Bockarie towards the end of 1997, going into 1998.  
8 Is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

14:54:18 10 Q. Why did you leave Kenema?

11 A. We were attacked by Kamajors in Kenema."

12 So let's just pause there. So, Mr Taylor, you see, there  
13 is another layer to this. Not only is it that Jungle, Sampson,  
14 Junior go to Kenema, but they link up with Bockarie, pick up Issa  
14:54:42 15 on the way and go to see Johnny Paul Koroma in Freetown, yes?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. Now, were they envoys of yours to Johnny Paul Koroma?

18 A. No. So we've got to be talking about before February 1998.  
19 That's what --

14:55:05 20 Q. Well, the witness is asked, at the end of 1997, going into  
21 1998.

22 A. Yeah, because Johnny Paul is removed by February 1998, so  
23 she's talking about - it has to happen before February because  
24 he's no longer in Freetown.

14:55:19 25 Q. I agree.

26 A. And so here we have now, for the first time, hearing that  
27 all these people are my envoys now supposed to be going all the  
28 way to Freetown to see Johnny Paul Koroma. This never happened,  
29 no. They are not envoys of mine. I don't even think - without



1 even knowing the information, I don't even think this ever  
2 happened as she is describing here, because there's testimony  
3 that, if I am correct here, that Bockarie, in fact, is  
4 practically stationed in Buedu because he doesn't like living in  
14:55:53 5 Freetown, he doesn't trust the security. So I don't know when he  
6 moved back to Kenema again. I don't know, but - that's not -  
7 this is all warped and it's totally, totally off track. No.  
8 Q. And you're correct, Mr Taylor, this must be before the  
9 ECOMOG intervention.

14:56:18 10 A. It has to be.

11 Q. Because on the page where I stopped, which is page 15609,  
12 the witness continues in this vein, line 18:

13 "A. They pushed the RUF/AFRC from their positions.

14 Q. Who pushed the RUF/AFRC?

14:56:44 15 A. The ECOMOG were fighting against them at that time."

16 And then the witness goes on to say that they moved from  
17 Kenema to Buedu along with civilians and even AFRC members, yes?  
18 So we know what the time frame is now. And then continues on  
19 page 15610:

14:57:13 20 "Q. Are you able to recall exactly what time you finally  
21 got to Buedu?

22 A. Well, it was early '98."

23 Thereafter the witness says this, line 15, same page:

24 "Q. What was the situation there when you arrived there?

14:57:30 25 A. Well, at that time the situation - Sam Bockarie was in  
26 command at that time but that was the time Johnny Paul too  
27 went there and even Johnny Paul went to Buedu. Sam  
28 Bockarie did say that he had been given an instruction that  
29 he should assist for Johnny Paul to go to Buedu.

1 Q. When you say Sam Bockarie said he had been given an  
2 instruction, what instruction did he say he had been given?

3 A. Well, he did say that he had spoken with 50 and that 50  
4 told him that his dad, Charles Taylor, had instructed him  
14:58:14 5 that he and Sankoh had spoken concerning Johnny Paul and he  
6 should try by all possible means - that Sam Bockarie should  
7 try by all possible means to help Johnny Paul to Buedu  
8 since they have something for them."

9 See that, Mr Taylor?

14:58:40 10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. Let's unpack that slowly, shall we? So we have this  
12 situation: Late '97, '98 we have the trip by Jungle, Bockarie et  
13 al, picking up Issa on the way to Freetown to see Johnny Paul,  
14 yes?

14:59:03 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. We now have a situation where, after the ECOMOG  
17 intervention, when everyone has fled to Buedu, we have this: Sam  
18 Bockarie is spoken to by 50, Benjamin Yeaten, who tells him that  
19 his dad, that's you, had instructed him that he had spoken to  
14:59:29 20 Sankoh. So you're in conversation with Sankoh, according to  
21 this, at the time of, or shortly thereafter, the ECOMOG  
22 intervention. Do you follow?

23 A. Yes, I follow.

24 Q. And so you have then instructed Yeaten, following that  
14:59:49 25 communication, that he's got to get Johnny Paul by all possible  
26 means to safety because they've got something for them. What did  
27 Johnny Paul have for you, Mr Taylor?

28 A. I don't know, but it never got to me.

29 Q. Well, hold on. It is said that Johnny Paul was found in

1 possession of a large quantity of diamonds which he was relieved  
2 of or which he told Sam Bockarie about at a later stage. Now  
3 help us, was he bringing them for you?

4 A. I don't know, but they surely didn't get to me and there  
15:00:37 5 would have been no reason. But how do I speak to Sankoh?

6 Q. Well, you tell us, Mr Taylor. You're the one who's alleged  
7 to have done it, so tell us: How did you do it?

8 A. How do I speak to Sankoh? Where is Foday Sankoh at the  
9 time of the intervention in Sierra Leone? Where is he? Foday  
15:00:58 10 Sankoh is incarcerated. How do I speak to this Foday Sankoh?

11 Where do these people get these lies from? How do I speak to  
12 Foday Sankoh? Foday Sankoh is arrested, okay? He's in Nigeria.  
13 He's finally transferred to Sierra Leone after Kabbah returns in  
14 1998 and is put on trial. Until then he is incarcerated in

15:01:17 15 Sierra Leone - excuse me, in Nigeria. How do I get to him? How  
16 do I get to him? How do they put this together? How do I get to  
17 Sankoh? Nobody told this lady anything like this. She's making  
18 this up because I have no communication with Sankoh. Sankoh is  
19 in jail somewhere in Nigeria. Never spoke to Sankoh. Even there  
15:01:47 20 is evidence in this Court from a letter I wrote to Abacha, okay?

21 At the time I got on the committee I went to Nigeria, and I  
22 wanted to speak to Sankoh when I was put on the committee in  
23 1997. Abacha played little games, and I just got upset and I  
24 wrote him and told him - I said: Well, look, there's nothing

15:02:07 25 [indiscernible] that says you don't want me to see Sankoh. I  
26 never spoke to Sankoh. How do I get to Sankoh at the time of the  
27 intervention?

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, once again the court  
29 reporter's missing some of your words, you are going so fast.

1 WITNESS: I'm sorry again. Okay. Let me start over.

2 Well, in short, this is a pure fabrication. Foday Sankoh  
3 is in jail in Nigeria. I do not speak to him. I have not spoken  
4 to him. It's impossible for me to speak to him. So this whole  
15:02:35 5 thing is a fabrication. The whole thing.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. But the witness's testimony continues nonetheless,  
8 Mr Taylor, uncomfortable as it might be, in this way, page 15611:

9 "Q. Madam Witness, can we try and break the information  
15:03:01 10 you've given, your evidence, so that we're able to  
11 understand it clearly. You said that Sam Bockarie said he  
12 had spoken to 50. '50' meaning who?

13 A. Benjamin Yeaten.

14 Q. And what did he say that 50 told him, just one step up?

15:03:18 15 A. Sam Bockarie said that he had spoken to 50 and that 50  
16 instructed him that he should try to bring Johnny Paul to  
17 Buedu.

18 Q. Can you pause just so that we're able to take in what  
19 you are have given us.

15:03:34 20 A. Okay.

21 Q. That he had spoken to Johnny - who did 50 say he got  
22 this information from?

23 A. 50 said he had got the instruction from his dad,  
24 Charles Taylor, and that Charles Taylor said he and Foday  
15:03:50 25 Sankoh had discussed that 50 should instruct Sam Bockarie  
26 so that Sam Bockarie will help to bring Johnny Paul in  
27 Buedu. "

28 Over the page, page 15614 - no, we've skipped a couple of  
29 pages. Line 10:

1 "Sam Bockarie was explaining to Eddie Kanneh about the  
2 instruction that he received from Benjamin Yeaten."

3 Line 21:

4 "I saw Sam Bockarie talking over the satellite phone. He  
15:04:34 5 was standing in an open place. So after the communication  
6 through the satellite phone he came, and they were about serving  
7 him food whilst he was explaining to Eddie Kanneh that Benjamin  
8 Yeaten just gave him instruction that he should pass on to others  
9 that they needed Johnny Paul Koroma in Buedu, and he said  
15:05:03 10 Benjamin Yeaten said it was an instruction that came from  
11 Charles Taylor."

12 Over the page, line 11:

13 "Johnny Paul has now come. Now, if you want to deal with  
14 the meeting that you said was held when Johnny Paul came  
15:05:27 15 first, please.

16 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie held a meeting in Buedu where he  
17 invited both the AFRC and the RUF."

18 Now, we've had reference to such a meeting earlier today,  
19 haven't we, Mr Taylor?

15:05:41 20 A. Yes, that's true, yeah.

21 Q. "At that meeting they were to rearrange both parties", that  
22 is the RUF and the AFRC, "and to coordinate their operations so  
23 that all of them will work under the same umbrella and then with  
24 one aim and that JPK was the current leader, since Sankoh was not  
15:06:00 25 present. He said that was the instruction that he had received.  
26 He said JPK should be respected and that everyone should honour  
27 him as the RUF leader in the absence of Sankoh."

28 Pause there. What's the problem, Mr Taylor?

29 A. As I listen to this, I swear this witness's account of this

1 meeting again, it's all a fabrication. Because if this witness's  
2 account is true, we just today heard another witness that talked  
3 about a meeting, this meeting, when Johnny Paul came and talked  
4 about cooperation and all, and what happened in the meeting? Sam  
15:06:54 5 Bockarie bounces up in the meeting and says: Guess what? I am  
6 the guy in control now, and in fact turn over all the diamonds  
7 and all the money that you have. I am the man in control now. I  
8 am the guy. Johnny Paul Koroma starts to mess around, they pull  
9 weapons, and he shows where the diamonds are. So what is this  
15:07:16 10 now? So if this account is true, then I'm sure this is a  
11 fabrication. This girl - this lady is fabricating here, and if  
12 this is not a fabrication then that means that we - if we accept  
13 this, then every other situation regarding this one meeting after  
14 Johnny Paul Koroma arrives wherever, then they are all false. So  
15:07:41 15 somebody is lying here, and so that's all I can say.

16 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm sorry, but I have to press you on this  
17 because, you know, you've been advised that Sankoh's in custody.  
18 You're the one to be providing advice, so help me, who were you  
19 advising? Was it Sam Bockarie as leader of the AFRC/RUF, or was  
15:08:02 20 it Johnny Paul Koroma? Which of the two?

21 A. I'm not advising anyone, and in fact if I can contact  
22 Sankoh, they should be able to do it too. I'm not advising  
23 either of them. None - either. None.

24 Q. Now, it continues:

15:08:24 25 "Q. Madam Witness, at this time just before Johnny Paul  
26 came do you know whether Sam Bockarie carried a rank?

27 A. Well, at that time when we went to Buedu anew, he  
28 travelled to Liberia. He had got the rank even before  
29 Johnny Paul went to Buedu.

1 Q. Do you know what rank? You've said you travelled to  
2 Liberia. Can you explain that further, please?"

3 Over the page, page 15618:

4 "A. Well, he travelled to Liberia together with Sampson.

15:09:07 5 It was Sampson, Junior and Jungle who came first at Buedu.

6 When they came they were there for two days, and the third

7 day they left Buedu at night and they went to Liberia. So

8 on his return, that was the time he brought with him a

9 tactical jeep and a combat suit with the rank of general.

15:09:29 10 Q. Who is the person that you are referring to?

11 A. Sam Bockarie.

12 Q. Did Sam Bockarie say how he got the rank of general?

13 A. Well, he told us it was the Pa who promoted him, that

14 is Charles Taylor, and he said - he, Sam Bockarie, said

15:09:46 15 there were documents to the effect, but what he showed us

16 was the combat suit, the tactical jeep, green coloured, and

17 we saw him come with new arms.

18 Q. Do you recall when they went to Liberia?

19 A. Well, I do not recall the time any more, but it was in

15:10:05 20 the same 1998."

21 Now note this. Back to page 15617:

22 "Q. At this time just before Johnny Paul came, do you know

23 whether Sam Bockarie carried a rank?"

24 So note the sequence, Mr Taylor. We're in the period after

15:10:35 25 the ECOMOG intervention. Everyone's retreated to Buedu. 50 has

26 been on the radio saying the Pa wants you to bring Johnny Paul to

27 Buedu. Before Johnny Paul is brought to Buedu, Bockarie goes to

28 Monrovia and guess what? You promote him to general. Why?

29 A. I didn't. I didn't. How could I have done that? He never

1 came to Monrovia and I didn't. But we also have evidence that  
2 Johnny Paul Koroma promoted Sam Bockarie to chief of defence  
3 staff. So what one now to - so that's how they just spread the  
4 lies. Just spread the lies. I'm promoting him, I'm talking to  
15:11:26 5 Sankoh while Sankoh is locked up somewhere in Nigeria that I  
6 don't know. We get one witness that says that Sam Bockarie was  
7 promoted to chief of defence staff by Sam Bockarie - I mean, by  
8 Johnny Paul Koroma. Another witness comes here and says: Oh,  
9 no, even before he came he had rushed to Monrovia.

15:11:50 10 So in other words, if I'm understanding this properly, and  
11 I stand corrected on this, the intervention - between the  
12 intervention in Freetown and by the time Sam Bockarie - I mean,  
13 by the time Johnny Paul Koroma gets in the interior, I don't know  
14 how many days we're talking about, Sam Bockarie has rushed to  
15:12:14 15 Monrovia.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. This is what - I mean, I stand corrected on this one.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. Okay? He's rushed to Monrovia within the interval of the  
15:12:23 20 intervention and Johnny Paul's arrival up-country and he's been  
21 promoted already.

22 Q. And he comes back with a jeep.

23 A. And, you know, he comes back. I mean, how - what - why -  
24 how did people get to put these people together like this to do  
15:12:39 25 this to me? I mean, how? It's not possible. It did not happen.  
26 So why would people just deliberately come and sit here and just  
27 make up one story after the other? No.

28 Q. And when we go to the next page, page 15619, following an  
29 exchange which need not concern us, this question is asked:



1 "Q. That visit that you - the travel that you referred to  
2 that Sam Bockarie made with Jungle and others, do you  
3 recall whether it was before Johnny Paul came to Buedu, or  
4 was it after Johnny Paul came to Buedu?

15:13:25 5 A. Clear. Before Johnny Paul's arrival in Buedu.

6 Q. And do you recall how long you had been in Buedu before  
7 Sam Bockarie's travel to Liberia.

8 A. Well, when he came it did not take too long when he  
9 went to Liberia. At that time in fact he used to go there  
10 frequently and return.

15:13:51

11 Q. You have mentioned that Sam Bockarie came with a  
12 tactical jeep. What are you referring to?

13 A. It was a small open van, a van like something - green  
14 coloured, which maybe can accommodate up to four to five  
15 people.

15:14:05

16 Q. You said he came with a new uniform. What kind of  
17 uniform?

18 A. It was an army uniform. A combat suit. A military  
19 uniform. Well, it was a combat with the rank of a  
20 general."

15:14:17

21 Now, Mr Taylor, not only was there the physical appearance  
22 of him to confirm his appointment by you, but he'd been given  
23 documents to that effect. Now, help us, having been a President,  
24 when you appoint someone general, what documents do you give him  
25 or her?

15:14:44

26 A. Well, in Liberia, when you approved by the Senate for a  
27 rank, a commission is signed. That's what I know. But what she  
28 says here is that he doesn't show her anything. He just shows  
29 her a combat uniform.

1 Q. But he said there were documents. So help us, what  
2 documents could you have given him to confirm the fact of his  
3 promotion?

4 A. It would have - if there's a document to be given for a  
15:15:15 5 promotion, it would have to be a commission.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Okay. But, I mean, I didn't promote Sam Bockarie, so I  
8 could not have given him. He's not a Liberian soldier. And to  
9 be - in Liberia, when I was President, and that's the  
15:15:28 10 constitution, all ranks, from the rank of major, at least, from  
11 what we call - I think these are - my understanding, company  
12 grade officers, you have to be approved by the Liberian Senate.  
13 And so this is totally out of whack. That's not true.

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, moving on and returning to the issue of  
15:16:09 15 radio stations. We are told at page 15628, commencing at line  
16 15:

17 "Q. And you said it came from an operator at Roberts  
18 International Airfield. Do you recall that?

19 A. Yes.

15:16:32 20 Q. Now where was Roberts International Airfield to your  
21 knowledge?

22 A. Well, as far as I know it is Roberts International  
23 Airport in Liberia.

24 Q. And do you know on whose behalf the operator was - the  
15:16:49 25 operator you mentioned - who was the operator again?

26 A. I said Sky 1.

27 Q. And do you know for what group Sky 1 was working at the  
28 Roberts International Airport?

29 A. What I know is that he was one of Charles Taylor's

1 fighters.

2 Q. And are you able to tell the Court how he was able to  
3 communicate with radios within RUF territory?

4 A. There are times he will just come to the national which  
15:17:18 5 was" - and she gives a reference which needs not concern us  
6 - "he will just come up and say, '448 has just left my  
7 location heading for your location.' Then the station  
8 would go off. "

9 So, Mr Taylor, maybe I misled you because this radio at  
15:17:45 10 Roberts International Airport, that radio at the airport -  
11 although when we return to page 15600, it actually says "we had  
12 an operator there who was called Sky 1", in reality it was a  
13 Liberian radio operator at RIA. Now, help us, Mr Taylor, now  
14 that we're told it's a Liberian, who was it?

15:18:24 15 A. I don't know the name of this person. That's why I said  
16 before - you didn't mislead me. You said exactly what - that's  
17 how these people talk. And I knew - but she named three places  
18 that where she referred to as - "We had operators," she say, at  
19 Robertsville," they had an operator at Foya, and "We had an  
15:18:48 20 operator at Vahun." She named three places in the testimony.

21 You didn't mislead me. You said it just as she said and I said  
22 at that time she could be saying maybe they knew someone. Now it  
23 comes back to what I guess she really meant. They probably knew  
24 someone at Robertsville or someone at these stations, but when  
15:19:08 25 they speak - if you don't understand them, they speak with so  
26 much knowledge or the appearance of knowledge that you would want  
27 to believe them, okay.

28 And this - probably what this lady is talking about, they  
29 probably had some contacts or knew people there that they could

1 call from time to time, switch to other channels. I wouldn't  
2 rule that out, that they knew people in Liberia. But that's why  
3 I said here before, it's impossible that the RUF would have had  
4 radio stations installed in Liberia. So your statement was  
15:19:39 5 proper.

6 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let's look at this issue from a slightly  
7 different angle in light of an exhibit which Mr Anyah has  
8 helpfully reminded me of. It's exhibit P-98, and I wonder if we  
9 could display that, please. Now, Mr Taylor, this was a document

15:20:07 10 --

11 MR GRIFFITHS: And I wonder, helpfully, Mr Court Manager,  
12 if you could raise it a little bit so that we can see all areas  
13 of Liberia where there is a star and I think we just need to see  
14 just below Monrovia:

15:20:34 15 Q. I'm right, aren't I? There are no stars below Monrovia.  
16 Let's just look at it in an enlarged copy first. Let's see the  
17 whole map, yes, and then let's now just reduce it to that  
18 horizontal blue line just below Monrovia.

19 Now, Mr Taylor, this is a map showing radio stations in  
15:21:12 20 Liberia that the RUF communicated with between 1999 to 2001 and  
21 this map was referred to in testimony on 9 April 2008 at pages  
22 7016 to 7018 of the transcript by TF1-516. Now, Mr Taylor, I've  
23 so far referred you to three locations: Roberts International  
24 Airport, Vahun, yes, and Foya?

15:21:50 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Now, we see from this map that there were a number of  
27 stations with whom the RUF communicated, we are told, in the  
28 period 1999 to 2001. Firstly, Monrovia, Base 1, which is  
29 Benjamin Yeaten's house and 020, the Executive Mansion. Then

1 there is Gbarnga, Zorzor. I can't make out the one above -  
2 Tenenbu. We see Gbarnga, Zorzor, Tenenbu, Voi nj ama, Kol ahun,  
3 Foya, Buedu. Okay. Now, Mr Taylor, it doesn't take a brain  
4 surgeon to work out that all of those stations are located along  
15:23:19 5 what?

6 A. When you say along what? I just see roads here along the  
7 highway.

8 Q. Along what route, from where to where?

9 A. From Monrovi a to Foya.

15:23:38 10 Q. Yes. Because when you are travelling from Monrovi a to  
11 Kailahun, that area, if I understand - and I'm getting used to  
12 the geography now - one would go vi a Kakata, Gbatal a, Gbarnga,  
13 Zorzor, Tenenbu, Voi nj ama, Kol ahun to Buedu, right? Yes?

14 A. Yeah.

15:24:04 15 Q. And what do we have here on this map? We have radi o  
16 stations along that route with whom we are told the RUF are in  
17 communication between 1999 and 2001. What do you say about that?

18 A. Let me see the top of this map again. What's the title at  
19 the top of this map? "Main radi o bases while TF1-516 was at

15:24:46 20 Planet 1 (Buedu) and Base 1 (Liberi a)." Oh God, I swear. All I  
21 can interpret this to be is that during this particular period as  
22 Sam Bockarie in late '98 and '99 coming into Liberia and going  
23 out, they establish maybe friendly contact with certain people  
24 along the way that they can communicate. But, I mean, as far as

15:25:17 25 I'm concerned, when I was President of Liberia, this is - this  
26 person doesn't even know what they're talking about because I'm  
27 telling you that there could have been maybe about 75 radios.  
28 Every principal town - if you go - this just shows, "I'm  
29 travelling this way. I know some people." When you're going to

1 Leave places like Cape Mount, Bomi, right on the Sierra Leonean  
2 border, Bopolu, all of these places, Tubmanburg, Klay, Bomi,  
3 Robertsport, Bo Waterside, all have radios. So these can't be  
4 main radios.

15:25:56 5 What I see here that I can help with is a route that the  
6 RUF officials coming in between late '98 and '99 maybe get to  
7 know and establish friendly contacts along the way that they can  
8 ask to call or something in to, you know, is Sam Bockarie coming  
9 in or going out, that I can understand. Anything beyond that,  
15:26:21 10 then it would just be - just probably mischief on the part of  
11 this person. But these are not even one tenth of the radio  
12 stations.

13 Q. Well, help me with something, Mr Taylor, and sorry to  
14 bother you, but I wonder if you could just change places for a  
15:26:37 15 minute, leaving the map precisely where it is. Roughly, where is  
16 Roberts International Airfield on this map? Just point with your  
17 finger, please.

18 A. That would be about here. Around Harbel.

19 Q. Do you see where Sky 1 is on this map? You remember Sky 1  
15:27:00 20 was the operator at Roberts International Airport?

21 A. Yeah. Let me look good. I don't see Sky 1 here. Maybe  
22 I'm missing it. I just see the --

23 Q. Monrovia, Base 1 --

24 A. Monrovia, Base 1. I don't see Sky 1.

15:27:17 25 Q. Where's Sky 1?

26 A. Maybe this expert forgot to put it in. It would be around  
27 here, Harbel. That's where Robertsfield is.

28 Q. Okay. You can go back to your seat now, Mr Taylor, and  
29 thank you very much for your assistance, Mr Court Manager. We

1 can put that away,

2 Now, we also hear this, Mr Taylor, line 26, page 15635:

3 "Q. Madam Witness, when you say 'that was the time', that  
4 is not quite clear. Was it in 1997? Was it later than  
15:29:05 5 1997? Exactly when did you go there? That's to Tongo.

6 A. Well, it was in 1997 even before we pulled out of  
7 Kenema.

8 Q. How early or late was it in 1997?

9 A. Well, I can say it was mid-1997.

15:29:25 10 Q. Who did you go to Tongo with apart from Sam Bockarie?

11 A. Well, we went there together with Jungle and others.

12 Q. When you say 'and others', can you try and recall some  
13 of the others?

14 A. Well, at that time we went there with Shabado, Jungle,  
15:29:46 15 Sampson and so many other people, but I cannot recall all  
16 of their names now.

17 Q. You talked about a Liberian operator who was in Kenema  
18 at the time you were there. Do you recall?

19 A. Yes.

15:30:04 20 Q. The name of that operator, you said, was Sellay. Is  
21 that correct?

22 A. Yes, we used to call him CO Sellay.

23 Q. In your evidence on Friday you talked about the  
24 communications which Sellay had with Liberia and you said  
15:30:19 25 those communications were restricted. Do you recall that?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. To whom were the communications restricted?

28 A. Well, it was from other fighters, the other RUF  
29 fighters, and even amongst us, the radio operators who were

1           there.

2           Q.   Now, who had access to those communications and who had  
3           not? It is not quite clear from your answer. Who had  
4           access to communications with Sellay in Liberia? Let's  
15:31:12 5           start with who had access.

6           A.   Well, Sam Bockarie was number one person who had access  
7           to such communication.

8           Q.   Anybody else?

9           A.   Well, Jungle and Sellay and Issa Sesay.

15:31:35 10          Q.   Did any of the operators - Bockarie's operators - have  
11          access to such communications?

12          A.   Well, they only used to receive calls. When they came  
13          on they would call. When Benjamin Yeaten's operators came  
14          on, Sunlight, they will call and then sometimes Ebony would  
15:31:58 15          receive the call or Tourist will receive the call. That  
16          was when they would want to inquire about Sellay or Sam  
17          Bockarie. Those were the only communications that they  
18          monitored or that they received."

19          And then he goes on to deal with one or two names, and then  
15:32:20 20          we find this:

21                 "Q.   Madam Witness, you mentioned the name Sampson on  
22                 Friday as somebody who travelled from Liberia, do you recall  
23                 that, to Kenema?"

24                 That's page 15638, but we'll come back to that in a moment.

15:32:43 25          Mr Taylor, just looking at that passage we've just looked at,  
26          what do you understand by the term "restricted"?

27          A.   Not for the use of unauthorised persons.

28          Q.   And we're told that:

29                 "Q.   To whom were the communications restricted?



1 A. Well, it was from other fighters, the other RUF  
2 fighters and even among us, the radio operators who were  
3 there."

4 What do you understand by that phrase, which is page 15636  
15:33:22 5 from lines 21 through to 22? What do you understand by that?

6 A. Well, my understanding is that even she did not have access  
7 to the radio. It was just Sam Bockarie, and that was it, and  
8 whoever else there. But even she didn't have access to that  
9 radio communication. And she says that this is occurring in the  
10 middle of 1997? In the middle of 1997, now, it depends on what  
11 part of that middle she's in.

12 Q. Why do you make that observation?

13 A. Well, in 1997, July I'm elected President of Liberia, so I  
14 don't know what she's talking about. 1997 the middle, July is  
15:34:16 15 the seventh month, so we're talk about - if we go back to June,  
16 that's the sixth month. I'm still not President of Liberia, so I  
17 don't know what she's talking about here when she says early, as  
18 coming out here, this happened in the middle of 1997. So again  
19 that shows you how warped this whole thing, and now she's talking  
15:34:40 20 about these people that are supposed to have access in this way  
21 in 1997. I do not have any contact with Sam Bockarie or the RUF  
22 in 1997 whatsoever. None in early 1998. None whatsoever until  
23 September. So this middle of - I don't know what part of it  
24 she's talking about, June or July, because I'm just elected  
15:35:02 25 President at that time.

26 Q. Well, the part of the transcript I'm talking about is line  
27 2 on page 15636: "Well, I can say it was mid-1997."

28 A. Yeah, then she can't - so she's talking foolishness.  
29 Total, total nonsense. Maybe she made a mistake in the year, but

1 I can't give her evidence. But there's no such thing going on.  
2 Not even at this time there's not even communication. All of the  
3 contacts I'm talking about, I'm talking about late 1998. Not  
4 anywhere in the middle of 1997 is there any contact between the  
15:35:47 5 RUF and myself. I'm not even President of Liberia, depending on  
6 what month you take in 1997 - middle of 1997.

7 Q. Now, the witness continues, page 15638 beginning at line  
8 19:

9 "Q. Madam Witness, you mentioned the name Sampson on  
15:36:14 10 Friday as somebody who travelled from Liberia, do you  
11 recall that, to Kenema?

12 A. Yes. Three of them were always in company, Sampson,  
13 Junior and Jungle. The three of them were always in  
14 company.

15:36:35 15 Q. What nationality was Sampson?

16 A. He was a Liberian soldier.

17 Q. How did you know that?

18 A. They used to come in uniforms and they used to speak  
19 Liberian English. They used to come in something like an  
15:36:53 20 overall, dark coloured, written on the back triple S, and  
21 they only used to speak Liberian English.

22 Q. What does triple S stand for?

23 A. Special Security Service in Liberia.

24 Q. What nationality was Junior?

15:37:15 25 A. He was a Liberian as well."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, there they are, bold as brass, travelling  
27 to Sierra Leone proudly wearing their SSS uniforms. You weren't  
28 trying to hide this, were you?

29 A. I don't think these people - there were no such people in

1 that place there in no '97 or any time like that, no. This lady,  
2 I'm sure she got to know these people. And I don't want to say  
3 this, but I may because even though we're in open session, but  
4 maybe at the time she was there, but --

15:37:57 5 Q. But, Mr Taylor, the point I'm making is this: There's  
6 nothing clandestine about this, according to this witness, so why  
7 were you so emboldened to send your runners off to Sierra Leone  
8 proudly dressed in their SSS uniforms? Why?

9 A. They didn't go there, that's why. Because it would be  
15:38:20 10 silly. If there is this thing clandestine, you wouldn't send  
11 them that way. And if they are - even if they are there, which I  
12 don't think - if they are there, it must be maybe sometimes  
13 later. But that would be a silly thing to do, wouldn't it? It  
14 would be silly to do, to send people all dressed up. I'm  
15:38:42 15 fighting for peace and my SSS or my military people are all in  
16 full uniform parading the roads of up-country Sierra Leone? It  
17 didn't happen that way.

18 Q. No, it was nothing to do with up-country, Mr Taylor. They  
19 went all the way to Freetown. Listen to this:

15:39:02 20 "Q. In your evidence on Friday" - just after she's  
21 described the uniform - "you talked about a trip that  
22 Jungle, Sampson and Junior made from Liberia to Kenema, and  
23 you said that they went to Kono and on to Freetown, do you  
24 recall that?

15:39:17 25 A. Yes, I still recall.

26 Q. Now, do you recall when they made this trip to Kono and  
27 down to Freetown?

28 A. Well, it was that time Johnny Paul was in power in  
29 Freetown.

1 Q. And how did you know that they went to Kono and then to  
2 Freetown?

3 A. Like I said on that day, we did not use the main road  
4 to go to Freetown because the Bo route was blocked. Mile  
15:39:48 5 91, Malamah Junction, all those were occupied by Kamajors.  
6 So the only route we had to go to Freetown at that time was  
7 to go through Kono, and from Kono they would proceed to  
8 Freetown.

9 Q. How did you know this? Did you yourself travel with  
15:40:10 10 them to Kono and down to Freetown?

11 A. No, Issa Sesay used to come from Freetown to Kono and  
12 then to Kenema, and then the time Jungle and the others  
13 came, he, Sam Bockarie, said that he and Jungle and others  
14 were going to Kono to meet Issa there and they would be  
15:40:27 15 joined by Issa, and then they would travel to Freetown to  
16 meet Johnny Paul Koroma. That was before they left."

17 Now, that trip, Mr Taylor - and the witness continues at  
18 page 15640, line 8:

19 "Q. You also have talked about a control station for the  
15:40:50 20 RUF. Do you recall?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, where was the control station for the RUF based?

23 A. Well, at the time that Foday Sankoh and others came to  
24 Freetown, the control station by then was based in Freetown  
15:41:08 25 and it was called Vision 1. But after Foday Sankoh had  
26 been arrested, the control station in Buedu under Sam  
27 Bockarie's command, it was called Planet 1 at that time."  
28 Now just to see if you can assist us: Vision 1, Mr Taylor?

29 A. I don't know it, no.

1 Q. And there's further clarification that that Vision 1 was  
2 after Sankoh returned from Togo to Freetown, lines 19 through to  
3 23. Now, did you, once Sankoh returned from Togo, Mr Taylor,  
4 ever communicate with him by radio?

15:42:04 5 A. No. I spoke to Sankoh by phone. No, never by radio.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, at or about the time of the ECOMOG intervention,  
7 did Sam Bockarie come to Liberia where he was provided with arms  
8 and ammunition?

9 A. No. Never came to Liberia at all. No.

15:42:52 10 Q. Now I want to you think about it, Mr Taylor. Did you?

11 A. Sam Bockarie was not in Liberia before August - before  
12 September of 1998. The intervention occurs in February. Sam  
13 Bockarie is not anywhere close to Liberia, no.

14 Q. Let me remind you of this piece of testimony. Page 15648,  
15 8 September 2008:

16 "Q. Madam Witness, on this particular trip you said that  
17 Sam Bockarie came back with arms and you mentioned AK-47s.  
18 Do you recall that? You said brand new ones.

19 A. Yes.

15:43:34 20 Q. And you said that they had not even been used with AK  
21 rounds, do you recall?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What do you mean when you said that they had not even  
24 been used with AK rounds?

15:43:48 25 A. What I meant was at that time they had not used them at  
26 all. That they were arms that had been used, no, they were  
27 brand news ones. They had not used them. They had not  
28 used them to fight at all. They were new.

29 Q. And you said that this trip - at this time Sam Bockarie

1 made many trips. Just to be clear, when did he make this  
2 trip to Liberia?

3 A. Well, it was in early 1998.

4 Q. Are you able to tell whether this was before the  
15:44:39 5 intervention in which Johnny Paul's government was removed  
6 from power, or was it after the intervention?"

7 Question, over the page:

8 "Q. You recall that Johnny Paul Koroma was removed from  
9 power at a certain point. Do you recall that?"

15:45:08 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now the trip which Sam Bockarie made to Liberia that he  
12 came back with - with the new arms that you have mentioned  
13 and he came back with a uniform and a rank, do you recall  
14 whether this trip was before Sam Bockarie - before Johnny  
15:45:22 15 Paul was removed from power or was it after he was removed  
16 from power? Do you recall?

17 A. Well, it was before he was removed from power."

18 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor. You remember we looked at an  
19 account about this, what, a few minutes ago, yes?

15:45:44 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And the sequence then was, call from 50, message from Pa,  
22 Pa's spoken to Sankoh, get Johnny Paul here, it's all after the  
23 intervention, he's got things for us, yes?

24 A. Yes.

15:46:06 25 Q. We now see that it was in fact before the ECOMOG  
26 intervention. Now, did you send some brand new AK-47s with Sam  
27 Bockarie down to Sierra Leone before the ECOMOG intervention?

28 A. No, never. Didn't even have contact with Sam Bockarie.

29 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, which is right? And I have to put all

1 possibilities to you so that you have an opportunity to deal with  
2 it. Was it the case then - given that the witness says, line 16  
3 page 15648, that there were many trips by Bockarie at about this  
4 time, was it the case that there was a trip before the  
15:46:55 5 intervention and then after the intervention after you'd spoken  
6 to Sankoh there was another trip? Ah, but then I must be wrong,  
7 you see, because the witness said, this is the occasion, page  
8 15649, when he came back with a uniform and rank. So it's got to  
9 be the same one. So I'm misleading you. So which is right,  
15:47:21 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yeah, none of this whole thing - there's nothing right  
12 about this. And that trip that you talk about, it was also clear  
13 from this witness that that trip was very short between the  
14 intervention and the time Johnny Paul Koroma arrived up-country.  
15:47:45 15 That was the version. That was the version. So that had to be a  
16 quick one. Now I have arms now coming in before the  
17 intervention. So that means that this must be between January  
18 1998 or December/November 1997. None of this is true. Not a  
19 teeny bit of it is the truth. Nothing about it is true.

15:48:19 20 The only thing that I can remind the Court of as a  
21 reflection would be, we have evidence here led in this Court that  
22 by, what, is it, October, or thereabout, in 1997, arms arrived at  
23 Magburaka. Now, for me, thinking about this, that's the first  
24 place my head would go to. That this kid is somewhere and she's  
15:48:45 25 just talking about things that she does not know. The only time  
26 we know - because what happens? We know that Johnny Paul Koroma  
27 writes me a letter asking for arms. There is no response. We  
28 also know that he sent a delegation to Monrovia that I do not  
29 receive and apparently arrangements are made somewhere by him to

1 get in weapons through Magburaka that are flown in, which are  
2 definitely not coming from me because I knew nothing about it and  
3 there is so much, you know, on this particular situation.

4 So here she is now placing weapons, brand new weapons, in  
15:49:28 5 my hands in late 1997 up to early - and once it's before the  
6 intervention, I would say before February too, at the beginning  
7 of the intervention of 1998. So none of it is true. Not a bit  
8 of it is true. This kid is just making this thing up and I can  
9 just say she's confused. That's all I can put it to.

15:50:00 10 Q. Okay. Well, the witness goes on, and I'm not going to  
11 belabour you with the detail. Let's put this in round terms.  
12 Beginning at page 15656, at line 9, through to page 15662, at  
13 line 19. Mr Taylor, were arms being taken from White Flower and  
14 from your farm in Gbarnga to be taken to Buedu?

15:50:33 15 A. No, no.

16 Q. At any time?

17 A. No, no.

18 Q. Now, on that note, let me take you, please, to page 15663.  
19 Let's set the context by looking at page 15662, this lengthy  
15:51:13 20 question:

21 "Q. Thank you, Madam Witness. Just before we move on on  
22 this point I want to clarify a point. At what point were  
23 weapons or supplies loaded into trucks and at what point  
24 were they loaded or reloaded into pick-ups? At what point  
15:51:31 25 were they in trucks and at what point were they in  
26 pick-ups?

27 A. Well, the time about the trucks, that was late 1999.  
28 At that time there was a problem between Foday Sankoh and  
29 Sam Bockarie, between Issa Sesay and Superman. It was



1 during that time. There was no understanding between Sam  
2 Bockarie, Superman, Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh. So it  
3 was at that same time that they loaded up five trucks.  
4 They had food. There was rice, onions, used clothing,  
15:52:21 5 sneakers, bails of sneakers, arms and ammunition in five  
6 trucks from Monrovia to Buedu. So during that time two  
7 trucks entered Buedu and that coincided with the time when  
8 Charles Taylor had told Mosquito to go to Monrovia and at  
9 that time Mosquito had sent his wife and children together  
15:52:49 10 with his mother, three days before we left Buedu for  
11 Monrovia. So all of them had gone.

12 Q. Madam Witness, we are going far into an area that I  
13 actually did not ask about." Bit unfortunate that. "The  
14 question here was when there was loading of material,  
15:53:20 15 weapons, arms and ammunition, from White Flower, before  
16 they were taken to Benjamin Yeaten's place what were they  
17 loaded in from White Flower? Were they loaded in pick-ups  
18 or were they loaded in trucks?"

19 We'll come back to the second half of the question, but  
15:53:34 20 let's look at the first part first - of the answer, sorry. Well,  
21 the time about the trucks, that was late 1999. So it is that  
22 same December that they loaded up to five trucks. They had food.  
23 There was rice, onions, used clothing, sneakers, bails of  
24 sneakers, arms and ammunition in five trucks from Monrovia to  
15:54:01 25 Buedu. This is a few days before Bockarie leaves, Mr Taylor.  
26 What are you doing?

27 A. I don't know. I don't know here.

28 Q. Take your time, Mr Taylor.

29 A. So five trucks leave and go and turn around and come right

1 back. It doesn't make sense. There's no - Sam Bockarie, when we  
2 look at the UN special envoy's documentation, the last week in  
3 December, Obasanjo, this very Obasanjo, Foday Sankoh, Sam  
4 Bockarie, Charles Taylor meet in Monrovia when we make it very  
15:54:53 5 clear to Sam Bockarie - Sam Bockarie is aware of his departure  
6 from Sierra Leone. We've told him, "You either leave or start  
7 the disarmament and Foday Sankoh is the only person we're going  
8 to talk to." Now, does it make any sense that I'm going to load  
9 up five trucks of arms, ammunition, rice, food to give to Sam  
15:55:18 10 Bockarie to drive in and then drive back out?

11 Q. Well, we need to be careful here, Mr Taylor, because the  
12 individual doesn't quite say this was going to Sam Bockarie.  
13 It's from Monrovia to Buedu.

14 A. That's for who now? For who?

15:55:40 15 Q. Well, it could well be for Sam Bockarie, but I don't want  
16 to be accused of misstating the evidence, so that's why I'm just  
17 reminding you of precisely what is said in the plain black and  
18 white of the transcript.

19 A. Well, there's no such thing. There is no such thing. But  
15:55:59 20 mind you now, a witness testified, we just went through his or  
21 her testimony today, that said that when Issa Sesay arrived in  
22 Buedu at the departure of Sam Bockarie, there is someone there  
23 who runs away - I forgot the name of this operator - who hides  
24 and comes out of the bushes. I forgot the name of this  
15:56:27 25 particular person that they mentioned. But it would mean --

26 Q. Zedman.

27 A. Zedman hides and then comes. So that means that if it was  
28 not Sam Bockarie that carried them, at least this witness would  
29 have been able to say to Zedman, "But even though he left, but

1 here are things that Mr Taylor just sent from Monrovia." But if  
2 we also look at the testimony of that witness, that witness said  
3 that when Sam Bockarie was leaving, what did he do? He cleaned  
4 up the place. He even carried generators and everything. So, I  
15:57:05 5 mean, I don't understand this. There is no way that I sent five  
6 trucks from Monrovia to no place in Sierra Leone loaded with  
7 arms, ammunition, food and all of these things.

8 Q. Mr Taylor, what if it is suggested that in reality what was  
9 going on was this: You were using your public persona,  
15:57:30 10 supposedly negotiating with UN approval, merely as a smokescreen,  
11 to hide what in reality you were doing, which was, behind that  
12 smokescreen, supplying five trucks full of material to the RUF?

13 A. Well, I tell you, that proposition may not be far off from  
14 what we can expect to hear from the Prosecution. That's the only  
15:57:55 15 place that they're going to land this whole case, because the  
16 evidence that I have been talking about here, we're looking at  
17 their evidence and we're looking at black and white  
18 documentations from the United Nations and other places. So that  
19 might not be farfetched anyway. I'm sure that's all going to

15:58:16 20 come - but that would be total nonsense because that's not the  
21 case that I would be hiding behind the activities of the UN,  
22 [i ndi scerni ble] would pack up five trucks, send it in. And then  
23 all of a sudden what happens to the five trucks? Nobody knows.

24 In fact, do they drive back out? Does Issa Sesay receive them?  
15:58:29 25 Because Sam Bockarie is not there, so what is going on? I'll be  
26 waiting for that. I know that's what they're going to come up  
27 with, that: Oh, yes, he was doing that, but behind that there  
28 was Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. That's what - I'm going to be waiting  
29 for that. I'll be right here waiting for it.

1 Q. Let's move to page 15700, Mr Taylor, line 11:

2 "Q. We were talking about this meeting that took place,  
3 and the point we last discussed was Sam Bockarie discussing  
4 the idea of a meeting with Eddie Kanneh. You said that  
15:59:12 5 during the meeting they also discussed something about  
6 Freetown - about moving towards Freetown. Do you recall  
7 saying that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you explain clearly what they discussed at the  
15:59:24 10 meeting about Freetown?

11 A. He said they should discuss about how to go and attack  
12 Freetown during that particular mission that they were at  
13 first supposed to clean up Kono and he said that Kono,  
14 Superman and Komba Gbundema and others should combine. It  
15:59:45 15 should be a uniform mission. They together with SAJ and  
16 others because by then there weren't existing  
17 communications between them. He said after they and SAJ  
18 would have cleaned up Kono they should go to Kabala, and  
19 from Kabala they should proceed to Freetown. That was what  
16:00:08 20 he meant by 'discuss', because by then there wasn't any  
21 communication between Sam Bockarie and SAJ."

22 What do you understand by that, the absence of  
23 communication between Sam Bockarie and SAJ in the lead-up to the  
24 Freetown invasion, Mr Taylor?

16:00:27 25 A. My understanding is that they had - in fact, they were not  
26 in contact. They had no agreement or, may I say, common cause.  
27 This is - this indicates conflict between them to me.

28 Q. And recall this is a radio operator speaking here.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. "Q. The matters that you've just talked about, were they  
2 matters which were discussed at the meeting, or were they  
3 matters which Sam Bockarie discussed with Eddie Kanneh  
4 during the time they were having food together?

16:01:04 5 A. Well, what I have just explained to you was the  
6 discussion that took place between he and Eddie Kanneh  
7 whilst they were taking meal together.

8 Q. Do you recall where the meeting took place?

9 A. Well, it was in Buedu at Sam Bockarie's house.

16:01:24 10 Q. And do you recall the persons who were present at this  
11 meeting?

12 A. Well, Isaac was present, that is CO Isaac, Morris  
13 Kallon was there, Issa Sesay was there, Abu Keita was  
14 there, together with some other people.

16:01:43 15 Q. Now, you mentioned Abu Keita. Who was he?

16 A. He was a Liberian fighter. A soldier.

17 Q. How did you know he was a Liberian fighter?

18 A. Well, he only spoke Liberian English. He was not  
19 speaking Krio, nor English. He was only speaking Liberian  
16:02:03 20 English.

21 Q. And did you know why he was there?

22 A. Well, he was one of the fighters who had joined the RUF  
23 to fight.

24 Q. Do you know when he joined the RUF to fight?

16:02:18 25 A. Well, I only saw him in Buedu and I only came to know  
26 him in Buedu.

27 Q. Do you know where he came from before he came to Buedu?

28 A. Yes, he came from the Liberian side".

29 Pause there. Mr Taylor, who sent Abu Keita? You, or was

1 he recruit into the RUF? Which is right?

2 A. I think he was recruited. I think Abu Keita fled. After  
3 he fled, he just --

4 Q. Fled when?

16:02:53 5 A. He fled after the September --

6 Q. September when?

7 A. 1998. He fled from Liberia. So she's talking - anything  
8 that's got to be - he fled - after the fracas in Monrovia in  
9 September of 1998 he fled and he joined - I'm sure he joined the

16:03:09 10 RUF. But then again this is interesting, because this witness  
11 doesn't talk about he was the commanders that came with  
12 reinforcements. She doesn't even - she's supposed to know -  
13 like, the other people say that he was the guy that was sent, you  
14 know, to reinforce. But apparently she doesn't know about that  
16:03:31 15 trick.

16 Q. But wasn't Abu Keita one of your men, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No, Abu Keita fought against the government forces for  
18 Roosevelt Johnson, was arrested, released, and he was never one  
19 of our men, no.

16:03:50 20 Q. But do you recall following his release he met with you and  
21 became one of your trusted runners?

22 A. He never met with me, no. That's a lie. I know the  
23 reference you're talking. He never met with me.

24 Q. Did you tell him to go and join the RUF?

16:04:13 25 A. No, I didn't.

26 Q. Well, didn't anyone tell you in all those radio  
27 conversations: Guess what? That runner you sent to us,  
28 Mr Taylor, he likes it so much here in Sierra Leone he's decided  
29 to join the RUF. Didn't anyone ever tell you that?

1 A. No, because I didn't send him. No.

2 Q. Line 27:

3 "Q. And do you know what was decided or discussed at that  
4 meeting?

16:04:50 5 A. Well, I did not attend the meeting, but that was what I  
6 heard even before the meeting itself took place.

7 Q. Did you learn about what was discussed at the meeting  
8 later?

9 A. Yes, just the same thing I have just explained. Those  
16:05:15 10 were the things they discussed. This is to go and  
11 re-attack Kono. This is the RUF fighters.

12 Q. Now back to Abu Keita. Do you know whether he belonged  
13 to any group in Liberia from where he came?

14 A. Well, I only knew that he was a Liberian fighter, but I  
16:05:37 15 did not actually know to which group he initially belonged.

16 Q. Apart from Abu Keita, at this time do you know whether  
17 there were any other Liberian fighters in Buedu?

18 A. Yes, I later knew about one Senegalese.

19 Q. Who was Senegalese?

16:06:09 20 A. Well, he was a Liberian fighter too. He was a Liberian  
21 soldier. He was fighting in Liberia.

22 Q. When did you first see Senegalese?

23 A. Well, I saw him at first in Kenema together with Jungle  
24 at the time Jungle and others used to go there.

16:06:29 25 Q. And then after that did you see him anywhere else apart  
26 from this time that he was in Buedu?

27 A. Yes, I said I saw him at first in Kenema, and all of us  
28 pulled out from Kenema before we went to Buedu.

29 Q. And do you know what nationality Senegalese was?

1 A. Well, he was a Liberian.

2 Q. How did you know he was a Liberian?

3 A. He was speaking Liberian English and he came from  
4 Liberia.

16:07:01 5 Q. Do you know whether he belonged to any group in  
6 Liberia?

7 A. Well, that I wouldn't tell you. All I know is he was  
8 a Liberian soldier and he came from Liberia.

9 Q. How do you know he was a soldier from Liberia?

16:07:12 10 A. He came from there, he together with Jungle and others  
11 and he was well armed when he came.

12 Q. Apart from these two, did you know of other Liberians  
13 whose were in Buedu at this time?

14 A. Yes, I recall that at a point in time some Liberian  
16:07:29 15 soldiers came from Liberia and they came to Buedu.

16 Q. Do you know who these Liberian soldiers were?

17 A. Well, they said they came from Liberia and they were  
18 fighting in Liberia. They came from the Lofa side.

19 Q. At the time you are talking about now, and you talked  
16:07:55 20 about having seen Abu Keita, we're in Buedu, are we not?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Who else did you see in Buedu that was a Liberian  
23 fighter?"

24 This is page 15704, line 26.

16:08:19 25 "A. Well, I saw Senegalese and around 40 to 50 Liberian  
26 soldiers in Buedu.

27 Q. You said there were 40 to 50 Liberian soldiers. How  
28 did you know that these were Liberian soldiers?

29 A. They came from Liberia and they were speaking the



1           Liberian English.

2           Q.   When was it that you saw these 40 or 50 Liberian  
3           soldiers, as you call them, in Buedu?

4           A.   Well, it was in 1998 - late 1998."

16:08:56 5           Pause there. No, just a little further:

6           "Q.   Did you see these 40 or 50 Liberian fighters in Buedu  
7           before that meeting or after the meeting?

8           A.   It was before the meeting. They were there for about a  
9           month before the meeting. That is to say, they went there  
16:09:18 10          around November."

11          And then she goes on to explain that they were wearing -  
12          they were speaking Liberian English and that they were in  
13          civilian clothing, bottom of that page.

14          Now, Mr Taylor, we have this situation, don't we: November  
16:09:45 15          1998, just before the Freetown invasion, 40 or 50 Liberians in  
16          Buedu; who sent them?

17          A.   Well, I didn't, if anybody at all sent them.

18          Q.   "All of them were saying that Abu Keita was their  
19          commander." This is page 15706. Now, Mr Taylor, let's look at  
16:10:21 20          the timing here. When was the Roosevelt Johnson incident?

21          A.   September 1998 or thereabout, yeah.

22          Q.   September 1998. Apart from Abu Keita, did other members of  
23          ULIMO end up in Sierra Leone?

24          A.   Yes, yes.

16:10:47 25          Q.   Were some of them not airlifted by the United States to  
26          Freetown?

27          A.   Yes.

28          Q.   So we have this situation now where in November, 40 or 50  
29          Liberians speaking Liberian English, dressed in civilian

1 clothing, commanded by Abu Kei ta, who had fled a couple of months  
2 before, end up in Buedu. What do you say about that?

3 A. Well, there is something even sinister about it. Because  
4 this Abu Kei ta, if he is with men in Buedu, that means that I can  
16:11:37 5 almost, as I picture it, say that they are involved in this  
6 attack on Foya. These are those same LURD, Mosquito Spray  
7 people. That's the same people that just were gathering to cause  
8 trouble in Liberia. But Abu Kei ta by no stretch of the  
9 imagination, your Honours, I tell you this, was, you know, a

16:12:06 10 friendly soldier to the Government of Liberia. Not at all. This  
11 was an enemy soldier when it came to the Government of Liberia.

12 Now, her account of what's going on in Buedu - and these people  
13 are not being truthful. When the question is asked to this lady  
14 as to whether there were others - and she only says that they've

16:12:26 15 been flinging two names around in these witnesses' heads: Abu  
16 Kei ta, Senegalese, Jungle. Don't you guys ever forget it: Abu  
17 Kei ta, Senegalese, Jungle. Once these names are going up and  
18 down, we know it's going to be fine. Now, we have a situation  
19 here where these witnesses are aware of the fact that retreating

16:12:56 20 from Freetown after the invention are hundreds of Liberians, and  
21 they don't see anybody except they say there are 40 in Buedu.

22 Hundreds of Liberians retreat from Freetown along with the junta.  
23 Hundreds. Hundreds. In fact, I would probably put it to maybe  
24 to about a thousand or a thousand and a half and they are

16:13:27 25 scattered all in that area there. They are what we know now to  
26 be what? The STF. There are hundreds of Liberians amongst these  
27 people, but they've zeroed in on someone called Senegalese that  
28 has been described in several ways. One witness here said that  
29 he spoke English and French. Another witness said he was killed

1 in Makeni. I don't know this man called Senegalese. I did not  
2 send Abu Keita. But all they can remember is that - now, I don't  
3 put it past Abu Keita because if Abu Keita was in that place, the  
4 only people he had with him were former ULIMO-K fighters that he  
16:14:05 5 had fled with from Liberia. After he was released, he couldn't  
6 take any more chances, he fled. So the fact of the matter is,  
7 this is all a concoction. No, it's none of what this lady has  
8 explained.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before we return to this narrative provided  
16:14:29 10 by this witness, we need to examine in a little more detail what  
11 it is you're saying to us now. Are you suggesting that these 40  
12 or 50 Liberians who end up in Buedu under the command of Abu  
13 Keita, former ULIMO-J, that they were possible former ULIMO  
14 fighters, the 40 or 50 men? Is that what you are suggesting?

16:15:00 15 A. If what again? Let me get the question.

16 Q. That the 40 or 50 Liberians led by Abu Keita, are you  
17 suggesting they're probably former ULIMO-K?

18 A. Yes. I'm saying that knowing the way these boys operate,  
19 when Abu Keita fled Liberia, he had to flee with some of the boys  
16:15:15 20 that he used to work with ULIMO-K. This is the way I put it.  
21 Including - if there's a Senegalese, he cannot be separate.  
22 Senegalese would be working under Abu Keita. They're all  
23 together.

24 Q. Now, you say that in light of the juxtaposition of the Camp  
16:15:34 25 Johnson Road incident, Keita fleeing and others being transported  
26 by the United States to Sierra Leone at or about this time in  
27 late 1998, yes?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. And then a month later there is this sighting of this group

1 in Buedu led by Abu Keita, yes?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Is that what you're suggesting?

4 A. This is what I'm suggesting.

16:15:59 5 Q. So looking at that scenario critically, Mr Taylor, we have  
6 this situation then, don't we: We have the body funded and armed  
7 by you, the RUF, joining forces with a large group of combatants  
8 opposed to you, yes?

9 A. Uh-huh.

16:16:20 10 Q. So why did you allow that to happen, question number one?

11 A. Well, that would be impossibility. So it's either they are  
12 not there, as she is saying, or if they are there, such a mixture  
13 would just be putting, I would say, lemon in milk. I mean, so  
14 that would be - so something's got to be wrong. But Abu Keita is  
16:16:47 15 definitely an enemy soldier. Definitely.

16 Q. But let's just examine it a little further, Mr Taylor,  
17 because by implication then, this being November, when in early  
18 December we have this large shipment of arms coming from  
19 Ouagadougou via Roberts International Airport, part of which is  
16:17:12 20 off-loaded at White Flower, the balance going to Sierra Leone,  
21 that means you're sending arms to the RUF and potentially to  
22 large groups of former ULIMO fighters. Why were you doing that?

23 A. Wouldn't that be silly? So it didn't happen. That would  
24 be really stupid, that I'm going to be arming them to come and  
16:17:34 25 attack me. That's what it would mean.

26 Q. Now, the witness continues, page 15706, line 4:

27 "A. After the meeting Sam Bockarie called for a formation.  
28 He spoke to them. He addressed the Liberian soldiers in  
29 the Liberian English as well as Krio and he told them that

1           they were to go to Kono to join Superman to attack Koi du  
2           and that after that he was going to send them for a  
3           combined mission to Kabala and from Kabala they should  
4           proceed to Freetown.

16:18:14 5           Q. After Sam Bockarie had addressed these men, do you know  
6           what happened?

7           A. Well, he supplied them with arms and ammunition and it  
8           was Senegalese who took them along, who led them. All of  
9           them went together with Senegalese, but Senegalese led  
16:18:30 10          them.

11          Q. Now during the time that these men were in Buedu, do  
12          you know whether they were answerable to anybody?

13          A. Yes, they were in fact staying with Abu Keita."

14          Now, that suggests Abu Keita is in a position to provide  
16:18:51 15          them with accommodation in Buedu. Now, this is the same Abu  
16          Keita we encountered this morning meeting up with Mike Lamin and  
17          the fleeing RUF refugees in what year, Mr Taylor?

18          A. That's 1996, Zogoda.

19          Q. 1996. So we're in '98 now, so two years later, yes?

16:19:11 20          A. Uh-huh.

21          Q. And note, Bockarie addressed them in Liberian English as  
22          well as Krio. Now, these Liberians you sent to Bockarie, had you  
23          taught them Krio before they went, Mr Taylor, to make sure they  
24          understood the language?

16:19:43 25          A. No.

26          Q. Well, help me. Did you purposefully select bilingual  
27          Liberians to go to Sierra Leone, those who could speak both  
28          Liberian English and Krio?

29          A. No.

1 Q. Such that Bockarie could address them in both?

2 A. No, I didn't.

3 Q. Well, can you help us at all with that?

4 A. No. I mean, that's - you know, these are the situations  
16:20:15 5 that don't have any coherence but they talk about it, but I don't  
6 know Krio. I can understand some - more Mende and Temne than  
7 Krio because of the dialect I speak from Liberia. But, again,  
8 the way how these boys operated, I can tell you something, they  
9 have tribal groups in our areas, I tell you something, that  
16:20:50 10 really hold together and I know how these boys behave. And in  
11 our area - in fact, most of West Africa, I can almost say maybe I  
12 will probably get - if they hear this, people will get upset, but  
13 that's how I feel about it - the one tribe in West Africa that  
14 holds together very seriously, the Mandingos. The Mandingos from  
16:21:14 15 Senegal across West Africa, they hold together. And Abu Keita -  
16 I can bet that if they're 1 or 40, every one of these men with  
17 Abu Keita is a Mandingo because they trust each other and they  
18 hold together. They speak the language and they hold together.  
19 The next group, followed by the Krahs. That's why you always  
16:21:36 20 have these conflicts, because they actually hold together.

21 So when you see Senegalese and this whole - if Abu Keita is  
22 there, these are mostly ULIMO-K boys. This is why when ULIMO  
23 split, the Krahs went on one side, the Mandingos came on the  
24 other side. So from what I can see here, if this man is speaking  
16:21:53 25 anything to these people, I'm not sure if these boys can  
26 understand Krio, he would just speak ordinarily and they would be  
27 able to understand, because most of these boys speak English,  
28 most of them will speak English, French and Mandingo, okay, very  
29 well. Either - and then again, it depends on what kind of

1 Mandingo because there are about two or three different - in our  
2 West African region, we've got the Koniaka and we have the Gboni.

3 Q. Spell that, please.

4 A. Koniaka, I don't know how to spell it. Koniaka,

16:22:37 5 K-O-I-N-I-K-A [sic]; Koniaka. Then you've got the Gboni. That's

6 B-O-I-N-I [sic]. They're two sects, but they understand each

7 other very well. And depending on the - that's how they hold

8 together. So this whole clique, the only thing I can suggest to

9 this Court is that when Abu Keita fled Liberia some of his

16:23:00 10 Mandingo brothers followed him into Sierra Leone. This is the

11 best that I can come up with it. And this Abu Keita boy knows

12 very well that I never sent him anywhere. But then again, those

13 boys were out there hustling, and I don't know how Abu Keita

14 ended up in this Court, but those boys saw an opportunity to eat

16:23:25 15 some money and they came. And that's what we're going to find

16 out later. But, as far as I'm concerned, I don't know if these

17 boys could actually speak Krio or Sam Bockarie could speak

18 Liberian English. I'm not aware of that.

19 Q. Can I confirm some spellings? Gboni, G-B-O-N-I. Koniaka,

16:23:44 20 K-O-N-I-A-K-A.

21 Now, let's go back to the passage we were dealing with,

22 please, to throw some further light on this:

23 "A. Yes, they were in fact staying with Abu Keita.

24 Q. The question was whether they were answerable to

16:24:09 25 anyone.

26 A. Yes, they answered to Abu Keita as well as Mosquito as

27 they were being supplied food every other day.

28 Q. Now you said that these fighters were sent to Kono

29 along with Senegalese. Do you know whether any other

1 persons were sent to Kono on the mission which you have  
2 just talked about?

3 A. Well, Senegalese went with all the fighters. He  
4 together with Issa and Rambo, all of them went.

16:24:36 5 Q. And do you know what happened following the move to  
6 Kono by these fighters?

7 A. Well, they moved together with - they and Superman and  
8 others moved and they went towards the Waterloo area. All  
9 of them joined Superman's group.

16:24:56 10 Q. Did anything happen there in Kono?"

11 Line 4:

12 "A. Yes, they went to Kono and they captured Kono.

13 Q. How do you know?

14 A. It was announced and even Alice Pyne told me. Superman  
16:25:13 15 sent the message to Sam Bockarie saying they'd captured  
16 Kono. He said they did not succeed in capturing Kono, he  
17 said, but they were able to capture some arms and  
18 ammunition.

19 Q. You said you could recall some things about the events  
16:25:28 20 of 6 January. What can you recall?

21 A. Well, I recall that at that time Sam Bockarie was very  
22 frequent in the radio room, that was the RUF radio room and  
23 he used to monitor Gullit and others movement going towards  
24 Freetown and he went over air, over the BBC that within 72  
16:25:51 25 hours he will ensure that his men entered Freetown."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, pause there. Those 40 to 50 Liberians,  
27 according to this, end up with Rambo in Waterloo where we know  
28 from much other evidence there were some RUF combatants who did  
29 not actually enter Freetown but were there as possible relief.



1 You appreciate that?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. So it means then, based on the allegation you face, that  
4 these men sent by you were in close support of what was happening  
16:26:39 5 in Freetown in January 1999. Do you follow?

6 A. That's what they want to suggest here.

7 Q. And so I'm giving you an opportunity to deal with it. Did  
8 you?

9 A. No, never did. Never did. But let's be reminded because  
16:27:01 10 we've got a short time. Let's be reminded now. When we get into  
11 this testimony, if I can recall, and I don't have the full  
12 picture, but I can remember that Superman, that is mentioned  
13 here, was supposed to be heading the Red Lion battalion and that  
14 Red Lion battalion was supposed to be comprise of a lot of

16:27:27 15 Liberians, okay, and there was another group headed by a Rambo,  
16 but that was - I'm not sure if that was Red Goat or Black Goat,  
17 but I think Rambo was Red Goat. So we have now separated, and we  
18 have to watch for this, we've separated these so-called 40 men  
19 that I'm supposed to send away now from Senegalese - I mean, with  
16:27:52 20 Senegalese. They are separated from Superman. I think we've got  
21 to watch out for that. But none of that is true because I didn't  
22 send anybody. But when we get into that whole section in dealing  
23 with this so-called move to Freetown, there are a whole bunch of  
24 other stories that are totally away from that.

16:28:11 25 But we also know at that particular time that there is the  
26 STF involved also. So I don't know where they come in. But  
27 based on your question, no, I don't send them.

28 Q. Well, on all accounts, Mr Taylor, there's a lot of  
29 Liberians about that that time?

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,  
3 Mr President?

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Just before we adjourn, I'd like to  
16:28:38 5 say something. Tomorrow at close of business we commence a  
6 well-deserved, if belated, court recess. It is the first recess  
7 this Court has taken in almost six months, and no doubt we're all  
8 looking forward to it. In fact, I'm sure we all need it. We  
9 hope you all have a stress free and relaxing break and return  
16:29:08 10 refreshed for the next session of this case which will commence  
11 on Monday, 26 of this month at 9.30 a.m.

12 Mr Taylor, once more in the interim period I remind you  
13 that there is an order in force that you not discuss your  
14 evidence with any other person. We'll adjourn.

16:29:33 15 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
16 to be reconvened on Monday, 26 October 2009 at  
17 9.30 a.m.]

18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29

## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	30042
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	30042