



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 29 SEPTEMBER 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Mr Simon Meisenberg  
Ms Sidney Thompson

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Tuesday, 29 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:13 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,  
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J  
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora, and our case  
09:31:25 10 manager Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
14 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah of counsel and Ms Katie  
09:31:40 15 Hovington.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Taylor, I will just remind  
17 you that you are still bound by your oath. Yes, go ahead,  
18 please, Mr Griffiths.

19 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

20 [On former affirmation]

21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

22 Q. Mr Taylor, last week when we concluded we were looking at  
23 the testimony of a witness who had given evidence in closed  
24 session. Do you recall that?

09:32:02 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. And I remind you of that because of the importance that we  
27 proceed with care. Now, this question was asked on 29 January  
28 2008 at page 2513 of the transcript:

29 "Q. How would you characterise the relationship between

1 Charles Taylor and the AFRC/RUF after that junta was  
2 overthrown.

3 A. Well, the RUF junior forces look up to the commanders,  
4 you know. I mean, most of them didn't really know who

09:32:50 5 Mr Taylor was or the kind of relationship that existed  
6 between Mr Taylor and the RUF. So because of the loyalty  
7 demonstrated over and over again by senior commanders of  
8 the RUF to Mr Taylor's call, all the RUF and the AFRC toed  
9 the line. I mean, they heeded to the command of those

09:33:15 10 commanders in terms of fighting for Mr Taylor. So that is  
11 the reason why, in fact, when he was under attack, when the  
12 LURD, the members, nearly overran the Lofa County, most of  
13 those boys, the AFRC boys, as well as the RUF, went to Foya  
14 which was then one of the command posts under Christopher

09:33:40 15 Varmoh and joined forces there upon the instruction of Sam  
16 Bockarie to fight in favour of Mr Taylor against his  
17 enemies. So I mean, they were very loyal to him. Some of  
18 them fought for Mr Taylor without ever seeing Mr Taylor or  
19 even knowing who he was and some of them in fact lost their

09:34:01 20 life in Lofa, so they were very loyal and again as I said  
21 for Sam Bockarie, that relationship again for some of them  
22 ended actually in tragedy, especially like for Denis Mingo,  
23 who I got to know later just after fighting in that axis.

24 Mr Taylor's security had to call him. Benjamin Yeaten told  
09:34:24 25 him that Mr Taylor wanted to see him in Monrovia."

26 We've dealt with that episode so we won't go through that  
27 again. Mr Taylor, what do you say about that description of your  
28 alleged relationship with the AFRC, note, and the RUF?

29 A. No, there was no such relationship with the AFRC/RUF of

1 that sort, no.

2 Q. Now, did you have a commander called Christopher Varmoh?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did he have an alias?

09:34:57 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What was his alias?

7 A. He was called Mosquito.

8 Q. Where was he based?

9 A. Mosquito was based in Lofa County.

09:35:08 10 Q. Was he based in Foya?

11 A. No, his headquarters was in Voinjama.

12 Q. To your knowledge, were former members of the AFRC ever  
13 based with Christopher Varmoh in Foya?

14 A. No, no.

09:35:26 15 Q. What about members of the RUF?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Now, at the same time, Mr Taylor, that individual at a  
18 later stage in his testimony was shown a diagram showing the  
19 hierarchy within Sierra Leone during the time of the People's  
09:35:59 20 Army, AFRC/RUF. This is page 2894 of the transcript for 1  
21 February 2008:

22 "Q. Why haven't you put his, that is account

23 Charles Taylor's, name on this diagram?

24 A. This diagram talk about the AFRC/RUF command structure,  
09:36:25 25 junta command structure, as it was in Freetown. It has  
26 nothing to do with my opinion as far as Mr Taylor control  
27 of the RUF as I said. And if you want me to go into the  
28 details of that --

29 Q. No, please. No, thank you.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. No, thank you. But as far as you're concerned would  
3 you say this: That Mr Taylor controlled the junta  
4 government?

09:36:49 5 A. No, no. As far as this is concerned he is not part of  
6 the command structure. No, he is not.

7 Q. Would you agree that Mr Taylor did not control the  
8 junta government?

9 A. Yes."

09:37:07 10 Now, what do you say to that, Mr Taylor, that's the same  
11 individual?

12 A. Well, it just shows the contradiction. On the one hand I  
13 am supposed to be controlling the AFRC junta and in the next  
14 statement I am not. I think he tells the truth in the next

09:37:23 15 because I am not controlling neither the AFRC nor the RUF. So he  
16 is right about his second account, that I am not in control or  
17 command and control of the activities.

18 Q. Now, there was a five year period between 1991 and '96 when  
19 we were told this individual became disillusioned with the NPFL  
09:38:00 20 and the RUF and said this:

21 "Because of my initial experience, you know, as I told you,  
22 that at the point in time I was really disillusioned. I was  
23 disillusioned first of all with my earlier experience with the  
24 NPFL. Then later on once they continued with their extreme  
09:38:22 25 brutality and towards especially civilians that we - some of us  
26 thought they could have tried to win. I mean that was a complete  
27 departure from the tenet of so-called guerilla warfare for that  
28 kind of programme they had. So once I got disillusioned, I mean  
29 I never had that enthusiasm like that before."

1 Now, I mention this passage for this reason, Mr Taylor: As  
2 a guerilla leader was it your policy to use terror to in effect  
3 pacify the people of Liberia?

4 A. Quite to the contrary. From all indications of what

09:39:04 5 I - like I said, I have never done military training in my life,  
6 but from all of the reading that I have done in my lifetime  
7 regarding guerilla activities across the world, and I have read  
8 quite a bit, one of the first things that the NPFL did was to  
9 take care of the civilian population because if you lose the  
09:39:28 10 support of the civilian population, you lose the war. And this  
11 is why this Court has seen evidence that was even presented by  
12 the Prosecution about how stringent we were in dealing with even  
13 some of my Special Forces for the commission of atrocities in  
14 Liberia. Whether we talk about Sam Larto for the execution of  
09:39:53 15 people - rape, soldiers were executed. So for him to even  
16 suggest that we were using terror tactics - I am not quoting him  
17 directly - to in a way control the population is total nonsense  
18 because the first thing I sought to do was to make sure that the  
19 civilian population was very well taken care of and that led to  
09:40:20 20 not only my success in the war, but even during the elections.

21 This is why amongst the entire field of individuals who  
22 later claimed that they came to stop me from overtaking the  
23 country, including Alhaji Kromah and George Boley, and the rest  
24 of them, including civilians that participated in the elections  
09:40:41 25 of 1997, I was able in that entire pool of 13 candidates to win  
26 more than 75 per cent simply because I took care of the  
27 population. So that's total nonsense. Total, total nonsense.

28 But then again, the witness in question, we know what this  
29 witness is all about. And said before that from 1991 to 1995 he

1 was stopped somewhere in Monrovia or wherever he was. This  
2 individual I - you know, I hate to say this, but I think is an  
3 opportunist that would run away from the war, run back in, run  
4 away, run back in, several years you are gone and all of a sudden  
09:41:25 5 - that's why he never - I can't see how someone of this stature  
6 like I said before could have not progressed in this organisation  
7 where a little commander down the line like Sam Bockarie comes  
8 and overtakes him. He is an opportunist and a coward and so  
9 that's why he can come up with these lies. That's all he is.  
09:41:43 10 You know, I just have to say that.

11 Q. Now, moving on with the testimony of this witness. I want  
12 to deal with a fairly lengthy passage of his testimony which  
13 deals with the Freetown invasion so that you have an opportunity  
14 to deal with this. I am beginning at page 2556, testimony of 29  
09:42:11 15 January 2008, at line 12 of a lengthy answer:

16 "But the catch 22 situation was that, I want you to  
17 appreciate this, that you had the high command I mean that was  
18 extremely intolerant sometimes with advice, especially from the  
19 War Council of which I was made part of in the presence of Sam  
09:42:35 20 Bockarie who instead of even listening to the War Council while  
21 we were there, and there are instance if you want I can even  
22 mention one or two, who instead of listening to the advice of the  
23 War Council of which I was a member, he instead was running from  
24 that, from Buedu to Monrovia to seek the advice of Mr Taylor, I  
09:42:56 25 mean who was directly taking instruction from Monrovia. So I  
26 mean that was the situation. So we in the War Council didn't  
27 really have any say in terms of what Sam Bockarie did or not. I  
28 mean in terms of trying to mitigate some of those atrocities that  
29 both the AFRC and the RUF were committing."

1 And then he continues on page 2641, line 2:

2 "The idea of going to Freetown was discussed by Sam  
3 Bockarie among the senior commanders to free Mr Sankoh, but  
4 the instruction to go to Freetown originated from Monrovia,  
09:43:42 5 from Mr Taylor as expressed by Sam Bockarie to the senior  
6 commanders.

7 Q. Thank you very much. I don't want you to be coy about  
8 it. Just so that we are clear, your account is, the idea  
9 to invade Freetown originated with Charles Taylor, right?

09:44:02 10 A. The instruction to go to Freetown from Sam Bockarie  
11 originated from Monrovia. That was what Sam Bockarie told  
12 us to the commanders, that is what I am saying. That  
13 commanders were generally discussing whether they agreed  
14 with the death sentence and people were talking about - we  
09:44:24 15 have to go to Freetown to free Sankoh, free Sankoh, free  
16 Sankoh, but once Sam Bockarie came from that trip, he told  
17 us specific instruction that he had received."

18 To line 25:

19 "The October instruction to go to Freetown, that  
09:44:44 20 instruction came from Mr Taylor through Sam Bockarie as  
21 conveyed to us by Sam Bockarie, it came first."

22 Over the page, page 2642:

23 "The instruction to invade came from Charles Taylor and  
24 then there were discussion amongst the commanders, is that  
09:45:05 25 the sequence?

26 A. That is not the sequence. The instruction and the  
27 discussion are different. I keep telling you this.  
28 Sometime in October when the 24 soldiers were executed and  
29 Sankoh was sentenced to death, the commanders were talking



1 among themselves about going to free Sankoh, free Sankoh,  
2 free Sankoh, going to Freetown to free Sankoh. That  
3 discussion was already going on, but the instruction came,  
4 as was expressed by Sam Bockarie to the combatants, the  
09:45:44 5 instruction to go to Freetown came from Mr Taylor, conveyed  
6 to the commanders through Sam Bockarie as he told us, that  
7 is what I said."

8 Line 18:

9 "Sam Bockarie came and informed us after his trip from  
09:46:03 10 Monrovia that the Papay said, as you rightly put it, we  
11 should attack Freetown and force the government to the  
12 negotiation table."

13 Now, Mr Taylor, so far as October 1998 - which it must be -  
14 is concerned, did you see Sam Bockarie then?

09:46:31 15 A. Yes, I saw Sam Bockarie in October.

16 Q. When in October?

17 A. I'm not sure. It could have been somewhere in the middle  
18 of October or thereabouts, which was his second trip to Monrovia.

19 Q. Now, were you aware that 24 soldiers had been tried and  
09:46:58 20 executed by military tribunal in Sierra Leone?

21 A. Yes, I was aware. In fact, I was very upset because I felt  
22 that Kabbah had lied to me.

23 Q. Why?

24 A. Because one of the soldiers that was executed, Victor King,  
09:47:21 25 Kabbah had promised that nothing would happen to him, and so I  
26 felt a little betrayed by Kabbah.

27 Q. Because you had sent King back to Sierra Leone, hadn't you?

28 A. That is correct. And so that was about my only involvement  
29 in knowing what happened down there. I was very concerned

1 that - because this was the second time that a Government of  
2 Liberia had had such problems with the Sierra Leonean government.  
3 The first had happened some years ago with a predecessor of mine,  
4 former President Tubman, involving General Lansana that was sent  
09:48:03 5 back, and I think it was Siaka Stevens who had promised that  
6 nothing would happen, and Siaka Stevens executed General Lansana,  
7 and President Tubman then broke off the extradition treaty  
8 between Sierra Leone and Liberia. And so when this issue arose  
9 with the February - to be exact, February 14 arrival of Victor  
09:48:28 10 King and all of the squabbles that happened thereafter, my  
11 decision to send him there was a very hard decision and I wanted  
12 to - all of the assurances that nothing would happen to him, and  
13 he was executed. So this lie where I am supposed to be  
14 instructing people to go to Sierra Leone to Freetown to free  
09:48:54 15 Sankoh is a blatant lie. There was no such thing.

16 The second trip that Sam Bockarie came - in line with your  
17 question - in October was the second meeting that I had invited  
18 him back to follow up on the September meeting in seeing how we  
19 could begin to rapidly move the 1996 agreement forward and making  
09:49:21 20 sure it was implemented. So that is not true.

21 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let's examine the mindset which might be  
22 alleged against you. You were upset with President Kabbah for  
23 carrying out those executions, weren't you?

24 A. Well, no, I wouldn't put it that way. I was upset with him  
09:49:44 25 for carrying out the execution against Victor King; not the rest  
26 of them. I didn't know the people.

27 Q. But did you feel, for example, that President Kabbah was  
28 being intransigent in terms of seeking peace in Sierra Leone,  
29 given your role on the Committee of Six at that point?

1 A. Not necessarily intransigent, I would say, but --

2 Q. Obstructive?

3 A. No, that's too harsh. I mean, coming back after the  
4 intervention he was a little - I would say overcareful, may I put  
09:50:22 5 it. He was very - may I say overprecautious about each step of  
6 the way. I wouldn't say obstructive.

7 Q. The reason I asked that, you will recall that in the  
8 passage of testimony I read out to you it says that:

9 "Sam Bockarie came and informed us after his trip from  
09:50:43 10 Monrovia that the Papay said we should attack Freetown and force  
11 the government to the negotiation table."

12 Now, had you given the instruction in order to put a little  
13 zip into the step of President Kabbah in terms of peace  
14 negotiations? Do you follow me?

09:51:05 15 A. Oh, I follow you. No. In fact, it must be very clear.  
16 After Foday Sankoh was condemned to death, let it be very clear  
17 that Kabbah had given everybody a clear signal - a very clear  
18 signal that Foday Sankoh would not be executed. I mean, if you  
19 were anyone in ECOWAS at the time, the international community  
09:51:34 20 had pressure on Sankoh, it was very clear to everybody that Foday  
21 Sankoh would have not been executed. So as far as the entire  
22 ECOWAS was concerned, and I am sure other very top diplomatic  
23 missions, all indications and assurances had been given to the  
24 international community that Kabbah - I mean, that Sankoh would  
09:51:56 25 not be executed. There is no one that can claim that they were  
26 afraid, you know, that was of any importance in the process, that  
27 Sankoh would be killed. No. I think Kabbah was very, very, very  
28 clear to the international community, if not, overtly, but very  
29 quietly, that no, there was no such thing. But he needed to add

1 pressure, so there was no concern on my part or many colleagues  
2 in ECOWAS, and I would say senior diplomatic missions and the  
3 international community, about the execution of Foday Sankoh.  
4 That was very clear, it would not have happened.

09:52:38 5 Q. But were you and your colleagues anxious to progress  
6 negotiations towards peace?

7 A. Yes, we were anxious. Very anxious.

8 Q. And did you see, for example, a stepping up of military  
9 activity in Sierra Leone as a device to bring that about?

09:52:58 10 A. No, quite to the contrary. The stepping up of military  
11 activities would have hardened the heart of Kabbah, so no one was  
12 interested in stepping up anything. Don't let's forget now that  
13 the whole purpose of Sam Bockarie coming to Liberia after  
14 consultation with my colleagues in September was to begin to move

09:53:19 15 the process forward. Secondly, don't - let's go back to the  
16 Secretary-General's report, where certain individuals had been  
17 identified for movement in and out for consultations, okay?  
18 Because both the AFRC/RUF combination had said that certain  
19 individuals had to travel outside to seek diplomatic advice and  
09:53:48 20 whatnot. That is what led to individuals being permitted to  
21 travel, including Sam Bockarie, that travelled later on in  
22 November. No.

23 No one in our circles looked at stepping up of military  
24 activities as being something to push the progress forward. No,  
09:54:05 25 that would have really hindered the process and hardened the  
26 position of ECOWAS and Kabbah.

27 Q. Now, on this same point, let us continue. Line 24, page  
28 2642:

29 "Q. When Bockarie went to Monrovia on that occasion,

1           Monrovia was just a transit point on the way to Burkina  
2           Faso, is that right?"

3           We are talking about this trip made by Bockarie in late  
4           1998 to Burkina Faso, okay, Mr Taylor?

09:54:39 5       A.     Uh-huh.

6       Q.     "A. Monrovia for the RUF was not a transit point. It was  
7           a base. By the time Sam Bockarie went, Monrovia we already  
8           had a base there."

9           What do you say to that concept of the RUF having a base in  
09:54:58 10          Monrovia?

11       A.     Well, when you - base, I would not - well, depending on how  
12           one looks at it. In October 1998, a guesthouse, communication  
13           area, office, guesthouse together was granted to the RUF with the  
14           acquiescence of my colleagues in order that we stay in

09:55:30 15          communication with them. Now, if someone interprets that as a  
16           base, I would be reluctant to use the word "base" because then  
17           again it begins to expand what kind of base? Military? Convert?  
18           Intelligence? No, no. I would call - I would not use the word  
19           "base", and I think he used that mischievously. I would say just  
09:55:52 20          plainly that the RUF was given a guesthouse and office and radio  
21           communication in line with the peace process, and I would be  
22           reluctant to use it, as he used it, as a base.

23       Q.     Very well. I just wanted you to have an opportunity to  
24           clarify that. But it continues.

09:56:11 25          "Q. Very well. But Sam Bockarie went from Monrovia to  
26           Burkina Faso on that trip. Is that right?

27       A.     Yes, he went. He met Mr Taylor. Before he went to  
28           Burkina he went along with Mr Taylor's protocol, Musa  
29           Cisse, who carried them there."

1 Now, you agree with that, don't you?

2 A. Oh, yes, I do.

3 Q. "All I'm trying to do is sort out the sequence, nothing  
4 else. So the sequence is he travels to Monrovia, meets  
09:56:39 5 with President Taylor, then leaves from Monrovia and goes  
6 to the capital of Burkina Faso. Is that the sequence?

7 A. Yes, that is the sequence.

8 Q. And he went to Burkina Faso in order to obtain arms, is  
9 that right?

09:56:54 10 A. When he left from Buedu he did not inform us that he  
11 was actually going to Burkina Faso to purchase arms. He  
12 was going to Monrovia as usual, where we had been getting  
13 materials. He was going to Monrovia as usual to meet  
14 Mr Sankoh. And once they were there, along with the team,  
09:57:16 15 they left from there to Burkina.

16 Q. The arms that were latterly used for the Freetown  
17 invasion came from Burkina Faso following that trip by  
18 Bockarie, didn't they?

19 A. Yes.

09:57:32 20 Q. Thank you. So we've established these two things - so  
21 the invasion of Freetown was a planned invasion by the RUF,  
22 is that right?

23 A. The attack on Freetown was planned. It was planned.

24 Q. It was a planned invasion by the RUF. Is that right?

09:57:52 25 A. Yes, the operation was planned by Sankoh."

26 Now, who planned the invasion, Mr Taylor; was it you or  
27 Mr Sankoh?

28 A. Well, I sure didn't plan it, and I don't know if Sankoh  
29 did. I didn't plan it. He's saying that it was planned by

1 Sankoh.

2 Q. Well, that's what the black and white of the transcript  
3 says.

4 A. Well, that's the problem with, you know, as you look at  
09:58:21 5 - as I recall, you know - first of all, in direct answer to your  
6 question, I did not. I did not plan any invasion of Freetown  
7 ever. But now, when you look at the context of some of these  
8 statements being made, now here is Foday Sankoh at this time who  
9 is incarcerated - and I only bring this up because of the  
09:58:52 10 inconsistencies and the lies that these boys tell. Foday Sankoh  
11 is in prison and I do not know how he could have planned it, but  
12 I cannot speak for him. Maybe there was a method they used to  
13 get to Sankoh, who was incarcerated, to plan this invasion.

14 But as I sat in this courtroom months ago and listened to  
09:59:14 15 various accounts of who invaded Freetown and the participation,  
16 this witness differs significantly with other witnesses that have  
17 dealt with this issue. So as far as my claiming the lies that he  
18 has concocted, we will have to look at the whole account given  
19 this Court of what SAJ Musa went through, the reason why they  
09:59:46 20 were going, the execution of these same 23 people that you are  
21 talking about who entered, how they entered. So there are  
22 varieties of accounts given by several witnesses here and it just  
23 shows that this lie is just concocted by him now.

24 So I did not order any invasion of Freetown and so - but I  
10:00:11 25 am just saying that it differs very, very much with many other  
26 top Prosecution witnesses as to their own account of what  
27 happened.

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want to move on and deal with about three  
29 other substantial topics before we conclude with this particular

1 individual. I am moving to page 2671 of the transcript of 30  
2 January 2008, line 5:

3 "Q. From what date do you say the RUF started to receive  
4 substantial support from Charles Taylor following that  
10:00:49 5 interregnum which began in or about November 1993?"

6 Now, can I pause to explain, the interregnum we are talking  
7 about here is that period when ULIMO cuts off the border between  
8 Sierra Leone. Do you follow? That's the context.

9 "A. Before the retreat from Freetown I forgot - before the  
10:01:15 10 retreat from Freetown, Ibrahim Bah was already in Freetown  
11 and there was this Magburaka shipment.

12 Q. When was that?

13 A. 1997, which was organised by Ibrahim Bah who was in  
14 Freetown representing Mr Taylor. That consignment came and  
10:01:37 15 that consignment was used I mean throughout when Freetown  
16 was invaded, but RUF as a movement by itself, that was the  
17 general operation of RUF and AFRC. But when you talk about  
18 the RUF as a movement, it began again 1998, from June 1998  
19 onwards when Sam Bockarie started taking trips on his own  
10:02:06 20 to Mr Taylor.

21 Q. So you would put support from the RUF per se as being  
22 in substantial amounts from would you say autumn 1998?

23 A. The major substantial amount came around November to  
24 December.

10:02:29 25 Q. 1998?

26 A. Yes."

27 Now, I want us to deal with one or two aspects of that,  
28 Mr Taylor. First of all this: Let me just remind you of what we  
29 just dealt with. Remember page 2643:



1 "Q. The arms that were latterly used for the Freetown  
2 invasion came from Burkina Faso following that trip by  
3 Bockarie, didn't they?

4 A. Yes."

10:03:11 5 When was it that Bockarie made that trip to Burkina Faso,  
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. Bockarie travelled to Burkina Faso late November 1998.

8 Q. And returned when?

9 A. Two weeks later. I would say about a little before the  
10:03:34 10 middle of December 1998.

11 Q. Now, let's go back to the passage we've just read, bearing  
12 that fact in mind. Page 2671 line 11:

13 "Ibrahim Bah was already in Freetown and there was this  
14 Magburaka shipment which - that consignment came 1997 and the  
10:04:02 15 consignment was used I mean throughout when Freetown was  
16 invaded."

17 Do you follow?

18 A. Yeah, but that's - you say follow. I mean what nonsense.

19 So the material that was supposed to come in 1997 --

10:04:26 20 Q. October.

21 A. October.

22 Q. Organised by Ibrahim Bah in Freetown?

23 A. By Ibrahim Bah lasted throughout 1997 and entire 1998.

24 This is what my understanding of that is. That from 1997 October  
10:04:44 25 that's a part of the weapons that were used to attack Freetown in  
26 January 1999. What nonsense. I mean, then if that is the case  
27 then what happened to all of the other material that they had to  
28 acquire for operation Fitti-Fatta and the attack on - what's it  
29 called, this place - Kono. So what are we talking about here?

1 Q. Well, that's why I am asking you, you see, Mr Taylor,  
2 because you're supposed to know because you're running the RUF.  
3 So was it the October 1997 Magburaka shipment which was used for  
4 the Freetown invasion or was it this additional quantity which  
10:05:27 5 you organised on this trip to Burkina Faso in December 1998?  
6 Which is right?

7 A. I wouldn't even know which because it's impossible. I have  
8 nothing to do with it, so I really don't know what this man is  
9 talking about, okay. But it doesn't just make sense when you  
10:05:44 10 listen in trying to put it together, you know, where some  
11 material from 1997, but mind you they are saying throughout 1998  
12 Sam Bockarie is coming to Liberia and getting arms and  
13 ammunition. And if my recollection is correct, last week we  
14 heard of these diamonds that are supposed to be taken from Johnny  
10:06:11 15 Paul Koroma where Sam Bockarie goes to Monrovia to see me and he  
16 doesn't, he leaves them, but he leaves with a supply of arms and  
17 ammunition. Oh my God, it's just one story after another story.  
18 One lie after another. It just doesn't make sense.

19 Look, I never gave Sam Bockarie any weapons. I never had  
10:06:31 20 any weapons to give to Sam Bockarie. The times that Sam Bockarie  
21 came to Liberia, it was strictly peace. I pushed this peace  
22 equally or more so than any other leader in West Africa and I  
23 challenge any one of them to say no. So all of these lies - Sam  
24 Bockarie went to Burkina Faso in late 1998 with the knowledge and  
10:06:57 25 acquiescence of the international community and I am not just  
26 talking about West Africa because it was a part of the  
27 Secretary-General's report of letting people go. Blaise Compaore  
28 was the chairman of the OAU. It was necessary for him to go.  
29 And Blaise did very, very well in helping.

1 If Sam Bockarie came with weapons back from Burkina Faso  
2 through Liberia, it would be a very tough take because, while it  
3 is possible, it never came to my attention. I was involved in  
4 the polio programme. But such an amount of ammunition coming  
10:07:34 5 through Liberia, unless senior government people were involved in  
6 this thing and getting paid off, it would have reached to me. I  
7 know nothing about these arms going to Burkina Faso. And I tell  
8 you, maybe at that time if anybody had tried to come with  
9 ammunition through Liberia that I knew, I would have taken it  
10:07:55 10 because I didn't have it for myself and I swear I would have used  
11 it. I didn't have ammunition. I didn't send any ammunition to  
12 Sam Bockarie. I did not get involved in Sierra Leone at a level  
13 of trying to inflame the situation, no.

14 Q. There is another level at which I want to deal with this  
10:08:19 15 particular passage, Mr Taylor, and it's this: Effectively we are  
16 being told there are three stages to this. There is a period up  
17 to November 1993 when you are providing assistance. We then have  
18 this interregnum period. Then in or about the autumn of 1998  
19 major substantial quantities of arms are being imported for the  
10:08:53 20 assistance of the RUF.

21 Now, note, autumn 1998. Now, Mr Taylor, is it a  
22 coincidence that you just happened to, on your own account, meet  
23 up with Sam Bockarie at or about that time? Do you follow?

24 A. Yes, I follow. It appears, based on what they are trying  
10:09:19 25 to say, that, oh, it's just something that happened at that  
26 particular time. But at this particular time in question, Sam  
27 Bockarie is more interested in getting in touch with us than we  
28 are interested in getting in touch with him.

29 Q. Now, moving on. Another important topic, page 2681,

1 testimony of 31 January 2008:

2 "Q. Now, upon becoming President of Liberia,  
3 President Taylor sent an envoy to the RUF, didn't he?

10:10:11

4 A. President Taylor sent a series of envoys to the RUF  
5 during 1997 to 1999.

6 Q. A series of them?

7 A. Yeah."

8 Pause. Did you send an envoy to the RUF as early as 1997,  
9 Mr Taylor?

10:10:27

10 A. Never, ever. Never.

11 Q. "Q. Who was the first envoy sent by President Taylor?

12 A. That I know of, the first person he sent that I know  
13 about was Ibrahim Bah, but he sent to Freetown to meet with  
14 Johnny Paul Koroma."

10:10:49

15 What about that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Nonsense. How would I send Ibrahim Bah that I don't know?  
17 But there is sufficient evidence - what was Ibrahim Bah doing  
18 with Foday Sankoh in 1996 in Freetown - I mean in Abidjan, excuse  
19 me. What was he doing there? What was he doing? In fact when

10:11:10

20 the junta came to power there is evidence before this Court that  
21 Bah showed up, so he had to be sent by me? And if I had all

22 these envoys that I was sending from 1997, then what was the  
23 purpose - then why some of these - if Bah is such an envoy, then  
24 why do they not send Bah in 1997 to me after I become President  
25 instead of that they send someone else that I refuse to see? So  
26 why didn't this special envoy Bah come with that delegation?

10:11:40

27 Then why do you want to write a letter to me in 1997 asking  
28 for arms and ammunition based on a speech that had been delivered  
29 at the General Assembly? So I've got this great envoy Bah, so

1 why not send Bah? The letter comes, there is no response. Then  
2 a delegation and on that delegation there is no Bah. Well then,  
3 if you know that there is this useful envoy - this lie cannot  
4 continue this way. There is this useful envoy that no one knows  
10:12:18 5 about. He does not show up in Sierra Leone before then. He  
6 doesn't show up in 1996 in Abidjan while Foday Sankoh is there.  
7 Remember he is not present when the letter is written by Sankoh  
8 to Mohamed Talibi. He is not present, is he? He is there. So  
9 all of a sudden he is this special envoy but he doesn't come on  
10:12:39 10 an important mission later in 1997, a mission that I refuse to  
11 receive them. It's a lie. Never sent Bah any place in 1997 or  
12 1998 or no other time. It is a lie.

13 Q. The transcript continues in this way, line 7, same page,  
14 2682:

10:12:59 15 "Q. I am asking about the first envoy you sent to meet  
16 with the RUF, who was that?

17 A. That's what I am telling you. When I came back to the  
18 RUF - when I came back from Abidjan" --

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

10:13:16 20 MS HOLLIS: Yes, I would ask that those last - that last  
21 phrase be redacted. I think we are getting into information that  
22 will identify this witness.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Which last phrase?

24 MS HOLLIS: Talking about coming back and from where and  
10:13:34 25 when. And again, these facts are not in isolation. We have a  
26 lot on the public record about this witness's knowledge.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say to that, Mr Griffiths?

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I can't really see how it could  
29 identify the witness, given that everybody knows there was peace

1 talks in Abidjan, and everybody knows there was an external  
2 delegation comprised of several members of the RUF in the  
3 Ivory Coast, and more than one witness has spoken about the  
4 existence of movement of that group. So I fail to see how that  
10:14:18 5 reference could identify the witness.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We don't think that that phrase  
7 that's being quoted tends to identify this particular witness.  
8 So we will overrule the objection, Ms Hollis. But, needless to  
9 say --

10:14:47 10 MR GRIFFITHS: I will proceed with care.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. "The first person that Mr Taylor sent to the RUF and AFRC  
14 from Monrovia in Freetown was Ibrahim Bah."

10:15:02 15 Now, reference was then made to a previous inconsistent  
16 statement which read where relevant - this is line 17 of the same  
17 page:

18 "... then Taylor sent his first envoy, this man Benjamin  
19 Yeaten.

10:15:25 20 Q. Now, was Benjamin Yeaten the first envoy that  
21 President Taylor sent?

22 A. Benjamin Yeaten, according to the information I had  
23 from Mosquito was, when we retreated '98, was the person  
24 that Sam Bockarie that came to see with Sam Bockarie. That  
10:15:46 25 is the period '98 I am talking about.

26 Q. That's why I asked you, after he became President, it's  
27 right, isn't it, the first envoy you sent was Benjamin  
28 Yeaten?

29 A. That's not the information here I am talking about. I

1 mean, when he became President, the context in which I was  
2 talking here and the context in which this question was  
3 asked was a particular time reference and that was '98."

4 So I am going to pause there, Mr Taylor, and ask you, which  
10:16:19 5 was it? Was it Benjamin Yeaten or was it Ibrahim Bah? Who was  
6 the first envoy?

7 A. None of them. None of them. None of them did I send any  
8 place. But we've heard somebody else that say he was first.

9 Q. Who is that?

10:16:38 10 A. Varmuyan Sherif said that I sent him first to go and meet  
11 with Bockarie then after my election. So we've got so many  
12 firsts. Then another witness just said I sent Jungle. So, I  
13 mean, they just come up with one thing after another. I did not  
14 send any envoy any place. Ibrahim Bah, my God, was not strange  
10:17:02 15 to the RUF. And when the AFRC took over, Ibrahim Bah - I am sure  
16 his connection had to be through Sankoh that he was with in 1996  
17 in Abidjan. No, I did not send any envoy to the RUF or AFRC for  
18 any reason. None. None.

19 Q. Very well, Mr Taylor. Let me ask a slightly different  
10:17:31 20 question on the same topic. When, in due course, you wanted to  
21 make contact with Sam Bockarie, who did you send?

22 A. I sent General Dopoe Menkarzon to the border in September  
23 1998 to receive Sam Bockarie and have him brought to me. General  
24 Dopoe Menkarzon.

10:17:56 25 Q. Prior to that, had you had any kind - had you sent any kind  
26 of envoy to either the AFRC, or the AFRC/RUF junta, or to the RUF  
27 prior to that date?

28 A. No, none whatsoever. No. You know, if we look at this -  
29 and to put the context for the Court - 1997, if we look at the

1 delegation that was sent to me in Monrovia that I refused to  
2 see - and I am not going to get into the individuals on that  
3 delegation because I will be going too far - but there was some  
4 very educated people on that delegation that if there was any  
10:18:50 5 desire on my part as President of Liberia that we could have  
6 contacted - that we could have contacted to say, well, look - I  
7 mean, I'm talking about important diplomats, educated - top  
8 educated people that we could have contacted. There was no  
9 desire on the part of my government to engage the RUF/AFRC at any  
10:19:14 10 level except that which that was agreed upon our colleagues in  
11 ECOWAS to get them back to the 1996 agreement that was assigned  
12 in la Cote d'Ivoire. No other reason.

13 If there was any sinister reason why I wanted to contact  
14 the RUF, we had all the links to those individuals because one of  
10:19:36 15 the individuals on that delegation was very close to a minister  
16 in my government. Very close. And if you refer to the  
17 testimony, it goes on who took care of them after I refused to  
18 see the delegation and how they got back. It was simple. There  
19 was a senior member of my government that knew a member of that  
10:19:54 20 delegation very well. So why would I be sending a Bah or this  
21 and that? It is a blatant lie. There was no - none whatsoever.  
22 No attempt to contact anyone in that place. I hope we had an  
23 opportunity, because I was privy to doing that, okay? But we did  
24 not have that opportunity because there were no links. And after  
10:20:24 25 February 1998 - I want to really make this clear. After the  
26 junta left power, there - the decision that was taken at our  
27 level was that we had to go back to the 1996 agreement, and the  
28 only way we could get the agreement going was to make sure we  
29 dealt with the RUF. Because by bringing the junta - as far as we



1 were concerned, the junta had been removed. The only entity that  
2 we should discuss with was the RUF, and that discussion - and  
3 that decision continued into 1999 when the Lome agreement was  
4 signed. That's why the so-called junta SLA was not a part in  
10:21:07 5 Lome. That decision comes from way back after the February -  
6 some would 2nd, we take the 14th to be the final day of the  
7 intervention. So there was no - no - no anxiety on my part to  
8 make any contact with anyone over there except the individual  
9 that finally, once he made an attempt to contact us, we - and I  
10:21:33 10 am saying we - jumped for that particular privilege of having him  
11 come to talk to us.

12 Q. Who was the government minister who had those contacts?

13 A. At that particular time it was John T Richardson who knew a  
14 member of the delegation very well and he took care of - after I  
10:21:51 15 refused to see them, he made sure that they got a safe passage  
16 back to Sierra Leone.

17 Q. And that was during the period of the junta, was it?

18 A. That is correct. And at that particular time - and that  
19 name has come up here before. At that particular time he was not  
10:22:10 20 the national security adviser. He was Minister of Public Works  
21 at the time and not - he subsequently years after that became  
22 national security adviser, but he was Public Works Minister in  
23 1997 when that delegation came to me in Monrovia that I refused  
24 to see.

10:22:27 25 Q. And Mr Taylor, I am going to ask you to assist us a little  
26 further.

27 Could the witness be provided with a piece of paper,  
28 please?

29 And I invite you to write down the name of the member of

1 the delegation who was known to the Minister of Public Works,  
2 okay?

3 A. I don't know how to spell it.

10:23:29

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Could it be shown to counsel opposite and to  
5 the judges, please.

6 THE WITNESS: I put "SP" under there for spelling, because  
7 I may be wrong with the spelling.

10:24:03

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, from my part, Mr President, given that  
9 we are not dealing with a protected witness, I see no reason why  
10 that name cannot be put on the record unless there is an  
11 objection.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, is there any reason that name  
13 can't go on the record?

10:24:19

14 MS HOLLIS: We are not aware of any reason it could not go  
15 on the record.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Just so that we are clear now, Mr Taylor - and we have  
18 adopted that procedure through an abundance of caution. Firstly,  
19 which delegation are we talking about?

10:24:38

20 A. We are talking about a delegation in late 1997 that was  
21 sent by the junta to meet with me in Monrovia.

22 Q. With a view to what?

10:24:58

23 A. Well, they said they had - they wanted to talk to me. I  
24 figure it was in furtherance of the letter that they had sent to  
25 me regarding supply of arms, and I just didn't meet with them.

26 Q. And you say a member of that delegation was known to the  
27 Minister of Works?

28 A. Public works, yes.

29 Q. And who was the member of the delegation who was known?

1 A. Karefa-Smart.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, is there any need now, does  
3 anyone feel, to mark that?

10:25:27

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't see any purpose. It's on the  
5 record already.

6 JUSTICE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, just to be certain, this  
7 is the Minister of Works in the Liberian government?

8 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:25:48

10 Q. Who later became minister of that?

11 A. In later years he became national security adviser.

12 Q. Now, moving on from envoys to another topic: Varmuyan  
13 Sheriff. There had been a previous statement to this effect,  
14 which one finds on page 2685, line 29:

10:26:23

15 "The witness knew Varmuyan Sheriff as a ULIMO strongman in  
16 the Lofa area. He assisted the RUF in getting ULIMO weapons  
17 after their disarmament. He made an enemy of Sam Bockarie. The  
18 witness did see Varmuyan Sheriff with Sam Bockarie on one  
19 occasion. The witness stated that many of the ULIMO fighters  
20 defected to the NPFL."

10:26:51

21 Then, having quoted that passage to him:

22 "Q. When did you see Mr Sheriff in company with Sam  
23 Bockarie? Which year?

24 A. Sometime in 1998.

10:27:12

25 Q. Sometime in 1998?

26 A. Yes, I saw him. On one occasion I met him in company  
27 with other ULIMO fighters that he was with with Sam  
28 Bockarie.

29 Q. So just to put matters together, on your account the

1 first envoy was Ibrahim Bah, then in October 1997 came  
2 Benjamin Yeaten, but Mr Sherif did not come to see Sam  
3 Bockarie until 1998. That's your account, isn't it?

4 A. Yes, I saw him in 1998.

10:27:53 5 Q. Sometime in 1998?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So help us. When you say he was a ULIMO strongman,  
8 what do you mean?

9 A. I got to know most of them - I got to know most of them  
10:28:10 10 when I went - the RUF were chased out of Zogoda and when  
11 they crossed to Liberia, there was a time when we went to  
12 their territory where RUF were disarmed and I spent a  
13 considerable time with them. I met with a lot of them. I  
14 mean, that way I got to know people like Abu Keita. I got  
10:28:33 15 to know even their commander and this man you are talking  
16 about, Sherif?

17 A. So you first met Mr Sherif then when you had cause" --  
18 No, let's pause there and jump to page 2869:

19 "A. Sometime in 1998 when we went, when we retreated, Sam  
10:29:14 20 Bockarie gave me the instruction to meet one of the ULIMO  
21 commanders, one of them that was in fact involved in  
22 selling some of their arms and ammunition to them at Lofa  
23 area. There were the water pump machine for them to give  
24 in exchange of those ammunition. In fact that was three  
10:29:35 25 boxes I can remember of AK-47 ammunition that they had on  
26 them, that they had a dug hole and they kept it in it,  
27 yeah."

28 Now, pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, firstly, "Varmuyan  
29 Sherif was an ULIMO strong man, he assisted the RUF in getting

1 ULIMO weapons after their disarmament." What do you understand  
2 by that?

3 A. Well, I see a link between what they have been doing. Now,  
4 he is showing, he says somewhere in 1998, but he also says that  
10:30:26 5 somewhere in 1998 he meets Varmuyan Sheriff with Sam Bockarie in  
6 Sierra Leone. Then again sometimes in 1998 we seem arms moving.  
7 That would not be surprising to me, that - because Varmuyan is a  
8 senior member of ULIMO, so it's not surprising because remember  
9 there is testimony here that at the time of this closure there is  
10:30:53 10 brisk business between ULIMO and the RUF throughout the period  
11 from 1992 coming on, so that would not be strange to me that  
12 there would be this particular dealing.

13 Q. Well, help us with this then, Mr Taylor, because he goes on  
14 to say, "He" - that being Varmuyan Sheriff - "made an enemy of Sam  
10:31:15 15 Bockarie." So help us, why did you send this man to go and fetch  
16 Sam Bockarie?

17 A. Yeah, but that's the whole point about these boys. They  
18 mix up their lies so much. But if he is an enemy of Sam  
19 Bockarie, then why would I be sending him there? Then I am  
10:31:32 20 sending him to his death. It simply means that somewhere in this  
21 fiction that he is has created that he has got mixed up with it,  
22 that there is no such thing because I never sent Varmuyan Sheriff  
23 to Sam Bockarie at any time. But there is evidence here that  
24 apparently they have known each other for an extended period of  
10:31:58 25 time.

26 Q. What about this part, "Many of the ULIMO fighters defected  
27 to the NPFL"?

28 A. No. I do not know what period. Now, by defection, there  
29 was no such thing as a defection to the NPFL. The only thing I

1 can help the Court with regarding ULIMO individuals, following  
2 the elections in 1997 there were some of the ULIMO fighters that  
3 returned to Sierra Leone for fear that they would be harmed and  
4 we tried to keep a lot of them by reassuring them that nothing  
10:32:41 5 would happen, so some of them stayed. But we are talking about  
6 now beginning in 1997, okay. But as he touches before 1997, that  
7 is when he talked about his contact with this Abu Keita, there is  
8 no such thing as an ULIMO defection because ULIMO ceases to exist  
9 as of January 1997. So those individuals that stay are not  
10:33:13 10 defecting from ULIMO. These are just individuals that really  
11 want to give peace a chance. That's all.

12 Q. Now, what about this aspect: Were you aware of an occasion  
13 when the RUF stronghold in Zogoda fell and members of the RUF  
14 crossed over into Liberia? Are you aware of that?

10:33:38 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. When did that take place?

17 A. This occurred in 1996 at the Zogoda attack. That's when.

18 Q. When in 1996?

19 A. This has to be late. I would put it to around October or  
10:33:53 20 thereabout in 1996.

21 Q. Now, we see this:

22 "There was a time when we went to their territory where RUF  
23 were disarmed and I spent considerable time with them. I met  
24 with a lot of them. I mean, that way I got to know people like  
10:34:12 25 Abu Keita."

26 What do you make of that, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Well, it again shows here that the link between the RUF and  
28 the ULIMO forces in fact, factually, is longer than the link with  
29 the RUF and the NPFL. So it would not be out of the ordinary for

1 him to have met an Abu Keita at that particular time because the  
2 area that the RUF crossed into in Liberia, after the Zogoda  
3 attack, was an area that still inhabited the fighters of ULIMO,  
4 ULIMO-K. Because as I remember very clearly, that group came  
10:35:09 5 across the border in through Mano and they ended up into an area  
6 called Lofa Bridge. And so Abu Keita and these guys were top  
7 ULIMO commanders and at this time in 1996, even though we are  
8 engaging in the process of disarmament, but the fighters are  
9 still located in these special locales, okay. So they simply, I  
10:35:39 10 would almost say, cross into friendly territory.

11 And, by the way, when they crossed it was reported to the  
12 Council of State that these people had crossed. ECOMOG was  
13 involved in the disarmament of this unit and the International  
14 Committee of the Red Cross participated and granted cards to each  
10:36:02 15 of them. So I am aware of the movement, but I was not - remember  
16 I am not President at this time. The head of the council is Ruth  
17 Sando Perry, we have mentioned that in this Court, and the  
18 decision is taken for them to be disarmed and they were put into  
19 camps. A lot of them did not stay because they received refugee  
10:36:27 20 status and we could not restrict their movement to wherever they  
21 wanted to go.

22 Q. So what do you say to the suggestion, Mr Taylor, that later  
23 when you became President, knowing of this prior link between  
24 ULIMO and the RUF, you identified individuals like Abu Keita,  
10:36:46 25 because of that prior link, in order to progress the supply of  
26 ammunition to the RUF? Do you follow?

27 A. Yes, I follow. That would be total nonsense because I  
28 didn't even know the extent - I didn't know an Abu Keita, I did  
29 not even know that Varmuyan Sherif had this strong link with

1 them. So that would be incorrect that I could have conceived  
2 such an idea to use them. No, that would not be the case because  
3 even by this time we are still observing them because we know  
4 that a lot of the people have left the country. We know the  
10:37:31 5 contacts. So they are with us, but they are not fully in our  
6 fold that even if one were to assume for a minute that you want  
7 to do that, of course you want to do that with people that you  
8 know and trust, not with people that just tried to kill you and  
9 you are going to be entrusting them with such top operation. No,  
10:37:52 10 that would not be a very good suggestion.

11 Q. Let's move on to what I think is the final topic I want to  
12 deal with in relation to this individual. Page 2689 line 12:

13 "Q. Would you agree that there were three phases to the  
14 supply of arms and ammunition to the RUF?

10:38:20 15 A. From the period - I mean the time frame you are talking  
16 about?

17 Q. From 1991.

18 A. Yeah, I am coming. I am talking about 1991. There  
19 were three shipments I can recall, 1997 to 1999, of arms  
10:38:41 20 and ammunition to the RUF and the AFRC from Mr Taylor.

21 Three large shipments, I mean major shipments. Of course  
22 there are other minor trips of arms, but those were the  
23 major."

24 And he goes on dealing with the shipments, page 2701:

10:39:17 25 "Q. So we have the Magburaka shipment?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. And that came from Liberia from Charles Taylor?

28 A. That shipment was organised by Ibrahim Bah who was sent  
29 to Freetown to talk with the junta, and Ibrahim Bah was



1           there representing Mr Taylor, and he organised that  
2           shipment upon the relationship that he established with  
3           Mr Johnny Paul Koroma.

10:39:53

4           Q. That large shipment came from Liberia sent by  
5           Charles Taylor?

6           A. What I am saying is that that large shipment came by  
7           the transaction between Mr Taylor, Mr Taylor of Liberia,  
8           and Johnny Paul Koroma with this fellow Ibrahim Bah.

10:40:16

9           Q. That shipment came from Liberia sent by Charles Taylor,  
10          did it?

11          A. That flight that came to Magburaka, whether it actually  
12          took off from Liberia, I can't tell whether it took off  
13          from Liberia.

14          Q. I don't know if the flight took off from Liberia?

10:40:38

15          A. Yes."

16          Then he goes on, page 2702. So that's the first shipment,  
17          Mr Taylor, yes.

18          "A. The second shipment, the major shipment, that was  
19          November and really December period.

10:40:52

20          Q. Of which year?

21          A. That's 1998.

22          Q. Sorry, my fault. I forgot to ask you for a date for  
23          the Magburaka shipment.

24          A. Magburaka shipment October 1997."

10:41:08

25          So let's just pause and get the sequence correct,  
26          Mr Taylor. Three major shipments. The first into Magburaka in  
27          October 1997. Unaware where the flight took off from but it  
28          landed at Magburaka. Second, November/December 1998. Goes on,  
29          line 13, page 2702:

1 "There was this second large shipment that actually also  
2 came from - that one came from Ouagadougou to Monrovia and it was  
3 deposited in Monrovia at White Flower before - after Mr Taylor  
4 ordered his bodyguard, Benjamin Yeaten, took their supplies  
10:41:59 5 before they could give the RUF their own supply which was  
6 escorted from White Flower to Buedu."

7 And he goes on to say:

8 "... it was transported in long, long eight-tyred trucks."

9 "Q. Do you know how it got into Monrovia? Was it by  
10:42:25 10 plane?"

11 This is the second shipment, do you follow, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. "A. Yes. I got to know from those that travelled, they  
14 travelled with Mr Cisse, the protocol of Mr Taylor who  
10:42:41 15 organised that flight.

16 Q. So it flew into Roberts International Airport, taken to  
17 White Flower and then driven by truck to where in Sierra  
18 Leone?

19 A. To Buedu.

10:42:57 20 Q. To Buedu. Right, so that's number two. What about  
21 number three, when was that?

22 A. Number three, just before we left for Lome in 1999,  
23 when the fighting intensified.

24 Q. Can you give us some months?

10:43:18 25 A. Well, that's the early part of 1999, maybe after. It  
26 would have been between February and March 1999. Actually,  
27 between February and March 1999 when we were preparing to  
28 go for Lome and this attack on Taylor intensified at the  
29 border, these LURD rebels. And RUF was already there,

1 actually. They were helping them out with the fighting.  
2 An instruction came from him through Benjamin Yeaten to get  
3 RUF men permanently stationed in Foya, and Sam Bockarie  
4 left sometime just after the invasion in January from  
10:44:04 5 Monrovia and he came back a week or so later. He came with  
6 this consignment to Buedu. All those materials were  
7 physically transported to Buedu by transport, by pick-ups  
8 and trucks - pick-ups and trucks."

9 Pause there. Do you get picture, Mr Taylor? Three large  
10:44:29 10 shipments. The first in October 1997 comes into Magburaka, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You organised that through Ibrahim Bah, your agent, along  
13 with Johnny Paul Koroma. What do you say about that?

14 A. You know, really, that's not true. That is so far from the  
10:44:54 15 truth, and the witness knows that it's not true. Because if we  
16 stop and we read very carefully the account and the two specific  
17 questions - I don't know whether it's the Prosecution or the  
18 defence asking this man the question. Did these shipments come  
19 from Monrovia? Well, you know, the flight that came into - look,  
10:45:20 20 man, this is my life. This man either - is he - what is he  
21 saying? If he's sure - look, if you go back through that, you  
22 see - anybody looking through it, you are sure of what you are  
23 telling the Court about somebody's life and you are there playing  
24 around and saying, well, the flight came in. Did it come from  
10:45:38 25 Liberia? Well, the flight came - yes or no; did it come from  
26 Liberia? So I mean, I don't know what these people are joking  
27 with here. There is no flight in October 1997 that comes out of  
28 Monrovia. I am not aware of anything going on.

29 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, can I interrupt you, and just let's deal

1 with each of these instances in turn. You're inaugurated as  
2 President in August 1997?

3 A. That is correct.

10:46:19

4 Q. Now, what is being alleged is that within two months, you  
5 organised, through Ibrahim Bah, in conjunction with Johnny Paul  
6 Koroma, a major shipment of arms into Magburaka. Did you do  
7 that?

8 A. No, never did. Never did. Never, ever did. No.

10:46:46

9 Q. Now, the second allegation is this, Mr Taylor: That you  
10 thereafter through your protocol, Musa Cisse, organised a second  
11 shipment which is flown into Roberts International Airfield after  
12 Sam Bockarie makes a trip to Ouagadougou in late  
13 November-December 1998. Do you follow?

14 A. Yes, I do.

10:47:08

15 Q. Did you organise that?

16 A. I did not organise that. And it is not just no, I didn't;  
17 but even if you look at the accounts of this particular incident,  
18 one incident that Sam Bockarie should have travelled, which he  
19 did to Burkina Faso, it is alleged that arms came. But let's  
20 look at if this witness is telling the truth that I organised

10:47:33

21 arms that came through Burkina Faso to White Flower and trucked  
22 away, then there are at least two other witnesses here that are  
23 lying. Because the records here show that arms were supposed to  
24 come into Roberts International Airport, but it was packed in a

10:47:55

25 truck and parked on a highway between Kakata and Gbarnga and  
26 people came to Monrovia and continued. So if the account is it  
27 came to Monrovia in White Flower, then those other witnesses  
28 talking about this particular shipment, so somebody got to be  
29 lying here, and they know that there was no arms that I am aware

1 of that came - I do not think Blaise Compaore, as chairman of the  
2 OAU would have given Sam Bockarie any arms. I don't really  
3 believe it. If arms entered Liberia at that particular time, so  
4 help me God, I was not aware. It was never brought to me. But  
10:48:35 5 then when you look at the accounts, there's got to be questions  
6 about this one shipment being described in so many ways. It's  
7 got to be consistent. Although people make mistakes when it  
8 comes to dates and times, but you can't have a shipment that is  
9 coming to Monrovia going to White Flower offloading and packing  
10:48:53 10 and then another witness say it came to Roberts International  
11 Airport packed on trucks and was parked on the highway.

12 So it's just not true. That is not true.

13 Q. What about the third shipment then, Mr Taylor, which is  
14 organised after the Freetown invasion and we are told it's early  
10:49:16 15 1999, Bockarie left sometime just after that invasion in January  
16 from Monrovia and he came back a week later or so. He came with  
17 this consignment to Buedu. Yes? Let's just get the sequence  
18 right based on this testimony. Freetown invasion is when,  
19 Mr Taylor?

10:49:41 20 A. 6 January 1999.

21 Q. Shortly after that invasion, did Sam Bockarie come to  
22 Monrovia?

23 A. No.

24 Q. In or about the end of January 1999, Mr Taylor, had LURD  
10:50:07 25 invaded Liberia?

26 A. No. No. At that particular period, no.

27 Q. To the best of your recollection, was there a LURD invasion  
28 of Liberia in the first half of 1999?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. When?

2 A. That would be around April, when the movement is about to  
3 start to Lome.

4 Q. Which movement?

10:50:40 5 A. The movement to Lome. There is a brief disruption in Lofa.  
6 But I would have to be God, okay - which I am not, God forbid -  
7 to be giving Sam Bockarie weapons to help to start off LURD.  
8 When I do not know that LURD is going to be attacking April, I am  
9 going to be giving them weapons in January, February? Am I God  
10:51:03 10 to know that they are coming? So it's a blatant lie. I never  
11 gave them any weapons to do anything.

12 Q. Let's just remind ourselves what is being said:

13 "Between February and March 1999, when we were preparing to  
14 go for Lome and this attack on Taylor intensified at the border,  
10:51:21 15 these LURD rebels and RUF were already there, actually. They  
16 were helping them out with the fighting, and instruction came  
17 from him through Benjamin Yeaten to get men permanently stationed  
18 in Foya, and Sam Bockarie left sometime just after that invasion  
19 in January for Monrovia and he came back a week or so later. He  
10:51:48 20 came with this consignment to Buedu."

21 So he comes with a consignment to Buedu a week after the  
22 Freetown invasion, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Total nonsense. That's a lie. Total lie.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

10:52:03 25 MS HOLLIS: That is a mischaracterisation of this evidence.  
26 I do want to put on the record that our opinion is that this  
27 evidence has been mischaracterised in several aspects. We will  
28 deal with it in cross-examination, but I did want to put that on  
29 the record.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's recorded, Ms Hollis.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Mr Taylor, did you anticipate in January 1999 that LURD  
4 would be attacking in April?

10:52:29 5 A. No, no. How could I have anticipated that? No.

6 Q. Well, help us. What were you giving arms to Sam Bockarie  
7 for in late January 1999?

8 A. Never gave him any ammunition. That's a lie. I never did.  
9 Never did.

10:52:48 10 Q. Transported in trucks to Buedu, trucks and pick-ups.

11 A. Never. Never.

12 Q. So those three shipments that are spoken of, Mr Taylor,  
13 what do you say about them?

14 A. Those are three lies. That's all they are. The Zogoda  
10:53:09 15 situation is a lie, and I am sure that other witnesses will  
16 testify to that effect. It's a lie. The so-called  
17 October-November 1998 shipment had nothing - and did not even  
18 know that a shipment came. I had nothing to do with it. This  
19 extraterrestrial [sic] sense that I am supposed to have in  
10:53:40 20 January or February, and in fact there is no fight of no LURD in  
21 Liberia in this period. There is no fighting. In April when the  
22 movement begins, there is some disruption. There is no fighting  
23 before that particular time. So these are three lies. And these  
24 lies are based on the assumption that Taylor has weapons hidden  
10:54:03 25 someplace that he is supposed to be pulling out. These are three  
26 lies.

27 Q. Well, that's not quite correct, Mr Taylor. Because what is  
28 being suggested is that the weapons were coming from Burkina Faso  
29 organised by your agent, Mr Bah, and on two of the three

1 occasions, the weapons came from Ouagadougou via Monrovia.

2 That's the allegation. What do you say about that?

3 A. That is totally, totally, untrue. It's a lie. Two lies.

4 Bah was never my agent, never. And you know, I am sure the

10:54:41 5 Prosecution really believed that Bah is an agent of mine. They

6 have the ability to bring Bah here. You understand me? Never -

7 Ibrahim Bah never worked for me. Never, ever worked for me, and

8 they know that. They know he never, ever worked to have been an

9 agent or nothing. No such thing happened. If Bah arranged

10:55:02 10 weapons into Zogoda or weapons through Liberia, I cannot say to

11 this Court with any truthfulness from my heart that it's not

12 possible to bring weapons through Liberia. It's possible. It

13 was not brought to my attention, but I doubt it. I am talking

14 about the possibility. I doubt it because if it had come, at

10:55:23 15 least I would have known about it. And I didn't know, so I have

16 to assume that it didn't come.

17 Q. Now, terms of payment for those shipments, Mr Taylor, we

18 are told this at page 2704:

19 "A. The first shipment was paid for by a 90-carat diamond.

10:55:55 20 Q. Who provided it?

21 A. The junta, Johnny Paul Koroma.

22 Q. Who was that given to?

23 A. Those were given to Ibrahim Bah through Sam Bockarie.

24 Q. So just so that we can get the sequence clear, payment

10:56:12 25 for the shipment is made by diamonds and it's arranged by

26 Ibrahim Bah. Is that right?

27 A. Yes, who was in Freetown upon the instruction of

28 Mr Taylor."

29 Then later at page 2979 on that question of the 90-carat



1 di amond:

2 "Q. This 90 carats of di amond and \$90,000 US for these  
3 arms and ammuni tion, who indicated that 90 carats of  
4 diamonds and \$90,000 US would be required to get these arms  
10:56:51 5 and ammuni tion?

6 A. It was Ibrahim Bah who came out with all those figures  
7 he mentioned. He did mention it to Sam Bockarie first in  
8 our meeting with him, and Sam Bockarie told him that that  
9 was no problem. In fact, that carats of diamonds we are  
10:57:09 10 talking about for the AFRC is a very small amount. They  
11 would get that, and he met with Johnny Paul Koroma later,  
12 he, Bah, and mentioned that, and Johnny Paul Koroma made  
13 reference to it in the counsel meeting. So it was actually  
14 Ibrahim Bah who talk about the \$90,000 for the flight and  
10:57:29 15 the 90 carat diamonds that he would need for the payment."

16 So that's payment for the Magburaka shipment, do you  
17 follow, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. We go back to page 2704:

10:57:43 20 "Q. How was the second shipment paid for?

21 A. Well, prior to the second shipment arriving, Sam  
22 Bockarie took those diamonds, which were later given to  
23 Mr Taylor, the nine plastics from Johnny Paul Koroma, and  
24 it was our express understanding that those diamonds were  
10:58:07 25 in exchange for all other shipment. Every other ammuni tion  
26 that came, those diamonds that went to Monrovia were used  
27 to pay for those shipments - subsequent shipments.

28 Q. So would this be a fair summary, that the second and  
29 third large shipments were paid for by a consignment of

1 diamonds taken by Sam Bockarie to Charles Taylor?

2 A. Yes, yes?

3 Q. And Mr Bockarie took those directly to Mr Taylor.

4 There wasn't a middleman like an Ibrahim Bah or anybody

10:58:47 5 like that. He dealt directly with the main man?

6 A. There was a middleman at that point in time, but most

7 of the time - I mean it was two way of doing it. I mean

8 Sam Bockarie entrusted Charles Taylor middleman Ibrahim Bah

9 who sometimes took it to him directly and sometimes Sam

10:59:06 10 Bockarie himself went and met with Mr Taylor directly."

11 Now, let's pause and examine that. Now, you understand

12 what's being said here, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 Q. The first Magburaka shipment is paid for by 90 carats of

10:59:25 15 diamonds provided by the AFRC to Ibrahim Bah. What do you know

16 about that?

17 A. Nothing whatsoever. Nothing.

18 Q. It is then suggested, and we've touched on this before,

19 that diamonds removed from the person of Johnny Paul Koroma

10:59:51 20 following the ECOMOG intervention, yes, nine plastics of diamonds

21 were deposited with you and those nine plastics paid for the

22 December 1998 shipment and for the late January 1999 shipment.

23 What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

24 A. It is total nonsense. Nothing whatsoever. But remember

11:00:19 25 now, if you look at the sequence of how this lie builds up,

26 remember these nine plastics of diamonds, I was supposed to keep

27 them for Sankoh until Sankoh was released. I was supposed to

28 keep them. And Sam Bockarie now is supposed to be waiting for me

29 to keep these, so what am I supposed to be paying for these arms

1 with, if I am keeping these diamonds for Foday Sankoh? What am I  
2 going to use to pay for these diamonds? That's on the one hand.

3 But to see the further complication of this lie, we have a  
4 situation here now where these diamonds now are supposed to be  
11:01:01 5 sold by me, okay, to pay for arms and ammunition, okay, and  
6 Ibrahim Bah, who - so what part is he going to be playing now  
7 with this if I have the diamonds to go and pay for weapons and by  
8 the same time I am supposed to be keeping them for Sankoh?

9 Look, something has to - you know, this is - you know, with  
11:01:33 10 this number of complicated lies that have developed in this case,  
11 it is so terrible - it is so terrible that the key players in  
12 this thing, I am sure some of them will come, but this - in the  
13 interest of justice, this Bah, this Bah, I don't know how we can  
14 get this Bah, but I am sure maybe through the grace of God he  
11:02:04 15 will finally decide to come. But we've got statements from Bah.  
16 We've got statements from Bah to intelligence agencies, maybe  
17 that will help this Court. They have been provided some of them  
18 by the Prosecution, some we have found.

19 There is no dealing, no dealing, I have with Ibrahim Bah  
11:02:26 20 whatsoever. Nobody gives me any diamonds. I do not pay for any  
21 arms and ammunition and this is the fact. This is the truth.  
22 And by God's grace it will all come out here. I have nothing to  
23 do with Ibrahim Bah and diamonds if he is dealing with the RUF,  
24 no.

11:02:46 25 Q. Now, on that same note, Mr Taylor, you mentioned that you  
26 were supposed to be the safekeeper of the diamonds until Sankoh  
27 returns. I move to page 2772, line 28:

28 "When I met with Mr Sankoh 1999, Mr Sankoh travelled to  
29 Monrovia and met with Mr Taylor and Mr Taylor did show him some

1 of the parcels. Mr Taylor did show Sankoh a few parcels which  
2 made Sankoh really embittered because the information Sankoh had  
3 received and we had filtered was not what Mr Taylor showed to  
4 him. And when Sankoh came to Freetown, Sankoh expressed that to  
11:03:45 5 me, SYB Rogers and other members. In fact, he did not even - I  
6 mean he did not ask Mr Taylor for those parcels. He said it was  
7 shameful for him to ask him to give him the parcel, but Sam  
8 Bockarie had been giving him for safekeeping. So information I  
9 mean were not hidden."

11:04:07 10 And it goes on, page 2938:

11 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie brief Foday Sankoh about the  
12 interactions he had with Charles Taylor?

13 A. Yes. When we went to Buedu for the first time, that  
14 was the first time he actually met Sam Bockarie when he  
11:04:43 15 went to Buedu after Lome, he spent the night there and he  
16 had a lengthy discussion with Sam Bockarie and I was there.  
17 I went there. In fact, I spent a couple of minutes with  
18 them and I left and later I was with him and he was - he  
19 was grumbling about especially his concern about most of  
11:05:02 20 the diamond mining that took place during his absence and  
21 he, Bockarie, entrusted most of those diamonds to  
22 Mr Taylor.

23 Q. Who was grumbling about that?

24 A. Sankoh. Grumbled about that, you know."

11:05:18 25 Get the picture, Mr Taylor?

26 A. So what did I pay for the arms with?

27 Q. Well, let's take it in stages. Firstly, Sankoh did come to  
28 Monrovia after Lome, didn't he?

29 A. Yes, he came to Monrovia.

1 Q. And when he came to Monrovia, did you show him some parcels  
2 of diamonds that you had been safekeeping for him?

3 A. Never. I didn't have any diamonds with Sankoh or anybody.  
4 I didn't show him any diamonds, no.

11:05:47 5 Q. And you see in the same vein you note it is being said  
6 Sankoh is seriously upset because he has been led to believe that  
7 you, his comrade in arms in Libya, has been looking after the  
8 assets of the RUF in his absence and, lo and behold, when he  
9 comes back the cupboard is bare. When he goes to Buedu and asks  
11:06:13 10 Bockarie about it, he doesn't get a satisfactory answer and he is  
11 grumbling. What do you say about all of this, Mr Taylor?

12 A. All I can say is that whoever came after me really put it  
13 together, yes. Here is Sam Bockarie. Assuming that Sam Bockarie  
14 gave me diamonds and these diamonds were used to buy arms, on the  
11:06:38 15 one hand, and on the other hand they were supposed to be kept,  
16 Foday Sankoh comes - Sam Bockarie comes to Monrovia. Foday  
17 Sankoh comes to Monrovia in September. Sam Bockarie is present  
18 in Monrovia when Foday Sankoh comes in September 1999. He files  
19 a report to Sankoh. Now in that report there has got to be one  
11:07:05 20 or two - one of the two accounts. That salute report from Sam  
21 Bockarie must be able to say that, "Based on our operation here  
22 with President Taylor we were able to get the arms that we  
23 needed." That could be one report. Or, "Based on our diamond  
24 mining operation, the diamonds that you left, they are with  
11:07:30 25 President Taylor." So one of these two accounts would have to be  
26 in Sam Bockarie's report. Why is it Sam Bockarie does not state  
27 that he gave me diamonds?

28 So the only person that knows that Sam Bockarie brought  
29 these diamonds and had to just be present there, he was present,

1 a little fly on the wall, he is present in Monrovia when - is he  
2 there when I'm meeting Sankoh but Sankoh has to go all the way in  
3 the interior before finally things are loosened up to him. It's  
4 a lie. Blatant, blatant lie and I am sure there are others -  
11:08:09 5 some of the names mentioned here if God is helpful will appear in  
6 this Court and will be able to tell the lie that this witness is  
7 talking about. It's a lie.

8 No diamonds were given to me. I didn't show Sam Bockarie  
9 any - excuse me, I didn't show Foday Sankoh any part of - when  
11:08:26 10 Foday Sankoh came to Monrovia, in fact I gave Foday Sankoh some  
11 money. Obasanjo sent me also \$25,000. Olusegun Obasanjo of  
12 Nigeria, President of Nigeria, sent me \$25,000 in addition to  
13 give to Sam Bockarie - excuse me, to Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul  
14 Koroma because from our understanding they were broke. Obasanjo  
11:08:52 15 sent me his plane to take them and \$25,000. There was nothing  
16 else dealing with Sankoh except that money from Obasanjo and what  
17 I contributed to him myself. That's it.

18 Q. Now, two other matters that I want to deal with in relation  
19 to this particular individual before we move to another witness,  
11:09:15 20 Mr Taylor. Firstly this: You do know who we are talking about,  
21 don't you?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Have you ever met that individual?

24 A. Yes. I have met the individual. I am not sure when, but  
11:09:32 25 on one of the delegations I met him.

26 Q. On how many occasions do you recall having met this  
27 individual?

28 A. I would say maybe at least - it could be twice. Not more.  
29 Not more. Based on my recollection.

1 Q. Where?

2 A. In Monrovia.

3 Q. When?

4 A. This could be I would say in 1999 after the Lome - I can't

11:10:16 5 recall, because there was no delegation that this individual

6 headed, but I am sure as a member in one of the meetings with

7 Sankoh I think he was in that meeting, just brief, you know,

8 introduction and he left. And I really can't recall the other

9 time, but I think it was at least twice.

11:10:44 10 Q. Where?

11 A. In Monrovia.

12 Q. In Monrovia?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, what about 1990 at the Executive Mansion in Gbarnga?

11:10:58 15 A. 1990?

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. No, no.

18 Q. When that person went with Sankoh to collect some arms and

19 ammunition?

11:11:08 20 A. No, no, never met nobody at that particular time. That's a

21 blatant, blatant lie. Just as the other things that we can't

22 mention here of the lies that he told and I could get into a

23 whole score of them. That is totally, totally a lie, no. In

24 fact other witnesses have testified here that when Sankoh came to

11:11:33 25 see me, he came and saw me alone. Nothing, no.

26 Q. Mr Taylor, did the NPFL celebrate its first anniversary?

27 A. No, we were fighting. The first anniversary would have

28 been December 1990. No, we were - no, we didn't carry on any

29 celebration. We had not won anything, no.

1 Q. Was there not a celebration of the first anniversary when  
2 you met with Mr Sankoh and this individual was around?

3 A. Never, no, no. At December 1990 we were fighting. There  
4 was no time for a celebration, no. No, there was no celebration.  
11:12:30 5 That's a lie. I did not meet Sankoh before 1991, no. That's a  
6 total, total lie. No.

7 Q. What about in Voinjama when you were planning the invasion  
8 of Sierra Leone?

9 A. Never, never met him. Never went to Voinjama in 1990.  
11:12:49 10 That's a total lie. No.

11 Q. What about meeting him in Mali at the invitation of  
12 President Alpha Konare?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis.

14 MS HOLLIS: Again, we are going into a lot of specifics.

11:13:10 15 These are cumulative facts. They are going to identify this  
16 witness. If the questions need to be asked, they should be asked  
17 in private session.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I can't see how that could possibly identify  
11:13:24 20 the witness. We know that there was a sizeable RUF delegation in  
21 Mali at the time of the Lome discussions, and I really don't see  
22 how this could possibly identify the witness.

23 [Trial Chamber conferred]

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we think that reference is vague  
11:14:48 25 enough not to identify the individual concerned. We will  
26 overrule the objection.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

28 Q. Well, did you, Mr Taylor?

29 A. No. Excuse me, counsel, are you saying in Mali or you mean



1 Togo?

2 Q. In Mali.

3 A. In 1999?

11:15:13

4 Q. Well, I can only assist to the extent that it was

5 supposedly at the invitation of President Alpha Konare.

6 A. Well, I don't see how Alpha could have invited the RUF in

7 1999 during the Lome agreement, because that had happened in

8 Togo. So if this witness claims that he was in Mali, I know

9 nothing about it. I didn't meet - I didn't go to Mali at that

11:15:38

10 particular time.

11 Q. Have you ever met this individual in Mali?

12 A. No, never, ever, ever. No.

13 Q. Has that individual ever been to White Flower in Monrovia?

14 A. I really don't know. It's possible.

11:16:02

15 Q. 2002?

16 A. It's possible, because - it's possible. I would say it's

17 possible, even probable. There is a delegation from the - in

18 about 2000 to 2002 - 2001, 2002, a delegation that I did receive

19 at White Flower that were about seven, eight persons, and he very

11:16:36

20 well - this person could have been a part of that delegation. I

21 remember Issa, and I can remember there was another gentleman

22 that I - you know, I have subsequently gotten to know who it was.

23 There was a very short - short guy in that meeting that actually

24 cried. When I really got very hard in that meeting, he cried.

11:17:01

25 And I've subsequently got to know he's Augustine Gbao, I got to

26 know later on. A shortish fellow and I was very, very hard in

27 that meeting, and he actually cried in that meeting. But I

28 wonder - if he was there, it had to be this time. I want to be

29 very clear to this Court, it's possible, but I cannot recall him.

1 But it was a high power delegation that included several persons.  
2 At least eight, nine persons met me and he very well could have  
3 been there.

4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Could you run through that time again?

11:17:38 5 THE WITNESS: That's around 2001, 2002, your Honour. I  
6 can't be - but there was a very large delegation.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. In that time period, Mr Taylor, was there one or more that  
9 one RUF delegation that came to Monrovia? That's 2001, 2002?

11:18:01 10 A. Oh, yes. I mean, Issa made a couple trips, and I would  
11 call that a delegation. I don't remember everybody. Some of  
12 those trips I wouldn't see the leader, who would be Issa. But  
13 yes, there were a couple that came.

14 Q. Okay. Now, the final matter I want to deal with in  
11:18:24 15 relation to this individual is this: Does the name Martina  
16 Johnson mean anything to you, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes. Yes.

18 Q. What does it mean to you?

19 A. Martina, I would like at her almost like a little - I would  
11:18:47 20 almost call it almost like family. Because she is a very smart  
21 kid that was a part of - that commanded our - she was the  
22 artillery commander - strategic artillery commander during the  
23 war. Very, very --

24 Q. During the war where?

11:19:19 25 A. During - before my election in 1997, NPFL time. She is  
26 from my tribe and I always look at her as a little sister like.  
27 But that's how I know she rose to the rank of general. She was  
28 trained - she was very well trained in a long-range artillery  
29 firing. And I am saying strategic, because it called for a lot

1 of calculations. But she was a very smart kid, and she was a  
2 group selected to train on long-range firing. By that I mean up  
3 to - anything in excess of 18 kilometres firing what we call the  
4 BM 21. She was an expert in that.

11:20:06 5 Q. Was she a training commandant?

6 A. No, she was the commander of the unit, but not a  
7 training - well, as commander, I would say - well, okay, let me  
8 put it for the Court to really - be help with this. Now, she was  
9 trained as and became strategic commander. Now, subsequent to  
10 that she did not - she was not just a training commander. She  
11 was commander, but at times she participated in some training.  
12 But her official function, she was commander of the strategic  
13 forces.

14 Q. Did you ever send her to Sierra Leone?

11:20:48 15 A. Never, no. No, never send her to Sierra Leone.

16 Q. Let me try and help you. Do you recall an occasion when a  
17 huge amount of arms and ammunition were captured by Brigadier  
18 Issa from the Guineans, including a 40-barrel missile and its  
19 arms? Does that ring a bell?

11:21:12 20 A. Well, I heard the testimony here in this Court.

21 Q. "And the 40 barrel was taken to Makeni and Sam Bockarie  
22 requested one of Mr Taylor's training commandants, called Martina  
23 Johnson, and Sam Bockarie said she was coming to train them in  
24 the use of the 40-barrel missile, and I can recall that towards  
25 the end of December she actually visited Buedu with Sam Bockarie.  
26 She came along with Sam Bockarie in Buedu. They never used it  
27 actually until the period when the disarmament took over. Yes,  
28 they didn't use the 40-barrel missile because they're kind of  
29 very difficult to use. Technically difficult to use."

1 Know anything about that?

2 A. No. What year are we talking about?

3 Q. Well, came with Sam Bockarie. So I assume, given that  
4 context, we are talking about December 1998.

11:22:19 5 A. If Martina went, I did not send her. But Martina was and  
6 is an expert in that field, and she is a soldier now. Martina is  
7 a soldier, and everybody knew she - and there were about - a  
8 group of about close to ten that were trained originally on the  
9 BM 21. So for me it would not be out of the ordinary if somebody  
11:22:53 10 recommended her, because at the time we are talking about Martina  
11 is command - is chief of security at the Roberts International  
12 Airport, and so - but everybody knows Martina. Everybody knows  
13 Martina. So if she went there, which I cannot account for,  
14 probably she did on her own. Or somebody said, "Oh, let Martina  
11:23:18 15 go and check this." But I didn't send her on any such  
16 assignment. We didn't have any BM 21, no.

17 Q. Come on, Mr Taylor. One of your senior artillery generals  
18 slips off to Sierra Leone to train them in the operation of this  
19 piece of technical equipment along with Sam Bockarie, and you  
11:23:36 20 don't know anything about it?

21 A. Know anything about it. If Martina had been away from the  
22 airport long, of course I would have known about it. I do not  
23 know if she went there. I have no information that Martina went  
24 over there to train. But besides that, what period of training  
11:23:52 25 are we talking about? Because if Martina was away from that  
26 airport for anything like a week, I would have known. And I have  
27 no knowledge of Martina being away from Roberts International  
28 Airport for a week, because it would have definitely - whether I  
29 liked it or not, it would have come out. Because as chief of

1 security at the airport, that's not a post that you can leave for  
2 a very long time, no. Did he say that she actually trained or  
3 went to look at a weapon? No, no, she never --

4 Q. I can only assist you to the extent I have.

11:24:25 5 A. No, Martina Johnson did not train diddle over there - no  
6 one in Sierra Leone on a BM - because it would have taken some  
7 time to train them and I would have known. That is totally,  
8 totally untrue. Not - I mean, both sides: That I sent her,  
9 that's untrue; and that she would have trained in Sierra Leone,  
11:24:45 10 that's not true. It's not possible.

11 Q. That's all I want to ask about that witness, Mr Taylor. We  
12 are moving on.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, for the record that would  
14 have been the witness on D-90. The witness we have been  
11:25:06 15 discussing is the one whose name was written on exhibit D-90.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: That's right.

17 Q. Right. Mr Taylor, we are moving on to a witness who gave  
18 evidence in open session, Zigzag Marzah. Now, in the few minutes  
19 available before the break, you do recall the evidence of that  
11:25:45 20 witness, don't you, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. And you do appreciate that his account has achieved a  
23 certain notoriety, even on the website of the Special Court for  
24 Sierra Leone?

11:26:03 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. What do you say about the testimony of that man, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Well, there is absolutely nothing that that Marzah boy said  
28 here that was factual. And I think Marzah could have been  
29 brought here for the publicity to - maybe sensationalisation of

1 this case. Because that boy, even where he is, in his little  
2 heart, he must know that he lied on me here. If he doesn't feel  
3 it, for those of us that have - and I know - I'm not saying this  
4 here, because most people are atheist - but those who believe in  
11:26:59 5 a higher being that we have to report to, I am sure he must be  
6 thinking about it. Because he sat in this courtroom, and I don't  
7 know what it took for him to do it, but he really lied here about  
8 me eating human beings and nonsense like that. He lied.

9 Q. But, Mr Taylor, he was quite vehement about that. He said  
11:27:23 10 that was a practice he shared with you, eating human beings.  
11 What do you say about that?

12 A. Total nonsense. That boy is sick. Total nonsense. He is  
13 sick. He is very, very, very sick.

14 Q. But Mr Taylor, we will come to it in detail. But I am  
11:27:48 15 giving you the opportunity now before we look at the details to  
16 just comment in general terms. What about the burial of the  
17 pregnant woman behind White Flower on the beach?

18 A. Total nonsense. You know, if this boy claimed that I,  
19 Charles Ghankay Taylor, would kill somebody and bury them or  
11:28:12 20 even - I have never taken a gun to shoot a human being in my  
21 life. This Prosecution will bring a witness, he said that on the  
22 beach, not behind, he said on the beach, the beach in question is  
23 a public beach. This Prosecution, and I am sure with the  
24 cooperation of the Government of Liberia, if they did not do  
11:28:36 25 their due diligence by going and digging it up, then they must be  
26 a part of these lie themselves, you understand me, because  
27 anybody who is an experienced lawyer would know - and this is a  
28 public beach in Monrovia that he is talking about where he says I  
29 was living, not White Flower as we know it. He talked about

1 another place. They would have gone there and they would have  
2 dug it up. It's a lie from - I don't even know how to describe  
3 it. Charles Taylor would be involved in burying - I executed  
4 people for rape and would be killing pregnant women? I executed  
11:29:14 5 people for rape in Liberia, I admit. Soldiers that raped women  
6 in Liberia, I executed them. I would be going and burying  
7 people?

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Will that be a convenient point,  
9 Mr President?

11:29:25 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We will take the morning break and  
11 resume at 12 o'clock.

12 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

13 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:01:46 15 Q. Zigzag Marzah, Mr Taylor. Issue number one, transcript  
16 page 5851 of 12 March 2008:

17 "Q. When you returned back to Liberia, were you alone or  
18 with a group?

19 A. I came back along with Prince Johnson's group, who were  
12:02:20 20 about 17, and I was recruited by him in Ivory Coast. He  
21 told me that we had a leader by the name of Charles Taylor  
22 who was there to redeem us, the people from Nimba, so we  
23 should be prepared to join him for us to come and redeem  
24 our country on December 24th, 1989.

12:02:48 25 Q. While you were in the Ivory Coast, you said you met  
26 Prince Johnson. Had you met him before?

27 A. Yes, I met Prince Johnson at Camp Schefflein before  
28 from the time he was a first lieutenant. And then at that  
29 time, when Doe was carrying on atrocities against the

1 people from Nimba County when I left, the second time I met  
2 him was in Ivory Coast when he brought the message to us  
3 that there was a leader who was there to support us.

4 Q. Did you meet Charles Taylor?

12:03:24 5 A. Yes, yes.

6 Q. Did you meet Charles Taylor while you were in the Ivory  
7 Coast?

8 A. No. He told me that Charles Taylor was in Burkina Faso  
9 and he had the full support for us, so if there was  
10 anything that we required to enter he will come after we  
11 enter and when we captured a ground he will come and meet  
12 us there."

13 Now pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, firstly to your knowledge  
14 was Zigzag Marzah a member of the Special Forces?

12:04:07 15 A. No, he was never a member of the Special Forces, no.

16 Q. Understand I'm not suggesting he was, I'm just asking.  
17 Secondly, what is your knowledge of recruitment by Special Forces  
18 in La Cote d'Ivoire prior to the invasion on Christmas Eve 1989?

19 A. The Special Forces did not recruit in La Cote d'Ivoire  
12:04:44 20 prior to the invasion of December 1989.

21 Q. How do you know?

22 A. Well, they were already trained. They were there for the  
23 attack. They would not recruit. I mean, this is an individual  
24 who - no, no, no. It was a secret mission. They would not go  
12:05:01 25 about recruiting, so I would say no.

26 Q. But Mr Marzah claimed that he was recruited by Prince  
27 Johnson in La Cote d'Ivoire?

28 A. Well, I doubt it. Because Prince Johnson came from  
29 training and they had come on that mission, and I cannot see him



1 meeting Zigzag Marzah and recruiting him, except where - as he  
2 says he knew Prince Johnson from Camp Schefflein, I'm not sure if  
3 anywhere in the testimony he states that he was an old member of  
4 the Armed Forces of Liberia. Just in terms of helping, if he  
12:05:50 5 were an old member of the Armed Forces of Liberia, the chances  
6 are that if someone saw him in La Cote d'Ivoire at that time,  
7 they would have recruited him. But he mentions about the  
8 atrocities being carried out by Doe against the people, so this  
9 has to be pre-recruitment. And so I would say that if Prince  
12:06:15 10 Johnson had recruited him in a pre-recruitment situation, he  
11 would have ended up in Libya.

12 So I have to cast some doubt on the fact that Prince  
13 Johnson, upon coming to carry out this mission, recruited someone  
14 that until now I can't say with any certainty was an old trained  
12:06:37 15 soldier.

16 Q. Now, had Prince Johnson to your knowledge been at Camp  
17 Schefflein?

18 A. Well, no, I don't know. But I know that Prince Johnson is  
19 - it's a former trained armed forces person. He was a  
12:06:58 20 lieutenant, so he was a trained armed forces person. So the  
21 chances are he could have been at Schefflein, but I'm not sure.  
22 I did not know Prince Johnson prior to his move into Libya.

23 Q. And at the time of the invasion on New Year's Eve 1989,  
24 where were you?

12:07:13 25 A. You mean Christmas Eve.

26 Q. Christmas Eve. Christmas Eve.

27 A. Okay, by this time I'm in a border town in La Cote  
28 d'Ivoire, Bin-Houye.

29 Q. Were you in Burkina Faso at that time?

1 A. No, no, no. At the time of the entry I am at the border  
2 town of Bin-Houye in la Cote d'Ivoire. I'm right on the border  
3 here.

4 Q. Next issue, page 5855:

12:07:48 5 "Q. After you entered Liberia, when was the first time, if  
6 ever, you saw Charles Taylor?

7 A. The first time to meet our leader Mr Taylor was in  
8 Gborplay at that time. The remaining Special Forces were  
9 there, and the remaining Special Forces arrested me and  
12:08:05 10 took me to Gborplay. I was not alone. Myself and Prince  
11 Johnson, they took us there and they kept us in on old car  
12 box that appeared like a container, and they were lighting  
13 fire - lighting fire on top of the container and whilst  
14 it was burning, we were shaking inside the container and at  
12:08:26 15 that time some of our friends had already died. So he" -  
16 that being you - "asked them and they opened the container.  
17 They took us out. I think at that time we were about 26 to  
18 25, something like that, but six of us were still alive and  
19 they took us in a wheelbarrow. They took us to a place,  
12:08:50 20 Hacia in Gborplay, and we slept there outside until the  
21 next morning I was able to see him.

22 Q. Can you tell the Court what you mean by 'Special  
23 Forces'?

24 A. The Special Forces means those who were trained from  
12:09:06 25 Libya, Burkina Faso by Charles Taylor.

26 Q. Now the organisation that you joined and you said you  
27 then entered Liberia with with Prince Johnson, did that  
28 have a name?

29 A. At first we never had a name. We called ourselves

1 freedom fighters.

2 Q. Did you later get a name?

3 A. Yes, after the arrival of Mr Taylor in Gborplay that we  
4 had the name NPFL, the National Patriotic Front of  
12:09:38 5 Liberia."

6 Let me pause. Mr Taylor, when was that name adopted?

7 A. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia was adopted prior  
8 to our arrival in Libya and that was the name we were registered  
9 under, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, throughout our  
12:09:52 10 training in Libya.

11 Q. Is it the case, as suggested here, that it was only after  
12 you arrived in Gborplay that that name was given?

13 A. That's a total lie. This boy doesn't know what he's  
14 talking about. No, that's not true.

12:10:11 15 Q. Well, let's go on at page 5856:

16 "Q. Now, you have told us that you and others were placed  
17 in a container. Who were the other people that were placed  
18 in the container?

19 A. Like Maduna Bwua. You know, I have not been expecting  
12:10:39 20 to sit like this today to narrate a long story like this,  
21 but it was not something to be kept in mind."

22 And he goes on at line 20, page 5856:

23 "Q. The other group that you were arrested with, what  
24 group did they belong to?

12:10:56 25 A. From the same junior commando group that was fighting  
26 under Prince Johnson through the directive of Mr Taylor.

27 Q. Now, you say in the container some of your fellow  
28 soldiers died. Can you explain just why they died?

29 A. Because of the heat and moreover, the kind of way the

1 fire was on top of the container and it took place during  
2 the dry season.

3 Q. How many were in the container? How many died, do you  
4 know?

12:11:24 5 A. We were above 20 plus. We were above 20, 25 or 26,  
6 something like that, but I can't recall now.

7 Q. Now, how was it that you were let of the container?  
8 Can you explain that?

9 A. Yes, it was through His Excellency, Mr Taylor, as the  
12:11:45 10 MP commander, Cooper Weah, he asked - he said, 'What is  
11 this container that you are setting fire over it?' And  
12 then later they explained to him that these are the Prince  
13 Johnson boys. And from there he said, 'No, this is not the  
14 reason why you people are here for. You are here to help.

12:12:06 15 The problem between Prince Johnson and myself is not the  
16 thing.' And at that time we were helpless and because of  
17 the heat, most of our brothers had already died.

18 Q. So when Charles Taylor ordered you out of the  
19 container, how did you feel towards Charles Taylor?

12:12:28 20 A. Before God and man he was looking so great to me, and I  
21 was grateful to him to do any kind of piece of work that he  
22 would want me to do.

23 Q. Did you express your gratitude to Charles Taylor?

24 A. Yes, I let him feel at all time that he saved my life,  
12:12:48 25 and a way that I would have proved that to him was to fight  
26 a physical battle against any enemy that was fighting him.

27 Q. Was anyone punished for killing your fellow soldiers by  
28 setting the fires to the container?

29 A. No, no. The only thing that Mr Taylor did in our

1 presence was the time he was reordering us and he said,  
2 'Next time you should treat those boys nicely, the ones who  
3 have come to embrace you to fight the battle against Doe.'  
4 But after that he did not give any punishment against any  
12:13:26 5 other person."

6 Now, pause there. Mr Taylor, do you recall such an  
7 incident?

8 A. No. In fact, going way back, Prince Johnson was never ever  
9 arrested by me or my forces. Never. And beginning where he  
12:13:51 10 says, he said Prince Johnson was in the container, that's a  
11 blatant lie. Prince Johnson was never arrested by the NPFL  
12 forces throughout the war. Prince Johnson, upon killing a couple  
13 of individuals, I ordered his arrest, he fled and formed the  
14 INPFL. He was never caught by me until now. Prince Johnson is  
12:14:17 15 in the Senate in Liberia. So as for this container business,  
16 this whole thing for me is a blatant lie. I don't recall the  
17 container issue, but the mere fact that he talks about Prince  
18 Johnson being arrested and in the container is a lie.

19 Q. Page 5855, line 11:

12:14:36 20 A. It's a lie.

21 Q. "I was not alone. Myself and Prince Johnson, they took us  
22 there and they kept us in an old box that appeared like a  
23 container."

24 A. It's a lie. Prince Johnson was never arrested at any time  
12:14:51 25 during my search to arrest him. He was never caught, he was  
26 never arrested. So this whole story about being in a container,  
27 I don't recall it. I do not recall such a story, but I can tell  
28 you what happened. If anyone was locked up under conditions that  
29 were inhumane, I mean, necessarily I would have intervened

1 because that's my basic style, but I do not recall this container  
2 issue, but because he said here that Prince Johnson was arrested  
3 in a container, that's a lie. Never. He was never arrested.

4 Q. "After my release from the container by Charles Taylor" -  
12:15:44 5 this is page 5858 - "he assigned me within the 1st Battalion  
6 under Edward Millen."

7 Pause. Do you recall a Zigzag Marzah at this time,  
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. Not at all, no.

12:16:08 10 Q. Did you assign him to the 1st Battalion?

11 A. Never. I never assigned any soldier, him or no other,  
12 never, no.

13 Q. Who was responsible for the assignment of soldiers to  
14 whichever battalion? Was that your job?

12:16:23 15 A. No, not at all. People were trained. They were assigned  
16 by the adjutant general, different commanders had their men based  
17 on - they never, never had to assign a soldier to any unit, no.  
18 That was not my function. I never did.

19 Q. Edward Millen?

12:16:46 20 A. There is Edward Mineh. It's pronounced Mineh. I know  
21 Edward Mineh very well. He is one of my Special Forces.

22 Q. Was he head of the 1st Battalion?

23 A. I'm not sure which battalion. No, he was a battalion  
24 commander. He was one of the Special Forces battalion commander,  
12:17:09 25 yes.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is this a name whose spelling we have  
27 already?

28 THE WITNESS: Yes. You have it, your Honour. It's even on  
29 the list of Special Forces presented to the Court, Edward Mineh.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Well, just for clarity's sake, Mr Taylor, if you could -  
3 Edward, is that the normal spelling?

4 A. That is correct.

12:17:27 5 Q. Surname?

6 A. Mineh, that would be spelt M-E-H - it's supposed to be L-N.  
7 Mineh, M-E-H-L-N. Mineh.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I'm told that the phonetic spelling is  
9 M-L-E-H-N or M-I-L-L-E-N, but the correct spelling is actually  
10 M-I-N-E-H. Sorry about that, your Honour, but I'm taking that --

11 THE WITNESS: It's the same Mineh.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now, the next matter I want to tell with, Mr Taylor, with  
14 good reason is this: The witness was asked this question, page  
12:18:27 15 5861:

16 "Q. You have told us that you fought before being placed  
17 in the container with Prince Johnson forces and you told us  
18 you remained with the NPFL and its successors up to 2003.  
19 Can you compare how the Prince Johnson forces treated  
12:18:47 20 civilians with how the NPFL forces treated civilians?"

21 Line 14:

22 "A. I said during Prince Johnson's administration there  
23 was no authority to go and harass civilians, or even to  
24 rape, or to loot, during Prince Johnson's administration.  
12:19:08 25 When you joined Prince Johnson, the cloth that you had on  
26 you, you would battle with it until you return. At any  
27 time he saw something strange with you, you would either be  
28 executed, or you will go through military discipline, so  
29 there was no way you could play around civilians during

1 Prince Johnson's administration. What he told us was to  
2 battle against soldiers and to ensure that we overthrow Doe  
3 from the directive from Charles Taylor to him.

12:19:45

4 Q. And how did that compare with your time with the NPFL?  
5 How were civilians treated with the NPFL?

6 A. I will say the truth and nothing but the truth. When  
7 our leader himself was present in Liberia, there were more  
8 opportunities for us. We had a chance to do anything, like  
9 to loot, to rape. At the same time what you got was for  
10 you to be courageous and battle for him.

12:20:07

11 Q. When you are talking about battling for him, who are  
12 you talking about?

13 A. Charles Taylor.

14 Q. Who were you referring to when you said our leader  
15 himself?

12:20:21

16 A. Mr Taylor.

17 Q. Before the elections of Charles Taylor as President,  
18 were the NPFL soldiers paid any salary?

19 A. Before election or after elections?

12:20:35

20 Q. Before elections.

21 A. No, we had go ahead that what - wheresoever we  
22 captured, what we got there was for us. So we were  
23 encouraged to battle. We were not physically paid, no.

24 Q. Sir, when you were with the NPFL were there any tactics  
25 that were used to create fear in your opponents and those  
26 around you, those civilians around the area?

12:20:53

27 A. Yes. When I was with NPFL to fight from Tappita to go  
28 to Grand Bassa, the tactics that we used sometimes we set  
29 ambushes, but before setting any ambush anywhere, anywhere



1 we are going to capture, the battle that we do there is no  
2 rescue for any civilian. From there you take the human  
3 head and you would place it over your car bumper and when  
4 people see it they become afraid and when the enemy hears  
12:21:29 5 that news they will say the people who are coming, the men  
6 who are coming, do not forgive any person. So for that  
7 reason they too would vanish.

8 Q. Do you know if Charles Taylor ever passed these  
9 checkpoints that had the displays that you're talking about  
12:21:50 10 of human heads and intestines?

11 A. Yes, he was aware. He made us understand that as  
12 guerillas you have to play with human blood so that the  
13 enemy forces would be afraid of you. He checked at some of  
14 the checkpoints in so many areas.

12:22:09 15 Q. Were you present with Charles Taylor at some of these  
16 checkpoints when he was there?

17 A. I told you that I was one of the most senior junior  
18 commanders and each time we battle, when we come - when he  
19 comes to come and visit us we had to go and welcome him and  
12:22:27 20 take him to our CP and he will see our various checkpoints  
21 like Buchanan Highway. When we were moving there he saw  
22 more than eight checkpoints decorated with human intestines  
23 and human heads. There he is, you can ask him."

24 Now, Mr Taylor, let's take that in stages. First of all,  
12:22:51 25 you will note the distinction being made by the witness between  
26 Prince Johnson's forces and, as he calls it, the NPFL and that  
27 under you he had greater opportunity to loot and rape, whereas  
28 under Prince Johnson such things were verboten. What do you say  
29 about that?

1 A. Well, really, in dealing with myself, that's not true. In  
2 fact, why did I go after Prince Johnson? Why did I go after  
3 Prince Johnson and order his arrest? It is for killing people,  
4 civilians. Prince Johnson, on some old family quarrel, killed  
12:23:46 5 some people. If I'm not mistaken, it's in a town called Bluntuo.  
6 That's B-L-U-N-T-U-O, Bluntuo. And I said we did not come to  
7 Liberia for that and that the civilians had to be given maximum  
8 care, so I ordered him to be arrested, to be investigated. This  
9 was when Prince Johnson took off and organised his own unit.

12:24:18 10 In the NPFL, we provided food. We did not pay salaries,  
11 but there was no way that somebody will come to this Court and  
12 say that there was an opportunity to rape and loot and that's  
13 what Charles Taylor tolerated. If that was true I would have  
14 never been elected, ever. And my popularity and my strength in  
12:24:42 15 Liberia had to do with how I dealt with the civilian population  
16 then and how they feel about me now. Now, as I sit here. So  
17 this boy does not - he's talking total foolishness.

18 Q. This point he makes though, Mr Taylor, that before the  
19 election of Charles Taylor they were not paid, "so we were  
12:25:05 20 encouraged to battle, we were not physically paid." They weren't  
21 paid, were they?

22 A. If they what again?

23 Q. They were not paid - NPFL combatants were not paid, were  
24 they?

12:25:18 25 A. They were not paid.

26 Q. Now, what he's saying, in effect, then, Mr Taylor, to  
27 borrow a phrase, in those circumstances they were constrained to  
28 pay themselves through looting. You follow?

29 A. Well, that would not be consistent and the reason why that

1 would not be consistent, I would say no. How did Prince Johnson  
2 handle his people? They were not paid and so they what? They  
3 were fighting ragged? That was not the case. What happened when  
4 we got into Liberia is that, because of the popularity of this  
12:25:57 5 war, there were vast donations of food. Eventually when we got  
6 to Buchanan, things got much better. We captured a ship off the  
7 coast of Buchanan that had brought in close to half a million  
8 bags of rice for the Government of Liberia and we used that to  
9 make sure - in addition to little assistance that we obtained  
12:26:22 10 from friends outside. So there was no such thing to go and loot  
11 and rape and do all this type of nonsense. Then why am I  
12 executing people for rape if I'm encouraging it? Why? It  
13 doesn't make any sense. There's several people - several  
14 soldiers that were found, they were court-martialed, they were  
12:26:42 15 executed for rape and murder. So why would I be doing that if  
16 this is supposed to be a modus operandi of the NPFL? Then why I  
17 am executing people?

18 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm sorry, I have to press you a little further  
19 on this. We have this situation, do we not: Your Special Forces  
12:27:06 20 enter Liberia, set up training camps and soon you have armed,  
21 illiterate, young people from the countryside and not so young  
22 people of Liberia armed with the power that flows from the barrel  
23 of a gun, yes? Now, did it ever cross your mind that such power  
24 could result in looting, theft and the sort of crimes which it is  
12:27:43 25 alleged not only the NPFL but also the RUF committed? You do  
26 follow my reasoning, don't you?

27 A. Yeah, but that reason it would not be proper, because it  
28 all depends on the control that you have. I launched a  
29 revolution; I didn't just go shooting like a fool. And even

1     though it's the countryside, these are - most of the people that  
2     participated in this revolution are school aged individuals.  
3     These are not illiterate heathens in the bush. These are people  
4     that are in school. Their schools are - most of these young men  
12:28:16 5     that come and joined with their brothers and different things -  
6     and by "young men" I'm not talking about under age men - they at  
7     least can read and write and these are not just illiterate  
8     people. So look, this revolution was organised. We get into  
9     Liberia, we do not forcefully recruit anybody. People volunteer.  
12:28:34 10    The region that we enter into Liberia, Nimba County, is the  
11    hotbed for revolt. They are those that are most affected by the  
12    activities of Samuel Doe. That is why we go into that region.  
13    There is sympathy. You have the population. Their brothers are  
14    the ones that are taken for Special Forces training. So when we  
12:28:58 15    get back in Liberia, almost 80 per cent of the people that are  
16    Special Forces are from Nimba County. Very, very clear  
17    [indiscernible]. People come, they donate food, they donate  
18    money, they donate medicine, drugs. It was an organised  
19    revolution, and this was why we were very strict from day one to  
12:29:17 20    the end. If you were involved in forcefully taking food -  
21    killing is an extreme - even forcefully taking food from  
22    individuals, you were dealt with. This was an organised  
23    revolution, and that's how we succeeded in the country. From  
24    Gbutuo all the way to Monrovia, we did not tolerate that, no.  
12:29:44 25    Q.    Well, let's look at the other aspect of this passage that  
26    I've just reminded you of. What the witness was clearly  
27    suggesting, Mr Taylor, is that you adopted as a tactic and  
28    condoned the use of terror tactics against the civilian  
29    population of Liberia; that is, the mounting of human heads and

1 intestines at checkpoints. Did you?

12:30:28 2 A. No. That's what I'm saying. Total nonsense. And this  
3 boy, that's why he was brought in here to do, to - look, this is  
4 total nonsense. Charles Taylor would drive through a checkpoint  
5 and see a human intestine? Total nonsense. I have said to this  
6 Court, and I say it again, there were at least once or twice that  
7 I, Charles Taylor, saw a human skull. I'm not going to lie about  
8 it. I saw a human skull at a particular checkpoint. I asked why  
9 was the skull there? and they said that this was an old - this  
12:30:59 10 was an enemy that had been killed some time ago and they put this  
11 skull - they had this skull at the checkpoint as a symbol of  
12 death. I did see that personally.

13 Q. Where?

14 A. This happened - I would say it was at a major intersection,  
12:31:21 15 I think probably in the Harbel area. I'm not too - I don't know  
16 precisely, but I did see a skull. Not a human head; I saw a  
17 skull. And I saw it and asked the question. I did not order the  
18 skull removed, I will tell this Court. It was explained to me  
19 that it was used as a symbol, and because I did not see it at the  
12:31:51 20 time as anything dangerous, because skulls had been used by other  
21 organisations as symbols, that was what I saw, human - look,  
22 there is no individual in the NPFL, not from my Special Forces  
23 down, that committed murder - forget about it - committed murder  
24 in the NPFL, a soldier, that was brought to my attention that  
12:32:25 25 survived it. So it has come before this Court that I approved  
26 many executions. Rape, murder and things like those, we - I did  
27 not tolerate it, and that, I can still say and repeat myself, was  
28 the cause of my success in Liberia; that after the war when  
29 people were running around saying, "Oh, don't vote for Taylor,"

1 when you heard that famous thing that came before this Court, "He  
2 killed my ma, he killed my Pa; I will vote for him," is because  
3 the vast majority of the Liberian people knew that I was very  
4 strict about how I dealt with the activities in Liberia. So this  
12:33:04 5 thing about - this sick boy talking about human intestine I have  
6 strung up --

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, he says specifically, right:

8 "When he comes to visit us, we had to go and welcome him  
9 and take him to our CP when he will see our various checkpoints  
12:33:24 10 like Buchanan Highway. When we were moving there he", that's  
11 you, "saw more than eight checkpoints decorated with human  
12 intestines and human heads." Did you?

13 A. But where he was he? This is a lie --

14 Q. On the Buchanan Highway.

12:33:39 15 A. That's a lie. But where would he be? You're a soldier at  
16 the front. Where would you be behind to see eight checkpoints?  
17 Is he a soldier? Is he a soldier? I mean, one must look at -  
18 you are supposed to be a front line soldier fighting.

19 Q. No, he says, Mr Taylor --

12:33:57 20 A. That's what I'm saying.

21 Q. "When he comes to visit us, we had to go and welcome him  
22 and take him to our CP." So he's gone to meet you and he's  
23 taking you to see their CP. So he's with you driving through  
24 these eight checkpoints on the Buchanan Highway.

12:34:14 25 A. Nonsense.

26 Q. That's what he's saying.

27 A. But he's talking total nonsense. Is he a commander? Why  
28 would anybody come to meet me? You are a soldier at the front  
29 line. What are you doing coming to meet me for what and where?

1 When I had to travel, my travel was very planned. There is no  
2 way Charles Taylor travelled through any checkpoint with him or  
3 no - I didn't even know this human. It was in this courtroom  
4 that this boy you brought here called Zigzag Marzah - that I  
12:34:46 5 first laid my eyes on, and there will be witnesses that will come  
6 here and tell you this, that I saw this boy here calling himself  
7 Marzah. This man came, but he told you he can't read, he can't  
8 write. This boy is sick. That he will come to meet me - he  
9 doesn't say he's commanding. At this time is he commanding?

12:35:04 10 Q. He says he's a senior junior commander.

11 A. What is a senior junior commander? Nothing. All  
12 commanders in the NPFL at this time are Special Forces. If he's  
13 not an a Special Forces, he's nothing. Absolutely nothing.  
14 Absolutely nothing. A senior junior commander; what is that?

12:35:24 15 Nothing. Nothing.

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I'm sorry I have to press you further on  
17 this, because you appreciate fundamentally what this witness was  
18 telling this Court - and it forms a major aspect of this  
19 indictment - is this: That you were condoning terror tactics  
12:35:48 20 rather than the classic guerilla warfare where the guerilla seeks  
21 to win hearts and minds, Fidel Castro style; that you were, in  
22 contrast, adopting terror tactics against the civilian  
23 population. Is that the case?

24 A. It was never the case. The Liberian people would have  
12:36:10 25 thrown me out. Nobody will conduct terror tactics against a  
26 population involved in a war that lasts almost seven years,  
27 participate in an election that involved all - I mean all of  
28 those that participated in the war and all the leading  
29 politicians in the country that were not a part of the war and

1 win 75 per cent of the vote conducted by the international  
2 community that led terror tactics against people. This is total  
3 nonsense. It is my strictness, and maybe the Prosecution were  
4 trying to point me out as a big killer when they brought the  
12:36:57 5 Special Forces list with their access on it. And what happened  
6 to this one? He was executed. Yes, they were executed because  
7 they committed atrocities, and I did, you understand me? I did,  
8 and the Liberian people appreciated what I did. They were given  
9 a fair trial. There was due process. If they killed or raped or  
12:37:17 10 maimed the population, as soldiers that understood the uniform  
11 code of military justice and had an operational order, yes, they  
12 were tried and the recommendation, I approved it. So, if that  
13 makes me a killer, than I am a killer. But to say that I used  
14 terror tactics against the people of Liberia, I would have never  
12:37:38 15 won 75 per cent of the vote. Never.

16 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, I have to ask: Was the use of tactics  
17 such as decorating checkpoints with human intestines and human  
18 heads, were you, the western, educated leader, exploiting and  
19 condoning such primitive savagery for your own purpose?

12:38:08 20 A. Never. It was never condoned. It was never accepted. I  
21 would have never tolerated that. In fact, even talking about it  
22 makes me sick that this sick boy could have said that, and there  
23 are millions of Liberians that have heard this and have just been  
24 sick at the stomach themselves that this boy could have come and  
12:38:27 25 told this lie to this Court. It's a blatant lie. That's all it  
26 is. From now to eternity it's a lie.

27 Q. Topic number five. Page 5864, transcript of 12 March 2008,  
28 line 29:

29 "Q. Do you know a person by the name of Foday Sankoh?



1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Tell us where you first met or got to know a Foday  
3 Sankoh?"

4 Listen carefully, Mr Taylor.

12:38:58 5 "A. Yes. I saw Foday Sankoh after Charles Taylor released  
6 us from the container. I think about two to three days.  
7 Let us say about five days before he gave us instructions  
8 to go and battle, he introduced Foday Sankoh to us as his  
9 colleague Foday Sankoh and some Gambian forces like

12:39:21 10 Domingo, Dr Manneh. There were so many, I can't recall  
11 them all, yes.

12 Q. What did Charles Taylor say to you when he introduced  
13 Foday Sankoh?

14 A. He said he was one of the senior men assigned with him.  
12:39:40 15 All of them were there to help us to go and overthrow Doe  
16 at the time in Gborplay.

17 Q. Did you ever receive any assignment from Charles Taylor  
18 related to Foday Sankoh?

19 A. Yes, at that time we had battled from Nimba County,  
12:40:04 20 Grand Bassa and we were at Margibi when the Sierra Leone  
21 forces used to join the AFL to fight against us, when they  
22 heard that Foday Sankoh was about to go to Sierra Leone to  
23 become a leader."

24 Let's take things in stages. First of all, "He introduced  
12:40:28 25 Foday Sankoh to us as his colleague." This is two or three days,  
26 five days after the container incident, Mr Taylor. What do you  
27 say?

28 A. This boy a liar. Never - I don't - there was no container  
29 incident. I do not know when he says this container incident

1 occurred, but when I get to Liberia in April of 1990, by this  
2 time Prince Johnson is on the run. So this boy cannot even be in  
3 this general area for even there to have first of all been a  
4 container, not to speak about introducing Foday - who is this man  
12:41:09 5 that Foday Sankoh, assuming he's in Liberia, would be introduced  
6 to them? As what? As what? Or even the people he talks - yes,  
7 there is a General Domingo who was one of the Gambians that come  
8 in April, he's fighting. But if you look at where he's talking  
9 about now, he says at that time we had battled from Nimba County,  
12:41:37 10 Grand Bassa and Margibi. So I am to assume that this - I don't  
11 know when this introduction - is it around Margibi time or are we  
12 talking about still back in Gborplay time? Because if we're  
13 talking about Margibi, Margibi is where you call - that's Harbel.  
14 That's where Margibi is. And all the records of this Court show  
12:41:59 15 we are not in that area until about - and then he talks about the  
16 Sierra Leoneans fighting. He's got to be referring to the  
17 arrival of ECOMOG, which is August 1990. So we're talking about  
18 way down the line. That's from January now coming all the way to  
19 August. So, you know, when they're mixing thing up like this, I  
12:42:23 20 don't think he knows what he's talking about. Because if he's  
21 talking about this, the Sierra Leone forces, that's got to be  
22 ECOMOG, okay? So we're now talking about August 1990. By this  
23 particular time I don't know what introduction he's talking  
24 about, whether it is in Margibi or whether it's in Nimba, but  
12:42:45 25 there is no such thing of him being introduced to Foday Sankoh or  
26 even introduced to General Domingo. Domingo --  
27 Q. What about Dr Manneh?  
28 A. Never. Why would he be introduced to Manneh? Manneh by  
29 this time, by August of 1990, is in Buchanan. He's in Buchanan.

1 But how would he be introduced to Manneh? I mean, how would he  
2 be introduced to Manneh? No. No, there's not --

3 Q. The witness continues:

4 "We were at Margibi when the Sierra Leone forces used to  
12:43:29 5 join the AFL to fight against us, when they heard that Foday  
6 Sankoh was about to go to Sierra Leone to become a leader."

7 And then there was an interruption and he continued:

8 "Thank you. I said Foday Sankoh. At the time he had the  
9 forces from Monrovia in Schefflein. They were mixed with Sierra  
12:43:53 10 Leonean soldiers. So they had the forum by the Special Forces,  
11 including my own immediate commander, the late Paul Wai, for  
12 Foday Sankoh to go to Freetown to take over the government that  
13 was there. It was at that time that they went and later I was  
14 released - relieved from my post and sent there to see Foday  
12:44:18 15 Sankoh at a place commonly called Combat Camp."

16 Let me continue:

17 "Q. In Liberian English do you sometimes refer to Sierra  
18 Leone as Freetown? Do you refer to the country?

19 A. Yes, the whole of Sierra Leone we consider to be  
12:44:40 20 Freetown, yes.

21 Q. Now you said you were relieved of your post and sent  
22 there to see Foday Sankoh. Who relieved you of your post  
23 and sent you to see Foday Sankoh?

24 A. Basically from the beginning, from taking me from my  
12:44:57 25 post, that was directed by Charles Taylor after the Special  
26 Forces had gone with the first phase to Freetown and had  
27 failed. The Freetown forces pushed them back to Foya. It  
28 was at that time that he sent for me at Harbel Hill and  
29 another man to Visalah and be there until I received the

1 Last instruction to go to Freetown - I mean Sierra Leone."

2 Now, taking that in stages, this reference to "mixed with  
3 Sierra Leonean soldiers from Monrovia in Schefflein", do you  
4 understand what that means, Mr Taylor?

12:45:44 5 A. No. The only thing I can put this to when I hear Sierra  
6 Leonean soldiers, I can only attribute this to the coming in of  
7 ECOMOG because Sierra Leone did have a contingent with ECOMOG,  
8 but the rest of this, I don't know whether this is gibberish or  
9 what. I don't know what he's talking about. I don't know what  
12:46:08 10 he's talking about, no.

11 Q. Paul Wai?

12 A. I have a Special Forces called Paul Weah.

13 Q. Spelt?

14 A. These names. W-E-A-H, I think.

12:46:40 15 Q. And do you know of a place called Combat Camp?

16 A. No, no.

17 Q. Where Foday Sankoh was located?

18 A. No, I don't know any Combat Camp. Others have talked about  
19 Schefflein - I mean, say he was at Naama, so I don't know any  
12:46:57 20 Combat Camp, no.

21 Q. Did you direct for Zigzag Marzah - no, let me use his own  
22 words and then seek your comment:

23 "From taking me from my post, that was directed by  
24 Charles Taylor after the Special Forces had gone with the first  
12:47:23 25 phase to Freetown and had failed. The Freetown forces pushed  
26 them back to Foya. It was at that time that he sent for me at  
27 Harbel Hill and another man to Visalah and be there until I  
28 received the last instruction to go to Freetown - I mean Sierra  
29 Leone."

1 Now, there's a lot involved there, so let's break it down.  
2 Is it correct, Mr Taylor, that in Liberian English, Sierra Leone  
3 is referred to as Freetown?

12:48:06

4 A. No, that's not true. Except you're telling that - then who  
5 controlled Liberia? A bunch of idiots? It takes an idiot like  
6 Marzah to talk this nonsense. The whole educated population of  
7 Liberia, we talk about Liberian English we mean Freetown. That's  
8 his capacity, not the rest of Liberia. The question itself is  
9 preposterous.

10 Q. Now, did you sense -

11 A. Not from you now, counsel. I mean the question asked him  
12 here.

12:48:43

13 Q. I'm grateful for that. But, Mr Taylor, help me with this:  
14 Did you direct an order that Zigzag Marzah be sent to, note, he,  
15 Zigzag Marzah, be sent to Freetown/Sierra Leone?

12:49:13

16 A. Your Honours, I don't even know this boy at this time. If  
17 I need a mission at this time I would call a Special Force. You  
18 know from the records here that there are close to 160 some odd  
19 Special Forces. Every command in the NPFL, from battalion  
20 commanders to company commanders, are commanded by Special  
21 Forces. This person - I really don't know this boy at this time  
22 or any other time. And there are thousands of people. Now, if -  
23 the man he calls here, Paul Weah, is a Special Force. He's on  
24 the list. If he is saying that he's under Paul Weah, I don't  
25 know, it's possible.

12:49:45

26 There's no way people any little - what they call  
27 themselves, people that were trained in Liberia were known by me  
28 personally or I would call to go and perform any mission. Even  
29 if we assume that there is a mission, it would not be this man I

1 will call. I will call a Special Force that I know is trained to  
2 carry out. And what we are talking about? We're talking about  
3 August, September 1990, fresh in the revolution, my Special  
4 Forces are in full control throughout the country. I wouldn't  
12:50:17 5 call him. It's not true.

6 Q. Well, he disagrees, Mr Taylor, because, let's continue,  
7 page 5866, line 27:

8 "Q. Now you said Charles Taylor gave you that assignment.  
9 Can you tell us how well Charles Taylor knew you at that  
12:50:42 10 time?

11 A. Your Honour, let me tell you one thing. I am the  
12 single Zigzag Marzah. There is no second one." Thank God.  
13 "I am competent indeed and I used to battle indeed to the  
14 best of his expectation and he had a trust in me. So for  
12:50:54 15 this reason, wherever the target was heard, at times he  
16 will send for me to deploy me there, yes. That was how he  
17 sent for me from Camp Schefflein Highway to send me to Lofa  
18 and Visalah to meet with Sankoh to go into Sierra Leone.

19 Q. Now when you went to Visalah what happened?

12:51:17 20 A. When I went to Visalah at the time most Special Forces  
21 were there like Anthony Mekunagbe and some others. Most of  
22 them were dead when I went. At that time Sam Bockarie was  
23 a small boy.

24 Q. When you went to Visalah and you met some of these  
12:51:37 25 people there, to your knowledge had a group already entered  
26 Sierra Leone?

27 A. They entered but they couldn't make it. The force  
28 couldn't make it to maintain the ground. For this reason I  
29 was ordered along with some other men to go and march with

1 the remaining men in Visalah to go back to Sierra Leone.

2 That is what I said.

3 Q. Did you enter Sierra Leone?

4 A. Yes."

12:52:05 5 Now, Mr Taylor, he's being quite specific there. Zigzag  
6 Marzah is, in effect, saying he had a special value to you that's  
7 why he had been selected and taken all the way from Schefflein  
8 Highway, on your specific direction, to go to Sierra Leone.  
9 That's what he's saying.

12:52:26 10 A. Well, that's not true. But why is it not true? Until  
11 Marzah came to this Court, the only time we actually heard of  
12 Marzah was carrying arms and ammunition or at least ammunition to  
13 Sierra Leone. That's when he became permanent here, that Marzah,  
14 Sampson Weah, are the individuals that were supposed to be  
12:53:01 15 carrying weapons to Sierra Leone between 1998 and 1999. That's  
16 when Marzah, really - the name Zigzag started coming up.

17 Now, if we go back to this period in question, if this  
18 testimony is true, then that means that all of the other people,  
19 from Isaac Mongor and the witness that we just went through whose  
12:53:29 20 name I cannot call, and all of them, forgot this important  
21 commander between the years 1990 and coming on. They really  
22 forgot him, because he's not mentioned. Marzah comes up  
23 associated with the movement of arms on Benjamin Yeaten's orders.  
24 All of a sudden here is Marzah now being sent. And when he says  
12:53:53 25 here on the very page coming from line 10, "You know when I was  
26 at Visalah at the time at that time most of the Special Forces  
27 were there, like Anthony Mekunagbe and some others, most of them  
28 were dead when I went," I don't know if he's talking about who  
29 was dead when he went, I don't know, but - and I don't want to

1 say that I'm mischaracterising the testimony, but I will want to  
2 assume that he's talking about most of the Special Forces were  
3 dead.

4 Well, Anthony Mekunagbe and these people are the people  
12:54:36 5 that are involved in the Black Kadaffa situation and this happens  
6 later on. So at what point is he talking about? Because when  
7 you begin to talk about Schefflein road and Sierra Leonean  
8 soldiers, we're talking about 1990. The Anthony Mekunagbe and  
9 that whole thing coming late '91/'92, so I don't know if this boy  
12:55:02 10 understands what he's talking about. But in any case, there is  
11 no such thing about this Marzah being called by me.

12 If I had called Marzah or he was so important, how does a  
13 man that is important on the Buchanan Highway, this is a man that  
14 I call upon who is combatting at important combat, this is man  
12:55:34 15 that there is a serious problem in Sierra Leone where he's  
16 called, and at the end of the day - I mean, like the President,  
17 and he ends up as an orderly cleaning Benjamin Yeaten's shoes?  
18 How does that happen for such an important commander that has  
19 struggled and sacrificed his life during the war? Does it make  
12:55:58 20 sense?

21 Q. Mr Taylor, did you ever promote him to general, for  
22 example?

23 A. Never, never.

24 Q. I mean, like Yanks Smythe, did you ever suggest his  
12:56:06 25 important as ambassador somewhere?

26 A. Yanks Smythe?

27 Q. No, no, no. Zigzag Marzah, he's so important. That's why  
28 I ask.

29 A. Never. Never. Never promoted Zigzag Marzah to no general.



1 Never, never.

2 Q. Now, it continues, page 5868:

3 "Q. When you were in Sierra Leone, Mr Witness, did you  
4 ever see Foday Sankoh?

12:56:30 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Tell us about the first time you saw Foday Sankoh in  
7 Sierra Leone.

8 A. You know when we went back and recaptured Koindu as far  
9 as to Buedu, when Foday Sankoh went there I saw him again  
10 when he went to visit us where we had captured and where we  
11 were maintaining.

12 Q. At that time you said you had captured Koindu.

13 A. Koindu including Buedu.

14 Q. What did you observe Foday Sankoh to do when he  
12:57:02 15 arrived?

16 A. Foday Sankoh at that time, at that time that he was  
17 alive, he was a woman man. When he saw the action - when  
18 he saw where the action had taken place, where the  
19 destruction had taken place, he started crying. He started  
12:57:20 20 putting things together. When he saw the other body there,  
21 he would put his hand on his head and he immediately went  
22 to the radio room and called my leader, Charles Taylor, and  
23 said, 'Oh, old man Charles Taylor, the man that is here is  
24 beginning to cry about what was happening here.' That is  
12:57:38 25 Sankoh. Later he told me --

26 Q. 'He' went to the radio room. Who went to the radio  
27 room?

28 A. I went to the radio room and lodged Sankoh's complaint  
29 for him not to confuse the forces that we were moving. He,

1 as leader, cannot see destruction and start crying. That  
2 was my reason for lodging his complaint with  
3 Charles Taylor.

12:58:15 4 Q. And when you say destruction, what was it that Foday  
5 Sankoh saw there in Sierra Leone?

6 A. He saw some of the corpses of soldiers, some corpses of  
7 civilians, some houses burnt. Many things had happened.  
8 We were talking about war.

12:58:37 9 Q. When you say you called - you lodged Sankoh's complaint  
10 for him not to confuse the forces, first of all, when you  
11 went to the radio room who did you call on the radio?

12 A. I called our leader, Charles Taylor. I told him  
13 about Sankoh's behaviour. He is considered as our leader  
14 to fight under him. He should not look at the first  
12:58:57 15 operation and start crying. That was my reason I went into  
16 the radio room and called Charles Taylor to lodge Sankoh's  
17 complaint, and I did that.

18 Q. When you complained about Foday Sankoh's behaviour to  
19 Charles Taylor, how did he respond?

12:59:17 20 A. Over the radio at that time, I think some of the Sierra  
21 Leonean boys called Sankoh and told him that Zigzag is  
22 making a complaint about you to Charles Taylor.

23 Charles Taylor told me to continue the operation and that  
24 he will get used to it, Sankoh will get used to it, but  
12:59:38 25 continue the operation.

26 Q. How long were you in Sierra Leone?

27 A. I spent three or four months, something like that  
28 there.

29 Q. Do you recall what year it was you went into Sierra

1 Leone?

2 A. In 1991. I can't recall the days that we entered  
3 Sierra Leone. I spent a few months before they sent me to  
4 go to the Schefflein Highway."

13:00:08 5 Now, Mr Taylor, was Zigzag Marzah a radio operator to your  
6 knowledge?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you recall ever receiving a radio message from Zigzag  
9 Marzah?

13:00:21 10 A. Never.

11 Q. Complaining about Sankoh being a woman man --

12 A. Never.

13 Q. -- crying at the first sight of corpses?

14 A. Never.

13:00:31 15 Q. Are you sure?

16 A. Very positive. Never.

17 Q. And did you not tell him: "Well, carry on with the  
18 mission. He'll get used to it"?

19 A. Never. Never. And he's saying - 1991 he's saying?

13:00:50 20 Q. In 1991 you sent him there for three months; this was the  
21 first operation; Sankoh is seeing bodies and crying. That's what  
22 he's saying?

23 A. Okay. Well, let's put it in perspective and maybe we'll  
24 untangle the lie. 1991, now, it depends on - we know, this Court

13:01:13 25 I think is a fact, that the invasion of Sierra Leone occurs when?  
26 About March, am I right? March of 1991.

27 Q. Yes.

28 A. I think it's a proven fact before this Court. So if he's  
29 talking about 1991, he must be talking from between March to

1 December that ends 1991. Now, the 1991 entry into Sierra Leone,  
2 there are so many individuals that have claimed here who led  
3 these operations. When we look at the records here, we know that  
4 one of the famous commanders that was supposed to be leading is  
13:02:00 5 Mr Isaac Mongor. He is the man that says he takes over on one  
6 side, and one of the witnesses that we just discussed these other  
7 days - a few days ago, we just ended today - talked about how -  
8 what happened on the Bomi side that certain things happened, and  
9 he kills a Liberian for doing something, and that particular  
13:02:21 10 person we know what happened.

11 Now, but we also had in this courtroom this gentleman, I do  
12 not think he's protected, Perry Kamara, who talked extensively  
13 about these - so all of the people that are associated with the  
14 attack on Sierra Leone and going, I stand corrected, I don't see  
13:02:49 15 anybody mentioning this famous commander called Zigzag Marzah in  
16 these operations in 1991. I may be wrong, but I don't recall  
17 that. So now who is this man now claiming - so if Zigzag Marzah  
18 is one of the principal commanders and is carrying on all these  
19 operations, that these other guys really forgot to talk about  
13:03:14 20 him. They really forgot. Either they forgot, or he's lying or  
21 they're lying. So this boy is not called by me. He doesn't make  
22 any radio call to me. In fact, how would he ever call me? How  
23 would he ever call me? How? It's not possible. So that did not  
24 happen. He lied.

13:03:36 25 Q. Help us with this then, Mr Taylor: Have you heard evidence  
26 to the effect that Foday Sankoh was a trained soldier in the  
27 Sierra Leonean army?

28 A. Yes, he was a trained soldier. I have heard that, yes.

29 Q. And he'd also trained in Libya?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. He was also a radio operator?

3 A. Yes.

13:04:09 4 Q. Now help us, does it surprise you that someone with that  
5 amount of military experience would be crying at the sight of  
6 dead bodies in a war?

7 A. No, not at all.

8 Q. But, help me, if he's a radio operator can you explain why  
9 Zigzag Marzah had to send you a radio message rather than Sankoh  
13:04:31 10 himself?

11 A. None. No reason. No reason. Foday Sankoh had been  
12 involved in a coup d'etat in Sierra Leone, and you want to tell  
13 me in Foday Sankoh's life he had never seen a dead body? This is  
14 total, total nonsense that he's talking here. That Foday Sankoh  
13:04:47 15 is putting his hand on his head and crying and say oh this and  
16 that and he has to call me to report Foday Sankoh. That is not  
17 true. That could never be true.

18 Q. Question, page 5870 line 8:

19 "Q. What were your assignments after you returned to  
13:05:13 20 Liberia?"

21 A. My assignment was with the 1st Battalion, but served so  
22 many units. Within the 1st Battalion we established combat  
23 units which Augustine Weah, who was a Special Forces  
24 commander, was to go as far as Bannerville Estate in  
13:05:35 25 Monrovia."

26 Pause. Augustine Weah?

27 A. There is an Augustine Weah.

28 Q. There is?

29 A. Yes, there was an Augustine Weah, yeah.

1 Q. Who is he?

2 A. He was a Special Force.

3 Q. Bannerville Estate in Monrovia, what's that?

13:05:59

4 A. There is a Bartnersville, B-A-R-T-N-E-R-S-V-I-L-L-E,  
5 Estate. That's on the outskirts of Monrovia.

6 Q. And what - does that have any significant?

7 A. No, no, no. By the time we encircled Monrovia in 1990, by  
8 July/August of 1990 we are in charge of Bartnersville. We  
9 encircle the entire city. It's on the outskirts.

13:06:25

10 Q. So bearing in mind that Marzah says he's in Sierra Leone  
11 for three months in 1991, then returns, in 1991 had Monrovia been  
12 encircled?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 Q. And so Bartnersville was already in NPFL hands, was it?

13:06:46

15 A. Yes. Yes.

16 Q. Now he continues:

17 "Q. You said that you were with the 1st Battalion. Did  
18 you have any other assignments?

19 A. Yes. I can say I served nearly all the units within  
20 the NPFL. I served the 1st Battalion, then I served the  
21 EMPG in Gbarnga. From there I served the Death Squad.  
22 From there I served the Jungle Fire unit. From there I  
23 served the combat unit. So, you know, I was just an  
24 operational man for Charles Taylor.

13:07:33

25 Q. Now, you have mentioned the Death Squad. Can you tell  
26 us what the Death Squad was?

27 A. Yes. The Death Squad was purposely there for  
28 execution. It could be a soldier - in case you were a  
29 soldier and did not go by Charles Taylor's instruction.

1           When he tells you to halt and you did not halt and others  
2           need to execute you, I will execute you, and I did that  
3           twice.

4           Q.   What did you do twice?

13:08:05 5           A.   When I said twice, I mean things that happened more  
6           than 50 times, more than 100 times.  If you ask me to  
7           explain where and how it happened, then of course I will  
8           explain it.

9           Q.   Are you saying that you performed executions?

13:08:24 10          A.   Yes.

11          Q.   Did anyone order you to do these executions?

12          A.   Yes, yes.  I was ordered by Charles Taylor because the  
13          government was a government - was a constitutional  
14          government that was governing the state and people should  
13:08:38 15          not do things without his order.  That is Charles Taylor's  
16          order."

17          Pause there.  Taking things in stages, Mr Taylor, firstly  
18          EMPG, what does that stand for?

19          A.   I don't know.  EMG I know, but not EPMG.

13:09:09 20          Q.   Right, what's EMG?

21          A.   Executive Mansion Guard.

22          Q.   Was there such a unit in Gbarnga?

23          A.   Yes, there was an Executive Mansion Guard unit in Gbarnga.

24          Q.   To your knowledge was Zigzag Marzah a member of that unit?

13:09:24 25          A.   No, not to my knowledge.  I don't think he was.

26          Q.   Did you have a Death Squad, Mr Taylor?

27          A.   No, we didn't have a Death Squad.

28          Q.   Are you sure?

29          A.   I'm very positive.

1 Q. With Zigzag Marzah a member?

2 A. I wouldn't really know. If Zigzag Marzah is saying here  
3 that he participated as a part of an execution squad, that could  
4 very well be. I don't know.

13:09:51 5 Q. But was there a specialist Death Squad?

6 A. No, there was no Death Squad. But if you try people and  
7 the order is signed for execution, okay, whoever participates in  
8 it, there was always a squad that participated based on the  
9 legitimate execution. Now, if he was - if he participated at any  
13:10:13 10 time, I don't know. But there was no Death Squad.

11 Q. Well, understand this, Mr Taylor: You appreciate that  
12 Prosecution witnesses have been divided in this case between  
13 insider witnesses and crime base witnesses. You appreciate that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

13:10:35 15 Q. And you appreciate that Mr Marzah falls into the former of  
16 those two categories, yes?

17 A. Uh-huh

18 Q. What he's saying here is he's the operational man for  
19 Charles Taylor since in about 1991. Do you follow?

13:10:53 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So he's a proper insider. What do you say about that?

22 A. Total nonsense. At least if he was an insider and was  
23 doing all of these great things, he should have been really  
24 compensated for it by giving him something important to do and  
13:11:08 25 not sending him to clean Benjamin Yeaten's boots. Total nonsense  
26 that he's supposed to be - I mean, if these are the insiders then  
27 I swear I need to really be hanged. If he's an insider with  
28 Charles Taylor, this man who comes here and tells this Court he  
29 can't read, he can't write, so what is he an insider on? On



1 what? Total nonsense.

2 Q. He also says this, Mr Taylor - and it connects with a point  
3 I asked you about earlier about the use or condonation by you of  
4 terror tactics. He says this, page 5871 line 10:

13:11:56 5 "Q. I want to ask you - you've told us about in 1991  
6 spending some time, some months, in Sierra Leone. Did you  
7 receive any other - did you perform any other missions to  
8 Sierra Leone?

9 A. In Sierra Leone the instruction I get from  
13:12:14 10 Charles Taylor before moving there to capture the ground -  
11 I will say the truth and nothing but the truth - was that  
12 there should be no consideration. The forces in Freetown  
13 are powerful, so there should be no consideration for the  
14 forces there and you should perform."

13:12:35 15 Do you recall giving such an instruction?

16 A. There was no such instruction. None.

17 Q. Question, page 5871, line 22:

18 "Q. Was there a time when ULIMO forces occupied Lofa  
19 County in Liberia?

13:13:04 20 A. When the ULIMO forces occupied Lofa County, at that  
21 time the Government of Sierra Leone opened the road from  
22 the capital city as far as to Koindu, so there was no way  
23 to go through to Sierra Leone."

24 There was an interruption so this follows:

13:13:28 25 "Q. When we stopped you mentioned there was a time when it  
26 was impossible for you to travel to Sierra Leone because  
27 ULIMO had blocked the road at Lofa County and Sierra  
28 Leonean government forces were on the road to Koidu.  
29 During that time did you ever receive an order related to

1 Sierra Leone?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. What were you asked to do?

4 A. At the time ULIMO was in Lofa we were still in Gbarnga,  
13:13:55 5 that was the headquarters for Charles Taylor, and at that  
6 time Charles Taylor instructed me because there was no one  
7 to penetrate through with ammunition or arms and I was  
8 asked by Charles Taylor and I was ordered by him, he in  
9 fact issued me a Nissan pick-up and gave me 1,600 United  
13:14:25 10 States dollars in order to buy kola nuts to establish  
11 relationship with the border line through Yekepa in Nimba  
12 County which I did.

13 I made two trips with kola nuts and I established  
14 friendship with one Mandingo woman and that Mandingo  
13:14:43 15 woman's husband was a customs officer for Guinea. Later  
16 when I crossed for the first time I offered the man a  
17 balawala bag of kola nuts. At that time a Special Forces  
18 was assigned in Guinea as the Liberian ambassador. I made  
19 two trips and the woman's husband by the name Bangura was  
13:15:10 20 free handed to me. He used to help me to help me put my  
21 kola nuts in the car as far as Kissidougou."

22 And then he was asked about the name he had mentioned and  
23 he said:

24 "... I said the Tiagen Wantee, Special Forces.

13:15:29 25 Q. Did you ever bring anything then through Guinea?

26 A. Yes, it was from that two trips that he was convinced  
27 and he each time I was ready to go at that time I would  
28 carry some ammunition from Charles Taylor, like rockets. I  
29 used to put them in small bags. I would put them inside

1 the kola nuts that had the balawala bags and each time I  
2 crossed I will offer Bangura some kola nut bags. From  
3 there he would escort me as far as Kissidougou. And at  
4 that time the late Musa Cisse had a Mandingo friend that  
13:16:09 5 used to come with Tiagen Wantee who used to collect these  
6 kola nuts and they would take it to the Liberian embassy."  
7 And then he goes on to give further description, which I'll  
8 come to, but let's just pause there. Firstly, do you understand  
9 what's being said here, Mr Taylor? ULIMO cuts the border, they  
13:16:32 10 occupy Lofa County. You can't get arms to the RUF in Sierra  
11 Leone so you assign this important individual, Zigzag Marzah, to  
12 find an alternative route through Guinea. Do you follow?  
13 A. Yes, I do.  
14 Q. You arm him with a pick-up truck, a Nissan, to boot, and  
13:17:00 15 \$1,600 US. He uses that to establish contact with the Guinean  
16 authorities in order to ease the passage through Guinea. What do  
17 you know about that, Mr Taylor?  
18 A. I even think Mr Koumjian was surprised by this answer.  
19 Look, 1991/1992, this man is telling me that I have an ambassador  
13:17:28 20 in Guinea called Tiagen Wantee. Look, there is a Special Force  
21 called Tiagen Wantee. There's an ambassador called Tiagen  
22 Wantee. Tiagen Wantee is sent as ambassador from Charles Taylor,  
23 my government, to the Republic of Guinea after I'm elected  
24 President in 1997. How can I send an ambassador to a country  
13:18:02 25 when I'm not President? How this boy can make up this kind of  
26 lie, I don't understand. 1991/'92, I have an ambassador in  
27 Guinea? How is that possible? I'm still - I'm not even in  
28 Monrovia. I'm not even in Monrovia. I'm not President of  
29 Liberia. What kind of ambassador --

1 Q. No, Mr Taylor, sorry to interrupt you. I think we need to  
2 take things in stages. First of all, he begins with the  
3 occupation of Lofa County by ULIMO.

4 A. Yes.

13:18:33 5 Q. Now, give us a time frame for that.

6 A. The occupation is completed by 1992, the ending of 1992.

7 Q. And when is that lifted?

8 A. After I'm elected as President in July 1997. So why do I  
9 need --

13:18:49 10 Q. So hold that thought. So during this period then, that is  
11 the time frame we're talking about, '92 to '97, you can't get  
12 arms to the RUF so you're looking for an alternative route. Now,  
13 during that period, '92 to '97, does the NPFL have an ambassador  
14 Tiagen Wantee in Guinea?

13:19:12 15 A. No, no.

16 Q. Well, after 1997, after you are elected President and you  
17 do have an ambassador Tiagen Wantee in Guinea --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- why would you need to find a route through Guinea to get  
13:19:30 20 arms to the RUF?

21 A. Well, we need to find out from first - this is where this  
22 lie comes up. The road is open. I'm President of Liberia. Why  
23 do I have to go - and maybe we need to look at a - from where  
24 this man is talking --

13:19:45 25 Q. Well, let's have a look at a map.

26 A. Why would I have to travel through Guinea when I can drive  
27 through Lofa, Voinjama, Kolahun, Foya into - I have to go through  
28 Guinea, a thousand miles, when it would take me maybe a couple of  
29 hundred miles to go?

- 1 Q. Well, let's have a look at this map, first of all. And  
2 we're looking at this map in order to identify where Yekepa is  
3 mentioned by the witness. Okay? Where is it, Mr Taylor? Just  
4 change seats for a moment and tell us. And this is a map you can  
13:20:23 5 mark, if necessary. Where is Yekepa?  
6 A. Here is Yekepa up here.  
7 Q. And this is at a time when you're based in Gbarnga?  
8 A. That is correct.  
9 Q. Just help us, where is Gbarnga?  
13:21:01 10 A. There's Gbarnga here.  
11 Q. Gbarnga?  
12 A. Excuse me. Here is Gbarnga here.  
13 Q. Now, what is being suggested is, you give him this Nissan  
14 and the \$1,600 and he then sets up a route through Yekepa. Now,  
13:21:25 15 just help us, Mr Taylor. From Yekepa, how do you get from Sierra  
16 Leone?  
17 A. Do you want me to mark it? You will have to travel --  
18 Q. I think what we need to do, can we just reduce the size of  
19 the map on the screen for a bit so we can see all the way around  
13:21:44 20 Sierra Leone to get through to Kailahun. Let's just use Kailahun  
21 as a point, for argument's sake. Where do you have to go?  
22 A. You will have to come from Yekepa. You would travel to  
23 Lola. You will have to Nzerekore. You have to travel to  
24 Macenta. You have to come all the way up here to Gueckedou  
13:22:15 25 before you come down to Kailahun.  
26 Q. Now, tell me, Mr Taylor, if you're in Gbarnga, wouldn't it  
27 be easier to go through, say, Ganta? There's another route going  
28 north from Gbarnga. Wouldn't it be easier to do that to get into  
29 Guinea if you want to go into Sierra Leone?

1 A. If you want to get into Sierra Leone, at the period he's  
2 talk about - I'm not just in Gbarnga. I'm in Monrovia now, at  
3 the time he's talking about.

13:22:45 4 Q. No, no, no. He's talking about a time when Lofa is being  
5 cut off by ULIMO.

6 A. Okay, so if you really want to get into Sierra Leone, there  
7 are several places you could come from. Ganta. You can also -  
8 even closer, you could come from Gbarnga. You can come from  
9 Gbarnga, straight to Yomou. Okay, you can come - there is a road  
13:23:05 10 here. Camp Naama is up in here. You can cross the border from  
11 Camp Naama to Yomou.

12 Q. So, Mr Taylor, help us, why would you want to go via  
13 Yekepa?

14 A. There is no reason. That's why it didn't happen, because  
13:23:22 15 he doesn't know what he's talking about. He's lying that we  
16 would have to come to - he's supposed to travel with kola nut all  
17 the way here, but that's a blatant lie.

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, Tiagen Wantee, we've seen a letter from  
19 him, haven't we?

13:23:46 20 A. That's right, we have.

21 Q. That's a letter dated 12 August 1998?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. From the embassy of Liberia in Conakry, yes?

24 A. That is correct.

13:23:55 25 Q. And it's signed by Tiagen Wantee, ambassador?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. You recall that letter, do you?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. It's the letter mentioning that one Major Eddie Kanneh,

1 former Secretary of State of the defunct military junta, on 8  
2 August 1998, called on me and provided some confidential  
3 information regarding security threats against the Liberian  
4 government, and then went on to mention Sam Bockarie and one  
13:24:24 5 Mr Sheriff, assistant director of the special security services,  
6 yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That's the Tiagen Wantee we're talk about, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

13:24:33 10 Q. When was he appointed Liberian ambassador to Guinea?

11 A. He was appointed, I would say, late '97, early '98, when we  
12 were making diplomatic assignments.

13 Q. Now, by that time, Mr Taylor, what was the position so far  
14 as ULIMO were concerned in Lofa County?

13:24:56 15 A. There was no ULIMO. ULIMO had been dissolved. They had  
16 men in this particular area, ULIMO - former - I would say former  
17 ULIMO soldiers are in Lofa.

18 Q. Now, you will recall, Mr Taylor, that in October 1997, a  
19 couple of months after your inauguration, it is said that you  
13:25:19 20 were busy organising the Magburaka shipment, do you recall?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, help me, then, Mr Taylor, why are you at this time  
23 assigning Zigzag Marzah to find a route through Guinea to get to  
24 the RUF? Why?

13:25:36 25 A. Because it didn't happen. There is no why to that. It  
26 didn't happen. Why would I - yes, why? Why would I need to do  
27 that? If there are ammunitions to carry to Sierra Leone, why  
28 would anybody want to travel all the way through Guinea with the  
29 chances of getting arrested by Guinean authorities for transiting

1 arms through their country, and here I am right here, all I have  
2 to do is to get the arms and drive it through Zorzor, Voinjama,  
3 Kolahun, Foya and into Sierra Leone.

13:26:15 4 Q. Of course, Mr Taylor, Lansana Conte was a very good friend  
5 of yours, wasn't he?

6 A. To say the least, Lansana and I had problems, so there was  
7 no way he would have been happy to have caught one rifle coming  
8 from Liberia from my side. He would have been really, really  
9 happy for that.

13:26:28 10 Q. But you even had your ambassador, Tiagen Wantee, a former  
11 Special Forces, involved in this. Why were you doing that?

12 A. It just didn't happen. That's how - he couldn't construct  
13 this lie any better. Total, total, total falsehood, that I would  
14 leave the whole Liberian territory as President and go from here,  
13:26:51 15 track all the way, Lola, Nzerekore, Macenta, Gueckedou, and come  
16 all the way down when all I have to do is to drive right through,  
17 the same way he, Zigzag Marzah, sat down here and said that he  
18 used to carry ammunition along with other people. So why didn't  
19 he continue using this route through Guinea? Why did he say he  
13:27:18 20 travelled through Voinjama, if at all he went? He's just lying.  
21 That's all he's doing.

22 Q. Whilst we're on that map, Mr Taylor, where is Kissidougou?

23 A. Kissidougou, I'm not - I don't see it on this map, but  
24 Kissidougou would be, I would suspect, somewhere I would say - I  
13:27:46 25 don't know Guinea very well, but it would be somewhere around the  
26 Gueckedou, Kissidougou, I think it would be going in this  
27 direction. I'm not too certain, but it's not in this part of the  
28 country because the largest town is Nzerekore. Macenta is here.  
29 That should be anywhere around Gueckedou or up this end.



1 Q. Now do you mind going back to your normal chair, please,  
2 Mr Taylor, and we can put that map away. And the witness says:

3 "At time that the late Musa Cisse had a Mandingo friend who  
4 used to come with Tiagen Wantee who used to collect the kola  
13:28:50 5 nuts, and they would take it to the Liberian embassy."

6 Know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. That never happened, no. Not even - no, it never happened.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point?

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we'll take the lunch break now and  
13:29:04 10 resume at 2.30.

11 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

12 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, before the break we were looking at the  
14:31:17 15 suggestion made by Mr Marzah that on your instructions he had  
16 sought to establish a route through Guinea for the transport of  
17 arms at a time when you had an ambassador in Guinea called Tiagen  
18 Wantee, yes? Now continuing with that account, because I want  
19 you to have an opportunity to deal with this, page 5873 line 28:

14:31:55 20 "Q. We understand that you said that the Mandingo friend  
21 of Musa Cisse would collect the kola nuts and take it to  
22 the embassy. Did they collect anything else, anything  
23 besides kola nuts from you?

24 A. Musa Cisse is not my friend. Musa Cisse is not my  
14:32:23 25 friend."

26 There was a bit of misunderstanding, so it continues at  
27 line 11:

28 "Q. Was it only kola nuts that you were giving to this  
29 person?

1 A. No, no. The first two trips were to establish  
2 relationship with the securities for them to be convinced  
3 that I am a businessman, but the rest of the other eight or  
4 eleven trips I had some ammos with some rockets inclusive  
14:32:54 5 and when I carried it sometimes I would give Bangura two  
6 bags of balawala kola nut bags and he would be encouraged  
7 to escort me as far as Kissidougou and then the Liberian  
8 ambassador, a Special Forces, Tiagen Wantee would come  
9 along with Musa Cisse's friend to receive these items,  
14:33:22 10 which were kola nuts mixed up with these ammunition, to  
11 receive them from me and take them as far as Conakry at the  
12 Liberian embassy. That is what I said here sitting here.

13 Q. Thank you. Do you have any information about what the  
14 ultimate destination of these weapons was or ammunition?  
14:33:46 15 Was it only to go to the embassy in Conakry?

16 A. No, no. There was something when Tiagen carry it the  
17 late Jungle, commonly known as Daniel Tamba, he knew the  
18 jungle between Guinea and Sierra Leone and he would take it  
19 from the embassy and he would carry it. So Jungle too was  
14:34:10 20 assigned with Tiagen Wantee and that was his mission for  
21 which he was assigned there and my own mission was to take  
22 it from Gbarnga from Charles Taylor to escort it as far as  
23 Kissidougou. That was what I said.

24 Q. Where exactly in Gbarnga did you get the ammunition and  
14:34:33 25 rockets?

26 A. From the mansion. From Charles Taylor's mansion at  
27 Bofell Hill. That was where the ammunitions were stored in  
28 his warehouse."

29 Now, Mr Taylor, sorry to trouble you but I want you to

1 change places, please, and I would like the witness to be shown  
2 map P-1, which is a map of West Africa. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing  
3 in mind what you told us earlier, you remember indicating where  
4 Yekepa is, yes?

14:35:41 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Bearing that as a reference point in mind, okay, the  
7 witness says the material will be taken from White Flower, your  
8 residence, through Yekepa where he'd established links with the  
9 customs officer, yes?

14:36:03 10 A. Uh-huh.

11 Q. Around to Kissidougou, yes?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. Where it would be handed over to your ambassador Tiagen  
14 Wantee, a Special Forces, yes?

14:36:15 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Along with Musa Cisse. They would then take it all the way  
17 around Sierra Leone to Conakry where the embassy was, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And there it would be picked up by Jungle?

14:36:29 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. Who would then take it through the jungle, because he knew  
22 the jungle well, to Sierra Leone?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, why did you do that?

14:36:41 25 A. Counsel, I think - I'm sure the Prosecutor - you know, in  
26 asking your question the other side will say - I think you're  
27 talking about the Executive Mansion in Gbarnga and I think you  
28 said Musa Cisse's friend, because I'm sure you're going to be  
29 accused of misrepresenting the evidence, so. Well, the route -

1 if I can just trace it? I'm not going to mark. He's talking  
2 about coming from here, travelling through Kankan.

3 Q. Kissidougou?

4 A. Okay. Well, I don't see Kissidougou here, but this is  
14:37:40 5 Kankan which is not too far, but the route would be from here all  
6 the way down here to Conakry. That means that they would have to  
7 take the weapons back up here to Kailahun. That's what this  
8 witness is saying.

9 Q. Well, we don't know which route they took, it's just given  
14:38:07 10 to Jungle, who knows the jungle, being Jungle, and he would then  
11 take it?

12 A. So if he is here in Conakry, that means if he comes on this  
13 side he's talking about Freetown but I think the original area  
14 was Kailahun. I mean --

14:38:20 15 Q. Mr Taylor, let's break it down. When there was a White  
16 Flower in Gbarnga, page 5875 --

17 A. There was never, ever --

18 Q. -- did you have an ambassador in Guinea?

19 A. No. There was no White Flower in Gbarnga and I didn't have  
14:38:39 20 an ambassador in Guinea. Ambassadors are only sent by  
21 Presidents. Tiagen Wantee did not go as ambassador to Guinea  
22 until about late '97, '98 when I was receiving and sending out  
23 envoys. So there's no White Flower. White Flower is the code  
24 that was given to my place in Monrovia after I became President.  
14:39:02 25 But I do not know - this shows this man's mentality. Someone  
26 would have to travel from here, drive all the way to Conakry and  
27 then drive all the way back or however this Jungle - Jungle now  
28 ends up now with the embassy now in Conakry.

29 Counsel, in direct answer to your question, there was no

1 such thing that went on. No such thing went on about somebody  
2 calling himself Marzah traversing throughout Guinea, come to the  
3 embassy and bringing a bag with Jungle or Jungle coming back all  
4 the way here into - because we're talking about Kailahun

14:39:52 5 District. It did not happen.

6 Q. But he says that he did that on - the first two trips was  
7 to establish a relationship and then he did another eight to  
8 eleven trips. Mr Taylor, how could he have been doing so many  
9 trips and you know nothing about it?

14:40:12 10 A. Because it never happened. Because it just - even he - he  
11 never, never, never - even he could have never gone that way.  
12 You will go through Guinea ten times coming throughout Guinea  
13 with ammunition, two try and eight, you are not arrested, you are  
14 not stopped, nothing happens and Jungle is waiting here? How did

14:40:40 15 Jungle get from Kailahun right here when all they had to do was  
16 to come into around we're talking about here I think because  
17 Gueckedou would be somewhere here, Kissidougou would be around  
18 here. You pass this whole place. It's similar to climbing up a  
19 plum tree, marking the plums and coming down and stoning them.

14:41:06 20 What is this? This never happened, counsel. It never happened.  
21 Never happened.

22 What logic is this that I would send a man that would leave  
23 from here and travel all the way to Conakry, go to Jungle here  
24 and come and then Jungle would travel through what jungle, to  
14:41:24 25 what bush, and come all the way back here to Kailahun District?

26 Q. But, Mr Taylor, let me ask you something else. You've  
27 already explained that not being President until 1997, at the  
28 time when ULIMO had control of Lofa County, just on the basis of  
29 this logic, justifying the need to establish this outer route,

1 you've already told us you didn't have an ambassador in Guinea?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Was there a Liberian ambassador in Guinea at that time?

4 A. Of course I'm sure there would have been. I did not know

14:42:02 5 who the ambassador was because at the --

6 Q. Which government would have appointed an ambassador to

7 Guinea at the time when Lofa was controlled by ULIMO?

8 A. Oh, boy. Let's see. That would have been the government

9 of Professor Kpormakor. I think it was Professor Kpormakor.

14:42:28 10 That is on the records because that gives me a hard time as a

11 surname. But it's Kpormakor. That would have been that time

12 but --

13 Q. He would have been what?

14 A. The head of the transitional government in Monrovia at the

14:42:43 15 time in question, Professor Kpormakor.

16 Q. So he would have had responsibility for appointing an

17 ambassador to Guinea?

18 A. Yes, at that particular time and I really don't know who

19 that person is, or was.

14:42:55 20 Q. Following your election you then appoint Tiagen Wantee as

21 your ambassador to Guinea?

22 A. Yes, after my election, yes, I appoint - we are making

23 changes, I appoint Tiagen Wantee as ambassador to Guinea.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, just before we leave this topic, can you explain

14:43:20 25 the logic behind sending this man Zigzag Marzah, as he suggests,

26 on this roundabout route to meet up with an ambassador who wasn't

27 appointed until years after the event? Why did you do that?

28 A. I don't understand his logic, but that shows the man.

29 That's all I can say this man. This is a situation that defies

1 all logic, that I'm sending to somebody that is not ambassador,  
2 I'm not President, they are going - it's like passing the point  
3 going hundreds - thousands of - because from - from here to  
4 Conakry, from - I know from Nzerekore to Conakry is about 1,200  
14:44:15 5 miles, so from about this point, which is Lola, to Conakry, I'll  
6 put it to about 1,000 miles, will go 1,000 miles and then come  
7 back maybe another 700 miles. That's the person that we have  
8 talking about this that does not know what he is talking about.  
9 It's a lie.

14:44:46 10 Q. Let's put that map away, please, and could you retake your  
11 seat, please, Mr Taylor. One other detail before we move on.  
12 Bofell Hill?

13 A. Yes, there is a Bofell Hill. There is a Bofell Hill.

14 Q. With a was located at Bofell Hill?

14:45:11 15 A. Bofell Hill is where the famous radio station that we  
16 called here Treetop, that was the military headquarters at Bofell  
17 Hill.

18 Q. Was there a mansion which you used at Bofell Hill?

19 A. No, no, no, the mansion that I used in Gbarnga was not at  
14:45:29 20 Bofell Hill. It was across, on the other side from Bofell Hill.

21 Q. How far away from Bofell Hill?

22 A. Not very far. I will say about 2.5, 3 city blocks.

23 Q. Now, before we move on, Mr Taylor, a point of detail: Did  
24 you have a white male working for you at any stage with a big  
14:45:59 25 stomach?

26 A. A white male?

27 Q. Mmm, with a big stomach. I'm sorry, I can't provide you  
28 with any other identifying details.

29 A. No. Never had a white - white man - white Caucasian

1 working for me, no.

2 Q. Have a listen to this, page 5875, line 13:

3 "Q. After ULIMO disarmed, did you make any trips to Sierra  
4 Leone?"

14:46:33 5 So this is after the period when he is making eight - well,  
6 10 to 13 trips around through Guinea, yes?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. "Q. After ULIMO disarmed, did you make any trips to Sierra  
9 Leone?"

14:46:47 10 A. Plenty times. Plenty times. At that time the road was  
11 free to me. Many times. If you ask I will name them.

12 Q. Can you just give us an estimate of how many trips you  
13 made to Sierra Leone? Give us some idea.

14 A. I made trips to Sierra Leone at the time Mosquito was  
14:47:10 15 there, up to Issa Sesay's administration, so it was more  
16 than 20, 30 to 40 trips.

17 Q. Thank you. On those trips would you carry anything to  
18 or from Sierra Leone?

19 A. Yes, I carried arms, ammos, including some artillery  
14:47:35 20 pieces, chasers. We had one of Charles Taylor's friends, a  
21 white guy with a big stomach. He used to bring some  
22 artillery pieces. I escorted it there so many times."

23 What's that about, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I have no idea. I have no - a white guy with a big  
14:48:00 25 stomach? You know - I see. I - this - the only thing I can help  
26 this Court with on this, this could be - and I suggest could be -  
27 the connection that maybe he was trying - he was tutored to make  
28 about Guus Kouwenhoven. That's the line connection they are  
29 trying to make. He doesn't know how to make it. I'm not sure if



1 this is what he is talking about, but a white man with a big  
2 stomach. This is the other little tangent that I - we probably  
3 will see.

14:48:59 4 Q. Now, were you sending - was Guus Kouwenhoven, the man with  
5 the big stomach, bringing artillery pieces to you?

6 A. Guus Kouwenhoven does have a little tummy, but he never  
7 dealt in ammunition and that's how he got hooked up with the lie  
8 and was freed in a Dutch Court. But I'm trying to say that there  
9 is some little nexus I can see coming up here trying to say  
14:49:19 10 there's a white man with a big stomach bringing ammunition, which  
11 never happened. Guus never dealt with - I'm not saying that  
12 that's what he is saying. We're are not misinterpreting the  
13 evidence. I'm just saying that I'm beginning to see how people's  
14 lives get destroyed with these things. So, now, there's a white  
14:49:39 15 man here who is bringing ammunition, that never happened. But I  
16 can - now I'm reflecting to see how he got involved in ammunition  
17 business.

18 Q. Now, artillery pieces, Mr Taylor. Now, were you  
19 transporting artillery pieces to the RUF?

14:49:58 20 A. No. And the period he is talking about here, if you go  
21 back to the beginning, if I'm right, after ULIMO disarmed, so he  
22 is talking about the disarmament period. And here we have  
23 ECOMOG, the UN going across the country disarming, I'm supposed  
24 to be hiding artillery and he is supposed to be carrying it out.  
14:50:21 25 So now, if we're talking about anything here, after ULIMO  
26 disarmed, we are talking about late 1996. That's the period that  
27 this man's got to be talking about now because that's the  
28 disarmament period. Disarmament ends in December 1996. By  
29 January 1997, all factions are disbanded and we begin the whole

1 process going towards election in July 1997. So we can see what  
2 he is talking about here, at the time that this ammunition is  
3 supposed to be going into Sierra Leone. Now he is not going all  
4 the way to Conakry. He is going straight now, by late 1996.

14:51:05 5 Q. 40 trips.

6 A. Which is even impossible because even - even after  
7 disarmament, who in Liberia with Victor Malu would have been able  
8 to move one inch with a weapon? Victor Malu was a very, very  
9 strict and tough general in charge of ECOMOG's 18,000 troops in  
10 Liberia and I don't know who would have been moving up and down  
11 with arms, ammunition and artillery 30 to 40 times.

12 Q. You remember, among the items he said he carried were  
13 chasers. "Chasers," he explained over the page, page 5876, "was  
14 purposefully for jet bombers. At that time the ECOMOG troops  
15 were in Freetown. The chaser was for the jet bombers because  
16 they were giving us a hard time." You understand what he is  
17 saying, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. You were supplying the RUF with anti-aircraft weapons.  
20 Chasers. Were you?

21 A. No. Not at all. The last time I've heard about chasers  
22 was when? 1997 at Magburaka when they said that ammunition was  
23 brought or supposed to be a chaser, there was supposed to be  
24 anti-aircraft on that and there was a man on board called  
25 Commander Musa that was sent to train the people, and that's the  
26 last time I heard about chasers in this Court. Never, never,  
27 never sent any anti-aircraft stuff to Sierra Leone. Never.

28 Q. "Q. You've talked about these trips to Sierra Leone. Were  
29 you doing these on your own or were you doing them pursuant

1 to orders?

2 A. No. I will say the truth and nothing but the truth,  
3 and at this time I can't recall most of those things, but  
4 at this present moment I will tell you, Ecclesiastes  
14:53:16 5 Chapter 3 says that everything happens three times. It is  
6 now the time for me to tell you the truth. I took direct  
7 instructions from Charles Taylor. I have not said any  
8 other person. And it was a government that had a  
9 constitution that governed the country led by him, Charles  
14:53:36 10 Taylor, so anything we did was by his orders."

11 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor? It's you.

12 A. Ecclesiastes Chapter 3 says everything happens three times?  
13 Oh, God. Well, that's not my - well, this thing this boy is  
14 talking about, it never happened, counsel. But it shows you what  
14:54:00 15 we're dealing with, Ecclesiastes Chapter 3 says everything  
16 happens three times. That's not what I know about Ecclesiastes.  
17 But to answer your question, what this boy explained here, it  
18 never happened, ever. Never.

19 Q. "Q. The ammunition and arms that you carried, where did  
14:54:27 20 you get them from, these that you took to Sierra Leone?

21 A. Mostly some were kept in his house at White Flower.  
22 And at times when they rush to take a plane."

23 And it was obviously confused with "Russian" as opposed to  
24 "rush" to take a plane. So he continues:

14:54:45 25 "THE WITNESS: When the Russian cargo goes, when the  
26 Russian cargo plane, a big plane.

27 A. At times when the cargo plane came at a late hour  
28 sometimes we will go to the airport, and then whilst I  
29 would be going to White Flower I would take some to his

1 house and by Charles Taylor's directive I would take some  
2 straight to Sierra Leone."

3 So he would take it off the Russian cargo plane, take some  
4 to White Flower, your mansion, and the rest to Sierra Leone,

14:55:18 5 Mr Taylor. That's a very direct allegation this man is making  
6 against you. What do you say about that?

7 A. That is so false. And I do not know the legal thing for  
8 this, but if this is an allegation, then I swear - then I don't  
9 know what's going to happen to me in this Court, because this is  
14:55:44 10 what I call a lie. This - well, total lie. Total, total, total.

11 Q. Now, he goes on after that to deal with another topic,  
12 diamonds, page 5877. Now, again, Mr Taylor, I want you to have  
13 the opportunity to defend yourself against these allegations, so  
14 I listen to what he is saying:

14:56:20 15 "Q. When you were in Sierra Leone did you ever see  
16 diamonds?

17 A. I saw diamonds many times. Many times I saw diamonds  
18 and I escorted diamonds to Charles Taylor and that he  
19 himself can attest to, if he can say the truth."

14:56:41 20 So now is your chance, Mr Taylor:

21 "Q. When you took diamonds to Charles Taylor were you  
22 always alone, or did you do that in the company of others?

23 A. Most of the staff would be present like Benjamin  
24 Yeaten, Musa Cisse, Kai who was the houseboy to him, so  
14:57:03 25 many officials, but mainly when I was ready to hand them  
26 over to him maybe two or three people will be in his  
27 private office.

28 Q. Did you ever escort anyone else carrying diamonds from  
29 Sierra Leone?

1 A. Yes, I escorted diamonds over 10 to 15 times, but the  
2 one that was actually encouraging was the passport sized  
3 diamond in the shape of a human body [sic]. That was the  
4 one that encouraged him and I was not alone that carried  
14:57:38 5 it. I went along with Mosquito, Benjamin Yeaten and Joe  
6 Tuah. We entered in the fence and it was something heavy.  
7 It was a passport sized diamond. It was big. It was  
8 actually big.

9 Q. Now, Mr Witness, I want to ask you about this occasion  
14:57:58 10 what you called a passport sized diamond. You mentioned  
11 Mosquito and can you make it clear which person you are  
12 referring to on this occasion when you say 'Mosquito'?

13 A. Sam Bockarie.

14 Q. When you first saw this diamond were you in Liberia, or  
14:58:14 15 were you in some other place?

16 A. In Sierra Leone. When I went to Sierra Leone with  
17 ammos Mosquito showed me this diamond and a few other  
18 diamonds that were around it, and from there we took the  
19 diamonds to Monrovia at White Flower to Charles Taylor and  
14:58:32 20 again I saw the diamond, yes.

21 Q. Now this, particular diamond you said was shaped like a  
22 human head. Can you just show us with your hands or  
23 fingers how big the stone was?"

24 And he goes on to deal with that. I'm not interested in  
14:58:51 25 that. So let's go on. Page 5879, line 22:

26 "A. When I went and Sam Bockarie showed me the diamond I  
27 said, 'Oh, this particular one, if Charles Taylor sees it  
28 he will be very happy', because at that time he used to  
29 call him Father. If he saw it he would be happy. And when

1 we took it along Charles Taylor was impressed and he gave  
2 us some money and we took enough ammo back to Sierra Leone.  
3 What happened to that diamond passport size and shape like  
4 a human body, Mr Taylor? What did you do with it.

14:59:30 5 A. There was no such thing that this boy ever did with me or  
6 bringing me a human - he is used to maybe human beings and he's  
7 lucky that his case never came before me of eating human beings.  
8 There was no human head looking diamond nothing. Can you imagine  
9 how big a diamond would have to be to be what he called passport  
14:59:56 10 size picture? That would be a diamond that I - I mean, in fact  
11 you - a diamond of that size would never be kept secret because,  
12 number one, even if it was ever sold it would be published  
13 because any diamond that is found anywhere in the world in excess  
14 of maybe 50 carat, it's always public information. A diamond  
15:00:21 15 that size we're talking about, what, maybe 200 carats and it  
16 would just go and nobody would ever find it? It's looking like a  
17 human head and all this thing here. This is not true. This is  
18 not true.

19 Q. Now, do you recall some testimony to the effect, Mr Taylor,  
15:00:50 20 that the first time Sam Bockarie tried to get to you with some  
21 diamonds they had to turn back because of ECOMOG? Do you recall  
22 that?

23 A. Yes, that was supposed to be the diamonds that he took from  
24 Johnny Paul Koroma, there's so many bags of diamonds that he  
15:01:07 25 came, couldn't see me, had to leave it, took some ammunition. I  
26 recall that.

27 Q. Yes. Then there was another occasion when he came back,  
28 yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And gave you some diamonds?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Did that include this big one?

4 A. There was no such - no such thing that ever happened, no.

15:01:27 5 No.

6 Q. But the witness goes on, Mr Taylor:

7 "Q. Now were you actually present when Bockarie gave  
8 the diamond to Taylor?

9 A. I told you that Bockarie and I took these diamonds from  
10 Sierra Leone to Taylor and he hand delivered it in my  
11 presence and after delivering it he offered an envelope to  
12 each and every one of us.

13 Q. What was in the envelope?

14 A. Money, United States dollars, US dollars. Mine was  
15 roughly - was about 2,000 plus. Because it has taken a  
16 long time I can't give you the accurate amount but it was  
17 above more than \$2,000 US but Sam Bockarie's own was a  
18 little heavier but he didn't open it in my presence."  
19 What do you say, Mr Taylor?

15:02:20 20 A. This boy is just a liar. That's all he is. It's a  
21 blatant, blatant lie. A blatant, blatant lie. Sam Bockarie  
22 would have such a diamond and he would bring it to me and  
23 Foday Sankoh would come out of jail he would not tell him about  
24 it. In fact the size of diamond this boy is describing where I  
15:02:43 25 would say when he says a passport sized diamond where I would put  
26 it to minimum 200 carats, that diamond would be worth so much  
27 money there is no way it would be hidden and he only got, what,  
28 \$2,000? That's not true, counsel. This never, ever happened.  
29 Never.

1 And, you know, at least all the other witnesses that came  
2 here that talked even about diamonds that they allege which I'm  
3 sure people coming here will be able to testify never reached to  
4 me, they never mentioned this passport sized diamond, so maybe it  
15:03:24 5 was a big secret. That never happened, that's why nobody knew  
6 about it.

7 Q. Now I need to ask you about another passage because it  
8 raises another issue. Page 5882 line 19:

9 "Q. After this delivery of diamonds did Sam Bockarie ever  
15:03:54 10 return to Liberia?

11 A. When he gave these diamonds Charles Taylor gave us some  
12 money and the next day called G4 Moses and Kai. Yes, he  
13 went back do Liberia, Sam Bockarie went back to Liberia."  
14 Pause. Who is G4 Moses?

15:04:15 15 A. There's an individual I said Moses, there's a Moses Duoh, I  
16 mentioned that name the other day, that worked with the SSS in  
17 the SSS department. They used to call him - that's the only  
18 Moses I know.

19 Q. G4?

15:04:31 20 A. Well, but the G4 is - the G4 in the army as far as I know  
21 is a supply area. I don't know why they used to call him G4  
22 Moses. He used to work in the SSS supplies.

23 Q. This Moses is a Moses Ngai, N-G-A-I. Do you know such a  
24 Moses?

15:04:58 25 A. No.

26 Q. Have you seen line 25?

27 A. Yeah. No, I don't know that Moses. The only Moses I know  
28 is Moses Duoh. That's the only Moses I know.

29 Q. And then he goes on:



1 "... The G4 Moses Duoh is different and Kai who was  
2 assigned directly under Taylor is different. But it was  
3 Kai who had the warehouse key, the two warehouses from  
4 where we used to get the material from. The ammo warehouse  
15:05:34 5 that was attached to Charles Taylor's house that faced the  
6 other side, it was Kai who had the key. But before getting  
7 the ammos it was G4 Moses who was in charge. Before you  
8 take the ammos and the arms you will stand before him. He  
9 will take the papers and then he will give it to Moses and  
10 Moses would take the papers to Charles Taylor for him to  
11 sign them.

12 Q. So, Mr Witness, was it necessary in order to obtain  
13 ammunition that you have a paper signed by Charles Taylor?

14 A. Most times, yes, yes. Any ammo that we received, they  
15:06:20 15 would bring document, we sign and then Moses will take it  
16 to Kai and Kai will take it to Charles Taylor based upon  
17 the amounts that we were receiving to carry, but he cannot  
18 sign it. We who would be receiving it, we signed for it."

19 Now, Mr Taylor, 40 or so trips signed for. Help us. Where  
15:06:51 20 are those documents bearing your signature attesting to these  
21 ammunition being dispersed from White Flower? Where are they?

22 A. I haven't seen them. There was no such thing, so I haven't  
23 seen them.

24 Q. What about your archives, Mr Taylor? Have you diligently  
15:07:09 25 gone through your archives to see if there are any of these  
26 chi ts?

27 A. There would never be any of those because it didn't happen.  
28 I didn't have to sign for anything coming from the SSS. So I  
29 could go from now until judgment and they would not be there

1 because there were no such signatures required from me for  
2 supplies coming from SSS. The President signing for the Secret  
3 Service? No.

15:07:45 4 Q. Now, bear in mind, Mr Taylor, the witness has said he comes  
5 with Bockarie with this passport sized diamond, okay?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. It's important that we get the sequence. Thereafter arms  
8 and ammunition are issued and the witness continues, page 5883  
9 line 17:

15:08:06 10 "After we had given the diamond to Charles Taylor we spent  
11 a day in Monrovia. The following day Sam Bockarie returned. I  
12 escorted him to Buedu with enough ammos, rockets, GPMGs, about 50  
13 new ones with belt" - I'm sure that should be feed.

14 A. No, I think it's right. Belt felt.

15:08:37 15 Q. Belt felt. What is that?

16 A. What the - I'm sure there are maybe a lot of people here  
17 that may have a better idea. The belt felt is the belt that the  
18 ammo - they push ammunition in these belts and as they fire they  
19 either cut or go - they are called belt felt, not fed.

15:09:04 20 Q. Okay.

21 "Q. Sir, did you ever see Sam Bockarie return with  
22 diamonds to Liberia?"

23 Now listen carefully to the following:

15:09:20 24 "A. Yes, when we went with the material under the  
25 directives of Charles Taylor, before we arrived Issa  
26 brought some diamonds."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, remember previous testimony: Issa goes to  
28 Monrovia with diamonds which are supposed to end up in Burkina  
29 Faso for arms. You remember that?

1 A. Uh-huh.

2 Q. And the diamonds go missing, yes?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. Listen:

15:09:44 5 "Before we arrived Issa brought some diamonds in a small  
6 jar, just like this glass here", and the witness was  
7 indicating a glass on the table in front of him, "but the  
8 mouth was small, almost to the end of the jar, and we took  
9 it back to Liberia.

15:10:08 10 Q. When you took this jar of diamonds back to Charles  
11 Taylor what happened then?"

12 And I totally ignore for the purposes of this question the  
13 fact that Mr Koumjian had totally misinterpreted the answer given  
14 by the witness who had said, "We took it back to Liberia." He

15:10:25 15 then says, "Took it back to Charles Taylor." But let's ignore  
16 that.

17 "... What happened then?"

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

19 MS HOLLIS: Simply for the record, if he is going to  
15:10:38 20 comment on it he certainly hasn't ignored it.

21 MR GRIFFITHS:

22 Q. "... What happened then?"

23 A. After we had taken this jar, that was the time that  
24 Charles Taylor called Musa Cisse in my presence. I will  
15:10:57 25 say the truth and nothing but the truth. In my presence  
26 Charles Taylor told - he called Musa Cisse and said these  
27 boys were doing extremely well. It will be better if I do  
28 a recommendation for him and you to go to Burkina Faso to  
29 sign for ammunition for himself. And that he did, and

1 Later Mosquito, Eddie Kanneh, Mike Lamin, Musa Cisse, they  
2 left and went.

3 Q. They went where?

4 A. To Burkina.

15:11:37 5 Q. And do you recall if Sam Bockarie ever came back to  
6 Monrovia after he left for that trip?

7 A. Yes, they returned. After a week and five days they  
8 returned. When they returned even Eddie Kanneh brought  
9 some pictures for me from where they went on a step. After  
10 they had returned at one time in the night we were sitting  
11 in a club on a drinking table. Then Sam Bockarie received  
12 a call from his phone."

13 So you see the sequence? Sesay brings diamonds in a small  
14 jar. He is then present, Mr Taylor, when you call Musa Cisse and  
15:12:33 15 speak to him about a trip to Burkina Faso which in due course is  
16 made. There are a number of RUF members, including Mosquito,  
17 Eddie Kanneh, Mike Lamin, Musa Cisse. Yes? What do you say  
18 about that, Mr Taylor.

19 A. That's not true. What these boys have done, these people  
15:12:52 20 have done, they've taken a little bit of truth from here, a  
21 little bit of truth from there, and they mix it up like you're  
22 about to bake a cake. And are they just really, really putting  
23 it out here on me. Here is a boy who's - there is a trip to  
24 Burkina Faso. So he takes the trip to Burkina Faso. Even the  
15:13:20 25 people, all of them he mentioned on that list, I can't talk about  
26 all of them, but it's untrue about all of the people he is  
27 talking about that went to Burkina Faso. I can't get more  
28 specific than that.

29 But here he comes now with an Issa Sesay. Remember the

1 diamonds that Issa Sesay brings to Monrovia that are supposed to  
2 go to Burkina Faso, what happens to them? They get lost. Issa  
3 Sesay is alleged to have lost the diamonds in Monrovia and it  
4 comes on the news and he returns to Sierra Leone. But now here  
15:13:59 5 are the diamonds apparently - I don't know if these are the same  
6 diamonds that are going across to Burkina Faso.

7 Now, if you break this all up there's a trip to Burkina  
8 Faso. I'm not sure if this is the time he's talking about. Some  
9 of the names mentioned do go. Some of them are not there. But  
15:14:16 10 because they do not know and they are patching things up they are  
11 just calling names and mixing things up. So here I am, I'm stuck  
12 with a - some half truths, some truths or - if I look at it in  
13 total I have to say it's a mischaracterisation of what happened.

14 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, were you aware of Mosquito going to  
15:14:40 15 Burkina Faso?

16 A. Yes, I was aware.

17 Q. Were you aware of Eddie Kanneh accompanying him?

18 A. Yes, Eddie Kanneh did go.

19 Q. And did your protocol Musa Cisse go?

15:14:52 20 A. Yes, he went.

21 Q. Do you know of a man called Mike Lamin going?

22 A. No, this Mike Lamin did not go.

23 Q. Now, if we put this - if we try, Mr Taylor, to marry the  
24 account given by this witness with what you've told this Court,  
15:15:30 25 then this trip with the jar full of diamonds is late November,  
26 early December 1998, yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. And what he is saying, in effect, is, on the previous visit  
29 that Bockarie made to Monrovia, he brought you the passport sized

1 di amond. Now, when was Mosquito's previous trip before that  
2 November/December trip?

3 A. There was one in October.

4 Q. Did Mosquito in October bring you such a diamond?

15:16:01 5 A. Never brought any such diamond or diamonds, none. No.

6 Q. Now, you recall him mentioning being in a club when Sam  
7 Bockarie received the telephone call, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. He continues, page 5886:

15:16:35 10 "Q. ... you said when Sam Bockarie came back from  
11 receiving the phone call he said 'Top Brass'. What does  
12 the word 'Top Brass' or name mean? Who is that?

13 A. I was the one they called Top Bra. Over there they  
14 called me so many names. They called me Zigzag, they

15:16:56 15 called me Top Bra, they called me" - another name which was  
16 indiscernible - "they called me Five-0-Five, they called me  
17 Jungle Broom. These are my names."

18 Now, you may not have known him as Zigzag Marzah,

19 Mr Taylor, but did you know him as Top Bra?

15:17:18 20 A. No.

21 Q. Did you know him as Jungle Broom?

22 A. No.

23 Q. What about Five-0-Five?

24 A. No.

15:17:30 25 Q. "Q. So you said that after the phone call you all rushed  
26 to the Roberts International Airfield. Is that correct?

27 A. We were not rushed directly. We rushed to White Flower  
28 to Charles Taylor's house. It was there we met Benjamin  
29 Yeaten, Joe Tuah and Peter Saikpedeh there. Later Mosquito

1 went inside from there. They took us to the airport. We  
2 went and I said at the time I saw a Russian cargo plane, a  
3 very big plane loaded with ammos and ammunition - I mean  
4 ammunition and arms."

15:18:10 5 Let's just pause and make sure we get the sequence correct.

6 Note: Bockarie goes to Burkina Faso with those others, yes,

7 Mr Taylor?

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. Page 5884:

15:18:24 10 "A. ... After a week and five days they return. When they  
11 returned even Eddie Kanneh brought some pictures. After  
12 they had return at one time in the night we received a call  
13 from the phone."

14 What do they do after they receive the call from the phone?

15:18:48 15 They rushed to White Flower, then to Roberts international  
16 airport, where there's a Russian cargo plane loaded with  
17 ammunition and arms. Do you follow, Mr Taylor?

18 A. I do.

19 Q. So what's happened is this: Bockarie has gone to Burkina  
15:19:07 20 Faso with the diamonds or whatever happened to the diamonds. He  
21 comes back. The very night he comes back, a Russian cargo plane  
22 lands at the only international airport in Liberia and it's  
23 loaded down with arms and ammunition. Okay? And they go to  
24 White Flower first before they head off to the airport. What do  
15:19:31 25 you know about that, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Absolutely nothing. Absolutely nothing. He knows that no  
27 such thing happened because, now, let's look at the other  
28 account. This is the Bockarie that went to Burkina Faso and it  
29 is said that when he came he brought arms and ammunition that

1 were brought to White Flower, on one account, and from White  
2 Flower taken to Sierra Leone. There is another account that when  
3 Sam Bockarie came from Burkina Faso, they offloaded ammunition.  
4 It did not reach to Monrovia. It was stopped halfway on the  
15:20:04 5 highway, and that's the ammunition that went to Sierra Leone.

6 Now we have a third version here now that Sam Bockarie  
7 goes, he comes with nothing. But later on that night, there's  
8 this big plane. They just don't have their stories straight, and  
9 because it's a lie, that's why they can't get it straight. So on  
15:20:26 10 this one trip that Sam Bockarie made to Burkina Faso, there are  
11 three accounts of arms and ammunition, except they are talking  
12 about three trips now. So they just don't have it right. It's  
13 wrong. It's totally wrong.

14 Q. But he goes on:

15:20:45 15 "Q. Now, you've described that the plane was full of  
16 ammunition. Can you tell us what kind of ammunition was in  
17 the plane?

18 A. Some were LAR rounds, AK round, GPMG, 32 PC, and some  
19 GPMG barrels. Enough, yes. These were the materials that  
15:21:07 20 were in the plane.

21 Q. Now, you've mentioned you were not able to take all of  
22 the ammunition to White Flower that night. What did you  
23 use to transport the ammunition to White Flower?

24 A. In Monrovia Charles Taylor was having so many trucks  
15:21:29 25 and these trucks, two were assigned directly to me to  
26 escort arms and ammunition, but that night there were some  
27 trucks that were headed by Joe Tuah, one of the Special  
28 Forces, some trucks headed by Peter Saikpedeh. There were  
29 some headed by Benjamin Yeaten. I led the other two, but



1 we were not able to haul everything at night.

2 The only thing we did was that we offloaded the plane,  
3 because when the plane comes we don't want that plane -  
4 daybreak on that plane. So, we offloaded the plane at all  
15:22:06 5 costs and stored the ammunition in the cargo warehouse at  
6 the airport."

7 What do you know about that, Mr Mr Taylor?

8 A. Nothing. Nothing about it. And I don't think he does  
9 either.

15:22:24 10 Q. But he goes on:

11 "Q. So how many trucks in total carried ammunition from  
12 the airport that night?

13 A. If I'm not mistaken it's six or five, if I've not  
14 mistaken.

15:22:37 15 Q. Can you give us some idea of the size of these trucks,  
16 of how much they could carry?

17 A. No, I can't give account of that, but the trucks were  
18 big."

19 And he goes on to describe it as a "Mack truck. My own.

15:22:51 20 The one that I was using. My own Mack truck, a yellow  
21 truck.

22 Q. Did this appear to be a lot of ammunition to you?

23 The ammunition that arrived that night, based on your prior  
24 experience was that a lot of ammunition to arrive in

15:23:13 25 Liberia?

26 A. Yes, yes. Like the chaser, the chaser that came with  
27 our chief Charles Taylor's friend, the four white guys,  
28 there were many. Many times. Even the other truck - the  
29 other plane that came at the second to the last time that

1 had the accident on the runway with our ammos which he  
2 Charles Taylor - when Charles Taylor had stopped all  
3 international security not to go to the airport again, we  
4 were able to produce eight to nine trucks.

15:23:48 5 Q. I want to concentrate now on this ammunition that  
6 arrived - that came just after Sam Bockarie returned from  
7 Burkina Faso and you said Sam Bockarie got the call about  
8 the arrival of the plane. Was Sam Bockarie at the airport  
9 when the ammunition arrived?"

15:24:14 10 Now, Mr Taylor, the witness is being quite clear here.  
11 What he is suggesting is that there's this trip to Burkina Faso  
12 on the very day Bockarie arrives back in Monrovia, a Russian  
13 cargo plane arrives in - at Roberts International Airport, yes,  
14 loaded down with arms and ammunition. Now, Mr Taylor, could that  
15:24:51 15 have happened without your knowledge?

16 A. No, it could not have.

17 Q. Now, he continues:

18 "Q. Was Sam Bockarie at the airport when the ammunition  
19 was being unloaded?"

15:25:04 20 A. Sam Bockarie and I rode in the same car, we rode the  
21 same jeep. Then my driver who was assigned with me and  
22 Benjamin Yeaten, they have their own truck. Yes, but he -  
23 he was not on the field at the same time. We were in  
24 Monrovia sitting in the nightclub when he received a call  
15:25:22 25 that the plane had arrived with the ammo.

26 Q. The next day after the plane had arrived and the  
27 ammunition had been unloaded, what did you do?

28 A. We were happy. The following day we were rested all  
29 day. I think we spent two days in the city. It was the

1 following night that we took off because we couldn't have  
2 left during the day. We took the first trip from White  
3 Flower with the ammo. I went along with Eddie Kanneh and  
4 Mosquito, Mike Lamin, including their bodyguards. One was  
15:25:58 5 called FOC, Victor Kallon, Yellow Man. I can't remember  
6 all these boys, yes.  
7 Q. On that trip, what vehicles did you take?  
8 A. We used two Mack trucks, the trucks I was using.  
9 Q. The two yellow Mack trucks, where did you go to Sierra  
15:26:17 10 Leone?  
11 A. Passing through Bong County, Lofa, Voinjama, Kolahun,  
12 Foya and entered through Buedu.  
13 Q. What were you carrying on those vehicles on this trip?  
14 A. I told you the arms and the ammo that came. The first  
15:26:33 15 one that came were enough in ammos that we carried, that  
16 was what was in the car, but the jeep we were in, there was  
17 no ammo in there. But it was in front of me escorting  
18 these item. So when they see me they will know  
19 straightaway that I was the one travelling with these  
15:26:50 20 trucks and they would be no embarrassment through Charles  
21 Taylor's directive."  
22 Follow that, Mr Taylor?  
23 A. Un-huh.  
24 Q. So important an individual is Mr Marzah that his mere  
15:27:06 25 presence in the convoy ensured its safe and uneventual passage  
26 because he was your man, Mr Taylor, wasn't he?  
27 A. He was never, never my man, so to speak. Never.  
28 Q. And let's complete the picture:  
29 "Q. Just to be clear, in the trucks that you were

1 carrying, what was being carried?

15:27:49 2 A. Ammo, ammo, ammo, ammo. I repeat, ammo, ammo, that  
3 can be put in a gun to shoot. That's what I'm talking  
4 about. It's not something different. We cannot carry an  
5 empty truck.

6 Q. Now the ammunition that you were carrying, you  
7 indicated that this plane had arrived, you called it the  
8 Russian cargo plane at Roberts International Airport, and  
9 you had unloaded the ammo from that plane. Did you take  
15:28:05 10 all of the ammo from that plane on this trip to Sierra  
11 Leone?

12 A. No, we did not carry them on the same time. I said the  
13 ammo was plenty. What we did was that we offloaded the  
14 truck - I mean we off-loaded the plane and stored these  
15:28:23 15 ammos and arms in an RIA cargo warehouse. The one we were  
16 able to haul that night, we took them to Charles Taylor's  
17 residence at White Flower in Monrovia. At the time they  
18 were hauling overnight we were resting. The following  
19 night we took off from Monrovia with the two yellow trucks.  
15:28:52 20 Anyway I'm very sorry. You see my head, I've got a  
21 problem, so you too should take your time to ask me. You  
22 see this head, you see here, through my ears, I can breathe  
23 through my ears. Do you see? You hear that? So you must  
24 take your time too. The rocket burst this side."

15:29:18 25 So that's the Russian shipment, Mr Taylor. Now, Mr Taylor,  
26 would you agree that if this is a serious allegation, a Russian  
27 cargo plane loaded with ammunition arriving at Monrovia hot on  
28 the heels of the return of the then leader of the RUF from  
29 Ouagadougou should not have escaped your notice. Do you agree.

1 A. Oh, I fully agree.

2 Q. Did anyone mention such an event to you at the time,  
3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. No, nobody mentioned such a event to me but the fact of the  
15:30:28 5 matter is I keep talking about mixing up information. We did  
6 have a plane that came to Liberia with arms and ammunition that I  
7 ordered, but we're talking about way in 2001/2002 that I wrote  
8 the Security Council of the United Nations telling them that I  
9 would order arms for legitimate self-defence and I did. Now here  
15:30:51 10 is this person here talking about a truth that occurred at a  
11 totally different time.

12 There was a large aircraft. We did order. I wrote the  
13 Security Council and told them that in line with the United  
14 Nations charter that they did not have any right to deny Liberia  
15 legitimate self-defence and in line I think it was Article 51 I  
15:31:10 16 wrote them, I told them where I will order the weapons from, I  
17 told them the type of weapons that we will order and I sent the  
18 list to the Security Council and I ordered the weapons. Now,  
19 this happened in 2001.

15:31:28 20 Here is this man all the way back in 1998 talking about a  
21 truthful situation, okay, that he has lied about. I do not know  
22 what it took for these people to lie. Weapons came into Liberia  
23 that I ordered as President and I wrote the council and told  
24 them. Liberia was under an arms embargo and I told them Liberia  
15:31:54 25 had a legitimate right to self-defence and my statement at that  
26 particular time was very fair, that if the United States, a  
27 member of the Security Council at that particular time, could  
28 take actions against countries based on the perception of a  
29 threat, and Liberia was legitimately under attack, that we will

1 use Article 51. I wrote them and sent a list to them, the  
2 Security Council of the United Nations. I told them where I will  
3 order the weapons from. We ordered it from Serbia. They went  
4 there and the Serbian government agreed that we had ordered  
15:32:27 5 weapons directly from them. The Security Council was fully  
6 briefed and fully aware of the action - of the legitimate action  
7 taken by my government. Now he has taken that and he has shifted  
8 it from that time to 1998 to authenticate the lie. That's all he  
9 has done.

15:32:49 10 Q. He goes on, Mr Taylor, to say this, remember this is an  
11 alleged insider:

12 "Q. Mr Witness, you have described a plane coming, you've  
13 described the type of plane and you've described what  
14 happened after it came. When did that happen?

15:33:16 15 A. Let me be bold to tell you I will say the truth and  
16 nothing but the truth. By being chief of operations for  
17 Charles Taylor, I had so many occasions that I can't recall  
18 all today. I had Sierra Leone problem on my hand. I had  
19 Guinea problem on my hand. I had Ivory Coast problem on my  
15:33:45 20 hand. So I cannot recall all of these dates to be exact.  
21 But I can remember the happenings and I tell you because I  
22 was the operation man for Charles Taylor. You can ask him  
23 yourself. He gave me three countries to attend to. That  
24 was the problem."

15:34:04 25 Mr Taylor, this is a true insider. He was your chief of  
26 operations, Mr Taylor. Why are you continuing to say that you  
27 don't know him?

28 A. I swear to God. Charles Taylor would have a man that  
29 cannot read, he cannot write and he is going to put him in charge

1 of major, major operations in three countries? This boy is  
2 really, really sick. All of the people around me, I'm going to  
3 take an uneducated man and put him in charge of three countries?  
4 If he is this big that means he doesn't work for Benjamin Yeaten,  
15:34:50 5 Benjamin works for him. I don't have a Defence Minister. He is  
6 the Defence Minister probably. I mean, what is this? Zigzag  
7 Marzah is my chief of operations in charge of three countries?  
8 Oh, God. It's not true. It is not true. It is not true.

9 Q. I mean, Mr Taylor, are we missing a document here, you  
15:35:16 10 know, setting out the role played by members of the SSS but which  
11 has conveniently for your purposes left out Zigzag Marzah as the  
12 overseeing force? Have we missed something?

13 A. Really you haven't missed anything because there is nothing  
14 there. I mean then I would be in big trouble because Zigzag  
15:35:42 15 Marzah sat right here and he said so many times, "I told you I  
16 cannot ready, I cannot write." What am I supposed to get from  
17 this man that I'm supposed to put him in charge of so much  
18 responsibility? Never, never, never, never, never.

19 Q. Page 5893 line 28:

15:36:01 20 "Q. Mr Witness, you've mentioned Sam Bockarie being in  
21 Sierra Leone. Do you know if Sam Bockarie stayed in Sierra  
22 Leone or did he ever leave the country?

23 A. Sam Bockarie at least he and Issa had a conflict. Our  
24 leader Charles Taylor sent me, Joe Tuah, Peter Saikpedeh  
15:36:29 25 and we went and we received Sam Bockarie. Took him from  
26 Sierra Leone to Monrovia. After we had arrived in  
27 Monrovia, he was at my house. Charles Taylor leased the  
28 house for him at 14 Houses. That was where he was and to  
29 go to Burkina Faso for him to prepare for Ivory Coast war.

1 He was not in Liberia."

2 Help me, Mr Taylor, do you understand that?

3 A. Yes, I do.

15:37:14

4 Q. So taking matters slowly, did you send Zigzag Marzah to in  
5 effect fetch Sam Bockarie from Sierra Leone after the conflict  
6 with Issa Sesay in December 1999?

15:37:39

7 A. Never. Never sent him. He doesn't - this boy doesn't know  
8 how Sam Bockarie got into Liberia. December 1999, we have told  
9 this story a hundred times. There are even UN documents to -  
10 this boy doesn't even know what happened. Even if he saw it on  
11 paper like he said he would not have known.

15:38:05

12 Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia in late December 1999 after I  
13 and my colleagues agree that he should be extracted from Sierra  
14 Leone. That's when he comes. He comes to the border. He is  
15 disarmed at the border and he and his people come into the  
16 country. By the time Sam Bockarie gets there there is no such  
17 thing as no 14 Houses. Sam Bockarie is lodged at a place called  
18 Three Houses. We have talked about this many times, about ELWA  
19 Junction, Three Houses. Sam Bockarie would not go at his place.

15:38:26

20 So I don't know - this is just an individual who is so far  
21 off on the fringes that it's just saying things that - oh, boy.  
22 There is another witness here - there is another witness that  
23 talks about receiving Sam Bockarie in Voinjama. My head - I  
24 can't put - this is evidence in this Court led about who went and  
25 received Sam Bockarie in Voinjama and that all of the people  
26 could not come to Monrovia, some of them had to stay, as I'm  
27 thinking in my head. This man never went to no Freetown - excuse  
28 me, Sierra Leone to receive Sam Bockarie after he had a problem  
29 with Issa Sesay. I don't know of Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay

15:38:55



1 having any problems.

2 The problem that I know in Sierra Leone is between Sam  
3 Bockarie and Foday Sankoh. I don't know about Sam Bockarie and  
4 Issa Sesay having conflict. It was Foday Sankoh. That's how he  
15:39:26 5 was extracted and brought with the consent of ECOWAS, everybody.  
6 You read one of Downes-Thomas's reports here it is stated very  
7 clearly who was in that meeting. The last meeting in December,  
8 Obasanjo and myself sat down and we gave Sam Bockarie - we told  
9 him what was coming. If he did not move or either disarm and he  
15:39:49 10 decided that he would pull out. So this boy does not know the  
11 story and he is making up whatever he has put in here.

12 Q. What about this part, "That was where he was and to go to  
13 Burkina Faso for him to prepare for Ivory Coast war." What do  
14 you understand by that?

15:40:10 15 A. I have no idea. Sam Bockarie stays in Liberia until about  
16 2001. So all of 2000 and most of 2001 Sam Bockarie is in  
17 Liberia. So I don't know what this boy is talking about here as  
18 though he came and rushed out for another war. That's not true.

19 Q. "Q. When Sam Bockarie left Sierra Leone and came to  
15:40:36 20 Monrovia did he come alone or did anyone - did he bring  
21 anyone with him?

22 A. He came with - let's say there were many. Over three  
23 to five, more than that, there were many because the truck  
24 in which we carried I didn't check it, but all these  
15:40:54 25 vehicles were full of human beings when they arrived in  
26 Monrovia. During his departure for Burkina some of these  
27 men were deployed in various units in Liberia and some were  
28 taken away by Charles Taylor's friend the, white man with  
29 the big belly, with them to go for in-service training for

1           Babylon to fall."

2           What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor?

3   A.    Nothing.

15:41:26 4   Q.    I admit I'm having difficulty, but who were these men that  
5   you gave to your big bellied white man friend for in-service  
6   training for Babylon to fall?

7   A.    I really don't know what he is talking about. I really  
8   don't know what he means or is talking about here whatsoever.  
9   Big belly and Babylon, I know of no place in Liberia that we call  
15:41:50 10   Babylon or outside of Liberia. And this big bellied white man, I  
11   really don't know who he is referring to as a big bellied white  
12   man going for Babylon to fall. No, I really don't.

13   Q.    "Q. Now you've indicated that the men that came with  
14   Bockarie, some of them were put into various units. First  
15:42:21 15   of all, at that time when Bockarie came back - came to  
16   Monrovia with these men, what unit were you in?

17   A.    At the time that Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia I was  
18   working directly at the mansion. But, you know, I was  
19   chief of operations, yes. I didn't have any special unit,  
15:42:46 20   but I received salary under the SSS."

21           Pause there, Mr Taylor. Are we being misled here,  
22   Mr Taylor? That whereas Zigzag Marzah's name appears on a list  
23   of - you remember we looked at a list and his name appeared, yes?

24   A.    Uh-huh.

15:43:13 25   Q.    That really that was just a cover because really secretly  
26   he was your chief of operations and what you were doing was you  
27   were disguising his true role by on the face of it downgrading  
28   him to a mere orderly or bodyguard to Benjamin Yeaten. That's  
29   what was going on, wasn't it?

1 A. But that would not even be possible. No, that was not what  
2 was going on. With the major role that Marzah claims he played  
3 here, even at that particular level, you are responsible for  
4 three countries. You are responsible for operation and then,  
15:43:57 5 what, you are being - aiding to drive for Benjamin Yeaten? I  
6 mean, come on, I mean, then he was really, really - that's - he  
7 was really a fool, okay, that you would do all these things. He  
8 is called to go to Sierra Leone at the beginning of the crisis to  
9 put down something. He goes away. He calls Visalah. He comes  
15:44:19 10 back. He is leading all this - now he is chief of operation for  
11 three nations and he is driving for Benjamin Yeaten? No, no, no,  
12 no.

13 Q. Then he goes on, Mr Taylor:

14 "Q. Do you know if any of these soldiers were integrated  
15:44:45 15 into the SSS, any of these soldiers that came with  
16 Bockarie?

17 A. Yes, yes. Some were with the SSS. Some were with the  
18 ATU, the anti-artillery unit. Some were with the police.  
19 Some were with immigration."

15:45:09 20 Were those that came with Bockarie so dispersed? Were  
21 they, Mr Taylor?

22 A. No, no.

23 Q. Some in the anti-artillery unit, some with the police, some  
24 with immigration?

15:45:24 25 A. We didn't have any anti-artillery unit. I think he made a  
26 mistake and it should be Anti-Terrorist Unit not anti-artillery.  
27 But most of the men that came with Sam Bockarie were trained as a  
28 part of the Anti-Terrorist Unit, most of them. A few of them,  
29 yes, I think were in the SSS, the - from what I remember, those

1 that were mechanics - there were some mechanics, mostly technical  
2 people, mechanics, car mechanics and different things, were  
3 assigned at the motor pool of the SSS, from my understanding from  
4 the director, but not in any other units. They were either ATU  
15:46:22 5 or they worked in the technical part. Those that were not  
6 able-bodied people, we did not bother. They had their  
7 citizenship, but all we did was just to give them as much  
8 assistance as we could. I think there was no group - I think he  
9 erred when he said anti-artillery. I think he meant anti --  
15:46:44 10 Q. Mr Taylor, now you know that it is alleged and firmly  
11 alleged that you executed Sam Bockarie on your orders.  
12 A. That's the allegation, yes.  
13 Q. Tell me, did you have a falling out with Issa Sesay as  
14 well?  
15:47:03 15 A. No, I never had any problems with either of them.  
16 Q. Are you sure? Did there not come a time when you wanted to  
17 see Issa Sesay dead?  
18 A. No, never.  
19 Q. Now, take your time, Mr Taylor, please, and think about it,  
15:47:18 20 because it's a serious allegation to make against someone.  
21 A. Never. Never. Issa Sesay never had any problems with me,  
22 ever. In fact, I liked the young man because - all of us in  
23 ECOWAS liked him because Issa Sesay, I have told this Court,  
24 contributed significantly to the peace in Sierra Leone. From the  
15:47:41 25 moment Issa Sesay took over the leadership of the RUF, things  
26 moved very fast. There were no disruptions. If there was  
27 anything Sesay had - in fact, he was so good at it that all of us  
28 talked about it. Obasanjo spoke about it. Alpha Konare spoke  
29 about it. The chairman of ECOWAS and President of Mali - he was

1 about the best thing that could have happened to the peace  
2 process at that particular time. And no matter what the  
3 situation is, Issa Sesay contributed more to the peace process  
4 than any other previous leader of the RUF, including Foday  
15:48:26 5 Sankoh. I had no problems with him whatsoever.

6 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, the witness was asked this question:  
7 "Q. Mr Witness, you've indicated that Bockarie had a  
8 conflict with Issa Sesay. Did you ever receive any orders  
9 subsequent to Sam Bockarie leaving Sierra Leone concerning  
15:48:41 10 Issa Sesay?

11 A. Yes, I received an instruction from Charles Taylor when  
12 he said I should go for Sam Bockarie, 'I don't want him to  
13 have conflict with Issa and Issa has more fighting men  
14 under him once he was facing battle and Mosquito was in  
15:49:01 15 Buedu. You go and bring him.' It was at that time that I,  
16 Peter Saikpedeh, Joe Tuah went for him and brought his  
17 group of people, his group of people including his mother,  
18 his wife and his children.

19 Q. But after you had brought Sam Bockarie to Liberia,  
15:49:17 20 after that time did you ever receive any orders concerning  
21 Issa Sesay?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you tell us who gave you the order?

24 A. From time immemorial I was taking orders from my  
15:49:35 25 leader, Charles Taylor. When Issa Sesay was there I  
26 received orders to ammos for him. When Issa Sesay was  
27 there, there was some behaviours that he was putting up  
28 like signing documents with the UN. At that time I was in  
29 Kono, some UN people went there for a paper for Issa Sesay

1 to sign. I called directly to Charles Taylor. From there  
2 he asked me whether I can execute Issa and I said, 'Oh,  
3 chief, I am in Kono, the centre. I'm in the midst of these  
4 people. I cannot do anything.' Then he said, 'Come to  
15:50:15 5 Kailahun. I will call him to come for ammos in Buedu.  
6 Then you'll be able to execute him there.' So I left Kono,  
7 I told Issa that I was trying to go and he gave me his  
8 jeep. I went and left.  
9 When I left Kono, I stopped at Mile Five River. I left the  
15:50:36 10 vehicle at Mile Five River, at the ferry, and I crossed  
11 over to Pendembu in the Kailahun District to wait for Issa  
12 to execute him under the directive of my leader. Later he  
13 called me and said he had already sent for Issa to go and  
14 receive ammos in Buedu for him to come and pass through me  
15:50:56 15 to Buedu and then I will follow him to get him, but Issa  
16 never returned. I spent almost two weeks in Kailahun and  
17 later he told me that, 'The man has gone. He will no  
18 longer receive supplies from me.'"  
19 Why did you give that order to Zigzag Marzah, Mr Taylor?  
15:51:20 20 A. Never gave any such order to Zigzag Marzah. Never. Never.  
21 Q. But, Mr Taylor, why would - if you are right - this man  
22 make up such a lie?  
23 A. Not just this lie. He has made up tons of lies throughout  
24 this whole thing. Not just one. Well, I tell you, you go to  
15:51:45 25 Liberia and you take an orderly of the SSS director who never  
26 went to school, cannot read and cannot write, and you offer him  
27 all of these things, give him this allowance and that, and tell  
28 him to come and lie and say - I mean, probably I'll tell a lie  
29 myself. Zigzag Marzah as an insider close to Charles Taylor?

1           So what do you expect from Zigzag Marzah? What do you  
2 expect from Zigzag Marzah? 2000, Issa Sesay takes over the RUF,  
3 formally in August of 2000. He works very hard with everyone.  
4 From the beginning of our dealing with Issa Sesay, from the  
15:52:33 5 beginning, round about May 2000, we get the UN people released.  
6 He cooperates very much. He takes over the leadership. He meets  
7 all of the important colleagues of mine responsible for the  
8 Sierra Leonean crisis. And now here is someone saying that  
9 someone - I ordered him to do what to Issa? For what? Issa  
15:53:01 10 Sesay caused no disruption anywhere in Sierra Leone. He worked  
11 for peace. So what do I - I really don't know.

12           I mean, for it - it beats me, and this is what I'm saying,  
13 you know, when I sit here sometimes, you know, it really - how do  
14 you get so many people to make up so - I mean, somebody has been  
15:53:25 15 - this desperation to get Charles Taylor, I swear, I mean, it's a  
16 major desperation for so many people to come and tell so - I'm  
17 sitting here before these judges, "It's a lie. It's a lie. It's  
18 a lie. It's a lie." So the judges say, "Oh, well, one of them  
19 has got to be telling the truth." Then I'm finished.

15:53:47 20           Why this happened, I really don't know. Why these people -  
21 how they were able to do this. This is another lie. Not just a  
22 lie. Another lie that Issa Sesay, I ordered him to do this.  
23 Never. Never, never, ever. Never.

24 Q.       Now, he goes on in the same account, Mr Taylor:

15:54:22 25           "Q. Who told you that 'the man had gone'?

26           A. I said Charles Taylor said. Charles Taylor has already  
27 connived. He has already connived.

28           I didn't say 'he's gone'. I said that he told me that 'the  
29 man had already connived'. I didn't say 'he's gone'. He

1 has already connived. At that time I had spent two weeks  
2 in Kailahun waiting for Issa to execute him.

3 Q. Mr Witness, you indicated that when you received the  
4 order from Charles Taylor to execute Issa Sesay that Issa  
15:54:58 5 Sesay had signed some paper. Do you know anything about  
6 what these papers were about?

7 A. In relation to the document I'm not too sure, but what  
8 I saw in Kono, at the time that I went there, in my  
9 presence I took some ammos to Issa to transfer it to Morris  
15:55:20 10 Kallon in Makeni. But I was in Kono, some white guys went  
11 there with some UN people and the CO man said that the  
12 people came to the chief, Issa, for him to sign some  
13 documents. I asked what the document was for and he said  
14 for the peace agreement in Freetown.

15:55:41 15 It was at that time that I left with those white guys and  
16 entered Issa's residence. I went into Issa's room because  
17 I didn't speak Krio so they won't notice that I am a  
18 Liberian. When they finished talking I used the bypass  
19 route and went to CO man who was in control of the diamond  
15:56:03 20 that we used to bring. I went to his house.

21 It was there that I was - that I called over the Thuraya  
22 satellite and called to Charles Taylor that there are some  
23 white people from Freetown who had come to Issa, but they  
24 said they had come there for peace agreement and he," that  
15:56:23 25 being you, "said, 'The man wants to connive.' Then he,"  
26 that being you, "said, 'Go to Kailahun and wait for him  
27 there. I will send for him.' First he said, 'You can  
28 execute him in Kono,' and I said, 'No, the group is large  
29 and if there were places by Pendembu or Kailahun I will be



1           able to execute him.' Then he said, 'Okay, but then come  
2           to Kailahun. I will send for him to come.'  
3           That's the time that I left Kono and went to Kailahun and  
4           waited for over two weeks - let's say for over two weeks -  
15:57:02 5           and Issa never returned. Later Charles Taylor called me  
6           and said, 'The man has already connived. You can come  
7           back. He will no longer receive supplies from me,' because  
8           our operation, RUF is not different, NPFL is not different.  
9           Once you go across you go to Freetown you are an RUF. When  
15:57:25 10          you cross from Sierra Leone to Liberia you are NPFL. That  
11          was how the movement was like. We all took one instruction  
12          from Charles Taylor. Have I made myself clear?"  
13          Is that clear to you, Mr Taylor?  
14          A.     It's not clear.  
15:57:46 15          Q.     You wanted Issa Sesay executed by your chief of operations,  
16          Zigzag Marzah, because he was busy signing UN documents to  
17          achieve peace in Sierra Leone?  
18          A.     That's a blatant lie. Blatant, blatant lie. Issa Sesay,  
19          who pushed - you know, I'm glad we have these documents. Who  
15:58:09 20          pushed very hard after Issa Sesay took over to make sure that a  
21          UN would begin to move? We've got documents right here, United  
22          Nations documents, that prove that I fought tooth and nail even  
23          when they wanted to delay, when the United States suggested six  
24          months of training for peacekeepers I said no, no, no, no, no,  
15:58:34 25          this thing must go on. This boy - it's a lie. It's a lie.  
26          Q.     Just to round off this issue, Mr Taylor, page 5898 line 27:  
27          "Q. Now to the best that you can, can you give us an idea  
28          of what year this took place where Charles Taylor gave the  
29          order to execute Issa Sesay?

1 A. That was the last trip that I made to Freetown. Yes,  
2 the last trip. That was the last trip I made to Freetown.  
3 I think at the end of 2002 or something like that. I was  
4 having more problems on my hands so I can't just recall one  
16:00:05 5 and I was not expecting that we would sit down today  
6 explaining because we were hoping we will not go anywhere.  
7 It was not something that we could have kept on record."  
8 Now, Mr Taylor, when did disarmament - when was peace  
9 declared in Sierra Leone?

16:00:25 10 A. The beginning of 2002.

11 Q. Yes, January 2002?

12 A. Yes. The beginning of 2002 when Kabbah declared the war is  
13 over.

14 Q. Why did you want Zigzag Marzah to execute Issa Sesay eleven  
16:00:41 15 months after that?

16 A. But by the end --

17 Q. Toward the end of 2002, why?

18 A. It never happened. This boy doesn't know what he is  
19 talking about. He just lie and lie and he doesn't know when to  
16:00:54 20 stop. By the end of 2002 what has happened in Sierra Leone? If  
21 I'm not mistaken they should have already had elections. What is  
22 Issa Sesay signing? What? What is he signing or attempting to  
23 sign? The war is declared finished by the beginning of 2002 by  
24 Tejan Kabbah. They have the political process in Sierra Leone.

16:01:18 25 And here is this man saying that Issa Sesay is supposed to be  
26 attempting to sign some papers. The RUF is already functioning,  
27 they have the presidential candidate and here I am, this man is  
28 saying I'm instructing him to go and kill somebody.

29 Q. But he goes on:

1 "Q. Do you recall when you got this order if the RUF had  
2 completely disarmed?

3 A. At the time they said they disarmed the RUF but I used  
4 to carry - we were still - we still had our arms under  
16:01:58 5 cover in Kono and Kailahun. RUF was not properly disarmed.  
6 Those who disarmed were from Makeni, Tongo and some other  
7 areas there. Those were the people who were disarmed, but  
8 from Kono to coming towards Kailahun we were still in  
9 possession of weapons."

16:02:20 10 Now, you see what he is saying? Even after disarmament  
11 process commenced in Sierra Leone, Mr Taylor, he was still  
12 carrying arms into those particular areas of Sierra Leone.

13 A. So where are the peacekeepers? Where are the peacekeepers?  
14 During only disarmament process everybody - so where are the  
16:02:51 15 peacekeepers? He is saying, "We were still in possession of  
16 weapons." What this boy - so "we", he is referring to him. "We  
17 were still."

18 Q. So what is being suggested, Mr Taylor - you bear in mind of  
19 course the ambit of the indictment period in this case, yes?

16:03:09 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. What is being suggested is that even after disarmament  
22 process was put in place, you were still busy sending arms to  
23 Sierra Leone. Question: Why?

24 A. I never sent any arms to Sierra Leone. Never sent any arms  
16:03:31 25 to Sierra Leone. Not at 2001, nor 2002, or no thousand. Never  
26 did. When Tejan Kabbah declared the war in Sierra Leone over  
27 they got into the political process followed by elections and  
28 that was it in Sierra Leone.

29 Nobody called Charles Taylor and even this boy never

16:04:14 1 crossed into no Sierra Leone to carry nothing. Even at that time  
2 even - even if they had some weapon hidden someplace in Liberia  
3 by this time we're talking about from 1996 until 2002, most of  
4 them may be rusted by that particular time. This boy is just one  
5 of the line of liars that they brought to make this case and he  
6 has really, really messed it up because he does not know what  
7 he's talking about. He's got the facts all wrong. He's lying  
8 and there's nothing credible about what this boy is saying here  
9 because he doesn't know what he's talking about.

16:04:34 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I omitted in looking at an earlier passage  
11 to ask you about a particular comment made by the witness and  
12 because I don't want this to come back to haunt you at a later  
13 stage let me remind you. Page 5898:

16:05:01 14 "Because our operation, RUF is not different. NPFL is not  
15 different. Once you go across you go to Freetown you are an RUF.  
16 When you cross from Sierra Leone to Liberian you're a NPFL. That  
17 was how the movement was like. We all took one instruction from  
18 Charles Taylor."

19 You do understand that, don't you.

16:05:21 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. The RUF and the NPFL were one and the same and you were the  
22 head of it?

23 A. He went through a lot of lying tutoring. He is really  
24 tutored, you can see. There were quite a few of them that said,  
25 "Oh, we were the same." King Perry, all of them, "We were the  
26 same." He went through a lot of tutoring. I think that's the  
27 proofing. He really was proofed. It is a proofing lie. Never -  
28 there was never - there was complete - the RUF and NPFL were  
29 never ever the same. Never. We weren't the same.

1 Q. Now, thereafter the witness provided some more details  
2 about his murderous behaviour on your orders, Mr Taylor. Page  
3 5899:

16:06:28

4 "Q. Did you receive other orders from Charles Taylor to  
5 kill people that you were able to fulfil?

6 A. Plenty. I told you plenty. Plenty. If I have the  
7 chance if you permit me, I can explain more than ten to 15  
8 times and if possible all day so that we wouldn't need any  
9 more - any explanation any more."

16:06:55

10 And he goes on.

11 "Q. Can you begin to tell us what you recall about orders  
12 you received from Charles Taylor to commit executions that  
13 you carried out?

16:07:15

14 A. It happened during the arrival of Charles Taylor when I  
15 received my first instruction from him to move from  
16 Gborplay to go from Grey Tappita. He said wherever the  
17 Armed Forces of Liberia were based and you see any civilian  
18 there who was supporting those armed men, you shouldn't  
19 spare them. That will put fear in them to retreat. So for

16:07:40

20 this reason I started executing from Grey Tappita, Kamutes  
21 Town, as far as Buchanan. Then from when Gbarnga fell in  
22 '94 I can remember the EMG battalion that was assigned with  
23 him directly. That was a special bodyguard. They were the  
24 special bodyguard assigned to Charles Taylor's mansion

16:08:05

25 bodyguard. You've got me clear? In Liberia - the  
26 executions started in Liberia. The same motto of the NPFL  
27 in Liberia was the same motto of the RUF that continued in  
28 Sierra Leone. I told you previously there was no  
29 difference between the RUF - there is no difference between

1 the RUF and the NPFL."

2 Was this man your favourite executioner, Mr Taylor?

3 A. No, Zigzag Marzah never received any orders from me and you  
4 know I must admit he is very lucky. I trained Special Forces in  
16:08:55 5 Libya for two years. Some of my very senior people that went out  
6 and killed innocent people that were tried and executed. He,  
7 this Zigzag Marzah here, would have carried out a killing in  
8 Liberia that I would have known and he would have been here to  
9 [overlapping speakers] --

16:09:20 10 Q. Sorry to interrupt you, Mr Taylor. Not a killing.

11 A. No.

12 Q. Plenty, plenty killings.

13 A. That's what I'm saying, but he would have carried out one  
14 that I would have known and he would have been here to sit to  
16:09:31 15 talk about it? He would have never been here to sit to talk  
16 about it because I was very strict. If you went out and you  
17 killed somebody, you were tried. The results of the tribunal  
18 were carried out. And he's here talking about him going and I'm  
19 sending him plenty times to kill people? Never. This Zigzag  
16:09:59 20 Marzah here, never, never, never, never.

21 Q. "Q. What orders did you receive from Charles Taylor in  
22 regards to that battalion?"

23 That's the Executive Mansion Guard.

24 "A. The order, that was the first time to form the Death  
16:10:24 25 Squad unit. That was the first time also to establish the  
26 SBU, the Small Boys Unit."

27 And then he goes on to say that the commander of the Small  
28 Boys Unit was one Zupon.

29 "Yes, honourable judge, I told you I am one of the key

1 players of the NPFL from the beginning to the end. So I will say  
2 the truth and nothing but the truth."

3 Yes, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Key players.

16:11:01 5 Q. From the beginning to the end.

6 A. Never. Zigzag Marzah was key in the NPFL? Never  
7 commanded, never ordered never held any position in NPFL or in  
8 government. He was key? This boy was never anything in the  
9 NPFL. Neither was he anything in government. And if he

16:11:21 10 considered himself key, and up until I left office, like I said  
11 before, was serving as an orderly, then really I don't know what  
12 to say about this boy. Never. Never.

13 Q. Page 5901 line 28:

14 "After the fall of Gbarnga the EMPG battalion that was  
16:12:00 15 serving at the mansion in Gbarnga, they abandoned the war and the  
16 enemy that entered in Gbarnga, they went as far as between Nimba  
17 County and Bong County. Up to the bridge called Bella Bridge."

18 Know of it, Mr Taylor, Bella Bridge?

19 A. Yeah, there is a Bella Bridge there.

16:12:22 20 Q. "So they were there putting people's children in the water  
21 in the sea, saying that they have connived, executing some them.  
22 So when Charles Taylor heard that at that time then went for me  
23 at Grand Gedeh. When we got there we formed the Death Squad unit  
24 and they made me commander. But Benjamin Yeaten was the overall  
16:12:49 25 supervisor of the unit. He told me when you go to Bella if it is  
26 true that EMPG unit were killing people, harassing people, you  
27 should execute them for sure. When I went there I saw some of  
28 them holding people, people's babies and throwing them in the  
29 river going down. So I sent my bodyguard Heavy D to go and talk

1 with Jeongor - I mean Jeongor. He wanted to shoot him and he ran  
2 and he came to me. Then I shot among them and I killed few of  
3 them, about 49 or 59. There were many, you know. So I called  
4 that I have killed a few of them, over 50. Then he said you can  
16:13:43 5 continue your march. That was how Saddam, Pablo, Idi Amin, King  
6 GB, that's how we started marching on the road as far as to this  
7 place, this junction in Bong County now. We started engaging the  
8 enemy from there and we went and we stopped at Pedilay. I mean I  
9 will call the name of the town Kpallala. We stopped at Kpallala  
16:14:11 10 that very day after that execution. We started engaging the  
11 enemy from diamond junction to Kpallala. We slept. Around 4 we  
12 started our journey up to Gbao Town."

13 Now, Mr Taylor, 50 individuals killed by one man, how did  
14 that escape your attention?

16:14:40 15 A. Oh, boy. This boy, I swear he never - I don't know of  
16 anything like this. That's why I say this boy - if this boy did  
17 these things he is the luckiest man under the sun. If he did  
18 this, he's the luckiest man under the sun because I can tell you  
19 he would have faced a tribunal and he would never have been here  
16:15:02 20 because I did not joke about that. He will go and just shoot  
21 down 50 people? When my Special Forces for killing one man got  
22 kill - no, look, when Gbarnga fell I was not in Liberia. When  
23 Gbarnga fell I was not there. This Court has heard evidence I  
24 was at Akosombo when Gbarnga fell. I stayed there until the end  
16:15:29 25 of the meeting. I arrived in Liberia I would say four or five  
26 days after the fall of Gbarnga. I did not get all of this news  
27 of what had happened, about people throwing people in the river  
28 and all this kind of stuff. I did - we did get information that  
29 there was a boy called Junior Gall that was involved in the



1 killing of a man near this bridge, but Junior Gall was arrested  
2 and tried and executed for it, Junior Gall.

3 So there is no such thing that could have happened with my  
4 knowledge and this Marzah would have gotten away with it. Not to  
16:16:20 5 my knowledge. Because there was massive confusion. Cassius  
6 Jacob who was the commander at that time had given up Gbarnga to  
7 the enemy forces. By the time I reached there he was under  
8 arrest and there were very - nobody would have done anything in  
9 my absence. He was under arrest. They had not ill treated him,  
16:16:42 10 he had not been beaten. He had been arrested by other Special  
11 Forces that - because he was not a Special Force, for what he had  
12 done in Gbarnga.

13 But what this boy is explaining here I am now - I heard it  
14 for the first time when he testified. Not with my knowledge and  
16:16:59 15 I can assure the world that if this had come to my attention he  
16 would not have been here to testify. I can assure you of that.

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Can we have the spelling of Junior Gall.

18 THE WITNESS: Junior as in junior, your Honour, and I think  
19 it was Gal like G-A-L-L I think he ended it with an E, Galle.  
16:17:32 20 Almost like the French spelling. But I think it's G-A-L-L, Gall,  
21 Junior Gall.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. It goes on, however, Mr Taylor, because there was an  
24 interruption at that point because the Learned Presiding Judge  
16:17:52 25 made an inquiry. Following the resolution of that inquiry, the  
26 witness continued in this way, page 5904:

27 "I have not completed my answer yet. I told you when you  
28 talk about my execution it's more than a thousand except if  
29 you say it should stop that far. From there when we got to

1 Gbarnga Charles Taylor ordered me and we established the  
2 Jungle Fire unit and he said from Gbarnga behind Belafanai  
3 up to Belatui there is no enemy there. I mean there is no  
4 civilian there. Anyone who is there was in support of the  
16:18:43 5 enemy. I don't want to see any of them. It was at that  
6 time that we formed No Baby on Target. Be it ULIMO or  
7 young baby or you're an old man, we started executing  
8 everybody until the road was opened from Gbarnga to Belatui  
9 it's so many if I continue we will - on execution and time  
16:19:13 10 will go.

11 Q. You said that Charles Taylor gave you an order  
12 regarding the civilians in that area.

13 A. He said that there are no civilians there. I don't  
14 want to see any of them.

16:19:31 15 Q. What did that mean to you, I don't want to see any of  
16 them?

17 A. He said that the civilians on that side, they were in  
18 collaboration with the enemy forces. He said they were the  
19 ones who were passing information to the ULIMO and he said  
16:19:50 20 mostly it was those people's children who are fighting  
21 against us so he said they should be executed and he said  
22 we should get rid of any one of them.

23 Q. Was that order carried out?

24 A. Yes, we carried out that order starting from Gbarnga as  
16:20:11 25 far as Belatui. You can't walk like from here to the other  
26 side without seeing flies passing all over the corpses.  
27 All over the bushes and the villages until we got rid of  
28 that place to re-enter Lofa.

29 Q. What were the ages of the people that were killed and

1 the corpses that were left?

2 A. You know, some were pregnant women. We even delivered  
3 them with penknives, some of the babies we just - some of  
4 the babies we just take them and knock their heads on the  
16:20:48 5 wall and they were dead. Some were girls, both men, women  
6 and children.

7 Q. Approximately how much civilians were killed?

8 A. I cannot give you the exact number but they were many,  
9 many, many more that were executed by Charles Taylor's  
16:21:06 10 orders.

11 Q. Can you continue with telling us about executions you  
12 carried out on the orders of Charles Taylor?"

13 We'll come on to that one in a moment. Do you recall such  
14 an operation, Mr Taylor, No Baby on Target?

16:21:29 15 A. Never such an operation. Never, ever such an operation.  
16 In fact, the area that he is calling there, actually I think it  
17 means - I think he is talking about Gbalatuah. Gbalatuah is the  
18 - we've come across that here. It's the bridge - the St Paul  
19 River Bridge is also - there's a town of Gbalatuah there.

16:21:54 20 It took us three months - three months for the recapture of  
21 Gbarnga before we recaptured Gbarnga and we fought the ULIMO and  
22 coalition forces in this. I said this is a very lucky man.

23 Very, very, very lucky man and even as I think about it, if this  
24 was going on and even the commanders did not know to - because no  
16:22:20 25 NPFL commander - at least the Special Forces or the people  
26 knowing how strict I was to even kill one person, this man is  
27 talking this sick thing about taking babies from - look, this is  
28 really, really, really, really sickening that he would talk this  
29 nonsense here, lying to this Court and talking this type of thing

1 that would make somebody want to throw up. He taking penknife  
2 and taking babies. Anyway --

3 Q. Mr Taylor, let's be quite blunt about this. What is being  
4 suggested is that you were quite happy to have in your employ  
16:23:09 5 this psychopathic sadist Zigzag Marzah because it suited your  
6 purpose --

7 A. That's what to believe.

8 Q. -- to instill terror on not only people of Liberia because  
9 the RUF and the NPFL are one, but also on the people of Sierra  
16:23:24 10 Leone. That's what's being suggested. What do you say about  
11 that?

12 A. I'm saying it's a - even those that think that we are  
13 psychopathic themselves because here's a situation on the one  
14 hand you can't be accusing Charles Taylor in this place of  
16:23:39 15 executing his Special Forces for carrying out atrocities, and on  
16 the other hand you are saying that he is ordering babies, other  
17 people. They have got to be sick themselves to believe that  
18 nonsense. You understand me? But that's how they want the world  
19 to look at - when they want to destroy you they bring this  
16:23:54 20 nonsense out about you eating human beings and you cutting babies  
21 out. So I'm an animal. That's what they want to portray. This  
22 is total nonsense.

23 This Zigzag - look - oh, God. There is not one soldier in  
24 the NPFL - not one - that survived willful murder while I carried  
16:24:23 25 on with the NPFL. Even the best of them we dealt with. Bong  
26 County, you pull the records now that are in this Court on the  
27 election results in Bong County. I got 99 per cent of the votes  
28 in Bong County. Does this look like a man who is going around  
29 cutting babies out of people's stomach? Those results are here

1 as a part of our exhibit. You will see the percentage of votes  
2 obtained in these counties. This looks like a man cutting babies  
3 out of people's stomach? This sick boy they brought here talking  
4 about he is an insider to me? He is very lucky. He is very

16:25:04 5 lucky.

6 Q. He continues in a similar vein, Mr Taylor, in relation to  
7 Prince Johnson. Page 5907, line 4:

8 "From there they set up a quick operation for us to go and  
9 wait for Prince Johnson in order to execute him and get Doe from  
10 him so we left."

16:25:35

11 This is after Doe has been captured by Prince Johnson's  
12 INPFL, do you understand, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yeah, but this is way back in 1990 now.

14 Q. We've gone back in time, yes.

16:25:53

15 "We took the route from Fenna Junction and we went as far  
16 as Cassava Hill in Louisiana, that is Upper Caldwell. We were  
17 there waiting for Prince to come with Doe, but his first group of  
18 soldiers who were rejoicing coming on the way, we thought Prince  
19 Johnson himself was amongst the group. And I think they were in  
20 about four cars. We surrounded the cars. We had all those men  
21 and then Benjamin Yeaten called Charles Taylor and then he said,  
22 'Oh, Prince did not come?' Or he said, 'Those group of people,  
23 you shouldn't allow them to go back and you shouldn't bring them  
24 here. You should execute them.' And that was the time through

16:26:17

25 him, Charles Taylor, and then that ben said, 'Chief said we  
26 should execute the people. He said we should execute them with  
27 knife.' I think those men, there were about 72 or 76, something  
28 like that. We executed them with knives that same day. But  
29 those who made it to escape from that, when they went back to

16:26:44

1 Prince Johnson and when he heard the information that was the  
2 time Prince Johnson killed Doe. He decided not to go to Gbarnga.  
3 Then he sent Varney to follow and a group sent Colonel Varney to  
4 carry him. Those groups that Colonel Varney came with, we  
16:27:32 5 arrested them at night again and then we killed them with knives  
6 and those were all executions that we carried out through Charles  
7 Taylor's orders and even against Prince Johnson. So the  
8 executions were so many that I cannot name all of them, here him  
9 sitting down himself."

16:27:56 10 Mr Taylor, what this man is describing, killing 50 people  
11 at one place, killing another 72 or 76 at another, killing  
12 pregnant women and babies, how did this miss you? How come you  
13 failed to identify Zigzag Marzah as Liberian executioner number  
14 one? How did you miss it?

16:28:27 15 A. Because, number one, I don't even think this kind of thing  
16 happened. They needed to show a whole lot of killings in Liberia  
17 so they brought a sicko here to say he killed - four cars holding  
18 72 people. He said there were about four cars and there were -  
19 how would 72 people get in four cars? How? Even you pack them  
16:28:48 20 on the top, how would 72 people get in to four cars?

21 Q. Well, taxis in Monrovia can get quite crowded, Mr Taylor?

22 A. 72? No. Look, 72 people in four cars? So divide 4 into  
23 72, we're talking about what? But even the tyres would not do  
24 it. How would 72 people - look, your Honours, I swear I - this  
16:29:14 25 never - in my wildest dream, this never happened. And why this  
26 sick boy came here with this nonsense, I swear it simply tells me  
27 how desperate people are to get me, really. I mean, Charles  
28 Taylor, what does one Charles Taylor regime change? So go find  
29 the people to make it up. Yet this sicko comes here talking

1 about, he killing 72 people that come in four cars with knives  
2 and he is doing this and that, and Prince Johnson executed Doe  
3 because he was sent to execute Prince Johnson; it didn't happen.  
4 It didn't.

16:29:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We're just about at the end of the tape.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: That's as convenient a point as any,  
7 Mr President.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn for the day.

9 Mr Taylor, I remind you of the order not to discuss your  
16:30:06 10 evidence.

11 We'll adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

12 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 30 September  
14 2009 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR 29747

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS 29747