



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 24 SEPTEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Erica Bussey
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Thursday, 24 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.]

09:31:38 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearance,
6 please.

7 MR BANGURA: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours and
8 counsel opposite. Your Honours, appearing for the Prosecution
9 today are myself, Mohamed A Bangura, Mr Christopher Santora and
09:33:11 10 our case manager, Ms Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

12 MR BANGURA: Mr President, we do not have Ms Hollis with us
13 today but the Prosecution is able to proceed.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura.

09:33:24 15 Mr Griffiths.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
17 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself, Courtenay
18 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah and Mr Terry Munyard of
19 counsel, and with us again today is Ms Priyanka Reddy.

09:33:38 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

21 Mr Taylor, before you are asked any further questions, I'll
22 remind you again, you are bound by your oath.

23 Now, at the end of yesterday's proceeding we were still in
24 private session, Mr Griffiths. Is it necessary to go back into
09:33:55 25 private session?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't think it's necessary now,
27 Mr President, and I've examined the notes that I have, and if it
28 does become necessary, I will alert the Court if I feel that the
29 detail being provided is such as to identify the witness.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. We'll rely on you to let us
2 know that, Mr Griffiths. We'll stay in open session. Go ahead,
3 Mr Griffiths.

4 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

09:34:18 5 [On former affirmation]

6 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

7 Q. Mr Taylor, continuing with the testimony of a particular
8 individual, at page 2433 of the transcript of 28 January 2008, we
9 find this:

09:34:47 10 "Q. You have testified about Sam Bockarie's trips to
11 Monrovia. During this time you were in Buedu." That's
12 from March 1998 until April 1999. "Did Sam Bockarie
13 travel to any other locations in Liberia?"

14 A. Yes, Foya.

09:35:04 15 Q. And why did he go to Foya?" That's Sam Bockarie.

16 "A. Well, he went to Foya to see - to give morale and talk
17 with the RUF combatants that were based in Foya."

18 Now, pause there, Mr Taylor. Foya is in which country?

19 A. It's in Liberia.

09:35:25 20 Q. "... I mentioned earlier that while the Freetown
21 fighting was going on there was a serious fighting between

22 Mr Taylor's security forces and the LURD rebels at that

23 axis where Christopher Varmoh and Mosquito, whatever,

24 Liberian Mosquito were based. And they did request and

09:35:47 25 that came from the instruction from Mr Taylor and Benjamin
26 Yeaten to get a contingent of RUF to be based in Foya to

27 give support to them. So Sam Bockarie gave instructions to

28 some other commanders, including even Morris Kallon, to

29 base there and give them support and there were more than

1 200 armed RUF in that axis. So he spent some time there
2 coordinating the activities."

3 Now, pause there. Mr Taylor, what do you know about that?

4 A. I know nothing about it. I'm not aware that the RUF sent
09:36:32 5 200 armed soldiers into Liberia. No, I'm not aware of that.

6 Q. Now, note the timing, Mr Taylor. This is supposed to be
7 taking place at the same time as the Freetown invasion. So we're
8 talking about January 1999, okay? So despite the fact that the
9 RUF/AFRC have allegedly combined to carry out the attack on

09:37:04 10 Freetown, Mosquito, has nonetheless based 200 - more than 200
11 armed RUF fighters in Foya. Did that happen?

12 A. No. And if it happened, it is not with my knowledge. I
13 knew nothing about it and at least - at least the Defence
14 Minister or somebody would have informed me. And because I did
09:37:34 15 not get such information, I don't think it happened.

16 Q. "Q. Was this the first time that Morris Kallon had gone to
17 Liberia to fight?

18 A. No, no, no, that's not the first time Morris Kallon had
19 gone to Liberia to fight.

09:37:53 20 Q. And when had he gone to Liberia before that to fight?

21 A. There was an incident about somebody called Mosquito
22 Spray who initially came to Buedu. He was I think the
23 forerunner of that attack. But the attack did not actually
24 sustain. I mean it was not sustained. Morris Kallon went
09:38:17 25 there briefly and they repelled the attack and they came.

26 But it intensified towards the end of 1998 and early 1999."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, there had been, had there not, an incursion
28 from Guinea in August 1998?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. And would it be accurate to say, as this individual did,
2 that that situation intensified towards the end of 1998, early
3 1999?

4 A. Well, I would say it continued. It continued.

09:38:58 5 Q. But would you say intensified?

6 A. Between '98 and '99, no. Between '99 and 2000, yes, I
7 wouldn't say - that's why I say it increased. Intensified later
8 on, but between '98 and '99, there was no real intensification.
9 There's another attack, but it's not intensified.

09:39:19 10 Q. Now, the attack in August 1998, Mr Taylor, for how long was
11 that attack sustained?

12 A. For not more than a day. They came in, caused some
13 trouble, Mosquito Spray, and they were driven right back out.
14 Within hours, that was all over.

09:39:38 15 Q. Was it the kind of situation where the Liberian security
16 forces required assistance from abroad?

17 A. No. No.

18 Q. And did you on that occasion, as suggested here, did you
19 employ members of the RUF to deal with Mosquito Spray?

09:39:58 20 A. Not at all, no.

21 Q. Now, it continues:

22 "Q. When Morris Kallon and these other commanders and the
23 some 200 RUF fighters were in Liberia fighting against the
24 LURD, who did they report to?

09:40:15 25 A. Benjamin Yeaten.

26 Q. And when they were in Liberia fighting against the
27 LURD, who provided them with arms and ammunition?

28 A. Benjamin Yeaten provided them with the arms and
29 ammunition."

1 Now, Mr Taylor, do you understand what's being suggested
2 here? That in addition to the supplies of arms and ammunition
3 which you had provided, as we dealt with on a prior occasion, in
4 order to facilitate the attack on Kono and the Freetown invasion,
09:40:58 5 the suggestion here is, you were also providing additional arms
6 and ammunition for use in the defence of Liberia from LURD. Do
7 you follow?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Were you?

09:41:08 10 A. No. And if I - if - I don't know why these boys would make
11 up these things. Look, LURD comes in, attacks Liberia. Should I
12 as President have a problem defending it? So what's all this
13 thing about, "Oh, he gave" - you know, the only part of this
14 that, you know, I would be concerned about, if anybody in the
09:41:32 15 government - we're not talking about NPFL, we're talking about
16 the government. There's no NPFL. If anybody encouraged any
17 individuals from Sierra Leone or wherever to participate in
18 trying to expel insurgents from Liberia, I mean, this should have
19 been done with the knowledge and consent of me as commander in
09:41:54 20 chief of the Armed Forces of Liberia. That was not done. But
21 somebody is saying that, of course, if LURD came into Liberia and
22 I had the opportunity to get arms from wherever I would have
23 gotten it, which was my right to do. But I did not invite anyone
24 from the RUF to participate. As simple as that. I didn't.

09:42:16 25 Q. Now, could we just deal with that proposition a little
26 further then, Mr Taylor. Could some 200 plus foreign, in effect,
27 mercenaries have been in your country without you knowing about
28 it?

29 A. No, I would have had to know about it. I would have had to

1 know about it. Now, you know, these boys exaggerate. Now, if
2 this man is saying that while there was fighting in Liberia and
3 there's very - because we're talking about Foya. We're talking
4 about Liberians that - and Sierra Leoneans that you can very
09:42:57 5 rarely distinguish between. If he is saying that while the
6 fighting was going on in Foya that a few Liberians that were on
7 the other side - because these Gissi, Gbandi boys on that border,
8 you don't know the difference between them. If he is suggesting
9 that some Liberians that were in Sierra Leone came over, because
09:43:19 10 these are their towns and villages in that area, and fought, this
11 I would not know about. And I would even be very fair and say
12 that's possible, that a few Liberians that were in Sierra Leone
13 could have come back because their towns and villages, you know,
14 were under attack. But to say that some 200 plus people will
09:43:42 15 come well armed, I would have to know about it. And because I
16 did not know about it, I would really say that it is not true.
17 Q. But, Mr Taylor, not only is he suggesting that these
18 numbers were involved, it's further being suggested they were
19 based in Foya, being controlled by their own commander, who was
09:44:03 20 acting under the command of your head of security, Benjamin
21 Yeaten. Question: How could that have occurred without you
22 finding out about it?

23 A. That's what I'm trying to say, because it didn't occur. I
24 would have had to know, because Benjamin Yeaten was not in charge
09:44:18 25 of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Benjamin Yeaten was the director
26 of the Special Security Services, and if he was in the field, he
27 was not the most senior person there. What happened to the
28 Defence Minister, the chief of staff of the armed forces at the
29 time? Such a thing could not have happened for some foreign

1 group to be based in Foya and I would not know about it. That's
2 not the case.

3 Q. So what were - what was Benjamin Yeaten's role in relation
4 to those LURD incursions, Mr Taylor?

09:44:48 5 A. Benjamin Yeaten being a Special Force and all senior
6 generals and all fighters at that particular time visited the
7 front line to see what was going on. But, I mean - and if they
8 had to fight, they fought. Everybody took part to try to expel
9 and keep security within the country.

09:45:07 10 Q. But who was in charge of the overall situation in Lofa?

11 A. Oh, the overall situation in Lofa was under the command of
12 the chief of staff of the armed forces.

13 Q. Who was?

14 A. General Kona.

09:45:20 15 Q. How do you spell that?

16 A. K-O-N-A, Kona. Some spell it with an H, K-O-N-A-H.

17 Q. Help me, in order to deploy the Armed Forces of Liberia to
18 meet such a threat was there any particular rules and regulations
19 governing your ability to send troops into battle in that zone?

09:45:50 20 A. When you say rules and regulations I need some help here.

21 Q. Well, help me, as commander-in-chief were you accountable
22 to the legislature in Liberia before you could transmit forces to
23 Lofa?

24 A. No, no, no, no. Once the country comes under attack, the
09:46:15 25 President must act immediately. Under the laws he has the right.

26 That's the whole point of the oath of office, to protect the
27 constitution and territorial integrity of the country. So you
28 don't immediately need to go to the legislature. You have to
29 respond and then inform the legislature.

1 But the normal procedure would be no different from any
2 other military procedure anywhere else. You get an attack. The
3 Defence Minister will meet with the chief of staff. They will
4 put together a plan and they will come and inform the President.
09:46:53 5 And most of these cases involve funding. If it calls for any
6 extra assistance in terms of money, food, medical and other
7 things that's the immediate job of the President to making sure
8 that the armed forces can - and what are we talking about when we
9 talk about armed forces? We don't actually have an army at that
09:47:17 10 time but I would say the fighting men, I prefer using the
11 phraseology fighting men, are able to carry out their duties.
12 This would be what would happen.

13 Q. Now, I want to move on and deal with another topic. I want
14 to deal with a version of events with regard to the transfer of
09:47:42 15 RUF representatives to Lome. Do you follow?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. In April of 1999. Page 2434 line 13:

18 "A. We left on board a vehicle that was brought to us by
19 Jungle. Two pick-ups which took us to Foya - I mean Vahun
09:48:08 20 and Vahun we on boarded a helicopter to Monrovia.

21 Q. What kind of helicopter was this?

22 A. It was a helicopter that somebody - one of Mr Taylor's
23 security Joe Tuah came along with the helicopter for us for
24 the delegate to Monrovia.

09:48:28 25 Q. Do you recall what was the colour of this helicopter?

26 A. No, I can't really recall.

27 Q. When you arrived in Monrovia what did you do?"

28 Can I pause to ask you a factual question, Mr Taylor. Was
29 the RUF guesthouse in Monrovia located on a particular street?

1 A. The RUF guesthouse is located on Tubman Boulevard in
2 Monrovia.

3 Q. You appreciate that in, for example, New York, many streets
4 bear a number rather than a name. Are there any numbered streets
09:49:09 5 in Monrovia?

6 A. Yes, there are numbered streets.

7 Q. Where is 16th Street?

8 A. Oh, 16th Street is within an area of Monrovia called
9 Sinkor, that's spelt S-I-N-K-O-R, but 16th Street I would say is
09:49:35 10 approximately a mile and a half from where the RUF guesthouse was
11 actually located. So that's a long distance between 16th Street
12 and where the guesthouse was located, which is next to the
13 Nigerian embassy in Monrovia.

14 Q. In any event: "When we arrived in Monrovia, we were taken
09:49:57 15 to the RUF guesthouse at 16th Street." What do you say about
16 that?

17 A. That's not true. The RUF guesthouse is not located on 16th
18 Street. 16th Street, like I say, is a mile and a half at least
19 from that point. I'm not sure if we have a very good map of the
09:50:19 20 city area, but he is wrong. He is wrong about the location of
21 the RUF guesthouse. He is wrong.

22 Q. Let's just briefly deal with that, shall we. Can we just
23 please take up for a moment the map of Monrovia which was
24 distributed. I want to deal with this as quickly as possible,
09:50:48 25 please, Mr Taylor. I don't want to delay overlong on this point.
26 Right. Mr Taylor, can you see the map from where you are?

27 A. Yes, I can.

28 Q. As I say, I don't want to waste too much time on this. Do
29 you see an area called Sinkor?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. Do you see the name Sinkor is just above Tubman Avenue,
3 yes?

4 A. Yes, I do.

09:51:50 5 Q. If you look to the left of Tubman Avenue do you see 9th
6 Street?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. If you count the streets going to the right, you have 9,
9 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 is just above the second S in Zaire

09:52:10 10 embassy. Do you see that?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Then 17th and then 18th, all right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Then we see to the right bottom corner the Sierra Leone

09:52:20 15 embassy and you had indicated on this plan earlier where the RUF
16 guesthouse was, yes?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. And just remind us quickly, where is the RUF guesthouse?

19 A. I'll have to move to do that.

09:52:34 20 Q. All right, fine. If we just do that quickly. Just
21 indicate because remember you've already marked it on a map. If
22 you just point to the general area.

23 A. It's somewhere up in this area going towards the boulevard
24 where you go to the airport, up here. That's the distance from

09:53:02 25 here - that's why I estimated it is about a mile and a half or so
26 from here to here.

27 Q. Fine. Thank you, we can put the map away now. So you say
28 an error has been made. It's not 16th Street, it's somewhere
29 else, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. "Q. How long did you stay in Monrovia?

3 A. We were there for two days and we were transported from
4 there to Lome.

09:53:42 5 Q. When you were in the guesthouse do you recall who if
6 anyone else was in the guesthouse at the time?

7 A. When we went to the guesthouse we already met the RUF
8 securities that were stationed there. Sankoh's securities
9 were there and the radio operators, Memunatu Deen was
09:54:02 10 there. Memunatu was in charge of the radio and there was
11 another guy called Tolo, Osman Tolo, and there were two
12 Sankoh security I saw there were who permanently based at
13 the 16th Street guesthouse, one Rashid and the other one
14 called Freedom."

09:54:23 15 Now again pause. Two questions. Firstly, were the RUF
16 representatives bound for Lome lodged at the RUF guesthouse in
17 Monrovia?

18 A. Yes, they were.

19 Q. Secondly, do you accept that the RUF had at that time radio
09:54:40 20 operators based at that location?

21 A. Yes, they had a radio - well, I'm not sure if operators.
22 They had a radio operator and people, yes.

23 Q. Were you aware of there being securities attached to Sankoh
24 at the address permanently based?

09:54:59 25 A. No. I was aware that Sankoh left a caretaker there. There
26 were at least two or three persons that were permanently based
27 there. I did not know their specific assignments but there were
28 at least two or three persons there.

29 Q. And it goes on: "They were Black Guards. They were

1 Sankoh's security and were also the security of Sam Bockarie."

2 It goes on, "But Mr Taylor provided that guesthouse" which you
3 accept, don't you, Mr Taylor?

4 A. Yes, I do.

09:55:37 5 Q. "We were there and Benjamin Yeaten came and met us.

6 Mr Taylor's security met us at the guesthouse and he gave each of
7 the delegates 300 US dollars and we were just there."

8 Do you recall that? Would you agree?

9 A. That I gave each person \$300?

09:55:55 10 Q. Yes.

11 A. I did give some money. I can't remember how much, but I
12 agree.

13 Q. "Also another commander, one Mustapha, a Gambian, came
14 there also and met with us and talked to us and he asked us to
09:56:10 15 wait for the next day for the flight that was going to take to us
16 Lome. So two of them actually met us there."

17 A Gambian called Mustapha?

18 A. I'm not sure. There's a Gambian called Mustapha, I don't
19 know as to whether he went there, but he could have.

09:56:31 20 Q. What role did he play?

21 A. Mustapha was generally one of the security personnel that
22 moved around. Mustapha Jalloh is the full name, yes.

23 Q. "So two of them actually met us there. They were the only
24 people that met us there and we were there until the day
09:56:50 25 for our flight. They took us to James Spriggs field
26 airfield?

27 Q. Did Benjamin Yeaten tell who provided the \$300 that was
28 given to each of you?

29 A. Yes, he met us. He said Mr Taylor gave that money to

1 all the members of the delegate, each member of the
2 delegate \$300.

3 Q. When you actually came into Monrovia on the helicopter
4 where did you land.

09:57:16 5 A. James Spriggs field airport."

6 Then he went on to mention that they were taken by car to
7 the guesthouse, we need not detain with that, and that the car
8 belonged to Mr Taylor's security. Then it continues:

9 "Q. When you left and went back to James Spriggs field
09:57:39 10 airport how did you travel to the airport?

11 A. The same guest car took us to the airport.

12 Q. And then from that airport how did you travel to Lome?

13 A. We travelled on board a UN plane."

14 Is that true?

09:57:57 15 A. Yeah, you see that's the problem with these people. But he
16 could not remember that the helicopter that picked him up from
17 Vahun, this is this - this is the man that could not remember the
18 UN helicopter picked him up. The only name he could come up with
19 was Joe Tuah. When we have produced documents here, reports to

09:58:20 20 the United Nations by Downes-Thomas stating how they got picked
21 up from Vahun and who all were involved. He could only remember
22 that some man came called - he couldn't remember that it was a UN
23 helicopter. You know, that's the problem with this and his whole
24 description of it is a little cutting in here to make up things.

09:58:40 25 An UN helicopter went to Vahun, piloted by UN people, on board
26 were UN people that brought them from Vahun and we have documents
27 that have been presented here, reports from Downes-Thomas, of why
28 we had to move from Foya to Vahun because of the friction in the
29 area and a decision was taken by the UN but he couldn't remember

1 that it was a UN helicopter.

2 So I mean as he is tying this up, you know, we have to
3 break it down a little bit because a UN helicopter picked him up
4 from Vahun, on board were UN people, they brought him to Spriggs
09:59:19 5 Payne Airport, he was taken to the guesthouse and he was taken
6 back to Spriggs Payne Airport and he was flown out of Liberia on
7 UN aircraft.

8 Q. Now it continues:

9 "Q. Who was with you going to Lome?

09:59:40 10 A. In our flight beside the delegates nobody else, only
11 the delegates.

12 Q. Who were the other delegates?

13 A. Myself, SYB Rogers, Rashid Sandy, Junior Vandi,
14 Lawrence Womandia and others."

09:59:58 15 Now, remember, we looked at US documentation showing the
16 full list of names, so we needn't delay over that:

17 "Q. What happened when you arrived in Lome?

18 A. We arrived in Lome, we were escorted by the organisers
19 of - no, we were met by the Foreign Minister of Togo at the
10:00:13 20 airport and he took us to the Deux Fevrier hotel.

21 Q. What happened when you arrived at this hotel?

22 A. We met Mr Sankoh and we were given various rooms to
23 stay in, we rested for that night and the next morning
24 Mr Sankoh summoned us at the poolside for briefing to give
10:00:37 25 him status report of what actually had occurred during his
26 absence while he was in detention both in Nigeria and
27 Freetown.

28 Q. Was Mr Sankoh staying at the same hotel you were
29 staying at?

1 A. Yes, we were all stayed at the same hotel.

2 Q. So what happened then during this briefing session?

3 A. We had a briefing with him and he did ask every
4 delegate to report. SYB Rogers reported to him as well as
10:01:10 5 the adjutant Rashid Sandy, myself and Ibrahim Bah who was
6 there, I mean we met Ibrahim Bah there with Mr Sankoh and
7 Omrie Golley."

8 Now, do you recall the UN documentation we looked at,
9 Mr Taylor?

10:01:24 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. That Bah and Golley were the first two in Monrovia to be
12 flown out to Lome?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And now we're now being told that when these delegates
10:01:37 15 arrive they meet up with Bah and Golley already there. You
16 follow?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. "A. Omrie Golley at the time was the head of the external
19 delegation. They had an external delegation. He and
10:01:52 20 Ibrahim Bah and also at one point in time he was the
21 spokesman for the RUF.

22 Q. You said Ibrahim Bah was there. What was his role at
23 the time?

24 A. Ibrahim because was an adviser to Mr Sankoh before and
10:02:14 25 still he was still the adviser to Mr Sankoh when we met him
26 and he was also - he also doubled as a member of the
27 delegation, external delegation along with Omrie Golley."

28 Now, Mr Taylor, was it at your request that Ibrahim Bah had
29 gone to Lome?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Because it continues:

3 "Q. You had mentioned him earlier in connection with him
4 being a liaison with Charles Taylor. To your knowledge at
10:02:52 5 this time did he continue to be a liaison with Charles
6 Taylor?

7 A. At one point in time, yes, of course, at the same
8 moment while this was all going on he actually left Lome
9 for Monrovia and he came along with Memunatu Deen to Lome
10:03:11 10 and I met two of them at Mr Sankoh's suite and he and
11 Memunatu brought \$20,000 for Mr Sankoh which according to
12 them was sent by Mr Taylor to Mr Sankoh."
13 Do you understand that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

10:03:29 15 Q. So Bah, having been transferred by the UN to Lome, travels
16 back to Monrovia where he is given \$20,000 by you and he returns
17 to Lome with one of the RUF radio operators. Do you follow?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Did you?

10:03:51 20 A. No, I didn't send Foday Sankoh any money. If I had, it
21 would have been a good gesture, but I didn't. And if I wanted to
22 send Foday Sankoh money, I would have sent it by the Foreign
23 Minister - the former Foreign Minister that was already on the
24 ground in Lome. Why would I wait for somebody called Bah to come
10:04:11 25 back to Monrovia? It would have been a good gesture to give
26 Foday Sankoh money, as Eyadema did, Obasanjo did, everybody. I
27 just didn't at that particular time, no.

28 Q. "Q. And did they explain what this \$20,000 was for?

29 A. Well, they said he has sent - he has actually sent, he,

1 Sankoh, he needed money at that point in time and he has
2 sent Ibrahim Bah and Ibrahim Bah suggested to him that they
3 should go - he should go and get some money for Mr Sankoh
4 and in our briefing we explained to him about the mining
10:05:02 5 operations and what have you, but Ibrahim Bah have also
6 intimated to him on most of the activities that took place
7 even before we got there. So Ibrahim Bah went to Monrovia
8 and they got this money the \$20,000 from Mr Taylor for
9 Mr Sankoh. And he was really very unhappy in fact with
10:05:26 10 that because according to him that was - I mean that was
11 peanuts for him at that point in time based upon the report
12 he received when he was in prison regards the RUF diamonds
13 that Sam Bockarie took to Mr Taylor during the entire
14 operation. "

10:05:44 15 Do you understand what's being said, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. That the \$20,000 wasn't a gesture. It was, in effect,
18 money you owed to Mr Sankoh as leader of the RUF.

19 A. Uh-huh.

10:05:56 20 Q. Because you were the one who had been collecting diamonds
21 from the RUF during the period of his incarceration in both
22 Nigeria and Freetown. Do you follow?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. What do you say about that?

10:06:09 25 A. That's totally - total, total foolishness because I had
26 collected no money. And, in fact, we subsequently see when Sam
27 Bockarie reports, he doesn't report I received any diamonds
28 because I didn't. And, quite frankly, if I had sent Foday Sankoh
29 money and he had said that, that would be very ungrateful of him

1 to say that - that, if he received a whole \$20,000 and said it
2 was peanuts, he was a very ungrateful person. I mean - but I
3 didn't send him any money at that particular time.

10:06:48 4 Q. Well, I'm going to ask you another question about this in a
5 moment, Mr Taylor, but let us finish the - what was said about
6 this:

7 "Q. ... when you say it was peanuts to him and he was
8 upset who are you referring to?

9 A. Sankoh.

10:06:59 10 Q. This briefing you received about diamonds to Charles
11 Taylor, were you present for that briefing?

12 A. Yes, I was present at that briefing.

13 Q. And what was told to Foday Sankoh about diamonds to
14 Charles Taylor?

10:07:13 15 A. Yes, everything that had transpired in Buedu was
16 explained to him. The Johnny Paul Koroma diamonds ..."
17 You remember the 1,000 pieces, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That Bockarie took but didn't get to meet you, remember?

10:07:29 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. "... all the other diamonds that were mined and the
22 diamonds they took to Mr Taylor - by Sam Bockarie taking
23 those diamonds to Mr Taylor. I mean everybody gave that
24 report to him.

10:07:40 25 Q. And what concerns if any were raised about these
26 diamonds to Charles Taylor?

27 A. Well, Sankoh was not happy, was not happy with them.
28 He was you be set. I mean he at one point in time was
29 actually agitated" - note that word - "but

1 unfortunately Mosquito was not around, I mean he was in
2 Buedu when we were having this meeting and he was asking
3 Mr SYB Rogers at one point in time why is it that they
4 didn't control those diamonds until he comes. I mean, what
10:08:17 5 was the use of giving the diamonds to Mr Taylor. So he was
6 really upset about that.

7 Q. When he asked that question what was the answer he was
8 given?

9 A. Well, everybody was blaming Sam Bockarie. Everybody
10:08:31 10 was blaming Sam Bockarie."

11 Let's pause there. Now, Mr Taylor - now, Mr Taylor, this:
12 Do you recall it being suggested, Mr Taylor, that Foday Sankoh
13 had given instructions for you to be the guardian of diamonds
14 produced by the RUF?

10:09:09 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. Do you recall that being said?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, you note that according to this control - this report,
19 it's being said that, "Why didn't they control those diamonds,"
10:09:23 20 that is, the RUF, "until he comes?" Do you follow?

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. Now, which is right: Were you told to be the safekeeper of
23 those diamonds, or what? Or had you somehow intervened and
24 injected yourself in this situation in order to enrich yourself?

10:09:42 25 Do you follow?

26 A. Uh-huh.

27 Q. Which is right?

28 A. Neither of the statements is. But there's so many of these
29 statements that are just not right and they just don't hold.

1 This is the same person - the same person who stated that Johnny
2 Paul Koroma had appointed Sam Bockarie as chief of defence staff
3 and turned right around and said that I made him a general. Now,
4 I do not know what the chief of defence staff position should
10:10:26 5 have been. Now, here we are saying that Foday Sankoh is
6 "agitated" in a meeting about diamonds, and if we look at the
7 time of this meeting, which is around April or thereabout, and we
8 look at the time that Sam Bockarie makes his salute report to
9 Foday Sankoh, which is in September, so we have May, June, July,
10:10:53 10 August, September. So Sam Bockarie has almost four months,
11 knowing that Sankoh is agitated in Lome about diamonds that
12 should have been given to me, the full five months that he had to
13 prepare this report, so why didn't he tell Sankoh in his salute
14 report, "Well, please don't be upset, but you're so-called
10:11:18 15 brother got all these diamonds"?

16 I mean, this man is a liar as I see it in that statement
17 that he made there about diamonds coming to me and all that.
18 Neither of the two statements in your question, neither is
19 correct because it's a lie.

10:11:37 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help us. You arrived in Lome in July,
21 didn't you?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And you met with Foday Sankoh, did you not?

24 A. Yes, I did.

10:11:47 25 Q. When you met with him, did this agitated man, who had been,
26 in effect, swindled out of thousands of pieces of diamond, did he
27 confront you about it?

28 A. No. Never asked me a question about diamonds. Never.

29 Q. Did he, to your knowledge, say to any of the other Heads of

1 States present: "You can't trust this man, Taylor, you know.
2 Guess what he did to me"? To your knowledge, was anything like
3 that said?

4 A. Nothing like that. Nothing.

10:12:46 5 Q. Now, let's go on. And I'm going now to - we're still on
6 the topic of Lome. Page 2442:

7 "Q. While you were in Lome as part of this delegation, do
8 you recall meeting with any Liberians?

9 A. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Mr Taylor's government
10:13:12 10 visited us there very briefly.

11 Q. Who was that?

12 A. Monie Captan visited Mr Sankoh.

13 Q. Were you present at that visit?

14 A. Yes, I was present.

10:13:23 15 Q. What was discussed at that meeting?

16 A. It was basically a courtesy call on Mr Sankoh and
17 complimenting him for partaking in the peace talks."

18 Now, pause there. Did your Foreign Minister go to Lome,
19 Mr Taylor?

10:13:41 20 A. Yes, he went to Lome when I went, yes.

21 Q. Did he go with you or had he gone to Lome prior to your
22 arrival?

23 A. No, no, no, he went with me. On the ground in Lome I had
24 the former Foreign Minister, D Musuleng-Cooper, as head of a
10:14:00 25 delegation there, but the actual Foreign Minister went on the
26 5th, or thereabouts, when I went.

27 Q. "Q. In addition to Monie Captan, did you have meetings
28 with any other Liberians?

29 A. The other meeting had to do with the presence of this

1 fellow, I think I mentioned about him, Jungle. And he was
2 the only Liberian along with Ibrahim Bah and Memunatu Deen.
3 When they came from Monrovia with the \$20,000 for Mr Sankoh
4 that was given by Mr Taylor I was in that meeting when they
10:14:40 5 presented that money to Mr Sankoh in this room by them."

6 Pause there. Do you understand that?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. That the transfer of the \$20,000 US wasn't just involving
9 Bah, but it also involved one of your other regular runners to
10:14:59 10 Sierra Leone, Jungle. Did you send Jungle to Lome?

11 A. No. If Jungle got to Lome he was an RUF so he went with
12 Sankoh - he went because Sankoh was there. No. What would a
13 little Jungle be doing going to Lome? How did he get to Lome, I
14 mean except through Sankoh, because Jungle is not an official in
10:15:25 15 my government. What would he be doing there?

16 Q. Now, what about this, Mr Taylor:

17 "Q. To your knowledge did Johnny Paul Koroma travel to
18 Monrovia during the time of the Lome negotiations or
19 before?

10:15:41 20 A. He did travel there during I think the time of the
21 negotiations."

22 What do you say about that?

23 A. Johnny Paul Koroma travelled to Liberia, Monrovia, in
24 August, long after the Lome agreement was signed which was signed
10:16:09 25 in July - around 7 July 1999. It is not until the Okra Hills
26 situation and the West Side Boys that this man is brought to
27 Monrovia. He is not in Monrovia at all in the month of July of
28 1999. No. That's totally false. Totally false.

29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall, it's a matter which you

1 dealt with at an earlier stage in your testimony, that there was
2 some dissatisfaction on the part of the AFRC?

3 A. Oh, yes.

4 Q. And what was that dissatisfaction about?

10:16:51 5 A. There were about two issues. One, they were not a part of
6 the negotiations in Lome, okay. The SLA was not a part. The
7 second problem was that they saw no role for the SLA after Lome.
8 And the third point was that there was no role for Johnny Paul
9 Koroma, who was the leader of - speaking on behalf of the SLA.

10:17:19 10 So those were the three problems that were left unresolved.

11 Q. So bearing that in mind, was Johnny Paul Koroma and an AFRC
12 delegation in Lome at the time of the negotiations?

13 A. Not at all. There was not one of them. Johnny Paul Koroma
14 at the time of the Lome negotiations is being held - he is
10:17:43 15 incarcerated by the RUF up-country. He is incarcerated. He
16 doesn't even - I don't think he follows it at all. And it is
17 because of his incarceration, one, and, secondly, the
18 nonparticipation of the SLA that lead to the taking of the UN and
19 other official hostages in August that lead to the famous Okra
10:18:08 20 Hills situation with the West Side Boys.

21 Q. Well, we're being told here, "He did travel there during I
22 think the time of the negotiations."

23 "Q. To your knowledge did Johnny Paul Koroma travel to
24 Monrovia during the time of the negotiations or before?

10:18:40 25 A. He did travel there during I think the time of the
26 negotiations."

27 So it's travel to Monrovia.

28 A. No, he didn't.

29 Q. "Q. Do you know why he travelled to Monrovia?"

1 A. He went to see with other AFRC delegates that came from
2 Freetown to meet with Mr Taylor, his AFRC boys. He went
3 there and he met with them and they spent some time as the
4 guests of Mr Taylor.

10:19:09 5 Q. And how did you learn about this?

6 A. I learnt about that when I went in Freetown and I talk
7 with one of the delegates Bazy Kamara who was on that
8 trip.

9 Q. Did Bazy Kamara tell you what was discussed with
10 Charles Taylor?

11 A. I said that they met with him and he did try to
12 persuade them to work along with the RUF for a smooth
13 programme following the signing of the accord."

14 Now, was that meeting with Johnny Paul Koroma during the
10:19:41 15 time of the Lome negotiations?

16 A. Not at all. No, no.

17 Q. When was it?

18 A. The discussions in Monrovia and the negotiations occurred
19 in August. Following the release of some UN personnel, very few,
10:20:10 20 and some other officials, negotiations were undertaken for the
21 exchange of the prisoners for Johnny Paul Koroma. Johnny Paul
22 Koroma was then brought to Monrovia and the UN and other Sierra
23 Leonean government officials and other RUF officials were
24 released.

10:20:33 25 About a week later or thereabouts, working with President
26 Kabbah and the United Nations, we then bring to Monrovia members
27 of the West Side Boys unit that were involved at Okra Hills in
28 taking these hostages. I meet with them. A witness in this
29 Court covered a part of that meeting. I meet with them and they

1 Leave and Johnny Paul Koroma remains in Monrovia until Sankoh
2 comes in September and that is the final meeting where there are
3 negotiations dealing with the issue of the SLA and the agreement.

4 But, you know, that's why when you get this second-hand
10:21:18 5 information he's got it all wrong and he is running with a part
6 of it that is not correct. Johnny Paul Koroma is not in Monrovia
7 at the time of Lome. He comes in Monrovia far after Lome and we
8 conduct these negotiations before he and Foday Sankoh leave in
9 October.

10:21:40 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, Mr President, I wonder if we could go
11 briefly into private session just to deal with one topic which
12 shouldn't last more than ten minutes, just to deal with one
13 matter. It's some detail which might identify the witness and
14 through an excess of caution I think it might be best if we dealt
10:22:04 15 with it in that way.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. For the members of the
17 public, we're going to go briefly into private session, which is
18 estimated to last not longer than ten minutes. This is necessary
19 to protect the identity of a witness who enjoys the benefit of a
10:22:27 20 protective measures order of this Court. Now what that means is
21 the members of the public can still continue to watch the
22 proceedings, but simply will not be able to hear what is being
23 said. As I said, this private session will probably last around
24 ten minutes.

10:22:49 25 Madam Court Manager, could you please put the Court into
26 private session.

27 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of the
28 transcript, pages 29620 to 29622, was extracted and sealed under
29 separate cover, as the proceeding was heard in private session.]

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we're in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we have this question:

10:27:48 5 "Q. After you came back from Lome where was Sam Bockarie?

6 A. Sam Bockarie had a problem with Mr Sankoh and he was
7 against the disarmament process."

8 This is page 2449 of the transcript.

9 "He was not in support of the Lome agreement and he tried
10:28:09 10 to persuade some group of the RUF not to disarm. And

11 because of that he fell out with Mr Sankoh and Mr Sankoh
12 explained he was very embittered. There were arguments on

13 the phone when he was talking to Sam Bockarie and he

14 instructed Issa Sesay to go to Buedu and have Sam Bockarie

10:28:28 15 arrested. Sam Bockarie heard it. He contested that

16 particular instruction from Sankoh and he collected arms as
17 well as ammunition he had with him in Buedu and his

18 security, his family and some other RUF were actually put

19 under gunpoint and all of them drove to Foya in Liberia and

10:28:50 20 they met with the security there, Benjamin Yeaten, and they
21 drove to Monrovia."

22 Hear that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What do you say about that?

10:29:01 25 A. That shows you how much real problems I have. How do you
26 untangle all this web of - people that do not know. There are
27 United Nations documents here, the discussions with Foday Sankoh
28 and Sam Bockarie that we conducted in Monrovia. The presence of
29 Obasanjo in the meeting as reported by the United Nations

1 documents here, the United Nations representatives being present,
2 the threat to Sam Bockarie, the instruction. I can see he knows
3 nothing about it, but he has come up now with his own version of
4 things. But the rest of the world knows a different story and
10:29:49 5 not from Charles Taylor's side. The United Nations documents are
6 very clear about it. The participation of Obasanjo in these
7 meetings, our clear-cut statement to Sam Bockarie and his
8 eventual extraction from Sierra Leone. So this man, like most of
9 his stories, have been attached in a way that suits his own
10:30:12 10 knowledge and that's all it is. It suits his knowledge, but
11 there is an official version of this. Sam Bockarie did not just,
12 as he put it up, just got up and packed up, took arms and
13 ammunition, whatever he said. There was a process of two
14 meetings involving another Head of State, involving a special
10:30:29 15 representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
16 So there's a different version totally, totally different from
17 what he said. So he does not know what he is talking about in
18 what he said there, just as he has done in many other areas of
19 his testimony. It did not happen the way he explained it there.
10:30:48 20 It did not.

21 Q. But there's one particular aspect of that account which I
22 want to ask you about. Bockarie actually put under gunpoint some
23 RUF and drove them to Foya. You get it? That some of those who
24 went with Bockarie into Liberia were taken there at gunpoint by
10:31:11 25 Bockarie. What do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

26 A. How could that be? So they were hostages. Sam Bockarie
27 did not enter Liberia with any hostages because, in fact, it
28 would not have been accepted and every human that arrived in
29 Liberia with an entourage from Sam Bockarie were disarmed at the

1 border. And so assuming that someone was held at gunpoint and
2 brought into Liberia, at the point of the border, they were all
3 disarmed and they were all free men and no such thing was brought
4 to my attention. So I can't account for what happened in Sierra
10:31:56 5 Leone, but that was not brought to my attention, but they were
6 disarmed at the border. And when Sam Bockarie entered Liberia,
7 he did not enter as one coming with his people. Every man and
8 woman that came as free people.

9 So I would strongly disagree with his assertion that people
10:32:19 10 were forced in at the level of Liberia. In Sierra Leone, I can't
11 account for that, but - and if they were brought in by force, and
12 as a result, if they were hostages, they could have been hostages
13 up to the Liberian border and it had to cease, because everyone
14 was disarmed. And once they entered Liberia, they were all free
10:32:41 15 people. So I really can't say as to whether that is true on the
16 Sierra Leonean side, but that was surely not true on the Liberian
17 side.

18 Q. Can I ask you about a particular detail, Mr Taylor.
19 Following the Lome - the signing of the Lome agreement, was Sam
10:33:00 20 Bockarie in Monrovia at that time?

21 A. No. Sam Bockarie only came - when Foday Sankoh came, Sam
22 Bockarie came to - he came in April, went - he came back in
23 September when Foday Sankoh arrived.

24 Q. So he was there in April 1999?

10:33:22 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Was that at the same time as the delegation was going to
27 Lome?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And he came back in September?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Now, we are told that - in fact, I'll leave that. Page
3 2450:

4 "Q. How did you learn that Sam Bockarie had left Buedu
10:33:56 5 with his family, security and others and arms and
6 ammunition had gone to Foya?

7 A. I was there when the securities who escaped from Buedu
8 brought the complaint to Mr Sankoh as well as those that
9 went with Sam Bockarie to Monrovia. Once they were at -
10:34:14 10 once they sought sanctuary with Benjamin Yeaten, who used
11 to be Mr Taylor's security, one of them called Eddie Kanneh
12 called Mr Sankoh on the phone and he was actually appealing
13 for Mr Sankoh to have clemency on him, that he as going to
14 leave Sam Bockarie to come back to Freetown. At the same
10:34:36 15 time I paid a couple of visits to Monrovia sometime in
16 2000, 2002 and met most of - almost all Sam Bockarie's
17 security and all the RUF that he carried with him with the
18 arms in Monrovia. I met them with Benjamin Yeaten. I met
19 them at the house of Momo Dgiba who is one of Mr Taylor's
10:34:58 20 aide-de-camp. "

21 Two matters. Sanctuary? Sought sanctuary with Benjamin
22 Yeaten, Mr Taylor?

23 A. I don't know how that was possible. He didn't. Sam
24 Bockarie was brought to Liberia by the Government of Liberia
10:35:18 25 under my instructions in coordination with my colleagues that had
26 agreed that such action. So it is very foolish of this man to
27 say that somebody will come into Liberia with a group of people
28 to seek sanctuary with a junior security personnel in the
29 country. It didn't happen that way.

1 The Government of Liberia brought Sam Bockarie in line with
2 the acquiescence of ECOWAS and the United Nations. That's how he
3 got there. So if there was sanctuary, it was granted by the
4 Government of Liberia.

10:36:01 5 Q. Now, the second aspect of this that I want to ask you about
6 is the Eddie Kanneh situation. When Bockarie came to Monrovia in
7 December 1999, did Eddie Kanneh come with him?

8 A. Yes, Eddie Kanneh did move with Bockarie.

9 Q. Do you recall whether there was some request by Eddie
10:36:22 10 Kanneh to be allowed to return to Sierra Leone?

11 A. No, I'm not aware of any such request, because Eddie Kanneh
12 stayed in Liberia, from my understanding, from there on. And
13 started going back and forward later on, but I'm not aware of any
14 such conversations between Kanneh and Sankoh. No, I'm not aware.

10:36:45 15 Q. And the final aspect of this I want to ask you about,
16 Mr Taylor, is this: "I met most - almost all of Sam Bockarie's
17 security and all the RUF that he carried with him with the arms
18 in Monrovia." Do you follow?

19 A. Uh-huh.

10:37:04 20 Q. What do you say about that?

21 A. I don't know what this man is speaking about, with the arms
22 in Monrovia.

23 Q. That's why I'm asking, Mr Taylor, because according to you
24 they were disarmed at the border.

10:37:17 25 A. Exactly.

26 Q. So what are they doing with arms in Monrovia --

27 A. They do not have --

28 Q. -- in 2001, 2002?

29 A. Except where he is explaining a situation where most of the

1 men that come that are granted citizenship are now ATU personnel.
2 That's a different story. But he is explaining it as though - I
3 understand that the continuation of that statement, as with the
4 arms in Monrovia, as comparing to the arms and ammunition that he
10:37:52 5 talks about that they brought out when they came, okay? And so
6 he has his facts all mixed up. Totally mixed up.

7 Q. And, now, Momo Dgiba was an aide-de-camp to you, wasn't he?

8 A. That is correct, yes.

9 Q. Now, it continues, page 2451:

10:38:14 10 "Q. What happened with the men that Sam Bockarie took with
11 him to Liberia?

12 A. Well, they were integrated into the Liberian security
13 forces, the Anti-Terrorist Unit. Most of them were in the
14 ATU. Some of them were used as personal bodyguards to
10:38:32 15 senior security commanders. When I visited Monrovia I saw
16 them with Mr Taylor's top most security commander like one
17 Roland Duoh. He had most of them with him and Benjamin
18 Yeaten had in fact dozens of those boys residing at his
19 house at White Flower and some of them were with Momo Dgiba
10:38:53 20 in the ATU and they were used as security and that was it.

21 They were all integrated into the Anti-Terrorist Unit of
22 Mr Taylor."

23 What do you say about that?

24 A. Well, there's just so many lies, so I don't know what to
10:39:11 25 say, yes or no, to what - the whole thing is - look, the ATU was
26 trained and equipped by the Government of Liberia. They were the
27 best force ever trained in that country during my administration.
28 They were not assigned to no Benjamin Yeaten. They were not
29 assigned to - those individuals were the best housed and the best

1 equipped in the country. Their mission in Liberia, as has been
2 explained by one of them before this Court, was to provide
3 security to foreign diplomatic missions and government
4 installations. They didn't leave anybody - he is lying as he
10:39:48 5 describes it there. Now, one of them have been before this Court
6 and have explained their functions.

7 Q. Now, you do accept though that many of those RUF who
8 accompanied Mr Bockarie into exile in Monrovia were indeed
9 integrated into the ATU. You accept that, don't you?

10:40:14 10 A. Oh, yes, I do.

11 Q. Were they also employed as personal securities by
12 commanders such as Roland Duoh and Benjamin Yeaten?

13 A. Never. In fact, Roland Duoh, so distant - never, ever.
14 No.

10:40:30 15 Q. Roland Duoh so what?

16 A. I say he is so distant from the whole process. Roland Duoh
17 was army, so he had nothing to do with security functions. And
18 none of those boys were assigned to any individual. They were
19 strictly assigned to VIPs. Not to Liberian government security.

10:40:53 20 Benjamin himself is a security personnel, and the ATU were very,
21 very, very well trained and very well equipped for the purpose of
22 serving diplomats and others, no. So Roland Duoh and Benjamin
23 Yeaten situation as described by him, totally, totally false.

24 Q. Given your acceptance that members of the RUF were
10:41:28 25 integrated into the ATU, Mr Taylor, was Sam Bockarie himself
26 integrated into any security position within Liberia?

27 A. Never, no. Never, no. And may I just add: After those
28 individuals, the Sierra Leoneans that were given actual
29 citizenship in Liberia, after their integration into the ATU, Sam

1 Bockarie had no control whatsoever or no contact with them and
2 Jabaty Jaward, who was a senior officer in the ATU, that was one
3 of those spoke about it here before this Court. Sam Bockarie had
4 no contacts with them and he said that in his testimony for the
10:42:13 5 Prosecution in this Court. So they were just not there for what
6 he is explaining, no. Absolutely no.

7 Q. Line 1, page 2452:

8 "When I first met with Sam Bockarie actually he was part of
9 Mr Taylor's security. He was integrated into Mr Taylor's
10:42:39 10 security in Monrovia. He complained about his disappointment with
11 Mr Sankoh and that - I mean he's now integrated in the security
12 of Mr Taylor."

13 What do you say about that, Mr --

14 A. That's a lie. That's a lie. Sam Bockarie was never part
10:42:58 15 of any security unit in Liberia. Never. Sam Bockarie arrived,
16 he was put on salary, he was given a jeep, he was - his immediate
17 family around him were given subsistence, he was given a house.
18 He was never put as a part of any security force in Liberia. The
19 men - the able-bodied men that were recruited were given
10:43:25 20 citizenship, they are put in the ATU, they were given a monthly
21 salary, in fact, the best paid in the whole country. He was
22 never a part of any security. It's a lie.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when Bockarie left in December 1999, are
24 you aware of who took over control of the RUF at that point?

10:44:03 25 A. Yes, I'm aware.

26 Q. Who?

27 A. It was Issa Sesay.

28 Q. Had he taken over in December 1999, to your knowledge?

29 A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge, immediately upon the

1 departure - we have to be very careful with takeover now, but he
2 takes over the command responsibility. But Foday Sankoh at this
3 time is in Freetown, okay.

4 Q. Because this is said, same page, 2452, after Bockarie left,
10:44:45 5 Issa Sesay took over his position. Then this question:

6 "To your knowledge during the junta and also in 1998 and
7 1999" - so the period we're looking at, Mr Taylor, is 1997 to
8 1999. Do you follow?

9 A. Okay.

10:45:07 10 Q. "... in what ways was information about RUF actions
11 conveyed to Charles Taylor?

12 A. Three main ways. One of them was the satellite
13 telephone communication facility that was with Sam
14 Bockarie. The second measure was the military
10:45:28 15 communication VHF, very high frequency set that relayed
16 messages to radio Sunlight. They had a crew Sunlight,
17 somewhere behind White Flower, that is the residence of the
18 SSS director Benjamin Yeaten. And our radio operators too
19 that were in Monrovia and they said we were true runners" -
10:45:53 20 this is the third way - "Like Sampson, Marzah and Jungle
21 who were part of Mr Taylor's security outfit."

22 Now, do you understand what's being said there?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. There were these different methods of communication between
10:46:10 25 1997 and 1999. One, the satellite telephone. Two, the VHF radio
26 and indeed there appears to be two aspects to that. There's
27 firstly radio Sunlight somewhere behind White Flower, and our
28 operators that were in Monrovia and then you've got the runners
29 like Sampson, Marzah and Jungle. Do you follow?

1 A. Uh-huh.

2 Q. So two radio stations, radio Sunlight and the operators in
3 Monrovia, then we've got the satellite phone, and then we've also
4 got now the runners, yes?

10:46:53 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Now, what do you say about that, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind
7 the time frame posed by the question, '97 to '99. Do you follow?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What do you say?

10:47:06 10 A. We have to put this - we have to break it up now and put it
11 into full context. 1997. Well, there are trips to Monrovia in
12 1997 and so I do not know if they are runners by some of these
13 people involved. There's a letter. He forgot the letter routed
14 1997 because there's a letter from Johnny Paul Koroma and the
10:47:39 15 AFRC, so he forgot that. But then when we go into the most
16 serious part of this, 1997 there is no contact that I have with
17 the RUF.

18 Q. What about the junta?

19 A. Or with the junta. There are two contacts that we have
10:48:04 20 with the junta. Two. Two contacts. The first contact is a
21 letter from Johnny Paul Koroma that we do not respond to. The
22 second contact is a delegation to Monrovia that we do not meet.
23 This happens in 1997, the second half of 1997. Now, let's not
24 forget in 1998 there's massive confusion because we have the
10:48:32 25 intervention in February of 1998. But from 1997 going on I hope
26 I had a way of getting contact because we had been authorised but
27 we had not established contact yet with the RUF. You look at
28 ECOWAS documents that have been presented before this Court, the
29 Committee of Five was authorised to speak to the junta and let's

1 review something.

2 Why didn't I meet with that delegation in 1997? Because
3 ECOWAS - while ECOWAS was speaking to the junta, ECOWAS and the
4 international community had not recognised the junta as a
10:49:10 5 government. So for me to have met them and their so-called
6 delegation for anything other than the peace process would have
7 been acquiescence to an extent. So that level of acquiescence
8 would not have been acceptable to the international community, so
9 we didn't meet them.

10:49:30 10 Now we have the situation where in August 1998, scrambling
11 to get some contact, we have this contact with my ambassador in
12 Guinea. So the first communication with the RUF and Sam Bockarie
13 occurs in September of 1998. By October, okay, radio contact is
14 made because we give the guesthouse and we install a radio there
10:50:00 15 and Sam Bockarie is given a telephone. So to the extent of there
16 being radio contact and telephone contact in October of 1998 that
17 is true.

18 But now you've taken a factual situation, it's been
19 obscured by the lies and then unless you take it apart you would
10:50:21 20 not understand. "Well, okay, he's right, he has been in
21 contact." Well, the contact comes, it must be added, officially
22 and for a purpose. This happens from beginning of October.

23 So if we go back to 1997 all the way up until August of
24 1998 if he says there's contact with the RUF, that's a lie.

10:50:40 25 Right off the bat. Then we look at October going on between that
26 time and going on from October 1998, November, December, and
27 coming on into the Lome Peace Agreement 1999, fine. Because in
28 February following the intervention we begin the whole process
29 again of trying to get these people back to the negotiation table

1 and there are a lot of contacts that my government - that I have
2 at that time with the RUF. Many, many contacts. And we finally
3 succeed, okay, in getting together. And these are all contained
4 in the Secretary-General's report. All the contacts are open.
10:51:28 5 They are public. They are transparent. So to that extent, yes.
6 But that's the context that we have to put it in, if not the
7 whole thing is obscured. So based on your question now, counsel,
8 there cannot be a straight yes or no to that question because
9 there's some truth, but the context now I think will help the
10:51:50 10 Court as I have explained it.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I apologise for this but again
12 briefly we will have to go into private session.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: To the members of the public I'll
14 announce that the Court once more will need to go briefly into
10:52:18 15 private session. Again that is to protect the identity of a
16 witness who is subject to a protective measures order of this
17 Court. What that means is that the public can still see the
18 proceedings but will not be able to hear what is being said.

19 Madam Court Manager, please put the Court into private
10:52:43 20 session.

21 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
22 the transcript, pages 29635 to 29652, was
23 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
24 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

25
26
27
28
29

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Mr Taylor, the witness was then asked this question on a
11:26:14 5 different topic and we need to deal with it:

6 "Q. I would like to ask you some questions to clarify some
7 points of your earlier testimony. You testified last
8 Friday that upon your return to Zogoda in 1996 Foday Sankoh
9 briefed you what the situation had been like since you left
11:26:30 10 the RUF in 1991. And you testified that part of what he
11 told you was that at some point the border between his
12 forces in Sierra Leone and Liberia was closed because of
13 ULIMO. You also testified that at some point you and Faya
14 Musa travelled from Danane through Ivory Coast and Guinea
11:26:52 15 to return to Sierra Leone and Zogoda. During your
16 discussions with Foday Sankoh when he was telling you what
17 had happened in your absence what if anything did
18 Foday Sankoh tell you about the use of that route through
19 Guinea and Ivory Coast?

11:27:07 20 A. That was the route that the external delegates used to
21 Ivory Coast, I mean to Danane in Ivory Coast. It was used
22 by other people that wanted to see Mr Sankoh. I can recall
23 he told me they used the same route when journalists wanted
24 to report what was actually happening in the jungle to the
11:27:27 25 outside world. They used the same route to come to meet
26 him and that was what he told me.

27 Q. What if anything did Foday Sankoh tell you about any
28 meetings between Charles Taylor or his representatives and
29 the RUF during this time the border was closed?

1 A. I can't really recall him telling me that. The only
2 person I can recall telling me that he used that route was
3 Jungle. He said he used it sometime in 1993/'94.

4 Q. Did he tell you why he used that route?

11:28:03 5 A. He said he used to come - he told me he was sent to
6 meet with Mr Sankoh by Cisse, Musa Cisse."

7 Now, such a route through the Ivory Coast and Guinea to get
8 to the RUF in order to avoid ULIMO, Mr Taylor, was that a route
9 you were aware of?

11:28:23 10 A. No. But it's a possible route, yes.

11 Q. Was it a route used by you, for example, to send Jungle to
12 the RUF?

13 A. No. But if Jungle is with me in Liberia to go to the RUF
14 why does he have to go through Guinea? All he has to do is go to
11:28:43 15 Danane, right across the Liberian border and go on to Sankoh.
16 Why would he have to go back, go through Guinea? No, I mean it
17 would be foolish if he is with me in Liberia.

18 Q. It's said that Jungle used that route '93/'94?

19 A. So that means that he is in Sierra Leone. So I have no
11:29:04 20 control over Jungle. '93/'94 that's in Sierra Leone. Now, if he
21 is working for - because Jungle had been with Sankoh since that
22 time, okay, and so I can see if he is sent he is sent by the RUF
23 to Sankoh using Guinea.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Pause there. Mr President, I heard the
11:29:27 25 telephone so I guess we're running out of time now?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: We've probably got less than a minute of
27 tape left, Mr Griffiths.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: That's as good a point as any.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn now for the morning

1 adjournment and reconvene at 12 o'clock.

2 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:01:30 5 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were considering
6 some testimony regarding a route through the Cote d'Ivoire and
7 Guinea into RUF held territory in Sierra Leone. Do you recall
8 that?

9 A. Yes, I do.

12:01:48 10 Q. And just to remind us, the route went via Danane in the
11 Ivory Coast. Is that right? And then through Guinea into Sierra
12 Leone, yes?

13 A. Uh-huh.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, in consideration of that route
12:02:10 15 allegedly taken by Jungle in 1993, '94, I would like us to refer
16 to a map of West Africa, please, and I have alerted all parties
17 to the particular map we propose to look at. It's the map of
18 West Africa, which looks like this.

19 Now, Mr Taylor, I wonder if you would change places for a
12:02:41 20 moment, please?

21 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I'm sorry, Mr Griffiths, is this one of
22 the ones in this bundle?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: No, it's not. It's was one in the original
24 bundle provided by the Prosecution in that black folder. It
12:03:07 25 should be under the - at the back of the bundle behind the
26 category called "miscellaneous".

27 MR BANGURA: To assist the court, it's an exhibit,
28 exhibit P-1.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this is the best map that we have
3 available, which shows in their entirety Sierra Leone, Liberia,
4 Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, yes? Now, just take a moment and
12:04:00 5 acquaint yourself with the map. So if we can locate first of all
6 Abidjan, which is on the Atlantic coast of the Cote d'Ivoire,
7 yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Now, there came a time, did there not, when Foday Sankoh
12:04:20 10 was based in Abidjan in the Cote d'Ivoire. Is that right?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Now, we see that there is that border between Liberia and
13 Cote d'Ivoire up to where that finger of Nimba County points into
14 Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea?

12:04:49 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Just above the "A" in "Liberia", we have that finger
19 pointing into Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, don't we, yes?

12:05:00 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And in that stretch, that is where Danane is located, just
22 above the "Y" in "Yamoussoukro", yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And so the route being described by the witness departs
12:05:24 25 somewhere above the "Y" in "Yamoussoukro", goes through Guinea
26 and then into Sierra Leone, you appreciate that?

27 A. Uh-huh.

28 Q. Now, such a route, Mr Taylor, was it a route that you used
29 during this period after ULIMO had cut off the border to maintain

1 contact with the RUF. Do you follow?

2 A. I follow. No.

3 Q. Did you?

4 A. No. Why would it make sense for anybody to - and the
12:06:07 5 period in question here is what, 1993?

6 Q. '94?

7 A. '94. But Sankoh is not in La Cote d'Ivoire at this time.

8 But if Jungle is coming and going, so he wouldn't have to go to

9 Abidjan, that means he will come and - at this point that you

12:06:34 10 were talking about, what you referred to as the finger right

11 here, this is the border between Guinea and La Cote d'Ivoire. It

12 is true this section of the country points up here, but the

13 interesting point to mention here is that from where you

14 described as this finger all the way here, that's all the border

12:07:01 15 between Liberia and Guinea. So if anybody is coming from Sierra

16 Leone and if there is anything factual about somebody coming from

17 Sierra Leone to me, you would be able to enter NPFL area from

18 this finger. You wouldn't have to come all the way down here to

19 Danane, because right up here is Mount Nimba. We've heard of

12:07:32 20 Sanniquelle before in testimony here and we've also had another

21 word introduced here called Yekepa that's right up here. So

22 you're already into NPFL held area. This is - Yekepa is right

23 here. So why would this person leave Yekepa, which you can come

24 from Yekepa right down to Sanniquelle and Ganta, okay? Why

12:07:59 25 would you leave Ganta - why would you leave Ganta and come all

26 the way down here to Danane, when you are right - from here you

27 can come into Ganta. Ganta is NPFL area and from Ganta to

28 Gbarnga is less than an hour's drive. So it doesn't make sense

29 what this witness is trying to explain, okay? Maybe they have

1 other reasons for going all the way to Abidjan, with would be in
2 1996, okay? But at the time he is talking, if there is contact
3 between the RUF and the NPFL and one wants to consummate that
4 particular contact, you would be better off doing right here,
12:08:43 5 which is Ganta. If you look, Ganta is right here and from Ganta
6 coming to Gbarnga at the time in question, '93, '94, you would be
7 about - less than an hour drive from the border. So nobody would
8 want to leave here and traverse all the way here, so it doesn't
9 make sense. I don't know as to whether this is a spare map that
12:09:07 10 you want to make little dots on to point the location, or what.

11 Q. I think --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's a Prosecution exhibit. Is that
13 the exhibit that the witness is being shown?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: It's a Prosecution exhibit.

12:09:19 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: The actual map there is exhibit P-2, is
16 it?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: As I understand it, yes, your Honour.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, you can't mark it, Mr Taylor.

19 MS IRURA: Your Honour, that's not the exhibit. It's a
12:09:29 20 copy that's in the map file.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's different.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, if it's a copy, Mr Taylor, just help
23 us. If you could mark on that, first of all then, Ganta.

24 A. Okay. Ganta would be just about here.

12:09:47 25 Q. Put a number "1" beside that and then put a key in the
26 Atlantic Ocean and put "Ganta". Marked "Danane" roughly where
27 Danane is.

28 A. Danane would be about here.

29 Q. Put a number "2", key in the Atlantic Ocean, please.

1 A. I am not sure if I am spelling Danane correct here.

2 Q. Mark number "3" Gbarnga, roughly. And the point you are
3 making being that the distance from 3 to 1 is a much more direct
4 route than through Danane to go all the way around the finger of
12:11:13 5 Nimba to get to Sierra Leone, is that the point?

6 A. Of course, yes. Between 3 and 1, maximum, an hour drive.
7 45 minutes, people take between Ganta and Gbarnga. You enter
8 right from Guinea into - Gbarnga - I mean, into Ganta. There is
9 no two ways about it.

12:11:37 10 Q. Okay. Is there anything else you want to tell us about
11 that map before we move on, Mr Taylor?

12 A. No. I am fine.

13 Q. Could I ask that that be marked for identification?

14 A. Would you want me to sign this and date it?

12:11:56 15 Q. Yes, please.

16 And could we have it marked for identification MFI-263?

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: How do you want that described,

18 Mr Griffiths?

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Map of West Africa showing Danane, Ganta and

12:12:19 20 Gbarnga marked by the defendant.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. That map is marked for
22 identification MFI-263.

23 THE WITNESS: I haven't signed it. I was waiting for you.

24 Can I go ahead and sign it?

12:12:42 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: And the date, please.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just to correct the transcript, I think I
28 made an error earlier on in describing the map before it was
29 marked as Prosecution exhibit P-2. It is in fact Prosecution

1 exhibit P-1.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the particular witness we are dealing with
4 at or about this point in testimony was shown a document and it's
12:14:07 5 an important Prosecution exhibit which I think you should have an
6 opportunity of dealing with. It's exhibit P-67, and it's a
7 report from the Black Revolutionary Guards, a handwritten report,
8 okay. Do you recall that document, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, I do.

12:14:47 10 Q. Now, I am going to take a little time going through this
11 document to give you an opportunity to deal with it. Now, you
12 will see it's addressed to the leader - no, in fact, can we start
13 right at the top, please. There is some writing missing at the
14 top, but it's appears the words "Revolutionary Black Guard of
12:15:26 15 Sierra Leone Peoples Army", yes, top right-hand corner?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. "To the leader, from the Black Revolutionary Guards.
18 Subject, situation report." Now, pause. We are told by this
19 individual that this is a photocopy of the report of the Black
12:16:00 20 Guards to Sankoh dated April 1999 and that it was actually
21 presented by a Black Guard representative at the time, Junior
22 Vandi, okay. That's the testimony of the witness, page 2477.

23 "Sir, on behalf of the entire Black Guard unit we are
24 hereby taking this opportunity to make a summary report to let
12:16:35 25 you know or understand the situation on the ground.

26 To start with, we thank the Almighty God" - I can't make
27 out what the word to the left of the hole punch is - " as per
28 your previous concentration programmes to the entire movement
29 that this is a holy war which everyone within the movement have

1 realised because in your absent the struggle continues with lot
2 of developments. "

3 Now, pause. Mr Taylor, have you heard of the Black
4 Revolutionary Guards?

12:17:44 5 A. I had not heard of it before. I heard of it here in the
6 Court.

7 Q. "Sir, as you left us in 1996 to go and sign the Abidjan
8 accord, lot of enemy pressure (Kamajor) was mounted on us, but
9 due to the dedication and loyalty of the command you left on the
10 ground, we were able to contain situation until the AFRC coup
11 d'etat, wherein you instructed the high command for us (RUF) to
12 join the brothers in order to form the People's Army and defend
13 the sovereignty of our motherland.

14 The external delegates who were with you in Abidjan also
15 went over to the media that they have toppled the leadership of
16 the RUF, and went to the extent of inciting people, but due to
17 the fastness and the security experience of the high command, we
18 were able to trick them to come on the ground for us to work out
19 all necessary modalities. They came through the Guinea-Sierra
12:19:37 20 Leone border (Nongowa ferry) and were finally arrested by us and
21 brought on the ground in a lock up.

22 Furthermore, when we join the brothers, some of us senior
23 officers and elders were given ministerial positions in the AFRC
24 government. All the same things were not working well with the
12:20:05 25 RUF members in which the high command even decided to leave the
26 city Freetown and decided to base in the provinces. Things were
27 not put in a proper shape as the so-called honourables were just
28 doing things as they like. There was no proper command and
29 control until ECOMOG decided to make a final strike into Freetown

1 in which they succeeded in driving the entire AFRC out of the
2 city.

3 When Freetown fell in the hands of ECOMOG, the high command
4 therefore decided at once without any delayance, as there was no
12:20:56 5 command and control, to move to our original base (Kailahun) and
6 position the RUF combatants to the old former 1991 defensive
7 points, which were Neuma, Bonbohun and Jojoi ma. These positions
8 were seriously defended until when the ECOMOG advanced to Kenema
9 and Daru. From then, the enemies had tried their level best to
12:21:37 10 penetrate the defensive position, but no chance had been given to
11 them. In the north, the enemies captured Makeni and tried to
12 advance to Kono. Our men retreated and defended part of Kono."

13 Something "to the security situation, the high command
14 therefore instructed the then battle group commander, Brigadier
12:22:16 15 Issa Sesay, to try by all means to report with the former AFRC
16 chairman JPK to Kailahun. As a result JPK and his bodyguards
17 were brought to Kailahun as per instructions. They were welcomed
18 by the high command and elders.

19 Sir, at this stage, the high command, JPK, senior officers,
12:22:44 20 junior officers and the entire combatants held a forum and
21 finally agreed to continue the struggle under one structure and
22 command.

23 Immediately Freetown and the provincial headquarters fell
24 in the hand of ECOMOG. The high command was call to report by
12:23:09 25 the President of Liberia, Mr Charles Taylor, wherein the
26 President seriously briefed the high command and gave him the
27 confidence that he should not give up but to keep up the struggle
28 and uphold the revolution until the leader returns."

29 Now, pause there. Now, Mr Taylor, the events narrated by

1 the writer, that is the external delegation and what they said to
2 the media, the fact that they were lured back into Sierra Leone
3 and arrested and detained, we have all heard evidence to that
4 effect, haven't we?

12:24:01 5 A. Yes, we have.

6 Q. The invitation to the RUF from the AFRC to join them in
7 Freetown, again we have heard evidence to that effect, haven't
8 we?

9 A. Yes, we have.

12:24:17 10 Q. The intervention by ECOMOG in February 1997, again we have
11 heard evidence to that effect, haven't we?

12 A. No, you mean 1998.

13 Q. 1998, sorry. We have heard evidence to that effect,
14 haven't we?

12:24:32 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. So would you agree, Mr Taylor, that whoever is writing this
17 report is giving an accurate record of what happened after Sankoh
18 left in November or thereabouts of 1996. Do you follow?

19 A. Yes.

12:24:51 20 Q. Now we come to this part: "Immediately Freetown and the
21 provincial headquarters fell in the hands of ECOMOG." So that's
22 February 1998?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. "The high command was called to report by the President of
12:25:08 25 Liberia, Mr Charles Taylor." Who do you understand to be the
26 high command, Mr Taylor?

27 A. I really don't know who is the high command. I don't know
28 how they make - because the high command, as I know it, would be
29 more than one person. But in this Court they have referred to

1 the high command as the leader. I think the high command here,
2 this writer could be referring to Sam Bockarie, in my
3 understanding of it.

4 Q. Well, that's what the particular individual who was being
12:25:41 5 shown this report also concluded, that this is a reference to Sam
6 Bockarie. So bearing that fact in mind, let us continue:

7 "The high command" - let's say Sam Bockarie - "was called
8 to report by the President of Liberia, Mr Charles Taylor, wherein
9 the President seriously briefed the high command and gave him the
12:26:09 10 confidence that he should not give up but to keep up the struggle
11 and uphold the revolution until the leader returns. The
12 President" - that's you - "gave full assurance to the high
13 command, Sam Bockarie, and promised to give his maximum support
14 to the RUF. The President also took an oath that he will never
12:26:36 15 betray his brother (Corporal Foday Sankoh). From that point, the
16 President gave huge quantity of logistics (ammunition) to the
17 high command" - Sam Bockarie - "for us to start repelling the
18 ECOMOG advancement or to contain the situation."

19 Did you, in or about February 1998, meet Sam Bockarie and
12:27:13 20 make such a promise to him, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, no.

22 Q. So, Mr Taylor, help us with this: You accept that up to
23 this point this is an accurate account of what took place in the
24 absence of Sankoh?

12:27:26 25 A. Uh-huh.

26 Q. Why do you say now that this part of the report is wrong?

27 A. Well, in the first place, I don't know if this
28 really - nobody has challenged the authenticity of this report,
29 the fact that you have a report and there are factual points in

1 the report, it doesn't make it - I mean, it depends on who wrote
2 this report. I would have a serious problem. Why would the
3 Black Guard be reporting this, according to them, in 1999 and --
4 Q. April.

12:27:57 5 A. April 1999 and come - and it's in handwriting. I don't
6 understand this. But I know the facts that they mention. I
7 mean, this is somebody that knows some information. But there is
8 no way that I summoned Sam Bockarie to Monrovia and gave him a
9 large amount of ammunition because that's an impossibility.

12:28:22 10 That's an impossibility. At the time that Sam Bockarie comes to
11 Monrovia, which is far later from February, there are no arms,
12 there are no ammunition. But another witness talks about Sam
13 Bockarie coming and ECOMOG is giving him trouble with diamonds
14 and he can't give it to me. So there is something factual in
12:28:42 15 what this writer is talking about, but I don't know the motive
16 behind putting this in. But I gave Sam Bockarie - I don't have
17 weapons to give to anybody. How can I give him weapons? That's
18 not true. It is not true.

19 Q. So what are you saying about this document then, Mr Taylor?
12:28:55 20 And I invite your comment, because you appreciate this is one of
21 the foundation stones of this Prosecution. It's an important
22 document from their point of view. So what are you saying about
23 it?

24 A. Well, there would be several things that I would say about
12:29:13 25 this document. One, this is a document that contains some
26 factual things. I would first of all wonder why this document is
27 written in April 1999 and given to Sam - to Foday Sankoh, if
28 that's April, in Lome. Okay? Why is it written? That would be
29 the first thing. And for this, even for the whole document to be

1 considered as being an authentic document in any case, we would
2 even have to find out if this is actually the handwriting of the
3 guy that wrote this document. This could be a forgery, it could
4 be a fabrication. I don't know. But it does contain some
12:29:55 5 factual evidence, okay?

6 So if you ask me what's my comment on, it, and we really
7 want to get into - because this is about somebody's life, my
8 life, then we may have to verify handwriting to make sure and
9 bring - in fact, who is the Black Guard commander at that point?

12:30:15 10 If he is available, we'll subpoena him and bring him to this
11 Court.

12 Q. Well, we are told it is a Mr Vandt who presented this
13 report to Mr Sankoh.

14 A. Yeah, but Vandt - is Vandt the Black Guard commander? From
12:30:31 15 what we have been told in this Court, there is somebody else
16 that's supposed - I forgot the name, but it's not Vandt that's
17 the Black Guard commander. Why would Vandt write a report for
18 the Black Guard and he is not the commander?

19 Q. Well, we don't know who wrote it. Because if we just
12:30:43 20 quickly go to the final page, to come back - final page. Let's
21 move to the bottom of that page. Do you see any signature there
22 or name?

23 A. No, it just says, "Faithfully submitted, your Revolutionary
24 Guard, RUF". So who wrote the report? I mean, I don't see a
12:31:14 25 signature. I don't see a name.

26 Q. Well, according to someone, it's supposed to be a Mr Vandt.

27 A. I don't - I wouldn't - I tell you what, there is just
28 something suspect about - you know, this is a typical document
29 with some factual things inside, but they got it all wrong.

1 Q. Well, can we go back to the page we were on before, please.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, before you go there,
3 Mr Taylor said this document was written in April of 1999. Where
4 do you get that date from?

12:31:57 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, that is a date I get from the
6 testimony of a witness at page 2477, beginning at line 14.

7 "Q. Do you recognise that document?

8 A. Yes. I recognise this document as a copy of a
9 photocopy of the report of the Black Guard to Sankoh, 1999

12:32:23 10 in April, and that was actually presented by the Black
11 Guard representative at that time, Junior Vandj.

12 Q. And at that time in April 1999, did you read that
13 report?

14 A. Yes, I went through it when we were in Lome, after he
12:32:41 15 had already made the report to Sankoh and it was turned
16 over to Rashid, who was then the adjutant in the discussion
17 in Lome."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, have you heard of the name Revolutionary
19 Guard in relation to the RUF?

12:33:07 20 A. No, I had not heard it until here.

21 Q. Have you heard the name Black Guard in relation to the RUF?

22 A. No.

23 Q. What about Black Revolutionary Guard?

24 A. No, not before here.

12:33:28 25 Q. Let's go back now to this page.

26 "... for us to start repelling the ECOMOG advancement or to
27 contain situation. To this development, when the high command
28 returned from Liberia, he briefed JPK, Johnny Paul Koroma,
29 pertaining to the latest development and met him personally to

1 give a helping hands with diamonds or any foreign currency he had
2 brought from Freetown for him to impress President Taylor as a
3 result. JPK denied bitterly that he had brought no diamond with
4 him, whereas the high command had gathered information that JPK
12:34:21 5 has brought lots of diamond with him, but he wants to keep it on
6 his own without financing the movement, as we are now under one
7 umbrella. Therefore, the high command gave instruction to
8 Brigadier Issa Sesay and Brigadier Mike Lamin for them to proper
9 search JPK for diamonds. After the searching, lots or large
12:34:50 10 quantity of diamond was taken from JPK and his bodyguards.
11 Later, the parcels of diamond was given to Mr Ibrahim (General)
12 and Sister Memuna for them to travel with the parcels directly to
13 President Taylor."

14 Pause there. Now, you recall that earlier in the testimony
12:35:17 15 of this witness, this witness claimed first visit is after they
16 had removed the diamonds from JPK they took the diamonds to
17 Monrovia, were unable to see you, they were given to Musa Cisse,
18 Benjamin Yeaten and Bah in Monrovia to give to you. Do you
19 remember that?

12:35:44 20 A. Yes, and in fact, Bockarie went.

21 Q. Yes, Bockarie went. Now, two things: Firstly, according
22 to this document, even before that trip, after they had searched
23 JPK, you had already seen Sam Bockarie. Do you follow?

24 A. Yes, yes.

12:36:06 25 Q. So there is an initial trip by Bockarie where you promise
26 all arms and ammunition and the rest of it. They - he goes back.
27 We then have, according to this document, the search of JPK, and
28 then now those diamonds are given to General Ibrahim and Sister
29 Memuna, not Sam Bockarie, to travel and report directly to you.

1 What do you say about this, Mr Taylor?

2 A. It's such a misstatement of facts that it is just
3 blatant - it's a lie. It's untrue. Okay? But as you mentioned
4 before, no, they are saying here that I have given - not
12:37:03 5 promised - I have given a large of material even before Bockarie
6 comes, according to this.

7 Q. Yes, even before any diamonds arrive.

8 A. It's a blatant, blatant fabrication. That's all it is.
9 And now as I am going through this document now, I am beginning
12:37:22 10 to see that there is something suspect about a document that is
11 written - nobody knows the author of the document, there is no
12 name attached to the document, just a general thing "Black
13 Guard". Anybody could have written this. We don't have
14 handwriting experts in this Court to authenticate, because - I
12:37:39 15 mean, this is not true.

16 Q. "To this development, the high command was unable to
17 receive the first satellite phone from General Ibrahim which he
18 was - used to do some important contacts with."

19 Pause there. When was it that you provided Sam Bockarie
12:38:16 20 with a satellite phone?

21 A. In October 1998, on his second trip.

22 Q. Were you aware that General Ibrahim had also provided a
23 satellite phone to the RUF?

24 A. No, I was unaware of that.

12:38:38 25 Q. Indeed, more precisely, that General Ibrahim had provided a
26 satellite phone to the high command, that is, Sam Bockarie; were
27 you aware of that?

28 A. No, I was not aware of it.

29 Q. Let's continue, shall we:

1 "After General Ibrahim returned back to Burkina Faso, the
2 high command also received a good caratage of di amond from Kono.
3 He also planned to send another good parcel to General Ibrahim in
4 Burki na Faso . . . "

12:39:30 5 Now, help us, Mr Taylor, I thought these di amonds were
6 coming to you.

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Why were you allowing Sam Bockarie to be sending your
9 di amonds to Ibrahim Bah in Burkina Faso? Why are you doing that?

12:39:44 10 A. This person doesn't know - this is a pure fabrication here.
11 Because Ibrahim Bah is a part of the delegation to Monrovia that
12 was supposed to bring me these di amonds before, after Bockarie
13 comes to Monrovia and fails to see me. Now they have got him
14 here off, he is going to Burkina Faso, and this person now does
12:40:07 15 not even refer to this alleged trip by Bockarie where the
16 di amonds are given to Benjamin Yeaten, Bah, you know, to give to
17 me. So this - I have serious, serious doubts that this is a
18 serious document that does not have an author. I don't - I have
19 serious problems with this document.

12:40:30 20 Q. "... send another good parcel to General Ibrahim in Burkina
21 Faso for ammunition and arms, as he had started making some
22 important contacts for materials."

23 Now, were you aware that Ibrahim Bah was making such
24 important contacts - and from the context one can only assume in
12:40:58 25 Burkina Faso - for materials? Were you aware of that?

26 A. No, I was not aware.

27 Q. "The high command therefore decided to hand over the said
28 parcel of di amonds to the battle group commander Brigadier Issa
29 Sesay in order for him to pass through Monrovia and make his way

1 to Burkina Faso and meet General Ibrahim to work out fast
2 modalities to get some needed materials for us."

3 Now, pause. So the route - so Issa Sesay, the battle group
4 commander, is taking diamonds to Monrovia, but not for you,
12:41:51 5 Mr Taylor. Monrovia is just a transit point for him to go to
6 Burkina Faso. Do you get it?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. So help me, why are you allowing senior members of the RUF
9 to come to Monrovia laden with diamonds, and you are not taking
12:42:12 10 them; you are allowing them to go on to Burkina Faso? What are
11 you doing?

12 A. I am not in control of them, but I doubt even if this
13 happened. I doubt this very much, because the only time we - the
14 period in question - and you can tell this is a fabrication,
12:42:33 15 really, I can almost say this - the period in question, there is
16 evidence led in this Court that - remember now, Issa Sesay comes
17 to Monrovia with some diamonds that get lost. So now this is
18 another person saying that he was supposed to come
19 through - because we are talking become the same period - and, of
12:42:51 20 course, one can say maybe this could be another time - but as far
21 as we know with Issa Sesay coming with diamonds to Monrovia, we
22 know here, from what I have heard in this Court - and I stand
23 corrected - that Issa Sesay comes to Monrovia with diamonds, they
24 are lost, and eventually they hear it on the news.

12:43:09 25 Q. Well, hold that thought. Let's move on:

26 "Brigadier Issa Sesay left the base and travelled along
27 with Colonel Jungle and some Liberia securities to Monrovia."

28 So note, Sesay is travelling not by himself but with some
29 of your securities, even though the diamonds are not going to

1 you. Do you follow?

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. "He did not make his way through as he only stop in
4 Monrovia. And information was later received by the high command
12:43:49 5 that the parcel of diamonds has dropped from Brigadier Issa. He
6 therefore return on base and gave the same report to the high
7 command.

8 The joint security therefore investigated the battle group
9 commander and took statement from him.

12:44:09 10 Later, a forum was held pertaining this issue, and the
11 senior officers and elders suggested to suspend the issue until
12 the arrival of the leader.

13 More so, President Taylor continues to give helping hands
14 with logistics which involves foodstuff and materials. The high
12:44:48 15 command was called in every month to report to Monrovia for
16 briefing."

17 Do you understand that?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. On a monthly basis, Bockarie was called to Monrovia for a
12:45:05 20 briefing, Mr Taylor. What do you say about that?

21 A. Oh, Lord, I say this is totally, totally mixed up. This
22 document - this is a lie. Bockarie would not call every month
23 for no briefing. But when we look at this document now, there is
24 more reason to be more suspect. There is no way we can accept
12:45:28 25 this document here. Well, except you look at all the evidence
26 presented on this case. Now there are witnesses that took an
27 oath in this Court and said that Issa Sesay was given diamonds to
28 bring to me in Monrovia and he lost them. Here is another
29 witness that has taken an oath and has sworn that Issa Sesay was

1 given diamonds to take to Burkina Faso and they got lost in
2 Monrovia. They're the same diamonds we're talking about here.
3 So what's supposed to happen to me now? Okay. Everybody has
4 sworn to an oath here, but here is this - this is the same thing
12:46:05 5 we are talking about, okay, that Issa Sesay was sent to Monrovia
6 to take diamonds to President Taylor to receive arms and
7 ammunition at a very desperate time and he dropped them and it
8 was on the news and he came back. Here is another man who calls
9 himself the black revolutionary united guard or whatever who is
12:46:27 10 now saying Issa Sesay was given diamonds to take to Ibrahim Bah
11 in Burkina Faso. So I'm caught in between now with the two oaths
12 and the two lies. That's what I am caught with here.

13 Q. Now, you appreciate, of course, that the individual who is
14 speaking about this document is saying that it's an accurate
12:46:54 15 document. He is verifying that. Do you understand this?

16 A. Maybe what we ought to do is to see if we can obtain the
17 handwriting of this individual. I think it may help to see. If
18 he didn't help to construct this document that - in fact, I stand
19 corrected on this. But I think when Foday Sankoh goes to Lome in
12:47:20 20 April, the Black Guard commander does go to Lome. I will have to
21 research this. So then why would this individual present a
22 handwritten report when the commander is already there that the
23 commander cannot sign and the commander cannot attach his name
24 to?

12:47:40 25 So this is a part of their handiwork here, this
26 fabrication. This is what's going on. So we may have to see if
27 there is any document that this person has signed and maybe we
28 may have an idea and if we have to get a handwriting expert
29 because this is a pure, pure, fabrication. It has to be.

1 Q. "The high command later called Brigadier Denis Mingo
2 (Superman) on a forum for a mission to be carried out to capture
3 the whole of Kono. They came up with an agreement to apply some
4 guerilla tactics to overrun the strategic positions in Kono
12:48:29 5 District. A plan was drawn, but Superman never went with the
6 plan, and the mission fail without capturing Kono and over 30
7 MIA" - missing in action - "on our side and also KIA" - killed in
8 action.

9 "After this said mission, Superman was able to put some
12:48:55 10 manpower together and proceeded to Kabala axis and created a
11 jungle there.

12 In September 1998, the high command called a vanguard
13 forum. He addressed the forum, and made all the vanguards to
14 understand that they should tighten up their belts and officiate
12:49:28 15 themselves as vanguards of the revolution. Also as to how best
16 they should operate to promote the good image of the struggle.
17 In this forum, the high command" - Sam Bockarie - "tried to
18 constructively criticise the way Superman is behaving. The high
19 command made Superman available over the communication for a
12:49:56 20 dialogue. In their dialogue, he criticised Superman for putting
21 a Lebanese woman behind him which is delaying the operation. In
22 fact to this the high command therefore instructed Superman to
23 report for a better plan up, but he responded that he will not
24 report to the call. From that point, Superman started operating
12:50:24 25 on his own without taking any instruction or orders from the high
26 desk.

27 In October, the high command was again called by
28 President Taylor. We therefore went along with him to Monrovia.
29 The high command was instructed by President Taylor to move to

1 Burki na Faso and meet wi th the Burki na Presi dent. "

2 Pause. At one level that's factually correct, isn't it,

3 Mr Tayl or?

4 A. No.

12:51:05 5 Q. Did you not see Sam Bockarie in October 1998?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Was that visit not thereafter followed by a visit by him to
8 Burki na Faso?

9 A. Yes, but that was in November. He is specific here, he
12:51:23 10 says October. So that's not factual.

11 Q. No, but let's read it again:

12 "In October the high command was again called by
13 President Taylor. We therefore went along with him to Monrovia.
14 The high command was instructed by President Taylor to move to
12:51:41 15 Burki na Faso and meet wi th the Burki na Presi dent.

16 The high command, the war council chairman and one SLA
17 representative, Colonel Eddie Kanneh, took the trip to Burki na
18 Faso. "

19 What do you say about that?

12:51:58 20 A. Well, I am going to have to open this up because I can't
21 say yes to this because the fact of the matter is I did not order
22 or instruct Sam Bockarie to meet with Compaore. So that's false.
23 I did not. That arrangement was made with the knowledge of
24 everyone and don't let's forget in Secretary-General Kofi Annan's
12:52:24 25 report it's stated that permission had been given to individuals
26 to be able to travel out at that particular time. So there is no
27 instruction from me. This is an arrangement that had been made
28 and the United Nations is aware that certain people have to move
29 out of Sierra Leone. That's contained in the Secretary-General's

1 report. So I did not instruct. There was an arrangement for
2 them. They made their arrangement. They move on. So I did not
3 instruct. It is factual that they went to Sierra Leone, but it's
4 not factual that the instruction came from me.

12:52:54 5 It is also not factual and you have a point that I cannot
6 argue, he says in October he was called but he doesn't say he
7 travels to Burkina Faso in October. So I will give him the
8 benefit of the doubt. So it could have happened after that. But
9 I do not instruct. This is something that has all of the hands
10 of the international community for the approval of certain people
11 of the junta and the RUF to move out and it was in that report
12 that was read out to this Court from Kofi Annan. So this whole
13 thing so he has got it all wrong. So there is some truth and
14 some not, you know - I would call it lack of understanding.

12:53:29 15 Q. "The high command, the war council chairman and one SLA
16 representative, Colonel Eddie Kanneh, took the trip to Burkina
17 Faso. They met President Blaise Compaore and they were highly
18 welcomed. They took two weeks in Burkina Faso. They were given
19 words of confidence and assurance by President Blaise that he
12:54:02 20 will not let Corporal Foday Sankoh down at all. The President
21 told the high command" - Sam Bockarie - "to be very hard in
22 command to uphold the movement until the arrival of the leader.
23 In fact he instructed the high command" - Sam Bockarie - "to
24 forward the RUF issue to the OAU as he is the current OAU
12:54:43 25 chairman."

26 Who was the OAU chairman at this time, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Blaise is. Blaise Compaore.

28 Q. "On their return, they were given huge quantity of
29 materials for serious offensive to start a campaign for the

1 release of our leader. The delegation returned back to Monrovia
2 in November. The delegation returned back in case and held an
3 immediate forum for a serious offensive to commence."

4 Pause. Now, according to this, Mr Taylor, Sam Bockarie,
12:55:31 5 the chairman of the war council and Eddie Kanneh travel via
6 Monrovia to Burkina Faso in October returning in November. True
7 or false?

8 A. That's false.

9 Q. When did they go?

12:55:48 10 A. November, and returned in early December. He is just a
11 little off.

12 Q. Do you agree with the suggestion that they were gone for
13 approximately two weeks?

14 A. Yes.

12:55:59 15 Q. Now, you see, it goes on to say that they received a huge
16 quantity of materials for serious offensive, yes?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. So this would be sometime late in the year of 1998, just
19 prior to the Freetown invasion in January, do you follow?

12:56:22 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. Now, help me, Mr Taylor, did you provide that ammunition or
22 did Blaise Compaore?

23 A. Well, I didn't provide any ammunition because I didn't
24 have. He is suggesting here that Blaise Compaore provided that.

12:56:41 25 I received no information as President of Liberia in 1998 that
26 when Sam Bockarie returned from Burkina Faso he brought arms and
27 ammunition. Such a report never reached me. And I remember when
28 Sam Bockarie came, when they returned from that trip I was out of
29 Monrovia, in fact I was not in the city. I was on the polio

1 campaign as I have mentioned to this Court. But --

2 Q. Sorry to interrupt you, Mr Taylor, but yesterday when we
3 were dealing with the testimony of this same witness, this same
4 witness claimed before these judges that it was you who provided
12:57:24 5 this large quantity of arms in late 1998 for the Freetown
6 invasion?

7 A. Yes, yes. 300 boxes.

8 Q. 300 boxes of AK, remember?

9 A. Yes.

12:57:36 10 Q. So which is right? Did it come from Burkina Faso or did it
11 come from you? Help us.

12 A. It did not come from me. If there was any such ammunition,
13 it did not come from me. If it came from Burkina Faso, I cannot
14 verify that it came because no such report came to me that
12:57:55 15 ammunition arrived at Roberts International Airport. As I said
16 that, yes, there is corruption, it's possible that such could
17 have happened, but I received no such reports that there were
18 ammunition, because the aircraft for going and coming was not
19 provided by the Liberian government. They provided their

12:58:16 20 own - they made their own arrangement for air travel. So I
21 cannot say with any certainty before this Court that Blaise
22 Compaore sent ammunition through Liberia. If it came, I was not
23 informed of it, and it would have probably entailed some very
24 senior corrupt officials. But such, the possibility of arms and
12:58:43 25 ammunition coming in and passing through Liberia or any other
26 thing, are all possible in any of these - in some of these small
27 countries. But that report never reached me.

28 Q. But hold on a second, Mr Taylor. 300 boxes of AK-47
29 ammunition passed through Liberia without you noticing or it

1 being brought to your attention?

2 A. If there are sufficient corrupt --

3 MR BANGURA: Your Honours --

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Bangura.

12:59:14 5 MR BANGURA: I am not sure if the document we are dealing
6 with now suggests that, as my learned friend has put it, 300
7 boxes passed through Liberia. I am not sure which evidence my
8 learned friend is referring to, but certainly not this document.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I am not suggesting, Mr President, that it's
12:59:32 10 a reference to this document. I am suggesting to the testimony
11 of the individual we are dealing with - an aspect the testimony
12 we are dealing with.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, you are referring to evidence from
14 yesterday. I will overrule your objection, Mr Bangura.

12:59:50 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Now, do you see the point, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Just so that we get an idea, just roughly how big is a box
19 of AK-47 ammunition?

13:00:02 20 A. Oh, I would say about three quarters the size of this file
21 tray.

22 Q. So when you say the file tray, we are talking about - are
23 we talking - it's on two levels?

24 A. Oh, no, the top level. Just that top level.

13:00:29 25 Q. Just the top level?

26 A. Yeah, three quarters of that top --

27 Q. And how wide?

28 A. I would say just about that wide too.

29 Q. And how high?

1 A. Just about the same. Just about the same.

2 Q. So we are talking somewhere in the region of what?

3 A. Oh --

4 Q. About a metre long, a metre square, and about what? A
13:01:02 5 quarter of a metre high?

6 A. Well, you have to forgive me. We were trained not in these
7 metres. I still have --

8 Q. I am old fashioned as well, Mr Taylor. Give us some feet
9 and inches?

10 A. Okay. I would say that appears to be about a foot and a
11 quarter in length; I would say anywhere between a half - about 6
12 inches in width - I mean, in height, and width - I would put the
13 width to close to a foot. So that's about the size of an AK box.

14 Q. Now, we are talking about 300 of those.

13:01:37 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So we are possibly talking about a room almost this size
17 full of AK-47?

18 A. Well, let me see if I can break it. 300 boxes of AK can
19 fit in a 10-ton truck. So it would be something smaller than
13:01:58 20 this. It can fit in one truck, a 10-ton truck.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's just examine a few more details then,
22 right? Now, 300 boxes of AK-47 ammunition, to those who have
23 purchased it, would you agree, would be an extremely valuable
24 item?

13:02:25 25 A. Oh, yes.

26 Q. So you would expect those to whom such a quantity belonged
27 to guard it with their dear lives?

28 A. Uh-huh. That's true.

29 Q. So you would expect such a quantity of ammunition to be

1 accompanied by very, very tight security, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Who themselves would need vehicles in which to transport
4 themselves. Are you following me?

13:02:55 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So we are talking about, then, a convoy of vehicles
7 traversing Liberia with all its unpaved roads, so moving quite
8 slowly, to get to Sierra Leone. You follow me?

9 A. Uh-huh.

13:03:12 10 Q. Now, bearing all of that in mind, we now have a mental
11 picture. Are you saying something like that could have happened
12 in Liberia without you knowing?

13 A. Yes. I am saying that if you - the situation over there
14 was - yes, that's possible. If you have the high level contacts
15 with sufficient corrupt people, it can happen. One truck with
16 maybe not a long convoy with an escort, at this particular time I
17 would say it's possible. If you have some corrupt people that
18 are in charge, you can do that.

19 Q. And in amongst them there is not one honest soul who has
13:04:04 20 put his hand up and said, "Hey, Mr President, guess what?"

21 A. Well, it depends on how high that - if these senior people
22 with some little authority in dealing with security people, I
23 would not get to know. I would not get to - I tell you, there
24 were things that happened - minor things that happened in that
13:04:30 25 country - in some of these little countries - even some of my
26 colleagues talk about - it took a year or two before you heard
27 about it. A lot of things happened. I can tell you, for
28 example, when we started fighting LURD in Liberia, there were
29 times that we transited material through countries without the

1 authorities knowing. So this is - I am just trying to say, it is
2 possible. As to the probability, that's another issue. But it's
3 possible. If, for example, you are dealing with some senior
4 security people within the establishment, you can get something
13:05:13 5 like this. Once it's not staying in, it's something going
6 through, and they would even see to it that it is escorted
7 through right way away, this is possible, I am saying.

8 Q. Let's go back to the document:

9 "All the combatants were happy and agreed to start the
13:05:34 10 operation in capturing Kono. The said operation was given to the
11 battlefield commander, Brigadier Issa Sesay. Huge quantity of
12 material was given to the battlefield commander, and he
13 immediately left for Kono. They also held a forum in Kono and
14 succeeded in overrunning the entire Kono District and capture
13:06:33 15 some artillery weapons and huge quantity of arms and ammunition.
16 The whole operation was therefore given to the late Colonel
17 Rambo, who further extended the operation to Tonkolili and
18 advanced to Makeni. After the fall of Makeni the late colonel,
19 as per instruction, went and received Brigadier Superman to join
13:07:02 20 the operations.

21 They therefore extended the operation to Port Loko as far
22 as Waterloo and Kambia axis.

23 Furthermore, Colonel Rambo also tried his level best to
24 link up with the other brothers that entered Freetown, but the
13:07:23 25 Freetown operation was not coordinated as the said commander,
26 Black Jah, was not going by the instruction from the high
27 command. When they retreated from Freetown, the battlefield
28 commander met them and told them to present a comprehensive
29 report pertaining the whole Freetown operation, but they

1 deliberately failed to do so."

2 Pause. Now, what do you understand by:

3 "Colonel Rambo also tried his level best to link up with
4 the other brothers that entered Freetown, but the Freetown
13:08:04 5 operation was not coordinated as the said commander, Black Jah,
6 was not going by the instruction from Sam Bockarie"?

7 What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. He is saying that the RUF contingent never entered
9 Freetown. That's what I understand.

13:08:25 10 Q. And so who was responsible for the Freetown invasion,
11 according to this? Who is Black Jah?

12 A. I don't know who Black Jah is, but he is supposed to be an
13 RUF commander, according to what - from what I understand here.

14 Q. Well, we have got other evidence about who Black Jah is,
13:08:47 15 but I am not here to give evidence. But anyway, "... was not
16 going by the instruction from the high command." What do you
17 understand by that?

18 A. That --

19 Q. The high command being Sam Bockarie?

13:09:00 20 A. Well, high command is Sam Bockarie. It simply means that
21 this particular person, whoever this person is, is not taking
22 instruction from Sam Bockarie, doesn't follow the instructions.

23 Q. And that thereafter they're asked for a comprehensive
24 report but they deliberately failed to do so.

13:09:20 25 "According to the Black Guards security information, they
26 brought some diamonds and lot of foreign currency from Freetown,
27 but they never presented anything to the high command.

28 The late Colonel Rambo even arrested \$600,000 US from some
29 of the men from Freetown and presented the said sum to the

1 battlefield commander Brigadier Issa, and also some diamonds.

2 Again there was instruction from the high desk for
3 Lieutenant Colonel Gibri I Massaquoi to report for important
4 inquiry and briefing, but he refused the call for over four good
13:10:18 5 times.

6 As a result, there was an instruction from the high command
7 to the battlefield commander for Lieutenant Colonel Gibri I
8 Massaquoi to be arrested and turn over.

9 The battlefield commander further went along with the late
13:10:35 10 Colonel Rambo and some Black Guards as per instructions to arrest
11 Lieutenant Colonel Gibri I and Major Nya.

12 During this process, Superman and his men put on stiff
13 resistance and even open fire and launch some RPG bombs,
14 therefore scatter the whole group and killed some men and went to
13:11:00 15 the extent of advancing to Makeni and attack the residence of the
16 battlefield commander and vandalised the whole compound and took
17 everything in the compound, including the materials for
18 operations and enough foreign currency and diamonds. He even
19 extended in razing the compounds of some other senior officers.

13:11:26 20 After some days, he came for the second time and attacked
21 Makeni and killed Colonel Rambo and some security personnels,
22 fire some people, but they missed to kill the battlefield
23 commander and chased him all the way to Makali and missed him for
24 the second time.

13:11:56 25 According to security findings, most of the senior officers
26 cannot give any advice or try to contain that situation.
27 Instead, they keep on inciting to spark the situation.

28 According to Superman, he has vowed not to ever take
29 command from the high command, Sam Bockarie.

1 In regards to the mining process, it is only recently that
2 the authorities has given the go ahead for mining to be going on.
3 Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy is the overall mining commander. They
4 have been getting some small pieces which is in our big record
13:12:47 5 book.

6 Another development is that one businessman from Cuba by
7 the name of Carlos offered the movement one FM radio station, and
8 the station itself has being built up a hill in Dodo-Kortuma."

9 Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware of a radio - an FM radio
13:13:20 10 station being provided by the Cubans to the RUF?

11 A. No, I am not aware of it.

12 Q. Or a Cuban?

13 A. No, but another witness said that I did that.

14 Q. Yes, I know. That's why I asked you, you see.

13:13:34 15 A. No, I am not aware of this.

16 Q. "Also in January, the high command organised an operation
17 for the Segbwema to be captured in order to cut the supply
18 between Daru barracks and Kenema. The said operation went on
19 smoothly, but unfortunately failed to capture. We in fact left
13:14:04 20 another operation at hand to attack Kenema.

21 In conclusion, sir, we are hereby suggesting that the issue
22 of Superman should immediately be put under control before he try
23 to mislead some of our struggle brothers.

24 Faithfully submitted, your Revolutionary Guards, RUF/Sierra
13:14:30 25 Leone."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, you would accept, do you not, that there we
27 have preserved in cold black and white a suggestion in that
28 report said to date from April 1999 deeply implicating you in
29 events during the absence of Foday Sankoh. You agree, don't you?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. What do you say about that?

3 A. I am saying that this whole document, if it has to be
4 looked at very seriously, because this looks like mischief to me,
13:15:12 5 the first thing we have to do is to identify whether this
6 document is authentic, number one. Who wrote the document? Did
7 it come from the Black Guard command? And why is it in this way?
8 It would take some time for us to really verify it. But what I
9 see here, this looks like a fabrication to me. That's all I can
13:15:36 10 put it to. Because this is someone mischievously that mixes
11 facts and half truths, disinformation. So for me, I don't see
12 how a report can be written to the leader, their leader, that
13 does not even - you know, it's not signed by anybody. At last you
14 would say signed XYZ commander. But this is just a blank report
13:16:05 15 and I guess the person had good reason for not putting a name to
16 it, because reference could be made to that person.

17 Anybody could have written this document with some
18 knowledge of the situation on the ground and you can see how they
19 put it. I would say that this is a fabrication and it's a
13:16:21 20 mischievous fabrication because it does not contain - I mean, I
21 don't know how - that's the Court's decision, but my whole thing
22 is that I don't see how such a document could be accepted where
23 we still don't know the author of the document. Sam Bockarie
24 wrote his document, we know it comes from Sam Bockarie. All the
13:16:40 25 other reports, anybody who writes a report should be able to put
26 a name to it. There has got to be a name and a face to a report.
27 So this one we just say faces, the Black Revolutionary Guard.
28 That could be any group or anybody. So that's my comment.

29 Q. Now, that document was examined in detail by the particular

1 individual we are concerned with. Portions of the document were
2 put to him for his comment. Do you follow?

3 A. Yes.

13:17:25 4 Q. One such portion was that part which reads: "From that
5 point the President gave huge quantities of logistics
6 (ammunition)" and the question was posed, "Is that accurate?" The
7 answer was given, this is page 2481, "Yes, up to 1999." True or
8 false, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Totally false.

13:17:49 10 Q. Then that first trip described in the report of Bockarie to
11 you when you effectively told him to uphold the revolutionary
12 ideals in the absence of Sankoh. Do you recall that?

13 A. Yes, I recall that.

13:18:10 14 Q. "Q. Did Sam Bockarie make a trip to Liberia after you had
15 arrived in Buedu but before you took the diamonds from
16 Johnny Paul Koroma?"

17 An understandable question in light of the witness's
18 testimony.

13:18:24 19 "A. I can't really recall whether he made a trip before
20 that. I cannot recall at this point. I can't. But what I
21 do know is that after General Ibrahim was already there and
22 he came through that end from Monrovia, he was already
23 there and so what I do recall is after these diamonds were
24 taken from Issa, he travelled to Liberia along with General
13:18:47 25 Ibrahim and this Memunatu Deen. It is mentioned here.

26 Q. So the part that says 'later the parcel of diamonds was
27 given to Mr Ibrahim general and sister Memuna for them to
28 travel with the parcels directly to President Taylor', who
29 do you say accompanied them on this trip?

1 A. Sam Bockarie."

2 Now, do you see any mention in that document to Sam
3 Bockarie, high command mind you, going on that trip with Ibrahim
4 Bah and Memuna?"

13:19:28 5 A. No, it doesn't mention that here. No, not in this report.

6 Q. Well, according to this individual, Sam Bockarie went along
7 with Memunatu Deen and Ibrahim Bah but somehow the writer of the
8 report forgot to record that?

9 A. Yeah, but, counsel, this witness cannot on the one hand say
13:19:50 10 that his testimony is true and the details of this report are

11 also true because there are two - you know, I mean, either his
12 account is true or the accounts - because there are different
13 accounts of the same issue as he gave it and this is where it
14 goes back to the question of the 300 boxes, okay, and then when

13:20:14 15 we look at this account where you have ammunition being given to
16 Sam Bockarie before the diamond issue, on the one hand, then you
17 have Sam Bockarie was supposed to have come, couldn't see me,
18 okay, and left the diamonds in the hands of - I mean for

19 Benjamin, Jungle and Bah to give it. And on the other hand you
13:20:40 20 have a different account in this where Issa Sesay is given
21 diamonds, okay, the same diamonds that he referred to that now
22 comes to Monrovia, but not for me, is destined for Burkina Faso
23 where Bah is supposed to carry.

24 So he cannot say that he agrees with this report and it's
13:20:59 25 supposed to be such an authentic report where his own accounts,
26 okay, are different from the accounts in this report. So one of
27 those two must be wrong. So I do not really think he can say
28 with any degree of clarity that he agrees with this later
29 assertion. So if now he agrees that the account read there is

1 the proper account in this document, then his account must be
2 wrong.

3 Q. Now, he was asked about the transfer of diamonds via Issa
4 Sesay and via Monrovia to Burkina Faso. And he was asked:

13:21:46 5 "Q. Was that the plan?

6 A. Yes. I think I did mention this. There was a point
7 when Sam Bockarie gave Issa Sesay some diamonds. He went
8 to Monrovia and he was along with Jungle when later he said
9 that the diamonds got missing and he came back together
10 with Jungle with that report.

13:22:04

11 Q. To your knowledge, why did Issa Sesay travel through
12 Monrovia on this trip to Burkina Faso?

13 A. I mean that was the access. I told you that that road
14 was opening and Ibrahim was already in Buedu by the time I
15 returned and that was the route used to go to Monrovia."

13:22:25

16 Now, pause a second there, Mr Taylor, and help us with
17 something else. Remember we are dealing here, according to this
18 witness, with late 1998, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

13:22:42

20 Q. ECOMOG intervention has taken place in February 1998, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. The RUF and the AFRC have been forced to retreat from
23 Freetown, yes?

24 A. Uh-huh.

13:22:56

25 Q. Now, at this stage, bearing in mind all of that, from your
26 understanding of matters, members of the RUF and AFRC, would they
27 have had the facility to travel out of Sierra Leone via Lungi
28 airport?

29 A. At this particular time in late 1998, no, not to my

1 knowl edge.

2 Q. So help me, if I am a member of the RUF, I am a Sam
3 Bockarie, and I want to get to Ouagadougou, what's the route I
4 have to take to get there?

13:23:41 5 A. There are two routes. Two. Either through Guinea or
6 through Li beri a.

7 Q. Through Gui nea in whi ch way?

8 A. You come, you have to go through Conakry and go on, keep
9 goi ng.

13:23:55 10 Q. Or al ternati vel y?

11 A. Gone through Monrovi a.

12 Q. And is there a UN travel ban at this stage?

13 A. There is. There is a travel restriction on them.

14 Q. So was it to your knowl edge that indi vi dual s like Ibrahi m

13:24:16 15 Bah was using Monrovi a as a transi t point for travel between RUF
16 held terri tory and other parts of the Afri can conti nent?

17 A. It was not to my knowl edge, but it's possi ble that he could
18 have been doi ng that, yes.

19 Q. Now, were you, as Presi dent of Li beri a, moni toring such
13:24:42 20 travel ?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Well, I mean, Ibrahi m Bah was not on any travel ban, so he
24 was not of i nterest to the Li beri an government. Those

13:24:53 25 indi vi dual s that were on some restri cti ons were granted

26 permi ssi on by the UN. You j ust have to refer to Kofi Annan 's

27 report, the names of the j unta peo ple and those peo ple, there are

28 certai n group that had soug ht permi ssi on to move out and it was

29 granted that those peo ple could move. And Bockarie happened to

1 be one of those that the United Nations was very aware of and
2 contained in the report and the names of who were some of the
3 people being considered for that travel. But Ibrahim Bah was not
4 of interest to the government or anybody else at that time.

13:25:44 5 Q. Now, in relation to the same report, the witness provides
6 us with a further detail missing from the report itself. Now, on
7 the sixth page of that report, there is reference to the capture
8 of the whole of Kono and:

9 "They came up with an agreement to apply some guerilla
13:26:11 10 tactics to overrun the strategic positions in Kono District. A
11 plan was drawn up, but Superman never went with the plan and the
12 mission fail without capturing Kono and over 30 MIA" - missing in
13 action - "on our side and also KIA" - killed in action.

14 You remember that portion of the report?"

13:26:35 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, it's said that this was the first mission attempt to
17 capture Kono. They called the mission Fitti-Fatta mission, yes?

18 A. Uh-huh.

19 Q. So Fitti-Fatta late 1998, mission to capture Kono, this is
13:26:53 20 what he says. Do you know of a Fitti-Fatta mission, Mr Taylor?

21 A. No, I read about it here. No, didn't know anything about
22 it.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you know, this witness says that you
24 ordered Operation No Living Thing, so how come there is this
13:27:09 25 Fitti-Fatta mission and you don't know anything about it?

26 A. Because I never ordered any of them. This witness also
27 said some other things there. In fact just going back about a
28 few lines, this witness, and if you look at the Prosecutor's
29 question that follow, which was a little I think misquote in the

1 record, this witness had not said anywhere in his testimony, to
2 the best of my recollection, that that first - that that trip
3 that Issa Sesay took to Monrovia with these alleged diamonds were
4 supposed to be taken to Burkina Faso. If I recollect, this
13:27:53 5 witness said that Issa Sesay was given diamonds to bring to me in
6 Monrovia for ammunition and he lost them.

7 Q. Yes, he did.

8 A. But the way the Prosecutor phrased the next question, when
9 he was referring to the account in that note, the Prosecutor
13:28:13 10 suggested that he had said in the way - that Issa Sesay, while en
11 route to Burkina Faso, lost the diamonds, but that was a
12 misrepresentation of what the witness had said. If you go back
13 to that question as it was phrased by the Prosecutor, you will
14 see the nuance that - where it misstated what this witness had
13:28:35 15 said before. You read the question before in the record.

16 Q. Page 2482. Now, if we look at the bottom of that fourth
17 page:

18 "Q. After General Ibrahim returned back to Burkina Faso,
19 the high command also received a good carriage of diamond
13:28:57 20 from Kono. He also planned to send another good parcel to
21 General Ibrahim in Burkina Faso for ammunition and arms, as
22 he had started making some important contacts for
23 materials. The high command therefore decided to hand over
24 the parcel of diamond to the BGC Brigadier Issa Sesay in
13:29:17 25 order for him to pass through Monrovia, make his way to
26 Burkina Faso and meet General Ibrahim to work out fast
27 modalities to get those needed materials for us. Now, was
28 that the plan?

29 A. Yes. "

1 And what do you say, Mr Taylor?

2 A. I am saying now when you look at the Prosecutor's question,
3 it infers that the witness had already alluded to the fact that
4 Issa Sesay was en route to Burkina Faso to carry the diamonds
13:29:50 5 when they got lost. But when you look at that witness's
6 statement throughout his testimony, he said emphatically that
7 Issa Sesay was given those diamonds to bring to me in Monrovia
8 for arms and ammunition.

9 Q. And he lost them?

13:30:05 10 A. He lost them, okay? So by him agreeing now that in fact
11 the plan was to pass through Monrovia to Burkina Faso misstates
12 the fact based on the question that the Prosecutor asked. So
13 right there he lied in between and, you know, based on the
14 question that the Prosecutor asked him, he even lied because he
13:30:22 15 had never said that or alleged that before. He had alleged that
16 those diamonds were for me specifically.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I see the time, Mr President.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We will break for lunch now.

19 Resume at 2.30.

13:30:41 20 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

21 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Bangura.

23 MR BANGURA: Mr President, I just wish to announce a change
24 in representation for the Prosecution this afternoon.

14:30:41 25 Mr Christopher Santora is not with us this afternoon.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura. Yes,
27 Mr Griffiths.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

29 Q. Mr Taylor, before lunch we were considering that document,

1 the Black Revolutionary Guard situation report, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And do you recall that we'd encountered in that document
4 reference to one Black Jah - J-A-H?

14:31:11 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Now, in further relation to that document, the individual
7 we're discussing went on to be asked this question, quoting from
8 the document, page 2487, 29 January 2008:

9 "A. Furthermore, Colonel Rambo also tried his level best
14:31:41 10 to link up with the other brothers that entered Freetown,
11 but the Freetown operation was not coordinated, as the said
12 commander Black Jah was not going by the instruction from
13 the high command.

14 Q. Tell us, who is Black Jah?

14:32:07 15 A. Black Jah is the code name for Gullit."

16 Did you know that, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No.

18 Q. "Q. Do you know what is meant when it is said that Gullit
19 was not going by the instruction from the high command?"

14:32:21 20 A. He was supposed to have waited for the joint operation,
21 waited for Issa before they can proceed to Freetown, but he
22 went ahead without waiting for that instruction."

23 Now finally in relation to that document, that individual
24 was asked this. This is page 2487 of the transcript:

14:32:55 25 "Q. Moving to the last page of that report, if we look at
26 the second paragraph down, 'In regards to the mining
27 process, it is only recently that the authorities have
28 given the go ahead for mining to be going on. Lieutenant
29 Colonel Kennedy is the overall mining commander.'

1 At what point did Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy become the
2 overall mining commander?

3 A. I can't recall really, but it was in 1998, mid-1998. I
4 saw him there. I saw him going to Kono as the mining
14:33:34 5 commander. He was working along with another fellow called
6 Med, CO Med. I can't really specifically tell you the
7 date, the month, but it was mid-1998.

8 Q. Now the language here, 'In regards to the mining
9 process, it is only recently that the authorities have
14:34:02 10 given the go ahead for mining to be going on,' do you know
11 what was meant by that language?

12 A. No, no. I don't really understand what he is trying to
13 say here.

14 Q. During 1998, to your knowledge was mining going on in
14:34:25 15 Kono?"

16 Now, what do you understand by that, Mr Taylor, that only
17 recently that the authorities have given the go ahead for mining
18 to be going on following the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel
19 Kennedy in mid-1998 as the mining commander? What do you
14:34:48 20 understand by that?

21 A. It could suggest that mining had not - one suggestion I
22 could say would be that mining had not been going on before this
23 time. That's one - that's what I think. That's one suggestion.

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want us to leave that document now,
14:35:07 25 please, and there is another document that I want you to have a
26 look at. Again a document that was shown to this witness, and I
27 touched upon it yesterday but would like us today to look at it
28 in some more detail, and it is exhibit number D-8. Now, do you
29 recall this document being produced in this Court, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now we see that the document is headed, "Unofficial
3 translation verbatim report on a recorded discussion between
4 Corporal Foday Sankoh and his cohorts on his return from
14:36:12 5 detention at Nigeria in 1999 explaining their activities during
6 his detention in 1996 to 1999 (specifically January 6)". Now,
7 from where did Sankoh go - no, let's not move from the title just
8 yet, please. Now, from where did Sankoh come to attend the Lome
9 talks, Mr Taylor?

14:36:55 10 A. From prison.

11 Q. In?

12 A. Freetown, Sierra Leone.

13 Q. And in what year was that?

14 A. 1999, April to be exact month, yes.

14:37:07 15 Q. So looking at that title, "... on his return from detention
16 at Nigeria in 1999 ...", is that accurate?

17 A. No, it's not. It's not.

18 Q. "... explaining their activities during his detention in
19 1996". Was he detained in 1996?

14:37:29 20 A. No.

21 Q. When was he detained in Nigeria?

22 A. To the best of my recollection, it's early 1997 --

23 Q. That's a matter of record. March 1997, yes?

24 A. That is correct, yes.

14:37:43 25 Q. So again the title would appear to be inaccurate in that
26 respect, wouldn't it?

27 A. Uh-huh

28 Q. "Adjutant general: The Leader sir, War Council Chairman,
29 the adviser, and other members of the delegation. The report

1 that we had prepared since we came here contained certain issues
2 which I felt should not be documented because of security
3 reasons."

4 Note that, please:

14:38:24 5 "... should not be documented because of security reasons.
6 Therefore we decided to meet the leader and other members and
7 brief them orally. Among the issues jotted down for the leaders
8 and other members to deliberate on were:

9 1. We start with minerals. First and foremost the 1,832
14:38:55 10 pieces of diamond in nine plastics received from JP Koroma.

11 Next was the 14 pieces of diamonds misplaced by Brigadier
12 Issa Sesay, among which was an 11-carat piece of diamond. Then
13 the sales of 244 pieces of diamonds at a total price of \$17,000
14 US to rise funds.

14:39:29 15 2. Some of the behaviours of Brigadier Superman: A, he
16 was disloyal to the commander on the ground; B, he break the Kono
17 Bank without informing anybody; C, he had been attacking and
18 killing some RUF members; D, he had misused RUF funds.

19 3. The mass promotions that was made by us.

14:39:55 20 4. Moreover we made some trips to Burkina Faso and other
21 neighbouring countries.

22 5. Then, of course, we had been informing you about some
23 mining programmes that we have undertaken in Kono and Tongo. But
24 Pa Rogers and CO Mike can elaborate more on these points
14:40:12 25 mentioned. So let us start now with number one diamond received
26 from Johnny Paul Koroma, which was 1,833 pieces in nine
27 plastics."

28 Now before we go over the page, note the second sentence,
29 Mr Taylor:

1 "The report that we had prepared since we came here
2 concerned certain issues which I felt should not be documented
3 because of security reasons."

4 A. Yes.

14:41:00 5 Q. "Therefore, we decided to meet the leader and other members
6 and brief them orally."

7 What do you understand by that?

8 A. That there shouldn't be any written or recorded report
9 anywhere, even after that.

14:41:11 10 Q. That there shouldn't be any written report of certain
11 issues because of their sensitivity, but rather they were going
12 to tell Sankoh about them orally. Is that what you understand?

13 A. That's my understanding of that.

14 Q. Let's now move down the page and see what the issues are
14:41:30 15 now which are being dealt with orally. Now, we see the first
16 thing being dealt with orally are those diamonds removed from
17 Johnny Paul Koroma, yes? Now, given that they were meant to be
18 dealt with only orally, can you help as to why they appear in
19 that Black Revolutionary Guard report in written form? Do you
14:41:54 20 follow me?

21 A. I follow you now. It shouldn't be in there because
22 [overlapping speakers].

23 Q. Because remember, the Revolutionary Black Guard report is
24 dated April 1999, do you follow?

14:42:05 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. This is a meeting which Sankoh in person after he returns
27 to Sierra Leone beginning of October 1999. Do you follow?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now according to this individual, these issues were not to

1 be dealt with in writing and documented. They were to await, no
2 doubt, the coming of Mr Sankoh for them to be dealt with orally,
3 yes?

4 A. Yes.

14:42:38 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind that Black Guard report and
6 what you have said this morning regarding its authenticity, do
7 you see that items 1, 2 and, indeed, 4, were dealt with in that
8 document?

9 A. Yes, you can see that, yeah. It dealt with Superman, it
14:42:57 10 dealt with diamonds and it dealt with the trip to Burkina Faso by
11 Issa Sesay, Eddie Kanneh, et al, yes.

12 Q. Let's go to the second page, please. Now, as you
13 understand it, the person who was speaking on page 1, the
14 adjutant general, who would such a person be? Who is the
14:43:26 15 adjutant general attached to, do you know?

16 A. The adjutant general would be attached to the overall
17 commander who would be the high command. The adjutant general
18 actually would be the third. In military sense, you have the
19 commander, the deputy and the adjutant, so he would be the third
14:43:53 20 in command.

21 Q. After whom, bearing in mind the hierarchy within the RUF?

22 A. That would be - Bockarie would be the high command. You
23 would have Issa Sesay, from testimony here, would be the second.
24 They would be after Issa Sesay.

14:44:08 25 Q. Right. So that's the person giving that initial report on
26 page 1. Let's go to page 2, Pa Rogers:

27 "It is true that diamonds were received from JP Koroma.

28 Okay, those that the adjutant general had put on paper were
29 received from him. How these diamond were received I could not

1 tell because while some of us pulled out from Freetown we were at
2 Kono when JP Koroma arrived at our base. As a result of this, we
3 did not have any foreknowledge on whether they had received
4 diamonds from him. But there was a reason why they received the
14:44:55 5 diamonds from him. In the first instance when we pulled out we
6 thought that since he was regarded as Head of State at that time
7 he may have something to feed the boys as the boys did not have
8 anything on the ground to feed the combatants, other people and
9 his own delegation. We had to tell the CDS" - CDS, Mr Taylor?

14:45:18 10 A. I think this would be chief of the defence staff.

11 Q. Who, bearing in mind what we were told yesterday?

12 A. That would be Sam Bockarie.

13 Q. "We had to tell the CDS that JP Koroma had nothing at hand
14 which prompted them to ask other members of the delegation (SLA)

14:45:37 15 that if they know of members in their delegation which had money
16 in their possession they should inform Mosquito to take action.

17 With this view, they had to raid the place of JP Koroma. Mike

18 Lamin will be in a better position to elaborate on the raid

19 because they did the operation. Hence by the time we arrived, we

14:45:56 20 only heard that they had taken diamonds from Johnny Paul Koroma.

21 But again how these diamonds were transacted only, Brigadier Mike
22 can actually explain to you how they had gone about as far as the
23 diamond business was concerned.

24 Brigadier Mike. Okay, sir, just to reiterate what the
14:46:22 25 chairman of War Council has just said."

26 So we know now that the Pa Rogers referred to is the
27 chairman of the War Council.

28 A. War Council.

29 Q. And remember earlier there was reference to the chairman of

1 the War Council going along with Bockarie and Eddie Kanneh to
2 Burkina Faso, so we now know who that is:

3 "Just to reiterate what the chairman of War Council has
4 just said we left Freetown and arrived at Kailahun via Kono where

14:46:59

5 we met Mosquito who virtually had nothing to feed the soldiers

6 especially the SLA brothers. In fact Brigadier Issa and myself

7 escaped with Johnny Paul Koroma to Kailahun. Later, Mosquito,

8 Brigadier Issa and myself told Johnny Paul Koroma that since he

9 was the Head of State we expected him to have some amount of

14:47:17

10 money which we can decide to use for logistical support in a bid

11 to organise the men. Johnny Paul Koroma told them that Gullit

12 also known as Black Jah, had some diamonds he had instructed him

13 to mine in Kono. I then left with Brigadier Issa to meet Gullit

14 in Kailahun. I told him to hand over all the diamonds he had in

14:47:39

15 his possession and we collected 115 pieces of diamonds from him

16 which were valued at \$15,000 US. We returned with the diamonds

17 to Mosquito the same day. These diamonds were handed over to

18 Mosquito in the presence of Johnny Paul Koroma, Brigadier Issa

19 and myself. He in turn handed over the diamond to Johnny Paul

14:48:06

20 Koroma but he later refused to respond to our needs when we have

21 set our defence position at Gbaima in Koidu areas so that the

22 enemy could not push us further. In sequel, Rambo, the CSO to

23 Johnny Paul Koroma, informed us that Johnny Paul Koroma is in

24 possession of a plastic containing diamonds, including some

14:48:34

25 United States dollars which he intends to escape with together

26 with his family. Notwithstanding this, we had been monitoring

27 him through intelligence source that he had intentions to escape

28 so we intimidated Mosquito and Issa suggesting that we confront

29 this brother and ask him to hand over all government properties

1 he had in his possession to enable us to procure all the
2 logistical materials to carry out the operations they agreed with
3 us and therefore confronted Johnny Paul Koroma in a non-violent
4 manner. Johnny Paul Koroma had to reason with us and handed over
14:49:24 5 nine plastics containing diamonds. We in turn handed over these
6 diamonds to Mosquito for safekeeping and utility in the presence
7 of his late bodyguard brother Shabado, CO Mohamed's bodyguard,
8 Major Kamara, CO Issa and other senior men. Since then the
9 diamonds were with Mosquito since Pa Rogers and others were in
14:49:51 10 Kono. Not too long, Mosquito informed me that he wanted us to
11 contact the other brothers in Monrovia. Although he had already
12 made some contacts with them, but he needs some of the gemstones
13 to give to the leader in Monrovia to facilitate these contacts.
14 Before this, of course, we were aware that some transactions was
14:50:16 15 going on as on several occasions he made visit to Monrovia
16 through the help of one Benjamin Legon, a Liberian security
17 personnel, in collaboration with the adjutant general. The
18 general adjutant knows about some demands given to Benjamin Legon
19 for onward handing over to the leader of Liberia. Then we later
14:50:48 20 decided to send somebody to the brother in Burkina for the
21 logistical materials, hence brother Mosquito decided that
22 Brigadier Issa should go on that mission."

23 Can we pause and can we just go up the page a little bit.
24 "Not too long Mosquito informed me that he wanted us to contact
14:51:13 25 the other brothers in Monrovia."

26 The other brothers in Monrovia, Mr Taylor, who's that?

27 A. I don't know who he's referring to, to the other brothers
28 that they have in Monrovia. I have no idea of who this could be.

29 Q. "Although he had made some contacts with them but he needs

1 some of the gemstones to give to the leader in Monrovia to
2 facilitate these contacts."

3 Who's the leader in Monrovia?

14:51:57 4 A. I really don't know who is this leader in Monrovia to
5 facilitate --

6 Q. Sounds like you, Mr Taylor.

7 A. No, but he said to facilitate the contacts.

8 Q. Yes. But let's just think about the timing, shall we.

9 Leader, yes, could be Foday Sankoh, but he's not in Monrovia.

14:52:14 10 He's been in either Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria or Freetown. So who's
11 the leader in Monrovia?

12 A. Well, my understanding of this statement, I'm the President
13 in Liberia, but the way this statement reads that, although he
14 had made some contacts with them, but he needs some of the
14:52:38 15 gemstones to give to the leader in Monrovia to facilitate these
16 contacts, except where I am expected to make contacts, then he
17 cannot be speaking about me.

18 Q. No. You're the one who's going to be facilitating some
19 contacts.

14:52:59 20 A. That's what I'm saying. Unless he's referring - contacts
21 with who then?

22 Q. That's what I'm asking, Mr Taylor.

23 A. No, there's no --

24 Q. If we take this document at face value, it suggests a link
14:53:12 25 between you and Bockarie with a view to you facilitating certain
26 things for them. Do you see?

27 A. That's what he's trying to imply, but I'm not sure,
28 counsel, if - because of the unique situation here, I'm not sure
29 because - I don't know what you want to do with this.

1 Q. Well, I am giving you the opportunity, Mr Taylor, to
2 comment on this because undoubtedly in due course it is going to
3 be suggested that you're the leader in Monrovia being referred to
4 here. Do you understand?

14:53:55 5 A. No, no, no. I fully understand that, but I'm trying to say
6 that I'm talking about the - we are - well, I can't really get
7 into, really, analysing this statement as I should as we are now,
8 as we are in this particular setting. That's what I'm talking
9 about.

14:54:27 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, are you asking this witness
11 was he the leader in Monrovia or are you asking him to analyse
12 the statement?

13 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I'm asking him whether this is a
14 reference to him.

14:54:38 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, there you are, Mr Taylor. That's a
16 simple question. No need to analyse the statement.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Is this a reference to you, Mr Taylor?

19 A. I doubt it. I would say no.

14:54:52 20 Q. And who is Benjamin Legon?

21 A. I don't know anyone called Benjamin Legon.

22 Q. "Then we later decided to send somebody to the brother in
23 Burkina." Who is that, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I don't know who this person is referring to as the brother
14:55:17 25 in Burkina. Quite frankly, I don't know.

26 Q. "For the logistical materials, hence brother Mosquito
27 decided that Brigadier Issa should go on that mission."

28 A. Well, except he's referring to Ibrahim Bah as the brother
29 in Burkina because I'm sure he cannot be referring to anyone - he

1 can't be referring to the President. So I would say Bah.

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us look again at this, shall we:

3 "To the leader in Monrovia to facilitate these contacts.

4 Then we later decided to send somebody to the brother in Burkina"

14:56:01 5 - a possible contact - "for the logistical materials, hence

6 brother Mosquito decided that Brigadier Issa should go on that

7 mission."

8 Did you set up a contact between the RUF and the brother in

9 Burkina? You follow me?

14:56:20 10 A. I follow you. No, I never set up any such contact. No.

11 Q. "In this way some parcels of diamonds among which was a 15

12 carats diamond that I've seen myself was handed over personally

13 by General Mosquito and myself to him. We left for Monrovia but

14 we understood later from Issa himself that he had lost the

14:56:47 15 diamonds in Monrovia."

16 Can we just quickly to go to the bottom of the page to make

17 sure this is page 4. This same page. Yes. Let's go back to

18 page 3:

19 "In this way some parcels of diamonds among which was a 15

14:57:12 20 carat diamond that I have seen myself was handed over personally

21 by General Mosquito and myself to him. We left for Monrovia ..."

22 Let's go back to the second page and see who's talking at

23 this point. Who's talking? Is it page 2 or page 3? Just let's

24 confirm who's talking at this point. That's page 2. Let's go to

14:57:50 25 page 3. It's Brigadier Mike. Page 3, Brigadier Mike still.

26 Page 4, Brigadier Mike still, yes. Go to the top of the page,

27 please.

28 "We left for Monrovia, but we understood later from Issa

29 himself that he had lost the diamonds in Monrovia."

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Mr Taylor, can I just caution you to this extent now:

15:06:29 5 Forget about the witness we were dealing with. We're looking
6 purely at this document as an exhibited document now. Do you
7 understand?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. And we'll return back to the particular narrative we were
15:06:47 10 looking at at a later stage, do you follow me?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. And can we have up on the screen now where we left off,
13 please.

14 "Pa Rogers: Just as Brigadier Mike had explained about
15:07:02 15 the proceeds before we disbursed the money, we considered the
16 part played by the external delegation, comprising Omrie Golley
17 and General Ibrahim, who had been spending their money to
18 facilitate contacts and to clarify some issues on behalf of our
19 movement."

15:07:21 20 Now, remind ourselves, Mr Taylor: Omrie Golley and General
21 Ibrahim, the first two RUF delegates to arrive in Monrovia in
22 April 1999 for airlifting to Lome, yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. "We had trust in them, even though they did not put forward
15:07:41 25 any claim for the expenses accrued by them. We think it fit to
26 encourage them, hence the general called me to give the external
27 delegation \$8,000 US, which I did. Next, I was not present on
28 the issue about Johnny Paul Koroma. I was made to understand
29 that General Ibrahim was present at the time of that operation.

1 Therefore, General Ibrahim or general adjutant will dilate on
2 that issue what actually was given to him for the other brothers
3 outside there. I could not tell, but we were in dire need of
4 those things so that we can defend our ground to prevent the
15:08:21 5 movement going into disarray. These are the areas that brigadier
6 had not commended on."

7 So we go back to the adjutant general:

8 "Allow me to say something now with records to what the
9 brigadier had just said about the things received. Those
15:08:44 10 diamonds were with Mosquito when we decided that we would make
11 good use of it by creating an avenue for outside contacts, since
12 the pressure was high against us. Then luckily, General Ibrahim
13 arrived the same day. There and then we all agreed to move to
14 Monrovia to meet the Big Brother. This move coincided with
15:09:11 15 Benjamin leaving for Monrovia also. In this way we met at
16 Koindu, where we checked the 1,832 pieces of diamonds in a nine
17 plastic which was intact. In lieu of this, Bra told Benjamin
18 that they had something that they want to present to Big Brother
19 in Monrovia so that he will help us.

15:09:44 20 Immediately Benjamin advised us that for security reasons
21 we should not enter Liberia at the moment, as ECOMOG are hunting
22 for us. Benjamin further said he was instructed to sneak with JP
23 Koroma to Monrovia to avoid suspicion."

24 Now I want us to pause there. Let us remind ourselves,
15:10:09 25 Mr Taylor, of some evidence we've heard to the effect that
26 Mosquito's initial trip to Monrovia had to be aborted because of
27 ECOMOG patrols in Monrovia. Do you remember that? Remember some
28 testimony to that effect?

29 A. Well --

1 Q. Mosquito tried to get to Monrovia, but he couldn't because
2 of ECOMOG patrols. Do you remember that?

3 A. Well, that's not my recollection of the evidence, so that's
4 why - my recollection is that he's in Monrovia but cannot see me.
15:10:45 5 So it's not aborted. That's my recollection. That he goes to
6 Monrovia, but he doesn't see me, so he has to return.

7 Q. But something was said also, was it not, about ECOMOG?

8 A. Yes. Yeah, but he's in Monrovia but because of the ECOMOG
9 activities, he cannot see me. This is my recollection.

15:11:04 10 Q. Now, would it be right that in 1998, say, if someone like
11 Sam Bockarie had gone to Liberia, ECOMOG would be interested in
12 picking him up? Would that be right?

13 A. That would be right.

14 Q. Why?

15:11:28 15 A. Well, it depends on the time now, because he would be one
16 of those individuals - if it's closer to February, he would be
17 one of the individuals that they would have an interest in - in
18 speaking to, because the intervention has just occurred. So they
19 would be interested in speaking to him to see what is he doing
15:11:48 20 there. It would cause some problems, but they would be
21 interested in speaking to him.

22 Q. At this stage, Mr Taylor, to your recollection was there a
23 travel ban in place imposed by the United Nations Security
24 Council?

15:12:06 25 A. I'm not sure if - there was a travel ban that had been
26 imposed by ECOWAS.

27 Q. By ECOWAS?

28 A. Yes, that was in place.

29 Q. When had the ECOWAS travel ban been imposed?

1 A. Following this meeting in Abidjan.

2 Q. Which meeting are we talking about?

3 A. We're talking - well, I'm talking about the committee
4 meeting in Abidjan late '97 when the information reached us that
15:12:41 5 - I was not in the meeting. In fact, it was a foreign ministers
6 meeting - that the AFRC had no intention of giving up power, that
7 they would stay in. And so some actions were taken to begin to
8 deny them travel and some ECOWAS --

9 Q. Give me the date again.

15:13:00 10 A. I would say this is about the last couple of months of
11 1997.

12 Q. Right. Okay. So last couple of months of 1997, ECOWAS
13 imposes this travel ban. Was Sam Bockarie on that travel ban?

14 A. All the senior members of the junta would be on it.

15:13:26 15 Q. Now, let us just put together one or two other facts which
16 are now - which you've testified to already, Mr Taylor. You
17 recall that you tell us that in August 1998 you received some
18 information from your ambassador in Guinea?

19 A. That is correct.

15:13:49 20 Q. About members of the RUF wanting to get in touch with you,
21 yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And that as a result of that contact, yes, you thereafter
24 contact other members of the Committee of Six, yes?

15:14:13 25 A. Five, yes.

26 Q. Committee of Five.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And as a consequence of that, Bockarie comes to Liberia for
29 the first time in September 1998?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. In order for Bockarie to attend in Liberia in September
3 1998, did you have to get a special dispensation from ECOWAS for
4 them to lift the ban on him travelling?

15:14:36 5 A. Well, all this committee - this committee was responsible
6 for peace. Once the committee had agreed, that was sufficient.
7 Just as done at the UN. It's a sanctions committee and --

8 Q. Right. So just run that past me again. I'm not sure I
9 understand.

15:14:50 10 A. The committee is dealing with this particular matter on
11 Sierra Leone, and whenever the committee has to take action, it
12 doesn't have to go back to the entire ECOWAS to say, "Can we do
13 this?" This committee will take a decision upon consulting.

14 That's how we consult each other. And it's okay, and they felt
15:15:11 15 that it was okay; we invited him.

16 Q. Right. Now, bearing that background in mind, okay, August,
17 the letter from the ambassador in Guinea, yes?

18 A. Uh-huh

19 Q. You contact your colleagues, clearance is given for
15:15:28 20 Bockarie to come in September, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, from the letter you receive from your ambassador, it
23 was quite clear that members of the RUF wanted to get in touch
24 with you.

15:15:41 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Now, were you aware then, Mr Taylor, of perhaps an earlier
27 attempt by members of the RUF to enter Liberia before you had
28 gain the clearance when they were having to sneak about because
29 ECOMOG were hunting for them. Do you follow?

1 A. Yes, I follow. No, I had no prior indication that they
2 wanted to contact us, no.

3 Q. Because until you gain clearance from ECOWAS, if Bockarie,
4 without permission, had entered Liberia, ECOMOG would necessarily
15:16:29 5 be empowered at that stage to pick him up, wouldn't they, prior
6 to you getting clearance?

7 A. Well, can I say yes and I can say no, and I'm saying no to
8 the word "empowered". There would be maybe - there would be a
9 little technical issue here because they would be acting out of
15:17:00 10 line if they were to just pick somebody, but they would be at
11 liberty to show interest in speaking to him, okay. And I'm
12 deliberately putting it this way because to say that ECOMOG would
13 just pick up somebody and discuss the problem before that we've
14 mentioned to this Court about the 14 February entry of the two
15:17:25 15 helicopters from Sierra Leone, so it would not just be - they
16 would not have - be clothed with the authority to just go and
17 pick up, but they would express interest in wanting to speak to
18 him because the authority on the ground is the Government of
19 Liberia.

15:17:42 20 Q. But I'm looking at the language of this document and also
21 other testimony we've heard regarding ECOMOG and I'm seeking your
22 assistance with this as a possible scenario: Bockarie, et al,
23 want to get in touch with the leader in Monrovia. They try to
24 enter Liberia and they're being hunted by ECOMOG, so that trip is
15:18:13 25 aborted. We then have an approach through the Liberian
26 ambassador to Guinea and thereafter you make contact and now
27 legitimately they can enter Monrovia and in due course you meet
28 them in September. Do you follow me?

29 A. Yes. That's --

1 Q. Which would make sense of, what, this document. Now, do
2 you know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

3 A. No, I know nothing about the attempts before. No. But
4 your scenario would be appropriate. That's an appropriate
15:18:48 5 scenario that is expressed here. I know of no attempts before
6 they write my - before my ambassador writes me that they're
7 trying to reach me, no.

8 Q. Now, do you have any idea, Mr Taylor, who this Bra is,
9 B-R-A, being mentioned here on page 5?

15:19:17 10 A. No, I don't know. I don't know this.

11 Q. Or who is the Benjamin being referred to?

12 A. I would suspect that they would be talking about Benjamin
13 Yeaten, that's the only Benjamin I have come in come [sic]. But
14 what would Benjamin be doing in Sierra Leone at this time?

15:19:36 15 That's not possible. That's not possible.

16 Q. And the Big Brother in Monrovia, who could that be, I
17 wonder?

18 A. Well, I don't know if they're referring to - I'm not their
19 brother, but they could be referring to the President of Liberia.

15:19:53 20 They could be referring to me, or maybe somebody else they know
21 there. But I figure that they could be - if they're relating
22 Benjamin, they must be talking about me.

23 Q. "Immediately Benjamin advised us that for security reasons
24 we should not enter Liberia at the moment as ECOMOG are hunting
15:20:10 25 for us. Benjamin further said he was instructed to sneak with JP
26 Koroma to Monrovia to avoid suspicion."

27 Know anything about that, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That's total nonsense that - we have so much evidence
29 before the Court. There was no such thing about Johnny Paul

1 Koroma coming to Monrovia, and then this is contrasting seriously
2 with - now we're hearing that - in fact, if we're looking at this
3 period, Sam Bockarie doesn't come to Liberia, but we've heard
4 that he came. We've heard that he came.

15:20:48 5 Now, here is the adjutant here now - I think this is the
6 adjutant speaking - saying that Benjamin advised that he should
7 not enter. So that means that Benjamin - what I'm seeing here is
8 that Benjamin leaving for Monrovia is implying that Benjamin is
9 in Sierra Leone. Well, this is totally impossible. No.

15:21:16 10 Q. "Then Bra replied that JP was not around. He then asked
11 which area is JP presently. Bra said JP is about fairly miles
12 away from where we were at the time, hence Benjamin has to leave.
13 What follows after this was Bra asked me, he said, 'Rash, provide
14 one operator and one bodyguard including Jungle.'"

15:21:55 15 Pause there. "Provide one operator and one bodyguard
16 including Jungle." What do you understand by that, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Well, Jungle is in Sierra Leone --

18 Q. And who is in a position to provide him?

19 A. Well, then Bra should be able, whoever this Bra is. Rash
15:22:32 20 is supposed to be providing; I don't know who Rash is.

21 Q. Well, Rash is the adjutant general. So Bra is asking the
22 adjutant general of the RUF to provide Jungle. But I thought
23 Jungle was one of your securities. Do you follow?

24 A. Yes.

15:23:00 25 Q. So why are you allowing the adjutant general of the RUF to
26 provide one of your own securities, unless of course Jungle is a
27 member of the RUF? Do you follow?

28 A. Jungle is a member of the RUF since '93, surely.

29 Q. "I will be leaving tonight for Monrovia to meet Pa Musa.

1 During that patrol journey we narrowly escaped ECOMOG patrols and
2 arrived at Pa Musa's residence. "

3 Who's Pa Musa?

4 A. This could be Musa Cisse. That's the only person I would
15:23:42 5 think about.

6 Q. "We informed him about what we have at hand and our
7 intentions. He agreed with us and said he will brief the Big
8 Brother about our present stance. But when Pa Musa met with Big
9 Brother and explained about our mission he said no, Mosquito
10 should not come for security reasons and he even told us to leave
11 Liberia immediately as information has spread around that we all
12 going to him and that ECOMOG were deployed from that point on to
13 Mabaclay. "

14 Now, there's much there that we need to dissect. "When Pa
15:24:35 15 Musa met with Big Brother." Remember, they are in Monrovia now,
16 so who is Big Brother?

17 A. That's me.

18 Q. "And explained our mission." Now, was there an occasion,
19 Mr Taylor, when Musa Cisse came to you, Charles Taylor, and said,
15:24:52 20 "Look, there's a couple of people coming here from the RUF.
21 They've got some diamonds. They want to meet with you," and you
22 said, "No, don't let Mosquito come for security reasons. And you
23 know what, guys, you better leave Monrovia quickly because people
24 are talking, word's about that you're here," was there such a
15:25:15 25 meeting?

26 A. There was no such meeting, no. If anybody had managed to
27 get across the border at this particular time - and I do not know
28 where we can place this time, but we know it is somewhere after
29 February 1998 - I would have been delighted at that particular

1 time to have been able to make contact with the RUF. So there
2 was no such contact.

3 Q. Mabaclay, where is that?

4 A. No. I think what he's really trying - there is an area
15:25:54 5 near Monrovia called Mount Barclay, two words. Mount Barclay.
6 So I think this person made an error. It's Mount Barclay.

7 Q. "Therefore after we received such advice from Pa Musa we
8 left the same night, hurriedly washing our car which was too
9 dirty because of the bad Lofa road. We reached Gbarnga. Less I
15:26:24 10 forget he told us that if we have anything we should send it with
11 a reliable person but Mosquito should not go there. We arrived
12 at Koindu in the evening and met Benjamin, Memuna and others
13 where we left them and gave them the feedback on our mission.
14 Bra said no problem. This is how God works out things. That he
15:26:50 15 could have been arrested. He said we should write a letter and
16 hand over the 1,832 pieces in nine plastics to the Papay."

17 Who's that?

18 A. They're referring to me.

19 Q. "Bra approved the letter. General Ibrahim, Memuna and
15:27:20 20 Jungle went to Liberia while we returned to Buedu."

21 Sounds familiar? Heard that account before, Mr Taylor?

22 A. In a different way.

23 Q. "When Pa Rogers and others went to Gbarnga later, these
24 diamonds were shown to him. Big Brother told them he is going to
15:27:37 25 reserve them until you (Pa Sankoh) return."

26 You see the clear implications of that, don't you,
27 Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. You were given 1,832 pieces of diamonds for safekeeping

1 until Sankoh returns. Were you?

2 A. I was not. But don't let's forget we're talking about a
3 different set of people here now. These 1,800 people, this is
4 about almost a third group that's supposed to be involved with
15:28:15 5 getting this to me.

6 Q. "With regards to the 244 pieces that we sold, I have the
7 record in a ledger showing the quantity and everything. The
8 sales were followed by the arrival of external delegation selling
9 drugs and other brothers. Bra called JP, Pa Rogers, CO Mike,
15:28:50 10 Dr Williams, other authorities, including two other brothers who
11 were assisting us in getting drugs, food and other necessities
12 outside that were needed at the front line. We haggled on the
13 price of gems. We agreed at \$17,000 US which was paid later.
14 \$1,000 was given to Johnny Paul for his feeding; \$800 was given
15:29:18 15 to Mr Golley and Ibrahim; and the remaining amount was used in
16 buying more rice and the needed items such as cigarettes, et
17 cetera, that the boys needed upfront. These items arrived
18 recently, although \$500 was given to us when we left with
19 Brigadier Issa."

15:29:43 20 Now, that transaction, Mr Taylor, sale of 244 pieces which
21 realised a grand total of \$17,000 US, do you know anything about
22 that?

23 A. No, I don't know. I don't know anything about it.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, please, Mr President.

15:30:18 25 Q. Over the page, please:

26 "I was seriously sick with open mold for about two months
27 but I believe JRR, one of our security, can brief you better on
28 that sir."

29 So then junior Rambo intervenes:

1 "Yes, sir. Pertaining to the diamonds that general handed
2 over to Brigadier Issa, I was with general when these pieces were
3 brought from Kono. Among the gem was an 11-carat pieces. The
4 general held a meeting with some senior officers who told them
15:31:02 5 that the war had reached a stage wherein we needed external
6 assistants to make contacts for ammunition in Burkina Faso."

7 Mr Taylor, Burkina Faso? Why not Liberia?

8 A. Well, I guess they know we don't have weapons, so - but
9 this has been the normal route, I guess.

15:31:25 10 Q. "Thus Brigadier Issa, a senior member in the movement, was
11 given the said document to hand over the same to General Ibrahim
12 in Burkina Faso. Issa was also given the diamonds and briefed on
13 how best he could travel with it to Monrovia, then Burkina Faso.
14 He left Koindu with SS security like Colonel Jungle that the
15:31:54 15 leader had assigned to us for such operation. He was on this
16 mission. This Colonel Jungle, they high command instructed him
17 that they should secure Issa on to Liberia. From there the high
18 command further instructed Issa to try his level best to reach
19 Burkina Faso to meet General Ibrahim for the said diamond sales.

15:32:20 20 He was on this until we heard from Jungle that he dropped these
21 diamonds in Monrovia. The commander immediately summoned
22 Brigadier Issa to report back to the base. Jungle went to
23 receive him as he reached at the base."

24 "Foday Sankoh: Stop. So the mission was not accomplished?

15:32:45 25 Pa Rogers: Yes, sir."

26 Next we come to:

27 "Discipline the behaviour of Brigadier Superman: He proved
28 disloyal to the command on the ground; he break the Kono bank; he
29 attacked and killed other RUF soldiers; then he misused some fund

1 for RUF movement. The first issue is when he proved disloyal."

2 Now, Mr Taylor, let's just pause there for a minute. Do
3 you recall right at the beginning of this record the adjutant
4 general set out four items for discussion which were too
15:33:27 5 sensitive to have been put in documentary form. Do you recall
6 that?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. They're now moving on to the second item, which is
9 Superman. Now, up to this point let us just recap what has been
15:33:40 10 said to the leader about diamonds and you. What is said is that
11 some 1,832 pieces of diamonds were given to you for safekeeping,
12 yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Nothing is said so far about you providing materials to the
15:34:04 15 RUF in return. In fact, what materials the RUF are seeking to
16 receive, on the face of this document, they're seeking to obtain
17 from Burkina Faso, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor. Based on this, what were you
15:34:25 20 giving the RUF in return for the 1,832 pieces of diamond?

21 A. Well, apparently nothing. Because don't forget now,
22 they've already received a huge amount of ammunition from me, so
23 they really don't need nothing again, according to the accounts
24 that we've heard. So I'm giving them nothing. They are just
15:34:49 25 supposed to give me this diamond, and that's it, and they're
26 going off now to try to get some other material from another
27 place.

28 Q. "Foday Sankoh: Excuse me. I hope you will be brief.

29 Pa Rogers: I felt that since you left me on the ground,

1 with the exception of Pa Kallon we had elders. And one of them
2 was me, the chairman of the council. I settled any confusion
3 without any favour when the high command confirm such orders to
4 do so. But with particular reference to Brigadier Superman, who
15:35:31 5 was made battle group commander in your absence by the field
6 Commander CDS because he had been making efforts, but when he was
7 sent to Kono he was not doing his work as required. Hence, the
8 CDS told us to call him and organise a better operation so that
9 the area will not fall to the enemies. Superman refused to come,
15:35:59 10 even though this matter was referred to in the War Council to
11 look into it. This was jotted down, so that we can deliberate on
12 this issue that Superman had broken the structure you left
13 behind.

14 Foday Sankoh: Execute me? Superman is not the one that
15:36:20 15 have disrupted the structure. Because of I had given
16 instruction, Mosquito had no right to appoint neither colonel or
17 a major in my absence. He has no right."

18 Pause there. "Mosquito had no right to appoint neither
19 colonel or a major in my absence. He had no right." So what
15:36:38 20 were you doing, Mr Taylor, appointing Sam Bockarie a two-star
21 general?

22 A. When he can't even appoint a - I never did. Never did.

23 Q. "But that I will look into in the future. I'm not here for
24 that at the moment. When you make a lot of promotion, that is,
15:36:56 25 you have some many brigadiers, so many colonels, so many what do
26 you call them? You see it is difficult on that side to deal with
27 it.

28 Mosquito: Carry on, sir. I was just trying to explain.
29 Does it mean that if you promote a person he should not listen to

1 you? That is ungratefulness or whatever you might call it.

2 However, since you have said so about the command structure, we
3 might have made mistakes. But that will be corrected because we
4 know that even if we had gone astray, you are there to correct
15:37:26 5 us. What I had done was to call him to resolve the matter.

6 Foday Sankoh: I appointed you, field commander Issa,
7 battlefield commander. You have no right to give any appointment
8 to Superman. This has caused the problem, because you now know
9 that this man is hard to control. Look at the man that you gave
15:37:47 10 command. He is not fit to be a battle group commander, so again
11 he is a problem to you, Superman. He is not fit to be a
12 battlefield/group commander.

13 Mosquito: But he is senior.

14 Foday Sankoh: I know he is senior, let me tell you, but he
15:38:08 15 is not fit to be a battlefield commander, because I know his
16 attitude. When I'm there you can get him under control. When
17 I'm not there, he is a problem. This is what I have said, this
18 appointment has caused the problem. One thing I noticed, he had
19 no respect for the man sitting down here. Yes, it is true. He
15:38:27 20 has no respect for him. Can you do that to your teacher even if
21 you had superseded him? But Superman had not been the cause of
22 the problem. But command Pa Rogers in the army, you know, that
23 it is the people's war. If you are appointing somebody, you must
24 be careful. When they promoted me, I will continue to criticise
15:38:56 25 and I will neither take any action, nor charge anyone. But when
26 the time comes, we shall look into that. Superman, to put him
27 under control? God will put him under control. His behaviour is
28 important, but also not important. Do you understand that? I
29 thank you for all what you have done, but the command structure

1 should have remained as it was. He promotes some brigadier when
2 I do not the power and opportunity to promote a person brigadier.
3 In fact, in a people's war all promotions stopped at colonel,
4 lieutenant colonel, full colonel. That is all until the war
15:39:32 5 ends. After the end of the war, we can promote people."

6 Now, can I pause a minute, please. Now, you recall earlier
7 in the document, Mr Taylor, there's a reference to Bra, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now just to assist everyone, at page 2940 of the transcript
15:40:27 10 of 1 February 2008 an individual who we were dealing with is
11 asked, "Who is Bra?" and the answer comes, "Okay, Sam Bockarie."
12 Okay? So that's the Bra referred to earlier in the document. Do
13 you follow?

14 A. I do.

15:40:47 15 Q. Now picking up from there:

16 "Foday Sankoh: Does anybody have anything to say against
17 Superman?

18 Speaker: Yes, sir. In your absence I was assigned with
19 Brigadier Issa until we moved from Buedu to Kono, where we
15:41:05 20 launched an operation up to Waterloo. We met the brothers from
21 Freetown there. We were expecting them to give their SLA report,
22 but they did not. On a certain day CO Issa asked Barry, a newly
23 elected commander in the presence of Superman, Bra Issa Gullit,
24 and Five-Five about the SLA operation report. They did not give
15:41:39 25 any SLA ops report or present anything, nor did they give any
26 account about their manpower and arms. There was confusion over
27 this issue. At that moment we had to plan attack Tom Bo village
28 after Benguema. We went on that operation and returned on the
29 next day. We had to follow up on the issue concerning the

1 Freetown operation. All they could tell us they had freed the
2 other brothers. Two or three days later we arrested some SLAs
3 with \$600 US and 13 million leones. These money was taken to
4 Makeni with the SLAs. At night Superman attacked us in Makeni
15:42:19 5 and took away the money. During that period, Issa was in
6 possession of some diamonds had from our mining activities at the
7 Kambia axis. This attack took place when the general sent me to
8 bring about Bra Gi bo. CO Gi bo.

9 Foday Sankoh: Gi bo?

15:42:41 10 Speaker: Yes, sir, Gi bo. He told us to bring Superman
11 before him as he had called him on several occasions but he
12 refused to come and that the matter concerned your business.

13 Foday Sankoh: Who was that person?

14 Speaker: Gi bo. Gi bo, sir. Gibril Massaquoi was called on
15:42:59 15 six different occasions to be briefed and he did not report.
16 Therefore General Mosquito instructed Brigadier Issa to arrest
17 Superman and escort him to Kailahun."

18 Can I pause, Mr Taylor, to ask you this: Back in 1999,
19 were you aware of this dissension within the ranks of the RUF?

15:43:31 20 A. Well, not exactly. But there were some indications when
21 the delegation starting coming through in April 1999, we picked
22 up - by "we" the government - and I think even the UN personnel,
23 the UN officers in Monrovia picked up that there was a little
24 split, because even during the Lome discussions there was a group
15:44:09 25 that said they wanted to send a special message to Foday Sankoh
26 and they were permitted to go to Lome. I think Superman sent
27 somebody. So there was some indication they had problems.

28 Q. "At that time Superman, Brigadier Five-Five and others had
29 left the front line, leaving Kallon behind without even informing

1 others. I also left the front line on a vehicle with AA gun
2 mounted on it and I met them at Gberi Junction close to Lunsar.
3 Although my vehicle had mechanical problems in Makeni, I later
4 told Issa what had happened at the front line. Late Mamba and I
15:44:58 5 then left for Lunsar arrested Gibo the same night and placed him
6 in the vehicle. CO Issa told us to arrest CO Nya also. We went
7 to the compound where CO Nya and CO Denis were residing. As we
8 approached the entrance of the compound, we met Superman who told
9 us that if anyone one of us enters his compound he will shoot at
15:45:20 10 us. Rambo and I began to move forward while saying that we have
11 not come to him but to CO Nya because CO Mosquito said he must
12 report. We did not even step into his compound when he fired at
13 us sporadically but before this he took the commando mortar,
14 loaded the bomb and launched it at us. Before this sporadic
15:45:42 15 firing I was at the middle of both parties. CO Gibo was on one
16 side while CO Denis was on the other side. One person was killed
17 amongst us as we scattered about. Since only seven of us went as
18 security to CO Issa, Superman, Gibo, CO Nya came to Makeni and
19 raided our houses, took away all ammunitions and other materials
15:46:04 20 as the civilians fled for their lives. We found our way back
21 through Mile 91, Magburaka and then Makeni. After a month
22 General Mosquito had to send to Issa, instructing that they
23 should meet at Waterside to discuss the issue. Mosquito advised
24 Superman to forget about this raid. We left for Makeni again
15:46:26 25 with some ammunition and RPG rocket supplied by the general. As
26 we arrived at night we had plans to run some operations along
27 Bo-Makeni Highway. Staff told me to get the trucks, fuel them
28 and collect some manpower from Masingbi, Sewafe and Cole Town.
29 That was our last mission. After which Superman went and told us

1 that you had instructed him to arrest Mosquito. CO Issa, Moses
2 Kallon, because he, (Mosquito) had refused to answer a telephone
3 call you made to him and to obey our instruction and that
4 Mosquito should now take orders from him. He then attacked us
15:47:12 5 from three flanks. He led the flanks that went to Rambo who had
6 repelled a Kamajor attack at Mile 91. At night we had to retreat
7 to as far as Masingbi. Later we went to Magburaka and freed our
8 men that were arrested by Superman.

9 Sankoh: This command issue, even the soldiers are
15:47:39 10 grumbling about it and I will advise Rogers on this because this
11 is the root of the matter.

12 Pa Rogers: Whether I am here or not I will brief you
13 better so that if you all want to carry on with the movement you
14 can do so. Alhamdulillah. As I was saying everything is in the
15:48:02 15 hands of God. We do not want to come in like that. Let us
16 forget the business of Koroma, Superman, et cetera. Look here,
17 Pa Rogers, if it happens that we form a government I will look
18 firstly on who to appoint minister. I will not start from those
19 who have just joined us but those who have struggled. Just

15:48:21 20 imagine somebody from America may want to be appointed minister.
21 How will feel about that? This man, do you all want to overlook
22 him because of his body? I have noted that in my diary. This
23 man has trained all of you. Whatever he was doing, when I
24 promote I always say he is not going to be a commander but an
15:48:42 25 overall adviser until I came back. If I did not send informing
26 you that this man is deputy officer how can anybody know? He
27 deserves that, because you are not objective.

28 Those people gave me command that I am deputy. They wanted
29 to use me but I know later. How can you do that to release 300

1 soldiers from three of us? You could not even tell Foday Sankoh
2 what Koroma said over the air that we are now friends, yet you
3 release all the Nigerians, is that not so, even though we were in
4 custody?

15:49:17 5 Speaker: Permit me to these the words, the son of a
6 bastard, we shall kill them today. We tried to disarm him and
7 place him into our car. He had no alternative but to listen to
8 top senior officers and briefed them that this is our position.
9 We need assistance and back-up.

15:49:40 10 In fact we were in Freetown. And every day we had to
11 arrest one or two colonel and place them in ... so it was.

12 Not too long we began keeping them off and then 98.1 radio
13 station started announcing that a number of colonel had
14 surrendered to them, you see."

15:50:02 15 98.1 radio station, Mr Taylor, who's that?

16 A. I really don't know. I really don't know.

17 Q. "The point is this. JP made blunder, sir. We made the
18 blunder because by then we had appointed him when he was an
19 officer in the army. This he had to listen to the officers since
15:50:32 20 he felt that they were will support him but they were fooling
21 him. Do you understand, sir? While there was total
22 disintegration of the revolution. Pa Rogers can bear me witness.

23 We went to JP with general during which the general was
24 explaining all about all that was happening but with God I
15:50:51 25 managed to put it under control. The civilians were happy in
26 such a way that they presented one drum of diesel to Rambo
27 because he had repelled the Kamajor attack on Mile 91.
28 Consequently Rambo left for Makeni to report the incident to CO
29 Issa. Even though there was petrol and diesel scarcity he did

1 not report on the night of his arrival because he was too tired
2 and needed rest. With the hope to see CO Issa the next morning,
3 but CO Superman attacked Makeni with four groups. He Superman
4 advanced to the house where Rambo was resting at opened fire at
15:51:31 5 the entrance. In this way Rambo was shot in his stomach.
6 Superman then forced the door open and told C Rambo that he is
7 going to kill him, but Rambo pleaded that he should not kill him
8 because Superman was his elder brother. That took him to that
9 place. Superman later killed him. In addition to this the other
15:51:51 10 three groups led by Colonel T attached to Brigadier Mani, Colonel
11 Gi bo and Colonel Kumba. Superman's operations commander attacked
12 our base at D0's barracks in Makeni, took all the ammunition, the
13 next day he called the civilians and apologised for what he has
14 done. He told them that he had acted on military instructions
15:52:14 15 given to him.

16 Foday Sankoh: Instruction? When everybody heard me over
17 the air. Did anyone of you hear me give that instruction?

18 Speaker: No, sir. He did that just to gain support and
19 cooperation from the soldiers even though there are some soldiers
15:52:31 20 who had not entered Buedu since they pulled out of Freetown.
21 They are still in the jungle. Therefore most of them are not
22 aware of the CDS and the other brother's efforts.

23 Foday Sankoh: Why did not you go over the air to inform
24 the people that what he had said was untrue?

15:52:57 25 Speaker: Yes, sir. At that moment we were under arrest,
26 including CO Ibrahim who was beaten and placed in cells after
27 they advanced 42 miles further on to Matotoka, from Matotoka to
28 Makali and all of us was taken to Magburaka prison. That was why
29 we were unable to refute that statement. At this point JP had

1 wanted to say something, but Pa Rogers stopped him. He said
2 please sir, you have to listen so that you will know how you have
3 blundered. He said the accumulation of all the blunders have
4 placed us in this position today. Hence he allowed us to blow
15:53:41 5 our minds. Then from that point we turned to a new page. From
6 all this, what I was trying to say is this. That from the onset
7 JP was not 100 per cent of himself during the entire revolution.
8 I was with him in prison. I launched the first revolution and I
9 was arrested, placed in prison while others called on the
15:54:02 10 international community, which forced them to free ten of us.
11 When we came out we launched another attack and freed them. Do
12 you understand sir? This was how it all happened. Even when
13 ECOMOG entered Freetown. Gborie is not here today, but I am
14 saying this with the fear of God on my conscience, we sat
15:54:20 15 together with JP and argued bitterly, we told him that we should
16 not allow the Nigeria ship to berth here. But Gborie argued
17 again bitterly that we need to gain international support.
18 During that brief argument Victor King the pilot who was executed
19 was on my side.

15:54:44 20 Victor King, Mr Taylor, remember the name?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Who is he?

23 A. This was the commander that flew in February 1998 -
24 February 14.

15:54:51 25 Q. On board a?

26 A. One of the two choppers belonging to the Sierra Leonean
27 government.

28 Q. Right. And he was returned in due course to Freetown and
29 what happened to him?

1 A. Executed by Kabbah.

2 Q. "I asked them what was international community's business
3 in this matter because when two Heads of State are in dispute and
4 one has to come to talk peace it means this matter will be solved
15:55:14 5 on the table (negotiation). I told them that they should stay on
6 their own side while we remain here. Finally they persuaded JP
7 who later allowed them to berth at government wharf and when they
8 entered our territorial waters they moved to the quay. He told
9 them to come out of their ships with personal arms. What we saw
15:55:44 10 were armoured cars, RPGs, mortars, being off loaded from their
11 ship. These are the mistakes that happened. By then his elder
12 brother SFY Koroma was chief of defence staff.

13 Foday Sankoh: Chief of defence staff? Who made him chief
14 of defence staff?

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: JP appointed him because the former
16 chief of defence staff, Brigadier Hassan Conteh, was appointed
17 SLPP with Max Kanga. Although we had all kinds of pressures,
18 blockade, sanction, embargo, et cetera, and we proved ourselves
19 to be a government as we ensured that we functioned every day.
15:56:05 20 Notwithstanding this every day during our nine months we must
21 heard of missiles being launched, fighting near Freetown, et
22 cetera. With this scenario we held our last meeting wherein CO
23 Mike was the director of intelligence. He told us that our
24 popularity has dwindled within the populace because of anti-revos
15:56:22 25 (our men) had been harassing them. For instance some of them who
26 felt that because they are around Leather Boot at certain
27 deployment they should enjoy. But we picked our men based on
28 their loyalty. When we felt that if we instructed someone he
29 obeyed us he is our comrade in struggle.

1 Foday Sankoh: But why did you appoint Momoh adviser?

2 Speaker: I did not. In fact Momoh was not an adviser to
3 me but we needed him. Beside Paul Thomas, you asked for had
4 pulled out including others.

15:57:26 5 Foday Sankoh: Where is Paul Thomas?

6 Speaker: He has gone. The problem was we needed Bri gadi er
7 Mani although that is still possible because he is an old
8 soldier. He can provide us with a formi dable plan to enable us
9 to go on the offensive but he refused to come when called on
10 several occasions. His usual reply was that he referred to stay
11 with the men at the battle fronts. As he put it, his men will
12 leave their deployment if he is not there. This effort was
13 appreciated, but we needed him at the rear.

14 Foday Sankoh: When this man refused to come, don't you
15 know that he has hidden agenda? When I was talking to him I
16 gathered something from him. I am an experienced man and I will
17 not say anything against him. He can be contained when I
18 returned inside I will be in position to work with him because my
19 mind has accepted him on certain issues.

15:58:15 20 Speaker: Everybody was coming up with his own suggestion
21 while others were looting which later received condemnation from
22 the international committee. What we were trying to do was to do
23 things in order to gain some international praises. As they told
24 us that the RUF had been roaming about killing people which was
15:58:35 25 not true. In fact we had been praised for better behaviour than
26 the Sierra Leone Army in Freetown. Further all the fighting that
27 we had engaged in was to free you. All that had happened over
28 there, we pray that you go back as there are lots of problems if
29 we fail to found a solution to it, it will be hard for us to

1 refuse the criticism against us since we are all responsible.

2 Another speaker: I want to talk on behalf of the other
3 senior brothers. There had been problems with us in the bush and
4 this problem started after the merger between RUF and AFRC until
15:59:21 5 we ended up in disarray. We are therefore informing you our
6 leader so that you will know how this problem began. Firstly all
7 what the other brothers have said is true and everybody has been
8 making frantic effort. But these mistakes happened because of
9 the break in communication between you and the movement. And one
15:59:42 10 lesson that I have learnt in this struggle is when the leadership
11 is absent there is always a problem. The solution to this
12 problem was done with the help of God through the good advice of
13 Pa Rogers, Dr SS Williams and other elders. Finally we are happy
14 to meet you today so that you could be in a better position to
16:00:04 15 handle them when you return to the bush. In this way I will
16 conclude by allowing you the external delegation to say
17 anything."

18 So come then to the external delegation:

19 "Omrie Golley: We all want our outside activities those
16:00:31 20 come inside to be done simultaneously in a bid to unite our
21 operations as our main concern was your release. Superimposed of
22 all of these is the issue of bringing the RUF to international
23 recognition and respectability. This was why we had worked so
24 hard to achieve this objective. On our part, we have made a lot
16:00:54 25 of efforts from London to Paris, from Paris to America, from
26 America back to the sub-region, to Burkina Faso, Togo, Nigeria,
27 Liberia and all other countries within the sub-region. Because I
28 do not want to talk much, Ibrahim will explain. The only thing I
29 have to say is that the movement that you are now leading is a

1 very, very good movement. Within the short time I have been with
2 the movement and meet with the brothers. I am convinced that we
3 are on the right way forward to bring peace to the country. We
4 must therefore continue not only as a government but as a
16:01:30 5 representative of the people of Sierra Leone. And all I was
6 doing was to protect the image of the movement. Because I am not
7 a military man, I cannot add more to this as everybody
8 contributed in their own individual way. I will not say I worked
9 more than Mike Lamin, but the critical thing is that we should
16:01:49 10 continue to work and move forward as the outside forces are many,
11 especially the Sierra Leoneans are worst. They will talk to you
12 nicely but when you are not around, they will say the worst
13 things about you that will actually cause not to sleep or even
14 eat anything. But mistake that has been made, we will continue
16:02:07 15 to live with it as we move forward. One thing Josephine has said
16 that is very, very important that we are not the external
17 delegations but all of us. Therefore while some of us has to
18 leave other will be returning to their bases, so you have to
19 explain to the brothers what you have seen and what has happened.
16:02:26 20 Let us leave now, because this is not the time to begin
21 backbiting about what a person has done. Let us move forward not
22 only to fight the enemies, but to start preparing ourselves for
23 governance. That is the name of the game. We must fight, and in
24 this way put ourselves in a position to better ourselves and our
16:02:47 25 people. We have suffer for too long. We shall continue to fight
26 to protect the name of the RUF to bring it to international
27 recognition and respectability because of the negative things
28 that has been done. We are very, very concern. We have lacked
29 many things in and out of our movement that has really limit our

1 work. Most of the things we have done, we did them in our own
2 way. Myself together with this man had lived in a hotel, that we
3 pay our bills including telephone bills, one frank after another.
4 When I told them why we cannot pay for huge bills, they told us
16:03:26 5 we control all the diamond areas. Therefore we should have
6 money. We had nothing with us at the time. The way we had
7 worked Ibrahim will explain, but we need to find a way to resolve
8 this problem. This money issue must be solved once and for all
9 to let the movement proceeds forward. As we cannot proceed
16:03:45 10 without money, we must try to send the money.

11 Foday Sankoh: Has the movement reacted somewhere?

12 Ibrahim: Talking about the military side of the situation
13 first when the coup took place and when you instructed the
14 brothers to join the AFRC our main helper in Burkina Faso was
16:04:04 15 really annoyed. He told us that his experience that is not going
16 to succeed. It is difficult for a revolutionary leader to join
17 another group in this kind of situation."

18 That's the end of the document. Now, Mr Taylor, we have
19 gone through that document in toto so that bearing in mind the
16:04:41 20 context of the meeting, we could look at possible references to
21 you in these oral reports to Foday Sankoh. Do you follow me?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, having gone through all 16 pages of this document, the
24 potential references to you are all in relation to diamonds. Do
16:05:11 25 you accept?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. There's no reference to you in relation to the supply of
28 war-like materials. Do you accept that?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. The only reference to provision of war-like materials is in
2 relation to Burkina Faso?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And why I've left this last page up on the screen is
16:05:34 5 because right at the end of the meeting we have two important
6 contributions from Omrie Golley and Ibrahim. Now, we know that
7 the external delegation who first arrived in Monrovia in April
8 1999 were the said Omrie Golley and Ibrahim Bah, yes?

9 A. Yes.

16:05:57 10 Q. Ibrahim Bah, to whom Issa Sesay had been dispatched in
11 Burkina Faso bearing diamonds which had gone missing, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you will see that right at the end Bah makes this
14 interjection:

16:06:18 15 "Talking about the military side of the situation first,
16 when the coup took place and when you" - that being Sankoh -
17 "instructed the brothers to join the AFRC, our main helper in
18 Burkina Faso was really annoyed."

19 Do you see that?

16:06:40 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. "He told us that with his experience that is not going to
22 succeed. It is difficult for a revolutionary leader to join
23 another group in this kind of situation."

24 But, Mr Taylor, was it you who instructed the RUF to go and
16:07:02 25 join the AFRC in Freetown?

26 A. No, I didn't.

27 Q. Were you aware that they were being given contrary advice
28 by Burkina Faso?

29 A. Not at all, no.

1 Q. Yes, can we put that document to one side, please. Can we
2 return, please, to the narrative we've been examining from
3 yesterday, okay, bearing in mind that I remind we're in open
4 session still and I would refer if we remain in open session.

16:08:21 5 A. Okay.

6 Q. So let's exercise some caution. Page 2510. This is an
7 answer recorded:

8 "Somehow in the middle of 1993/'94, according to what he"
9 - the "he" being Sankoh - "told me that relationship" - that is,
16:08:48 10 the relationship with you - "was not really like before. It was
11 not normal, and again it assumed a new dimension once Sankoh
12 reemerged again in Ivory Coast for the peace talks. That was
13 1996 and '97. I mean 2000 - I mean 1999 when he went to Lome
14 Accord. Mr Taylor did make another gesture to re-ignite that
16:09:25 15 relationship with him, even though he already had that with Sam
16 Bockarie, and that was the reason why Ibrahim Bah and Memunatu
17 Deen took \$20,000 from Taylor for Mr Sankoh. Even though he was
18 not happy with that again, he considered that was peanuts.
19 Anyway, that was the relationship so far that I can talk about.
16:09:51 20 In the beginning it was perfect. At some point it was strained,
21 and at the end they did try to mend that same friendship they had
22 before."

23 What do you say about that?

24 A. I'm not sure if - this witness is saying there that -
16:10:16 25 alluding to the fact that the \$20,000 that is alleged that is
26 sent, it is to what? To rekindle this relationship?

27 Q. It's part of a fence building exercise, okay? Repairing
28 the fence, all right? Let me just remind you what's being said.
29 "In the beginning it was perfect." That's the relationship

1 between you and Sankoh. "At some point it was strained and at
2 the end they did try to mend that same friendship they had
3 before." So this individual is talking about three stages in the
4 relationship. Would you agree with that proposition, Mr Taylor?

16:11:02 5 A. No, I totally disagree with the proposition, and that's the
6 problem with what he's saying. Because don't - as a reminder, I
7 am supposed to send \$20,000 to Sankoh. That money is supposed to
8 be taken by Jungle. Not in that --

9 Q. Ibrahim Bah and Memunatu Deen?

16:11:29 10 A. Yeah, but let's reflect on what was said before about that,
11 and that Sankoh gets agitated and says that it's peanuts.
12 Because it is alleged that I'm supposed to have received all the
13 diamonds and to send him \$20,000 is nonsense. This is what was
14 projected before. Now I'm hearing that this \$20,000 now is a
16:11:58 15 fence mending process. Neither of the two is true.

16 Q. No, but, Mr Taylor, let's put the money to one side for the
17 minute and I'm merely looking at the historical narrative being
18 put forward by this witness that there are three stages to your
19 relationship with Mr Sankoh. At the outset, it's perfect. It
16:12:26 20 then becomes strained. There are then efforts, after 1999, to
21 rebuild the situation. What do you say about that?

22 A. I say total - I disagree.

23 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let's look at it in a bit more detail
24 then. Your case is: Initially, I was not involved in the launch
16:12:53 25 of the Sierra Leone revolution, but then for tactical reasons I
26 decided to support Foday Sankoh's revolution, which I did from
27 August 1991 through to May/June 1992. You accept that?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And during that period, I provided him with ammunition,

1 yes, and other supplies, yes?

2 A. Uh-huh

3 Q. There were then complaints by Sankoh about the behaviour of
4 NPFL troops resulting in Top 20, Top 40, Top Final, which ended
16:13:32 5 with me being very angry at the killing of some of my good
6 combatants by the RUF and the relationship broke down, stage two.
7 You get it?

8 A. Uh-huh

9 Q. Thereafter, Lome, July 1999, I attend, assist the others in
16:13:54 10 twisting Sankoh's arm, which begins stage three. Now, would you
11 agree with that as a historical narrative?

12 A. Now, I will have some difficulties if you want me to accept
13 it in that form.

14 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm giving you an opportunity to provide your
16:14:17 15 own account, you see, and I'm outlining that juxtaposing it with
16 the testimony of an individual so that you have an opportunity of
17 giving your own version of events.

18 A. Yes. I only see two stages. If we want to talk about
19 stages, I see two. There's the stage where, because of I would
16:14:46 20 call it self-defence, where the government of Joseph Momoh has
21 armed an insurgency to attack Liberia that I decide that in order
22 that I will fight my attackers from where they're coming, from in
23 their area, there's a relationship developed with the RUF. So
24 what I insist on is that the relationship with the RUF at the
16:15:14 25 time is not because I want to aid the Sankoh revolution, no. My
26 objective at that particular time is to deny ULIMO the capacity
27 to come and continue their revolution in Liberia. It is not to
28 assist his revolution. So I would describe that stage as good.
29 It ends, the second stage, when there is this Top 20, Top 40, Top

1 Final, it ends at that particular stage. Those are the only two
2 stages.

3 My mission in July 1999 to Lome, there is no attempt on my
4 part to rekindle any relationship with Sankoh. I'm acting at
16:16:09 5 this particular time as a Head of State and I am trying to seek
6 the interest of Liberia because I want peace in Sierra Leone
7 because I cannot carry on any development in Liberia. So I would
8 just describe that as two stages. One, what I described before,
9 and the second, it ends in May 1992.

16:16:32 10 Q. So I just want to be clear, Mr Taylor. When does stage one
11 - your stage one begin?

12 A. My stage one begins at the point of beginning the efforts
13 of joint security in or around August 1991. That's my stage one.

14 Q. And when does stage one end?

16:16:57 15 A. Stage one ends at the beginning of the Top 20, Top 40, Top
16 Final operation. That's around May 1992.

17 Q. And do you accept that thereafter the relationship between
18 you and Sankoh is at the least, strained; at its highest, one of
19 mutual hatred?

16:17:28 20 A. You're going to two extremes.

21 Q. Use your own words.

22 A. Strained will be too mild. Hatred - I would say extreme
23 anger because hatred for me would be, you know, of extreme anger
24 between us.

16:17:49 25 Q. And so far as that mood is concerned, did it ever change?

26 A. Well, for a long time, yes, somewhat it changed from anger
27 to a mellow comportmentation, but I would not describe that as a
28 stage.

29 Q. Now, let me refer to another piece of testimony and invite

1 your comment and hopefully we can do this before the conclusion
2 of play today:

3 "Q. Now based on what you saw, what you experienced and
4 what you were told, how would you characterise the
16:18:50 5 relationship between Sam Bockarie and Charles Taylor?

6 A. Well, unlike his relationship, that is Mr Taylor's
7 relationship with Mr Sankoh, the way Mr Sankoh treated
8 Mr Taylor at some point of time with kind of cautious
9 optimism, that was quite really different from the type of
16:19:13 10 relationship he had with Sam Bockarie."

11 Pause. Cautious optimism?

12 A. It's good to know. I mean, cautious optimism from the
13 Sankoh side with me.

14 Q. Cautious optimism.

16:19:36 15 A. Well, I guess I would tend to accept that explanation based
16 on my understanding of the approach of the - you know, if you
17 look at my focus in dealing with the RUF at that particular time
18 and we look at some of the advice that had been given by the
19 external delegation with me having no interest in Sierra Leone
16:20:06 20 other than security and what Sankoh finally came up to
21 understand, so I would say there was - there could have been a
22 degree of cautious optimism, yeah.

23 Q. You remember that letter he wrote to you?

24 A. Uh-huh

16:20:28 25 Q. "That was really quite really different from the type of
26 relationship he had with Sam Bockarie. The relationship
27 with Sam Bockarie and Taylor was that of a father and son
28 relationship and Sam Bockarie took Mr Taylor as a father.
29 He was loyal to him and he entrusted the most precious

1 resources of RUF and that was the diamonds they had to
2 Mr Taylor and he was very loyal to him. At the same time,
3 like Mr Sankoh was at one point in time, Sam Bockarie also
4 was a beneficiary of the monies Taylor lavished on them, he
16:21:07 5 and the other commanders. And at that point in time,
6 because of that loyalty to Mr Taylor and because he so
7 entrusted Mr Taylor, he could not even take instructions
8 from Sankoh. And once he fell out with Sankoh, he actually
9 sought sanctuary to Mr Taylor who provided that to him for
16:21:32 10 some time. I mean, in demonstrating his loyalty to
11 Mr Taylor, he even fought for Mr Taylor with other RUF
12 commanders and troops that he took from behind the RUF
13 territory who never really had the opportunity to undergo
14 the disarmament programme that went on in Sierra Leone. He
16:21:47 15 took those boys with him and he was loyal to him. He
16 fought along with them for Mr Taylor, but unfortunately the
17 relationship ended in a tragic move when Mr Taylor ordered
18 the execution of Sam Bockarie, and not only Sam Bockarie,
19 Sam Bockarie's girlfriend or wife, Sam Bockarie's three
16:22:07 20 children, among them one - a three-year-old girl, and Sam
21 Bockarie's mother and then his brother, his elder brother,
22 as well as all the commanders that were with Sam Bockarie
23 at Monrovia. That was how the relation ended. One of Sam
24 Bockarie's --

16:22:29 25 Q. How do you know that Charles Taylor ordered that?

26 A. One of Sam Bockarie's smaller brothers who was the only
27 survivor of that incident is currently in Freetown and
28 that's the source of the information.

29 Q. Now, in terms of the relationship between

1 Charles Taylor and Sam Bockarie, would you characterise it
2 as an equal relationship?

3 A. It never was an equal relationship. It never was. I
4 said it was like father and son relationship, father and
16:23:00 5 son relationship in the sense that Bockarie trusted him as
6 a father. In fact that is the reason why when he send
7 Benjamin Yeaten to call him to Monrovia and took his family
8 to meet with Benjamin Yeaten, Sam Bockarie agreed to do it,
9 to meet him with Sam Bockarie. I personally knew. If he
16:23:19 10 knew that he was going to encounter that kind of tragedy, I
11 mean, he would not have responded to it. So he was - he
12 trusted Taylor to the point that I would consider him to
13 have been very, very naive because he knew the track record
14 of the kind of people he was dealing with. So he is really
16:23:39 15 naive somehow and very, very overzealous in his loyalty to
16 Mr Taylor."

17 And he goes on, in effect, to say that's why he called you
18 Papay. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That's all total nonsense. Total nonsense. The fact of
16:23:58 20 the matter is I would not deny that in the typical African sense,
21 Sam Bockarie was a boy and I did look at him as a - you can say
22 as a son. That's very - that's as African as you can get.

23 Q. I don't understand that. I'm sorry. What do you mean?

24 A. I say Sam Bockarie is a younger man, I'm an older man, I
16:24:17 25 mean, of course, you will look at somebody that young - I mean,
26 in - like a son, because I have - my first child is over 40. So
27 Sam Bockarie for me was a kid, okay. So, I mean, in that sense
28 it would be silly for someone to believe that Sam Bockarie - I
29 mean, I was not Sam Bockarie's father. And, in fact, Sam

1 Bockarie already received instructions from Foday Sankoh and,
2 I look, when Sam Bockarie - when Sankoh came home in 1999 and
3 Sankoh ordered him to disarm and he tried to refuse, I invited
4 them to Monrovia and told Sam Bockarie that he had to. That the
16:25:06 5 only leader of the RUF that the international community was
6 prepared to do business with would be Foday Sankoh.

7 On the second meeting, I was very tough, very tough on Sam
8 Bockarie.

9 Q. Now, can I interject to put this proposition: That the
16:25:25 10 only reason you were able to do that is because he was, in
11 effect, your boy in your pocket. What do you say to that?

12 A. Well, I tell you what happened. That would be total, total
13 nonsense for anybody to even suggest that. No. Sam Bockarie did
14 not have to come to Liberia. He didn't have to come to Liberia.

16:25:45 15 And don't let's forget, the strong statements that were made to
16 Sam Bockarie was not just made by Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor
17 was - and it's good that the very Obasanjo was sitting right
18 there. Obasanjo made the stronger statements. I can remember
19 Obasanjo saying, "Look, if you do - if you continue to disturb
16:26:08 20 this process, we are going to fight you. I will send - I don't
21 care how many soldiers we require, we will fight you until we
22 defeat you."

23 So Sam Bockarie did not come to Liberia because he was "my
24 son" and I was his father and because he would not listen. No.
16:26:26 25 He came to Liberia because he had been given the strongest
26 language of ECOWAS that he would have - that this process had to
27 continue. Either do it or move, and he chose to move. So that
28 statement would be total foolishness. But --

29 Q. Go on.

1 A. We see this person. We saw a film. We know. We saw a
2 film in this Court of these people with just a loud mouth and he
3 explained and said he didn't - oh, boy. Sam Bockarie was not in
4 my pocket. No, never was.

16:27:09 5 Q. And did you order his --

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I don't know if Mr Taylor
7 could answer this: About how old was Sam Bockarie, in your
8 estimation?

9 THE WITNESS: The years that I dealt with Sam Bockarie, I
10 could have put it in his early 30s. I'm not too sure of his -
11 but I would put it to around his early 30s.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. What do you base that on, Mr Taylor?

14 A. I'm just looking at the young man. I mean, I don't know
15 his date of birth. I say I'm just estimating - just looking
16 facially - that he could have been his early 30s.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, Mr President, I note the time and I was
18 going on to deal with a different topic. Would that be a
19 convenient point?

16:28:00 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think we'll adjourn now. Just
21 before we adjourn, Mr Taylor, I'll remind you of the order that
22 you're not to discuss your evidence. Next Monday is an official
23 holiday, so we will adjourn the Court until 9.30 Tuesday of next
24 week.

16:28:18 25 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.
26 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 29 September 2009
27 at 9.30 a.m.]

28
29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	29596
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	29596