



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Ruth Mary Hackler

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Thursday, 17 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.]

09:29:10 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Brenda J  
9 Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura, Christopher Santora, and Ruth Mary  
09:33:51 10 Hackler.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself Courtenay  
14 Griffiths, with me Mr Morris Anyah and Mr Isaac Ip.

09:34:06 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Taylor, I'll remind you  
16 that you are still bound by your declaration to tell the truth.  
17 Yes, Mr Griffiths.

18 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

19 [On former affirmation]

09:34:14 20 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

21 Q. Mr Taylor, for the questions that I'm about to ask you  
22 could we first of all remind ourselves of a certain context. You  
23 will recall that the case is that the RUF invaded Sierra Leone at  
24 two points. Do you recall that?

09:34:41 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Prong 1 was through Kailahun District?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Prong 2 was into Pujehun District?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. There came a time when prong 2, the incursion into Pujehun  
2 District, was repelled and they retreated back into Liberia. Do  
3 you recall that?

4 A. Yes.

09:35:08 5 Q. They eventually then made their way back through Liberia to  
6 Kailahun, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, bearing that sequence of events in mind, the witness  
9 we're looking at now says - and this is page 21359 of the  
09:35:39 10 transcript of 1 December 2008, just so that we can recap:

11 "Well, we were in Bomi Hills and then myself and the other  
12 fighters, the NPFL and all of us, that is what I'm referring to,  
13 when the ULIMO attacked us in Bomi Hills and they captured Bomi  
14 Hills from us, so from there when we retreated through the Maca  
09:36:04 15 crossing point the next place I was based was Kakata. And we  
16 were in Kakata until the time Foday Sankoh came from Liberia.  
17 When Foday Sankoh came from the front line from Liberia, that is  
18 Monrovia, he came together with Mr Taylor. That was during the  
19 Operation Octopus sometime in September 1992, something like  
09:36:29 20 that. Yes, I am sure. September during Operation Octopus."

21 Now bearing in mind the context which we've now  
22 established, firstly were you aware ever Foday Sankoh re-entering  
23 Liberia from the Kailahun axis, to borrow a phrase?

24 A. No.

09:36:53 25 Q. You joining up with him and coming to these beleaguered  
26 troops in Bomi Hills from Monrovia?

27 A. No, I'm not aware of that. And the reason I'm not aware is  
28 because it never happened. I don't see how Foday Sankoh could  
29 have entered Liberia from any point by September of 1992. I

1 don't think he would have survived.

2 Q. Why not?

3 A. Because after the break-up in May - I will say May/early  
4 June of 1992, there is no senior RUF individual or junior or  
09:37:37 5 Sankoh that had any contacts with us physically and it was  
6 impossible for Foday Sankoh to have been in Liberia by September  
7 of 1992. It is impossible.

8 Q. Very well. In any event, Mr Taylor, the witness goes on to  
9 say this, page 21361:

09:38:02 10 "Q. About how long - how much time transpired between when  
11 you left Bomi Hills and you arrived in Kakata?"

12 Because the account is that they retreat to Bomi Hills then  
13 Kakata. Do you follow me?

14 A. Yes.

09:38:18 15 Q. "Q. Approximately how much time passed?"

16 A. About a month. Because we spent some time at Maca at  
17 the crossing point that I've just explained about. We were  
18 there on defensive from Maca we went to Kakata."

19 Now, Mr Taylor, I want to pause. Bearing that time frame

09:38:41 20 of about a month in mind, so we have this situation now: This  
21 group described by the witness as bearing the name Black Kadaffa,  
22 composed of something like 90 per cent Sierra Leoneans, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Have retreated from Sierra Leone and they are present in  
09:39:03 25 Liberia in that part of Liberia for about a month or so.

26 Question: Were you aware of their presence at the time?

27 A. No, I was not aware of their presence at that time.

28 Q. But, Mr Taylor, frankly let me ask a question. How is it  
29 possible that such a force could be present in Liberia for that

1 kind of period of time without you knowing?

2 A. Well, let's look at where - it may be of interest in trying  
3 to answer this question and probably I would suppose using a map.  
4 Let's not forget where we are. The area of where this witness is  
09:39:57 5 talking about --

6 Q. Can I interrupt then, Mr Taylor. If we need a map, let's  
7 have one.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You want a map of where?

09:40:07 10 A. A map of Liberia. Yes, a map of Liberia because I want to  
11 show the areas that this man is talking about where they were  
12 supposed retreat from after Kakata.

13 Q. Very well. Remember we provided a map of Liberia which  
14 looks like this and could you change places, please, Mr Taylor,  
09:40:31 15 because this is of importance. So, Mr Taylor, what are you  
16 saying to us?

17 A. The first thing I want to do is to at this particular time  
18 - at this particular time in question let's see where are the  
19 NPFL forces at this particular time in question.

09:41:29 20 Q. We're talking about the autumn of 1992?

21 A. That is correct. The area I'm going to mark will show the  
22 area around Monrovia.

23 Q. Why have you marked that area?

24 A. I'm marking this area to show that the NPFL forces are in  
09:42:06 25 the rest of the country, but at the point of where this gentleman  
26 is talking about here, Kakata, and I will give the explanation,  
27 in order to get from Kakata to the area that this gentleman is  
28 talking about, which is on the - I think it's at the Pujehun  
29 side, that will be around - I do not know where it is in Sierra

1 Leone, but that will be somewhere - we're talking about in this  
2 general area of entry.

3 Now, there are no roads from this side of the country to  
4 get to Kakata. Monrovia is being occupied by the Government of  
09:43:03 5 Liberia and the Armed Forces of Liberia. The only way you can  
6 get to Kakata, you have to track through the bushes. You have to  
7 walk. There is no driving. There is no driving. You have to  
8 come - this is Kakata. This is Bong Mines here. I will mark  
9 those with the letters. So you have to walk - and I will tell  
09:43:30 10 what these marks mean - through the forest. This is all - there  
11 are no highways between this part of the country and this part of  
12 the country. Even when forces have to get from on this side, you  
13 have to walk through the bushes to get there.

14 So the first question I would - you know, that would come  
09:43:50 15 in my mind is: How did he get from here? And why would he have  
16 come all the way to Kakata, okay, leaving Bomi Hills, Tubmanburg  
17 here and all these areas? So it brings a question to my mind as  
18 to whether this person is even in this area. But the question  
19 that you asked, why don't I know, because, number one, we know  
09:44:15 20 that people are fighting in this area. I don't know of a  
21 retreat. But we get to find out later through intelligence that  
22 that's this group that have been formed called Black Kadaffa  
23 involving Sierra Leoneans and Liberians headed by General Degbon  
24 and others that have infiltrated their way into Bong Mines and  
09:44:38 25 into Kakata. So the purpose for these people coming all the way  
26 here was the very reason why they were arrested. That was the  
27 plan of this troop movement here. So we really don't know  
28 because there are soldiers here and there's no reason for them to  
29 have been in this Bong Mine, Kakata area.

1 Q. The reason given by the witness, Mr Taylor, is that they  
2 were fleeing in the face of an advance by ULIMO.

3 A. No. No. But ULIMO did not just come in one day and sweep  
4 an entire region of the country. They could not have been

09:45:16 5 fleeing from ULIMO, because even at this particular time, as  
6 ULIMO is advancing, all this area of Bong Mines and all of the  
7 towns in this general area are occupied by NPFL forces. So ULIMO  
8 doesn't come this way. If you listen to the testimony before  
9 this Court, where did - what did ULIMO do? They went through

09:45:39 10 Bopolu, they came through the Belle Forest and entered where?  
11 Zorzor. This is why, eventually, you see the cutoff. So all of  
12 the towns in this general area here are still occupied by the  
13 NPFL. So there was no reason to retreat to Kakata when Bong  
14 Mines was a bigger city than Kakata. There was no reason. If he

09:45:58 15 was a part of this group, they came on this clandestine mission.

16 So why did I want this map? To show that there is no road  
17 that anybody could have travelled, that he makes it look easy.

18 You know, one may think, well, they came from here and  
19 transversed through Monrovia and came to Kakata. So if they

09:46:16 20 reached to Kakata, they came through the bushes on this  
21 clandestine mission. That's why they were arrested.

22 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I wonder if the witness  
23 could show us the Maca crossing, if he is able.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:46:31 25 Q. Maca crossing, Mr Taylor?

26 A. It may not be - it may not be on this map.

27 Q. First of all, let's take it in stages. Have you heard of  
28 Maca crossing?

29 A. Well, no. I have heard of Maca. I'm not sure if there's a

1 crossing point there. But Maca - maybe if we got another map of  
2 Liberia - is in Grand Cape Mount County. Maca would be somewhere  
3 here. It's a town over here. Maca is in Grand Cape Mount  
4 County. There's not a river at Maca. We may need a different  
09:47:12 5 map to show this, but Maca is a town in Grand Cape Mount County.  
6 Would you want me to write anything on this map about why I  
7 marked it this way?

8 Q. I'm considering, Mr Taylor, because given the markings  
9 you've made, it might be somewhat difficult to provide a key to  
09:47:38 10 what it was you were indicating.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I don't know if, your Honours, I can seek  
12 some guidance here.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I can't see any possible way you could  
14 prepare a key for those markings.

09:47:52 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I can't either. But I think the point being  
16 made by the witness is quite clear, and, consequently, despite  
17 the markings, I would still ask for it to be marked for  
18 identification:

19 Q. So, Mr Taylor, what I would ask you to do, please, is to  
09:48:17 20 sign and date it.

21 A. Well, okay, I'll follow the instruction, but I think a key  
22 can be provided. But if I sign and date this, what --

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, if the witness thinks --

24 MR GRIFFITHS: [Overlapping speakers].

09:48:38 25 WITNESS: Because it will not indicate anything if I just  
26 sign and date it.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Very well. If you just take your time, Mr Taylor, and  
29 provide a key, and then after you've provided the key, then you



1 explain to us what the key shows. Okay?

2 A. Okay. Let me just - I'll make like a star. Yes. The  
3 circle, star, I'm saying here, it shows the area controlled by  
4 the GOL, the Government of Liberia, that held the only route,  
09:51:42 5 auto route from Bomi Hills to Kakata. The broken lines show the  
6 ULIMO entry into Liberia. The third one, the lines from Cape  
7 Mount County to Zorzor, shows the encirclement of Monrovia by the  
8 NPFL, and the fourth, the broken lines here, show the foot route  
9 that these individual took through Bong Mines to Kakata.

09:52:15 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just so we can understand those  
11 notations, could you insert a date?

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: That those notations were applicable?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes.

09:52:33 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: If you could put a date and signature at  
16 the bottom.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's not what I'm referring to. Just  
18 for the first notation, you say circle (star) shows area  
19 controlled by Government of Liberia.

09:52:49 20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: At what time period? That's what I'm  
22 referring to.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes. Okay, I'll just make a second key.

24 Number 1 refers to - I put here dates applied to the key at the  
09:55:22 25 left of the page, which would be this, and number 1 will be  
26 around July 1990 through May 1992. Number 2, I'll say, on or  
27 about May 1991. Number 3 and number 1 are just about the same -  
28 the same dates because number 1 referred to the encirclement and  
29 number 2 just shows the - it's about the same. Number 4, I will

1 put this to around April/May of 1992.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Right. Could you sign and date that now, please,  
4 Mr Taylor?

09:56:04 5 A. Yes.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: And whilst that's being done, Mr President,  
7 can I ask that that be marked for identification MFI-262, please.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: How would you like that described?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Map marked by defendant showing alleged  
09:56:36 10 infiltration by Black Kadaffa and surrounding events.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document then will be marked for  
12 identification MFI-262.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, could you regain your seat, please. Now,  
09:57:16 15 I'm grateful for your assistance in that regard, Mr Taylor,  
16 because it then provides a context for the next passage of  
17 testimony to which I'm going to refer. Page 21361:

18 "A. ... From Maca we went to Kakata.

19 Q. Upon your arrival in Kakata, what happened?

09:57:40 20 A. I was now in Kakata until the time the NPFL launched  
21 their Operation Octopus on Monrovia."

22 Yes?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. Now, let us just pause there and remind ourselves that the  
09:58:04 25 witness had earlier said:

26 "When ULIMO attacked us in Bomi Hills they captured Bomi  
27 Hills from there. When we retreated through the Maca crossing  
28 point the next place I was based was Kakata when Foday Sankoh  
29 came from the front line, that was during the Operation Octopus

1 sometime in September 1992."

2 He then says at page 2161 that they spent about a month in  
3 Maca and then they arrived in Kakata at the time the NPFL  
4 launched their Operation Octopus on Monrovia:

09:58:44 5 "And we were there because even though we had been there  
6 with them and we had been scattered, but some of the Black  
7 Kadaffa units were still intact, although some of its members  
8 were on the various front lines, but a part of the people within  
9 the Black Kadaffa that I'm referring to now, there was a point in  
09:59:08 10 time when we were in Kakata and Mr Taylor and Pa Sankoh, they  
11 moved from the Gbarnga area and they went to the front line going  
12 towards Monrovia. That was Echo Bravo."

13 Now remember earlier he had said that you had come with  
14 Sankoh from the front line in Liberia, that is Monrovia. Now you  
09:59:36 15 are coming from the Gbarnga area with Pa Sankoh moving towards  
16 Monrovia. Do you see that?

17 A. I see it.

18 Q. "That was Echo Bravo. And whilst Pa Sankoh was going, he  
19 left a message with C0 Lion and he asked him to assemble us  
09:59:57 20 so that he will make us go back to Sierra Leone through  
21 Kailahun to join the other RUF fighters who were in  
22 Kailahun.

23 Q. First of all, you said that Mr Taylor and Pa Sankoh  
24 moved from the Gbarnga area and they went to the front line  
10:00:15 25 going towards Monrovia. How do you know that Mr Taylor and  
26 Pa Sankoh moved from the Gbarnga area and went to the front  
27 line towards Monrovia? How do you know that?

28 A. When they moved from the Gbarnga area they came to  
29 Kakata and C0 Lion and others met the Pa, Pa Sankoh, and

1 the message that Pa Sankoh gave to C0 Lion was, because I  
2 was also on the radio there, so I was one of the persons  
3 who C0 Lion gave the message to that Pa Sankoh had given to  
4 him, he said we should prepare that message. He said if  
10:00:56 5 there was anyone amongst us, my fellow, my colleague RUF  
6 fighters around Kakata, or around that area, he said I  
7 should inform that person that Pa Sankoh said we should try  
8 and prepare ourselves to go back to Sierra Leone and he  
9 gave a date in fact. He said from the date C0 Lion gave me  
10:01:17 10 that message he gave us two days to assemble ourselves and  
11 from that time almost everybody was now coming on board.  
12 Those of us, the RUF fighters, all of us were now coming  
13 to assemble around the police station where the NPFL police  
14 station was. That is on the highway in Kakata. That was  
10:01:37 15 where every one of us came because at any time Pa Sankoh  
16 would come everybody would be able to see him.

17 Q. Mr Witness, remember the original question I asked you  
18 was how you know Sankoh - Foday Sankoh, Pa Sankoh, and  
19 Mr Taylor went towards Monrovia towards the front line.  
10:01:59 20 That is what I asked you. How do you know that?

21 A. It was Mr Lion, Mr Alan Blamo, The Lion, he told me."  
22 Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, did you come from Monrovia  
23 with Pa Sankoh at this time?

24 A. No.

10:02:18 25 Q. Did you come from Gbarnga towards Monrovia at this time?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Were you in company with Pa Sankoh at this time?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Now help us. Was there a NPFL police station in Kakata?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Was it on the main highway?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, according to this witness, these men, these  
10:02:48 5 combatants, Black Kadaffa, were told by Pa Sankoh to assemble at  
6 a NPFL police station. Do you follow me?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Question therefore: How could such a thing happen without  
9 your NPFL police based at that police station informing you? Do  
10:03:12 10 you get me?

11 A. It didn't happen and if such a thing had happened it would  
12 not - the police would not have been able to inform me. I was  
13 just not an ordinary person. But, you know, as I'm listening,  
14 your Honours, to this testimony the only way I can answer this  
10:03:28 15 question is to put forward a proposition. Look, this particular  
16 person here appears to really, really be confused. And my  
17 proposition is if he is talking about the assembly of RUF  
18 individuals to leave Liberia or to go back in any case, my  
19 proposition would be that he must be talking about months  
10:04:01 20 earlier. Because when this conflict occurred between the RUF and  
21 the NPFL in May of 1992, all RUF individuals that were in Liberia  
22 packed up and they had to leave. Now, my proposition is that  
23 he's got it all mixed up and that if he is talking about this  
24 time NPFL - I mean RUF individuals were packed up and they left  
10:04:32 25 for their own safety out of Liberia in May of 1992 after Top 20,  
26 Top 40 and Top Final.

27 So I see this as the first confusion in his mind that I'm  
28 giving this proposition that he must be talking about this time.  
29 He reminds me of a typical - and this would not be unusual. For

1 a Sierra Leonean who may have been in that general area to be  
2 around Kakata or if he was in the Cape Mount, Bomi area to come  
3 to Kakata as an individual, but I can't see him as being a part  
4 of any organised force in Kakata at that time.

10:05:11 5 But even a third - a third situation that we have to look  
6 at. The most educated I would say amongst the RUF officials or  
7 former officials that appeared before this Court who are  
8 protected, all of them - the name I wrote on this paper, the last  
9 that I really - one of the top academics, every one that have  
10:05:41 10 come of any importance that had the capacity to say so many  
11 things all have said to this Court that all ties between the NPFL  
12 and the RUF were severed in May of 1992. Now, for this man to  
13 come and say that Sankoh - Foday Sankoh is in Liberia in  
14 September of 1992 is just incredible. It did not happen and he  
10:06:11 15 has got it mixed up. It just didn't - it is not possible. It is  
16 outrageous for him to say this and I would just propose that he's  
17 got the time all mixed up.

18 The evacuation of RUF from Liberia occurred in May. I've  
19 said that to this Court. Their own senior witnesses have said  
10:06:32 20 this to this Court.

21 So the reason why I didn't know, in direct answer to your  
22 question, because it didn't happen as he explained it here. It  
23 just didn't happen. I'm coming from Monrovia first with Sankoh  
24 and Sankoh - what would Sankoh be going to Monrovia with me? And  
10:06:52 25 even - even for the period - the period between August of 1998  
26 through - I mean, excuse me, of 1991 through May of 1992 when  
27 Foday Sankoh did come to Gbarnga, there's not one indication that  
28 Foday Sankoh and I are riding together or are talking together.  
29 All witnesses that have come here have told this Court

1 Foday Sankoh came to Gbarnga. He went to the executive ground to  
2 see me and he left. There is no comradery going on between  
3 Sankoh and myself even during the time that he is coming of us  
4 riding together and going up together. It didn't happen. Sankoh  
10:07:38 5 and --

6 Q. Hold that thought, Mr Taylor. You say you weren't riding  
7 around with him. That's not what this witness is telling us.  
8 Let's have a look at another passage. Page 21364 for 1 December  
9 2008. Listen to this. Remember, he's already got you coming  
10:07:58 10 from Monrovia with Pa Sankoh and going to Monrovia with Pa  
11 Sankoh. You understand that?

12 A. Yes. Yes.

13 Q. At or around the same time, but he goes on to say this,  
14 page 21364:

10:08:15 15 "Q. What specifically did the message say, the message  
16 that he said he got from CO Lion?

17 A. The message said we should prepare to go back to Sierra  
18 Leone through Kailahun to go and join our colleague RUF  
19 fighters in Kailahun.

10:08:32 20 Q. Okay. Originally this question was about you leaving  
21 Liberia and you have said now that you have reached this  
22 location Kakata. Now you've described the message that CO  
23 Lion sent about having Sierra Leoneans go back to Sierra  
24 Leone. Is that correct?

10:08:50 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. After this message was transmitted by CO Lion what  
27 happened?

28 A. Well, two days after that Pa Sankoh came to Kakata.  
29 And fortunately enough he met a good number of us around

1 the police - I mean the MP headquarters in Kakata. He came  
2 in convoy with Mr Taylor. He alighted and spoke to us  
3 briefly but Mr Taylor did not talk to us. He was still  
4 seated in his own vehicle. Mr Taylor did not alight. He  
10:09:30 5 was still seated in his own vehicle - his own jeep, the  
6 glass - the windscreens were up when Pa Sankoh alighted and  
7 came and spoke to us. He said, 'My children, my brothers,  
8 my sisters, all of us now know what the struggle is all  
9 about.' He said, 'You should prepare.' And he  
10:09:49 10 Foday Sankoh was now saying he was going to Gbarnga and on  
11 arriving there he said he was going to send a vehicle or a  
12 truck to pick us up from Kakata. Indeed, when he went he  
13 sent the truck.

14 Q. Who sent the truck?

10:10:04 15 A. Foday Sankoh."

16 Jumping a few lines:

17 "Q. How do you know the individual in the vehicle was  
18 Mr Taylor?

19 A. It was CO Lion who told me.

10:10:14 20 Q. Was that the first time you ever saw Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes."

22 Now, Mr Taylor, you see what's being said there, don't you?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What do you say about it?

10:10:29 25 A. It's totally, totally untrue. Sankoh and myself could have  
26 never - in fact during even the time he was permitted in Liberia  
27 we never rode in any vehicle together even in Gbarnga. Never.  
28 So this whole fantasy of Sankoh being in Liberia in September of  
29 1992 is totally, totally erroneous. Totally.



1 Q. He goes on to say, just to complete the sequence of events,  
2 that Sankoh did indeed send a truck to pick them up. And that  
3 truck - it was a big - a large sized three wiper Toyota truck.  
4 This is page 21366 of the transcript. The truck arrived and they  
10:11:23 5 were taken to Gbarnga. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

6 A. I'm not aware of any such thing happening. I'm saying that  
7 if this evacuation - if this witness is proposing that this  
8 evacuation of Sierra Leoneans occurred in or around May of 1992,  
9 I would give it some credence, because after this fallout Sierra  
10:11:51 10 Leoneans that Sankoh had in Gbarnga, that thing was severed and  
11 they packed up and they left. But there is no way that this -  
12 this evacuation of Sierra Leoneans from Liberia is occurring in  
13 September. It did --

14 Q. No, he says that eventually they make it back to Sierra  
10:12:10 15 Leone by November 1992?

16 A. Yeah, but even - if they didn't make it out in September  
17 they could not have made it out in November. They are not there.  
18 If Sankoh was there in September that's a miracle, and for Sierra  
19 Leoneans soldiers whatever to be in Liberia by November 1992  
10:12:35 20 that's even a bigger miracle because there was so much anger  
21 between these two groups because I was angry. I was not talking  
22 to Sankoh. And most of the people we are talking about, their  
23 brothers and their relatives got killed in that Top 20, Top Final  
24 thing and people were angry, and we're talking about something  
10:12:57 25 that happened in May. By September, October, November, there  
26 would still be Sierra Leonean soldiers hanging around in Liberia?  
27 It's impossible. Impossible.

28 Q. Well, it doesn't end there, Mr Taylor, according to this  
29 witness. So let me test you with this, because the witness goes

1 on to say this, page 21383 of the transcript: That having  
2 returned to Sierra Leone by November 1992, in the middle of 1993,  
3 he moves to Kailahun Town where he is working as the control  
4 station commander in Kailahun Town.

10:13:37 5 And then he says this, page 21384: "I used to receive  
6 instructions from Foday Sankoh" - this is why mid-1993 in  
7 Kailahun - "to contact the various front lines to inquire about  
8 situations. I was also receiving reports from the various front  
9 lines and passing them on to Pa Sankoh."

10:14:04 10 Then this: "I was equally contacting Liberia, like  
11 Treetop, to send messages from Pa Sankoh to Mr Taylor. Those  
12 were my duties, you know, in Kailahun Town; communication purely  
13 in Kailahun Town at that time."

14 Mid-1993, Mr Taylor, you're still in contact?

10:14:25 15 A. Total nonsense. Never happened. Never happened.

16 Q. And he goes further and embellishes it in this way, line  
17 24, page 31384:

18 "A. Well, we were fighting a war. Every morning when I  
19 opened the transmission I would check - I would call the various  
10:15:00 20 call signs within the liberated zones to get morning reports from  
21 all of them. Then I used to go to the Liberian radio net to  
22 contact Treetop to know if they've got any information - I mean  
23 if Treetop, their father, who was Mr Taylor, if he had anything  
24 for us, any message for Pa Sankoh."

10:15:28 25 What do you say about that?

26 A. Total nonsense. Total nonsense. I don't know - you know,  
27 again, in being - in being fair to some of these radio operators  
28 that are being led down this road, I would not --

29 Q. What do you mean "led down this road"?

1 A. Well, because they are all saying the same bunch of lies  
2 that are impossible. We had the first one, King Perry, that  
3 talked about contacts. We have the senior people saying that  
4 contacts were severed. But look at, you know, after it had been  
10:16:07 5 firmly established that there is no physical contact, I guess the  
6 other thing to do is to make sure that there is radio contact.  
7 Everyone is coming, talking about radio contacts.

8 Now, to be fair, as I have to be in this case, with the  
9 time that the RUF and the NPFL people are together, and I'm  
10:16:26 10 speaking specifically about August '91 through May '92, I don't  
11 doubt that some of these operators established friendship and it  
12 would not be out of the ordinary for an RUF operator who knows an  
13 NPFL operator at one station or another to call. I don't put  
14 this past them. You may have a friendship that you could have  
10:16:58 15 developed, you go to another frequency and you talk or what. But  
16 at my level, the defence level and the NPFL hierarchy level,  
17 there was no way that my radio operator, Butterfly, would have  
18 ever received, okay, any radio message from Foday Sankoh. He  
19 would have not.

10:17:17 20 Because, in fact, let's go back. Butterfly, my radio  
21 operator, is a Special Force who is in Libya, and - so while  
22 Foday Sankoh is coming to Liberia, there is another thing that is  
23 important, and the Gambians like, you know, like a Butterfly and  
24 others, were not looking at Foday Sankoh - when Foday Sankoh came  
10:17:41 25 to me in Gbarnga, he did not hang out with me as a colleague  
26 where he came and had dinner with me. Because, as far as I was  
27 concerned, Foday Sankoh, if he had any friends, they were Special  
28 Forces. Those were his people that he hang out with in Gbarnga.  
29 There is no way - no witness has come here and said, "Oh, he went

1 to have dinner with Mr Taylor." He came, he saw me, he left. So  
2 if Foday Sankoh wandered around Gbarnga, he went out with his  
3 colleagues, with other Special Forces.

4 So this type of situation that this man is explaining here,  
10:18:15 5 in fairness, I would not dispute any part of any of their  
6 testimony where they say that they are calling some radio  
7 operators in Liberia and chatting. That one I wouldn't put it  
8 past these people, once they know each other. But at the  
9 official level, and if I had known that any - any senior NPFL  
10:18:36 10 operator was in contact with Foday Sankoh, he would have never  
11 been an operator again. He would have been removed and punished.  
12 There were no official contacts between Foday Sankoh and myself.  
13 There were no official contacts between Foday Sankoh and my  
14 Defence Minister or any senior NPFL personnel. And so --

10:18:53 15 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, sorry to interrupt you.

16 A. -- it just didn't happen.

17 Q. And, you know, let me see if, in light of that answer, any  
18 or any senior NPFL personnel, how senior was General Anthony  
19 Mekunagbe?

10:19:19 20 A. Oh, was a soldier, yes. General Mekunagbe --

21 Q. No, no. Question: How senior was he? Would you describe  
22 him as a senior NPFL personnel?

23 A. Well, no. I would describe him as a middle level NPFL  
24 personnel.

10:19:38 25 Q. I'll tell you why I ask. Page 21385, in the same answer  
26 the witness says this:

27 "Like in Liberia, for instance, I can remember that Pa  
28 Sankoh used to tell me to contact General Anthony Mekunagbe and  
29 one - there was an SSS Cobra commander, whose name I cannot

1 recall, he used to call him to tell him - to ask him for  
2 ammunition, to tell him to send ammunition or logistics. Those  
3 were part of my duties in Kailahun?"

4 So what do you say about that?

10:20:10 5 A. I would not dispute this, that Foday Sankoh would ask  
6 somebody during that period to contact Mekunagbe. I would not  
7 dispute. It's possible and I will even say even probable because  
8 based on what - and I'm talking about after the fact now. Based  
9 on what information we receive as to Mekunagbe's own activities  
10:20:44 10 with Foday Sankoh that led to the training and attack in Sierra  
11 Leone, this was his principal - it was one of his principal  
12 contacts throughout the place and we got this information after  
13 the arrest of Mekunagbe. So it doesn't surprise me. It doesn't  
14 surprise me.

10:21:05 15 Q. Now, SSS Cobra, ring a bell?

16 A. There isn't - there is no unit that I know in the NPFL  
17 called SSS Cobra. This could be Cobra - Cobra is a code name  
18 that I think one of the generals used.

19 Q. All right. Did you have a general with a first name  
10:21:31 20 Cassius?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Who?

23 A. Cassius Jacob.

24 Q. What was his call sign? Cobra?

10:21:43 25 A. No, Cassius was not Cobra. I will help later on as we go  
26 along. I cannot remember it, but he was not Cobra, no. Cassius  
27 was not Cobra.

28 Q. Let me tell you why I ask, same page:

29 "Q. In the very last sentence you said he used to call him

1 to tell him, to ask him for ammunition. To tell him to  
2 send ammunition. Who --

3 A. Mr Sankoh used to tell me to contact the SS Cobra  
4 director at the time to send ammunition for him and at the  
10:22:19 5 same time he used to tell me to contact Treetop saying that  
6 we needed ammunition, that we were going through strains  
7 for ammunition, for Treetop to pass the message to  
8 Mr Taylor. To 'him' there is the man's name that I cannot  
9 recall, that SS Cobra commander. Something like - maybe  
10:22:38 10 I'll recall with time. Something like Cassius - Cassius  
11 something. But really, I cannot recall his name anyway."  
12 Cassius Jacob, a contact?

13 A. Yeah. No. In fact - in fact, I can say categorically it  
14 could not have been a Cassius Jacob. At this time, and we're  
10:23:00 15 talking about, what, 1992, am I --

16 Q. '93, mid-1993, the witness says he is in Kailahun at the  
17 control station.

18 A. No, but by this particular time, Cassius Jacob is not any -  
19 he is not, I will call it, a real - a senior commander in the  
10:23:19 20 NPFL at this time. Cassius Jacob is not a Special Forces. He is  
21 trained and he's very junior, so he doesn't take up any serious  
22 command responsibility until I will say the beginning of 1994.  
23 So it would not be Cassius.

24 Q. But, interestingly, you notice, now in this answer, in  
10:23:42 25 addition to Anthony Mekunagbe, which contact you may be prepared  
26 to concede, here he is saying he's contacting Treetop. And you  
27 explained to us yesterday, Treetop is the command control centre,  
28 right?

29 A. Of the Defence Ministry, yes.

1 Q. So he is saying there's contact with Treetop as well. What  
2 do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

3 A. I'm not in a position - it could very well be true, but  
4 that contact at Treetop, may be there's an operator on that he  
10:24:16 5 knows. I would not - I'm not in position to categorically say  
6 that he is telling a lie here because it depends on who is on  
7 duty and who - maybe it could be one of his friends that he is  
8 talking to.

9 Q. But, Mr Taylor, he goes on to say, page 21386:

10:24:40 10 "Q. How often were you in communication with the station  
11 Treetop?

12 A. It was daily. Sometimes if we were under enemy  
13 pressure, enemy pressure for instance we the RUF, when I  
14 would have informed Treetop they often contacted us - I  
10:24:55 15 mean, Treetop used to contact us often to know how best we  
16 were doing in repelling such attacks."

17 So he is describing two-way communication between Treetop,  
18 the command control centre attached to your Ministry of Defence,  
19 and the RUF in mid-1993 on a daily basis.

10:25:20 20 A. No, I wouldn't - I would not want to believe that even if -  
21 you know, when these people are speaking - and I know this is a  
22 legal situation. When these boys are speaking, we have to try to  
23 see if we can get into some of their heads to see what they are  
24 talking about. Number one, he cannot be in daily contact  
10:25:40 25 with Treetop. And when we're talking about Treetop, we're not  
26 talking about an individual. We're talking about a station with  
27 many, many operators.

28 So I'm saying that if this boy knows an operator that is on  
29 duty at a particular time and calls and speaks to him, this I am

1 in no position to say he is lying. Maybe he did talk to  
2 somebody. Now - but Treetop is just a radio station with many  
3 operators that are running three, four shifts with at least three  
4 operators or four on every shift. So if he knows somebody there  
10:26:18 5 he is talking about - but then again, as he explains this, let's  
6 look at the time. He is saying mid-1993. Mid-1993. But if we  
7 look at mid-1993 we must remind ourselves of one important thing:  
8 Even if he is getting material or he wants to get material, how  
9 is he going to get it by mid-1993? How is he going to get it?  
10:26:47 10 Where is he going to pass to get it in mid-1993? Where?

11 So this is how they confuse themselves. He cannot be  
12 talking about mid-1993 because by August of 1993 ULIMO has full  
13 control of Lofa. Where is he passing? Where? Where is he  
14 passing with this material? So I'm saying they are getting it  
10:27:14 15 mixed up. I mean he has got this thing totally wrong. Okay,  
16 let's say somebody is in NPFL area that is telling him come.  
17 Where is he going to pass to get it? So he cannot be talking  
18 about this period. And sometimes this is the way they mix up the  
19 dates and try to tie in information.

10:27:37 20 Well, if he is getting let's say even on the incident again  
21 with Mekunagbe, where does he meet - which Mekunagbe is he  
22 calling in mid-1993? The ghost Mekunagbe? Which Mekunagbe is he  
23 calling? Black Kadaffa and these people have this problem in  
24 late 1992. Remember he talks here about Operation Octopus. This  
10:28:05 25 happens around the time that we have this issue with the Black  
26 Kadaffa. These people are arrested, they are tried. This Court  
27 knows that we've admitted that people were executed Mekunagbe me  
28 died in jail. What Mekunagbe is he calling in 1993 except he is  
29 calling a ghost Mekunagbe.



1           So I'm trying to say that these boys being able to - if  
2 you've got a friend over in the NPFL area that you call and say,  
3 "Oh, my man, you know, how are things?" And these boys talk a  
4 lot on these radios, you understand me, and this is why when they  
10:28:42 5 get ready to talk they will leave the national frequency and they  
6 probably go to many, many hundreds of other frequencies because  
7 that frequency Treetop doesn't change. So you can call somebody  
8 and say, "Go to this frequency, I want to talk to you" that you  
9 do not interrupt the line. But this boy is lying. If he is  
10:29:02 10 calling Mekunagbe then he called him from the grave. There is no  
11 way that this is happening in mid-1993.

12 Q.       When is Mekunagbe executed?

13           JUDGE DOHERTY: I understood the witness to say he died in  
14 jail.

10:29:21 15           MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q.       When did Mekunagbe die?

17 A.       He died in jail. At about the beginning of 1993 he is  
18 incarcerated - late 1992. He dies in jail. He is not one of  
19 those that is executed, but he dies with this process.

10:29:35 20 Q.       He dies in jail at what time?

21 A.       I would say the beginning of 1993.

22 Q.       You are speaking of the impossibility of providing these  
23 supplies at this time. We'll come to that in a moment. But just  
24 to paint the full picture before we come to that the witness goes  
10:29:59 25 on to say this in answer to this question:

26           "Q. In terms of this ammunition messages, how often did  
27 these occur whilst you were in Kailahun?

28 A.       While I was in Kailahun almost every week I would  
29 send message pertaining to ammunition. Sometimes when the

1 pressure would have mounted from the Sierra Leone Army,  
2 almost every day I would still remind them. Sometimes they  
3 would send the ammunition. We would be in Kailahun and the  
4 ammunition would arrive.

10:30:32 5 Q. How do you know that?

6 A. When the ammunition - before the ammunition arrives a  
7 message would be sent. Like the Treetop would send a  
8 message that we should expect, or Cassius something, that  
9 SS Cobra director at the time, and when the ammunition

10:30:49 10 reaches us in Kailahun the Pa would tell me to inform

11 Treetop that the Pa, meaning Pa Sankoh, would tell me to  
12 inform Treetop that he has received the consignment.

13 Q. Do you have any information as to which route this  
14 ammunition arrived from?

10:31:06 15 A. Yes. It came most often from Gbarnga." Mid-1993 I  
16 remind you. "Gbarnga through Zorzor, Voinjama, from  
17 Voinjama to Foya and then to Sierra Leone. It was - and at  
18 any time the ammunition arrived the Pa used to give me  
19 instructions to send to the front lines to call up some of  
10:31:26 20 those commanders, the front line commanders, the target  
21 commanders, to come and receive their ammunition.

22 Sometimes he will tell me to send a message to CO Rashid -  
23 I mean The Lion. Sometimes The Lion will tell me to call  
24 CO Rashid to come and received the ammunition.

10:31:45 25 Q. How do you know that this was the route? The route  
26 you've described from Gbarnga through Zorzor, Voinjama, how  
27 do you know this was the route?

28 A. There was radio communication and when those men - and  
29 when everybody was escorting the ammunition at that time

1           they will inform us in the RUF, in the RUF controlled  
2           areas. They would inform me that they had arrived at a  
3           particular destination.

4           Q. Like?

10:32:12 5           A. I can recall there was a time when one Kennedy who was  
6           a Vanguard who travelled with some materials from Gbarnga,  
7           when he met us in Kailahun. Sometimes the Pa would send  
8           Domingo and others, his bodyguards, and Jungle, Colonel  
9           Jungle was the person who did those things at the time and  
10:32:28 10          I was there with Pa Sankoh."

11          Now he is saying mid-1993 whilst he in Kailahun these  
12          messages are passing backwards and forwards between Cassius,  
13          Mekunagbe and Treetop asking for ammunition on a weekly,  
14          sometimes a daily basis, and it's coming via from Gbarnga, it  
10:33:02 15          would appear by road, to Sierra Leone. What do you say about  
16          that, Mr Taylor?

17          A. Oh, boy. I swear. It is so big a lie. I don't - you  
18          know, all I can say here, it's a lie. I will just be repeating  
19          myself. I think this Court is aware now of the dates that we've  
10:33:23 20          talked about. I don't want to just sound like a broken record  
21          here. Because this particular boy here that is talking this  
22          thing, he doesn't know what he is talking. He cannot know what  
23          he is talking about mid-1993. But maybe in helping the Court we  
24          may have to get maybe Varmuyan Sheriff's testimony and some of the  
10:33:49 25          others.

26          Q. We'll come to him.

27          A. And how they place the dates of the occupation because when  
28          we talk about ULIMO's activities in Lofa, while they take full  
29          control by August of 19 - by at least August of 1993, I would say

1 the fighting in the area is so intense and dangerous, but the  
2 full control is as of this time.

3 So for this man to be talking about what Foday Sankoh -  
4 Foday Sankoh who had complained as early as May of 1992 of the  
10:34:32 5 insufficiency of material and the little bits and pieces here.  
6 The break-up has occurred way back in 1992. Senior individuals  
7 and their academics have come here and have told this Court that  
8 contacts were severed, physical contact and otherwise.

9 This man now comes and says way down in 1993, this is at  
10:35:01 10 least a year later, because between May of 1992 to September,  
11 October, November 1993 it's more than a year, he's got material  
12 passing through. This is simply a lie.

13 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let me help you as best I can with the  
14 time frame given by the witness for these movements. You  
10:35:26 15 remember in an earlier passage he said he arrived in Kailahun in  
16 mid-1993, yes?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. From there he told the Court that he then moved with Pa  
19 Sankoh to Sandeyalu and he was there in Sandeyalu until late  
10:35:44 20 1993. He then went to Koindu with Pa Sankoh and he was in  
21 Koindu, page 21393, up to December 1993. That's lines 13 to 17  
22 on page 21393. So he is in Koindu. He arrives in Koindu and he  
23 is in Koindu until December 1993. Bear that date in mind.

24 "Q. After your next basing --

10:36:26 25 A. Well, from Koindu, we stayed in Koindu until the enemy  
26 pressurised us and cut off our supply routes."

27 Line 20:

28 "Then we were in Koindu when Pa Sankoh told me to contact.  
29 That is before we left Koindu I contacted Treetop to contact

1 Mr Taylor for him to do whatever he could to send ammunition for  
2 us through the jungle. "

3 Do you follow me?

4 A. Uh-huh.

10:37:01 5 Q. Because they had been cut off. Do you follow?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. So he is now contacting Treetop for you to send ammunition  
8 for us through the jungle.

9 "Wherein other people from the RUF could go to receive  
10:37:19 10 them. I even contacted. There was even a dialogue directly  
11 between Mr Taylor and Foday Sankoh at that time, and that was  
12 really the first time that I saw - that I overheard the two of  
13 them directly speaking on the radio, on the VHF radio, whereby  
14 Mr Sankoh sent some options. "

10:37:46 15 Do you follow that?

16 A. I follow that.

17 Q. So after the supply routes are cut, one assumes in light of  
18 what we know by ULIMO, there is this request for the supplies to  
19 continue through the jungle and you, Charles Ghankay Taylor,  
10:38:06 20 according to this witness, was in direct conversation with  
21 Foday Sankoh at the end of 1993. What do you say about that?

22 A. I say that's a direct lie. Period.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, he goes on. The dialogue, that is the  
24 conversation you had with Mr Sankoh, he goes on to describe in  
10:38:37 25 this way at page 21394, line 12:

26 "The dialogue was based on so that Mr Taylor could send  
27 ammunition for us because, you know, the enemy had really  
28 pressurised us. The SLAs and the ULIMO too were pressurising us.  
29 So Mr Taylor even suggested to Pa Sankoh that he should see if

1 there was any way that Mr Taylor could ensure that a chopper,  
2 that is a helicopter, picks up Pa Sankoh from Koindu or the area  
3 that Pa Sankoh would identify. Then Pa Sankoh said that was not  
4 a good option for him. He said if he goes out of Sierra Leone,  
10:39:24 5 that the RUF would go in disarray at that time."

6 You do understand that, don't you?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. They are cut off. You're having this direct conversation  
9 with him, "Well, listen, Pa Sankoh, tell you what I'll do, my  
10:39:41 10 brother. I will send this helicopter to go and fetch you." Did  
11 anything of the like happen, Mr Taylor?

12 A. The NPFL never, ever had a helicopter. No such thing  
13 happened. Helicopter? Never. Never.

14 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let us examine all the possibilities  
10:40:03 15 because you will recall that you described certain things that  
16 you said to him in that letter of May 1992 as diplomacy,  
17 diplomacy involving at times an element of deception. Was there  
18 an element of --

19 A. Something that I said to him or he said to me?

10:40:26 20 Q. No, that you said in your response to his letter. Do you  
21 remember?

22 A. Okay. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Let's not forget, shall we. So help me, was this a bit of  
24 diplomacy?

10:40:40 25 A. No.

26 Q. Even though you didn't have a helicopter you were  
27 suggesting you did have one just to keep him quiet?

28 A. No, there was no such thing. There was no such discussion  
29 and so there could not have been any diplomatic language. I was

1 just not in contact with Sankoh since our last conversation in  
2 about May/early June of 1992. No.

3 Q. But the witness goes on:

4 "Q. How do you know that it was Mr Taylor communicating  
10:41:14 5 directly on the radio?

6 A. I contacted his radio station, Mr Taylor's radio  
7 station. Butterfly I suggest. It was I who suggested the  
8 dialogue from Lion. I mean at that time from Toyota to  
9 Ebony that Toyota would want to talk to Ebony on a very  
10:41:36 10 important issue. So I mounted pressure until Treetop took  
11 it up and he was finally able to get Mr Taylor to come to  
12 the radio to talk to his brother, the late Sankoh,  
13 directly. I conducted the dialogue. I overheard them  
14 speaking.

10:41:58 15 Q. Was there any other time you heard directly Mr Taylor  
16 communicating with Mr Sankoh?

17 A. I cannot remember that. I cannot remember that. I  
18 cannot remember that. During my regime with Foday Sankoh I  
19 cannot remember that any more."

10:42:16 20 So what the witness is asking these judges to accept, this  
21 is a conversation which sticks in his mind. It's the first time  
22 he's heard the two of you speak directly. He is able to put a  
23 date on it. He is able to further embellish it by suggesting  
24 that mention was made --

10:42:46 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

26 MS HOLLIS: I have an objection to the use of the word  
27 "embellish". This is the second time counsel has done that.  
28 That is comment. That is not question. "Embellish" certainly  
29 has negative connotations.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

2 Q. He adds the detail that a chopper was involved. Now, help  
3 me, what do you say about that? Are you still saying the man is  
4 lying?

10:43:01 5 A. The man is blatantly lying. There is no such - look, if I  
6 Charles Ghankay Taylor, following the conflict with Sankoh where  
7 some of my good boys died, had any further radio contact, not  
8 even me personally, because Charles Taylor, from the NPFL days  
9 through my presidency, getting on a two-way radio that every Tom,  
10:43:32 10 Dick and Harry anywhere in the world can listen to was a no, no.  
11 I knew better than that. But for this boy to get up and say that  
12 I am in contact with Sankoh and even speaking to him personally,  
13 he is lying. If it had happened, I would have sat here and told  
14 this Court, "Yeah, after Sankoh left, there was no - we couldn't  
10:43:56 15 help him, but I spoke to him from time to time." I would say  
16 that.

17 There was no contact with Foday Sankoh by this individual  
18 and that remained that way until I saw Sankoh in 1999 July in  
19 Lome. Never spoke to him. He never tried to make any contacts  
10:44:18 20 with me himself, with all the opportunities he had. I say it to  
21 these judges: I Charles Ghankay Taylor never talked to Sankoh  
22 after May of 1992. I did not.

23 Now, I don't care how many of these little liars come up  
24 and say this. I don't know how they constructed this, but it did  
10:44:40 25 not happen after that time. If it had, I would have said, "Yes,  
26 I spoke to Sankoh. There was no harm in speaking to Sankoh, so I  
27 spoke to him." I didn't. Period. I didn't.

28 Q. Very well. Let's move on from those suggestions and let us  
29 now deal with another topic mentioned by this witness. Page



1 21432, testimony of 2 December 2008, line 16:

2 "Q. Mr Witness, you also said that some of the contents of  
3 these communications while you were in Kenema concerned  
4 logistics. To your knowledge, how was the AFRC, RUF" -  
10:45:36 5 note - "receiving supplies at this time?"

6 A. Well, I recall that there was a point in time whilst we  
7 were in Kenema, it was in late 1997."

8 Do you follow, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes.

10:45:55 10 Q. So you've been elected President. You're a few months into  
11 the job, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "A. ... there was one Memunatu Deen who was a radio  
14 operator - a field radio operator - for the RUF and one  
10:46:12 15 Fonti Kanu who is now a late man. He was the battalion  
16 commander for Daru. They travelled to Monrovia - no,  
17 wrong, wrong, I want to say Liberia. They travelled to  
18 Liberia, Fonti and Memuna, and they went and they brought  
19 with them some ammunition. They brought some ammunition."

10:46:36 20 Pause. Firstly, does the name Memunatu Deen mean anything  
21 to you?

22 A. I have heard the name. I have heard the name.

23 Q. When?

24 A. Here. I've heard the name here in this Court.

10:46:48 25 Q. Whilst President of Liberia, did you know of that name?

26 A. No, I did not know of Memunatu. No.

27 Q. What about Fonti Kanu?

28 A. No, didn't know Fonti Kanu.

29 Q. You appreciate that what is here being suggested is that in

1 Late 1997 those two individuals went to Liberia and returned with  
2 ammunition. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Well, it is untrue, and I guess as we go further we will  
4 get to know how untrue it is. Because we're talking about late  
10:47:33 5 1997, the AFRC is in power in Freetown and we're still talking  
6 about the very infancy of my presidency where we don't have  
7 materials. I don't know how this material business will come for  
8 anybody called Fonti Kanu, that will come. If I know the RUF and  
9 don't know - and don't know this Fonti Kanu, whoever he is, but  
10:48:09 10 there was no material that will come from Liberia in late 1997 to  
11 go to anybody. That's not true.

12 Q. Now, late 1997, Mr Taylor - now, you recall a letter from  
13 Johnny Paul Koroma following the coup in May of 1997 requesting  
14 materials from you. Remember?

10:48:37 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Did you decide to meet that request?

17 A. No, I never - we never even - we never even - I never even  
18 responded to Johnny Paul Koroma's letter. In fact, Johnny Paul  
19 Koroma did more than that. He sent a delegation that I did not  
10:48:55 20 see. No.

21 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, of course, according to this same witness,  
22 you've been in contact over the years by radio with the RUF in  
23 Sierra Leone, haven't you, from Treetop?

24 A. But that is not true. That is not true.

10:49:17 25 Q. Yes. But that is what he is suggesting.

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. But in 1997, Johnny Paul Koroma, after coming to Pa,  
28 inviting the RUF to join them, writes you a letter. What do you  
29 say about that?

1 A. Well, you know, what makes this so - what I'll call  
2 illogical - Johnny Paul Koroma comes to power. The RUF joins  
3 Johnny Paul Koroma. They are together. From evidence before  
4 this Court, Sam Bockarie goes to Freetown. They have senior  
10:50:05 5 members. They have a council. Johnny Paul Koroma - I'm in radio  
6 contact now with the RUF.

7 Q. Over the years.

8 A. Over the years. Why would Johnny Paul Koroma have to write  
9 me a letter for ammunition? Why? Why would Johnny Paul Koroma  
10:50:24 10 have to write me a letter for ammunition? He is sitting in this  
11 council meeting with the RUF most senior man that I'm supposed to  
12 be in contact with, Sam Bockarie and all of them. Isn't it  
13 easier for somebody in the RUF to say to them in council meeting,  
14 "No, no, no, no, no, don't write Mr Taylor. We know the man.

10:50:47 15 We're in contact with him. We'll call on the radio and settle  
16 this matter"? Why is he writing me? Why is he writing me if I'm  
17 in contact with the RUF? Why? There's no point to write.

18 The fact is, I am not in contact with them at this  
19 particular time. And in trying to make contact, Johnny Paul  
10:51:09 20 Koroma writes. Because for me, I mean, if you're thinking  
21 logically, which I'm sure these people are not thinking in  
22 putting this - maybe in a hurry putting this lie together, why  
23 somebody wouldn't just say to them, "No, don't write him. Get on  
24 the radio. Call Treetop" - if there is a Treetop any more -  
10:51:26 25 "call Treetop and say we want to get to him, or call some of our  
26 old contacts"?

27 Look, my people, I don't know what to say again. I'm not  
28 in contact with the RUF over this period of time they are talking  
29 about at all. And, yes, Johnny Paul Koroma did write I think in

1 trying to establish some contact that I did not respond to in  
2 1997. He sends a delegation to Monrovia. That evidence is  
3 before this Court by a witness whose name was here - by that  
4 witness whose name I wrote on the paper. I did not see them.

10:52:04 5 At this particular time, what is going on in late 1997?  
6 ECOWAS is putting pressure on the junta to turn over power to  
7 Tejan Kabbah. You understand me? And by late 1997, I can  
8 remember after the foreign ministers' meeting where the  
9 information is reached that the AFRC have no intention of turning  
10:52:29 10 power over, that it should have turned over in April 1998, a  
11 decision is taken through consultations that force will have to  
12 be used.

13 So these boys do not know and they are stuck in a situation  
14 where they have to say something. There is no contact between  
10:52:49 15 the RUF and the NPFL as of May 1992 and it does not resume at  
16 this particular time. It only starts again in July 1999 when I  
17 meet Sankoh in Lome. That's the story. And that's the fact.

18 Q. "A. ... they went and they brought with them some  
19 ammunition. They brought some ammunition. On their return  
10:53:21 20 when they arrived at Daru they contacted Mosquito. So that  
21 was one of the shipments that I know about that I will say  
22 it was a means by which we got ammunition. Specifically  
23 that is the means that I recall that we got ammunition  
24 through during the AFRC days.

10:53:43 25 Q. Okay. Do you know, first of all, where in Liberia that  
26 Memunatu and Fonti Kanu travelled to, Mr Witness?

27 A. Yes, yes, please give me a chance to think properly.  
28 In late 1997, yes, I do not recall exactly where they  
29 picked the ammunition from, but Memuna was staying in -

1 Memuna was staying in Monrovia anyway at that time. Memuna  
2 was staying in Monrovia. She was based in Monrovia at that  
3 time.

4 Q. How do you know about this particular shipment? How do  
10:54:19 5 you yourself know?

6 A. I knew about it through radio communication. Memuna  
7 contacted me from Monrovia even before they left and she  
8 told me that she and Fonti Kanu, that is Memuna and Fonti  
9 Kanu, were travelling to bring some materials that had been  
10:54:37 10 given to them by the Papay, that is Mr Taylor. And when  
11 they arrived in Daru, Memuna also contacted me to tell me  
12 that they had arrived in Daru and Mosquito and I, we  
13 travelled to Daru to receive the shipment.

14 Q. What specifically was in the shipment?

10:54:57 15 A. They were an assorted form of ammunition, like AK  
16 rounds, GPMG, RPG. And I'm saying this according to Memuna  
17 and Mosquito because I did not specifically enter the ammo  
18 dump in Daru.

19 A. ... when we got to Daru we went straight to the  
10:55:20 20 battalion headquarters in Daru. That is the Moa Barracks  
21 where Mosquito and the late Fonti Kanu, they entered the  
22 office and they discussed and then I entered the signals  
23 room where I met Memuna and others - I mean Memuna and some  
24 other radio operators. And when we were now there in Daru,  
10:55:41 25 that was the time Memuna started briefing me about the  
26 things they had brought with them. After that, some of the  
27 material, we took them along with us to Kenema."

28 Mr Taylor, Musa Cisse, who is he?

29 A. Musa Cisse was chief of protocol at the Executive Mansion

1 in Monrovia.

2 Q. Listen to this:

3 "Q. ... Why was Memunatu based in Monrovia?

4 A. Memuna was one of the radio operators who travelled  
10:56:17 5 with Lion" - that's Foday Sankoh - "to La Cote d'Ivoire and  
6 sometime in 1996, during the Abidjan peace talks, and she  
7 was there until Pa Sankoh was arrested and circumstances  
8 through which and how Memuna went to Monrovia I did not  
9 know exactly because by then I was in captivity in the  
10:56:42 10 hands of the Kamajors, but she was living in Monrovia with  
11 one Papay Musa, one Musa Cisse. She was living with him in  
12 his house."

13 What do you say about that?

14 A. I don't know who Musa Cisse had in his house, really. This  
10:57:04 15 could be possible, but I'm not aware of it.

16 Q. Because she goes on to identify - he goes on to identify,  
17 page 21435:

18 "Q. Do you mean Musa Zesay?

19 A. Yes, one Musa Cisse. I knew that he was a Special  
10:57:22 20 Forces member and he was a Gambian. That is what I knew  
21 about him and he was one of Mr Taylor's securities. He was  
22 a Zambian - wrong, sorry, he was a Gambian, Musa Cisse.  
23 That is all I know about him."

24 And Musa Cisse was a Gambian, wasn't he?

10:57:42 25 A. No.

26 Q. A Gambian?

27 A. No. Musa Cisse?

28 Q. Yes.

29 A. No, Musa Cisse was Liberian. Liberian, Musa Cisse, all his

1 brothers, his family, uncles, brothers, pa, ma, everybody. He is  
2 Liberian fully. All his children are there, the late Musa Cisse.  
3 No, the chief of protocol at the Executive Mansion, Musa Cisse.  
4 His brother Jebbeh Cisse was ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Never,  
10:58:14 5 never been any other thing but a Liberia.

6 Q. Well, according to this man he is a Gambian or a Zambian.  
7 And then he goes on to say about Memunatu Deen:

8 "Q. Do you know what her duties were in Monrovia?

9 A. Yes. It was through Memuna that we coordinated most of  
10:58:39 10 our affairs. I mean the RUF through Memuna to Musa Cisse  
11 and from there Musa Cisse will link directly to the Papay.  
12 I mean Papay Taylor.

13 Q. And when was this?

14 A. This was late 1997."

10:58:58 15 So what the witness is suggesting, Mr Taylor, is that one  
16 of your Special Forces, a Gambian or a Zambian, Musa Cisse, is  
17 living with an RUF radio operator who has been in La Cote  
18 d'Ivoire in 1996 with Foday Sankoh until his arrest which we know  
19 to be March 1997 and she is coordinating, through the man she is  
10:59:28 20 living with, events with you?

21 A. That's not true. I don't know if Musa Cisse had anybody in  
22 his house called Memuna, because I really didn't know who was in  
23 his house. But I just want to put something maybe as a guide.  
24 Let's look back at late 1997 and some of the evidence that has  
10:59:57 25 been led here in this Court by the Prosecution. This man is  
26 putting himself up as the Mr Know-All but let's go back to -  
27 remember in this courtroom, ammunition that comes to the RUF in  
28 late 1997, based on evidence before this Court, we heard that  
29 there was supposed to be a plane that landed at Magburaka from

1 evidence, and this name Fonti Kanu that has come up was supposed  
2 to be on that plane. And also on that plane according to an OTP  
3 witness before this Court, I think at least more than one, there  
4 was supposed to be a gentleman on that plane called Commander  
11:00:58 5 Musa who had brought some ammunition and an anti-aircraft missile  
6 and have come to teach people how to use it.

7 So when we're talking about ammunition getting into the  
8 AFRC/RUF in late 1997, that's the evidence that witnesses have  
9 brought before this Court. But now this witness now is saying  
11:01:26 10 that Fonti Kanu is involved in bringing ammunition from Liberia.  
11 So we may be talking about two different things, but all I'm  
12 saying here is that what came before this Court about Magburaka  
13 and if we go in the records we'll see Fonti Kanu associated with  
14 the Magburaka shipment. So maybe as we investigate further we  
11:01:50 15 will get to know the veracity of what this witness is trying to  
16 tie in.

17 This is what - when these boys don't know what they are  
18 supposed to know they get into areas that they have no idea of  
19 and then pack it up with lies. So I just brought in this because  
11:02:08 20 what he is saying here is totally false and I'm wondering if it's  
21 not associated with this famous Magburaka shipment in late 1999  
22 with Foday Sankoh - with Dauda Fornie, whatever they call him,  
23 here. This could be what he is referring to and now he has tied  
24 it up to Dauda Fornie and Memuna coming from Monrovia with  
11:02:38 25 ammunition which is not true. So it just shows for me how mixed  
26 up they are and how they are still trying to patch this lie  
27 together.

28 Q. Just give me a moment, Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor, does the name  
29 Osman Tolo mean anything to you?



1 A. No, I don't know. I don't know him. I don't know Osman  
2 Tolo.

3 Q. Because on 4 July 2008, page 12991 of the transcript, we  
4 are told that Memunatu Deen's husband was an Osman Tolo?

11:03:28 5 A. Yes, that --

6 Q. Do you recall that?

7 A. Yes, I recall that.

8 Q. Now, we're being told here that she is living in the same  
9 house as Musa Cisse.

11:03:39 10 A. I can't - I don't know it. I don't know.

11 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: It's not Osmond. It's Osman.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Osman Tolo and that's page 12991, transcript  
13 of 4 July 2008:

14 Q. On this same note, Mr Taylor, the witness continued.

11:04:19 15 Remember this is late 1997.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Same topic.

18 "Q. I'm talking specifically when you said we coordinated  
19 most of our affairs through Musa Cisse and from there Musa  
11:04:36 20 Cisse will link directly to the Papay, I mean Papay Taylor.  
21 What time span are you referring to when you make this  
22 assertion?

23 A. It was late 1997, yes. That Musa Cisse was one of the  
24 people who liaised between us. That is, the RUF and  
11:04:54 25 Mr Taylor. He was one of the people who liaised at that  
26 time.

27 Q. How long did that last?

28 A. Well, Musa Cisse's phase down at the time when we  
29 withdrew, that is when the Kamajors flushed us out of the

1 Kenema - I mean after the operation Sandstorm Tiger Tail  
2 I launched by ECOMOG when we retreated to Buedu. After that  
3 Musa Cisse's coordination phased out and it was then  
4 Benjamin Yeaten who carried out most of the coordination  
11:05:28 5 now at that time. That is the RUF and the AFRC. I mean,  
6 sorry, RUF and Mr Taylor."

7 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Totally untrue. This person phasing out and another person  
9 phasing in. Benjamin Yeaten and Musa Cisse were like colleagues  
11:05:49 10 almost about the same rank. Musa Cisse chief of protocol,  
11 Benjamin Yeaten director of SSS. There is no such thing going on  
12 in 1997 or any other time. No. No, that is not true.

13 Q. I'm moving to another topic in relation to the same  
14 witness. Page is 21442:

11:07:07 15 "A. I received orders from CO Mosqui to to contact the  
16 other side, that is Liberia. That was one of the ways we  
17 referred to Liberia as the other side. That is Liberia.  
18 To contact and inform Papa Musa and Benjamin that the  
19 situation had got out of hands, but the ECOMOG had flushed  
11:07:34 20 us out of most of the areas that we occupied and that we  
21 had retreated to - that we had retreated to as far as  
22 Kailahun District."

23 This is following the ECOMOG intervention, Mr Taylor.

24 "And that the other people were still retreating and they  
11:07:58 25 were in the northern area. Some of our colleagues - some  
26 of our colleague fighters who were in the Western Area were  
27 on the run, retreating towards the Kono area and we needed  
28 material. We needed material, that is ammunition, to stop  
29 the ECOMOG advance into our territory.

1 Q. What happened then?

2 A. From there Sunlight told Five-Zero that message and  
3 Five-Zero in turn told Mosquito that he will get on to him,  
4 that he will get on to him.

11:08:34 5 Q. How do you know that Sunlight told Five-Zero that  
6 message?

7 A. Sunlight came back. He came back on the net and  
8 contacted me and he contacted us and said he had passed the  
9 message on to Five-Zero and Five-Zero had said Mosquito  
10 should be on the stand-by and he would get a response from  
11 him later. But on that very day we did not get any  
12 response in respect of that message until the following  
13 morning when we were in Pendembu.

14 Q. What was the response?

11:09:12 15 A. The response was for Mosquito to travel to Monrovia.  
16 It was for Mosquito to travel to Monrovia on the  
17 instruction of Mr Taylor according to Benjamin Yeaten."

18 Q. Just to be clear you have referred to 50. Who is 50?

19 A. 50 was a code name for Benjamin Yeaten."

11:09:47 20 Then he goes on. Do you understand what is happening here,  
21 Mr Taylor, before I go on to deal with some more details about  
22 this? This man is suggesting that in early 1998 your director of  
23 the SSS sent a message that Sam Bockarie was to travel to  
24 Monrovia. Do you see the implications of that?

11:10:30 25 A. Oh, I see. I see.

26 Q. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor? Early 1998?

27 A. Well, in response to your question, it is not true and  
28 there's several reasons why it cannot be true. Number one, for  
29 this to be true - and, in fact, let me just prefix my statement.

1 Look, by late 1997 we have ECOWAS documents before this Court.  
2 We have reports of the Secretary-General detailing. By late  
3 1997, I'm on the Committee of Five. We've been authorised to  
4 speak to Bockarie and all of these other people. Discussions in  
11:11:43 5 documents that we've presented, UN documents here, have seen that  
6 discussions are on the way even for some of these individuals to  
7 be permitted to travel. If I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, had spoken  
8 to Sam Bockarie or had invited Sam Bockarie, it would have been  
9 within my right. But it did not happen.

11:12:07 10 When did we make contact with Sam Bockarie? That comes  
11 back to my proposition that several things will have to be wrong.  
12 The trip of Eddie Kanneh to my ambassador in August 1998 and the  
13 letter from my ambassador in Conakry to the Foreign Ministry in  
14 August 1998 would have to be wrong. Because that letter plainly  
11:12:40 15 states that for the first time Sam Bockarie wants to come to see  
16 me. So now, unless we say that the ambassador is lying, or I  
17 don't know if we can ever get Eddie Kanneh to come here and tell  
18 what happened, then this man's story here then we will just have  
19 to accept it. This did not happen.

11:13:04 20 So even though I had the authority to send for Sam Bockarie  
21 granted me by ECOWAS and my colleagues, why would I sit here and  
22 say that I never saw him at that time when I had every authority  
23 as of 1997 to speak to any one of them? I had not done that. So  
24 the man is lying that there was this type of thing where I would  
11:13:25 25 send for Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia in  
26 September 1998 for the first time that I see him or meet with  
27 him.

28 If it had happened any time earlier - the point I'm trying  
29 to make - I would tell this Court, because I had the authority to

1 do so. Why would I have the authority to send or talk to  
2 Sam Bockarie at that time and sit here and say, "Oh, no, it  
3 didn't happen"? I had every right to speak to him at that time,  
4 but I had not spoken to him. I had not met him. So this boy is  
11:13:58 5 lying. He doesn't know what he is talking about. He's lying.

6 Maybe he's gotten the time mixed up. But at the time he is  
7 talking about that - let's go to the intervention, what is  
8 happening at the intervention? I know that there are agreed  
9 dates here, but the intervention took several days. And don't

11:14:21 10 let's forget, the aircrafts that participated in that  
11 intervention took off from Robertsfield in Liberia. We were  
12 aware. I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, was aware of the intervention.

13 By 14 February 1998, we have documents here before this  
14 Court that shows two Mi-8 choppers flew in from Sierra Leone that  
11:14:53 15 landed at Spriggs Payne airport. On both of those choppers, one  
16 of them was, we've talked about it, the commander of the Sierra  
17 Leonean Air Force called Victor King. We are in dispute over who  
18 has jurisdiction. Within that very same February, the Committee  
19 of Five met in dealing with the problems in Sierra Leone because

11:15:18 20 this Court has been told there was an important issue at the  
21 time. What was that issue? The use of force against the junta  
22 not having been yet approved under Chapter VII of the United  
23 Nations. The Committee of Five under I think the second or third  
24 report of the Secretary-General is mentioned - that has been

11:15:46 25 presented to this Court, the Committee of Five travels to Addis  
26 Ababa and on the sidelines discuss the issue and leave Addis  
27 Ababa and goes to New York and reports to the Security Council  
28 about what is going on. At that meeting, decisions are taken for  
29 the return of Tejan Kabbah to Freetown which happens in March

1 1998. With me in Liberia, still ECOMOG is there. There's a  
2 conflict. ECOMOG, we reported here, it was contained in this  
3 document from - that was published by the Nigerian embassy in  
4 Monrovia, one of our exhibits before this Court, buzz over my  
5 11:16:30 convoy and around the Executive Mansion this conflict.

6 Sam Bockarie will come to Liberia at that time when I have  
7 security provided by ECOMOG? In fact, the Nigerian government  
8 for the first time provides me, from the time of my election as  
9 President, with Secret Service from Nigeria. Sam Bockarie will

10 11:16:54 come and nobody will talk about it? ECOMOG will not complain  
11 that they have expelled the junta from Monrovia and here I have  
12 Sam Bockarie in Monrovia? How many lies or how disjointed can  
13 these lies be? ECOMOG has a whole unit protecting me. My

14 security at that particular time is provided by ECOMOG, soldiers  
15 11:17:15 and Nigerian Secret Service personnel. Here I'm meeting

16 Sam Bockarie at this particular time and ECOMOG doesn't complain  
17 about it? It's a lie, your Honours. He is not sent for by me at  
18 that time. When I do send for him, it's in September 1998 and he  
19 comes. That's the fact of the matter.

20 11:17:39 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, we hear what you say, but this witness  
21 gives an extremely detailed account of this visit. And I'm sorry  
22 but I must burden you with it so that you have an opportunity of  
23 dealing with it.

24 A. Yes.

25 11:18:03 Q. Page 21442, line 26:

26 "A. The response was for Mosquito to travel to Monrovia.  
27 It was for Mosquito to travel to Monrovia on the  
28 instructions of Mr Taylor according to Benjamin Yeaten."

29 Q. Just to be clear, you have referred to 50. Who is 50?

1 A. 50 was a code name for Benjamin Yeaten."

2 Let's jump to page 21444, line 21.

3 "Q. Can you put a time frame on this now? Is it possible  
4 for you to put a month and a year?

11:18:46 5 A. That was early 1998.

6 Q. You spoke earlier of an ECOMOG intervention occurring  
7 in Freetown. By the point you reach Buedu, about how much  
8 time had passed between the ECOMOG intervention and the  
9 time you reached Buedu? Can you approximate.

11:19:09 10 A. Well, it was in the same month. It was in the same  
11 month.

12 Q. Can you approximate how many days.

13 A. Because - no. Freetown did not just fall and we went  
14 to Buedu immediately, no. We were still in Kenema keeping  
11:19:29 15 the defensive for about at least a week. We were still in  
16 Kenema keeping the defensive. It was not just after  
17 Freetown had fallen to ECOMOG that we left Kenema. We were  
18 still keeping the defensive.

19 Q. Okay. So you said you passed the night in Buedu. Then  
11:19:46 20 what happened?

21 A. The following day I took off for Monrovia, together  
22 with Mosquito."

23 Do you understand that now, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I understand.

11:20:01 25 Q. On that time frame this man is saying he travelled with  
26 Mosquito to Monrovia in the same month of the ECOMOG  
27 intervention. Do you get it?

28 A. That's February, yes. Uh-huh.

29 Q. "Q. Who else was with you?

1 A. One Rashid Sandy was there. One Shabado was present -  
2 Shabado - together with some other bodyguards of Mosquito.  
3 There was a Sellay Duwor, Sellay ... We used about three  
4 years to go. About three vehicles, or so ... jeeps and  
11:20:39 5 vans. Jeeps and vans. One van - yes, jeeps and vans.

6 Q. ... how many people in total were in these three  
7 vehicles?

8 A. I cannot be exact, but I think we were about 15. I  
9 cannot be exact. No, not 15, no, around ten to 15,  
11:20:59 10 something like that. Then we were together with - yes, we  
11 were many, with some of Mosquito's bodyguard.

12 Q. Now, you mentioned Sam Bockarie of course, you  
13 mentioned Rashid Sandy and you mentioned Shabado. Is there  
14 anybody else you remember specifically?

11:21:17 15 A. Yes. Those of us who took off from Buedu I have just  
16 named a few of us and along the way we met" - guess who -  
17 "Jungle, one Colonel Jungle who was one of the Liberian  
18 security, and all of us travelled together.

19 Q. Where did you meet Jungle?

11:21:38 20 A. In Voinjama, because on that day we met him in Voinjama  
21 and we spent the whole day in Voinjama until late in the  
22 evening. That was when we took off from Voinjama."

23 Jump to line 22:

24 "A. We went through Voinjama and Gbarnga, then to  
11:21:55 25 Monrovia. And on the way, that is between Gbarnga and  
26 Kakata, we met with Benjamin Yeaten and Mosquito and  
27 Mosquito entered his vehicle and all of us travelled  
28 together back to Monrovia. We went back to Monrovia. All  
29 of us travelled to Monrovia.



1 Q. Well, when you say all of you, when you met Benjamin  
2 Yeaten between Gbarnga and Kakata, first of all describe  
3 exactly what you observed. What did you see when you met  
4 him?

11:22:27 5 A. When we met Benjamin Yeaten he turned the vehicle and  
6 Mosquito got into Benjamin's jeep and Mosquito left us in  
7 the other jeep and he entered into Benjamin's jeep -  
8 Benjamin's jeep - and all of us travelled, that is  
9 ourselves, Mosquito, Benjamin Yeaten and the others, all of  
11:22:45 10 us travelled to Monrovia. On the way, you know, there was  
11 no security threat. Nobody disturbed us. The moment they  
12 saw Mosquito - sorry, the moment the security post saw  
13 Benjamin's vehicle they will just give him a way.

14 Q. How did you know the person you were meeting there was  
11:23:05 15 Benjamin Yeaten? How did you know that?

16 A. I did not know. In fact, I never knew that Benjamin  
17 Yeaten was coming to receive us on the way. I did not have  
18 any communication like that. We just saw him on the way  
19 and he said he had come to receive us and he said the Papay  
11:23:24 20 had sent him to receive us and that was when Jungle said,  
21 'This is Benjamin Yeaten, Papay's chief security', that is  
22 Charles Taylor's chief security. He said he was the SS  
23 director.

24 Q. Who said that?

11:23:40 25 A. Jungle. Jungle.

26 Q. And you said that you had no trouble - nobody disturbed  
27 you along the way. The moment they saw Benjamin Yeaten's  
28 vehicle the security post, they wouldn't disturb you. What  
29 security posts are you referring to?

1 A. You know, like to enter Monrovia there was an ECOMOG  
2 security post at that time. There was an ECOMOG security  
3 post, yes, and besides that there were some police security  
4 posts."

11:24:16 5 Now, remember you telling us, page 52 of today's transcript  
6 at line - at line 10, that ECOMOG was still in Liberia at the  
7 time?

8 A. Seriously deployed. Yes. Yes.

9 Q. Now, he is saying that this group, something like four or  
11:24:37 10 five vehicles now, because three left Sierra Leone, they meet  
11 with Jungle, then they meet with Benjamin Yeaten, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Pass through an ECOMOG roadblock totally undisturbed. You  
14 get it?

11:24:56 15 A. I get it.

16 Q. "Q. So go ahead and continue. What happened after you got  
17 to Monrovia?

18 A. When we arrived in Monrovia, we were - Benjamin  
19 distributed us to - Jungle took some people and lodged them  
11:25:08 20 at a particular place, and I was at Benjamin's house with  
21 Sunlight and Mosquito. Mosquito too went to a different  
22 place. That was where he slept. And early in the morning  
23 he came.

24 Q. I was going to ask, because I'm not sure I understand  
11:25:25 25 your answer exactly. You said that you arrived in Monrovia  
26 and Benjamin 'distributed us. Jungle took some people and  
27 he lodged them at a particular place.' Who are you  
28 referring to? Which people did Jungle lodge at a  
29 particular place?

1 A. The securities that Mosquito went with.

2 Q. Later you said, 'I was at Benjamin's house with  
3 Sunlight and Mosquito. Mosquito too went to a different  
4 place.' What do you mean? Was Mosquito with you or not?

11:25:55 5 A. Well, Mosquito was just with us during the day, because  
6 when we arrived at that night we arrived late in the night,  
7 and so we needed some rest and so everybody went to where  
8 he was to sleep. So early in the morning Mosquito came and  
9 met with Benjamin Yeaten and I gave him updates from the  
11:26:13 10 various front lines and Mosquito, Benjamin and one Rashid,  
11 they went out and they left me at Benjamin's house that  
12 morning. Rashid, Mosquito and Sellay. Rashid, Mosquito,  
13 Sellay and Benjamin Yeaten. There were four who went out  
14 that morning and they left me at Benjamin's house.

11:26:33 15 Q. Now you said you gave Benjamin [sic] an update from the  
16 front lines - various front lines. Is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. How were you able to do that?

19 A. Well, that was the purpose why I travelled with  
11:26:49 20 Mosquito to monitor from the front lines and give him  
21 updates. When I arrived that very night I contacted them  
22 and in the morning - very early in the morning - I went to  
23 radio room, that is Base 1. I even used the Base 1 radio  
24 to contact that morning, and I contacted the various front  
11:27:03 25 lines to get updates. Then I fed Mosquito with the  
26 information.

27 Q. Who did you contact on the front lines?

28 A. Almost all the front lines. I contacted Issa's  
29 station, I contacted the various stations, Superman and

1 others, I contacted eagle. There were other stations that  
2 I contacted. I contacted many stations and I collected  
3 information from the various front lines.

4 Q. Do you remember what information you passed on to  
11:27:34 5 Sam Bockarie? Do you remember what was the contents of  
6 that.

7 A. Well, at that time Issa and others were retreating from  
8 Freetown, that is, Issa himself and others; Johnny Paul,  
9 Superman, and others. They were on their way from  
11:27:51 10 Freetown. They were on their way from Freetown while  
11 retreating, and in the defensive areas I asked Eagle and  
12 others, and they said they had no problems with the various  
13 defensive positions that particular morning."

14 Having confirmed that the Issa referred to is Issa Sesay,  
11:28:10 15 he continues:

16 "Q. Now, you said you went to Benjamin Yeaten's house.  
17 Where exactly was that house?

18 A. It was at one area in Monrovia called Congo Town. That  
19 is at the back. That is behind Mr Taylor's place, where  
11:28:27 20 Mr Taylor was. They refer to the place as White Flower.  
21 That was where we was."

22 Jump to line 17:

23 "Q. So you said that when you got to the house then that -  
24 well, first of all, you also have referred to a location  
11:28:44 25 that you contacted the front lines from, Base 1."

26 And he identifies where base 1 was. Let's pause,  
27 Mr Taylor. Do you understand what this man is saying?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. During the course of the ECOMOG intervention, whilst the

1 AFRC and the RUF are retreating from Freetown, including such  
2 senior individuals as Johnny Paul Koroma and Issa Sesay, Mosquito  
3 at that very same time is in Monrovia. You do understand that,  
4 don't you?

11:29:22 5 A. Oh, yes, I do.

6 Q. And you see the amount of detail that this witness is  
7 giving about this trip. Before we come back to this evidence  
8 just help us, what do you say about this allegation?

9 A. Totally, totally erroneous. Totally false. It is  
11:29:43 10 misleading, because he's got it all wrong. And unless we want to  
11 take the story that the ambassador informed me of - and my  
12 authority to meet with Sam Bockarie and I'm telling you it didn't  
13 happen at this time, then there's - I don't know how they manage,  
14 but they have done - I don't know how they put this thing  
11:30:12 15 together. I really do not know. There is no such thing at this  
16 particular time. Sam Bockarie does not come to Liberia at this  
17 time. This is not the time that I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, send  
18 for Sam Bockarie. He don't come to Liberia in February of 1998.  
19 Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia in September of 1998 upon my  
11:30:37 20 sending and asking him to come after receiving the message from  
21 my ambassador in Guinea. He does not the come before then at  
22 all.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'll take the morning break now.  
24 We'll adjourn until 12 o'clock.

11:30:56 25 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

26 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Now, before the break, Mr Taylor, we were looking in detail  
29 at the testimony of this witness regarding a trip he allegedly

1 took to Monrovia in February 1998, accompanied by Mosquito,  
2 whilst the ECOMOG intervention is in progress. Do you follow?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. Now I'll pick up where I left off:

12:02:36 5 "Q. So you said that when you got to the house then -  
6 that, well, first of all, you also have referred to a  
7 location that you contacted the front line from, Base 1.  
8 Where was Base 1 located?

9 A. Base 1 was at Benjamin's house. It was at Benjamin's  
12:02:56 10 house that Base 1 was. It was a radio station that was  
11 called Base 1.

12 Q. And can you describe this radio station? Well, when  
13 you saw it, was this the first time you had seen it?

14 A. That was the first time. It was a VHF radio set. It  
12:03:23 15 was in one of the rooms at Benjamin Yeaten's back yard in  
16 Benjamin's compound. That was where it was. There was a  
17 radio set with stationery and the radio set was a Yaesu  
18 radio set.

19 Q. Now, you said that Sam Bockarie, Jungle, Rashid and  
12:03:48 20 Benjamin Yeaten went off somewhere that day and you  
21 remained. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So when you say you remained, you remained where?

24 A. I remained in the radio room at Benjamin's house.

12:04:05 25 Q. Do you know where those four individuals went?

26 A. Well, they told me they were going to meet with the  
27 Papay directly. Master told me that. I mean Mosquito. He  
28 told me that they were going to see the President. At that  
29 time it was Mr Taylor.

1 Q. Now you yourself, you have also, who was in the radio  
2 room, who was in Base 1, who was there besides yourself?

3 A. That morning - that particular morning I was in the  
4 radio room with Sunlight. I was in the radio room with  
12:04:48 5 Sunlight that particular morning.

6 Q. Was this the first time you met Sunlight?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. Do you know his real name?

9 A. No.

12:05:03 10 Q. So you said that Sam Bockarie and the others left. How  
11 long were they gone for?

12 A. They were out for almost the rest of the day. It was  
13 around 7 - 6 going to 7 that Mosquito and others returned  
14 to the house at Benjamin Yeaten's.

12:05:28 15 Q. What happened after they returned?

16 A. From there Mosquito told me to pack up and that we were  
17 to return to Sierra Leone.

18 Q. And so go ahead, continue?

19 A. From there Mosquito told me to pack up my things and we  
12:05:47 20 were to return to Sierra Leone, so after I'd completed  
21 packing I went out and got into the vehicle and we left.

22 On our way we met a truck loaded with ammunition and the  
23 other securities who were with Mosquito. All of them, I  
24 met them now on the way along the highway on the outskirts  
12:06:13 25 of Monrovia going towards - going towards - going towards  
26 Kakata. Going towards Kakata.

27 Q. So just to be clear, how many nights did you actually  
28 spend in Benjamin Yeaten's house?

29 A. One. That was the night that we arrived, and the

1 following day we left."

2 So, Mr Taylor, just so that we are clear, this group of ten  
3 to 15 individuals, including Sam Bockarie, travel overland  
4 through ECOMOG checkpoints, come to Monrovia, having met Benjamin

12:07:01

5 Yeaten and Jungle along the way. They're housed by Jungle and  
6 Benjamin Yeaten. This particular individual is on the radio in  
7 Yeaten's house, Base 1, that night and in the morning obtaining  
8 updates on the situation in Sierra Leone. Meanwhile, Bockarie  
9 goes off to meet you. They leave that same day, the next day,

12:07:29

10 and on the way they're met by a truck going towards Kakata loaded  
11 with ammunition, the inference being you had supplied them. You  
12 follow, don't you?

13 A. Yes, I do. Yes, I do.

14 Q. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

12:07:53

15 A. Answer: It is a lie. But I always, you know, try to  
16 reflect on the records before this Court. A truck parked on the  
17 Kakata Highway mid-way with ammunition, we heard about that  
18 before in this Court. But we hear about it as having been a  
19 truck parked on the side with ammunition that was supposed to be  
20 brought into Roberts International Airport by Sam Bockarie & Co  
21 after they returned from a trip to Burkina Faso, that they did  
22 not reach to Monrovia and the truck was parked on the highway.  
23 At a different time. The same truck.

12:08:25

24 So what comes to my memory now is that in constructing this  
12:08:52 25 whole nonsense, they've got these boys mixed up. We've got these  
26 boys mixed up. We've heard about a truck before on the highway  
27 parked halfway between in - that was supposed to be late 1998 and  
28 this was the ammunition that was supposed to have been  
29 transported to Sierra Leone for the 6 January invasion. That's



1 the first time I heard about that truck - about a truck business  
2 in this Court. Now we have this man now putting this truck in  
3 February of 1998. I don't know. It's not true. I don't have  
4 any ammunition in - and I guess where the whole thing what I've  
12:09:33 5 repeated here before now just a second, is that everybody is  
6 building this case on the premise that Charles Taylor has  
7 ammunition, and I don't have. They forgot. They thought that  
8 following my election as President I was given all the arms and  
9 ammunition taken from the disarmament. Charles Taylor does not  
12:09:51 10 have any ammunition in the Republic of Liberia at this time.  
11 Every gun, every ammunition, is in the custody of the  
12 international community that they finally destroy totally. So  
13 this whole house of cards is built on the fact that Taylor has  
14 arms and ammunition. I don't. Where am I going to get  
12:10:16 15 truckloads of ammunition from in February of 1998 to escort some  
16 place? Where? It doesn't happen. It doesn't happen. And to  
17 show you how it's mixed up now, we hear a different story about a  
18 truck parked halfway on the road. As much as I can recall - I  
19 mean, we may have to go into the records. But as you're reading  
12:10:40 20 it, it's coming to me that we've heard about a truck like this at  
21 a different time again talking about the same thing. It's not  
22 true.

23 Q. I'm sorry, Mr Taylor. Had you finished?

24 A. Yes, I'm through. It's not true.

12:10:53 25 Q. Page 21452 of the transcript of 2 December 2008, line 29:  
26 "Q. Was this your first trip to Monrovia?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, you said that you spent one night in Benjamin  
29 Yeaten's house and you left, and on your way you met a

1 truck loaded with ammunition and the other securities who  
2 were with Mosquito - who exactly did you meet on the way?

3 A. We met Mosquito's bodyguards, Jungle and others, with a  
4 truck loaded with ammunition and it was a mini truck of  
12:11:36 5 ammunition on the way.

6 Q. Where did you meet this truck?

7 A. It was on the road, on the outskirts of the town  
8 towards Kakata. Towards Kakata.

9 Q. Now, you said 'with Sam Bockarie's securities'. Were  
12:11:53 10 these the same securities you referred to before?

11 A. Yes, yes. I'm referring to his bodyguards, Shabado and  
12 others with whom all of us had travelled.

13 Q. What type of truck was this, can you recall?

14 A. It was a six-wheel truck, but it was not a very big  
12:12:18 15 truck. It was a mini truck. Let me say a medium sized  
16 truck. Like in Sierra Leone there is a way we refer to  
17 them, we call them as pikin Benz. That's the kind of truck  
18 that I'm referring to."

19 He goes on to explain what he means by that. Then we go  
12:12:43 20 over the page to page 21454 and pick up the account, he having  
21 given the explanation. Line 9:

22 "Q. Did you have the occasion to learn anything that was  
23 discussed in the meeting?"

24 That's the meeting allegedly between you and Mosquito,  
12:13:07 25 Mr Taylor.

26 "A. I was not there directly, but while we were going on  
27 the way, because I was in the same vehicle as Mosquito with  
28 Rashid and others, and we were discussing on the way while  
29 going. We said it was not a bad trip. Mosquito said it

1 was a nice trip. He said the Pa had said that he would be  
2 ready to give us support to the best of his ability at that  
3 time, and Mosquito said Papay had said - that is Mr Taylor  
4 I'm referring to now - that at that time he did not have  
12:13:45 5 sufficient ammunition, that the time that we travelled,  
6 that's why we did not return with much ammunition.

7 Q. Do you recall the type of ammunition that you did  
8 return with?

9 A. Yes. It was asserted. AK rounds, I mean grenades,  
12:14:10 10 GPMG, RPG rockets. I mean not the tubes. Not the tubes  
11 themselves, but the rockets. GPMG rounds. I think so.  
12 That was - that was it so far.

13 Q. Did you eventually return to Buedu?

14 A. Yes. "

12:14:35 15 Let's go over the page just to complete the account, page  
16 21455, line 5:

17 "Q. Okay. You said that - I'm just going to give you,  
18 Mr Witness - you said in your response, when you were  
19 talking about the meeting, what you learned about the  
12:14:55 20 meeting between Sam Bockarie and others with Mr Taylor, you  
21 said that, in your response, we said that it was not a bad  
22 trip, Mosquito said it was a nice trip. He said the Pa had  
23 said that he would be ready to give us support to the best  
24 of his ability. Who are you referring to when you say 'the  
12:15:13 25 Pa'?

26 A. Mr Taylor.

27 Q. And who were you referring to when you said 'he would  
28 be ready to give us support'? Who is the 'he' that you're  
29 referring to?

1 A. Mr Taylor was willing to give us support."

2 Jump to line 26 and we see this answer:

3 "A. The ammunition that we went with was what we used.

4 You know we left some in Buedu and took the bulk of the

12:15:46 5 ammunition to the various front lines, and we distributed

6 them to the various front lines within Kailahun District

7 and we sent some to Kono. That was the ammunition we used

8 to stop the ECOMOG advance into our territory."

9 So, Mr Taylor, what is being said is this: You, whilst a

12:16:12 10 member of the Committee of Six pledged to bring peace to Sierra

11 Leone, at this time you supplied the RUF with arms and ammunition

12 to halt ECOMOG's advance in Sierra Leone, even though President

13 Abacha was allegedly your good mate at the time and he had

14 ordered that. What do you say?

12:16:45 15 A. I see why it is said that I was meddling in Sierra Leone.

16 It never happened. This boy is totally, totally always lying.

17 It never, never happened. And you know, if we want to get

18 logical about this, which we have to be, remember in late 1997

19 Johnny Paul Koroma writes me a letter for arms and ammunition

12:17:13 20 that he doesn't get. All of a sudden the intervention occurs,

21 and the very month of the intervention Sam Bockarie is supposed

22 to be invited to Monrovia by me and supposed to be given arms and

23 ammunition.

24 But there's a little logical part that we have to look at

12:17:37 25 here that is not answered. Johnny Paul Koroma writes for these

26 weapons. Maybe we could assume Sam Bockarie, who was the most

27 senior on the council, did not know about it. And once he comes

28 to Monrovia and he gets this ammunition en route to Sierra Leone,

29 he doesn't mention anything about, you know: I told Johnny Paul

1 Koroma not to write to Taylor, and you see I couldn't have  
2 handled this thing, but he didn't listen. You see we got  
3 material.

12:18:18 4 You know, there is no connection, there is no link between  
5 the failure to respond to the late 1997 refusal to give weapons  
6 to them and this so-called receipt on - I mean, within the period  
7 of the intervention being conducted by ECOWAS. So, you know, in  
8 this whole logical pattern in going through this thing, so many  
9 problems and so many disconnects in this that, you know, all you  
12:18:43 10 just keep getting - when the facts come out say yes, you get this  
11 - this did not happen. Sam Bockarie does not come to Monrovia in  
12 February of 1998.

13 Look, if Sam Bockarie had come to Monrovia in February  
14 1998, I can almost say with certainty there would have been an  
12:19:04 15 incident. There would have been an incident between the  
16 Government of Liberia and ECOMOG at that particular time. I can  
17 almost say so. Just as we had the incident when Victor King  
18 arrived in February - on 14 February 1998 with those helicopters  
19 that an incident - because there is no way ECOMOG soldiers, who  
12:19:28 20 had been dying in Sierra Leone, fighting, carrying out bombing  
21 raids, and one of the people that - the most senior members of  
22 the junta arriving in Liberia, going through ECOMOG lines, that  
23 they would not have at least made an attempt to arrest him. They  
24 would have made attempts to arrest him. It would have caused an  
12:19:45 25 incident between my government and ECOMOG.

26 Sam Bockarie did not come to Liberia in February of 1998 or  
27 March or April or May or June or July or August of 1998. He came  
28 in September of 1998 on my invitation to him. By this time in  
29 September of 1998 we have a situation where discussions are

1 underway for a status of forces agreement with ECOMOG. They are  
2 - we have gone through the period of tension. Everybody is aware  
3 that he's coming, including the United Nations is aware that  
4 certain members of the junta or former junta can travel. They  
12:20:31 5 know, I have discussed it with them, that's why we do not have an  
6 incident when he comes in September of 1998. He did not come to  
7 Liberia before September of 1998. He did not.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, in light of that answer, let me pose this  
9 proposition to you as one possible interpretation: That when  
12:21:01 10 Johnny Paul Koroma wrote to you following the coup in May 1997,  
11 you felt no need at that time to assist him because you had, in  
12 effect, achieved the purpose of the plan conceived in Libya,  
13 because the RUF were now jointly in control of Sierra Leone. But  
14 then following the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998 you saw  
12:21:29 15 your plan, your design, falling apart, so that's why you quickly  
16 rushed in reinforcements to hold the ECOMOG advance. Do you  
17 follow me?

18 A. I follow you very well.

19 Q. Well, what if that was suggested to you? What's your  
12:21:47 20 response?

21 A. My response would be that would be of, you know, a rather -  
22 what would I call it? Irrational theory that would be advanced  
23 like most cases are advanced, and that's why cases get lost.  
24 That would be totally irrational, because I can tell you for one  
12:22:06 25 reason if I did not want Nigerian jet fighter bombers taking off  
26 from Roberts International Airport in line with that  
27 intervention, they would have never taken off. We could have  
28 stopped them.

29 Q. How?

1 A. All we had to do was drive vehicles on the runway and they  
2 would never take off. Even if we could not fight them, we could  
3 have - look, I was aware that an intervention was taking place.  
4 I, in meetings with my colleagues - and a lot of us had said that  
12:22:40 5 a decision had been taken that there should be a peaceful  
6 resolution to the problem. The committee had agreed that the  
7 junta would turn over in April. Abacha felt otherwise. But when  
8 it got down to the nitty-gritty, it took the consensus of ECOWAS  
9 for the intervention to occur. Liberia, I can say, was a part of  
12:23:07 10 the intervention, because we permitted our territory to be used.

11 What we did not agree to was the use of personnel from  
12 Liberia with the Kamajors operation. Other than that it would be  
13 sick for anybody to believe: Well, no, they have carried on.  
14 What? We all knew that the junta had accepted stepping down.  
12:23:32 15 There was no question about it. And don't forget, ECOWAS had met  
16 with the junta. They had met with the individuals in Ivory  
17 Coast, and a senior ECOWAS delegation in records before this  
18 Court had gone to Freetown and had met with Johnny Paul Koroma in  
19 Freetown before the intervention. So, look, there were ongoing  
12:23:56 20 discussions. So that would not be logical to advance a theory as  
21 such. No, it would be illogical.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, we've spent a little time dealing with that  
23 alleged visit by Sam Bockarie in February 1998 because of its  
24 significance?

12:24:21 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. I would now like to move on, please, to another topic:  
27 Communications as described by this witness. Do you follow me?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 Q. Page 21479 of the transcript of 2 December 2008:

1 "Q. Now, you also said that the station situated across  
2 Sam Bockarie's house was in communication with stations in  
3 Liberia. Do you recall saying that?

4 A. Yes.

12:24:53 5 Q. Describe what you mean by this.

6 A. Well, that was the station that Sam Bockarie used to  
7 communicate with Benjamin Yeaten, because at the time we  
8 were now in Buedu. Sam Bockarie had a satellite phone. He  
9 had a satellite phones" - plural - "anyway. The first  
10 satellite phone was from Johnny Paul. That was the one he  
11 took from Johnny Paul, and then later Mr Taylor sent - I  
12 mean, Mr Taylor gave him another satellite phone, yes."

13 Now pause there. Did you give Sam Bockarie a satellite  
14 phone?

12:25:42 15 A. Yes, I did.

16 Q. When?

17 A. I gave Sam Bockarie the satellite phone in October of 1998.  
18 I gave him a satellite phone. That's why I'm saying this boy is  
19 mixed up with time. Yes, I did.

12:25:59 20 Q. October 1998?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Were you aware that he already had one?

23 A. Well, no, I was not aware. But from evidence here we know  
24 that in 1996, according to evidence led in this Court, when Foday  
12:26:16 25 Sankoh goes to Abidjan for the peace talks, OTP witnesses here  
26 have said that Foday Sankoh sent a satellite phone and a fax  
27 machine to his people. So I would assume that after the death of  
28 Mohamed Tarawali, Sam Bockarie should have had a satellite phone  
29 as of 1996, from evidence led in this Court.



1 Q. Question, line 14:

2 "Q. Okay, I'm speaking now - I will ask you more questions  
3 about satellite phones later. I'm specifically asking you  
4 about the radio station across from Sam Bockarie's house  
12:26:57 5 that you said was in communication with stations in  
6 Liberia. Which stations in Liberia was this radio station  
7 in communication with?

8 A. The leading station was Base 1."

9 Now, remember Base 1 is the radio station located at

12:27:18 10 Benjamin Yeaten's house?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. His compound?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "Q. When you say 'leading station', what do you mean by  
12:27:32 15 that?

16 A. It means there were other stations that we communicated  
17 with, but the most important amongst the stations that we  
18 always contacted was Base 1.

19 Q. How often was the contact between Sam Bockarie's  
12:27:48 20 station and Base 1?

21 A. Well, that sometimes depended on the nature of the  
22 security threats on the various front lines or the  
23 developments at the various front lines. Sometimes for the  
24 whole day we will only have one communication with them,  
12:28:07 25 but sometimes when we were in full force on full offensive  
26 we will communicate with them almost every day, sometimes  
27 on an hourly basis, yeah. But there is actually no  
28 specific time duration that I can refer to to say whether  
29 it was either after every two days that we spoke with them,

1 or every three days, or every hour. It all depended on the  
2 prevailing situation on the ground. So it was all based on  
3 that.

12:28:43 4 Q. Why were you in communication with this station,  
5 Base 1? Why was Sam Bockarie's station in communication  
6 with this station Base 1?

7 A. Well, Base 1 was the station that coordinated  
8 communications between Sam Bockarie directly to Mr Taylor.  
9 It was not through Base 1. For example, if Mr Benjamin  
12:29:07 10 Yeaten wanted to talk to Mosquito on the - but that  
11 Mosquito's satellite phone was not switched on, Benjamin  
12 will tell Sunlight to contact Bravo Zulu 4 to inform  
13 Mosquito to switch his satellite phone on. So in the  
14 inverse, Mosquito too would tell the operators at Bravo  
12:29:32 15 Zulu 4 to tell Benjamin Yeaten to call him on the sat phone  
16 so that they would discuss whatever he wanted to tell them.  
17 Sometimes if Mosquito - sometimes when Mosquito does not  
18 travel to Monrovia for ammunition, and if he decided to  
19 send someone else he, Mosquito, will communicate with  
12:29:54 20 Mosquito throughout until he or she gets to Monrovia and  
21 returns to Buedu. So that was how the communication used  
22 to flow."

23 So regularity of contact between a radio station attached  
24 to Benjamin Yeaten from a radio station immediately opposite Sam  
12:30:22 25 Bockarie's house and Yeaten using that link to coordinate your  
26 control of events in Sierra Leone. True or false, Mr Taylor?

27 A. False.

28 Q. Because he goes on. Page 21482, line 7:

29 "A. For example, Mosquito would want to make a request

1 from Charles Taylor for ammunition. Mosquito would use his  
2 own control station, that is Bravo Zulu 4 in Buedu, and he  
3 would use that radio station through the operators and  
4 would communicate with Base 1. That is Benjamin Yeaten's  
12:31:18 5 radio station. That was Benjamin Yeaten's radio station,  
6 and it was Sunlight who was in control at Base 1. When  
7 Benjamin Yeaten got any request from Mosquito he would say  
8 'Okay, hold on, I will have to meet the Papay', or 'Maybe I  
9 will have to hang heads with the father.' We had different  
12:31:44 10 code names that we used to disguise the various commanders.  
11 Something like that, and so that was the major role that  
12 Base 1 played."

13 He is explaining now at line 23: "That is, he would want  
14 to consult directly with Charles Taylor."

12:32:07 15 Mr Taylor, the witness is categorically there stating that  
16 you were controlling events through your able lieutenant  
17 Mr Benjamin Yeaten. What do you say about that?

18 A. That's totally false. Totally, totally, totally false.  
19 Totally false. Now, what would a radio - there's nothing unusual  
12:32:40 20 about Benjamin Yeaten having a radio at his house. It would be -  
21 that would be normal. SSS director. The SSS had its own radio  
22 frequency across the country. Wherever Secret Service were,  
23 there were radios. I don't know how they can put forward this  
24 kind of statement with such straight face that this is happening  
12:33:17 25 at the time. Maybe if there is constant communication between  
26 Benjamin Yeaten and Sam Bockarie as of the time he comes to  
27 Liberia, I would say that's highly probable. Yes, between the  
28 time that Foday Sankoh - I mean, that Sam Bockarie comes to  
29 Liberia in September of 1998 going on, I would not even argue

1 about contact between Benjamin and Sam Bockarie after he comes to  
2 Liberia. I would expect that it would happen. He was in charge  
3 of the security.

4 And one thing that he does mention here - and he doesn't  
12:33:59 5 mention here, and I guess he tried to get it straight. He  
6 doesn't talk about the guesthouse and all that kind of stuff, so  
7 there is no contact. Because from the second trip that Sam  
8 Bockarie pays to Liberia, which is October 1998, he's placed in a  
9 guesthouse and the Government of Liberia install a radio there.

12:34:18 10 We don't deny that. We installed a radio communication system at  
11 the place. But all these other things, your Honour, about  
12 February and all this thing, if this man is not mixed up with the  
13 dates, then he's deliberately lying. That's all I can put it to.

14 Q. Well, he goes on to describe the nature of the relationship  
12:34:41 15 between Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten. Page 21484, transcript of  
16 2 December 2008, beginning at line 21:

17 "Q. Now, you've made references as well to Benjamin  
18 Yeaten. What was his specific role, according to your  
19 knowledge?

12:35:06 20 A. I knew Benjamin Yeaten to be the SSS director for  
21 Mr Taylor, and Benjamin was the one who coordinated between  
22 Mosquito and Mr Taylor. Like, most often when Mosquito was  
23 speaking to Benjamin he used to answer to him, 'Yes, sir.  
24 Yes, sir.' I used to hear him answer, 'Yes, sir. Yes,  
12:35:32 25 sir.' And so I can say more or less Benjamin was a  
26 commander to Mosquito.

27 Q. And who, if anyone, do you know, was Benjamin Yeaten's  
28 commander?

29 A. Benjamin Yeaten's commander that I knew was his leader,

1 I can say our leader - our former leader, Mr Taylor, and he  
2 was a CIC." Commander-in-chief. "He was Benjamin Yeaten's  
3 commander".

4 I'm jumping a few lines in the next answer:

12:36:15 5 "The reason why I refer to him as our former leader is that  
6 because most often he was the one that Mosquito consulted with  
7 for strategic actions that he wanted to take - that Mosquito  
8 wanted to take, and he used to report to him directly. Mosquito  
9 used to report to him directly - either directly, or indirectly  
12:36:39 10 sometimes - and then really those are some of the reason why I  
11 said so. Even before Issa also took over he, Mosquito, used to  
12 report to Mr Taylor directly."

13 Now, you'll recall, Mr Taylor, a diagram being placed  
14 before this Court showing the hierarchy for the NPFL - well, for  
12:37:08 15 the RUF circa 1991-92. This witness is saying that at the time  
16 Sam Bockarie takes over, and thereafter when Issa Sesay succeeds  
17 him, you're the one effectively in control. He's saying this  
18 quite plainly, that Mosquito is referring to Benjamin Yeaten as,  
19 "Yes, sir. Yes, sir." God knows how he referred to you when he  
12:37:44 20 spoke to you. Now, what do you say about that?

21 A. I don't know how Mosquito referred to Benjamin Yeaten,  
22 whether he said "Yes, sir" or not. I doubt that Mosquito will  
23 say "Yes, sir" to Benjamin Yeaten, because they were all Krowla  
24 [phon] boys so to speak. But, you know, I am no second fiddle to  
12:38:11 25 anybody, so I am in charge when Foday Sankoh - when Foday Sankoh  
26 is there, he's in charge. When he goes away, I'm in charge. So  
27 I'm playing second fiddle to Foday Sankoh. I don't know what's  
28 going through their heads. All I can say to this Court is it's  
29 not true that I am running the RUF at any time. Foday Sankoh

1 remains in full control of his organisation. Even when he's  
2 arrested in Nigeria, there's evidence here that Foday Sankoh sent  
3 specific instructions - specific instructions - to Sam Bockarie,  
4 including his promotion. Again in 2000 - 8 May 2000, after the  
12:39:12 5 arrest of Foday Sankoh, what happens? Even after Heads of State  
6 of ECOWAS meet Issa Sesay on my invitation in July of 2000 at the  
7 Executive Mansion, where Obasanjo, Gnassingbe Eyadema, Yahya  
8 Jammeh, Alpha, we are there. Issa Sesay right there tells all of  
9 the Heads of State, "No, Your Excellencies, I have to go back and  
12:39:51 10 inform my people and I have to get the permission from Sankoh."

11 Alpha Konare, in records here factually before this Court,  
12 and Obasanjo fly to Freetown. They meet Tejan Kabbah. He brings  
13 Foday Sankoh. They deliver the note, and Obasanjo and Alpha  
14 Konare, then Chairman of ECOWAS, bring the note back, the  
12:40:20 15 approval. Issa Sesay comes to Liberia and in August of 2000.  
16 Alpha Konare, Obasanjo, Charles Taylor meet at the airport, he is  
17 named. So even then Issa Sesay is saying we have to go to  
18 Sankoh.

19 So whether it is Sam Bockarie who Sankoh appoints directly,  
12:40:41 20 okay, upon his arrest in 1997, or Issa Sesay who comes in 2000,  
21 in both cases it is the decision of Sankoh who leads his RUF.  
22 It's got nothing to do with Charles Taylor. I was not ever any  
23 second or third or fourth fiddle to anybody when it comes to the  
24 RUF. That is not true. It's a lie.

12:41:12 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the witness went on to give examples of  
26 your alleged control of affairs in Sierra Leone. Page 21485.  
27 Just to remind yourselves where we are. Line 14:

28 "A. Even before Issa also took over, he, Mosquito, used to  
29 report to Mr Taylor directly.

1 Q. How do you know that?

2 A. I was a contact person that liaised the communication  
3 between them. And then I had travelled with Mosquito to  
4 Monrovia and he had moved with some gemstones that he spoke  
12:42:02 5 about, although he did not show them to me directly, but he  
6 said he handed them over to Mr Taylor. And that besides,  
7 Mosquito I said - Issa - no, Mosquito consulted Mr Taylor  
8 about certain things that he wanted to do. Because for  
9 Mosquito to even accept a ceasefire, because there was a  
12:42:22 10 point in time when Foday Sankoh called from Freetown and  
11 talked about the ceasefire, he consulted with him before he  
12 accepted the ceasefire. That is Mosquito consulted with  
13 him before he accepted a ceasefire.

14 Q. Consulted with who?

12:42:44 15 A. Yes. That is, after Foday Sankoh has spoken with  
16 Mosquito and before Mosquito accepted the ceasefire that  
17 Foday Sankoh had said we should do, he first consulted with  
18 Benjamin Yeaten to get Charles Taylor's advice before he  
19 accepted - before he agreed with the ceasefire. And even  
12:43:07 20 when Mosquito and Foday Sankoh still continued the  
21 discussion on that ceasefire there was a time that Sunlight  
22 intercepted a conversation when Foday Sankoh was speaking  
23 directly with Mosquito. But Sunlight did not know that it  
24 was Foday Sankoh who was talking. He thought Mosquito was  
12:43:27 25 just speaking to any other commander just like that or any  
26 other person. So when Sunlight contacted Mosquito  
27 still tried to convince him."

28 Do you understand what's being said there, Mr Taylor? That  
29 Foday Sankoh tells, who's leader of the RUF, tells Mosquito,

1 "Let's have a ceasefire." Mosquito says, "No chance, not until I  
2 consult with the Papay Charles Taylor." Do you understand that?  
3 That's what's being said.

4 A. Yeah, the only little problem - I don't know what time he  
12:44:10 5 could be talking about. If Foday Sankoh --

6 Q. Well, I'll tell you what time we're talking about. Page  
7 21488, line 21:

8 "Q. Now, before the break we were focusing on the time  
9 when you were assigned as a radio operator in Buedu from  
12:44:26 10 early 1998 until April 1999 ...

11 A. Yes."

12 That's when we're talking about, Mr Taylor.

13 A. But Foday Sankoh is speaking about a ceasefire.

14 Q. Yes.

12:44:45 15 A. This period between early 1998 and April 1999, where is  
16 Foday Sankoh? Where is Foday Sankoh at that time that he Foday  
17 Sankoh is talking on the radio about a ceasefire? Where is he?  
18 As far as I'm aware, he's incarcerated. Isn't he? He's  
19 incarcerated. Foday Sankoh has been brought to Sierra Leone,  
12:45:20 20 Freetown. He's been put on trial, hasn't he, from Nigeria? He's  
21 in the custody of the Sierra Leonean government. So how is he  
22 talking to Sam Bockarie about a ceasefire? I don't understand  
23 this part, if we're talking about early 1998. Remember, now,  
24 Foday Sankoh is arrested in 1997 and he's not released. Foday  
12:45:44 25 Sankoh is sent to Freetown and he's put on trial and he's  
26 condemned, right? Yes. It can't be that Foday Sankoh is giving  
27 instructions to Sam Bockarie that he has to inquire from me. I'm  
28 not aware of - I mean, it's impossible.

29 But, having said that, one of the things that I'm beginning



1 to see here, and I think I ought to interject it in this trial,  
2 is the lack of understanding on a lot of the part of these RUF  
3 people that I have seen coming here regarding my own involvement  
4 on the Committee of Five and my own role as a mediator at that  
12:46:31 5 time, a lot of people don't understand it. And so whether it is  
6 intervening on that side, moving people - by moving people I  
7 mean, even the coming of Sam Bockarie, the coming of Johnny Paul  
8 Koroma, they see this as me controlling things. They don't  
9 understand what my role is as a mediator for ECOWAS and acting at  
12:46:58 10 this time. So a lot of these people here do not understand that,  
11 and I guess this could account for the confusion, "Hey, Mr Taylor  
12 is controlling."

13 Okay, so maybe one of my own sins is getting involved as a  
14 mediator for the committee - I mean, for ECOWAS at this time.  
12:47:20 15 Because for this man to be talking about even communication of  
16 orders from Foday Sankoh that is being followed up by me between  
17 early 1998 and April - because what I know by - well, it depends  
18 again how they play with it. April 1999, I know by mid-April  
19 1999, on or about 15 or 17 April, Foday Sankoh is airlifted from  
12:47:49 20 Freetown --

21 Q. Where was he in Freetown?

22 A. He was in prison.

23 Q. And remember the time frame this witness is talking about,  
24 early 1998 until April 1999.

12:48:03 25 A. Yes. On a Beechcraft aircraft that the UN gets permission  
26 from the Government of Liberia and he's moved into Lome around 15  
27 to 17 April 1999. So I don't know if Foday Sankoh had contacts  
28 or was permitted to speak to these people. I don't know, but I  
29 doubt it, because he was a prisoner up until - from our

1 understanding, up until the signing of the Lome agreement in July  
2 1999. While it is true Foday Sankoh was on the ground moving up  
3 and down in Lome, but if he did not sign that Lome agreement, he  
4 was not going to be a free man. He was going right back to jail.

12:48:57 5 So his freedom depended on a negotiated settlement in Lome. I  
6 knew that and most of our colleagues knew that. That's why he  
7 was escorted - he under escort to Lome, he moved around freely,  
8 but Foday Sankoh was reminded by me and many others in two nights  
9 of sleeplessness, "Listen, you have a choice of signing this  
12:49:22 10 agreement, or we can go back to status quo." He was told that in  
11 this meeting. Two nights. I get there on or about 5 July 1999.  
12 Obasanjo, Eyadema, Blaise Compaore, we spent two nights.

13 So I have a serious difficulty with this time and the  
14 account of this witness given the facts that I know, and I stand  
12:49:44 15 corrected on these facts. I have serious difficulties with this  
16 whole explanation that this witness is giving. I say it is not  
17 true.

18 Q. Well, he continues in this vein, page --

19 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, sorry to interrupt, but I  
12:50:00 20 think it's important. The LiveNote transcript has the witness as  
21 saying that on a Beechcraft airport that the UN gets permission  
22 from the government and he, meaning Sankoh, is moved into Lungi.  
23 I think it's Lome.

24 THE WITNESS: And a Beechcraft aircraft, not airport.

12:50:25 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Yes, we've looked at those code cables detailing the  
27 request of the Liberian government for overflight clearance for  
28 that Beechcraft aircraft.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, the witness continues in this vein, Mr Taylor, page  
2 21489 of the transcript commencing at line 7:

3 "A. ... when Sam Bockarie would want to see Mr Taylor, or  
4 anything that he thought should not be discussed on air, he  
12:50:59 5 would just make a request from BY - I mean Benjamin Yeaten  
6 - that he wanted to go to Monrovia.

7 Even though there was a sat phone communication, by the  
8 time we had our communication in Buedu those communications  
9 used to go on, because I can even recall some time when

12:51:22 10 during the Mosquito Spray operation when it initially  
11 started I remember there was a communication between

12 Benjamin Yeaten and Mosquito for Mosquito to send  
13 reinforcement across to Liberia in Kolahun, Voinjama area,  
14 to go and fight against Mosquito Spray - Mosquito Spray's  
12:51:46 15 fighters. "

16 Now, remember, we're in the period - let's just remind  
17 ourselves what the witness was told on the previous page:

18 "Q. ... we were focusing on the time when you were  
19 assigned as a radio operation [sic] in Buedu from early  
12:52:08 20 1998 until April 1999. The following questions are still  
21 related to this time period, do you understand?

22 A. Yes. "

23 In this time period, Mr Taylor, he's saying there's a  
24 Mosquito Spray incursion. Now, in April 1999, was there such an  
12:52:30 25 event?

26 A. April 1999, there is movement to Lome. We - let me see.  
27 No, I do not think it is at this time. We do have an incursion -  
28 yeah, I think there are some problems in April 1999, as we are  
29 undertaking Lome. I think, yeah, there is a little problem where

1 there is an incursion into Lofa.

2 Q. Was it by Mosquito Spray?

3 A. No, it was not by Mosquito Spray. That was in '98.

4 Q. No. But you understand what this means? Remember, the

12:53:20 5 witness has been directed to apply his mind to this time period

6 and the witness is saying, during this time period there's an

7 incursion involving Mosquito Spray and there is a request from

8 Liberia for the RUF to send reinforcements to deal with that

9 situation. Do you understand?

12:53:46 10 A. No, but there is no such thing at this time that the RUF or

11 any other time is asked to send reinforcement into Liberia. So

12 this is totally out.

13 Q. Well, let's just assume for the sake of argument that the

14 witness, given the time period he's being told to direct his mind

12:54:08 15 to, is talking about that incursion that took place in April

16 1999, that means, Mr Taylor, that you were running a two-track

17 approach. On the one hand, you're assisting the United Nations

18 to airlift RUF representatives to Lome. At the same time, you're

19 requesting Sam Bockarie to send fighters across the border to

12:54:36 20 fight your own little domestic battles. Do you see?

21 A. Yes, I see what he's talking about. Yes, I do.

22 Q. What do you say about that?

23 A. I say that's total nonsense. In fact, the area that he's

24 talking about, don't forget that the UN - where are they? They

12:54:54 25 are not picking up - and this is not a one-day situation. Most

26 of April is used removing people left and right, and that would

27 be totally ludicrous to say that while we're doing everything to

28 remove these people, get them from Sierra Leone, that I'm

29 supposed to be requesting. It is totally false. That's not

1 true.

2 Q. Now, let's deal with another detail whilst we're looking at  
3 that passage and it's this: "When Sam Bockarie would want to see  
4 Mr Taylor or anything that he thought should not be discussed on  
12:55:30 5 air, he would just make a request from Benjamin Yeaten that he  
6 wanted to go to Monrovia." What do you say about that?

7 A. I would not know if he spoke to Benjamin, but it would not  
8 be unusual during the time that Sam Bockarie is in touch with us  
9 for him to either maybe speaking to Benjamin and say, "I would  
12:55:58 10 like to come." I wouldn't put too much to - as far as denying  
11 that this was possible. I still think that it would be possible  
12 for Benjamin, within the period that we actually bring Sam  
13 Bockarie in that, you know, throughout late '98 throughout '99,  
14 but the period he's talking about is early '98 to mid-1999, which  
12:56:24 15 is not the real case, but within the time frame that he does  
16 come, I wouldn't object to the fact that it's possible he could  
17 have spoken to Benjamin Yeaten, no. It's possible.

18 Q. Very well. Page 21490, line 13:

19 "Q. Now with regard to these communications related to  
12:56:59 20 ammunition, describe what they were - what would happen  
21 with these communications? How would they work?

22 A. Like, for example, if Mosquito's sat phone had a  
23 problem and there was demand for ammunition, they would  
24 just give a direct instruction to the radio operator to  
12:57:18 25 send a message to Sunlight - sorry, Benjamin Yeaten through  
26 Sunlight, that we did not have ammunition or we were under  
27 enemy pressure. Then Sunlight would come back on the air  
28 and say that according to Benjamin Yeaten, Mosquito should  
29 wait for him. That is, Benjamin Yeaten to consult with

1 Zero-Four-Seven, and that was Mr Taylor. And sunlight  
2 would call again after some time and he would tell Mosquito  
3 that, 'Okay, you Mosquito' - Sunlight would tell Mosquito  
4 that according to Benjamin Yeaten, you should travel to  
12:57:57 5 Monrovia or send somebody to Monrovia to come and receive  
6 some materials. By that I mean ammunition. Sometimes  
7 Benjamin Yeaten would send, like, Jungle or Zigzag Marzah  
8 or one other Mosquito, a Liberian Mosquito. He was in  
9 Liberia. He was called Mosquito. He was one of Charlie's  
12:58:25 10 securities. Any of them, Benjamin could use them. They  
11 were the ones that Benjamin used to dispatch materials to  
12 Sierra Leone."

13 Detail: Zero-Four-Seven, who's that?

14 A. Well, at this time I have used that code name, but as  
12:58:41 15 President of Liberia I'm called Unit 1. So remember I said it  
16 came from Ebony and it would change. By this particular time  
17 I'm called Unit 1.

18 But there's another interesting piece of information here.  
19 I see that the material that are being dispatched, so to speak,  
12:59:04 20 to Sierra Leone, we're talking about the period - am I right,  
21 we're talking about 1998 going into --

22 Q. April 1999. We're still talking about the same period.

23 A. Okay. What he's saying here, that he was a Liberian, he  
24 was called Mosquito, and he was one of Charles Taylor's  
12:59:26 25 securities. Now, there was, and there is, a Mosquito in Liberia,  
26 and he has been there from the beginning of the war. In fact, he  
27 had that Mosquito name long before anybody called Mosquito. But  
28 what is interesting about this, remember now we're talking about  
29 1999 and 1998. I don't hear Zigzag Marzah here. I don't hear

1 Sampson Weah here. There's a new introduction about somebody  
2 that is now carrying ammunition and now that is Mosquito, whose  
3 real name is Christopher Varmos [phon]. Now I just want us to  
4 put a flag up on this one, because this period there's ammunition  
13:00:12 5 that's supposed to be going and there's not a Zigzag Marzah  
6 involved, there's not --

7 Q. Well, let me correct you to this extent, Mr Taylor. It  
8 reads: "Sometimes Benjamin would send, like, Jungle or Zigzag  
9 Marzah, or one other Mosquito, a Liberian Mosquito".

13:00:34 10 A. Oh, no. Okay. I didn't see the other part of that, okay?

11 Q. No problem.

12 A. Because it just caught me that I didn't hear those names  
13 before. Okay. Well, even though he mentions that, but that is  
14 not true Mosquito, because this Mosquito --

13:00:52 15 Q. Which Mosquito?

16 A. General Christopher Varmos was a senior general that would  
17 not go on an errand for a Benjamin Yeaten, so that would be out  
18 of the question. But that - in the period that he's talk about  
19 that doesn't happen, but I guess he's just calling names here,  
13:01:14 20 because these people know people on the ground and he's just  
21 talking. But General Varmos would not - I don't think Benjamin  
22 would disrespect a colleague to go run an errand for him like  
23 this, no.

24 And let me just put another bit of information on this  
13:01:31 25 satellite telephone business, because Sam Bockarie did have a  
26 satellite telephone. The problem that they had with that  
27 telephone was these telephones, you have to pay the bills for  
28 them and the reason why I gave him - I gave him a satellite  
29 telephone in October is the - it was a new company and we could -

1 he could buy the service cards in Monrovia, okay? The old  
2 telephone he could not - in fact, they had - they could not pay  
3 the bill. So I think it's important that we mention that he did  
4 have a phone before I met him, but we gave him one because of the  
13:02:17 5 service that we needed to have between he, myself and any other  
6 member of the committee that he wanted to talk to. And I think  
7 he did utilise it, because I did not arrange for him to go to  
8 meet the chairman of the OAU in late November. He organised that  
9 on himself - on his own.

13:02:37 10 Q. Talking about the satellite phone, Mr Taylor, was it  
11 possible for Sam Bockarie to top up or recharge the credit on his  
12 phone in Sierra Leone?

13 A. No. Well, okay, yes. But there's a procedure. Yes, I  
14 will say no and yes. Yes - no in that the cards were not there,  
13:03:07 15 but what happen on the Thuraya - the Thuraya telephones, they  
16 sell what we call scratch - they sell cards for a certain number  
17 of units that you can buy. So it's possible for somebody in  
18 Monrovia to buy a Thuraya - a certain number of credits and text  
19 it to you and then you could then get the numbers and you would  
13:03:35 20 dial - I think it's - you dial to the Thuraya operator when  
21 you're about to charge up and they can charge it. Yes, they can  
22 do that.

23 Q. Because at page 21510 in that regard the witness says this  
24 at line 28:

13:03:56 25 "A. Well, the satellite phone which Mosquito used most  
26 often were for direct talks with Benjamin Yeaten, and it  
27 was the same sat phone that Mosquito used for connection  
28 with BBC to share the views of the RUF with the world.

29 Q. Now, how do you know Sam Bockarie was using this



1 satellite phone for direct talks with Benjamin Yeaten?

2 A. Many times he told me myself to tell Benjamin Yeaten to  
3 call him on his sat phone. I can recall sometimes -  
4 sometimes he told me to tell Benjamin Yeaten to send credit  
13:04:38 5 for him so that he would recharge his account, and  
6 sometimes I would stand close to Sam Bockarie while he  
7 would be talking to Benjamin directly."

8 So do you agree with that, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Well, I agree that he could send him credit. His standing  
13:04:58 10 next to Benjamin contrasts seriously with - you know, with what  
11 other witnesses have said. But, yes, it's possible to send  
12 credits. It's possible, yes.

13 Q. And it continues:

14 "Q. Now, you said that you recall that there were  
13:05:17 15 sometimes that he told you to tell Benjamin Yeaten to send  
16 credit for him so that he would recharge his account. Who  
17 told you this?

18 A. Sam Bockarie.

19 Q. And specifically how did this work?

13:05:28 20 A. Well, I transmitted the message directly to Sunlight.  
21 From Sunlight, then Sunlight in turn would pass it on to  
22 Benjamin, and then Sunlight will come back to me on the  
23 radio and say, 'Daf, the message has reached Benjamin and  
24 he will act on it.'

13:05:44 25 Q. Did you know how the satellite phone was topped up?

26 A. No."

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I can see your concern, Mr Taylor, but my  
28 recollection is the only thing protected about this witness is  
29 his contact details, address and so forth.

1 THE WITNESS: Okay.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Then he's asked, page 21511, line 26:

4 "Q. Which of the phones - let's start from the time you  
13:06:13 5 arrived. When you started your assignment in Buedu, did  
6 Sam Bockarie have a satellite phone?

7 A. No. Initially when we got there, no.

8 Q. When did he obtain one?

9 A. It was after Johnny Paul's arrival from Freetown.

13:06:27 10 Q. And later on then you said he obtained a satellite  
11 phone from Charles Taylor. Do you know when this happened?

12 A. Yes, it was sometime around early 1998."

13 Do you see the significance of that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yeah, that's why I said that some of - he's got it wrong.

13:06:51 15 It's really - it's late 1998.

16 Q. Well, this witness disagrees. I'm on page 21512, line 16:

17 "Q. This incident you are referring to when Johnny Paul  
18 Koroma's phone was obtained, when did that happen? Can you  
19 approximate when?

13:07:18 20 A. Well, I do not recall the exact date, but what I know  
21 is that it was early 1998. That was after we had withdrawn  
22 from Kenema and when they too had moved from Freetown and  
23 arrived.

24 Q. And finally, you said that one of these phones was  
13:07:37 25 given to Sam Bockarie by Charles Taylor. How do you know  
26 that?

27 A. I recall that I made one other trip with Sam Bockarie  
28 to Monrovia, and on our return he handed over a bag to me  
29 for me to carry. He told me that it was a satellite phone

1 that was in there, and he told me it was the Papay who gave  
2 it to him, and by that he was referring to Charles Taylor. "

3 Now, it's difficult to identify when that one other trip  
4 was, but it's interesting that when we continue with the

13:08:28 5 testimony of this individual, last line, line 29 on page 21521 we  
6 find this:

7 "Q. Now, earlier you said that you yourself made trips to  
8 Monrovia. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

13:08:47 10 Q. You've described one of those trips that occurred after  
11 the ECOMOG intervention?"

12 Now, we looked at that in some detail, did we not,

13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, we did.

13:09:00 15 Q. "Q. Now, during your time in Buedu when you were working  
16 as a radio operator, about how many trips did you make to  
17 Monrovia?

18 A. Roughly seven.

19 Q. Now, you've also referred to an incident of the  
13:09:19 20 invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. Can you recall  
21 about how many of these trips you made to Monrovia before  
22 that incident, 6 January 1999?

23 A. I had gone there up to six times. Because after 6  
24 January, I only went to Monrovia once with Sam Bockarie,  
13:09:43 25 and that was during Sam Bockarie's regime. That apart,  
26 it's only when I went there again and boarded a flight to  
27 go to Togo. That one is not included, the time I went to  
28 Monrovia to transit and travel to Togo.

29 Q. Okay. I want to focus now on the trips that you made -

1 that you say that you made between when you arrived after  
2 your first trip up to 6 January 1999, and you said you went  
3 approximately six times."

4 There was then some clarification of the question asked and  
13:10:35 5 then he continues over the page at page 21514, line 3:

6 "A. Well, Mosquito had recognised me to be one of the  
7 operators who had been used to the Liberian communications  
8 network. He knew that I was one of the operators that had  
9 been used to their communication system. And that besides,  
13:11:00 10 it was an appointment, because the first trip that I made  
11 with him I did not cause any problem, and during the second  
12 I did not cause any problems, and when I travelled with him  
13 I did my job accordingly, the way I was supposed to do. So  
14 I thought it was just because of the kind of way I was  
13:11:22 15 doing my job, that was the more reason why I was travelling  
16 with him. That was the reason why I got the instruction to  
17 travel with Mosquito."

18 Then he's asked about the route they took. Then he's asked  
19 this question at line 26 on the same page:

13:11:45 20 "Q. Why was Sam Bockarie making these trips, do you know?

21 A. Yes, I know some of the reasons why he made those  
22 trips.

23 Q. What were those reasons?

24 A. Well, to the best of my knowledge - to the best of my  
13:12:05 25 knowledge, Sam Bockarie used to go to Monrovia to receive  
26 ammunition, sometimes some other logistics or condiments,  
27 food supplies, and then sometimes he would go to Monrovia  
28 on the instruction of Zero-Four-Seven for briefing. He  
29 would go to Monrovia on instruction from Zero-Four-Seven

1 for briefing.

2 Q. How do you know this?

3 A. Well, most times even when Mosquito will talk directly  
4 with Benjamin Yeaten and even if it was on the sat phone  
13:12:46 5 that he discussed with Benjamin Yeaten and if he got any  
6 information or instruction from Benjamin Yeaten to travel  
7 to Monrovia, he would tell his radio operators. And if  
8 there was any radio operator who was immediately around he  
9 would tell them and those were not informations that he  
13:13:13 10 decided to hide away from us. And for me sometimes I  
11 travelled with Mosquito on some of these trips. So  
12 Mosquito used to tell me directly when he got instructions  
13 from the Papay to go to Monrovia. He will say, 'Daf,  
14 prepare yourself and move with me.'

13:13:31 15 Q. Aside from yourself and Mosquito, who else would  
16 typically be on these trips?

17 A. Well, up until the time I left Buedu to go to Lome I  
18 was one of the operators who made those trips. Major  
19 Sellay - are you referring to the operators?

13:13:49 20 Q. Well, aside from radio operators, who else would  
21 typically go on these trips?

22 A. On those trips sometimes Mosquito had some bodyguards  
23 that he did not leave behind at all because there was the  
24 adjutant general, the RUF adjutant general, who was called  
13:14:07 25 Rashid, he never used to leave him behind. And also like  
26 Sellay, he never used to leave him behind. And sometimes  
27 he would go with Eddie Kanneh. Sometimes he would go to Pa  
28 Rogers, apart from me."

29 Let's pause there. Now, important question, Mr Taylor:

1 This radio operator is being asked what was some of the reasons  
2 why Sam Bockarie made the trips to Monrovia and he says, one, to  
3 receive ammunition, sometimes for other logistics and also to  
4 receive briefings from you, or instructions. Mr Taylor, what was  
13:15:02 5 the reason for Sam Bockarie travelling to Monrovia after you  
6 first made contact as you tell us in September 1998?

7 A. Only in pursuing him to agree to a ceasefire and the  
8 implementation of the 1996 Abidjan agreement. That was all. All  
9 of the trips that he makes, this is what it is all about. It's  
13:15:33 10 about the peace process that Sam Bockarie is being urged very  
11 much. He's also told that by the chairman of the OAU. He's  
12 under a lot of pressure to agree to accept peace. This is all  
13 the reason why he's travelling. No other reason.

14 Q. Did he on occasions travel with Eddie Kanneh?

13:16:00 15 A. I remember, yes, on a couple - I remember, from the second  
16 time that Sam Bockarie visited, there was a gentleman with him  
17 called Eddie Kanneh, yes. Some of the other meetings, I did not  
18 see the same gentleman, but we must be - as we're going through  
19 these operators, something has caught my attention.

13:16:28 20 Q. Tell us.

21 A. All of these operators - I remember one operator came here  
22 and described Sam Bockarie as I think he said bragard. I think  
23 he said bragard, that he told everybody everything. So I'm  
24 saying this is consistent now with these operators. They're all  
13:16:48 25 saying, "He talked everything. He talked everything. He told us  
26 everything." So it may be interesting to observe the consistency  
27 of this because this is to tie up - these are the loose ends of  
28 this lie. If Sam Bockarie is an individual that would be - if  
29 he's speaking at this level with radio operators, everything that

1 he's discussing with Heads of State and officials with radio  
2 operators, then I have a lot of questions about how - what kind  
3 of leadership he has. But when you look at the way that some of  
4 these questions are asked to these people, I mean, they are very  
13:17:25 5 - this whole thing has been so simplified. "How did you know  
6 that? Oh, somebody told me. And how did he get from Buedu to  
7 Monrovia?" Who doesn't know that there's one road from the  
8 border there in Lofa that the whole world knows that there's one  
9 road coming from Foya, Kolahun, Voinjama, Zorzor, Gbarnga. There  
13:17:53 10 is no other road. It's not like you would forget. But the  
11 simplistic nature of this whole trial and what is going on, I  
12 mean, it's very - it's a terrible situation here. "How did you  
13 know? Well, somebody told me. And how did he get from Buedu to  
14 Gbarnga? He came through Zorzor and Voinjama." Of course he  
13:18:16 15 came through Zorzor and Voinjama, because it's the only way to  
16 come if they're coming.

17 So, you know, you ask these type of simple questions to  
18 these witnesses and they just - they're talking. "How did you  
19 get to know Sam Bockarie? He used to brag. He told everybody."  
13:18:32 20 I don't care whether you can be the stupidest leader in the  
21 world, you don't talk important things with messengers and little  
22 radio operators. So, I mean, I guess this is the nature of  
23 things here, I guess, with me. But this boy here, yes, wherever  
24 he goes right there, I will tell this Court, "Oh, yes, this  
13:18:50 25 happened, that happened." But that Sam Bockarie is supposed to  
26 be coming, he doesn't know why Sam Bockarie is coming to Monrovia  
27 and he concludes that he's coming for a - and if we remember  
28 these period, I wouldn't even doubt, based on evidence before  
29 this Court, this period Sam Bockarie going back through Lofa and

1 if they had made arrangement with their old colleagues for a  
2 little ammunition, I mean, which some of their witnesses have  
3 said, yes. But for Sam Bockarie to come to Charles Taylor - and  
4 this whole case rests on - look, if this Court believes that I  
13:19:28 5 had material between disarmament up until I would say 2001 and  
6 2002 where I wrote the United Nations and told the Security  
7 Council that I would bring ammunition for legitimate  
8 self-defence, if this Court believes that I had material at the  
9 quantity that these people are talking about, then I'm already  
13:19:54 10 guilty. There was no such thing in that country with  
11 Charles Taylor having material; but the whole case is built on:  
12 "He's having material. He's distributing it." It's not true.  
13 It's not true. I guess this is --

14 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let's continue with the witness's  
13:20:17 15 evidence, because you recall he said that this trip in February  
16 1998 was the first trip he made to Monrovia with Sam Bockarie,  
17 yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Well, he goes on, page 21516, line 17:  
13:20:43 20 "Q. ... Do you recall your second trip to Monrovia?

21 A. Yes. I recall part of my second trip to Monrovia. I  
22 recall.

23 Q. Can you describe for the Court that trip?

24 A. Yes. The second trip I made to Monrovia was also with  
13:20:59 25 Mosquito and on that trip I went with Mosquito and that was  
26 the trip that we made when - I think when I went with one  
27 of the code. I had to travel the code, the communication  
28 code, the RUF communication code, to Sunlight.

29 Q. Why were you travelling with the RUF communication code



1 to Sunlight?

13:21:42 2 A. For him to be able to monitor communications directly  
3 from Sierra Leone and for him to use the code for himself  
4 so that he will be able to give briefings to Benjamin at  
5 any time when Benjamin asked him about updates from Sierra  
6 Leone. And also so that at any time he came to the RUF  
7 radio net he would not use the Liberian voice procedure  
8 there and he would not use the Liberian code there.  
9 Instead he would use the RUF codes on the RUF net, radio  
13:22:06 10 net.

11 Q. Who instructed you, if anyone, to give these codes to  
12 Sunlight?

13 A. It was the overall signals commander, and that was the  
14 late Sellay. The late Sellay M Duwor."

13:22:29 15 Then he goes on to explain that the codes they'd been using  
16 that had been changed, that's line 26 on page 21517, and he  
17 explains on page 21518 the regularity with which those changes  
18 took place. Then to date this trip we move to page 21519, line  
19 16:

13:22:53 20 "Q. Can you approximate when this trip occurred?

21 A. Yes, we were approaching mid-1998. Yes, around  
22 mid-1998. We were approaching mid-1998."

23 Jump to line 27:

13:23:24 24 "THE WITNESS: ... when we arrived in Monrovia I was just  
25 in the radio room with Sunlight - I stayed in the radio  
26 room with Sunlight - and then Mosquito and Benjamin and  
27 others went out.

28 MR SANTORA:

29 Q. Do you know where they went?

1 A. Yes, they went to meet with the CIC, the commander in  
2 chief, at that time.

3 Q. Who was the commander in chief?

4 A. Former President Taylor. They went to meet him,  
13:24:15 5 because Mosquito told me to wait on him in the radio room  
6 at Benjamin's house and he told me that they were going to  
7 see the Papay.

8 Q. Who actually was with Mosquito? Do you recall anybody  
9 else?

13:24:32 10 A. I recall that Rashid was with him. Rashid was one of  
11 the men who was with Mosquito, yes, when he went with  
12 Benjamin.

13 Q. How long did you stay in Monrovia this time?

14 A. We spent just about a day in Monrovia. It was just for  
13:24:52 15 a day and the following day we returned."

16 He is then asked who else went on the trip, which I'm not  
17 going to trouble with. But then when we go over the page to page  
18 21521 we find this: "What happened after they left?"

19 No, to put it in context I need to start earlier. Bottom  
13:25:27 20 of page 21520:

21 "Q. Now you said that Sunlight, Mosquito and others went  
22 to meet the commander in chief, former President Taylor.  
23 About how long were they gone for, can you recall?

24 A. I said Benjamin Yeaten. I said Benjamin Yeaten.  
13:25:49 25 Benjamin Yeaten, Mosquito and Rashid, they went to the  
26 commander-in-chief.

27 Q. And how long were they gone for?

28 A. When they went in the morning, I can say almost for the  
29 rest of the day Mosquito did not return at Benjamin's

1 house. He did not come there.

2 Q. Okay, where did they - well, did you - what happened  
3 after they left?

4 A. After they had left they were out for the whole day,  
13:26:22 5 and it was not until in the evening that the vehicles we  
6 had travelled with, they brought those vehicles loaded with  
7 ammunition and then we travelled back to Buedu.

8 Q. Who brought these vehicles loaded with ammunition?

9 A. Mosquito and Benjamin Yeaten.

13:26:44 10 Q. Do you know where this ammunition came from?

11 A. I do not know where they exactly loaded these  
12 ammunition in the vehicle.

13 Q. And how many vehicles do you recall had ammunition in  
14 them?

13:26:57 15 A. They went to two vehicles.

16 Q. And when you say that they returned with these vehicles  
17 of ammunition, where did they actually return to?

18 A. They came back to Benjamin Yeaten's house where  
19 Mosquito has left us. That was where they picked me up  
13:27:14 20 again and then we returned to Sierra Leone.

21 Q. So did they leave and come back on the same day?

22 A. Yes, yes."

23 Over the page to page 21522. No, let's pause there.

24 Mid-1998. Bockarie is back in Monrovia after a few months, meets  
13:27:46 25 with you and Benjamin Yeaten, ends up heading back to Sierra  
26 Leone with two carloads of ammunition. What do you say about  
27 that, Mr Taylor.

28 A. It's totally false. We are talking about February now, the  
29 first trip. Mid 1998? What'd we say, July. I would say about

1 mid-June, July.

2 Q. Six months later?

3 A. And he is saying that they went and came right back almost  
4 the same - they returned the same day or the next day, and they

13:28:21 5 went and came right back. But don't let's forget the period that

6 we're talking about here. If we're talking about mid - the

7 middle of the year in that part of the world, we're talking about

8 the rainy season. That's what we're talking about if we're

9 talking about June, July. Even if somebody is going on that road

13:28:41 10 to Sierra Leone, it would take you a couple of days at least on

11 the road. That's the rainy season. Terrible, terrible road. So

12 again this - you know, I don't know what's going into these

13 people's heads and what he's saying, but the period in question

14 is totally erroneous. Totally erroneous.

13:29:00 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we might take the lunch break now

16 and we'll resume at 2.30.

17 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

18 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

14:30:22 20 Q. Now, before the break, Mr Taylor, we were looking at the

21 trips made by this radio operator with Sam Bockarie to Monrovia,

22 yes? The last trip we looked at is timed by the witness as mid

23 1998. Now, moving on. At page 21522 of the transcript the

24 witness is asked this question, line 7:

14:31:08 25 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie always go on these trips with you?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Was there any - how many times did he not go on these

28 trips with you?

29 A. There were two trips that we made that Sam did not go

1 with us - no, with me.

2 Q. And what were these trips? Can you approximately tell  
3 me when with these occurred?

4 A. Yes. To be specific, one of the trips was immediately  
14:31:35 5 after the 6 January invasion - or I can say during  
6 immediately when our men had entered Freetown, that is, the  
7 AFRC/RUF fighters. Mosquito contacted Benjamin Yeaten and  
8 told him that that was the situation. He said our men had  
9 entered. That was Mosquito speaking to Benjamin Yeaten,  
14:32:05 10 and he was telling him exactly that that was the  
11 situation - Benjamin. He said, 'Now our men are in the  
12 Freetown in the city presently.' He said the only problem  
13 is that we are short of ammunition, and so he said, 'I want  
14 you to reinforce us with the ammunition.' That was  
14:32:25 15 Mosquito speaking. And when I say 'he', I am quote  
16 directly what it was Mosquito was speaking.

17 Q. I will come on to that particular incident. But prior  
18 to 6 January was there any occasion when you travelled to  
19 Monrovia without Sam Bockarie; do you recall?"

14:32:51 20 Now, Mr Taylor, pausing there. Now, I will come to it in a  
21 bit more detail in a moment, but do you see what the witness is  
22 saying here? That there is a visit immediately after the 6  
23 January invasion, yes? A visit to Monrovia. I want you to hold  
24 that thought and we will come back to it. Now, he goes on:

14:33:25 25 "Q. I would come to that particular incident, but prior to  
26 6 January was there any occasion when you travelled to  
27 Monrovia without Sam Bockarie; do you recall?"

28 A. Yes, yes.

29 Q. When was that? Can you approximately tell when?

1 A. It was around mid 1998.

2 Q. And what was the purpose of that trip?

3 A. It was ammunition that I went to receive: Myself,  
4 Victor and the driver, Bongo Man - I mean, Yellow Man and  
14:34:12 5 Jungle."

6 Now, let us just remind ourselves of this: Remember, the  
7 second trip in 1998 was mid 1998, you remember that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The witness is now saying at page 21523 that this trip  
14:34:36 10 without Mosquito is also mid 1998. Do you see that?

11 A. So in other words, he is making two trips.

12 Q. Well, no. Mosquito makes one trip, page 21516, yes? "The  
13 second trip I made to Monrovia", line 21 page 21516, "was also  
14 with Mosquito."

14:35:04 15 Now, page 21522: "Was there any occasion when you  
16 travelled to Monrovia without Sam Bockarie?

17 Answer, page 215223, "It was around mid 1998."

18 So here we have in the middle of 1998 a second visit to  
19 Monrovia by members of the RUF, although on this occasion

14:35:35 20 Bockarie doesn't come. Do you follow me? So this the third time  
21 - visit this witness talking about in 1998, and he continues.

22 "Q. How come Sam Bockarie didn't go?

23 A. Well, it was not at all times that Sam Bockarie

24 actually went to Monrovia to receive consignment. Apart

14:35:57 25 from me, sometimes he sent other people to go and receive  
26 consignments from Monrovia. Because of the situation on

27 the ground, sometimes he wouldn't be able to move away too  
28 far from the frontline."

29 Yet, remember, immediately after the ECOMOG intervention,

1 he did move from the front line and go to Monrovia, but we  
2 continue.

3 "Q. On this particular occasion when you went with Yellow  
4 Man and - when you went without Sam Bockarie and you went  
14:36:28 5 with Yellow Man, Victor and Jungle, do you know why Sam  
6 Bockarie didn't go on this particular occasion?

7 A. Yes. The reason why Sam Bockarie did not go at that  
8 particular time was because he was supposed to hold a  
9 meeting some commanders from the various frontlines.

14:36:50 10 Q. Do you know if this meeting was held? I am not asking  
11 about the meeting. I am just asking you whether or not you  
12 knew if the meeting occurred?

13 A. Yes."

14 Then he goes on, page 21524:

14:37:11 15 "A. Yes, the meeting took place.

16 Q. Now, aside from going on trips to Monrovia, did you  
17 make any other trips into Liberia during this time period  
18 when you were working as a radio operator in Buedu?"

19 Remind ourselves, time period: Middle of 1998 - no, early  
14:37:34 20 1998 to April 1999. Have you got that clear, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. "A. Yes.

23 Q. Describe the nature of these trips.

24 A. At one point in time also I recall - and that was  
14:37:47 25 before the 6 January operation in Freetown - before the 6  
26 January operation in Freetown I was in convoy with  
27 Mosquito, Eddie Kanneh, Pa Rodgers, together with Shabado  
28 and others amongst Sam Bockarie's securities, and we  
29 travelled to Monrovia."

1           So this is the fourth trip, apart from the 6 January trip,  
2 that he is talking about. Do you follow me?

3       A.     Uh-huh.

4       Q.     Remember he has described one in February with Mosquito,  
14:38:27 5 one in mid 1998 without Mosquito, yes? He is describing this  
6 trip now, and then we have the 6 January trip. So we will come  
7 to them.

8           "Q. Describe the nature of this trips?

9       A.     At one point in time also I recall - and that was  
14:38:48 10 before the 6 January operation in Freetown - before the 6  
11 January operation in Freetown I was in a convoy with  
12 Mosquito, Eddie Kanneh, Pa Rodgers, together with Shabado and  
13 others, amongst Sam Bockarie's securities and we  
14 travelled to Monrovia."

14:39:06 15           He is then asked this question:

16       "Q. Were there any particular occasions that you travelled  
17 to other places in Liberia during this time period?

18       A.     Yes.

19       Q.     Where were these locations?

14:39:20 20       A.     I also recall that at a point in time - at a point in  
21 time I travelled with - we travelled to Voinjama - the  
22 Voinjama area together with Shabado, Foday and others to go  
23 and receive some ammunition in Voinjama at one point in  
24 time.

14:39:41 25       Q.     Can you say approximately when this was?

26       A.     Mid 1998."

27           So this is the third trip he is making in mid 1998. Do you  
28 get it?

29       A.     Uh-huh.



1 Q. "Q. Why were you going to Voinjama to receive  
2 ammunitions?

3 A. Well, those ammunitions that Mosquito - I mean, some  
4 ex-fighters had buried in the ground that they were digging  
14:40:14 5 out again, there was a commander on the ground there who  
6 was responsible in that area for these ammunition and who  
7 was assembling them. So after assembling them, Mosquito  
8 would send people to go and collect them from there. And  
9 that did not just happen in Voinjama. It happened in some  
14:40:36 10 other areas like Vahun, Foya, areas along the border area.  
11 And those ammunition were kept underground by  
12 ex-combatants. That was before the disarmament in Liberia,  
13 and that was what led to the election of Mr Taylor.

14 Q. When you say 'ex-fighters', who do you mean?

14:41:00 15 A. Well, I am not referring to any distinct group,  
16 actually, in respect of this to say it was so and so group  
17 or so and so group.

18 Q. So who were you referring to then when you say  
19 'ex-fighters' were --

14:41:14 20 A. Liberian ex-fighters.

21 Q. And do you know any of the groups that they were  
22 affiliated with?

23 A. No, because I was not based there in that place. I  
24 only went there to receive. I only went as part of a  
14:41:32 25 receiving team at that time.

26 Q. How were you actually obtaining these ammunitions?

27 A. Well, in this case Mosquito used to send people to go  
28 into Liberia, because by then all the commanders who were  
29 based in the various towns, all of them knew about the kind

1 of coordination that was going on, the way we coordinated  
2 the operations. So they were all well informed about the  
3 kind of operations that was going on, so they used to  
4 protect people. Like, for instance, Kennedy - C0 Kennedy.  
14:42:12 5 Sometimes Mosquito used to send him there and secure these  
6 ammuni tions. Sometimes Mosquito used to send different  
7 people. Sometimes he even sent Sellay, commander, because  
8 that was his area."

9 Page 21526 we have reached, line 13:

14:42:42 10 "Q. How would Mosquito send them? How?

11 A. He used to give them physical cash money for them to  
12 go, but before that he would have spoken with the commander  
13 on the ground there and that commander in charge will be  
14 well informed on the ground in Liberia. I mean the  
14:43:04 15 commander in charge on the ground in Liberia, Mosquito  
16 would have spoken with that person and informed the person  
17 about the issue. And at that time those ammunition had  
18 been buried in the bushes and by then nobody actually  
19 needed them, so they thought they could just sell them and  
14:43:23 20 get something out of it.

21 Q. When you say physical cash, what do you mean exactly?

22 A. Money. Like US dollars.

23 Q. Do you know where Sam Bockarie obtained these US  
24 dollars?

14:43:40 25 A. Yes. Almost any trip Sam Bockarie made to Monrovia he  
26 used to get money from Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor used to give  
27 him sometimes 20,000 United States dollars. Sometimes  
28 10,000 United States dollars. The amount used to vary,  
29 but I know that any trips Sam made he used to get it. The

1 way I used to know about that, I don't know whether the  
2 figures he used to give me were accurate, but he used  
3 to say, 'Oh, Solution, but the Pa has given us something  
4 here, so I want you guys also to have this money and put it  
14:44:22 5 in your pockets.' Sometimes he used to give me something  
6 like 50 US dollars or 100 US dollars out that Mr Taylor  
7 used to give them."

8 Q. Now, these trips you are referring to to these  
9 locations in Liberia, you yourself, how often did you make  
14:44:45 10 these trips?

11 A. Like this one I have told you about, I only knew about  
12 that once. But that apart, I still used to travel to  
13 Liberia. I used to go there sometimes on my own accord to  
14 do my own personal business or sometimes Five-Zero will  
14:45:07 15 send a stock to like Foya and he would send ammunition to  
16 like Foya and he would communicate with Mosquito and tell  
17 him, 'Please send people to Foya to come and receive'."

18 Now, Mr Taylor, what is being described there, let's look  
19 at it in some detail, okay. I want you to bear in mind as we  
14:45:32 20 look at some of these details the salute report which Sam  
21 Bockarie prepared for Foday Sankoh in September 1999, do you  
22 remember?

23 A. I do.

24 Q. I also want you to bear in mind what you have told us about  
14:45:50 25 the effectiveness of the disarmament process in parts of Lofa,  
26 yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Back to page it 21524:

29 "Ammunition some ex-fighters had buried in the ground that

1 they were digging out again. There was a commander on the ground  
2 there who was responsible in that area for those ammunition and  
3 who was assembling. Those ammunition were kept underground by  
4 ex-combatants. That was before the disarmament in Liberia."

14:46:30 5 Now, what do you understand by all of that, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Well, I don't know why this witness just not - if he is  
7 being actually truthful he just doesn't say ULIMO. He knows  
8 ULIMO is there. He knows Sam Bockarie is captured by ULIMO when  
9 he goes to speak to them for arms. It is just baffling. I don't  
10 know if he wants to be, you know, truthful here. He knows it's  
11 ULIMO, so why don't you just say ULIMO was there. So he knows  
12 the NPFL was not there.

13 But he is just trying to right - you know, by shielding off  
14 ULIMO he is trying to tie in my government with the delivery of  
15 these arms, because he knows this is ULIMO. When he says before  
16 disarmament, who is there? So I don't think he is being very  
17 truthful here. But he must be referring to ULIMO, but he is  
18 trying to link it to my government - you know, during the time of  
19 my government that, you know, these things were hidden in and  
14:47:18 20 they are being dug up now and delivered.

21 Q. Now, you recall, Mr Taylor, that Sam Bockarie in that  
22 salute report, which we have looked at now on more than one  
23 occasion, indicated that he had used funds left behind by Foday  
24 Sankoh so establish a relationship with ULIMO for the purchase of  
14:47:59 25 arms, yes?

26 A. Definitely.

27 Q. And you recall, Mr Taylor, on a different level, it being  
28 alleged against you that you were receiving diamonds from the RUF  
29 in exchange for ammunition, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Bearing those two thoughts in mind, let us now revisit page  
3 21526:

4 "He used to give them physical cash for them to go. The  
14:48:29 5 commander in charge would be well informed on the ground in  
6 Liberia. And at that time, those ammunition had been buried in  
7 the bushes and by then nobody actually needed them, so they  
8 thought they could just sell them and get something out of them.  
9 Like US dollars."

14:48:51 10 Now, pausing there, what do you understand by that,  
11 Mr Taylor: They no longer had any use for them and so they might  
12 as well get something out of it? What do you understand by that?

13 A. Just from that I can say there is a sale of weapons for  
14 cash.

14:49:13 15 Q. Now, from your understanding of the situation in Liberia  
16 before disarmament, as the witness indicates, why would that make  
17 economic sense, if at all?

18 A. Well, the way the disarmament took place, there was not  
19 proper demobilisation, it was just a freeze. So some of these  
14:49:44 20 kids knowing that - in fact a lot of them - they were not getting  
21 anything out of disarmament, they decided to hide these things  
22 that they could sell later. And remember now they are already  
23 having a brisk business relationship across the border. So it  
24 made sense to them to try to keep these things, because they knew  
14:50:04 25 that there would be further sales and further business going on.

26 Q. And where it's said:

27 "Almost any trip Sam Bockarie made to Monrovia he used to  
28 get money from Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor used to give him styles  
29 20,000 US dollars, sometimes 10,000 US dollars, the amount used

1 to vary."

2 And bear in mind also in that regard, Mr Taylor, let us  
3 just pause briefly to remind ourselves of another piece of  
4 evidence. You remember Varmuyan Sheriff mentioning that you had  
14:50:41 5 begin him money to give to the RUF to purchase arms from ULIMO,  
6 you remember that?

7 A. Yes, do I.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind you are supposed to be the  
9 recipient of regular provisions of mayonnaise jars full of  
14:50:56 10 diamonds in exchange for ammunition, were you providing these  
11 kinds of sums to the RUF in order for them to purchase arms from  
12 ex-combatants in Lofa?

13 A. Of course not. Of course not. And if the RUF is receiving  
14 these, if I am receiving these mayonnaise jars of diamonds, 20 or  
14:51:21 15 10,000 dollars seem a real cheat. Then I am actually cheating  
16 them. Then I'm a cheat. I'm a real cheat. And then they have  
17 to take the money and go again and buy ammunition in Lofa. But  
18 then what's happening to the ammunition that I am giving them?

19 Remember now, I am supposed to be giving them this  
14:51:41 20 ammunition. There is the first amount that's given in February  
21 of 1998. And in the middle of this 1998 that he talks about  
22 there is supposed to be - now we know of three trips. One trip  
23 he comes with Sam Bockarie, he gets weapons. On another trip he  
24 come without Sam Bockarie. Then why do they have to buy  
14:52:03 25 ammunition again right about the same time --

26 Q. Middle of 1998.

27 A. The middle of 1998 when they are getting all these supplies  
28 already from Monrovia. So it's just a waste of resources. I  
29 mean, we will talk about the economy of scales, they know nothing

1 about that then. Because it just doesn't make any sense that you  
2 are getting this heavy supply from Monrovia and then the little  
3 money that you are bringing all these diamonds and all the  
4 diamonds that Taylor is getting and he gives you a little 20 or  
14:52:35 5 10,000 and you have to suffer to go and buy some additional  
6 things. It just doesn't make sense.

7 And, you know, I always like to come back because I have  
8 tried to go through this case so many times and it baffles me.  
9 When you look at the way the explanations are going, immediately  
14:52:56 10 after the February intervention, Sam Bockarie comes to Monrovia.  
11 Immediately after the 6 January invasion, Sam Bockarie comes to  
12 Monrovia. That's nearly a year apart. Identical action almost,  
13 identical behaviour on the part, so to speak, of Sam Bockarie.

14 Now, I am doing nothing in Liberia. In fact, the period he  
14:53:23 15 is talking about, even as I reflect on this so-called first trip,  
16 it is very important for me to remind while I am helping the  
17 Court - to remind the Court of what's going on at this time. The  
18 very month of February that this gentleman is talking about, in  
19 exhibit after exhibit before the Court - in fact, February,

14:53:54 20 following the intervention on the part of ECOWAS, I spend most of  
21 February going into March, based on evidence I led in this Court,  
22 receiving about I would say between six to ten ambassadors during  
23 that particular time. Because most of the letters of credence  
24 are presented in February and most of March. I am so tied up  
14:54:20 25 with the diplomatic community, okay, in dealing with this thing.

26 March, Kabbah comes to Freetown. President Clinton, if I am not  
27 mistaken, March of 1998 visits West Africa. I speak to him and  
28 that's on that side. So there is no way I am fooling around with  
29 a Sam Bockarie when I am busy dealing with the Sierra Leonean

1 problem and bringing ambassadors.

2 Now, go to this mid-1998 where he is pulling in ammunition  
3 an all this kind of thing. Three trips in mid-1998. What am I  
4 involved with in mid-1998? To the best of my recollection, in

14:55:12 5 June 1998 the President of the Security Council invites my  
6 minister counsellor in New York to a very important meeting, the  
7 President of the Security Council, based on a letter from this  
8 gentleman in Freetown called Francis Okelo saying that most of  
9 the people that were involved during the intervention that they  
14:55:42 10 arrested were Liberians. The President of the Security Council  
11 comes, he invites my minister counsellor, Mr Wisseh, for an  
12 important meeting and demands an explanation from the Government  
13 of Liberia.

14 And if we remember evidence presented before the Court,  
14:56:00 15 documentary evidence, Kofi Annan comes to West Africa the end of  
16 June. I go to Nigeria the end of June/early July where Kofi  
17 Annan, Tejani Kabbah, General Abdulsalami Abubakar and I have a  
18 meeting in July, the very first few days of July on the same  
19 Sierra Leonean situation and dealing with this problem. So I am

14:56:28 20 supposed to be so silly and stupid or whatever I am, I have all  
21 these things, the President of the Security Council is saying  
22 that the Security Council is demanding an explanation on the  
23 allegation that Liberians were involved and what was my own  
24 involvement. We are trying to respond to this. The

14:56:49 25 Secretary-General visits and all these documents have been  
26 presented here before the Court. And here I am having Sam  
27 Bockarie running up and down in Liberia in this period of time  
28 receiving arms and ammunition, when he is not coming, he is  
29 sending his boys in, they are receiving arms and ammunition. I



1 don't know. I don't know. It's not true. It is not true.

2 I mean, there is nothing else I can say about this, about  
3 this concoction that they have brought before this Court. It is  
4 not true. It is not true.

14:57:34 5 Q. Very well. Now, later on in the course of his testimony,  
6 indeed on the next day, 3 December 2008, the witness was invited  
7 by counsel for the Prosecution to revisit that trip made in mid  
8 1998 minus Sam Bockarie. I am looking now at page 21535 of the  
9 transcript at line 4. So we are talking about the trip now,  
14:58:09 10 Mr Taylor made minus Mosquito. Do you understand?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. "Q. Now, yesterday during the course of questioning you  
13 were describing some of your trips to Monrovia. And you  
14 said on one occasion prior to the Freetown invasion of 6  
14:58:29 15 January 1999, that on one occasion you yourself went with  
16 Victor and Yellow Man and Jungle without Sam Bockarie to  
17 Monrovia. Do you remember talking about that yesterday?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, it was some follow-up on that particular trip that  
14:58:51 20 I never inquired from you yesterday about. Again, do you  
21 remember approximately when this was?

22 A. I said around mid 1998.

23 Q. And what happened on this particular trip? Can you  
24 recall what happened? Or what did you do on this  
14:59:14 25 particular trip?

26 A. It was a trip that I went on to receive ammunition in  
27 Liberia in Monrovia.

28 Q. Where specifically did you go?

29 A. We received the ammunition from Five-Zero and returned

1 to Liberia - sorry, returned to Sierra Leone on the same  
2 day.

3 Q. Where did you receive this from Five-Zero?

4 A. Behind White Flower.

14:59:49 5 Q. How do you know?"

6 Then counsel for the Prosecution revised this question and  
7 asked him - said:

8 "Q. When the ammunitions were received, were you present?

9 A. Yes.

15:00:10 10 Q. Where were you specifically?

11 A. I was on the scene. I was standing right by the van  
12 that we went with. We were in the van when Benjamin  
13 called. There were some other Liberian securities, but I  
14 did not know their names. They were the ones who loaded  
15 the ammunition into the vehicle and we moved.

15:00:34 16 Q. Did you see them loading ammunition?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. Can you describe the ammunition? Can you recall what  
19 type?

15:00:47 20 A. They were assorted. AK rounds, it was more of AK, GMG  
21 rounds and some RPG rockets.

22 Q. And when you went to Monrovia from Buedu, by what means  
23 did you go to Monrovia?

24 A. We used a vehicle to go.

15:01:07 25 Q. How many vehicles?

26 A. One.

27 Q. And when you were loading the - when the ammunitions  
28 were loaded, how many vehicles were involved?

29 A. It was only the vehicle that we went with. That was

1 the vehicle that had the ammunition. But apart from that,  
2 Benjamin's vehicle was parked there and there were some  
3 other vehicles. But it was only that vehicle that was  
4 involved in the ammunition.

15:01:37 5 Q. And what kind of vehicle? Can you recall what kind of  
6 vehicle you were in?

7 A. It was a Hilux. Hilux van.

8 Q. Just one final point. Specifically, can you recall  
9 where exactly within the - you said it was at Benjamin

15:01:59 10 Yeaten's house. But where specifically did this loading  
11 take place, can you recall?

12 A. It was right inside of White Flower. Behind White  
13 Flower. Not at Benjamin's house. It was at White Flower  
14 itself. Not Benjamin's house. It was behind White Flower.

15:02:25 15 There is some underground area.

16 Q. When you say 'White Flower', what do you mean?

17 A. Mr Taylor's house where he lived. At the house. That  
18 is where we refer to as White Flower."

19 So you understand what he is saying, Mr Taylor?

15:02:47 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. This trip in mid 1998 without Benjamin Yeaten --

22 A. Without Sam Bockarie.

23 Q. Without Sam Bockarie. He directly implicates you by  
24 suggesting that the loading of the ammunition takes place inside  
15:03:06 25 White Flower?

26 A. I don't know what he is saying, whether it's inside,  
27 behind --

28 Q. Underground?

29 A. -- underground.

1 Q. Well, let's take them in turn. Was there a stockpile of  
2 ammunition inside your home address White Flower, Mr Taylor?

3 A. There is no - there has never been any stockpile of  
4 ammunition at White Flower and there is no underground. In fact,  
15:03:35 5 White Flower has been searched twice, once by the Special Court  
6 by a warrant from this Court. I am sure if there was an  
7 underground at White Flower, they would have said it. They have  
8 searched the house before. When I was [i ndi scerni ble] they  
9 searched the house. There is no underground. I guess it's this  
15:03:53 10 type of foolishness that they rushed and searched my property.

11 There is no underground. Nobody - I never kept weapons in there.  
12 White Flower is one building in a fence, and nobody would ever go  
13 in my fence to load ammunition. So now - but if you listen the  
14 way how this boy is talking, they are at Benjamin Yeaten's house.  
15:04:15 15 He is standing by a van. Ammunition comes and is loaded, but  
16 then it's loaded behind White Flower in White Flower. None of  
17 these things happened. Not only just this time when Sam Bockarie  
18 is not in Liberia or even this gentleman himself; it just never  
19 happened. Never. Maybe if he loaded ammunition at some other  
15:04:41 20 time from Benjamin Yeaten's house, I can't account for that. But  
21 not at White Flower, no. Never.

22 Q. Right. Let's put mid 1998 to one side now and move on.  
23 And I am moving to page 21542 of the transcript 3 December 2008.  
24 Now, let me preface any reference that that transcript with this  
15:05:24 25 question, Mr Taylor: Mr Taylor, in late 1998, did Sam Bockarie  
26 come to Monrovia?

27 A. No. Not late 1998. As far as very late, I will be  
28 specific instead of being general. Sam Bockarie came to Liberia  
29 in about late November 1998, to be specific. He passed through.

1 Q. When you say "passed through", what do you mean?

2 A. He went to Burkina Faso to visit --

3 Q. No, no. Let's just take things slowly, Mr Taylor. And I  
4 have a good reason for asking.

15:06:06 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. How does he travel to Monrovia?

7 A. He travels by road.

8 Q. Does he stay overnight in Monrovia to your knowledge?

9 A. No. To the best of my knowledge, he doesn't spend the  
15:06:24 10 night in Monrovia. He travels on.

11 Q. He travels on to where?

12 A. To Burkina Faso.

13 Q. From where?

14 A. From Roberts International Airport.

15:06:34 15 Q. Who organised that trip?

16 A. He himself organised the trip. I don't know how they got  
17 organised, but a plane came and picked him up and took him to  
18 Roberts.

19 Q. Did you purchase airline tickets for him?

15:06:49 20 A. No, no, no, no, no. There was no airline tickets. I  
21 didn't, no.

22 Q. Did you arrange for an aircraft to come to collect him?

23 A. No, I did not.

24 Q. Did he travel by himself?

15:07:01 25 A. No, he did not travel by himself.

26 Q. Who did he travel with?

27 A. Sam Bockarie travelled with Eddie Kanneh that I remember,  
28 because I had known that name. He had also travelled  
29 with - because of the French speaking - Musa Cisse speaks French.

1 He travelled with Musa Cisse to serve as interpreter for  
2 President Compaore.

3 Q. Now, pause. Musa Cisse was employed by whom?

4 A. By me.

15:07:36 5 Q. And with whose permission did Musa Cisse travel with him?

6 A. My permission.

7 Q. Why?

8 A. Because the mission that Sam Bockarie was going on to  
9 Burkina Faso was a peace mission to meet the chairman of the OAU

15:07:51 10 and because he, Sam Bockarie - from what he said, he couldn't  
11 speak French - I sent along my protocol officer, who spoke French  
12 and English, to interpret during the meeting.

13 Q. Now, you were explaining who was attending and you have  
14 mentioned Eddie Kanneh?

15:08:11 15 A. There were several other people from Sierra Leone, but I  
16 don't remember them.

17 Q. How long did he stay in Ouagadougou, to your understanding?

18 A. Well, I don't know how long he stayed in Ouagadougou, but  
19 he was away from Liberia for two weeks.

15:08:35 20 Q. As far as you are aware, was his travel confined to  
21 Ouagadougou?

22 A. No, to the best of my recollection, I was told that he  
23 travelled beyond Ouagadougou. He went to another place.

24 Q. To where?

15:08:55 25 A. He went to Libya while he did that travel, from what I was  
26 told.

27 Q. Did you know prior to him leaving that he was heading on to  
28 Libya?

29 A. No, I did not.

1 Q. When did you discover that he had been to Li bya?

2 A. Upon the return, my protocol officer briefed me that -  
3 because I wanted to find out why did the trip take so long. He  
4 said no, they were not in Burki na Faso. Sam Bockarie left them  
15:09:24 5 and he went to Li bya and came back.

6 Q. Did Musa Cisse accompany Mosqui to, Sam Bockarie, to Li bya?

7 A. No, he did not go to Li bya.

8 Q. Now, on his return did he stay long in Monrovi a?

9 A. No, no, no. Sam Bockarie came back and he continued on to  
15:09:43 10 Si erra Leone. They came back a little early. He came and he met  
11 with me to thank me for, you know, sending Musa and - you know  
12 and helping in arranging this trip with the - you know, to make  
13 it possible with the chairman of the OAU and that they had had  
14 very fruit ful di scussi on and he was on hi s way. He left the same  
15:10:08 15 day for Si erra Leone.

16 Q. Now, when he returned, Mr Tayl or, did you demand from hi m a  
17 debri ef?

18 A. No, no, no, no, no. I di dn' t. No, no. There was none.  
19 If I wanted to know anything, I would have found out from the  
15:10:26 20 chair man hi msel f or from Musa Cisse. And as a matter of fact,  
21 I et me j ust add, when Sam Bockarie came back, I was not - I was  
22 not in Monrovi a. I was not in Monrovi a itsel f. I was on the  
23 outski rts of Monrovi a. At thi s parti cul ar ti me i f my  
24 recol lecti on i s correct, I was i nvol ved i n the pol i o - I was  
15:10:59 25 i nvol ved i n the pol i o campai gn i n Li beri a at that ti me. So i t  
26 was j ust they came to the locati on where I was and, you know,  
27 thanked me because I was very busy - i t was dur i ng the pol i o  
28 campai gn ti me - and then he conti nued.

29 Q. Now, bearing all of that in mind, Mr Tayl or, I et us now

1 visit page 21542 of the testimony of this witness on 3 December  
2 2008. He is reminded of what he said about the trip at or about  
3 the time of the 6 January invasion.

15:11:41 4 "Q. And you said you went approximately, you thought,  
5 early December and you went with Mosquito, Rashid, Pa  
6 Rodgers, and Eddie Kanneh amongst the crew that went on  
7 this trip. Do you recall starting to tell the Court about  
8 that yesterday?

9 A. Yes.

15:11:55 10 Q. I'd like you to go ahead now and slowly. I am going to  
11 ask you to slowly describe this trip for the Court. Again  
12 I am going to emphasise to you that you take your time when  
13 you explain this, okay?

14 A. Yes. I do recall sometime in early December myself,  
15:12:17 15 Sam Bockarie, the late SYB Rodgers who was the People's War  
16 Council chairman, Rashid, Eddie Kanneh, among others -  
17 among other people, those of us who travelled to Monrovia.  
18 The trip that we made to Monrovia was to escort Sam  
19 Bockarie because he, Sam Bockarie, was supposed to travel  
15:12:42 20 to Libya, initially what he told us. He, Sam Bockarie -  
21 what he told us, he said according to the discussion he had  
22 had with Benjamin, that he was to go and receive some  
23 materials - I mean, ammunition. But when we arrived in  
24 Liberia the course changed and that particular movement was  
15:13:07 25 diverted to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Sam Bockarie, Eddie  
26 Kanneh, Pa Rogers went to Burkina Faso to the best of my  
27 knowledge.

28 "Q. You said that initially you were told by Sam Bockarie  
29 that he was supposed to travel to Libya, that he had had a



1           discussi on wi th Benjamin and that he was going to receive  
2           some materials and he was supposed to travel to Libya. Is  
3           that correct?

4           A. Yes.

15:13:41 5           Q. Where did you learn this? Where were you when you  
6           learned this from Sam Bockarie?

7           A. It was in Buedu. I was in Buedu right behind Sam  
8           Bockarie's house where his satellite phone was installed,  
9           where he used to install his satellite phone, and I met him  
15:14:03 10          there. He was sitting by his phone together with some of  
11          his bodyguards who were around him and some other people.

12          Q. Now you said then that when we arrived in Liberia the  
13          course changed and that particular movement was diverted to  
14          Ouagadougou. What do you mean when you say when you  
15:14:25 15          arrived in Liberia the course changed?

16          A. Well, instead of Sam Bockarie going to Libya, he said  
17          the Papay had told him that the ammunition had been brought  
18          to Burkina Faso, so he was now to go and receive the  
19          ammunition from Burkina Faso."

15:14:47 20          Now, Mr Taylor, you appreciate that your co-conspirators on  
21          this indictment include Colonel Gaddafi and Blaise Compaore. You  
22          know that, don't you?

23          A. Yes, I do.

24          Q. Now you see what is being suggested and inferred here,  
15:15:05 25          don't you? Sam Bockarie comes to Monrovia. He is supposed to be  
26          going to Libya. But you then, effectively, inform him, once he  
27          arrives in Monrovia that the plan has changed. "No need for you  
28          to go to Libya now, Sam. The ammunition is in Burkina Faso."  
29          You understand that, don't you?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. You see that that puts you at a heart of a design involving  
3 Colonel Gaddafi and Blaise Compaore, don't you?

4 A. Yes.

15:15:43 5 Q. You see that, don't you?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. That's a total lie. It's not true. Look, the decision for  
9 Sam Bockarie to go to Burkina Faso was not just Charles Taylor's  
10 decision. And if you look in a document presented here, which is  
11 a United Nations document, the issue of some of these people with  
12 the junta like Bockarie and others travelling out for peace was  
13 approved. There were several of them named in that document on  
14 who could travel, because at this particular time travelling for  
15:16:21 15 them was not supposed to happen.

16 So if there was a design, I have no idea of the design.  
17 But I know that Sam Bockarie would not have come and he would not  
18 have been permitted to travel through Liberia to go to Burkina  
19 Faso to see the chairman of the OAU unless the chairman knew, I  
15:16:43 20 knew and others knew, including United Nations and other people.  
21 Everybody knew of Sam Bockarie's trip. If not, he would not have  
22 travelled. And I am sure we can refer to that document that I am  
23 talking about, which is an UN document that has been exhibited in  
24 this Court.

15:17:01 25 So this matter of whether there was - I would have never  
26 known whatever else that was arranged. Sam Bockarie, I didn't  
27 spend a dime to get Sam Bockarie to go. From what I understand,  
28 a small aircraft came for Sam Bockarie that was arranged by the  
29 chairman and he travelled to Burkina Faso.

1 Q. Who is was the chairman?

2 A. Blaise Compaore.

3 Q. Chairman of what?

4 A. The OAU at the time. So this is totally - but, you know,  
15:17:31 5 based on those that constructed this case, they would need this  
6 kind of - I don't know how they got him to say this kind of  
7 thing, but this is totally not true. But is Blaise Compaore some  
8 little boy? Is Blaise Compaore some little boy that - I mean, he  
9 would have to almost be acting with my acquiescence. If he wants  
15:17:51 10 to give material to Sam Bockarie, it requires me to ask him? Or  
11 is Gaddafi a little boy? No.

12 Q. Now, how had this trip been arranged to the best of your  
13 knowledge, Mr Taylor?

14 A. This trip was arranged by Sam Bockarie and I think some of  
15:18:16 15 the people he travelled with. Because we had some good people.  
16 I understand - I really don't know this man very well. If there  
17 was an older man in the delegation that - because Sam Bockarie  
18 met me with Eddie Kanneh and an older man. I do not know if it  
19 was Mr Rogers, but he was an older man, a shortish type, with  
15:18:38 20 grey hair. I can still remember him. He had some good people.  
21 But they had arranged this before they made this --

22 Q. Arranged it with who?

23 A. Well, everybody agreed. Kabbah agreed that some of these  
24 junta people could travel. The UN agreed. So within their  
15:18:58 25 circles I am sure that he had talked to other senior people for  
26 it to be included in an UN report that certain members of the  
27 junta could be permitted to travel. They had talked to other  
28 people. And don't let's forget, the RUF by this particular time  
29 going all the way back to 1996, if we look at the delegations

1 that they sent, they were not a bunch of little bush boys sitting  
2 back there. They had educated people with doctorate degrees, Dr  
3 Abbas Bundu, Karefa-Smart. These are not little boys. These are  
4 people that knew how to get around.

15:19:35 5 I have no idea of how Sam Bockarie arranged that trip. And  
6 I repeat, when Sam Bockarie came to me in September 1998 he had a  
7 satellite phone and I gave him another phone because of the  
8 problems they were having in getting credit. But he already had  
9 a satellite phone by this particular time and I gave him a second  
15:20:01 10 one. So they had did a lot of work I'm sure. They had people  
11 that supported them.

12 Q. Now, it continues:

13 "He said the Papay had told him that the ammunition had  
14 been brought to Burkina Faso, so he was now to go and  
15:20:22 15 receive the ammunition from Burkina Faso.

16 Q. When you say in this context the Papay, who are you  
17 referring to?

18 A. Commander-in-chief Taylor.

19 Q. And just describe sequentially what happened. You said  
15:20:40 20 that when you arrived the course changed, but then you said  
21 of Sam Bockarie, 'He said the Papay had told him that the  
22 ammunition had been brought to Burkina Faso.' Do you know  
23 when this happened?

24 A. Well, it was in December.

15:20:59 25 Q. When did it happen in terms of the course of your trip?

26 A. It was only after we had reached in Monrovia. That's  
27 when I knew about that. That everything --

28 Q. How did you learn about that?

29 A. It was Mosquito who directly told me."

1 And then he establishes that the time frame is December

2 1998:

3 "Q. Now go ahead and I won't intervene. Just go ahead and  
4 sequentially say what happened. So you arrived in Monrovia  
15:21:35 5 and what happened then? Where did you arrive to?

6 A. When we got to Monrovia I was at Benjamin's place  
7 throughout the trip waiting for Mosquito. I waited on him  
8 in Monrovia and he went and returned. I was in Monrovia at  
9 Benjamin's house using Base 1 to collect information from  
15:21:59 10 the front lines, because I was coordinating with the front  
11 line all of the times, and Mosquito used to call on the  
12 phone, on the telephone line, to get information from me  
13 directly pertaining to what was going on at the front line  
14 and that was the reason why Mosquito travelled with me to  
15:22:20 15 go to Monrovia; so he would be getting information.

16 Q. Where was Mosquito calling you on the phone from, do  
17 you know?

18 A. Yes. Mosquito was calling me from Burkina Faso.

19 Q. And how do you know that?

15:22:37 20 A. He told me. When he arrived, that is Mosquito, he  
21 called on the telephone and he spoke with Sunlight and  
22 Sunlight called me and I spoke to him directly. He said he  
23 had reached his destination. And even before he left he  
24 told me that they were going to Burkina.

15:22:55 25 Q. How did it happen that the course changed?

26 A. Well, that one is for those in the higher echelons  
27 because I don't know exactly why the course was diverted."

28 And bear in mind, Mr Taylor, this is a radio operator  
29 speaking.

1 "That one is for those in the higher echelons because I  
2 don't know exactly why the course was diverted.

3 Q. So when you first arrived in Monrovia, where did Sam  
4 Bockarie go when you first arrived?

15:23:34 5 A. When we arrived in Monrovia I was at Benjamin's and Sam  
6 Bockarie and Benjamin used to go out. They would go out  
7 for the whole day and sometimes when he would return he  
8 would tell me that they met with Papay briefly and  
9 sometimes - when we were in Monrovia even before he would  
10 go out he will not come back to Benjamin for the whole day  
11 at times, except the following morning, because we spent up  
12 to 72 hours in Monrovia before Sam Bockarie took off for  
13 Ouagadougou.

14 Q. When you say we spent up to 72 hours, who spent up to  
15:24:13 15 72 hours in Monrovia before taking off to Ouagadougou?

16 A. Myself, Rashid - myself, Rashid, Shabado and some of  
17 Mosquito's bodyguards with whom he travelled.

18 Q. Who specifically actually went on the trip with Sam  
19 Bockarie, do you know?

15:24:32 20 A. Well, from the RUF side I recall the late Pa Rogers and  
21 Eddie Kanneh. They were the ones who travelled with Sam  
22 Bockarie.

23 Q. I am asking you about the trip that Sam Bockarie took  
24 to Ouagadougou. Is that what you are referring to? Well  
15:24:55 25 go ahead and say the people that you know travelled to  
26 Ouagadougou.

27 A. The people who went with Sam Bockarie to Ouagadougou  
28 were the late SYB Rogers and Eddie Kanneh.

29 Q. And anyone else?

1 A. Those are the two I know of from the RUF. If any other  
2 person was there, I don't know about that person.

3 Q. And how long were they gone for?

4 A. They spent up to a week. They spent up to a week in  
15:25:25 5 Ouagadougou.

6 Q. And during the week where did you stay?

7 A. I stayed in Monrovia at Benjamin Yeaten's house.

8 Q. And you said that you were receiving calls on the phone  
9 from Sam Bockarie during the course while he was on this  
15:25:42 10 trip to Ouagadougou. How often was that happening?

11 A. He called me about three times from Ouagadougou. About  
12 three times.

13 Q. And were there any other discussions aside from what  
14 you've already said about reporting the situation?

15:26:00 15 A. Well, during his stay in Ouagadougou, is that what you  
16 mean? During his stay in Ouagadougou most of the  
17 discussions we had was for me to give him updates from the  
18 front lines. If there was any problem I should tell him  
19 where there was that problem or where there was no problem.

15:26:20 20 That was the topic of discussion.

21 Q. How were you getting information to send to Sam  
22 Bockarie about the front lines?

23 A. I communicated on the RUF radio net every day. Every  
24 day I communicated on the RUF radio net. I followed the  
15:26:37 25 various activities in the front lines.

26 Q. Now, you said they were gone approximately a week.  
27 What happened when they returned? Describe what happened.

28 A. Well, I stayed at Benjamin's house right up to the time  
29 Mosquito and others returned, and when they returned, he

1 returned at night. On the very night I did not see him and  
2 the following day he came to Benjamin's house in the  
3 evening. He was sitting in the studio for a short time,  
4 that is Base 1, to get information from me, and he called  
15:27:14 5 Issa and the two of them spoke and Mosquito gave me  
6 instructions to send a message to the front line to some of  
7 the commanders to come and meet him in Buedu - to come and  
8 meet him, Mosquito, in Buedu. From there, that very  
9 evening we took off together with Mosquito. All of us had  
10 come with Mosquito took off again to go back to Buedu."

11 Let us pause there, and I want to ask you about one or two  
12 details been that. Now, the first thing Mr Taylor is this: This  
13 witness, although he accepts that he was not one of the higher  
14 echelons and therefore his knowledge might be limited, says that  
15:28:07 15 initially the visit was to be to Libya, yes? Then on arrival in  
16 Monrovia the plans changed because of your intervention, and  
17 instead they went to Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso; you understand  
18 that, yes?

19 Now, the witness goes on to say that he had radio or  
15:28:31 20 satellite phone contact with Bockarie whilst Bockarie was in  
21 Burkina Faso, yes?

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you have told us that you subsequently  
24 discovered that Bockarie, following his arrival in Burkina Faso,  
15:28:47 25 went on to Libya, yes?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Do you hear this witness making any mention of that?

28 A. No, he stops at Burkina Faso. He doesn't - but Bockarie  
29 does go to Libya.



1 Q. Now, do you have any motive, Mr Taylor, in disclosing that  
2 fact?

3 A. No. I am here to tell the truth and help the Court to make  
4 a decision. From what was reported to me by my protocol officer,  
15:29:20 5 was that Bockarie went to Libya. And I believe him.

6 Q. Now, the second thing I want to ask you about that passage  
7 is this: You said to me earlier that as best you recall,  
8 Bockarie arrived, goes to Roberts International Airport, and  
9 leaves from there to Ouagadougou, yes?

15:29:47 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Page 21545, however, at line 19, this witness says that  
12 Bockarie spent 72 hours in Monrovia before he took off to  
13 Ouagadougou. What do you say about that?

14 A. That's not true. Bockarie arrived in Monrovia, to the best  
15:30:06 15 of my knowledge. Bockarie saw me very briefly, except he came  
16 late at night. Because Bockarie saw me in the morning, and he  
17 said he had just come. So I don't know how he checked his hours.  
18 Bockarie could have come late at night and saw me in the next  
19 morning, because at the time that he saw me the next morning,  
15:30:34 20 they took off - from the best of my knowledge. I don't know the  
21 exact hour. They could have taken off late. But Bockarie saw me  
22 before noon on the date of their travel, and I would assume that  
23 he said that they were on their way, and so that's it now.

24 If 72 hours for him means that they came late at night and  
15:30:58 25 saw me early in the morning, I didn't get into that. But  
26 Bockarie came and saw me and left. But he was not in Monrovia.  
27 Because 72 hours for me is three days. No.

28 Q. Another detail I want to ask you about. Was he away for a  
29 week, or for longer than a week?

1 A. He was away for longer than a week. Two weeks, to be  
2 exact. Bockarie was out of my presence and my information for  
3 two weeks. Because if he had come back, I would have known.  
4 Like I say, I was dealing with the polio vaccination campaign at  
15:31:39 5 the time of the return. But it was about two weeks.

6 Q. Now, were you aware that whilst he was away in - outside of  
7 Liberia, that he was in regular contact with a radio operator in  
8 Monrovia?

9 A. No, I wouldn't know. I didn't know that.

15:31:55 10 Q. Would it surprise you if he was?

11 A. No, it wouldn't surprise me. If Bockarie had no contacts  
12 in Sierra Leone on getting information behind him, then it's  
13 possible that he could have had somebody, that his radio operator  
14 in Monrovia, he could call and provided the radio operator had a  
15:32:25 15 second satellite telephone. I don't know how they work out their  
16 arrangement, but I will be fair and say it's possible that he  
17 could have called his radio operator in Monrovia, and the radio  
18 operator in Monrovia, having access to radio communication in  
19 Sierra Leone, could tell him what happened. I don't fuss with  
15:32:49 20 that possibility.

21 Q. Now, let's pick up the account following Bockarie's return  
22 to Monrovia. Page 21547, line 18:

23 "Q. Okay. Before you go on, before you actually left,  
24 when the group returned from Ouagadougou, who was in the  
15:33:23 25 group, do you recall?

26 A. Well, at Benjamin's house, where they met me, Mosquito  
27 was in a group with Benjamin, Eddie, and General Ibrahim.

28 Q. Who is General Ibrahim?

29 A. General Ibrahim, I knew him to be a Gambian who used to

1 help Foday Sankoh coordinate the RUF affairs outside of  
2 Sierra Leone since 1996 during the Abidjan accord - even  
3 before the Abidjan accord. "

4 Now, let's just pause there, Mr Taylor, for a moment. Were  
15:34:16 5 you aware of this role played by General Ibrahim, the Gambian?

6 A. Which role? The role of coordinator?

7 Q. Coordinating RUF affairs outside of Sierra Leone since  
8 before the Abidjan accord.

9 A. No, I was not aware of that. That wouldn't be strange, but  
15:34:44 10 I was not aware of it.

11 Q. Why wouldn't it be strange?

12 A. Because Ibrahim Bah left NPFL controlled area back in  
13 1993-1994 and I never heard from him again, but he knew - he was  
14 in Libya. Ibrahim Bah was in Libya and so he had defended Foday  
15:35:08 15 Sankoh, he - in fact, some of the evidence that I heard in this  
16 Court about his role in 1996 and some of the documentation  
17 provided by the OTP that I have read, I have no reason to doubt  
18 that he, Ibrahim, could play such a role with Foday Sankoh. I  
19 wouldn't doubt it.

15:35:35 20 Q. Well, let's just pause, Mr Taylor. Just so that we  
21 can - before we move on to deal with another aspect of this  
22 witness's testimony in relation to Ibrahim Bah, let us remind  
23 ourselves. In April 1999 during the transit of RUF personnel to  
24 Lome, Ibrahim Bah and one Omrie Golley were two of the first to  
15:36:05 25 travel, weren't they?

26 A. They were the first two, yes.

27 Q. And as you understood it, Bah then, in April 1999, was  
28 there on RUF business on behalf of the RUF to your knowledge,  
29 yes?

1 A. Yes, to my knowledge and the knowledge of the  
2 United Nations too, may I add.

3 Q. And so putting that together with what this witness is  
4 saying, that means from before 1996 to at least April 1999, Bah  
15:36:44 5 is working on RUF affairs, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. On behalf of Foday Sankoh, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And let's just remind ourselves also of the contents of  
15:36:58 10 those two letters written to Mohamed Talibi back in 1996, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. My business partners, do you remember those references?

13 A. I remember that.

14 Q. Now page 21547, and we will come back to Ibrahim Bah. Line  
15:37:24 15 28:

16 "Q. Do you know why he was present at this particular  
17 moment when the group returned from Ouagadougou?"

18 Here answers the man who is not part of the higher  
19 echelons.

15:37:39 20 "A. Well, General Ibrahim, because he used to talk to  
21 Mosquito before that time on the radio - I mean, on the sat  
22 phone - General Ibrahim and Mosquito used to talk on the  
23 sat phone and most times General Ibrahim coordinated things  
24 for the RUF in other areas, sometimes with" - guess who -

15:38:02 25 "Charles Taylor, sometimes in Burkina, sometimes in Libya.  
26 He was the one who made those trips on behalf of the RUF,  
27 most of the trips that he made."

28 Now, let's just concentrate on that little nugget,  
29 "sometimes with Charles Taylor". True or false?

1 A. Totally, totally, false. Totally false.

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, were you aware at this time that Ibrahim  
3 Bah was playing this role in Burkina, sometimes in Libya, and so  
4 on?

15:38:49 5 A. No. I was not aware. I was not aware he was playing that  
6 role.

7 Q. But hold on an a second, Mr Taylor. You've been - you've  
8 set up the RUF in the first place. You've been running them,  
9 directing them by remote even after ULIMO cut off the border.

15:39:10 10 How is it that they've got contacts with Burkina and Libya and  
11 you are telling the Court you don't know anything about it? How  
12 come?

13 A. Because I never had any control over them, that's how come  
14 I don't know it. I didn't have any control over them. I didn't  
15:39:25 15 have any interests in what they were doing other than peace. I  
16 had no idea that Ibrahim Bah or any other person was involved in  
17 these activities. And Ibrahim Bah, wherever he is on this planet  
18 Earth, I don't think has ever told anybody that he was working  
19 with me or knew - he could not have, because I know it would have

15:39:55 20 reached here. No. Had no knowledge, because Ibrahim Bah was not  
21 one of those Gambians when they came that was of any very high  
22 command. I mean, Ibrahim just - he was one of those individuals  
23 that moved around. He was not even assigned with me. No, I  
24 didn't know Ibrahim was involved with Foday Sankoh except where -  
15:40:19 25 from evidence that we've seen here, we know that not only was he  
26 involved with Sankoh in 1996 or before. Even 1997 evidence has  
27 been led he goes to Freetown with the AFRC. I have no, no, no,  
28 no, knowledge of this, no.

29 Q. Right. Now, Mr Taylor, let's move on another topic. And

1 happily, we only have about half a dozen other topics to deal  
2 with in relation to this particular witness, but we are having to  
3 take our time because he is an important witness. So let's now  
4 go to page 21564 of the transcript for 3 December 2008. He is  
15:41:32 5 now talking about the Freetown invasion, okay?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, I know it's the end of a long week, but you  
8 really do have to say "yes" or "no", because it needs to register  
9 on the transcript, do you follow me?

15:41:49 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. "WITNESS: Apart from the ECOMOG transmissions, I heard  
12 from the transmitting station also about the capture of  
13 certain parts of the city, Freetown.

14 Q. Let's just stick to the transmit station, because I  
15:42:13 15 think that may make it simpler. What did you hear from the  
16 transmitting station on that day, 6 January 1999?

17 A. I saw a message in the message logbook which said that  
18 our men had captured the State House.

19 Q. Who are you referring to?

15:42:34 20 A. Our men who were in Freetown - the RUF/AFRC combatants  
21 who entered Freetown. And it read that they had captured  
22 the State House and certain parts of the city.

23 Q. Who was the message from specifically, do you know?

24 A. Yes, the message was from Gullit and he was Black Jar.  
15:43:03 25 That was his code name.

26 Q. Who is Gullit?

27 A. Gullit was one of the bosses in the AFRC, he was one of  
28 the bosses in the AFRC, and Gullit was one of the most  
29 senior commanders. And, to be specific, he was the one

1 who led the troops that entered Freetown?

2 Q. So who was at the transmitting station with you? Who  
3 else was there on this day, 6 January?

4 A. I met all the operators - in fact almost all the  
15:43:39 5 operators by then were in the transmitting station. Like  
6 Seibatu, Tiger, Tourist. Almost all the operators were in  
7 the station on that particular day.

8 Q. Now, on that particular day what stations was the  
9 transmitting station in Buedu in contact with?"

10 Now, pausing there. Mr Taylor, at the time - this is back  
11 in January 1999 - were you aware of an AFRC commander called  
12 Gullit?

13 A. No. No.

14 Q. Were you aware back then that the invasion of Freetown had  
15:44:37 15 been led by that individual?

16 A. No, I didn't know.

17 Q. Let's move on. Page 21581, line 1:

18 "Actually, there had been some minor problems that had been  
19 existing between us and Gullit. That is, RUF and AFRC.

15:45:17 20 That was Sam's concern. That was the only time that he was  
21 grumbling. Even before they entered Freetown and even when  
22 he received the message in the morning, that was when Sam  
23 was saying that. He said maybe Gullit and others would  
24 want to - maybe they would change this time around to

15:45:39 25 cooperate if at all they didn't go there to seize power,  
26 they wouldn't want to be greedy and take power on their  
27 own. And Sam Bockarie assured Gullit that Rambo was very  
28 close to him on his way to join him in the city - and that  
29 Rambo was on his way to join him in the city and that time

1           Late Rambo and others were around the Masiaka area going  
2           towards Freetown.

3           Q.   On that broadcast there was an individual named TAB  
4           Yaya, former PL0-2? Do you know who was that?

15:46:21 5           A.   No, I don't know him in person and don't know much  
6           about him.

7           Q.   Now, there is a reference Pademba Road prisoners. What  
8           do you know about Pademba Road prisoners during 6 January  
9           invasion?

15:46:39 10          A.   Gullit and others had captured Freetown. It was the  
11          following morning that he sent a message and it was King  
12          Perry who transmitted the message that they had released  
13          many people from the prisons and that they had released  
14          many of the political detainees who were held prisoner,  
15:46:59 15          together with some other people. But when they got to  
16          Pademba Road they could not see Pa Sankoh, but that they  
17          were able to release some other people but they did not see  
18          Pa Sankoh. The message was sent to Mosquito."  
19          Over the page to page 21582.

15:47:23 20          "A.   After Mosquito received the message he told Five-Zero,  
21          I mean Benjamin Yeaten, that the men had entered the city  
22          but they could not see the Pa, I mean Pa Sankoh, and that  
23          they did not know where Pa Sankoh had been taken to. Among  
24          the people released were like the late ex-President Momoh,  
15:47:45 25          Victor Foh and among other renowned Sierra Leonean  
26          politicians who were in the prisons. And Mosquito informed  
27          Benjamin about the people who had been released and he also  
28          informed him that he could not see Pa Sankoh in the prisons  
29          and he requested for more ammunition so that they will be



1 able to defend the city. He was asking Benjamin to send  
2 ammunition for us.

3 Q. Now, you said that Gullit sent a message through King  
4 Perry to Sam Bockarie - sent to Mosquito - about the  
15:48:23 5 prisoners from Pademba Road. Is that correct?

6 A. Through King Perry. I mean that King Perry was the one  
7 who transmitted the message as a radio operation.

8 Q. Then you said that after Mosquito received the message  
9 he told Five-Zero, meaning Benjamin, that the men had  
10 entered the city but they couldn't see the Pa, meaning Pa  
11 Sankoh. About how much time transpired between the time  
12 Bockarie received the message from Gullit through King  
13 Perry to the time he contacted Benjamin? How much time  
14 transpired between?

15:49:01 15 A. It was that very morning just when Sam Bockarie got the  
16 message, because at that time, while the 6 January  
17 operation was going on, we moved a bit from Sam Bockarie's  
18 house. We were no longer seated at Sam Bockarie's house  
19 where he used to sit, opposite the house. We went down  
15:49:33 20 towards Dawa Road. There was a barri, an old barri, where  
21 we used to sit because of air raid because there was  
22 frequently air raid by the Alpha Jet. The Alpha Jet used  
23 to raid Buedu. "

24 He then was reminded that he hadn't answered the question,  
15:49:59 25 so picking it up at line 14:

26 "A. It was not up to an hour. It was not up to an hour.

27 Q. And how in this particular instance did Sam Bockarie  
28 make contact with Benjamin?

29 A. It was through the sat phone. "

1 Now I want to pause there. Mr Taylor, you will understand  
2 that the witness is there saying this: That on the very morning  
3 of the 6 January invasion 1999, within an hour of being told by  
4 Gullit that forces had taken over State House and entered Pademba  
15:50:50 5 Road Prison, your director of the SSS was telephoned by Bockarie  
6 and informed. What do you say about that?

7 A. I don't - I don't know. I doubt if that's the case, but I  
8 really don't know. Maybe he would call Bockarie.

9 Q. Well, if you say you really don't know, Mr Taylor, then it  
15:51:16 10 begs the following questions, doesn't it: Why would Bockarie be  
11 calling your director of the SSS immediately, virtually, after he  
12 had received such a message? Why him?

13 A. But, counsel, I think even before we get to that, did such  
14 a call occur? That's what I mean by I don't know. We don't even  
15:51:42 15 know if such a call occurred. This is this man talking about, he  
16 - so, I mean, I wouldn't know. Because why, within an hour, we  
17 are talking about - what are we talking about? 6 a.m. in the  
18 morning Sam Bockarie is supposed to be calling Benjamin Yeaten.  
19 I don't even know if such a call occurred. But in the construct  
15:52:03 20 of these people anything is possible with them when they get  
21 ready to make up these things.

22 So I really don't know because I can't see why Sam Bockarie  
23 would have any reason to call and inform Benjamin Yeaten of what  
24 is going on when he knows very well that, what, from all the  
15:52:22 25 information that it's not an RUF - I don't know. I really don't  
26 know. I don't even think this call occurred.

27 I am not informed about this situation until about 9 a.m. I  
28 would say or thereabout in the morning when my national security  
29 adviser comes in. So how they collect their information, I don't

1 know really. I don't know even if the call occurred. I doubt  
2 it. That's what I mean by I don't know, because I doubt that  
3 such a call would be made because there is no reason to make a  
4 call to Benjamin Yeaten to say, "Guess what happened? We are in  
15:52:59 5 Freetown." As though he knew about the Freetown invasion. Did  
6 he know? From all evidence I have seen, he didn't know.

7 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, according to what the witness is saying,  
8 he had a very good reason to be calling Sam Bockarie, line 11,  
9 page 21582: "He was asking Benjamin to send ammunition for us."

15:53:21 10 That's the reason he claims.

11 A. Okay. Assuming that that's the reason. But we've been  
12 told, this Court has been told, of the massive amount of  
13 ammunition that was supposed to have been sent from Liberia for  
14 the invasion. That's what we were told here in this Court. That  
15:53:44 15 there were massive amounts of ammunition that were sent that  
16 conducted major operations, Kono and because this - remember we  
17 go back to Fitti-Fatta and it's all in my head now. Fitti-Fatta,  
18 then Kono and on to Freetown with this massive attack and that's  
19 how it was going. And then what are we talking about, say late  
15:54:08 20 December. So in less than a week you are supposed to be calling  
21 back, "Guess what happens? We need some arms and ammunition."

22 It's just terrible that these people make up these kinds of  
23 things. But even - let's just for the sake of an intelligent  
24 argument - number one, I didn't send any ammunition. I didn't  
15:54:30 25 have any ammunition. Where would I get ammunition from in  
26 January 1999? January 1999, we are in the last stages of  
27 concluding the programme to begin the burning of the arms later  
28 on in 1999, which occurs in July.

29 So when you put these facts together, I am telling you it

1 is as confusing to me as it ever gets. It does not happen  
2 because I don't see any reason why Sam Bockarie would call  
3 Benjamin Yeaten to say, "Send me some ammunition", as though  
4 Benjamin Yeaten or the Government of Liberia have ammunition. So  
15:55:13 5 I just don't believe this whole tale as it is presented.

6 Q. But also, Mr Taylor, according to this witness, in December  
7 Bockarie had gone to Ouagadougou where a shipment of ammunition  
8 had recently arrived from Libya. Do you recall that?

9 A. Oh, yes. That's what I am saying. There is supposed to be  
15:55:43 10 this massive ammunition, then what are they calling me for?

11 Q. He has just come back from Ouagadougou.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And, according to this witness, that was all about sorting  
14 out some ammunition which had been shifted from Libya, yes?

15:55:58 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So help me, can you understand why, what, a couple of weeks  
17 later he is asking your director of SSS for more ammunition? Can  
18 you help us?

19 A. I can't. That's why I say I don't believe this tale. I do  
15:56:14 20 not believe it at all. So there is - I really can't help. But I  
21 don't understand the necessity to develop this kind of  
22 fabrication. I don't understand it. So I am sorry, I really  
23 can't help you on that.

24 Q. But he continues, page 21586, line 5:

15:56:40 25 "After some time, Benjamin came back to Mosquito and called  
26 him on the sat phone and he gave him instructions to make sure  
27 that he told Gullit and others to dispatch all those big names  
28 that he had mentioned, to call for them to be with him in Buedu  
29 at the headquarters, that they should not be at the front line.

1 He said" - listen carefully - "that was the instruction from  
2 Mr Taylor. And Mosquito told the operator in charge - that was  
3 one Mohamed Kabbah, I can recall, and on that very day he was the  
4 one on duty and he sent the message. I was there when Mohamed  
15:57:26 5 Kabbah encoded the message and sent it to Gullit and others for  
6 them to send back those people to the rear for safety.

7 Now, Mr Taylor, I don't need to draw your attention to the  
8 significance of that, do I?

9 A. No.

15:58:10 10 Q. You are the director of operations here?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. You understand that?

13 A. Yes, I do. I understand that.

14 Q. Because, remember, the same witness has already established  
15:58:22 15 the line of command: It's you, then Benjamin Yeaten, then "Yes,  
16 sir. Yes, sir" Sam Mosquito, you get it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So here we see that line of command in operation, don't we?

19 A. Uh-huh, I see it.

15:58:41 20 Q. Right. So what are you saying?

21 A. This is a lie. But let me interject one more thing  
22 because, you know, this whole case is about as much as we can  
23 remember what's going on now. President Momoh - President Joseph  
24 Momoh - Saidu Momoh, who is a friend of mine - if Momoh, who it's  
15:59:09 25 said was released from Pademba Road during the 6 January invasion  
26 and that I was directing that those people should not remain at  
27 the frontline to be brought, why would Momoh sit down in the bush  
28 in - well, I don't know where - Kailahun, wherever they were, at  
29 last I would have granted Momoh the courtesy of bringing him to

1 Liberia. Momoh does not leave that part of the world until  
2 Johnny Paul Koroma is released from there in August 1999. So  
3 Momoh is up there in the bush suffering. I understand he was  
4 sick for many months. So why would I order or be in control of  
16:00:10 5 an operation in Freetown where the former President, who is  
6 friend of mine, would come out and I have such control that I  
7 cannot ask - or not even ask. That's the wrong word. That I  
8 cannot instruct, "Have Momoh brought to me", that he would be at  
9 least comfortable in Liberia. I have nothing to do.

16:00:26 10 But there is - I am not too sure about this and I don't  
11 want to jump the gun, because there is a name - there are names  
12 floating in this section here that I see a link in the lie and  
13 the construction of this lie, and I don't know if I can associate  
14 a particular name here, but I don't know the status, so I will  
16:00:48 15 just leave it for now.

16 Q. Well, hold on a second. Yes. Hold on a second. Now, you  
17 notice, page 21586, yes? Note the route of communication. It is  
18 Mosquito to Yeaten. Yeaten calls back and tells him there is  
19 this instruction from Mr Taylor. Do you see it? Page 21586.

16:01:35 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. And Mosquito told the operator in charge - that was one  
22 Mohamed Kabbah, yes?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. Remember we looked at Mohamed Kabbah yesterday?

16:01:46 25 A. That's what I was saying just now. I don't know the  
26 status, that's why I didn't want to mention any names.

27 Q. Let's just remind ourselves. Mohamed Kabbah, who we looked  
28 at yesterday, page 16173, 15 September 2008, line 7:

29 "Sam Bockarie communicated with Benjamin Yeaten, and he

1 used to communicate as well as with Charles Taylor. But for the  
2 communication with Charles Taylor, that one he used a satellite  
3 phone. And the capture of Freetown, that was not even a hidden  
4 thing that he would go to a corner and discuss like he used to  
16:02:27 5 do. That one he did in the open place when he was trying to  
6 inform Charles Taylor that our men were in Freetown. He did that  
7 in the open because the RUF was happy. That was a joy to the  
8 RUF. They had entered Freetown."

9 You see that?

16:02:45 10 A. Yes, but that's the name I was talking about. I didn't  
11 know as to what - when I said I didn't know the status, I didn't  
12 know his status, because I remember what he had said. I didn't  
13 know his status.

14 Q. Right. So help us, Mr Taylor, which is right? Did  
16:03:00 15 Mosquito speak to you directly, or did he speak to you through  
16 Benjamin Yeaten? Help us.

17 A. Neither of them. Neither of them. That's what makes it so  
18 confusing. I picked it up right away and said I didn't want to  
19 mention his status, because two different stories about the same  
16:03:18 20 situation.

21 Q. But Mohamed Kabbah, according to this witness, is the  
22 operator in charge. He is supposed to know. So help us, what's  
23 going on here, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Absolutely - from what I know, there is none of this kind  
16:03:35 25 of thing. There is no contact with Sam Bockarie. I don't speak  
26 to Sam Bockarie on the 6th and so on. So this is why I am  
27 explaining you have this radio operator saying one thing here,  
28 Mohamed Kabbah saying a different thing about the same thing and  
29 dealing with the same person. This shows you maybe it's almost

1 Like a script. Maybe they forgot their lines.

2 Q. And this witness - let's go back to the one we've been  
3 dealing with today.

4 "And Mosquito told the operator in charge, that was one  
16:04:22 5 Mohamed Kabbah I can recall, and on that very day he was  
6 the one on duty and he sent the message. I was there when  
7 Mohamed Kabbah encoded the message and sent it to Gullit  
8 and others for them to send back these people to the rear  
9 for safety.

16:04:44 10 Q. How did you know Mosquito was speaking to Benjamin  
11 Yeaten?

12 A. After he called Benjamin, and I was sitting at the  
13 other extreme edge of the corner, he said, 'Is this  
14 Five-Zero?' And he said yes. He explained to him the  
16:05:07 15 development at the frontlines, and when he was talking to  
16 him he used to respond, 'Yes, sir.' When they were  
17 discussing, he would respond to him directly 'Yes, sir.  
18 Okay, okay, I will do that.' And when Mosquito finished,  
19 he told the operator directly that he had had instructions  
16:05:27 20 from Benjamin from above; that is, Charles Taylor through  
21 Benjamin" - note: Not directly - "that Benjamin had told  
22 him that the Pa had said that they should make sure that  
23 those people who had been released from Pademba Road should  
24 come to Buedu."

16:05:57 25 And then he confirms at line 25, page 21587:

26 "It was Benjamin who came back on the line - on the  
27 telephone line and called Mosquito. Benjamin called  
28 Mosquito back on the sat phone. It was Benjamin who sent  
29 the instruction to Mosquito for Mosquito to call for the



1 people who had been released by Gullit and others from the  
2 Pademba Road Prison to send all of them to Buedu, including  
3 ex-President Missouri. He told Gullit and others to  
4 dispatch all those big names that he had mentioned?

16:06:44 5 Q. What do you mean when you say 'all those big names'?

6 A. Yes, all the big names. You know, like, there was one  
7 Steve Bio among them. Steve Bio, Osho-Williams -  
8 Osho-Williams, Victor Foh. You know, really I cannot  
9 recall all of the names now - all of the names of the  
10 people who were released from Pademba that were named, but  
11 there were about 20 prominent people in Sierra Leone who  
12 were among the list."

13 Then he is asked this question at page 21588, line 20:

14 "Q. Then you said, 'He said that was the instruction from  
15 Taylor.' Who said that?  
16 A. It was Mosquito who said that. That was the  
17 instruction.  
18 Q. Who did he say that to?  
19 A. It was the operator to whom he was explaining.  
16:07:38 20 Mosquito was now explaining to the operator about his  
21 conversation with Mr Benjamin Yeaten.  
22 Q. Now, then you said that Mohamed Kabbah, who was the  
23 operator, sent this message to Gullit. Is that correct?  
24 A. Yes, yes.  
16:07:55 25 Q. Now, just in terms of timing here, what date is this  
26 that we are referring to?  
27 A. It was around 7 January, I'm sure. It's supposed to be  
28 something like that, 7 January in the morning. That was  
29 after the Freetown invasion, the following day.

1 Q. Now, do you know if this message was received?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How do you know that?

4 A. Gullit and others received the message and acted on the  
16:08:57 5 message. "

6 Now for completeness, line 11, page 21589.

7 "Q. Now, I am going to ask you to just describe generally  
8 the frequency of the communications between Sam Bockarie  
9 and Gullit during the course of this Freetown operation?

16:09:30 10 A. I can say there was frequent communication at that  
11 time. Frequent communication was there. There was a free  
12 flow of communication.

13 Q. What do you mean by that?

14 A. That it did not take up to an hour when one of the  
16:09:51 15 stations in Freetown did not call to Buedu directly, or  
16 Mosquito's station in Buedu did not call one of the  
17 stations in Freetown directly to get an update from there.  
18 It was constant communication that existed. "

19 Now, I am going to leave that. Mr Taylor, late on a  
16:10:22 20 Thursday afternoon, simple question: Did you have a hand in that  
21 orgy of violence which was the 6 January invasion of Freetown?

22 A. No, never did. Did not know of it. Had nothing to do with  
23 it. Absolutely nothing.

24 Q. Before the event, did you find - did you provide materiel  
16:10:55 25 to either the AFRC or the RUF to facilitate that invasion?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Did you have any prior knowledge that it was to take place?

28 A. No prior knowledge whatsoever, no.

29 Q. Did you instruct, at any stage prior to 6 January, anyone

1 to conduct such an operation?

2 A. Never instructed anyone, never encouraged anyone, didn't  
3 know of anyone that anticipated any such terrible situation, no.  
4 No.

16:11:32 5 Q. Had you, through your contacts in either Libya or Burkina  
6 Faso, facilitated in December 1998 the provision of ammunition to  
7 the RUF or the AFRC to make such an invasion possible?

8 A. No. If I had opportunities for weapons at this time, I  
9 would have gotten them for the Government of Liberia. Had no  
16:12:06 10 such opportunity and did not seek any.

11 Q. Could Benjamin Yeaten, whose name features prominently in  
12 these radio reports, could he have facilitated the 6 January  
13 invasion without your knowledge or consent?

14 A. Well, there are two - I will give two responses. I will  
16:12:32 15 say no, and no. No. In fact, he could not have facilitated  
16 that; and no, he did not facilitate. He could not. What will  
17 little Benjamin Yeaten, a little director, be in a position to  
18 facilitate this kind of action? No, no, no.

19 Q. Did you, Mr Taylor, after the event learn of any role  
16:13:02 20 played by any of your staff in the 6 January invasion?

21 A. No, didn't get any - no, no.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, having been alerted, as suggested, of a shortage  
23 of ammunition through Benjamin Yeaten on the morning of 7 January  
24 1999, did you cause to be provided material reinforcement to the  
16:13:41 25 RUF or the AFRC?

26 A. No. Not at all. Even if there was a desire at any point  
27 in that period, I did not, could not have, because I had no  
28 ammunition, I would not have encouraged such a thing and there  
29 would be no need. Even if I had tons and tons of ammunition, I

1 would have never encouraged that because we had been pushing very  
2 strongly for peace. No, no.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this Court has heard distressing and  
4 depressing accounts of individuals having their limbs amputated  
16:14:27 5 in Freetown during that invasion. Did you order such behaviour?

6 A. Never ordered such behaviour. Don't condone it at all.  
7 Did not condone any such behaviour during the entire Liberian  
8 revolution. We have never --

9 Q. Did anything like that happened during the Liberian  
16:14:46 10 revolution?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Had you decided then to adopt a novel tactic in Sierra  
13 Leone?

14 A. No, none. I did not encourage - there are no amputees,  
16:15:00 15 none from the Liberian civil war. No, no. I did not encourage  
16 any brutality against civilians in Liberia. Those that were  
17 caught, soldiers got executed in Liberia for rape, soldiers got  
18 executed in Liberia for murder. I did not - that's how I won the  
19 elections in 1997. I did not tolerate any inhumane acts on the  
16:15:28 20 part of military people that were in the NPFL. And when you  
21 crossed the line based on the operational order, we court-martial  
22 you and the result of that court martial was followed.

23 And that's why I have not denied to this the Court the  
24 number of executions. It was not because of politics. They were  
16:15:46 25 executed for rape. They were executed for murder of civilians.  
26 I dealt with those problems as of - there were no impunity on the  
27 part of NPFL soldiers. On crimes that was brought to my  
28 attention, they were dealt with. There was a court martial that  
29 dealt with it. No, I did not know and could not have ordered any

1 such nonsense, no.

2 Q. For the record, Mr Taylor, did you order any member of the  
3 AFRC or those members - few members, it would appear, of the RUF,  
4 like King Perry, who arrived in Freetown, to abduct young females  
16:16:33 5 to become bush wives?

6 A. No, bush wives, no. No, we did not. I did not. No, no,  
7 no, no.

8 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we know that this Freetown invasion  
9 features prominently in this indictment which is why I am asking  
16:16:51 10 you these questions. Now, help us, what motive would you have,  
11 given the design alleged to have exploit the mineral resources of  
12 Sierra Leone - what motives did you have to order, condone,  
13 support in any way, the kind of atrocities which took place in  
14 Freetown?

16:17:21 15 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever. No motive whatsoever.

16 Q. At the time, January 1999, or for practical purposes  
17 December 1998, did the Liberian government have the arms and  
18 ammunition to provide to supply to the RUF or the AFRC to carry  
19 out such an operation?

16:17:55 20 A. No. The Liberian government had no arms or ammunition.  
21 All arms and ammunition that were within the Republic of Liberia  
22 were in the custody of the United Nations and peacekeepers in  
23 Liberia for destruction. We had absolutely nothing.

24 Q. Mr Taylor, in January of 1999 what were you writing to the  
16:18:19 25 Secretary-General of the United Nations about? Do you recall  
26 that correspondence?

27 A. Yes, we were writing - I wrote to the Secretary-General  
28 talking about the accusations that have come out and asking him  
29 for people to be assigned at the borders to make sure that the

1 accusations were wrong, asking for people to be posted.

2 Q. Do you recall writing to him also about the establishment  
3 of the, to borrow an UN phrase, modalities for the destruction of  
4 the arms?

16:18:54 5 A. Yes, that's the period, yes.

6 Q. You remember that correspondence?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Were you at the same time, Mr Taylor, effectively playing a  
9 double game?

16:19:05 10 A. But for one to have seen that - you know, if you are in  
11 control - first we must establish here that the weapons are not  
12 in my command. They are not in my control. The weapons, all are  
13 under the lock and key of the United Nations. I don't have the  
14 weapons. The Government of Liberia does not have control of the  
16:19:23 15 weapons. So we cannot be playing a game.

16 The weapons - all of the weapons are containerised under  
17 the lock and key of the United Nations. So there can be no game.  
18 There can be no game. We are having problems on the ground.

19 Remember in a letter that was presented to this Court, I had even  
16:19:44 20 asked the international community to at least let us save some of  
21 the good weapons to be used for security. That was not even  
22 done. I have no weapons. I have nothing. Even the full army of  
23 security forces in Liberia to stop the armed robbery from little  
24 groups around, we did not have sufficient to protect the  
16:20:08 25 citizenry. Not to even talk about arms and ammunition to be  
26 exporting - some fellow sits here talking about a six-tyre truck,  
27 what did he say, mini something, a Benz and all this nonsense.  
28 No, we do not have. And I think it has been sufficiently  
29 established here that the Government of Liberia doesn't have any

1 weapons during this period. And as a result, we cannot give that  
2 which we do not have. We do not have it.

3 So all of these lies are based on the supposition that we  
4 have these weapons. But through the grace of God, I am so glad  
16:20:46 5 that those weapons were not in our custody because the next thing  
6 would have come out, they would have said, "Oh, yeah, he had them  
7 but he was sneaking the weapons out." Well, we did not have  
8 control of the weapons; the United Nations did. We had no  
9 control of the weapons. None.

16:21:21 10 Q. Mr Taylor, how many satellite phones did you give to Sam  
11 Bockarie?

12 A. I gave Sam Bockarie one satellite phone.

13 Q. Page 22048 of the transcript of 10 December 2008, line 12:  
14 "A. Well, in fact, it was not one satellite phone. It was  
16:21:50 15 not only once. Mr Taylor used to give Sam Bockarie  
16 satellite phones to ease communication between the two of  
17 them. That is he and him. That is between him and  
18 Charles Taylor, between Mosquito and Charles Taylor and  
19 Benjamin Yeaten. And also for Mosquito to have access to  
16:22:11 20 the international media."

21 Q. So we've now got more than one satellite phone given by  
22 Mr Taylor to Sam Bockarie?

23 A. Yes."

24 What do you say about that?

16:22:23 25 A. That's not true. I gave Sam Bockarie a satellite telephone  
26 in October 1998. Now, if I had given him two or three, I would  
27 sit here and tell this Court, "Oh, I gave him three phones."  
28 What damage can you do with three phones that you cannot do with  
29 one phone? This is totally ludicrous. I gave Sam Bockarie one

1 phone and I have said to this Court I even assisted with the  
2 credits for that phone, for him to be able to call and have it  
3 alive when anybody wanted to speak to him. Many of us, other  
4 Heads of State in the sub-region, spoke to Sam Bockarie. He used  
16:23:10 5 it had whatever way he wanted. We did not restrict it to what he  
6 could use it to. If he had other phones, maybe somebody else  
7 gave it to him. I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, gave Sam Bockarie one  
8 telephone. Not two, not three. That is not true. That's not  
9 true.

16:23:33 10 And another thing this witness talks about, twenty or so  
11 Sierra Leoneans - permanent Sierra Leoneans are released from  
12 Pademba Road Prison on my instruction. Not one of them ends up  
13 in Liberia. So what's my interest? If I was interest in  
14 permanent Sierra Leoneans, he says about 20 or so were released  
16:23:55 15 from Pademba Road, not one would enter Liberia? So I have all  
16 this control, I will ask for them to be released and not one  
17 would end up in Liberia? Including the Momoh and all of them  
18 don't end up in Liberia? So what am I asking them to come out  
19 for? So none of them any interest in coming to safety at least?  
16:24:17 20 I don't know how the logic is run in this whole thing here. I  
21 just had nothing to do with what they were doing and as they put  
22 it together, they're wrong.

23 Q. Couple of other matters, Mr Taylor. Firstly this, page  
24 22167 of the transcript 11 December 2008".

16:24:43 25 "Well I am telling you that when Foday Sankoh was away, it  
26 was from Mr Taylor that Mosquito was seeking advice. Like even  
27 in the case of disarmament, I mean the going to Togo and to  
28 maintain the temporary ceasefire, Sam Bockarie at first consulted  
29 with Mr Taylor even before he accepted what Foday Sankoh said."



1           What do you say about that?

2       A.     Sam Bockarie received instructions from Foday Sankoh? The  
3     first thing, we talked about this before, I don't know how he did  
4     that. But then again in the context of what - you know,

16:25:26 5     sometimes you want to get - you feel bad but then you understand  
6     the level of some of these people. Before going to Lome - this  
7     boy does not know all of the communication with Liberia, with my  
8     Foreign Ministry, United Nations cables running up and down,  
9     seeking permission, Sam Bockarie, they don't know. They just see

16:25:49 10    it so if Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia and concludes a discussion  
11    and he goes back and now he tells them, "Oh, I talked to  
12    President Taylor and we are going to do this", they interpret  
13    this probably as instructions from me. So I don't know as to  
14    whether I should be upset at these kind of people. They don't

16:26:08 15    know what's going on and they come up with their own ideas. This  
16    whole Lome thing, it's not just Charles Taylor. So, I mean I --

17       Q.     Mr Taylor, we've got four minutes left and I want to finish  
18    this witness. There is one other point I want to deal with in  
19    relation to him. The witness spoke during the course of his

16:26:29 20    testimony of being placed in a dungeon by Mosquito because he had  
21    written a letter to Foday Sankoh in which he had suggested that  
22    Foday Sankoh should get you, Charles Taylor, to tell Mosquito to  
23    disarm. And the reason why he had written that letter to quote  
24    page 2257, line 37:

16:27:01 25           "Because I knew that he had direct influence over him.  
26    Even when Pa Sankoh was not there, it was to him that Mosquito  
27    sought. It was Mr Taylor that Mosquito used to seek most of the  
28    advice on relevant issues that he was supposed to deal with."

29           Now, Mr Taylor, if you had that kind of influence, why did

1 you allow Mosquito to almost disrupt the disarmament process such  
2 that you had to extract him from Sierra Leone and bring him to  
3 Monrovia? Why did you allow that to happen?

4 A. Because I didn't have that, what he is explaining here.

16:27:39 5 That's why. No such thing existed. But here is a man with so  
6 much influence over Mosquito, he personally, who is taken in  
7 confidence by Mosquito. Now for a single advice, if Mosquito  
8 throws him in the dungeon then you can just see where that  
9 closeness is and how much or how close he really is to Mosquito.

16:28:08 10 That's the tragedy of this whole situation, I guess.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,  
12 Mr President?

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

14 Mr Taylor, we are going to adjourn. I will remind you again not  
16:28:23 15 to discuss your evidence with any other person. We will adjourn  
16 now until 9.30 next Tuesday morning.

17 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.  
18 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 22 September 2009  
19 at 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

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EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	29141