



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Wednesday, 16 September 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:19 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning, we will take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS. HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the prosecution Brenda J
9 Hollis, Mohamed Bangura, Christopher Santora and our case
09:30:44 10 manager, Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis.

12 Yes, Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours.
14 For the defence myself, Courtenay Griffiths, assisted by my
09:30:55 15 I learned friend, Mr Morris Anyah, also with us Mr Isaac Ip.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor, I
17 remind you are still bound to tell the truth. Yes, go ahead,
18 please, Mr Griffiths.

19 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

20 [On former affirmation]

21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

22 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday we commenced looking at testimony
23 given to this Court by radio operator called Perry Kamara. You
24 recall that?

09:31:23 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now, I would like to complete that process today before we
27 move on to another witness. Now, before I come to some further
28 details of his testimony, Mr Taylor, can I ask you this: During
29 the time that you tell us you were in contact with the RUF, how

1 regularly would you yourself communicate with them? I am saying
2 how regularly would you personally be on the radio speaking to
3 Foday Sankoh, for example?

4 A. Never.

09:32:11 5 Q. How would that communication operate, Mr Taylor?

6 A. If I had to get a message to Sankoh, I would pass it
7 through - first it would go through my assistant, to the radio
8 operator, who was Butterfly, and then to Foday Sankoh.

9 Q. And tell me, was any communication ever done in written
09:32:34 10 form?

11 A. Oh, I am not - I would suppose that they would keep some
12 record, but I don't know how the operators did it. I would call
13 in my special assistant at the time and give a message that I
14 wanted to see Sankoh, I wanted to ask certain questions about
09:33:02 15 progress, and he would go out and give the message, it would be
16 relayed, and upon receiving the message - in most cases it would
17 be in writing. They would bring it in on a piece of paper to me,
18 and I would assume that they probably kept some record. But they
19 would bring the report back to me on a sheet of paper.

09:33:26 20 Q. What I am asking is this, Mr Taylor: Would you ever
21 personally write a note and send it to Foday Sankoh?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Why not?

24 A. Whatever we had to do - you know, I had to do was not - I
09:33:46 25 had aides and assistants. We had a whole system set up. I just
26 didn't write any personal notes to anybody. What I had to do, I
27 delivered it in instructions form. The individuals took notes,
28 but I personally didn't have to write, no.

29 Q. Now, tell me, the modes of communication employed, you've

1 mentioned radio?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. What about communication by satellite phone?

09:34:21

4 A. No. At the time I was in contact with Foday Sankoh - and I
5 am talking about August '91 through May, June '92, Foday Sankoh
6 did not have a satellite telephone in Sierra Leone at the time.

7 Q. Did you have one at that time?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. Now, what about contact via landline, Mr Taylor?

09:34:44

10 A. No, no, no, no. There are no landlines in that part of the
11 world, no.

12 Q. And I am asking you these questions for a very good reason,
13 which we'll come to in due course. Did you provide advice to
14 Mr Sankoh on what tactics to employ?

09:35:07

15 A. No, I didn't.

16 Q. Did you advise Mr Sankoh as to which targets to engage?

17 A. No, I knew nothing about Sierra Leone to advise on targets,
18 no.

09:35:25

19 Q. Did you advise Mr Sankoh as to appointments within the
20 ranks of the RUF?

21 A. No. No. I didn't know his people. No.

22 Q. Tell me, Mr Taylor, where is Sierra Rutile?

23 A. I heard in this Court that it's a place in Sierra Leone.

24 Q. Where is it?

09:35:49

25 A. It's in Sierra Leone, from what I know.

26 Q. Yes. Where in Sierra Leone?

27 A. I have no idea. I don't know the town, village area. I
28 don't know. I just know from hearing here in court that it's a
29 place in Sierra Leone.

1 Q. I have a good reason to ask you, Mr Taylor, so I am going
2 to press you on this. What is the strategic importance of Sierra
3 Leone Rutile?

09:36:15 4 A. I really don't know. I really don't know what is the
5 importance of Sierra Rutile. I really do not know.

6 Q. Is it a diamond mining centre, for example?

7 A. I do not know what Sierra Rutile is, no.

8 Q. One other matter before we go into further detail with this
9 witness. How many radio operators did you have, Mr Taylor?

09:36:43 10 A. In the NPFL?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. Oh, I would say about 30, 35 or more radio operators.

13 Q. And how many were personally assigned to you?

14 A. My operator was Butterfly. One, only Butterfly.

09:37:13 15 Q. Did you have any other operator?

16 A. No, I didn't have any other operator but Butterfly.

17 Q. Did you personally have a code name?

18 A. Yes, I had a code name.

19 Q. What was that?

09:37:26 20 A. In fact, I had - they called me unit 1. That was the code
21 name that they would use. They also used 047, they used that.
22 And they also used - I think it was Ivory or Ebony - the
23 Vice-President - I think I was Ebony and the Vice-President was
24 Ivory. So they used Ebony, unit 1, 047.

09:38:05 25 Q. Did you Foday Sankoh have a code name?

26 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, he did have a code name.

27 Q. What was it?

28 A. My remembrance is that his code name was Toyota, that I
29 remember.

1 Q. Now, bearing all of that in mind, let us look further at
2 the evidence of this witness. And remember, we are dealing with
3 the evidence of this witness, who is called Perry Kamara. Page
4 3049 of the transcript of 4 February 2008:

09:38:52 5 "When Sankoh was ready to go on the peace talks in Abidjan,
6 he left Mohamed Tarawalli in charge as acting leader. Mosquito
7 came next to him, and Issa too went next to Mosquito, and so then
8 he went. After he went, Mohamed Tarawalli got missing in action,
9 then Foday Sankoh appointed Mosquito as the leader. That was how
09:39:21 10 the structure changed."

11 Pause. Mr Taylor, did you appoint Mosquito as leader of
12 the RUF in the absence of Foday Sankoh?

13 A. No, I did not.

14 Q. Did you appoint him a general?

09:39:41 15 A. No, I did not.

16 Q. "Q. You said Mohamed Tarawalli got missing in action.
17 When was this?

18 A. It was in 1996."

19 Now, I want you to listen carefully to this:

09:39:56 20 "Q. During the period up until 1994, what was the state of
21 communication that you had, the RUF had with Liberia?"
22 Note 1994, Mr Taylor, yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "A. If you are talking about radio communication, it was
09:40:25 25 cordial. It was cordial.

26 Q. And can you comment on the frequency of the
27 communications with the NPFL?

28 A. Well, we always spoke to the NPFL at any time Mr Sankoh
29 want to speak to Mr Taylor; at any time Mr Taylor wanted

1 to speak to Mr Sankoh. That happened every two, three,
2 days, but every moment we used to send message to the NPFL
3 in Liberia and they would also send message to us, because
4 the Liberians knew our communication code and we also had
09:41:07 5 their communication code, so that was how it was arranged."

6 What do you say about that frequency of contact, Mr Taylor?

7 A. I would just - there was - even "frequency" is an
8 exhaustive word. There was just no contact in 1994 or 1993 that
9 came from me to the RUF. None whatsoever. That is totally
09:41:38 10 false. Totally false.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've heard repeatedly from witnesses
12 called by this Prosecution of supply lines being cut by ULIMO.
13 You recall that evidence, don't you?

14 A. Yes, I do.

09:41:55 15 Q. So help me. If you were not supplying anything to the RUF,
16 why were you - why were you in such regular contact with them,
17 according to this witness?

18 A. The fact is I was not. That's it. This witness - what am
19 I going to be talking to Foday Sankoh about in 1994 that I did
09:42:21 20 not talk to him about in 1992 - late 1992 and that I did not
21 speak to him about in 1993. There was no contact.

22 Now, I would not dispute if this witness said that maybe,
23 like some of these boys that got to know each other, would call
24 each other across radio lines, ordinary operators. We had -
09:42:46 25 every major town and city that we captured in Liberia, we put a
26 radio. Now, these boys, like Nya, who came from Nimba County,
27 and some of these other boys that were on the other side, it
28 would not be unusual for a Liberian who was fighting on that
29 side, wanting to talk to somebody in the NPFL area, let's say if

1 you have a relative somewhere in Nimba and you want to call and
2 say, "Oh, tell my mother I am okay", something like that.
3 Officially with this Charles Taylor or any senior general or
4 administrator in the NPFL, there was no contact whatsoever. I
09:43:26 5 certainly did not speak to Foday Sankoh or gave him a message or
6 received a message from him at the end of the period in 1992. So
7 that is totally out of question that there was supposed to be
8 some contact between me and anybody. In fact, I never even spoke
9 on the radio. Never.

09:43:47 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I have to put it to you because it may well
11 be suggested to you in due course: Was it the case that despite
12 the absence of any supplies from you to the RUF in this period,
13 you were none nonetheless still running the RUF project? Do you
14 follow me?

09:44:10 15 A. I follow you.

16 Q. By remote. Were you doing that?

17 A. No, I was not. I would say that would be total nonsense
18 that they would be suggesting because it's all about reasoning.
19 If this is true in 1994 - if this is true in 1994 - where there
09:44:30 20 is contact between Foday Sankoh and myself, one must assume that
21 it would continue in 1995 and it should continue in 1996. But we
22 know what happens in 1996, when in early 1996 Foday Sankoh goes
23 out of Sierra Leone into an area that he can contact me and he
24 doesn't. Then he is one ungrateful individual. There was no
09:44:56 25 contact. It is a lie. There was no contact between Foday Sankoh
26 and myself at the end of May/June 1992. None.

27 Q. Now, the witness continues, page 3050, transcript of 4
28 February 2008:

29 "They had code names. Even when they spoke directly. When

1 they were speaking directly to each other they referred to
2 themselves. Mr Taylor called Sankoh Toyota and Mr Sankoh, who
3 was Toyota, referred to Mr Taylor as Ebony."

4 Do you agree with that?

09:45:40 5 A. Well, I agree with the names. I don't agree that we
6 talked. Foday Sankoh and I did not talk on the radio, no. Those
7 codes are correct.

8 Q. The codes are correct, but what do you dispute?

9 A. I dispute that we spoke on the radio personally, no. I
09:46:00 10 would give a message and Foday Sankoh would send a message. I
11 never spoke on the radio with Foday Sankoh, no, but messages were
12 passed, I accept that.

13 Q. Now, it continues:

14 "But at times they used to refer to themselves as subjects,
09:46:23 15 when they never wanted to use the same code at all times. But
16 sometimes when we went on the Liberian net we referred - we
17 called Mr Taylor's radio station Butterfly and then when they
18 went to our radio net they would call 35, so we would know
19 automatically that they were calling from Liberia."

09:46:47 20 Now, was your radio station called Butterfly?

21 A. Not to my knowledge. My radio operator was called
22 Butterfly. I don't know how they would communicate with each
23 other, but Butterfly was my operator and when that operator got
24 on the air to any NPFL area they would know that that message was
09:47:12 25 coming from me. I don't know if that was the station name, but I
26 know the operator was called Butterfly.

27 Q. So you agree with the code names Toyota, Ebony and
28 Butterfly?

29 A. Yes, I do. I do.

1 Q. What about three five, 35?

2 A. No, I don't know what they called themselves on the other
3 side, their station, I don't.

4 Q. Right. Now this, Mr Taylor: Remember I asked you about
09:47:40 5 you providing military advice to Foday Sankoh?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. The witness says this:

8 "Q. Did the military situation in Sierra Leone change at
9 some point?

09:47:52 10 A. Yes, in that year 1994, the government troops attacked
11 us and we were restless. We always took our ammunition and
12 flee and we always took our ammunitions and carried them on
13 our heads. But during this period" - 1994, note - "in my
14 presence, Mr Sankoh called Mr Taylor and Mr Taylor said,

09:48:22 15 'You should stop attacking.' He said, 'You should use your
16 guerilla tactics at this point so that you will be able to
17 gain from the government.' What was this guerilla tactics?
18 He said, 'You should make sure you set an ambush and
19 secondly you should avoid towns' and indeed that was how it
09:48:45 20 happened. The ammunition we had we never used to attack
21 again. We would set an ambush and we would prepare
22 ourselves in what we referred to as the jungle. We avoided
23 the towns and then we based in the bush. We would cook
24 only at night."

09:49:03 25 Did you provide such advice?

26 A. Never did. Never provided Foday Sankoh, you know - and if
27 I did I would say I did. If I say I gave Foday Sankoh arms in
28 1991/92, what would an advice be as compared to arms? Look, I
29 just never advised Foday Sankoh. Foday Sankoh fought his war.

1 He was a trained man, a trained soldier. I have never done any
2 military training in my life. I have read military documents but
3 I have done no training. I could not and did not give Foday
4 Sankoh any military advice in 1994 when he had been fighting a
09:49:44 5 war since 1991. I am supposed to be advising him in '94 on how
6 to fight? This is nonsense. I never gave him any military
7 advice. None.

8 Q. Now, you have heard evidence in this Court, have you not,
9 of a change in the tactics of the RUF when they created their
09:50:08 10 zoebushes in the jungle. You've heard that?

11 A. Yes, I have.

12 Q. Now, was it you who dictated that change in strategy,
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. No, I did not. And I think if we refresh a little bit, I
09:50:23 15 think in Foday Sankoh's own publication of the RUF "Footpaths to
16 Democracy", Foday Sankoh explains what led to all of his
17 decisions. It was not informed by what Charles Taylor said or
18 didn't say because I was not in contact. No, did not have
19 anything to do with that whatsoever. I think Foday Sankoh's
09:50:44 20 action was informed by the situation on the ground. That's my
21 own suggestion.

22 Q. Well, we have looked at "Footpaths to Democracy" and I
23 don't intend to go back to it now.

24 Page 3053 of the transcript of 4 February 2008. The
09:51:05 25 witness had mentioned that no supplies were coming through from
26 Liberia and he was then asked this question:

27 "Q. Do you recall what sort of subjects would be discussed
28 at this time that there were no supplies coming through?
29 What would be the subject of their communication?"

1 A. Yes, you know, as we all observed the process in Sierra
2 Leone, Mr Sankoh always - was always advised by Mr Taylor.
3 At any time Mr Sankoh received message from Mr Taylor, we
4 will undertake a serious attack. The RUF will attack the
09:51:47 5 government troops. On many occasions as a radio man of the
6 RUF I received, I monitored, I read from the log books,
7 for example, when a place like Sierra Rutile - because
8 Sankoh told us that he wanted to look for a major place
9 that he would attack according to Mr Taylor's advice."

09:52:11 10 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Total, total, total fabrication. I never gave Foday Sankoh
12 any advice in 1994. Never talked to him, needless to say give
13 him advice. Never.

14 Q. Now Sierra Rutile, the witness confirmed, is in the Bonthe
09:52:35 15 District in the southern parts of Sierra Leone. Did you know
16 that?

17 A. No, I didn't.

18 Q. Page 3058:

19 "Q. Now, you were talking about advice that was given to
09:52:58 20 Mr Sankoh following the capture of Sierra Rutile and one of
21 those pieces of advice was that the RUF should set up
22 diplomatic relations with the outside world, as you stated
23 it. Apart from that, was any other advice given on
24 anything else?"

09:53:17 25 Did you provide such advice, Mr Taylor?

26 A. No, I did not. But let's reflect on the evidence before
27 this Court given by a Prosecution witness. A Prosecution witness
28 came in this witness chair and told this Court that a group of
29 them that were academics had advised Sankoh to pursue a

1 diplomatic course and that I was in fact just using the RUF and
2 it took him some time but finally he accepted it. And that
3 witness is protected, I can't call his name, but he appeared
4 before this Court very late during the Prosecution's presentation
09:54:04 5 as one of their academics.

6 So this is a blatant lie because from what he said was that
7 there was a debate in their team as to what they should do
8 outside to get the word of - this advice did not come from me.
9 It came from their own academics within their organisation.

09:54:25 10 Q. And you may recall that that witness also told us that they
11 set up an external delegation based in the Cote d'Ivoire?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. And went on to complain about the behaviour of Foday Sankoh
14 whilst he also was in the Cote d'Ivoire with them. Do you recall
09:54:49 15 that?

16 A. I recall. I recall.

17 Q. So I ask again, Mr Taylor: Who was it who decided to set
18 up or establish diplomatic relations? Was it on your advice or
19 was it on their own internal debates within their RUF?

09:55:10 20 A. It's on their own internal debate within the RUF. It had
21 nothing to do with Taylor. Taylor had no contact with them.

22 Q. Well, in answer to that question posed to the witness, the
23 witness said this:

24 "Yes, I recall some that I can say now. In fact, this was
09:55:25 25 a message from Mr Taylor to Foday Sankoh saying for now those
26 people have moved to that point, they should try and make an
27 arrangement to choose a particular area where they should
28 construct an airstrip for aeroplane to be alighting there. And
29 it was a written message from Mr Taylor to Foday Sankoh. After

1 Mr Sankoh had received the message, he sent the message to
2 Kailahun and then he appointed somebody who was called Peter B
3 Vandi and said to him that he should be with the civilians day
4 and night and that they should make sure that they do the job and
09:56:09 5 what was the job? For them to construct an airfield. And this
6 airfield, it was chosen at Buedu."

7 Did you do that, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Never did that. What was supposed to be sent to this
9 airfield for me? There were no planes. I had no planes in
09:56:29 10 Liberia. So what was I supposed to be sending to Foday Sankoh?
11 I never, never told or advised anyone, because there was no
12 contact with them, to construct any airfield. I would suppose,
13 and I would just put forward a proposition, at this time because
14 of maybe their external delegation they are making contacts
09:56:50 15 outside. But within Liberia, where am I supposed to get an
16 aircraft from that would take off from Liberia to go into RUF
17 area when I don't have any contacts with them? This has to be an
18 external situation, I would suppose. But not from
19 Charles Taylor, no.

09:57:09 20 Q. Well, let me put the following propositions to you then,
21 Mr Taylor: Was it the case that because ULIMO had cut off road
22 transport to Sierra Leone, you decided to adopt another means of
23 supplying them? Do you follow me?

24 A. Yes, I follow you.

09:57:28 25 Q. Was that the case?

26 A. That was not the case because that would suppose also that
27 first of all I would what? I would have the material and I would
28 have the aircraft, the means, to deliver it there. There was no
29 aircraft in NPFL area in 1994 and don't let's forget what's

1 happening around this time in 1994. If we just reflect very
2 briefly to the Court, in 1994 it's a very, very tough year.
3 1994, by mid-1994, and again we don't get time here - 1994, what
4 happens? I go to Akosombo in Ghana for a meeting. And what
09:58:11 5 happens at that time in 1994? Gbarnga, my headquarters, is
6 overrun. Gbarnga is overrun in 1994 while I'm out.

7 So while they have opened it up, but 1994 is a year of
8 fighting on the NPFL side. We don't have any aircraft. If there
9 were any aircraft, they would have been seized when they took
09:58:34 10 over Gbarnga. So there is no such thing. I go and I come back
11 from Akosombo and I have to fight for three months up until
12 November 1994 before I regain control of my headquarters and
13 other major towns. This is totally, totally untrue. Totally.

14 Q. Well, what about this proposition then, Mr Taylor: You may
09:58:59 15 not have had the aircraft, but then you may have got your good
16 mate, Blaise Compaore, to be sending arms and ammunition by air
17 to this airstrip constructed on your instructions in Buedu. What
18 do you say about that?

19 A. I would say that is totally nonsense, because Blaise would
09:59:22 20 not be sending material to me. If anybody needed material in
21 1994, I needed it. Because my headquarters had been overrun, all
22 the arms and ammunition - the armoury was in Gbarnga at the
23 time - had been captured by enemy forces. So if anybody needed
24 help, I needed help. But the fact of the matter is there was
09:59:42 25 just no contact whatsoever with Sankoh in any shape or form.

26 None whatsoever.

27 Q. Now, page 3073 of the transcript.

28 "Q. How far beyond Sierra Leone were you able to
29 communicate by radio?

1 A. We communicated in Sierra Leone and apart from that, we
2 had communications with Liberia with Charles Taylor, and we
3 also had communication with Abidjan. Then we also had
4 communication when Sankoh went for the Lome Peace Accord.
10:00:21 5 He went with a radio. When he was patrolling for the peace
6 talk, wherever he would go, like where I mentioned, would
7 have a personal communication on this particular radio."
8 Did you know about that, Mr Taylor?
9 A. About Sankoh moving --
10:00:38 10 Q. Travelling with a radio operator and a radio?
11 A. No, I did not know. I was not in contact. No, I didn't
12 know what he was doing, no.
13 Q. Then this:
14 "Q. Now, regarding communications with Liberia, how was
10:00:51 15 it? How would this operate?
16 A. Well, the Liberia communication was a direct contact
17 from our control station to Charles Taylor's radio station.
18 That was effective. I would almost say it was every day."
19 What do you say about that?
10:01:12 20 A. Total nonsense. We are talking about what year? 1996 now?
21 Am I right about that?
22 Q. Well, he doesn't give a date.
23 A. Well, he talks about Abidjan communication with Charles
24 Taylor also --
10:01:26 25 Q. Well, I am not so sure that this question is tied to that
26 answer, Mr Taylor, so let's not limit it in that way.
27 A. Okay. No, there was no contact. I don't know
28 where - there was just no contact. And if there were contact
29 with Foday Sankoh, why would I sit before the Court - this boy is

1 lying. There was no contact with Foday Sankoh at all. I,
2 Charles Taylor, at this period had no contact with Foday Sankoh.
3 And if I had, I would say, "Yes, I was in contact with Foday
4 Sankoh." That didn't mean I was doing something for him, but I
10:02:05 5 was not at all.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, who is Mr Martin?

7 A. Mr Martin? I don't know who Mr Martin is. Mr Martin?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. I don't know him.

10:02:30 10 Q. Well, according to this witness, page 3080 of the
11 transcript of 5 February 2008:

12 "Mr Martin was a very good coordinator. He was also an
13 agent for Mosquito, moving from Buedu to Monrovia for arms and
14 ammunition arrangements with Mr Taylor."

10:02:55 15 Who is this Mr Martin, Mr Taylor?

16 A. I don't know any Mr Martin. And what year are we into now?

17 Q. Well, I can't help you with that.

18 A. Well, he said moving to Monrovia.

19 Q. Yes, for arms and ammunition arrangements with Mr Taylor.

10:03:11 20 So Mr Taylor, help me, was it Mr Martin; was it Jungle; was it
21 Varmuyan Sheriff? Who was the coordinator, the liaison person?
22 Who was it?

23 A. There was no liaison. I don't know Mr Martin or nobody.

24 There was no liaison if we are talking about movement to

10:03:34 25 Monrovia, so I would interject that we must be talking
26 about - maybe I shouldn't say "we must be talking about", because
27 I am in Monrovia. We are talking about two different times. I
28 would say between 1995 up to my election of 1997 July, that's one
29 period; and 1997 July up until the end, that's another period.

1 So I don't know which period he is talking about.

2 Assuming that he is talking about the period of my
3 presidency, there is no coordinator between the RUF and my
4 government. By the time in '98 that I make the contact by

10:04:22 5 inviting Sam Bockarie, there is no coordinator. Sam Bockarie is
6 the one that we are dealing with.

7 Q. Well, try and help us, Mr Taylor. Because we have heard a
8 lot of evidence about liaisons between you and the RUF. Now, try
9 and help us; who was it?

10:04:42 10 A. None.

11 Q. Was it him? Was it Jungle? Was it Mr Sheriff?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Right. Was it Senegalese?

14 A. No, none of them. None of them served --

10:04:52 15 Q. Was it Eddie Kanneh?

16 A. No, Eddie Kanneh --

17 Q. Was it Ibrahim Bah?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Who was it?

10:04:59 20 A. There was no coordinator. I dealt with Sam Bockarie.

21 There was no coordinator that I had. I mean, at my level when I
22 wanted Sam Bockarie, he came, he left. But I did not use any
23 coordinator between the RUF and my government, no. I dealt with
24 them directly. There was no coordinator.

10:05:22 25 Q. Now, the witness went on to say this, page 3083 of the
26 transcript 5 February 2008:

27 "Q. Now, you have mentioned Sankoh and Mosquito having
28 satellite phones. Did any other person or any other leader
29 of the organisation get a satellite phone at some stage?

1 A. Yes. The time Sam Bockarie left and went to Liberia to
2 Mr Taylor, and again when Foday Sankoh was arrested in
3 Freetown during the May incident 2000, Issa took over as a
4 leader - as acting leader of the RUF. During that time
10:06:19 5 again Issa had a satellite phone through Liberia, so he
6 himself was talking to Mr Taylor. So whatever they
7 discussed, he would do the same thing by sending messages
8 to all commanders through field radio communications. And
9 even if the RUF spokesman or whomsoever was representing
10:06:41 10 BBC Focus on Africa or the Voice of America, they would use
11 the same satellite phone to talk."

12 One question about that, Mr Taylor, did you provide Issa
13 Sesay with a satellite phone?

14 A. No, I did not.

10:06:57 15 Q. Did you provide Mosquito with a satellite phone?

16 A. Yes, I did.

17 Q. Did you provide Foday Sankoh with a satellite phone?

18 A. No, I did not. But just to remind you: On the Foday
19 Sankoh satellite phone, there is evidence led here about Foday
10:07:25 20 Sankoh obtaining a satellite phone in 1996 when he went to
21 Abidjan and when he sent one back to Zogoda along with a fax. So
22 that is a part of the records here already.

23 Q. Now, another aspect of this witness's evidence, page 3102
24 of the transcript 5 February 2008, he gave this answer in answer
10:08:03 25 to this question:

26 "Q. Can you describe what happened when you arrived in
27 Koidu?

28 A. Immediately we got to Koidu, there was now
29 communication between the authorities, Issa Sesay, Superman

1 and Sam Bockarie, for them to reorganisation and base in
2 Kono - for us not to lose Kono. The first message that we
3 monitored - that we received in our message logbook,
4 according to Sam Bockarie, he said he had consulted
10:08:38 5 Mr Taylor in Liberia saying that in Kono - as long as we
6 have Kono, we will not fail in taking over the rest of
7 Sierra Leone again, because we already knew that Kono was
8 one of the prominent diamond mining areas in Sierra Leone,
9 therefore, all the troops should be on standby there except
10:09:02 10 Issa Sesay, Johnny Paul Koroma and the securities who were
11 going to escort them to Buedu."

12 What do you say about that?

13 A. Never talked to Sam Bockarie about any such operations in
14 Kono at all. Never did.

10:09:19 15 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, you appreciate that the control of Kono
16 plays a prominent role in the allegation against you, it being,
17 as the witness indicated, a prominent diamond mining area. And
18 you appreciate the suggestion that you were terrorising the
19 civilian population of Sierra Leone in order to exploit their
10:09:46 20 mineral wealth?

21 A. Uh-huh.

22 Q. So did you instruct the RUF to control Kono, as this
23 witness suggests?

24 A. Never did. Never instructed, never discussed it with them
10:10:03 25 at all. I don't know what it would have taken, as if the RUF -
26 and this Kono based on the testimony here, we are talking about
27 what now, '98, '99? Based on this, that it would have taken
28 somebody from outside to tell these people, who have been dealing
29 with their own people in diamonds all their lives, that

1 Charles Taylor will now say, "Guess what happened? Kono is a
2 place you got to take to do something." This is outrageous.
3 Never held any such discussion or gave any such instructions to
4 Sam Bockarie. Never.

10:10:46 5 And I guess, you know, this is a well put together
6 situation where it is important for these little boys to come up
7 and say, I see here where - who is involved here? Johnny Paul
8 Koroma. Well, I get Johnny Paul Koroma released in 1999. He is
9 incarcerated most of the time, so I don't know how he got
10:11:07 10 involved in this, but it just never happened. And I am sure as
11 we proceed, we will get to know - this Court will get to know
12 more about it and this accusation, that this never happened.
13 Never.

14 Q. Let's move on. Page 3104 of the transcript 5 February
10:11:32 15 2008:

16 "They always gave orders, but before the orders were given
17 Sam Bockarie, I can recall, transmitted a message that he had
18 finally had an arrangement with Mr Taylor, because we were now in
19 Kono and we should be able to take care of Kono. He", that being
10:11:54 20 Sam Bockarie, "said Mr Taylor had told him that they should try
21 and reorganise and", note this, "reprepare the airfield at Buedu.
22 So in there they would need civilians to do the work on the
23 field. The RUF sent over 200 to 300 civilians to Kailahun to do
24 forced labour, to work on the field day and night with security
10:12:24 25 escorts. Besides that, we also got rid of some civilians for the
26 mining purpose in Koidu Town in Kono District."

27 Mr Taylor, you understand what is being said here, don't
28 you?

29 A. I do.

1 Q. That for a second time you were giving instructions to Sam
2 Bockarie to reprepare the airstrip in Buedu. Did you do that?

3 A. No, I did not. And you know, this - I know sometimes it's
4 just too repetitious, but we just have to state it because this
10:12:58 5 is my life that these people are playing here with. Look, then
6 we must conclude, your Honour, that Sam Bockarie's salute report
7 is incomplete. Then he misled his leader in 1999 when he
8 presented his salute report. It's an incomplete report. Then he
9 was not qualified to be left. Because I don't see how all these
10:13:27 10 major advices that I am giving to Sam Bockarie to take Kono and
11 redo this and build airfield for this, and he failed to mention
12 this in his salute report to his boss when he reports in 1999.
13 Then, one, it's incomplete and, two, he was just not fit to be
14 left in control. This is not true. And maybe, thirdly, then he
10:13:58 15 is a very ungrateful individual.

16 And I would say that none of those would be true because I
17 would want to believe that he could not have hidden anything from
18 Foday Sankoh and the whole purpose of the reports, all of the
19 reports that have been made, someone would have said: Oh, well,
10:14:19 20 thank you. You cannot help but to thank Mr Taylor for what he
21 did for you and us by advising us to take Kono, by advising us to
22 do this airfield. Remember that airfield that he told you about
23 before, okay, we had to go back behind it.

24 Your Honours, this thing is all a lie. It is a lie. It is
10:14:42 25 as black of a lie as it can get. It did not happen. I gave no
26 such advice, so help me God. I didn't. I did not.

27 Q. Now, listen to this, page 3105 of the transcript 5 February
28 2008:

29 "In Koidu Town, before ever we left there, we had another

1 message from Sam Bockarie in which he said he needed money. The
2 arrangement between himself and Taylor has been confirmed and now
3 he needed money. But by then there was a commercial bank in
4 Koidu Town. He passed the order to Superman and he told him that
10:15:36 5 they should destroy the bank. There should be money in there.
6 And with regards the bank, Superman also gave orders to some
7 commanders and the bank was destroyed. There was money in there
8 which were US dollars, Sierra Leone money, sterling pounds and
9 diamonds in a big cup. I saw that with my eyes because where I
10:15:58 10 was working was in Superman's house. Where Superman was was
11 where I did my communications."

12 Now, Mr Taylor, firstly, the obvious question: Did you
13 have any hand in that bank robbery in Koidu Town?

14 A. No, I didn't. I did not. Did not have any knowledge that
10:16:29 15 some bank was in Koidu. I don't know where Koidu is to have to
16 instruct somebody or know that somebody is going to go to break a
17 bank. But my recollection is that there is a different account
18 of this by another witness, so I don't know. This is totally
19 untrue.

10:16:47 20 Q. Well, we know there is a different account and do you
21 recall what that account is, Mr Taylor?

22 A. My recollection is that this bank was broken into by some
23 individuals without the knowledge of the principal commanders and
24 they were arrested, some of the money recovered. That's as far
10:17:09 25 as I can recollect on this matter.

26 Q. And do you recall what that witness said about the use to
27 which that money was put?

28 A. I think he said that they used it to buy some material, I
29 think, either from the Guineans or ULIMO, or something like that,

1 and it helped to --

2 Q. Hold that thought, because the witness goes on to say this:

3 "Q. Do you know what happened to the money itself?"

4 That's the money from the bank, page 3107.

10:17:44 5 "A. Yes. Later Mosquito sent a message and said that he
6 was going on a trip and where he was going on this trip was
7 Liberia to see Mr Taylor. He said he was going to arrange
8 for arms, ammunition and food. So when he left with the
9 money, he returned with arms and ammunition from Mr Taylor.

10:18:07 10 Immediately after his return, he sent a message saying that
11 he has brought arms and ammunition and supply from
12 Mr Taylor out of the money that was - that he received from
13 the RUF in Koidu Town after the bank was destroyed."

14 So help us, Mr Taylor. Was the money used to buy arms from
10:18:29 15 ULIMO or did it end up in your pocket?

16 A. I saw no money. Sam Bockarie wouldn't be stupid enough to
17 bring me money. Sam Bockarie and I didn't have that type of
18 arrangement or that type of contact. That would be - I would
19 have even considered it disrespectful to me if Sam Bockarie had
10:18:51 20 even offered anything. Never. And it's just so terrible that,
21 you know, you are answering these thing, it's almost like a
22 broken record; it didn't happen, it didn't happen. But it really
23 didn't happen that Sam Bockarie would rob a bank and bring me the
24 money in Liberia. It just didn't happen, your Honours. It
10:19:08 25 didn't.

26 And I am not sure what year again these people are talking
27 about. I am not sure if this is '98 or '99. I don't know if I
28 can get some help on that.

29 Q. Now, apart from arms and ammunition, Mr Taylor, did you

1 ever provide the RUF with food?

2 A. No, I didn't give the RUF any food. No.

3 Q. Rice is the staple in that part of the world. Now, did you
4 provide them with rice?

10:20:12 5 A. No, I did not provide the RUF with rice. No. Foday Sankoh
6 bought rice when he came to Liberia. Now, the time in question
7 here - that's why I'm saying time for me is important here
8 because I don't know what period they are talking about so it's
9 very difficult to ascertain. When Sam Bockarie came to Liberia,
10:20:39 10 he would also buy things and carry and I am sure he carried rice,
11 but I don't know the period now that is in question here, so it's
12 very difficult to answer specifically to what he's talking about.

13 Q. Well, the witness was asked this:

14 "Q. What sort of food did you get from Liberia?

10:21:01 15 A. We had rice from Liberia. Rice.

16 Q. How did you know that this was coming from Liberia?

17 A. All the movements between Sam Bockarie and
18 Charles Taylor, whatever they arranged, whatever he get
19 from Taylor that man would send a message to us, the RUF
10:21:20 20 as a whole, that he had received this and this amount of
21 food. He had distributed it into jungles, so everybody
22 should come for his. That was the same way he distributed
23 ammunition. Whatever he would go and get from Mr Taylor he
24 would inform us through the radio communication and I was a
10:21:40 25 senior man in the radio communication business. I was
26 supposed to know all about this."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, bear in mind this is a radio operator and
28 we heard from several RUF radio operators in this case.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Being radio operators, they are the eyes and ears of the
2 organisation, and this man, this radio operator, is saying that
3 through that role he learned that you were the hidden hand behind
4 all of this. Now, what do you say to that allegation, Mr Taylor?

10:22:26 5 A. That is totally untrue. I was not the hidden hand. And
6 that's why some of these radio operators and [indiscernible], he
7 talked about a lot of this being in log books. From the log
8 books presented before this Court probably it would be good to go
9 through to see. I don't know as to whether they have all of
10:22:45 10 their log books to see if some of these major allegations, he
11 said that they were recorded, he learned some from log books. I
12 don't know if we can probably go through those log books to see
13 if this is true.

14 But this is one of the problems that you have with some of
10:23:01 15 these kinds of situations. Here is a radio operator someplace,
16 not knowing what's going on, Sam Bockarie goes to Liberia. Now I
17 am telling you, and everybody else, during the period that I
18 mediated for ECOWAS in dealing with the RUF I tell this Court if
19 I had given Sam Bockarie rice it would have been within my right
10:23:35 20 to do so. In fact, I would have felt that it was a good thing to
21 do. And there would be nothing about that to hide from this
22 Court, that I gave Sam Bockarie rice.

23 That period I did not give Sam Bockarie rice. I have even
24 testified before this Court that during the very tough period I
10:23:57 25 permitted RUF injured persons to take treatment in Liberia, okay.
26 So what would be rice? Of course, non-lethal thing as rice if I
27 give it to them why would I say I didn't?

28 Sam Bockarie then came to Monrovia, they did a lot of
29 shopping. They did a lot of shopping. They came to Monrovia,

1 they were not locked up in a prison. They moved around. When
2 they got ready to go back, sometimes they bought clothes,
3 blankets, different things. That was a part of the pacification
4 process that once it was a non-lethal thing - they even bought
10:24:35 5 fuel in Liberia, okay, to keep hospitals going, and old people.
6 So what would be rice that I would sit here and say I didn't give
7 him rice, come on. If I gave him rice it would have been proper
8 for me to give him rice. Once there was something non-lethal it
9 was within my duty to speak to him and to do that.

10:24:57 10 It's happening all over the world. You go between the
11 bridge now between China and North Korea, there are trucks moving
12 up and down. That's a part of the process. The process is to
13 pacify as much as possible.

14 I would not lie to Jesus about giving Sam Bockarie rice,
10:25:17 15 you understand me. Sam Bockarie bought what he wanted to buy in
16 Liberia that was non-lethal with the knowledge and consent of my
17 government. Whether it was rice - I don't dispute that Sam
18 Bockarie bought rice. I don't dispute that he bought clothes and
19 whatever, sneakers, and bought drugs and other things. I,
10:25:38 20 Charles Ghankay Taylor, did not give it to him. But we are aware
21 that he bought rice.

22 Now, here is a little operator someplace, and maybe Sam
23 Bockarie comes back and they see the thing because he's going to
24 Monrovia to see Mr Taylor, if he brings anything, it's coming
10:25:53 25 from Taylor. He doesn't know what he's talking about. That's as
26 plain as I can get with this.

27 Q. But, Mr Taylor, I have to go through these details for this
28 reason, listen to this passage from 3118 of the transcript of the
29 5 February:

1 "It was through our communication systems because within
2 the RUF we didn't hide any information. No information should go
3 beyond - should go without the knowledge of the communication
4 operators because at the time we were not using vehicles."

10:26:29 5 So these radio operators are at the centre of things, you
6 understand me?

7 A. Well, I don't believe that proposition at all. He's got to
8 be out of his head. Because any professional or even
9 semi-professional military organisation well know you are
10:26:46 10 speaking on a two-way radio where every major power in the world
11 got access in the area that you would be on a radio speaking your
12 heart out. It's a blatant lie. Then he is a foolish radio
13 operator because no one does that, okay, except where you have a
14 radio communication system that is secured. And, of course, the
10:27:13 15 little RUF, and even we, did not have secured radio. And what I
16 mean by secured, in advanced military systems you have scrambled
17 systems where you could be right there and as the communication
18 is coming through it is scrambled and then anyone trying to
19 intercept from the outside would not get it except the system on
10:27:39 20 the other side.

21 So for this man to say that everything on - I mean, that
22 had to do with the RUF came on the radio? No, it cannot be true.
23 Then I can see why they failed. Because if you are planning an
24 attack and you call and put it on the radio, then of course you
10:28:00 25 expect the enemy - and these radios are open radios that
26 everybody can listen to. Everybody. Of course you know the
27 government of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leonean Armed Forces
28 and ECOMOG and all these assets in the area will not know, then
29 they were very foolish. So he cannot be right by advancing the

1 idea that nothing was hidden. Then I can see exactly why they
2 messed up so badly, because no matter what happens, even the
3 great military powers will never just get on a radio and just put
4 everything out. And a little radio operator - and then every
10:28:38 5 radio operator, not ones that have been qualified as having
6 access to certain information - because in these organisations,
7 you have a clearance system - at least in my organisation. In my
8 organisation, there were people that had clearance that had
9 access to certain information. And even though it was
10:29:02 10 organisational, but other people in that organisation could not
11 get it because of compartmentation. So he does not - because he
12 wants to impress maybe the OTP that he knows what he is talking
13 about, he is talking foolishness because there are able people on
14 this OTP that know military science and know that this is not
10:29:25 15 correct.

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I appreciate that much of what I am asking
17 you about is tedious and repetitive?

18 A. It's okay.

19 Q. But I don't want it to be suggested at a later stage that
10:29:39 20 we didn't challenge aspects of the Prosecution case, do you
21 understand me?

22 A. I do. I do.

23 Q. So please bear with me. Page 3118 of the transcript.
24 "A. In the first instance, if, for example, it is
10:29:52 25 tomorrow, the day after that ammunition will be brought,
26 Sam Bockarie would say, 'Jungle would bring' - Jungle was a
27 strong fighter for Mr Taylor. He would say, 'Jungle will
28 bring ammunitions to Foya by helicopter' - this helicopter
29 was coming from Monrovia - and offload ammunition in Foya.

1 That was in Liberia. Foya is a short distance from Buedu,
2 so our vehicles which we had, which Sam Bockarie had, will
3 go to collect them and brought it to Buedu. That as well
4 would be part of the message, that ammunitions would be
10:30:32 5 coming today and the person who will be bringing the
6 ammunition, he will call his name in the message, and where
7 the ammunition was coming from, he will mention that as
8 well.

9 Q. Now, this person called Jungle who you just mentioned,
10:30:46 10 did you get to meet with him at all?

11 A. No. Jungle, I don't know him personally, but at any
12 time we get message, his name will appear in that
13 particular message. And when Jungle came to Buedu, we
14 would get information that Jungle had come to Buedu and for
10:31:04 15 such and such an arrangement, so I didn't know him
16 personally.

17 Q. Did you know whether this person had any other name
18 apart from Jungle?

19 A. No."

10:31:15 20 Now, Mr Taylor, we have had Mr Martin, and now we have
21 Jungle. Tell me, was Jungle a strong fighter for you?

22 A. Jungle was a junior soldier with the RUF - I mean, with the
23 NPFL that we lost in 1991 when ULIMO cut off Liberia from all
24 information that I got to know. He is a Gissi boy, I understand,
10:32:01 25 that was something like a brother to Sam Bockarie, because Sam
26 Bockarie was believed to be Gissi. And our soldiers got cut off
27 and Jungle, being from the Sierra Leonean-Liberian border, I
28 understand at that particular time became a member of the RUF.

29 Q. When did you come to understand this?

1 A. While we were - through our investigation here in this
2 trial I got this information of who this Jungle was, and I did
3 not know him personally. So as far as Jungle being some
4 messenger for me, that did not happen.

10:32:40 5 But even more important, counsel, I keep pushing this issue
6 of time, because there is something very important about these
7 big accusations being made here. We are talking about Sam
8 Bockarie. This is what this is about. Okay, so we must be
9 talking about, okay, 1998, and this period must end when? In
10:33:07 10 July 1999. So in dealing with Sam Bockarie for me, I am talking
11 about September 1998 to July 1999 --

12 Q. Why July 1999?

13 A. This is when the Lome agreement is signed and Foday Sankoh
14 is now back. Because during this time, Foday Sankoh is
10:33:29 15 incarcerated. Now - and in looking at this period, in dealing
16 with 1998, there is something important because these accusations
17 are floating at this particular time about arms supplies going in
18 and out of Sierra Leone from Liberia. Now, but something
19 interesting happens that we've led before the Court, and that is,
10:33:54 20 these accusations lead to a major investigation in 1998 where
21 Colonel Dempsey, my Defence Minister, United Nations armed forces
22 personnel, conduct an investigation about Camp Naama and all of
23 these things and file a report. And in that report, Colonel
24 Dempsey and the rest of them do say that there are no arms going
10:34:18 25 across and if any, they are going in small quantities. And I
26 even spoke about that in a speech that I delivered in December
27 1998 on a major policy thing dealing with Sierra Leone.

28 So this thing this man's talking about of arms, ammunition,
29 and breaking banks, these are some of the same lies that were

1 going on during this period about these large shipments that lead
2 to this investigation by the international community involving a
3 colonel from the United States embassy in Monrovia, okay, whose
4 report I saw.

10:34:55 5 So it can't be both ways, that they conduct this
6 investigation and find out that all this nonsense in 1998 is not
7 true. But these are the people that led the Prosecution into
8 believing that all these things were true, so we can't - that's
9 why I keep talking about the time, because the time in question,
10:35:12 10 we had an international investigation. So it's not true. It's
11 not true. Okay? And I deal with it at length in December 1998
12 in a major policy speech that I made in 1998 December on the
13 Sierra Leonean crisis revealing what this commission had come up
14 with and everything. So this is a part of that whole construct
10:35:40 15 of lies that, you know, I keep pushing for the time, because this
16 time had been settled through this investigation by the UN, the
17 American government, represented by Colonel Dempsey. We had my
18 Defence Ministry, other NGOs and everything, they conducted this
19 investigation. So it's just not true, but this is a continuation
10:36:02 20 of these lies.

21 Q. Now, the witness went on to say this, Mr Taylor, at page
22 3135:

23 "It was a continuous message that came from Sam Bockarie
24 almost all the time, but not every day. He said the mining in
10:36:32 25 Kono was very important for the RUF and that will enable us to
26 get arms and ammunition, food and drugs from Charles Taylor, and
27 therefore we should make sure that we get rid of civilians and
28 organised mining units and also hold fast to Kono District, Koidu
29 Town as a whole. These were some of the messages that came in."

1 Mr Taylor, this is a radio operator saying that
2 continuously these messages were being sent by Sam Bockarie?

3 A. I don't know what Sam Bockarie said to them, but I am not
4 in a position to confirm or deny what Sam Bockarie said to his
10:37:16 5 people. But it surely didn't come from Charles Taylor. I have
6 no idea of what Sam Bockarie was telling his people, but it
7 didn't come from me.

8 Q. And the same witness goes on in the same vein a couple of
9 pages later in the transcript, page 3142:

10:37:35 10 "Yes, the first stage was the first time he entered Kono.
11 We had a message from Superman - sorry, from Sam Bockarie, Buedu,
12 to Superman concerning mining in Koidu Town. The message said we
13 should not lose Kono at all because it had gone over to
14 Mr Taylor. He had gone over to Mr Taylor for arms and
10:37:58 15 ammunitions, and what Taylor told him is he should try and get
16 Kono. He should not lose Kono, and from Kono we could get
17 diamonds and we can use these diamond. Give it to Taylor and he,
18 in return, would give us ammunition. That was the first message
19 we got."

10:38:17 20 I am sorry to sound like a stuck record, Mr Taylor, but the
21 evidence of this witness is replete with these suggestions. So
22 what are you saying about them?

23 A. They are all lies. Total lies, that's what they are. And
24 I don't know who put him up to this, but they are lies.

10:38:33 25 Q. And in the same vein at page 3146:

26 "Mosquito sent us a message to all stations that Johnny
27 Paul Koroma was about to escape with diamonds, but they had been
28 taken away from him. What I understood about the diamond, it was
29 two plastics full. Among the diamonds one of them weighed up to

1 40 carats. He said he was giving that diamond to Issa Sesay to
2 take to Liberia."

3 Guess to whom? "Mr Taylor." What do you say?

4 A. That's not true. But we heard about another 40 carat that
10:39:12 5 Foday Sankoh was supposed to have given me. I am not sure if
6 this is the same 40 carat that - maybe it got thrown around in
7 their midst. There was no such thing, and I am sure this Court
8 will get to know later that there was no such thing.

9 Q. There is a similar suggestion on page 3148, but I am not
10:39:38 10 going to deal with it. I am going to skip that and go to page
11 3159 of the transcript:

12 "There came a time after this mission Bai Bureh went off,
13 and then we had an instruction from Sam Bockarie that came to
14 Superman that Superman should move to Buedu for a meeting. The
10:40:15 15 purpose of the meeting was for a plan that he brought from
16 Liberia from Charles Taylor so that he will be able to explain to
17 Superman, and then Superman in return will come and explain to
18 the other fighters and other camps on the ground. That was the
19 time we moved to Buedu."

10:40:34 20 Mr Taylor, did you use your position on the Committee of
21 Six as a way of camouflaging your dealings with Sam Bockarie and
22 the RUF? You understand me?

23 A. I understand you.

24 Q. You were using it as a cover?

10:40:57 25 A. Total nonsense. I would not bring myself so low where my
26 colleagues in West Africa would depend on me for something and I
27 would be dealing with a Sam Bockarie to not just undermine them,
28 but to undermine the whole peace process and Liberia. That is
29 total, total nonsense, no.

1 Q. Because what this suggests, Mr Taylor, is that, in effect,
2 you were micromanaging that war in Sierra Leone; that you were
3 summoning Bockarie to give him specific instructions on what to
4 do on the ground. Is that the case?

10:41:36 5 A. That is never the case. Never. Never the case.

6 Q. Who is Bai Bureh, Mr Taylor?

7 A. I don't know him.

8 Q. Have you ever met Superman, Mr Taylor?

9 A. No. No, I have not met Superman.

10:41:58 10 Q. Now, that conversation regarding the instructions was
11 supposed to have taken place in April-May 1998. April-May 1998,
12 Mr Taylor?

13 A. 1998 April, we are just - we are getting out of - that's
14 after the intervention. March, Kabbah goes to Freetown. No,
10:42:43 15 there is no such thing, no, in April of 1998 that I would be
16 involved in, no.

17 Q. Now, when Sam Bockarie came to Monrovia, Mr Taylor, did you
18 monitor or have monitored what he purchased to take back to
19 Sierra Leone?

10:43:27 20 A. It would be monitored, yes.

21 Q. Who by?

22 A. The security personnel that was assigned to observe what
23 they did would monitor them.

24 Q. And what was the purpose of monitoring that?

10:43:45 25 A. Well, to make sure that during this process they did not
26 get their hands on any war-like material, that is whether it is -
27 you know, anything that would be harmful. Like, whether it was
28 even as simple as a machete, we would not let them buy them in
29 Liberia. We wanted to make sure that we knew at all times what

1 they were doing.

2 Q. What about mining materials?

3 A. Well, like?

4 Q. Shovels, shakers and the like.

10:44:21 5 A. Oh, I am not sure if they bought it, but if they bought it,
6 yes, the security would have monitored that they picked up those
7 things, yes.

8 Q. What about things like radios?

9 A. What kind of radios?

10:44:34 10 Q. And other communication equipment?

11 A. No, they would not be able to buy communication equipment.

12 Q. Why not?

13 A. Because depending on what type of communication, if these
14 are walkie-talkies they were only sold to security agencies. If
10:44:50 15 they wanted to buy long-range radio equipment that the ordinary
16 radio equipment, unless it was for a purpose in Liberia, we would
17 not let them carry communication because it could be used for
18 military purposes. We would not let them do that.

19 Q. Because the witness at page 3162 speaks of seeing in Sam
10:45:22 20 Bockarie's house a carton of FM commercial radio and a satellite
21 phone:

22 "He said all these things, including the diamonds that he
23 had been collecting from Kono, he said they are the things that
24 have provided us with part of this ammunition. He said all the
10:45:45 25 diamonds that we have been sending from Kono and monies, he said
26 these are the things in return for them that Mr Taylor has given.
27 He said more things were coming after."

28 That's page 3162 of the transcript. What do you say about
29 that?

1 A. This boy doesn't know. That's not true. This FM
2 communication radio that he is talking about has been covered by
3 over witnesses here too and who was helping to operate it, such
4 as Hilton Fyle operating this FM communication and where it came
10:46:20 5 from. So there is a different account. Because the FM radio
6 station he is talking about is not like a communication radio.
7 It's a broadcasting station he is talking about. But it's been
8 covered here also. Hilton Fyle was supposed to be helping along
9 with that. It had nothing to do with Charles Taylor. Absolutely
10:46:39 10 nothing. And I am sure other witnesses will come that will even
11 give more details of how they got their radio station.

12 I didn't have any FM broadcast. This is not something you
13 go in a store and buy. A broadcasting station had to be ordered,
14 you had to get frequencies for it. It's a broadcasting radio
10:47:00 15 network. This is nothing that the Government of Liberia gave.
16 From my understanding from testimony here this was something that
17 the RUF bought through some of their own contacts and Hilton Fyle
18 was supposed to have been operating it, based on what I heard in
19 this courtroom.

10:47:19 20 Q. Now, Bockarie, according to the witness, showed those items
21 in his house at a meeting that was held to plan an operation and
22 the witness continued in this vein at page 3163 of the transcript
23 of 5 February 2008:

24 "Sam Bockarie told us that he was just coming from
10:47:51 25 Mr Taylor's site with a very big plan so that we will be able to
26 take over the country. So I saw them bring a map of Sierra
27 Leone. He said this is how Mr Taylor has planned and he told him
28 to come and implement it. He showed us the areas we should
29 attack. I can still recall the towns that he made mention of on

1 the war plan. One of the towns was Kono, Sefadu itself or you
2 call it Koidu. The other town was Kabala. The other town was
3 Makeni, Magburaka, Matatoka, 91, Masiaka and Waterloo, Waterloo
4 including Port Loko, Kambia. Those were the names that I can
10:48:48 5 recall and they were all on the map. He said that was what they
6 planned before he left Mr Taylor."

7 What do you say, Mr Taylor?

8 A. I don't know Sierra Leone or what the importance of these
9 towns. Sam Bockarie and myself would not sit down to plan
10:49:13 10 anything about what they have been doing in Sierra Leone. I
11 never planned anything with Sam Bockarie. Never even planned it
12 before with his boss Foday Sankoh. Never made any plans or
13 discussions with Sam Bockarie to attack any towns or villages in
14 Sierra Leone. Never did.

10:49:34 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if one looks or recalls a map of Sierra
16 Leone, those towns, Makeni, Magburaka, Matatoka, 91, Masiaka,
17 Waterloo, that looks like Port Loko, that looks like the Freetown
18 invasion, late '98/'99. Did you plan it?

19 A. No, never planned it. Never knew of it, no.

10:50:05 20 Q. And the witness goes on to say this, page 3164:

21 "Q. Did he indicate how you were going to take control of
22 these towns?

23 A. Yes. In fact, when we came to Buedu, Mr Taylor sent a
24 herbalist for these missions. The presence of the
10:50:31 25 herbalist will help us to get rid of the town. He said the
26 people who are in Kono - I'm sorry, when Superman returns
27 back, what he should do, the ammunition that he will carry,
28 he should carry them directly to SAJ Musa's place after he
29 runs the mission that I am going to refer to again

1 Fitti-Fatta mission. But I have to explain how he would
2 plan to attack the towns as it was discussed in the
3 meeting. He said SAJ Musa and Superman were going to be
4 responsible for Kabala and Makeni. The group that was
10:51:07 5 going to join Gullit at Rosos, they were going to be
6 responsible for Port Loko and Kambia. Those in Kono, after
7 Superman had left, they were responsible for Kono, Sewafe,
8 Makali, Magburaka, Mile 91. And the meeting point was to
9 be Masiaka because Masiaka was a main junction in Sierra
10:51:32 10 Leone. After we get to Waterloo then we make a fresh plan,
11 a new one. That is what he said Taylor told him.

12 Q. Mr Witness, now what was the overall focus of this
13 plan? What was the overall focus ultimately?

14 A. Well, the main focus was to get Freetown."

10:51:53 15 That's page 3164. You planned it, the Freetown invasion,
16 according to this man. You gave the plan to Sam Bockarie.
17 That's what this man is saying?

18 A. That shows you just how credible he is because all of the
19 other accounts that we have heard here, and this Court is very
10:52:17 20 well aware, from what I listened to in this courtroom of what
21 happened between the RUF and the SLA regarding this gentleman
22 called SAJ Musa. There was no contact. And that SAJ Musa and
23 the SLA were involved in this attack on Freetown and that the RUF
24 was not involved. So this other man comes with his own story.
10:52:42 25 And that's what it is, a real fairytale. I know nothing about
26 any invasion of Freetown. Never planned it, never knew of it at
27 all.

28 And his account, his account as he describes it here, goes
29 very much away from other accounts that have been led before this

1 Court. So there are several now before this Court. Different
2 accounts as to how the Freetown invasion occurred. Who were
3 involved, the conflict between the SLA and the RUF, the death of
4 SAJ Musa, that I heard in this Court, how he died, there maybe at
10:53:38 5 least a half dozen different accounts. This is totally, totally
6 untrue. I knew nothing about any attack on Freetown which occurs
7 in January 1999. Nothing whatsoever.

8 Q. Now, the questioning continued in this vein, page 3165:

9 "Q. You mentioned the herbalist was sent by Mr Taylor. Is
10:54:04 10 that correct?

11 A. Yes. One herbalist came. This herbalist - sorry, Sam
12 Bockarie gave Superman in Buedu, we all travelled and came
13 to Koidu Town. It was this herbalist that was going to
14 inspire us so that we will have no fear of attacking Kono
10:54:23 15 and the various areas I have named. This herbalist was -
16 we were going to use this herbalist to go on a mission that
17 we called Fitti-Fatta, Fitti-Fatta mission. This herbalist
18 after we had come to Kono before the Fitti-Fatta mission.

19 Q. Now, before you get on to going back to Kono, how did
10:54:48 20 you know this herbalist came from Mr Mr Taylor?

21 A. Well, the herbalist himself was introduced to us
22 during the meeting. It was from there that I was able to
23 know that he came from Mr Taylor and he said with all
24 these plans these were the herbalists who were helping him
10:55:04 25 in Liberia. Therefore he sent him to us also so that he
26 will come and work for us."

27 Mr Taylor, do you believe in juju?

28 A. No, I don't. No, I don't believe in juju.

29 Q. Well, did you send this herbalist to inspire the RUF?

1 A. No, I did not. But, you know, I think they were using
2 herbalists in the Kamajors too. These herbalists - how am I
3 going to take somebody that I don't believe in juju and send a
4 herbalist? Maybe a herbalist - that Lofa region, they have a lot
10:55:44 5 of herbalists in that region. Maybe somebody went there and
6 brought somebody from Liberia because the whole Gissi - Sam
7 Bockarie [indiscernible] that's a Gissi place. The Gissi, the
8 Gbandi - these are all spelt in the records here. Gissi, Gbandi,
9 Loma, Mende, that whole area, that's the area where you find
10:56:05 10 herbalists. So when you hear about the Kamajors who were the
11 bush fighters, these are herbalists and different things.

12 I did not send any herbalist to Sierra Leone and I did not
13 even use herbalists with the NPFL. So I don't believe that - we
14 saw people walking around claiming different things, but, no, we
10:56:33 15 never. I knew better than trying to depend on some herbalist
16 that would come and do - maybe depending on fetish or whatever,
17 no. I am not of that - I am not in that area, no.

18 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, the cynic might say, "Well, you might not
19 believe in it, but dealing with superstitious people by any means
10:56:55 20 necessary." Do you follow me?

21 A. Yes, but then if that would be true then I would use it for
22 my own people. I would use it - and I didn't use it in the NPFL,
23 so I wouldn't use it on that side.

24 Q. Now, at that same meeting, the witness claimed:

10:57:22 25 "Once again Sam Bockarie told us that the airstrip for
26 which he had received orders from Mr Taylor to construct, work
27 had started constructively on it because we got ammunition
28 through helicopter from Monrovia to Foya and that was a delay,
29 therefore the airfield was also part of the meeting."

1 Mr Taylor, again, we're looking at some time in 1998 here,
2 obviously, in light of this is the meeting where the Freetown
3 invasion is being planned. Were you also instructing Bockarie
4 once again to construct this airfield?

10:58:05 5 A. Never gave him any such instruction, no.

6 Q. The witness goes on to say this, and this is a specific
7 allegation which I want you to address, Mr Taylor, page 3169:

8 "Q. What was the ammunition and arms intended for?

9 A. These particular arms that were given to us were for
10:58:41 10 that Fitti-Fatta mission and also ammunition that Superman
11 was supposed to carry to SAJ Musa.

12 Q. Did SAJ Musa - did Mosqui to say anything about how arms
13 and ammunition would be provided for the big plan which he
14 had discussed, which was a long-term plan?

10:59:01 15 A. Yes. He told us that the ones that he had showed to us
16 were not for this, just this first mission plan. He said
17 there are more ammunition - of ammunitions coming for that
18 big mission. He said that was what Charles Taylor said."

19 The implication being you provided the arms for that
10:59:24 20 Fitti-Fatta mission. Did you?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. And that you promised arms for the bigger plan, the
23 invasion of Freetown. Did you?

24 A. No, I did not. But again, I just want to leave on the
10:59:39 25 record there are other accounts of how arms were obtained for
26 Fitti-Fatta that we heard in this Court. I am sure we will get
27 into that, maybe with another witness. There is another account
28 of how Fitti-Fatta, or whatever they call it, was put together.

29 Q. Because the witness makes quite clear that this was a very

1 important meeting, a meeting held in Buedu, the witness says.

2 And he continued about that meeting in this vein, page 3179:

3 "Q. Did Sam Bockarie get instructions from anyone about
4 the plan that was discussed in Buedu, the plan which he
11:00:42 5 discussed with Superman in Buedu?

6 A. Yes. What he told us, he said he had instructions from
7 Taylor. Both of them discussed before he left Liberia -
8 before he left Liberia for Buedu. Yes, he had an order
9 from somebody, and that person is Mr Taylor.

11:01:01 10 Q. How do you know this?

11 A. He himself explained it to us during the meeting at
12 Buedu. He said this time around when he went to Taylor,
13 Taylor called him and gave him instructions how he should
14 begin to run operations in Sierra Leone. He told him
11:01:26 15 everywhere. He told him the places where to attack, and so
16 when he returned he called all the prominent commanders and
17 explained to them so that they could take action with
18 regard to the instructions. That is what he told us. That
19 was one of the agenda items during the meeting which was
11:01:47 20 discussed in Buedu."

21 So you see the order of things, Mr Taylor: Bockarie goes
22 to Liberia; you summon him; you put to him a plan; he returns to
23 Sierra Leone; armed with your instructions, he organises this
24 important meeting in Buedu where not only is the short-term
11:02:17 25 Fitti-Fatta mission discussed and organised, but also a long-term
26 plan to capture Freetown. And you - according to this man, you
27 are the brains behind it all. Is that correct, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That is totally incorrect. And if we were to even assume
29 that it was correct, that means that Sam Bockarie failed to

1 follow instructions because from all of the records that I have
2 seen, which is factual, is that Sam Bockarie and the RUF were not
3 involved in this Freetown invasion. So I don't know how I could
4 have sat with him to plan and organise. Then he was just a
11:03:02 5 terrible person, he just didn't - he failed to follow what he was
6 told then. There was no such discussion with this man, and this
7 King Perry, he's - I must admit, he is pretty good at this. He
8 is pretty good at this.

9 Q. Now, in relation to the first part of the plan you are
11:03:25 10 alleged to have provided to Sam Bockarie, he goes on to say this,
11 page 3181:

12 "Q. Yesterday we discussed the Fitti-Fatta mission and you
13 said that your side took many casualties from that mission,
14 and some of the casualties were sent to Liberia for medical
11:03:46 15 care. Is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Where in Liberia were they taken to?

18 A. It was in Monrovia.

19 Q. Do you know who facilitated the arrangement?

11:03:58 20 A. It was Sam Bockarie and Mr Taylor.

21 Q. How do you know this?

22 A. Like, for example, when those people were wounded, his
23 response to Superman was he had made arrangements with
24 Mr Taylor. Whenever we had serious wounded fighters, I let
11:04:15 25 them be taken to Buedu so that he will send helicopters to
26 take them from Foya.

27 Q. In your experience, was this the first time that
28 fighters of the RUF or wounded fighters of the RUF had been
29 evacuated to Liberia for medical care?

1 A. No. At any time we had serious wounded fighters, they
2 would take them to Liberia for treatment. Those who had
3 problems would be taken to Monrovia, Liberia. The
4 helicopter would take them to Monrovia."

11:04:48 5 Is that true?

6 A. Well, he's got the - part of the information true, but he's
7 got it all mixed up. We don't get a helicopter until about 1999,
8 and so in 1999, just before we finally organise this

9 final beginning of April meeting in Lome, as a part of that
11:05:18 10 pacification we do let some wounded RUF individuals and some
11 other Sierra Leoneans civilians that were injured to be treated
12 in hospitals in Liberia. So if he is talking about a helicopter,
13 he is talking about 1999, so - and this happened, I would say - I
14 would put it to about February/March 1999, and all of these

11:05:44 15 little pacifications helped to get that April process going where
16 we begin to move people to Lome to start something. So this is
17 1999. This is what they do. He has some information, that he
18 ties it up to a different story to make people know that he is a
19 little radio operator someplace that knows everything is in
11:06:08 20 senior staff meetings. I don't know, but there are RUF people
21 that are brought to Liberia in 1999, yes.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, if that is right, then there seems to be a
23 certain congruence between what you are saying and what this
24 witness is saying. Because what the witness is saying - remember

11:06:31 25 the sequence - Bockarie goes to Monrovia. He is given a plan.

26 He returns and organises a meeting. Part one of the plan is
27 Fitti-Fatta, you provide a herbalist. Part two is Freetown
28 invasion. But also part of the arrangement is any serious
29 wounded will be taken to Monrovia. Now, you are telling us that

1 in February/March 1999, i.e. just after the Freetown invasion,
2 wounded soldiers were being taken to Monrovia. Do you see?

3 A. Well, no, I don't see. I don't see the congruence that you
4 describe, no. By February/March 1999, in fact, the individuals -
11:07:27 5 there are civilians, I say, and RUF people that are being treated
6 in hospitals, okay, that we, for humanitarian purposes, bring
7 them over. It's got nothing to do - I am not sure if the RUF -
8 from all information that I have, the RUF was not involved in the
9 Freetown invasion. I am explaining that here is a situation
11:07:48 10 where you have two sets of facts: You have one fact that yes,
11 during the period of my mediating, we let some wounded
12 individuals come to hospitals in Liberia. That's a fact.

13 There is another fact, that there is an invasion in
14 January. So somebody takes that information. It's like saying
11:08:14 15 Charles Taylor, as President of Liberia on a date, got in a black
16 jeep and he drove to a football stadium, and while at the
17 football stadium he saw the game, but while watching the game, he
18 saw X number of persons. Now, there are several facts in there,
19 but not all of them are true. Yes, Charles Taylor went to the
11:08:42 20 football game, but Charles Taylor didn't see those people that
21 the person described.

22 So what I am saying about this witness here - and this is
23 why I am here to tell the Court exactly what happened and I am
24 not here to - I am already in jail. I am not here to hide
11:08:58 25 information. I am saying here that when you look at the fact of
26 a helicopter, the Liberian government does not have a helicopter,
27 okay, before 1999. So if he says that a helicopter is evacuating
28 wounded, this has been to be in 1999. So 1999 at this particular
29 period, February/March, we are busy now trying to tie some final

1 pieces in getting Lome together. So for me, whether they are
2 civilians, bringing some cases to Liberia for humanitarian
3 purposes that we needed to do to pacify the RUF, I say we did. I
4 didn't ask whether - because I know the RUF was not involved in
11:09:43 5 Freetown. I didn't ask how they got hurt or where they got hurt.
6 If you were a civilian individual and you had a case where we
7 felt that could be done in a hospital, we assisted.

8 So we don't have any problems with that. We provided fuel
9 for hospitals to keep light going for injured civilians and other
11:10:00 10 people. So he has got some information, but he's got it mixed
11 up. This is not because of some arrangement that Sam Bockarie
12 comes and gets instructions and he carries it out. I was not
13 involved in any planning of any invasion in Freetown. And I tell
14 you, you know, one would have to know maybe the mindset of
11:10:25 15 individuals in dealing with some of these matters with some of
16 these simple, simple lies.

17 Look, in 1996 if Charles Taylor had planned with any human
18 for an invasion of Freetown, there are several questions, to even
19 believe this story, that would have to be asked. Number one,
11:10:54 20 what would Taylor do? I would want to make sure that the mission
21 would be successful. You understand me? Because we are talking
22 about a time in 1999, I am already President for almost two
23 years. I would definitely make sure that there are - that they
24 have the capabilities of carrying out such a mission. That would
11:11:20 25 that would be the first thing that any sensible person would want
26 to do. I have heard stories here --

27 Q. Are you talking about 1996, Mr Taylor?

28 A. No, 1999. Okay? 1999. So any sensible person would be,
29 yeah, I have it here, Charles Taylor makes a plan to invade

1 Freetown and another witness, in testifying about this whole
2 Freetown thing, says I sent reinforcement of, I think he said 30
3 men. Look, anything can be said about Charles Taylor, but not
4 being stupid. You understand me. A nation, first of all, wants
11:12:02 5 to invade another nation and we send 30 men?

6 Look, your Honours, this is beyond what one can keep
7 saying: I had nothing whatsoever to do with the January invasion
8 of Freetown. I had nothing to do with planning no Fitti-Fatta or
9 planning no Kono attack. Nothing to do with it, because I am not
11:12:34 10 stupid. And if there was such bad blood between the Government
11 of Sierra Leone and the Government of Liberia and there was an
12 opportunity that I saw to attack a country, I had sufficient
13 ex-combatants, I would have sent thousands, thousands, and by
14 that I can put a number. Maybe 5,000, maybe 10,000. Minimum I
11:12:59 15 would have sent would be 5,000 men to make sure - because, who is
16 in Sierra Leone? ECOMOG is on the ground. I am supposed to send
17 40 men to go and fight ECOMOG?

18 Why people think this way? It just didn't happen. It just
19 didn't happen. And the RUF, to the best of my knowledge, after
11:13:21 20 all of the evidence that has been presented throughout all these
21 trials, was not involved in any Sierra Leone attack. This was
22 the SAJ Musa and the SLA because of their, you know, whatever
23 reason. I had nothing to do with it.

24 Q. Let us deal with another specific allegation, Mr Taylor,
11:13:48 25 and in order to put you in the picture I need to deal with a
26 fairly lengthy passage of this witness's account so that we get
27 the full picture. Page 3262 of the transcript, please:

28 "Q. Now, Sam Bockarie when he was the leader of the RUF
29 was based in Buedu, is that correct?

1 A. Yes, he was based in Buedu.

2 Q. Now what was the position in your areas of deployment

3 at this time just after the Freetown invasion? You had

4 deployments in other parts of the country up until the

11:14:30 5 time you attacked Freetown and this attack, after two

6 weeks or so, you came back, you retreated, some of you

7 were based in Makeni. What about the other areas that were

8 under your occupation before you moved to Freetown?

9 A. Well, all the areas that were under our control, they

11:14:50 10 were still under our control. Even after we retreated from

11 Freetown, they were still under our control.

12 Q. Now, can we focus on one of those areas is Kono, Koidu,

13 is that correct?

14 A. Yes, Kono was under our control.

11:15:09 15 Q. Now, can we focus on Koidu after the Freetown invasion?

16 What was happening in Koidu after the invasion?

17 A. Just after the Freetown invasion, when the majority had

18 retreated to Makeni, some were based in Kono. What we were

19 doing mostly, because at that time we were not engaged in

11:15:32 20 fighting, was diamond mining. We were mining diamonds.

21 Q. And what was the - what was it all focused on, the

22 proceeds of the diamonds that you were mining, what was the

23 whole purpose for which you were mining these diamonds?

24 What was the focus of mining during this period?

11:15:53 25 A. Well, from the beginning up to this time, when we were

26 mining the main reason why we were mining was for us to

27 have more defensive arms and ammunition from Mr Taylor

28 because the moment our leader went for peace, it was at

29 that time that he told us that in times of peace we should

1 prepare for war. So when you go for peace talks, you
2 should always be prepared for war. So as a result he
3 organised the miners to mine for diamonds, but before
4 mining for diamonds we would have to arrange the
11:16:29 5 conditions, so they started calling the civilians to mine
6 the diamonds.

7 Q. Now, who arranged the mining. As you said the mining
8 was arranged, who arranged the conditions?

9 A. From the beginning when Mosquito had not gone yet, he
11:16:46 10 sent an instruction to Issa Sesay. Issa Sesay returned and
11 based in Kono. So Issa Sesay arranged - rearranged for the
12 mining to be more effective. But before that we had a
13 message. RUF heard a message from Sam Bockarie saying that

14 Charles Taylor was going to send white people to come and
11:17:11 15 inspect Kono and the airfield so that they could support
16 the mining and we would do effective mining. Supporting,
17 they said they would send machines like Caterpillar and any
18 other machine that we would use for the mining. And it got
19 to a point when two white men came from Buedu. They were

11:17:35 20 escorted by RUF security forces. They just came and took
21 snapshots at the mining field and took snapshots of the old
22 mining machines. According to them, according to the
23 message we received, Charles Taylor had sent them from
24 Liberia. They just came and took snapshots and wrote all
11:17:56 25 the things that we would need, machines for the mining, and
26 they returned the following day.

27 Q. Now, during this period that we are talking about, did
28 you continue to get any supplies from the proceeds of the
29 mining?

1 A. Yes. We used to have ammunition, but it was not
2 frequent. But our ammo dump was only in Buedu because
3 there was no fighting around there. So when ammunition
4 would come, Mosquito would keep it at Buedu, but again the
11:18:29 5 mining, we initially did it with our hands. We didn't use
6 machines. But at this point in time we started using
7 machines.

8 Q. The two white men who came from Liberia to Buedu and
9 then to Koidu, did you know their names?

11:18:48 10 A. No, I can't recall their names."
11 Mr Taylor, do you see what that's saying?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. That after the Freetown invasion you effectively tried to
14 organise the mining in Kono on a more commercial basis by sending
11:19:07 15 two white men to inspect to see what machines would be required.
16 Did you?

17 A. I did not. Never knew that white people went there or
18 didn't go there. Did not, no, no.

19 Q. The allegation is quite plain, Mr Taylor. The allegation
11:19:31 20 is that after the Freetown invasion, in a sense you had achieved
21 your purpose. The RUF were in control of Kono and so, therefore,
22 your design to exploit the mineral resources of Sierra Leone had
23 now come to fruition so you were sending the experts in, white
24 people, to organise it more effectively. Did you?

11:20:05 25 A. I did not. And, you know, to see how this witness puts it,
26 as though he has never seen white people before, that was his
27 first time seeing white people. All the Lebanese and the people
28 they have had in their mining places buying diamonds, that's now
29 the first time he has seen a white man. Like I say, this boy is

1 very good at putting these lies together. Look, I do not send
2 anybody into Sierra Leone to go to look for nothing. I have
3 diamonds in Liberia. We are not even mining in Liberia. What
4 about Liberian diamonds? No such thing happened, counsel. There
11:20:44 5 is no such thing.

6 But I would add for the record that a lot of this
7 information also is different, but I am sure during this defence
8 there will be more that will deal with this particular matter.
9 No, I wouldn't send two white men into Sierra Leone to go and
11:21:07 10 look at diamonds.

11 Q. But interestingly, Mr Taylor, the witness's account about
12 this continues in this way, page 3267. He was asked by
13 Mr Bangura:

14 "Q. Mr Witness, what happened to the diamonds that were
11:21:29 15 produced at this time?

16 A. Well, at this time that I am talking about, the
17 diamonds that Issa Sesay gathered from the beginning of
18 Issa Sesay's administration" - August 2000, note - "Gibril
19 Massaquoi used to go and collect it and bring it to
11:21:53 20 Freetown at this stage until the UN problem happened. That
21 was the time the RUF arrested the UN personnel. From
22 the time Mosquito left the RUF until the time RUF arrested
23 the UN, Issa was sending diamonds to Mr Sankoh in Freetown.
24 But when Mr Sankoh was arrested, in the May 6th" - it
11:22:23 25 should be May 8th - "incident in Freetown, all the diamonds
26 we used to get from that May 6th up until the time of the
27 final disarmament in Sierra Leone, all the diamonds were
28 going to Mr Taylor."

29 You see that?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So let's put the picture together then. After Freetown you
3 send two white men to organise this commercially, but the
4 diamonds, according to this, after Issa takes over, so that's

11:23:00 5 August 2000, until the UN personnel are --

6 A. Yes, until the UN personal are arrested.

7 Q. Yes. They go to Sankoh. But after Sankoh's arrest, they
8 start coming to you. What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Well, they are terrible people because if I have to go
11:23:27 10 through all this work, sending experts and everything and I am
11 still there and Sankoh comes and they forget about me and start
12 sending all the diamonds to him, then he gets arrested, then, you
13 know, if you have ignored me for all this time, why are you
14 sending me diamonds after Sankoh is arrested?

11:23:48 15 It just shows you how these boys work. There is no such
16 thing about me arranging experts to go to Sierra Leone and all of
17 this. I have no idea whether they sent diamonds to Sankoh or
18 not. The only idea I would have about diamonds going to Sankoh
19 during that period is contained in documents that have been
11:24:15 20 presented by the OTP that I have read about Sankoh's own dealing
21 with people in Belgium. That's all I know. So one can assume
22 that if those documents from the OTP are correct, then Sankoh did
23 receive some diamonds during that period. Other than that, I did
24 not receive any diamonds from Issa Sesay and I am sure there will
11:24:41 25 be adequate proof to that effect.

26 Q. Well, talking about proof, let's continue with what the
27 witness said, page 3267:

28 "Q. Now, you said from May 6th through to disarmament the
29 proceeds of diamonds were - the diamonds were taken by Issa

1 Sesay to Mr Taylor in Liberia. How frequent were these
2 trips to Liberia?

3 A. This was happening every two weeks because the diamonds
4 we were mining, we used to have it now more than before
11:25:16 5 because at this point we had machines and Issa started
6 going to Liberia and he was even bringing vehicles for
7 Mr Taylor. Anytime he would bring these vehicles, he will
8 call us and say, 'I have brought one or two vehicles from
9 Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor donated this.' And at the same time
11:25:37 10 he would keep the diamonds. He said Mr Taylor was storing
11 the diamonds for any time Sankoh would be released. So
12 that would be the time when he would report the diamonds to
13 Sankoh. He said that was what Mr Taylor said. He would
14 bring documents to the effect that they would read that to
11:25:58 15 us. We would see the number of diamonds, the date and time
16 that he left it there. Sometimes he would bring diesel,
17 petrol, engine oil for the machines that were working in
18 the fields and even food."

19 Now, taking matters in stages, did you give vehicles to
11:26:18 20 Issa Sesay?

21 A. No, I did not. I did not give vehicles to Issa Sesay.

22 Q. Were you holding diamonds in safekeeping for Mr Sankoh?

23 A. No, I was not. He says for the return of Mr Sankoh.
24 Mr Sankoh does not return, so that means I must have those
11:26:42 25 diamonds.

26 Q. Yes, so where are they, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Nobody ever gave me diamonds because after Sankoh is
28 arrested in 2000 he doesn't return, so where are the diamonds?
29 Then that means that Issa Sesay and the RUF should be able to

1 have me account for those diamonds. It just never happened that
2 way. Never. Never happened that Issa Sesay brought me diamonds
3 to keep or to show or nothing. Issa Sesay never did that.

4 Q. What about this documentary proof of the number of
11:27:11 5 diamonds, the date and time when they were left. Where is it?

6 A. I don't know. I am sure with this OTP witness having this
7 kind of information, the OTP would have gone after this because
8 this would be documentary evidence. He speaks about it because
9 he knows it doesn't exist, documents that I was supposed to be
11:27:35 10 keeping diamonds. There is no such thing.

11 Q. But what about the suggestion, "Sometimes he would bring
12 diesel, petrol, engine oil for the machines." You accept that,
13 don't you?

14 A. No, I accept that there were times that diesel, a drum or
11:27:55 15 two - by drum - what we call a drum in Liberia is 55 gallons.
16 For hospital operation, maybe one or two drums would go to Sierra
17 Leone, but not even --

18 Q. How do you know it would be limited for use in hospitals?

19 A. Well, the quantity. The quantity. We would not - because
11:28:13 20 we knew that fuel could be used for military operations, so we
21 were very, very strict. 55 gallon fits in a drum. We would make
22 sure the maximum that could leave Liberia were two drums because
23 we did not want it used for military purposes.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, what time frame is this?

11:28:36 25 THE WITNESS: We are talking about still - I am talking
26 about the period in early 1999 between February and March of 1999
27 that this is going on. Not even during Issa Sesay's time, but
28 during Sam Bockarie's time.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: You would send fuel for hospitals in

1 Sierra Leone?

2 THE WITNESS: They would buy fuel in Liberia, okay, and
3 they would carry it across to be used for hospitals and clinics,
4 yes.

11:29:13 5 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: So it was not donated?

6 THE WITNESS: No, no, no. They would buy it. They would
7 buy it, but we permitted the purchase.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point,
9 Mr President?

11:29:28 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we will take the morning break now
11 and reconvene at 12.

12 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

13 [Upon resuming at 12.01 p.m.]

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:02:31 15 Q. Right, Mr Taylor. We're continuing with the same witness
16 and hopefully we can finish him before lunch. The witness went
17 on to say this, page 3269:

18 "Q. Do you recall the year 2000, May 2000?

19 A. Yes, May 2000, yes.

12:02:57 20 Q. Where were you at this time?

21 A. May 2000 I was in Makeni. At times I would travel to
22 Kono.

23 Q. Now you've mentioned that Sankoh was arrested and that
24 was in May 2000. Is that correct?

12:03:14 25 A. Yes, I've just forgot the date. It was May 8, 2000.

26 The date I recalled, it was a mistake. The date should be
27 May 8th, 2000.

28 Q. Just before the arrest of Mr Sankoh, did anything
29 happen in Makeni around May 2000?

1 A. Before Sankoh was arrested a big thing happened in
2 Makeni. That was the arrest of the UN in Makeni Town
3 ordered by Issa Sesay, because Sankoh was arrested in
4 Freetown and at that time I was in Makeni when this
12:03:49 5 happened.

6 Q. Now after the arrest of the UN peacekeepers as you have
7 mentioned were they eventually released?

8 A. Yes, they released them but they were not released in
9 Sierra Leone. After we had arrested UN and all the arms
12:04:09 10 and ammunition, communication, vehicles from them, Issa had
11 to inform Mr Taylor through a satellite phone that the UN
12 personnel were under detention. Immediately after
13 Mr Taylor got the story, he ordered Issa saying, 'Bring
14 those people here to me in Liberia.' That was the message
12:04:36 15 Mr Taylor sent and Issa Sesay in Makeni, he called
16 everybody and told the authorities and fighters on the
17 ground and they loaded these people from Makeni. In fact,
18 they were stripped naked. They travelled from Makeni to
19 Yengema. Yengema was one RUF strong training base.

12:04:59 20 Yengema is a very short distance from Koidu Town which is
21 in Kono. From Yengema he crossed with them to Liberia. He
22 transferred all of them to Foya. It was a helicopter that
23 came from Monrovia sent by Mr Taylor and when this
24 helicopter came, it brought a lot of ammunition from
12:05:21 25 Liberia and dropped them in Foya. In return, it took the
26 peacekeeping forces, loaded them into the helicopter, and
27 took them to Liberia to Mr Taylor. That was how we
28 released those people."

29 Now, Mr Taylor, first of all, Issa had to inform you. How

1 did you come to learn about the detention of the UN peacekeepers?

12:06:10 2 A. That was communicated to me through the news media I got
3 from my national security adviser, but also from the UN special
4 representative in Monrovia that they had this terrible situation,
5 that several UN personnel had been arrested.

6 Q. So the implication of "Issa had to inform you" was that you
7 were controlling Issa Sesay at the time. Was that the case
8 Mr Taylor?

12:06:40 9 A. That was not the case. You know, in fact, when those
10 peacekeepers are taken, the first person that I get in contact
11 with is Foday Sankoh himself. I sent a mission to see President
12 Kabbah and Sankoh. Messrs Cooper and Joe Tuah went down. This
13 little boy, he doesn't know. No. No. It doesn't - it doesn't -
14 you know, when you don't know the story and you make up these
12:07:14 15 things, it doesn't happen this way. Issa Sesay got to inform me
16 that - so where is - these peacekeepers, the situation starts, we
17 get on Foday Sankoh, he's communicating. It takes us a period of
18 time. This is no - I got the peacekeepers, send them to me, we
19 take some time. There are so many countries involved.

12:07:40 20 Remember, I talk about assistance coming from different
21 countries, Libya. It took a process. Issa Sesay came to
22 Monrovia, okay? This is after Sankoh because this was going on -
23 when Sankoh gets arrested, Issa Sesay comes to Monrovia and he is
24 delivered a direct strong statement from me that these
12:08:03 25 peacekeepers have to be released; that the international
26 community will not accept it; and that they must be released; and
27 that there will be no attachment - the argument was, they wanted
28 Foday Sankoh released. I said there will be no quid pro quo.
29 Foday Sankoh's release would not be tied to the UN peacekeepers.

1 So he don't know what he is talking about, counsel.

2 Q. Now, let's just deal with the detail, in case it's
3 important, was that contact made by satellite phone?

4 A. To Issa Sesay?

12:08:35 5 Q. Yes.

6 A. No, the first call was made by radio. There was a radio
7 call to Issa asking him to account for what had happened over
8 there. Not by me. I think it was my national security adviser
9 or one of the officials of the government. Subsequently, I spoke
10 to him on the telephone and told him to come to Monrovia.

11 Q. This witness goes on to say "he", that being you, ordered
12 Issa, "Bring those people here to me in Liberia." Did you?

13 A. I did not. I did not order Issa Sesay to bring those
14 people here to Liberia. Issa Sesay came to Liberia. I told him
15 what the international community wanted. He returned. The
16 United Nations was involved in every step of the way. Every step
17 of the way. Even the helicopters that went to Foya to evacuate
18 the people from Foya were UN helicopters. So, in other words, he
19 is saying that the UN carried arms for these people. These boys
20 - this is the danger in this kind of situation, that they do not
21 know and they add. Well, then, I mean, the UN was involved in
22 taking ammunition to pick up the soldiers.

23 Q. Because he says "it brought a lot of ammunition from
24 Liberia and dropped them at Foya."

12:09:58 25 A. So the UN did then. So the UN did, because those
26 helicopters were UN helicopters that evacuated - there were
27 several hundred. We have a list in here. There were - in fact,
28 the total number of hostages that were taken was close to 500,
29 okay? And the first set that came - I forgot the number - 200

1 and some. You can't have 200 people getting in one helicopter.
2 There were several trips made up and down straight from Foya to
3 Spriggs Payne airport where the UN were waiting with - the whole
4 international press were at Foya. The international press were
12:10:34 5 at Spriggs Payne airport. So if any ammunition had been
6 offloaded off any helicopter, it would have been reported. It
7 would have been reported.

8 So, I mean, this step of fabrication continues and it makes
9 you - you know, you sit here and it makes you look so - well, you
12:10:55 10 know, you keep - it's almost like denying, denying, denying, but
11 the lies are just so many you just have to sit there - they are
12 not true.

13 I don't know if you go further on this, but there was a
14 question that was posed by the honourable justice just before we
12:11:09 15 broke and I think it was a very important situation by Justice
16 Sebutinde on - and I think some basis ought to be explained to
17 the justice of what is going on when she asks about the field
18 situation, and I think that we need to - I think we need to
19 understand the period. So when you're through, maybe I can
12:11:32 20 explain to the justice because --

21 Q. Well, explain now.

22 A. Well, she asked about fuel. I just want to give a little
23 brief background. Most of what mediations involve involve a
24 little give and take here and there. In October 1998, the
12:11:59 25 borders - my government closed the border with Sierra Leone.
26 That is reflected in - and it is at this time that President
27 Kabbah alleges that Liberia is about to attack Sierra Leone with
28 5,000 troops and then the UN goes and investigates and Kabbah and
29 myself speak. But that is contained in, I think it's the second

1 report of the Secretary-General in October 1998, and the closure
2 of the border is confirmed.

3 Now, we are now at that particular time putting pressure on
4 the RUF to come to the peace talks. Now, we are all shocked by
12:12:39 5 the 6 January invasion, and I did explain here and its contained
6 in the reports here about the ceasefire that we tried to get
7 leading on to Kabbah's return in March and so on. Now, there's
8 an important little point here that I want to get across with
9 that prefix. That is, the opening and closing of the border at
12:13:04 10 that particular time with the purchase of fuel or rice or chicken
11 soup, salt, tobacco, whatever, is a part of a process that we
12 used this extensively to open and tighten situations to bring
13 people to the table, okay, and making sure that it is non-lethal.

14 So in order to get what we got accomplished by April 1999,
12:13:37 15 with that border closure, what used to happen was that you had
16 merchants coming, little business people coming from Sierra Leone
17 buying. Now, if and when you cut it off, it forces them to come
18 forward. As you cut off this movement across the border, then
19 you force them to the table. So we had to use a little arm
12:13:59 20 twisting to get a lot of these peace things, so there was trade
21 going on across that border with non-lethal things and I didn't
22 want it just to be looked at as just fuel, but there is many
23 other things going on. And when we close it when we want to
24 force - when we close it, after a week or two, we can extract
12:14:18 25 also - by "we" I'm speaking about the Committee of Six, ECOWAS -
26 we can extract some concessions. As we gave, we extract some
27 concessions.

28 So this happens with mediations, and we did have a trained
29 mediator dealing with this. Mediations go - there's a little

1 give and a little take here. I didn't want to leave the justice
2 believing, oh, there's just fuel going across because of some
3 special thing. No, they bought what they had, but we could also
4 use that to twist their arms when we cut off that flow.

12:14:57 5 Q. Very well. Now, on the same topic of the detention of the
6 UN peacekeepers, the witness went on to say this - no, let me
7 start with the question:

8 "Q. Mr Witness, you said that the helicopter which took
9 the peacekeepers across to Liberia from Foya had brought
10 with it weapons, arms and ammunition which were given to
11 you, to Issa Sesay and he brought them to the RUF. Do you
12 know what those arms and ammunition were used for later?

13 A. Yes. According to Issa Sesay, he said Mr Taylor had
14 said since we had arrested and molested the United Nations,
12:15:43 15 let us expect fighting. So the light weapons that we had
16 taken from the United Nations, we should keep them and even
17 the ammunition that he was sending, we should reserve them,
18 in case they attempted to attack our positions we should
19 use those against the United Nations. That was why he sent
12:16:02 20 the ammunition."

21 What do you say about that, Mr Taylor?

22 A. A lie. But let's go into the record. What did they take
23 from the UN peacekeepers? According to the records presented to
24 this Court, there were some 500 people. They took, what? APCs.
12:16:21 25 These people were equipped. So what kind of ammunition I would
26 be sending? In fact, we were forcing them to return the material
27 to the UN peacekeepers. It was a part of the pressure we put on
28 them. These people invaded the UN facilities and took some 500
29 hostages along with all of the arms and ammunition that they had.

1 So what do I have to send to them? What do I have to send to
2 them when I don't have it for myself, when, in fact, they had
3 everything? They took all of the equipment from the people.

4 So this boy is just making up a lie. He is just making up
12:17:00 5 a lie. If this boy can say that the helicopters that went to
6 Foya carried arms and ammunition, then I don't know what else to
7 say about this man. Then he - the records are there. The UN was
8 involved. This was not a Charles Taylor operation. Everybody
9 connected with UN from Sierra Leone side to the Liberian side to
10 international journalists who were at Foya, they were at Spriggs
11 Payne airport, I don't know where this man got this thing from.

12 I don't know your Honours. I don't know. It is a lie. These
13 were UN choppers that picked up these people and brought them to
14 Spriggs Payne airport. So if they had ammunition, then there was
12:17:43 15 complicity on the part of the United Nations, and that is not
16 true.

17 Q. Now, let's deal with another topic raised during the course
18 of the testimony of this witness. He was asked this, page 3272
19 of the transcript of 6 February 2008:

12:18:02 20 "Q. Were RUF forces involved in any fighting in Liberia at
21 any period after 1992?

22 A. Yes, 1993 a group went there and even up to the time
23 when we had disarmed, Taylor sent instructions for the RUF
24 to go there as a standby force in case UNAMSIL would
12:18:27 25 attempt to attack our positions. In 1993 when our supply
26 route was blocked by ULIMO, Mr Kallon had to send - I'm
27 sorry, Mr Kallon had to lead a group to go and fight in
28 Liberia. It was a request from Mr Taylor to Sankoh at that
29 time. That was the first group I can remember went to

1 Liberia. They were the ones who went and formed - I mean
2 they attacked ULIMO positions so that we could get supply
3 routes to Mr Taylor's headquarters.

4 Q. This I understand, Mr Witness, was 1993. Correct?

12:19:09 5 A. Yes, it was 1993 that this happened."

6 Any truth in that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. None whatsoever.

8 Q. You see what is he is suggesting, in 1993 the RUF sent a
9 force into Liberia to fight ULIMO led by Morris Kallon. Did that
10 happen?

12:19:38

11 A. That did not happen. That did not happen.

12 Q. "Q. After that do you recall any other time that the RUF
13 had been involved in fighting inside Liberia?

14 A. Yes. I can recall after these UN problems occurred,

12:20:06

15 ULIMO started attacking Mr Taylor's position from the
16 Guinea border and he requested from Sam Bockarie and
17 Sam Bockarie used to send troops there to fight. Even up
18 to the time when Issa was in command of the RUF, he used to
19 send troops there to go and fight.

12:20:24

20 And apart from that, Mr Taylor also sent an order that
21 Superman should go and block between Guinea and Liberia to
22 fight there. This latter part that Superman went, this
23 information that we got was that one of Mr Taylor's
24 fighters had killed Superman. That was the last time the
25 RUF sent troops, apart from Sam Bockarie who was there on
26 his own accord."

12:20:45

27 What about that, Mr Taylor?

28 A. I don't know what part to - I don't know. I don't know.
29 Because here he got so many years tied up, none of it is true,

1 but he jumps from - because if he is talking Sam Bockarie, he is
2 talking about the end of 1999, not beyond that. If he is talking
3 Issa Sesay, he is talking about - from about August 2000. And so
4 he has bunched up a whole lot of falsehood and it doesn't make
12:21:18 5 any sense to me. But there is no way that I asked Issa Sesay or
6 Sam Bockarie to send troops to fight in Liberia. No.

7 What are we fighting - in 1999, what are we fighting? Who
8 are we fighting in 1999? There's a brief incursion from Mosquito
9 Spray earlier. We take care of it. There's nothing that
12:21:45 10 Sam Bockarie at this particular time, in 1999 - about who is
11 there now in 1999 that we have to go to Sam Bockarie? Isn't
12 Sankoh by this time, if he is talking any time from July on,
13 isn't Sankoh there that I would have to overlook Sankoh if I need
14 something and go to Sam Bockarie? It didn't happen this way.

12:22:09 15 Q. Now, it continues on the same topic:

16 "Q. Now you said that the request for the RUF to send
17 troops to inside Liberia first came to Sam Bockarie from
18 Mr Taylor and this was after the Freetown invasion period -
19 sorry, after the abduction of the UN peacekeepers. Now
12:22:29 20 where in Liberia were the RUF forces asked to participate
21 in fighting?

22 A. Okay, sorry. Let me make that clear to you. After
23 the UN invasion Bockarie was not in Sierra Leone. It was
24 during Issa's command. Issa used to send manpower. And
12:22:54 25 about before Bockarie left Bockarie used to send manpower
26 to go and fight in Lofa. Lofa is an area that joins Sierra
27 Leone. That was an instruction from Prosecutor Taylor."

28 So he is clarifying the situation there, Mr Taylor. He is
29 saying, during Bockarie's time, he sent troops. During Issa

1 times, he sent troops, all at our - all on your instruction.

2 What do you say?

3 A. Both cases are lies. Never sent any - never asked
4 Sam Bockarie to send troops to fight in Liberia at all. Never
12:23:31 5 asked Issa Sesay to send troops to fight in Liberia.

6 Q. And it goes on:

7 "And even when we attacked the UN, ULIMO was also attacking
8 Taylor from the border, the Guinea border. So he requested
9 for Mr Sesay who would come and contribute manpower, they
12:23:56 10 would go and fight along the Guinea and Liberia borders.

11 This used to happen all the time. And later again
12 Mr Taylor called for RUF senior officers' meeting in
13 Monrovia. He requested for a mission that was to go and
14 attack Guinea by Sierra Leone and also attack Guinea's
12:24:16 15 position by Liberia, Lofa County.

16 Q. Just briefly, when was the - when did Mr Taylor ask
17 Sam Bockarie to send forces to go and fight inside Liberia?

18 A. It was in 1999. It was in 1999. That was when we had
19 returned from Freetown. Our fighting had quelled down a
12:24:37 20 little. That was the time. Because immediately after our
21 men had withdrawn from Freetown we were not fighting any
22 more. So our troops were going to fight in Liberia. That
23 was under Sam Bockarie's administration.

24 Q. And when was it that Issa Sesay was asked to raise
12:24:56 25 manpower to help fighting inside Liberia again - Guinea, I'm
26 sorry?

27 A. That was the time when Issa Sesay was now the RUF
28 commander and this was the time we had arrested and taken
29 away the UNAMSIL or United Nations weapons and ULIMO

1 started attacking Taylor from the border, so he requested
2 for Mr Sesay so that Issa Sesay would send troops there
3 because of the route Issa Sesay would use to Liberia so
4 that the route should not be blocked. That went on until
12:25:25 5 the time he called again for a meeting to organise and
6 attack the Guinea position. Mr Taylor called this
7 meeting."

8 So there you are, Mr Taylor. Summoning senior RUF officers
9 to Monrovia in order to plan for the use of RUF combatants in
12:25:46 10 Liberia. True?

11 A. Not true. He doesn't even say who comes. That - senior
12 officers could be anybody. He doesn't even say who comes. A
13 witness like this should be able to say, if there was any such
14 thing, who came. It never - how would I summons RUF people to
12:26:06 15 Monrovia to come to talk about fighting when I'm busy trying to
16 get the RUF to disarm and demobilise to get the peace process
17 going.

18 Q. The witness later in his testimony, Mr Taylor, page 3294,
19 returned to the issue of General Devon and he said this:

12:26:48 20 "A. Well, General Devon, I understand in 1992 at the time
21 we got to Kakata, I had information from the fighters that
22 General Devon was killed by Charles Taylor."

23 Now, you agree with that, don't you?

24 A. Oh, Degbon. Well, you know, that's how they put you, was
12:27:11 25 killed by Charles Taylor, I'm the leader, yes, Degbon was
26 executed.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the final matter I want to deal with with
28 this witness is this: He was asked this question:

29 "Q. The messages they were recorded. The radio messages

1 between Sankoh and Taylor, they were recorded and they were
2 recorded in a special logbook. Correct?

3 A. Yes."

4 Have you seen any such logbook?

12:28:13 5 A. Have I seen any such logbook?

6 Q. Yes, that's what I asked.

7 A. No, I haven't. I haven't.

8 Q. Now, that's all I want to ask you about that witness,
9 Mr Taylor. I now want to move on and deal with another witness.

12:28:32 10 That witness is {redacted}. Now, again we need to be very
11 careful in dealing with the evidence given by this witness, okay?

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

13 MS HOLLIS: I think we have something of a problem here in
14 that I believe that with this witness it was actually closed

12:29:09 15 session testimony. Now, earlier I know when that sort of very
16 sensitive information was to be used there was a different
17 procedure and not even the witness's TF number was mentioned. So

18 I would ask that if this procedure is to be used that we would

19 redact the TF number and there simply be a reference that a

12:29:35 20 witness has said X or Y so that it is not linked even to a TF

21 number. So that the TF number would be redacted and anyone in
22 the audience would be instructed to disregard that number.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. Any problem with
24 that, Mr Griffiths?

12:29:55 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, Mr President, I fail to see how, given
26 that this evidence was given in closed session, a mention of that
27 TF1 number is going to alert anyone to the identity of that
28 individual. I fail to see that.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't have any recollection of the

1 beginning of this witness's testimony but apparently this Court
2 did order that the TF1 number be suppressed. Is that right? Is
3 that what you're saying, Ms Hollis?

4 MS HOLLIS: What I'm saying, your Honour, is that the fact
12:30:33 5 we do not go into closed session to deal with closed session
6 testimony is an exception because typically you would go into
7 closed session to deal with closed session testimony. So the
8 procedure that was agreed upon in order to have some degree of
9 openness and has been used before is that the TF number itself
12:30:51 10 would not even be mentioned, but rather reference would be made
11 that a witness said X and then a page number would be given.

12 So I see it as two options to protect the witness: One
13 would be closed session; the other would be the prior procedure
14 which would then have the TF number itself redacted and simply a
12:31:16 15 reference that a witness has said X and a page number. That
16 would be the Prosecution's submissions, Mr President.

17 [Trial Chamber conferred]

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, we're going to order that
19 the TF1 number be redacted. But the rest can be given in open
12:32:22 20 Court, can it not? You'll be able to tailor your questions so
21 that no identity is revealed.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I certainly can do that.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. We'll order that the TF1
24 number that was mentioned by Mr Griffiths be redacted for those
12:32:43 25 people in the public gallery we would order that you not mention
26 that TF1 number outside of the Court. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: If you could care to give us the page
28 numbers to guide us to where you are at.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm beginning at page 4803, 27 February

1 2008:

2 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this witness claimed to have obtained
3 information that Foday Sankoh's wife had indicated in 1990 that
4 he and you were friends and that he would help you fight your war
12:34:25 5 and after that war - and then you would assist him fight his war,
6 which suggests an agreement between you and Sankoh prior to the
7 invasion of Sierra Leone. Do you follow that?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. What do you say to that suggestion?

10 A. I don't know, first of all, what - no, that suggestion is
11 totally wrong. I'll answer directly. I'm not even going to
12 comment further. It's just totally, totally erroneous.

13 Q. Now, that information is alleged to have come from someone
14 very close to Foday Sankoh?

12:35:25 15 A. Well, I don't know. When I met Foday Sankoh in 1991, I
16 didn't even know who his wife was. I've never seen her, met her.
17 I don't know who he is referring to here. There is only - the
18 only wife that I know or woman that is connected with Sankoh is
19 somebody in later years that - in 1999 that I get to know is his
12:35:56 20 wife, but I don't know any woman of Sankoh that is connected with
21 Sankoh at the period that - I don't know Sankoh or the woman that
22 is connected with him. I don't know.

23 Q. On those occasions when Sankoh was visiting Gbarnga,
24 Mr Taylor, did he have a wife?

12:36:18 25 A. I am not sure. I know he had somebody. He had to have
26 one. But he never - speaking factually he never brought a woman
27 to me. He never introduced me to a woman as his wife. When
28 Sankoh came to meet me, he came alone. He met me alone. I
29 really didn't know but I would assume he had a wife, or a woman

1 at least.

2 Q. Now, the witness claims to have been trained in Camp Naama,
3 Mr Taylor?

4 A. Uh-huh.

12:37:13 5 Q. Now, the witness said that Camp Naama was also called
6 Sokoto for security reasons. This is page 4805. Do you know
7 that name?

8 A. No, I heard that name here. All I know is that camp was
9 called Camp Naama and if they are using another name maybe
12:37:41 10 there's a secret operation they were carrying on, but I never
11 heard of that Sokoto until I heard it in this Court.

12 Q. From your point of view as leader of the NPFL, Mr Taylor,
13 was there any reason to refer to Camp Naama by any other name
14 than Camp Naama?

12:38:05 15 A. No. No, we had no reason to do that. Naama was - I say
16 it's the largest military base in Liberia. Nobody would change
17 the name. Naama is Naama. Except there is something secretive
18 or clandestine somebody would, but that's not a NPFL something,
19 no. I mean, Naama is Naama. Schefflein is Schefflein. We've
12:38:29 20 called all of those names here. No, except it's clandestine, but
21 there's no reason for the NPFL to have changed the name.

22 Q. Now, the witness named some of the people met at Camp
23 Naama. Were you aware that Issa Sesay was at Camp Naama?

24 A. No.

12:39:01 25 Q. Sam Bockarie?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Morris Kallon?

28 A. No.

29 Q. Augustine Gbao?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Mike Lamin?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Rashid Mansaray?

12:39:12 5 A. No.

6 Q. Patrick Lamin?

7 A. You said were you aware? I mean awareness as to hearing it
8 here?

9 Q. No, no, no, no, no. Back then?

12:39:21 10 A. No, I was not aware, no, of the personnel at the base, no.
11 I was not aware.

12 Q. Now, the witness claimed that at Camp Naama the witness was
13 told by Foday Sankoh that he, that's Foday Sankoh, and his
14 brother were going - that is Charles Taylor - "That this is the
12:40:17 15 RUF, Revolutionary United Front, of Sierra Leone. My brother and
16 myself, that is Charles Taylor, we are bound together to fight.
17 We are fighting for Liberia and afterwards we'll fight for Sierra
18 Leone. We are fighting for the same goals. We are one."

19 Did none of that come to your ears, Mr Taylor?

12:40:41 20 A. None of that.

21 Q. That was page 4806 of the transcript.

22 A. None of that. And it could not have come to my ears,
23 because I didn't know the man. So maybe even this wife that
24 we're talking about, I don't know whether they mentioned the

12:40:59 25 wife's name earlier. There's no name for this wife, the earlier
26 part, because that's how the story starts; with a wife and all of
27 these different things. Because maybe if some of these names
28 were given we would be able to find some of these people. I
29 don't know if he mentions the wife's name.

1 Q. Does the name Fatou Brown mean anything to you?

2 A. No. Well, yes, in a way. I heard that name here, yes.

3 Q. But back in Liberia in 1990, '91 --

4 A. No.

12:41:43 5 Q. -- did you hear the name Fatou Brown?

6 A. No, never heard that name before.

7 Q. Now, the witness went on to say that there were two groups
8 training at Camp Naama, the NPFL and the RUF, and that the
9 witness trained with the RUF undergoing infantry training,

12:42:11 10 training in guerilla tactics and training in ideology and that
11 the trainers were Liberians and Sierra Leoneans and that one of
12 the Liberians involved in the training was one Isaac Mongor.
13 Isaac Mongor, do you know him?

14 A. Well, know him. I saw him here. I didn't know him until I
12:42:43 15 saw him here, Isaac Mongor.

16 Q. Another trainer was Patrick Dripo Gonkanu. Does that name
17 mean anything to you?

18 A. No, it doesn't mean anything to me.

19 Q. Now, the witness also mentioned travelling to Gbarnga with
12:43:53 20 Foday Sankoh in a vehicle which was then loaded with arms from
21 your address, your house that is, Charles Taylor's house, and
22 then the ammunition was taken to the front line. That is in
23 Pendembu. Do you recall that?

24 A. No, I don't. I don't recall that now. Again, this is a
12:44:34 25 difficult one to deal with, because I don't know what time this
26 is, but it is possible that this witness - if this witness could
27 have been on a vehicle at the period - and this is why time is
28 important - at the time that I'm dealing with Foday Sankoh, it's
29 possible because I never met who travelled in Liberia and out

1 with Sankoh. So if this witness was on a vehicle - and what this
2 person is saying "vehicle" - between '91 and '92, it's possible
3 that this person could have been on a vehicle. So I cannot
4 dispute that. Because apparently they are already in Sierra
12:45:22 5 Leone, so I don't know as to whether this person would have been
6 - would have come with Sankoh or not. It's possible.

7 Q. Does the name Charles Timba mean anything to you,
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. Charles Timba, yes. I know of Charles Timba, yes.

12:45:48 10 Q. From where?

11 A. Charles Timba was one of the commanders that were with our
12 special operations people in Sierra Leone.

13 Q. So you accept --

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Do you have a spelling of the surname?

12:46:04 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Page 4818 of the transcript, spelled Charles
16 as in Charles Taylor, Timba, T-I-M-B-A. It's line 14 on page
17 4818.

18 Q. So who do you say he was, Mr Taylor, remind me?

19 A. Charles Timba was one of the commanders that worked along
12:46:32 20 with Sam Tuah, and that name has come up. The group that - our
21 special operations people that were operating now. As soon as I
22 hear Charles Timba I can zero in on a year because now we're
23 talking about - I will put it to about August of '91 going into
24 '92. By the end of that. So that's the period that Charles

12:46:56 25 Timba is involved in that special operations here with Sam Tuah.
26 Yes, I know Timba.

27 Q. Now the witness described Timba as a Mano fellow, one of
28 the strong NPFL commanders. Would you agree with that
29 description?

1 A. Yes, yes. So then I know exactly where this witness - then
2 we know the time period. That's August 1991 to May/June 1992.
3 That's Timba and that's the operation.

4 Q. Now, the witness went on to say that in 1998 the witness
12:47:46 5 was summoned to Sam Bockarie in Buedu and he gave an instruction
6 that Charles Taylor said we should open a base at Bunumbu and so
7 the witness went and set up that base, a training base?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

9 MS HOLLIS: We're certainly getting into identifying data
12:48:16 10 about this person and I would ask that such detail, if it is
11 required for questioning the accused, be done in a private
12 session.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we're okay so far, aren't we? As
14 long as Mr Griffiths doesn't get further into it.

12:48:32 15 MS HOLLIS: Well, I would ask that he not get further into
16 it, but we're already talking about somebody being summoned,
17 being sent to a specific location to specifically set up a
18 training base. So in our view we're already getting into
19 information that should not be part of the public record.

12:48:50 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, I totally disagree with that.
21 This man is on trial for very serious charges. This is a
22 specific allegation being made by the witness that this man
23 ordered the setting up of that specific training base. How is he
24 supposed to deal with the allegation if he doesn't have an
12:49:08 25 opportunity of hearing the detail and how does that detail
26 identify the witness, given that we know there were thousands of
27 people in the RUF? How does that disclose the identity of the
28 witness?

29 [Trial Chamber conferred]

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we'll overrule the objection. You
2 can go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

12:49:48

4 Q. Mr Taylor did you order the setting up of a training base
5 at Bunumbu?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Where is Bunumbu?

12:49:57

8 A. I don't know. I think it's in Sierra Leone. I wouldn't
9 know the area of Sierra Leone. I've heard Bunumbu being talked
10 about here, but I don't know where Bunumbu is.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, you appreciate this is an indication that you
12 were micromanaging what was going on in Sierra Leone to this
13 extent: Actually ordering the specific setting up of training
14 bases. You understand that?

12:50:14

15 A. I understand that.

16 Q. So what do you say about that allegation?

12:50:41

17 A. It is so erroneous. The RUF starts operating way back in
18 1991, 1990 or whatever time they start. Your Honours, in 1998
19 Charles Taylor would have to ask somebody or tell somebody to set
20 up a base and even be specific as to where it should be set up.

12:51:08

21 Then I - I don't have a chance of doing - of being acquitted in
22 this case with this type of thing here. That what? '91, '92,
23 '93, '94, '95, '96, '97, '98, eight years after these people have
24 been fighting and fighting and doing all the things it would take
25 me eight years to say, "Guess what happened? Go into this place
26 and set up a base."

27 Your Honours, I did not ask anybody to set up any base
28 anywhere in Sierra Leone eight years almost after they have been
29 fighting and setting up their bases across the country from

1 evidence before this Court. They have bases across the country.

2 So I ordered them to go to Zogoda in the bush in 1996 or 1995?

3 So I did that then? I led them to Zogoda or I told them, "Oh,
4 guess what happened, you better go to a place called Zogoda"?

12:51:49 5 How trivial can we get with this thing? I didn't do it, your
6 Honours. I never talked to anybody and said, "Go into this place
7 and set up a base here." I mean I don't know where they get this
8 kind of idea from, but it is totally, totally erroneous. Totally
9 false.

12:52:05 10 Q. Mr Taylor, did you give an order to Issa Sesay that he
11 should train some 62 SLA men at Bunumbu?

12 A. SLA? What have I got to do with it? No, I didn't.

13 Q. This is page 4895 of the transcript. Did you?

14 A. No, I didn't. SLA men? I thought they were supposed to
12:52:38 15 already be trained. SLA are supposed to be Sierra Leone army. I
16 thought they were supposed to be trained.

17 Q. Well, I'm just giving you an opportunity to deal with
18 what's been said against you.

19 A. No, I didn't. I didn't.

12:52:52 20 Q. Did you send members of the ATU to be trained at Bunumbu?
21 Page 4896.

22 A. ATU?

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. No, no. I employed a retired South African general in a
12:53:13 25 unit to train the ATU at Gbatala in Liberia and after the
26 training - after their training they never went within sight of
27 that. And this training occurred after 1999. So there was no
28 unit even in Liberia at the time this witness is talking about
29 called ATU.

1 Q. Well, the witness claims that general --

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis.

3 MS HOLLIS: Defence counsel has misstated the reference to
4 ATU. There is no reference that the ATU were trained at this
12:53:59 5 base.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. All right, let me put it differently. Mr Taylor, did you
9 send any ATUs with Issa Sesay to the training base that you asked
12:54:26 10 to be set up at Bunumbu?

11 A. No. In fact, the ATUs as they were trained never went
12 within 100 miles of the Sierra Leonean border. No, never, never
13 did.

14 Q. Did they, for example, go to Bunumbu to attend a graduation
12:54:53 15 ceremony?

16 A. No. To the best of my knowledge, no ATU personnel went
17 there and the ATU personnel that testified in this Court that is
18 not protected, Jabaty Jaward, I'm sure the OTP would have led
19 that question for Jabaty Jaward to state that they went or didn't
12:55:18 20 go into Sierra Leone. There's no way the experienced lawyers
21 would have forgotten to say, "Well, what happened at the time
22 that the ATU went to" - never happened, because the question that
23 was led to Jabaty was about the proximity of Sierra Leone and he
24 mentioned that they did not even go within a certain distance of
12:55:37 25 Sierra Leone.

26 So there was no such thing. It never happened and if it
27 had happened, the OTP would have brought it up in their
28 examination of Jabaty Jaward. It did not ever happen that an ATU
29 personnel left Liberia and crossed into Sierra Leone for any

1 reason. None. None.

2 Q. Let me give you a time frame for when this happened.

3 Because the witness was asked to tell the Court when this
4 happened, when you trained the 62 SLAs and General Issa and the

12:56:17 5 ATU came to collect them. This is page 4897:

6 "A. It is at the time we retreated from Freetown when we
7 opened the base. It was during that time when we retreated
8 from Freetown.

9 Q. Can you give a year?

12:56:37 10 A. I can remember. 1998.

11 Q. When General Issa and the Liberian ATUs came to your
12 base did they bring anything with them?

13 A. Yes, they brought some things. They brought Liberian
14 mats. They brought some rice from Liberia. We call it
15 pusawai. They brought some pots."

12:57:04 16 Now, did you send your ATU to take rice and mats and pots
17 all the way to Bunumbu in Sierra Leone, Mr Taylor?

18 A. No, I did not. And this witness says they retreat from
19 Sierra Leone - from Freetown from 1998.

12:57:32 20 Q. Yes.

21 A. But what - I mean, just to tell the - I will call the
22 foolishness in this whole thing that this witness is talking
23 about - but, you know, I mean, I'm not sure, your Honour.

24 Because the way I really want to deal with this witness here,

12:57:54 25 okay, I don't know what to say or how to describe it, so I'm not
26 sure if counsel - if we may want to - I don't know, because I
27 don't want to make any mistake because I have to deal with this
28 witness for what this witness is and maybe the Prosecution could
29 complain about that.

1 Because the level of this witness - as I'm thinking in my
2 head it has to be dealt in a way that maybe I may say something
3 I've got no business saying and it would expose this witness in
4 the setting that we have. But this Bench must know, because it
12:58:32 5 is so foolish but I think I can deal with it in a different way.

6 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, you're on trial here and if you feel you
7 can only do justice to the topic then it may be that we have to
8 go into a private session so you can provide the answer which you
9 want to?

12:58:48 10 A. Okay. I really wouldn't mind, because I'm so restricted
11 here and I want to deal with this particular witness because the
12 level of this witness and some other things that, you know, short
13 of making a mistake and being interrupted all the time about it,
14 I really don't mind because the judges will have to decide anyway
12:59:09 15 that - for this particular witness, I really don't mind if the
16 Prosecution insists to go into closed session because there are
17 some things that maybe we need to say even more detailed about
18 this witness, okay, and what - and I don't want to make a
19 mistake.

12:59:24 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, can I therefore make a request then,
21 Mr President, that we go into private session to allow Mr Taylor
22 to deal with this witness?

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Ms Hollis, the original testimony
24 was in closed session but the witness concerned is not here now,
12:59:38 25 so I take it you would have no objection to a private session?

26 MS HOLLIS: No, we would not.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you.

28 Well, for members of the public, we're going into private
29 session for some portion of Mr Taylor's evidence. The reason

1 being that the evidence of a witness already given in this court
2 needs to be discussed and it might tend to reveal that witness's
3 identity and the witness is subject to protection orders from
4 this Court.

13:00:17 5 So, Madam Court Manager, could you please put the Court in
6 private session?

7 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
8 the transcript, pages 29069 to 29078, was
9 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
10 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we're in open session.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, please, Mr Griffiths.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you, Mr President. Just one moment:

13:19:40 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want to move on to deal with another
6 witness.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I just check something through
8 Mr Anyah for a moment, please:

9 Q. Yes, I want to move on to another witness, Mr Taylor, a
13:20:14 10 witness who gave evidence in open session in September 2008
11 called Mohamed Kabbah, yes? Do you recall him?

12 A. Yes, I recall the name now, not the - yes. Mohamed Kabbah.

13 Q. Now, the first matter I want to ask you about in relation
14 to him is this, page 16132 of the transcript of 12 September
13:20:47 15 2008, he was asked this question:

16 "Q. Now you said also at this time while you were based in
17 Buedu that communication was going on with Liberia and
18 you've mentioned some particular stations and individuals
19 related to that communication. First of all, as a general
13:21:06 20 matter, describe what was going on in terms of the
21 communications between Buedu and Liberia.

22 A. A communication was a daily free flow activity that
23 took place between the RUF and the NPFL, so at the time we
24 were in Buedu if for any reason Sam Bockarie wanted to
13:21:27 25 talk to Charles Taylor and at that time Sam Bockarie had
26 visited Monrovia and he had a satellite phone - because by
27 then his own dialogues was not conducted through the VHF.
28 He used this satellite phone. He would tell us to tell
29 Sunlight to tell Charles Taylor that he should put on his

1 Two-One so that he would talk to him, and equally so when
2 Charles Taylor wanted to talk with Mosquito, Sunlight will
3 call us and tell us that, 'The Pa wants to talk to your own
4 Pa'. So that was the kind of communication that took place
13:22:04 5 between us and, if there was any threat of enemy attack, he
6 would send the same message to us at Buedu."

7 What do you say about that?

8 A. These little boys put themselves way beyond
9 [indiscernible]. Sam Bockarie would not be brave enough to call
13:22:22 10 me on the telephone. It's a total lie. Sam Bockarie never
11 called me on the telephone. I have spoken to Sam Bockarie on the
12 telephone. Any time that - and every time that I spoke to
13 Sam Bockarie on the telephone, I would initiate the call if there
14 was a need to. And I do admit that I talked to him several
13:22:49 15 times. Sam Bockarie never ever called to Liberia and said please
16 - never. That's totally untrue. Totally untrue.

17 Q. Now, when you spoke to Sam Bockarie on those occasions
18 you've just described, Mr Taylor, was it on a radio or was it on
19 a satellite phone?

13:23:14 20 A. It was on a satellite phone. I would - times. Here we can
21 use times. But the number of times that I would have talked to
22 Sam Bockarie in total on the telephone would not surpass probably
23 two times, and it had to be very, very, very urgent. One of the
24 times - and I can almost be specific with this - that I talked to
13:23:45 25 Sam Bockarie on the telephone where I would tell somebody, "Get
26 Sam Bockarie. After you get him on the line, let me know," it
27 would be in December - early December 1999 when I initiated the
28 negotiations between he and Sankoh. The next time that I spoke
29 to Sam Bockarie was - I will put it to around April, May 1999.

1 It was not my - it was not in my habit to be calling
2 Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie and I were not friend. We were not
3 friends, neither were we colleagues. Sam Bockarie was a little
4 boy that was doing his work - when I needed Sam Bockarie, I would
13:24:38 5 instruct that, "Call Sam Bockarie. Tell him I want to see him
6 for this reason or that reason or another." If it was very
7 urgent, I would say, "Get him on the phone." If there was some
8 delay on him doing something like this Foday Sankoh issue in
9 December of 1999 that he didn't want to disarm, I would say,
13:24:53 10 "Well, get Sam Bockarie on the phone. I want to talk to him."
11 This is when I told him that I wanted him to come Liberia. But
12 he never initiated a call to me.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Could you clarify, when you say "I spoke
14 to Bockarie on the phone or on the satellite phone," was that you
13:25:09 15 speaking on the satellite phone or Bockarie speaking on the
16 satellite phone?

17 THE WITNESS: Bockarie speaking on the satellite phone. We
18 could get Sam Bockarie from even a landline, you could call.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:25:24 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you will note that the witness suggests
21 that there was free flow activity between the RUF and the NPFL.
22 Was the NPFL still in existence when you were in contact with
23 Sam Bockarie?

24 A. No. The NPFL is dissolved. No.

13:25:54 25 Q. Because let me just remind you the answer:

26 "A. A communication was a daily free flow activity that
27 took place between the RUF and the NPFL, so at the time we
28 were in Buedu if for any reason Sam Bockarie wanted to talk
29 to Charles Taylor," et cetera, et cetera.

1 So would the NPFL be in contact with the RUF at the time
2 when Bockarie is in charge?

3 A. No. No. No.

4 Q. Now, who is Sunlight?

13:26:30 5 A. I don't know who Sunlight is.

6 Q. What is Sunlight?

7 A. I'm not sure what Sunlight is. If you say Sunlight in
8 referring to - this could be the code of a radio operator, if he
9 is referring to radio here.

13:26:46 10 Q. Did you have an operator called Sunlight?

11 A. No, no, no, I didn't have an operator called Sunlight. And
12 let me just clarify one thing quickly. When I become President
13 of Liberia, this matter of radio operators being assigned to me,
14 there's no such thing as a radio operator being assigned to the
15 President. So if we're talking about radio operator and

16 assignment, we're talking about NPFL days. At the Presidency of
17 the Republic of Liberia, at the time that I was President, like
18 most Presidencies, there is a communication setup controlled by
19 the Secret Service that contained a whole lot of things. There's
13:27:04 20 several operators, telephone operators, radio operators, and

21 different things that the Secret Service operates. The President
22 does not have access - I mean, well, he can enter if he wants to,
23 but there's nobody in particular. People are on shifts. They
24 are on assignments. Even if the President has to make a

13:27:27 25 telephone call, I don't even know which operator places the call.
26 I don't know. All I do is state that I want to place a call to
27 X, Y, Z place. I don't even know who is in the operating room
28 doing it. So no.

29 So when we're dealing with my election as of 1997 and

1 talking about radio operators, I don't know who they are, where
2 they are, or what they are doing, depending on the shift that
3 they are working on. I don't know. Because there is a whole
4 communication setup at the Executive Mansion where the Secret
13:28:19 5 Service operates for many purposes. Interceptions. All kinds of
6 things are done.

7 Q. Now, on that question of Sunlight, Mr Taylor, the witness
8 went on to say this:

9 "Q. Where was Sunlight?

13:28:38 10 A. Sunlight was at the Mansion Ground in Monrovia.

11 Q. How do you know that?

12 A. The operators who moved with Sam Bockarie and Issa at
13 the times they visited Monrovia, they were located at that
14 particular area - they located that particular area. They
13:28:58 15 said that was where it was based, because I never went to
16 Monrovia."

17 A radio operator at the mansion ground in Monrovia called
18 Sunlight, what do you say about that?

19 A. It's possible. It's possible that there's a radio operator
13:29:19 20 at the mansion. It's possible. I wouldn't say it's not
21 possible. He is probably one of many, because there's 24 hours -
22 there's not a second that there are not operators - at least two
23 or three operators on a shift. So it's possible. I don't deny -
24 he says he don't go to Monrovia. I don't deny that there is a
13:29:35 25 radio operator there, one, but I don't know him.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: That might be a good place to pause,
27 Mr Griffiths.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll take the lunch break now and

1 reconvene at 2.30.

2 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

3 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

4 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

14:30:00 5 Q. Mr Taylor, what I'm going to do is this: I am going to go
6 through a lengthy passage of the evidence of this witness and
7 then seek your comment at the end of it. Do you follow me?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Remember before the luncheon adjournment we were talking
14:30:19 10 about a radio operator called Sunlight?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Well, the witness continues in this vein, page 16133:

13 "A. The operators who moved with Sam Bockarie and Issa at
14 the times they visited Monrovia, they were located at that
14:30:37 15 particular area - they located that particular area. They
16 said that was where it was based, because I never went to
17 Monrovia.

18 Q. All right. When I asked you how you knew Sunlight was
19 at Mansion Ground in Monrovia you said that, 'The operators
14:30:55 20 who moved with Sam Bockarie and Issa at the time they
21 visited Monrovia, they were located at that particular
22 area.' I'm just going to ask you to explain slowly how you
23 know that Sunlight was at the Mansion Ground in Monrovia.

24 A. I said the operators who were assigned with Sam
14:31:13 25 Bockarie, like for example Pascal who used to go to
26 Monrovia and Elevation stations in Buedu" -

27 Sorry, I am misleading you, Mr Taylor. My fault. My
28 fault. I meant to start at a different point. I'm sorry. My
29 fault. Page 13166:

1 "Q. Approximately how frequently were you in
2 communication with Sunlight?

3 A. I had said that this process was a continuous flow. By
4 that I mean it was a daily activity. It was not a hidden
14:32:01 5 programme. It was quite clear that every day we
6 communicated with Sunlight."

7 Now, remember, Sunlight is based in Monrovia, Mr Taylor,
8 yes?

9 A. Yes.

14:32:12 10 Q. So you understand what's being described now:

11 "Q. What were the content - what were some of the things
12 you remember about the content of these communications?

13 A. The communications that we used to have with Sunlight
14 were, one, in the morning after receiving reports from our
14:32:29 15 various front lines and at times when he called he would
16 ask us about news on the ground and then we would tell him
17 that things are good, but at any time we got attacks we
18 would also tell him that we had an attack. That besides,
19 if at any time Charles Taylor needed to talk to Sam
14:32:49 20 Bockarie then Sunlight would tell us that his Pa,
21 Charles Taylor, said Sam Bockarie should go. That happened
22 at all times that he needed him and, if at all from within
23 the RUF Sam Bockarie wanted to move to go to Monrovia, he
24 would tell us that and we would tell Sunlight that Sam
14:33:09 25 Bockarie wanted to go and meet the Pa, Charles Taylor, and
26 they would give the go ahead and Sam Bockarie's movement
27 was a free movement. At any time he wanted to go to
28 Monrovia he was welcome.

29 Q. How do you know that?

1 A. I was in that same town with that man. I was not in a
2 different town and at any time he wanted to go to Monrovia
3 he would tell us that he was going to Monrovia. It was not
4 something that he hid away from us. We were there with
14:33:37 5 him. We operated with him directly. We would go to his
6 house, most times, yes.

7 Q. Explain what you mean.

8 A. The war that we fought in Sierra Leone, the RUF and the
9 Government of Liberia were like brothers and sisters and
14:33:53 10 whatsoever thing that went on within the RUF, be it good or
11 bad, we would have to inform Sunlight because we
12 communicated every day for him to have knowledge of it so
13 that Charles Taylor would know because whatever information
14 our station, that is the headquarters station, that
14:34:14 15 Sunlight received from us, Charles Taylor would be able to
16 know.

17 Q. Why did you say we would have to inform Sunlight?

18 A. I have said this. I said the operation that went on in
19 Sierra Leone, let me say materials in terms of ammunition,
14:34:31 20 we got it from that country through Charles Taylor, so
21 whatever operation that took place within the RUF was not
22 anything hidden from them. We had communication with them
23 every day.

24 Q. Now you said that, 'In Sierra Leone, let me say
14:34:51 25 materials in terms of ammunitions, we got it from that
26 country through Charles Taylor.' Explain what you know
27 about this.

28 A. When we needed - that is when the RUF needed -
29 ammunition, Sam Bockarie would give us a message, or he

1 would tell Sunlight - we would communicate directly with
2 Sunlight for him to inform Charles Taylor that we needed
3 ammunition. So the response that came, it would be based
4 on that that Sam Bockarie would go to Monrovia to bring
14:35:22 5 ammunition, food, used clothing and some other things.

6 Q. Now in terms of this that you've just described, what
7 time period are you referring to?

8 A. That is the time we were in Buedu that I'm speaking
9 about.

14:35:40 10 Q. Now can you estimate about how often this would occur;
11 this being what you've just described in terms of the
12 message to Sunlight requesting ammunition?

13 A. I said at any time we were short of ammunition - I
14 cannot estimate whether it was one time or two times, but
14:35:55 15 at any time we were short of arms that was the area from
16 which we got our supplies. We would always ask.

17 Q. Could you estimate in terms of - if I asked you if it
18 occurred - actually, no, I'm going to withdraw the
19 question. Now you said that this message would go through
14:36:15 20 with regards to ammunition and then you said, 'so the
21 response that came, it would be based on that that Sam
22 Bockarie would go to Monrovia to bring ammunition, food,
23 used clothing and some other things.' Describe exactly,
24 from your observation, what you saw in terms of ammunition
14:36:30 25 coming to Buedu. How would this work?

26 A. Sam Bockarie used to go to Monrovia and bring
27 ammunition. Jungle too used to bring ammunition.
28 Sometimes when the request went Sam Bockarie would not go,
29 it was Jungle who would come, but sometimes the ammunition

1 that came wouldn't be enough and so at a certain point in
2 time whilst we were in Buedu in terms of ammunition we
3 planned an attack on Kono and so all the senior officers -
4 most of them - met and they decided on the plan. But at
14:37:06 5 first when Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia he did not bring
6 enough ammunition and the next time he went, he came, they
7 tried to get some diamonds and he gave them to Issa to go
8 to Monrovia to Charles Taylor to bring ammunition and on
9 Issa's return he said he'd lost the diamonds. So that was
14:37:25 10 a very big blow. And later the still tried, because by
11 then mining was going on around Kono, that is the front
12 lines, so they managed to get some quantity of diamonds and
13 Sam Bockarie himself took these to Monrovia and on his
14 return he came with a big ten-tyred truck that had enough
14:37:52 15 ammunition on board and when they arrived they packed
16 everything in Sam Bockarie's veranda on the Dawa Highway
17 and it had over 50 boxes of AK rounds, the RPG too were
18 there in rubbers, he brought wines with him, rice, Maggi,
19 salt and some other condiments, and so far whilst we were
14:38:13 20 in Buedu that was the largest quantity of ammunition that
21 we received from Monrovia and those were the ammunition
22 that we used to attack Kono up to Freetown.

23 Q. I'm going to ask you more about that later. First of
24 all, though, how do you know that Sam Bockarie was going to
14:38:35 25 Monrovia?

26 A. One thing I want to tell this Court is that Sam
27 Bockarie was a bragard. He did not hide anything away from
28 people, especially when it came to operations. In terms of
29 operation he would say that aloud, and those of us that

1 were with him he did not hide anything away from us because
2 we always sat with him at the office and anything that he
3 had in his mind he spoke it out. And there was no other
4 areas from where we got them. We never used to go to
14:39:08 5 Guinea and the vehicles that came they came from Liberia
6 from the Foya area by the Dawa Highway. So that was how I
7 was able to know that he went to Monrovia and got the
8 ammunitions from there."

9 Now, Mr Taylor, I've read that whole passage in the hope
14:39:27 10 that we can speed up a little bit. Now, first of all, you note
11 the suggestion of a radio operator based at the Mansion Ground in
12 Monrovia called Sunlight. Secondly, the suggestion that
13 communications with you was on a daily basis, yes?

14 A. Uh-huh.

14:39:59 15 Q. Also that you provided with Sam Bockarie with a large
16 consignment of ammunition, 50 boxes of AK rounds which was used
17 to attack Freetown. Now, I want you - Kono through to Freetown.
18 "It was Monrovia, and those were the ammunition that we
19 used to attack Kono up to Freetown."

14:40:22 20 Now, Mr Taylor, what do you say about all of those
21 allegations?

22 A. That's the charge right there, and it's well put together.
23 That's the whole charge about Freetown attack and Charles Taylor.
24 That just did not happen. I had nothing to do with the Freetown
14:40:38 25 attack. I never gave Sam Bockarie any ammunition. Here is a man
26 who says that he never comes to Monrovia, but he knows what's
27 going on in Monrovia. I will tell you - and to understand this
28 Sunlight and all these operators, at the mansion there are
29 operators. I don't deny that there may be a Sunlight. I really

1 do not know.

2 My job as - the way how the presidency operated in
3 Monrovia, a radio operator in the Executive Mansion would not be
4 able to get to me. Even if there was a radio call from Sierra
14:41:27 5 Leone, okay? And at this particular time if a radio call came
6 from Sierra Leone, it would pass through a minimum of four hands
7 before it would ever get to me, and during the period that Sam
8 Bockarie is there it's very possible - I would not ever deny that
9 Sam Bockarie could not have called a radio at the mansion during

14:41:53 10 the time he's dealing with us to say that please ask the
11 President if I can come to speak to him about X, Y and Z. But
12 there is no Sunlight that would get to me. A radio operator -
13 the radio operators work under maybe some - maybe I would say the
14 assistant director of communications of the mansion. It would
14:42:17 15 have to go from that operator to the assistant director, to the
16 deputy director, the director of SSS, to the Minister of State
17 before it gets - there is somebody sitting now in Sierra Leone
18 saying that Sunlight would get to me. It's the way how the
19 language is spoken as I'm seeing in this trial. These questions
14:42:36 20 are asked and there are responses, and knowing the way how our
21 people talk in that part of the world, yeah, he's talking like he
22 knows it. He is convinced. This man is convinced that what he
23 is saying is factual and this is that, because he wants to show
24 that he knows something.

14:42:55 25 The fact of the matter is this: Sam Bockarie comes to
26 Liberia. Between September 1998 all the way until December of
27 1999 he is coming to Liberia. The last trip with Sankoh, that
28 was in December of 1999 before he finally moves. The fact of the
29 matter is during this particular time there were radio calls that

1 would come in either from an instruction from me to get to Sam
2 Bockarie for a particular subject matter relating to this peace.
3 In fact, even the whole idea of putting the delegation - when
4 they put a delegation, the UN moving people up and down. I don't
14:43:36 5 get to see these operators. The fact of the matter is I don't
6 know how many operators are at the mansion. There could be
7 Sunlight. I don't deny this. There could be many. The
8 communication department down there is huge, and the President
9 would not have any responsibility of even wanting to know who is
14:43:54 10 in the communication department.

11 Having put that together, if someone wants to size this up
12 that when Sam Bockarie comes to Liberia, that he's coming and
13 he's getting material from me, it's totally, totally false. But
14 in 1998-1999, thinking about it from an intelligence standpoint,
14:44:19 15 we know that arms are being sold out of Lofa. Now, whether Sam
16 Bockarie is buying a little ammunition and somebody is sitting
17 over there talking about - once they see some come in that has
18 got to be - because he went to Liberia to Charles Taylor, it's
19 coming from there. That's the only guess I can give. But there
14:44:38 20 is no way I am supplying Sam Bockarie with ammunition in this
21 period of time and at no other time, because not - I don't have
22 the ammunition, and that's where a lot of these people, based on
23 this whole theory - in fact, I will call it maybe just a
24 hypothesis. This whole thing is that Taylor has got arms in
14:45:00 25 Liberia. I have no arms in this period that we're talking about
26 to be giving these huge quantities of arms that the people are
27 talking about.

28 All I can say in final is that it is not true. The way it
29 is constructed, there are some half truths, whole truths about

1 the operators and all of that. But the mansion doesn't operate
2 this way that I would be, as President of Liberia, on the radio.
3 God knows, I never got on the radio with anybody. I gave
4 instructions; they were followed. If somebody says that I
14:45:36 5 instructed somebody and they called, yes. But to say I was on
6 the radio, never. It's a lie.

7 Q. Mr Taylor, there's one other aspect of this passage that I
8 want to deal with - I want you to deal with it, and it's this:

9 The witness comments that the RUF and the Government of Liberia
14:45:56 10 were like brothers and sisters, a close relationship, and he goes
11 on to say this communication was on a daily basis, and when
12 speaking of trips by Bockarie to Monrovia, it seems that Bockarie
13 was a regular visitor to Monrovia. What do you say about that
14 relationship?

14:46:19 15 A. No, there is no - I have heard this brother and sister
16 business. Look, a lot of people came up with brother and sister.
17 There was not this kind of relationship between the RUF and the
18 NPFL. I have explained here, and I don't think it's necessary to
19 go through. My strategic involvement with the RUF at the time
14:46:42 20 following that --

21 Q. Mr Taylor, we're not talking about that period --

22 A. Yes, I know --

23 Q. -- because this witness is talking about Sam Bockarie.

24 A. Exactly. But that's the period that all of their minds -

14:46:50 25 you see, this case is built on this type of thinking to these
26 witnesses and talking to them for - because this brother and
27 sister business, he's not the first witness using this
28 expression. There are several witnesses that have come: Oh,
29 they were like brother and sister. Like brother and sister. So

1 it is being built on the pretext of the beginning, where's the
2 plan, and then I train and different things and take it. That's
3 why I'm trying to structure it. It is this mindset that got
4 these boys carrying on this lie. This brother and sister
14:47:25 5 relationship goes all the way back to what? The training and the
6 sending men in, and this is the way that this lie is constructed,
7 and it's got nothing to do with that. There is no such brother
8 and no sister relationship between the RUF and my government.
9 None whatsoever.

14:47:42 10 Q. But, Mr Taylor, what about the regularity of the contact as
11 suggested by this witness --

12 A. There is no --

13 Q. -- in terms of a communication on a daily basis, in terms
14 of, it would appear, Bockarie being a regular visitor to
14:47:57 15 Monrovia?

16 A. No, Bockarie is not a regular visitor to Monrovia. No,
17 he's not a regular visitor. He visits; it's not regular. There
18 is no everyday communication with the RUF. The frequency of
19 communication with the RUF would depend on the problem at hand,
14:48:16 20 okay? If there is a critical issue - for example, I would say in
21 April/May of 1999 there is a lot of communication going - I
22 wouldn't say on a daily basis - putting that whole delegation
23 together to go to Lome. But there is, to answer your question
24 short, finish, there's no frequency. There is communication, but
14:48:49 25 it is very infrequent and there is no regular visits, because
26 between August, when I get this information about Sam Bockarie,
27 to December of 1998, Sam Bockarie makes three visits into
28 Liberia. We're talking about a total of about four months; one
29 in September, one in October and the end of November/December he

1 passes through. So I would not call that frequent visits. In
2 1999 when do I - Sam Bockarie does not come to Liberia in 1999,
3 to the best of my recollection, until the Lome situation is going
4 through. He does come - he doesn't go to Lome, but he does come
14:49:32 5 to Monrovia first, and he returns after Sankoh gets back from
6 Lome. So I would not call that frequency of visits.
7 Q. Well, let's try and tie down and identify the visits again,
8 Mr Taylor.
9 A. Yes.
14:49:48 10 Q. And let's break this up into time periods, shall we?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Let's start off with September to December 1998. You say
13 three visits?
14 A. Three visits.
14:50:02 15 Q. September?
16 A. One.
17 Q. October?
18 A. One.
19 Q. End of November into December when he passes through to
14:50:09 20 Burkina Faso, comes back --
21 A. That's it.
22 Q. -- via Monrovia?
23 A. Three.
24 Q. Right. Now, another detail about that period: During that
14:50:17 25 period, September, October, November, December, four months,
26 what's the regularity of communication by other means?
27 A. No, no, no. There is no regularity, because this is the
28 first contact. There's no real - no, no, no. I would say hardly
29 any communication.

1 Q. Hardly any communication?

2 A. Hardly any communication.

3 Q. Right. Let's go to 1999 now.

4 A. Yes.

14:50:45 5 Q. You say there's a period of quite a bit of activity leading
6 up to Lome?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Try and time that for us, please?

9 A. I would put that to April - mostly in the month of April of
14:51:00 10 1999.

11 Q. And does Bockarie come to Liberia in that period?

12 A. Bockarie does come to Liberia in that particular period,
13 yes, he does.

14 Q. How many times?

14:51:12 15 A. Once. He comes to Liberia once while the delegates are
16 being put together. Once.

17 Q. Right. So that's the fourth trip?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Just to be clear, had he been to Liberia earlier in the
14:51:24 20 year of 1999?

21 A. No, not to my recollection, no. Between January and April,
22 no. Not to my recollection, no.

23 Q. Right. Before I move on we're up to the fourth trip now?

24 A. Yes.

14:51:36 25 Q. I just want to pause briefly and deal with radio
26 communications. In the aftermath of the Freetown invasion -
27 because you remember that's the beginning of 1999, the year we're
28 talking about?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Was there a great deal of radio traffic between you and
2 Bockarie and the RUF in that period?

3 A. By "you" - not personally, but there was communication.
4 Not by me now.

14:52:01 5 Q. Not by you, I understand that. Was there communication
6 between the Government of Liberia and Bockarie in that period?

7 A. Yes. In January of 1999 there was communication I would
8 say immediately after the Freetown invasion and into the
9 negotiation for the ceasefire which occurred, I would say, around
14:52:23 10 the middle of January. Yes, there were communications.

11 Q. So during that period there's communication going on?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. But no visit?

14 A. No visits, no. Strictly communication.

14:52:33 15 Q. So then we come down to April, and there's a lot of
16 activity and a visit by Bockarie?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Yes?

19 A. Yes.

14:52:40 20 Q. Then we have June, July: Lome?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. August, Johnny Paul Koroma comes to Monrovia?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Then we know Sankoh comes to Monrovia in September?

14:53:00 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Bockarie comes then, you tell us?

27 A. In September. He does come, yes.

28 Q. That's number five?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. After that, when is the next time Bockarie is in
2 Liberia?

3 A. The next time Bockarie comes is around November. He and
4 Sankoh come.

14:53:19 5 Q. Come together?

6 A. Exactly.

7 Q. With a view to patching up their differences?

8 A. Wait a minute now. Not come together, because Sankoh came
9 from Freetown, but he came through - he was in the bush. He came
14:53:30 10 through the other side, okay.

11 Q. So that's visit number six?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And then when again?

14 A. He comes back around the - close to the end of December

14:53:42 15 where he meets me, Obasanjo and Sankoh.

16 Q. Yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. That's seven?

19 A. That is correct.

14:53:48 20 Q. Any more visits?

21 A. Yes, the last visit he doesn't return.

22 Q. So he then comes on the eighth occasion and doesn't return?

23 A. Exactly. And doesn't return. That is correct.

24 Q. So, Mr Taylor, when they're talking about Sankoh - I mean,
14:54:03 25 Mosquito being a regular visitor to Monrovia, those, to the best
26 of your recollection, are the eight visits he made to Monrovia?

27 A. That is correct, between September of 1998 to December of
28 1999.

29 Q. Next passage I want to deal with is this, page 16148 of the

1 transcript for 12 September 2008. There's a meeting:

2 "A. Sam Bockarie who called the meeting, chaired it.

3 Q. Now you've mentioned that the topic of an airfield was
4 discussed. Actually I should say you mentioned that a
14:55:22 5 topic of an airstrip was discussed. Describe exactly what
6 was - to your recollection, what specifically was discussed
7 in terms of an airstrip?

8 A. The airstrip was to be constructed so that we can
9 receive our own ammunition. That is we were to be getting
14:55:42 10 ammunition from Libya. That is when it arrives it won't
11 come through Monrovia, it would come straight to us. When
12 Sam Bockarie came that was the message he brought. He said
13 we were to try and get the war strip. The work commenced
14 to construct the war - the airstrip but we did not see the
14:56:07 15 plane that came.

16 Q. I'm just going to ask you to clarify the last portion
17 of your answer, Mr Witness ...

18 A. We constructed the airfield for a plane but we never
19 saw a plane land there.

14:56:23 20 Q. Who did the construction?

21 A. The construction was done by civilians, soldiers
22 because when they were going to do that work Sam Bockarie
23 will - we would take the radio along, we would be there for
24 the entire day and in the evening we would return. Because
14:56:38 25 there was a Caterpillar there that was abandoned, that was
26 repaired and that was - it was working together there with
27 the civilians."

28 Now, what do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Nothing. I know nothing about it.

1 Q. Now, remember, we looked at another witness this morning
2 who spoke of you instructing Bockarie that such an airstrip
3 should be built.

4 A. Yes.

14:57:07 5 Q. Had you also made arrangements with Libya for the import of
6 arms for the RUF into this airstrip?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Because you note that the witness claims that they were to
9 be getting their own ammunition through from Libya?

14:57:23 10 A. Because they didn't want it coming through Monrovia.

11 Q. Yes. What do you know about that?

12 A. Nothing. I know nothing about it.

13 Q. Now the witness continued on this topic, the diamonds lost
14 by Issa:

14:57:46 15 "A. That diamond was the diamond that was Issa - that Issa
16 was to take to Charles Taylor to buy ammunition. Because
17 when we returned that was the first diamond that we were to
18 use to get ammunition and continue carrying on with the
19 operation. They took those diamonds from Johnny Paul and
14:58:08 20 others and handed them over to him. When he went he came
21 back and told us the diamonds were lost. That was why Sam
22 Bockarie himself went back to Monrovia."

23 Now, what do you know about that, Mr Taylor?

24 A. I know nothing about it. I heard it - well, no. I heard
14:58:32 25 about this whole diamond thing in this courtroom.

26 Q. But there's evidence to suggest that there was a radio
27 broadcast in Monrovia which led an initially disbelieving Sam
28 Bockarie to accept the account given by Issa Sesay. Do you
29 recall any such radio --

1 A. No, I don't.

2 Q. -- report in Monrovia of diamonds being lost?

3 A. No, I didn't hear that report.

4 Q. Now, it goes on. At the same meeting there was a
14:59:12 5 discussion about an attack on Kono, and the witness says this,
6 page 16149:

7 "A. So the struggle had reached a point where these bits
8 and pieces of ammunition that we were getting from Liberia
9 was dwindling because the area of the struggle had become
14:59:33 10 large and, you know, it is ammunition that fights wars. So
11 when Sam Bockarie returned it was at that time that he
12 spoke about that, that he had discussed that with
13 Charles Taylor, that we should try and get Kono and when we
14 would have taken Kono we would get ammunition because when
14:59:55 15 we get Kono we will get diamonds and he will help us to get
16 ammunition. That was the discussion; the retaking of Kono
17 so that we can mine and get enough ammunition, because the
18 bits and pieces he'd been giving us used to help us. But
19 what we wanted did not happen. That was a clear example,
15:00:19 20 when he took that diamond the type of ammunition that he
21 brought."

22 Now, what do you understand from that, Mr Taylor, bits and
23 pieces of ammunition?

24 A. Well, my own interpretation of this bits and pieces of
15:00:36 25 information, he's probably saying that they were small quantities
26 of ammunition that I had been giving them. But if we listen to
27 this witness, he has talked about large amounts in other places.
28 So he's only talking about, in my interpretation, of small
29 quantities.

1 Q. Now, in speaking about bits and pieces of ammunition,
2 Mr Taylor, does anything in particular come to mind?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What?

15:01:02 5 A. The purchase of arms and of these little amounts from ULIMO
6 in Lofa. That's the only thing that comes to my mind in that
7 period of time that OTP witnesses have talked about.

8 Q. And you note, Mr Taylor, the hint that for the attack on
9 Kono, you provided a large quantity of ammunition. Any truth in
10 that?

15:01:40 11 A. There is no truth to that because that's the same
12 ammunition that he is also saying - what he said, according to
13 the reading he said what? To attack Kono through to, am I
14 quoting it correctly, through to Freetown. So he's talking about
15:01:56 15 the Freetown invasion when he talks about this, which is not
16 true.

17 Q. Yes. Let's move on to something else. Now, Mr Taylor,
18 remind us, how and when did you find out about the Freetown
19 invasion?

15:02:49 20 A. I was informed of the Freetown invasion on the morning of -
21 the morning after the invasion by my national security adviser.

22 Q. Now, your national security adviser was who?

23 A. At that particular time it was Brown, Lewis Brown.

24 Q. Now, Benjamin Yeaten was the director of the SSS, yes?

15:03:27 25 A. That is correct, yes.

26 Q. Did you receive any information from him about the Freetown
27 invasion?

28 A. No, no. I received it from my national security adviser.

29 Q. As far as you're aware, Mr Taylor, was Benjamin Yeaten in

1 contact with Sam Bockarie during the Freetown invasion?

2 A. I really don't know. I really don't. I really don't know.

3 Q. If he was, would you expect him to tell you?

4 A. Well, if I asked him, yes, he would tell me. I would
15:04:20 5 expect - well, I would say I would expect that he would tell me
6 if I asked him, yes.

7 Q. The reason I ask is this, listen to this passage, page
8 16173:

9 "Q. ... You were speaking of a conversation between Sam
15:04:36 10 Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten during the time of the
11 Freetown invasion. First of all, can you just describe
12 generally who, if anyone, was Sam Bockarie in communication
13 with during the time of the Freetown invasion?

14 A. Sam Bockarie communicated with Benjamin Yeaten and he
15:05:03 15 used to communicate as well with Charles Taylor, but for
16 the communication with Charles Taylor that one he used the
17 satellite phone. And the capture of Freetown, that was not
18 even a hidden thing that he would go to a corner and
19 discuss like he used to do, that one he did in an open
15:05:26 20 place when he was trying to inform Charles Taylor that our
21 men were in Freetown. He did that in the open because the
22 RUF was happy, there was joy to the RUF that they had
23 entered Freetown.

24 Q. Let's start, first of all, what did you observe in
15:05:46 25 terms of communications between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin
26 Yeaten during the time of the Freetown invasion?

27 A. There had been communication between them for a long
28 time. It was - let me say it was a sisterly or brotherly
29 operation" - that phrase again - "that we had. So whatever

1 good or bad information that we had from any of the ends we
2 would share that with each other.

3 Q. ... I'm specifically asking you in terms of at the time
4 of the Freetown invasion what was the state of

15:06:18 5 communication - what did you observe in terms of

6 communication between Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten?

7 A. What I observed, it's just like for example when you
8 and your subordinates would be doing something you would be
9 giving him instructions or orders and that was the way I

15:06:38 10 observed. Like the time Sam Bockarie told him about this
11 operation that we had in Freetown and he, Benjamin Yeaten,
12 told him to send manpower or reinforcement to the city.

13 Q. When was that?

14 A. That occurred when he spoke with Gullit when he was
15 told that they were having suppression.

15:07:01

16 Q. When I asked you about the communication between Sam
17 Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten you said that it's just like,
18 for example, when you and your subordinates, we would be
19 doing something while you were giving him instructions.

15:07:22 20 What were you referring to when you said 'just like, for
21 example, when you and your subordinates'?

22 A. In that area - let me clarify it. Benjamin Yeaten was
23 senior to Sam Bockarie. That is what I meant directly.

24 Q. But when you said you and your subordinates in giving

15:07:44 25 an example - I'm sorry, when you said you and your

26 subordinates who were you referring to when you said 'you'?

27 A. Benjamin Yeaten was the 'you' and the subordinate was
28 Sam Bockarie.

29 Q. Mr Witness, when I asked you if Sam Bockarie was in

1 communication with anyone outside of Sierra Leone you've
2 discussed some conversations with Benjamin Yeaten and you
3 also said that Sam Bockarie was in communication on a
4 satellite phone with Charles Taylor. How do you know that?

15:08:16 5 A. That was not any hidden thing, particularly with
6 regards to communication, that was not hidden to me
7 particularly because I was in charge. Once when Sam
8 Bockarie went to Liberia he brought a satellite phone, just
9 like a handset that people use, that security guards use.
15:08:34 10 That was what he communicated with always whenever he
11 wanted to talk to Charles Taylor. When he would want to
12 talk to Charles Taylor he would tell like me or the
13 operator who would be on duty to tell Sunlight because
14 Sunlight was the one who worked at Charles Taylor's radio
15:08:51 15 station, the Mansion Ground."

16 Now, that clearly suggests, Mr Taylor, that if not you,
17 then at least your director of the SSS, Benjamin Yeaten, had a
18 controlling influence over the Freetown invasion. Is that true?

19 A. That is not true. That is not true at all. No official in
15:09:22 20 my government had anything to do with any invasion in Freetown.
21 No, that's not true.

22 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the witness goes on and he's quite specific
23 that Yeaten told Bockarie to send reinforcements to Freetown when
24 Gullit was coming under suppression. What do you know about
15:09:50 25 that?

26 A. Nothing. I doubt if Benjamin Yeaten would have had to tell
27 an experienced person like - if the RUF was involved in an
28 invasion of Freetown, it would take somebody from Liberia to call
29 Sam Bockarie to say send reinforcement? Sam Bockarie as a

1 general would know what he's supposed to do if he's involved. He
2 would know.

3 Q. Now, it goes on on this same topic, page 16176 - no, I
4 should pick it up at the bottom of page 16175:

15:10:47 5 "He would say, 'Tell Sunlight that I want to talk to
6 Father', because we used to call him Father or Pa. So he
7 would say, 'I want to talk to Pa or Father.' So Sunlight
8 would tell Charles Taylor that Sam wants to talk to you,
9 and he would switch on the phone and call. At that time
15:11:02 10 Sam Bockarie would be on the stand-by. It was not any
11 secret. It was not hidden or that the satellite phone was
12 not there. No, he had it. He used to hang it on his pants
13 walking around with it. It was not hidden. And for
14 communications it was - I would either be present or not,
15:11:20 15 but I will know?

16 Q. At the time of the Freetown invasion, how do you know
17 he was - Sam Bockarie was in communication with a satellite
18 phone with Charles Taylor?

19 A. All along communication on the VHF went all other
15:11:44 20 commanders, but the satellite phone communication went on
21 directly to Charles Taylor. The night that the dialogue
22 took place - that was at the MP headquarters in Buedu - the
23 operator who was on duty, Tiger, Sam Bockarie told him to
24 tell Sunlight to tell his Pa that he wanted to talk to him,
15:12:03 25 and that is Charles Taylor, and that very night Tiger
26 passed a message to Sunlight. And where the satellite
27 would receive call radios up at the MP and Sam Bockarie
28 went into the vehicle and they went. Sam Bockarie, I said
29 he went into his vehicle that was having the mobile radio.

1 We referred to the radio at Planet 1. The base vehicle,
2 that was Marvel too was in a vehicle, and we went into that
3 vehicle. We and the - myself and the other operators and
4 some bodyguards, we went to the MP. That was where we were
15:12:46 5 the night when he called and this discussion took place."
6 And then he goes on:
7 "Q. Were you present when Sam Bockarie made this call?
8 A. I was present. I said I was up at the MP station,
9 because that is where there was the hill and that is where
15:13:07 10 the satellite got coverage.
11 Q. Now, who else was present in this particular instance
12 when Sam Bockarie made this satellite call, if you recall?
13 A. I was present, Tiger, who was on duty, was present,
14 Pascal who was with Planet 1, that is Sam Bockarie's
15:13:26 15 station, was there. His bodyguard Commander Foday too was
16 there."
17 Now, nothing could be clearer, Mr Taylor. It's the
18 clearest suggestion that on the night of the Freetown invasion,
19 you were in contact with Sam Bockarie on a satellite phone. What
15:13:50 20 do you say about that?
21 A. That's a total lie. A total, total falsehood. Nothing
22 could be further from the truth. I am busy. In 1998 December -
23 I have been fighting all 1998. We were just about to put into
24 place the 1996 agreement that was signed in Abidjan. All of us
15:14:23 25 are surprised by this situation in January of 1999. There are
26 calls all over the place, scrambling, trying to bring this here.
27 This boy's got me on the phone with Sam Bockarie carrying on
28 something that, it is very clear before this Court, that the RUF
29 was not involved with. So I don't know. Maybe this is how the -

1 these are some of the difficulties with this situation here. I
2 am not on the phone with Sam Bockarie talking about nothing,
3 about invasion, or anything at that time. No. It didn't happen.

4 Q. But the witness goes on, Mr Taylor, and he specifically
15:15:01 5 says - he refers to the content of the conversation. 16178:

6 "The day that the communication occurred between Buedu
7 station and King Perry in Freetown, it was that very night
8 that the communication took place.

9 Q. Do you know what was discussed in this communication?

15:15:23 10 A. The one that I heard Sam Bockarie tell Charles Taylor
11 was that our men had entered Freetown. They were advancing
12 and they'd even captured State House.

13 Q. Did you learn anything else about what was discussed?

14 A. He was just laughing while we were talking. He will
15:15:41 15 say, 'Yes, sir. Yes, sir.'

16 Q. Who was laughing?

17 A. Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie."
18 Mr Taylor, was that you?

19 A. No, it was not me, but let's remind the Court about
15:15:57 20 something now. There are other - you know, this is the funny
21 thing about this whole thing. Remember now - and I'm sure we can
22 find it - there are other witnesses that describe Sam Bockarie
23 dealing with satellite telephones and what he did when he was
24 about to talk, that Sam Bockarie always moved away from everybody
15:16:19 25 and spoke, now but he is there listening to everything. So
26 there's a difference now in how Sam Bockarie conducted himself in
27 dealing with satellite telephone, and that is part of the records
28 of this Court, that Sam Bockarie would move away from everybody
29 and you could hardly hear what he was saying. Now, here is a man

1 who was a little radio operator who was standing there and he's
2 listening to everything. I don't know what to - how to put this,
3 but it is blatantly, blatantly a fabrication and really a
4 consistent fabrication, as I have seen throughout this thing.

15:16:58 5 It's a lie. That's all it is.

6 Q. Now let's go on to another topic mentioned by this witness:

7 "Q. Do you know what would happen to the diamonds?"

8 Having described the mining operation in Kono.

9 "A. Yes, sometimes he used to travel to Liberia with those
10 diamonds..."

15:17:22

11 That's Issa. Issa Sesay would travel.

12 "... and at one time on his return he, Eddie Kanneh, Zigzag
13 Marzah, Sheku, Sidi bay and some other Liberian guys, they
14 came along with two white men. Those two white men had the

15:17:49

15 semblance of Lebanese. When they came on that day they
16 entered and brought out the diamonds, and he put everything
17 on the table and they sorted them out. They put all the
18 bigger ones one side and they arranged that parcel, and
19 those diamonds were given to Eddie, and he asked Eddie to
20 take them to Charles Taylor. He said after he would have
21 sold them, he would send FOC to go and collect the money.

15:18:09

22 But at that particular time when they came, it was only
23 Eddie and the white men who returned. And when they
24 returned, Sidi bay and others stayed for the Guinea mission.

15:18:30

25 They did not go with the others. So whilst we were on the
26 ground, FOC later went. When he went he was there, and he
27 later told us that he did not receive the money and that he
28 has not been able to see even Eddie.

29 Q. When you refer to 'he', who do you mean?

1 A. Issa.

2 Q. Now, how do you know he used to travel to Liberia?

3 A. Before Issa would go - in fact, we were all in the same
4 office and any time he would be going, he would take along
15:19:12 5 with him an operator. That was Elevator. He used to go
6 with him as far as Monrovia up to the Mansion Ground, and
7 at any time the operator returned, he would give me his
8 report.

9 Q. Do you have any information as to what Issa would do
15:19:29 10 with the diamonds in Liberia?

11 A. Yes, he said he used to take them to Charles Taylor,
12 and I will give you an example. At one time there was a
13 boy, a commander. Because he was a commander at Tongo, we
14 used to him Verbatim. He got one 36-carat diamond, an
15:19:54 15 operator at Tongo, and that commander called the station at
16 Small Lebanon in Kono. They asked for Issa. We told him
17 Issa was not around and we asked what the matter was. They
18 said they had got a diamond which was about 36 carats. So
19 that particular morning we called Sunlight in Monrovia, and
15:20:11 20 at that time Issa was in Monrovia. We wanted to know if
21 Issa had moved and whether he was still there. So Sunlight
22 told us that Issa had already left. And we called Mortiga
23 at Foya for us to find out whether Issa had arrived there.
24 He said Sunlight had told him that they had already left,
15:20:32 25 but they had not yet arrived there. So we passed the
26 message on to Mortiga that when Issa arrives there, he
27 should report to him that 36-carat diamond had been
28 collected in Tongo. But we did not know that Benjamin
29 Yeaten was present in the office when the message went, so

1 he transmitted the message to Charles Taylor. So before
2 Issa could arrive at Foya, the message had already reached
3 there that on his arrival he should take the diamond to
4 Charles Taylor, and that was the message that Benjamin
15:21:07 5 Yeaten told him. When Issa went and collected the diamond
6 at Small Lebanon in Kono, he was very angry. He asked why
7 we went the message there. Why didn't we wait for him to
8 come? He said even a 52-carat diamond he had taken to
9 Charles Taylor, he had not paid at all. He had not
15:21:30 10 received all the money. He said now we have sent an
11 information that has warranted him knowing about this
12 particular one again, and that very night he collected the
13 diamond and moved it, and that was the reason why I said
14 the diamonds that Issa used to collect, he took them there.

15:21:55 15 Q. Okay, Mr Witness, before you - I asked you some
16 questions earlier. You were discussing an episode involving
17 Eddie Kanneh, Zigzag Marzah, Sheku, Sidi bay, and some
18 Liberian guys, along with these two white men. The
19 incident you were describing with these two white men, do
15:22:11 20 you know approximately when this was?

21 A. That incident took place before the attack, the first
22 attack in Guinea. Because at that time some men came that
23 was the mission that they came with, Sidi bay, Zigzag
24 Marzah, Sheku. They came for that Guinea mission that they
15:22:26 25 went on. So when they came, they stayed on the ground.

26 They stayed to do the arrangement with regards the attack
27 on Guinea and Eddie Kanneh, and the two white men returned.

28 Q. You said in your answer when you were discussing this
29 incident with these two white men - you said that when they

1 came on that day, he entered and brought out the diamonds
2 and he put everything on the table, and they sorted them
3 out, and they put all the bigger ones to one side, and they
4 arranged the parcel and those diamonds were given to Eddie,
15:22:56 5 and he asked Eddie to take them to Charles Taylor.
6 Mr Witness, earlier I asked you to try to call out names
7 when you're giving your answer. When they came on that
8 day, they - when you're referring to 'they' who are you
9 referring to?
15:23:16 10 A. Eddie Kanneh, the white men and Sidi bay and others.
11 When they came, Issa went to his room and brought out the
12 diamonds."
13 And then he goes on to deal with how they were sorting them
14 out. Now, there's a lot there, Mr Taylor. Do you know someone
15:23:39 15 called Sheku?
16 A. No, I don't know Sheku.
17 Q. Sidi bay?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Do you know of a visit to Sierra Leone involving Eddie
15:23:51 20 Kanneh, Zigzag Marzah, Sheku, Sidi bay and two white men, probably
21 Lebanese?
22 A. No, I don't. I don't know about it. Nothing. I don't
23 know anything about it.
24 Q. Now, we had mention of two white men visiting Kono earlier
15:24:08 25 today?
26 A. Yes, that is correct.
27 Q. Looking at the equipment with a view to making the mining
28 there more efficient, yes?
29 A. That is correct, yes.

1 Q. Now, although this account is different, it's the reference
2 to the two white men. Mr Taylor, did you send them?

3 A. I did not send any white men to Sierra Leone. None. None
4 whatsoever.

15:24:30 5 Q. And Eddie Kanneh. Did you ever have any dealings with
6 Eddie Kanneh over diamonds?

7 A. No, never.

8 Q. Now, that long account which the witness gave about that
9 36-carat diamond and Issa Sesay's reaction when Issa, in
10 particular, said:

11 "Even a 52-carat diamond he had taken to Charles Taylor, he
12 had not paid for all. He had not received all the money."

13 Which appears to suggest that effectively you swindled Issa
14 Sesay out of the money for a 52-carat diamond?

15:25:19 15 A. Yes, that's what he's suggesting. That's what he's
16 suggesting.

17 Q. And that as soon as - and I use this word quite
18 deliberately - your henchman Benjamin Yeaten heard about this
19 36-carat diamond, you wanted to get your mitts on it. You wanted
20 to get hold of it. Mr Taylor, what do you say about these
21 allegations?

22 A. I mean, they are just - what word can I use? They are just
23 beyond my thinking of description. These are blatant, blatant,
24 blatant, orchestrated fabrications. You know, although you say
15:26:06 25 it's different, but we're talking about accounting for two white
26 men. One witness comes before this Court and he says that I'm
27 supposed to send two white men, they go, and the only thing they
28 do, they take pictures and they leave. Another witness comes,
29 and they have constructed the white men thing. Now this witness

1 talks about two white men. If we're assuming that we're talking
2 about the same two white men, now they're involved in more than
3 taking pictures. They are involved in sorting diamonds and
4 different things. If two witnesses saw these men, observed them
15:26:46 5 and their actions, how can one describe one - these white men,
6 one say they only took pictures and left and said that we'll hear
7 from them later, but the other witness, who saw the identical
8 thing, can describe a situation where these men are involved in
9 diamonds spreading out of the table. How come this first witness
15:27:07 10 did not see this if he was supposed to be there to see these
11 people taking pictures taking pictures and leaving? So, you
12 know, I don't know how these people do this - I don't know how
13 they get it together this way. But I'm sure by the grace of God
14 before this defence is over there will be a lot that this Bench
15:27:25 15 will get to see and know about witnesses that will appear before
16 - these things are - this is a well, well constructed set of
17 lies. And because they are lies, everybody cannot hold fast to
18 his end of the lie. Two people go, see one man. One said the
19 other man only took pictures and the other man said no, he had
15:27:50 20 diamonds spread out and different things. Then he goes into 36
21 carat and 52 carats. I never received any carats of diamond from
22 no Issa Sesay, never. Or Eddie Kanneh.

23 Q. But, Mr Taylor, in this particular instance look at the
24 detail which the witness gives about the trip, calling Sunlight,
15:28:20 25 first of all, then Mortiga to so if Issa had reached there,
26 Benjamin Yeaten intercepting the call, all of this. What are you
27 suggesting, that all of that is a fabrication?

28 A. But he is in Sierra Leone, and the first thing here - you
29 hear about it, he's talking about Sun - this man assumes that

1 Sunlight, there's one human being at the presidency of Liberia
2 receiving calls 24 hours a day that the radio is going on.
3 Everything is Sunlight, Sunlight, Sunlight. Surely he must not
4 know what he's talking about. There are many operators at the
15:28:58 5 place. So is he calling everybody Sunlight? So I mean really -
6 I mean, they had better construct their lies than this. Lies are
7 constructed, so details of lies, once it's untangled, somebody
8 else will come and give a totally different - and there are so
9 many people mentioned here. He's talking about people that he
15:29:17 10 has involved in this lie, I mean, which are not true that
11 Sunlight called and what - yes, he knows people. But, look, the
12 fact of the matter is I don't care how many tales you put to
13 this, the most important part of this, from what I see, are about
14 three or four details: One, that two white men were supposed to
15:29:39 15 go, sent by me. That never happened. Now, all the time Lebanese
16 - they said they looked like Lebanese - he doesn't know Lebanese.
17 All the Lebanese that have been in Sierra Leone over the years,
18 they have been in Kono. They have been living there. Now he
19 says they looked like Lebanese. He doesn't know Lebanese? He
15:29:58 20 knows that Lebanese practically live upcountry, not just in
21 Freetown. He knows that from evidence before this Court. He
22 knows that. So these other names, Mortiga and different things,
23 doesn't mean anything to me. That's the first instance. The
24 second important thing that I see in this thing here, the two
15:30:15 25 accusations, he talks about a 36-carat and a 52-carat diamond
26 that was supposed to be given me by Issa Sesay, and Issa Sesay
27 gets upset and he talks about it, which is a lie. And we will
28 find out that it's a lie.
29 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, on the topic of these two white men, the

1 witness did indeed go on to say this, page 16190:

2 "Q. Do you have any information as to why these two white
3 men were present at this time?

15:30:57

4 A. I do not actually know, because we were surprised. I
5 in particular. Because during those times it was difficult
6 to see a white man amongst us, because the Lebanese and all
7 other whites had run away from us. They had escaped. So I
8 was very much surprised to see white men in our midst at
9 that particular time. So I did not actually know what
10 their mission was, what they came for.

15:31:17

11 Q. Do you know the names of any these white men?

12 A. What? Those who were in Kenema with Sam Bockarie, what
13 they said? Because at that time one of the boys who was
14 with him in Kenema was present, he called Mohamed. He told
15 me one of them was called Michel."

15:31:45

16 What is that? Why the groan?

17 A. I see where this lie is coming from.

18 Q. Why the groan, Mr Taylor?

19 A. I see where the lie is coming from by the use of "Michel".

15:32:02

20 Q. Why?

21 A. I can construct - I see where the lie is coming from now.

22 Q. Where is it coming from?

23 A. Well, we do have a document that was presented by the OTP
24 of a business partner of Foday Sankoh called Michel in those

15:32:16

25 documents we have from the OTP. I see how the construct is
26 coming about, which blatantly is a lie. This is a Michel that
27 writes Foday Sankoh a note talking about diamonds and their
28 dealings with diamonds in Belgium and so forth. Now, this little
29 boy here now is pumped up now with this lie that I'm sure we will

1 confront. This Michel that he mentions, no relationship to me.
2 This is Foday Sankoh's what do you call it that we have documents
3 from the OTP, and this lie spread across the world, and we will
4 get to it.

15:32:59 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want us to make a mental note, okay?

6 A. Yes, yes.

7 Q. Page 16190 in the evidence of Mohamed Kabbah, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. We have this mention of somebody involved in diamond
15:33:34 10 dealing called Michel?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Please remember that.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "He said he was Sam Bockarie's friend at the time they were
15:33:51 15 in Freetown." Now we're going to leave that point for now, but
16 we will come back to it, won't we, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Let's go on and deal with another topic. Page 16264 of the
19 transcript for 15 September 2008:

15:34:40 20 "Q. So you're in a position to help me with what was going
21 in that movement from early 1992 until 2002, aren't you?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, I want to ask you about one or two events during
24 that decade long period and see if you can help me. Do you
15:35:02 25 recall in May 1992 a message from Charles Taylor addressed
26 to one Anthony Mekuagbe to evacuate all NPL troops from
27 Sierra Leone?

28 A. Yes, yes.

29 Q. Now taking things slowly, Anthony Mekuagbe is who - or

1 was who at that time?

2 A. Anthony Mekunagbe was one of the generals that was in
3 charge of the troops in Sierra Leone, the NPFL.

15:35:44

4 Q. And you recall, don't you, that Charles Taylor's code
5 name Ebony was, through that message, ordering all Liberian
6 troops out of Sierra Leone?

15:36:03

7 A. To say that I monitored a message, at that time I was
8 not on the set so I cannot say that I monitored it. But I
9 came to Pendembu, and there I was when a truck came and
10 said that President Taylor said that all his men should go
11 because of the problems they had started causing. I heard
12 about that. But to say that I was on the set when the
13 message came, I did not hear about that. I saw the message
14 that came - the truck that came for these people.

15:36:25

15 Q. But in any event, and I appreciate what you're telling
16 me, Mr Kabbah, and I'm not suggesting that you personally
17 received that message. That's not my case at all. But you
18 certainly heard about that message, didn't you?

15:36:45

19 A. I heard about it. I heard about and I saw that truck
20 that came for them."

21 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

15:37:05

22 A. What part of it? Well, there's just so many - it's a mixed
23 bag here. There's some truth, there's some half truths. So if I
24 want to put this in a short focus, I ordered all of my people out
25 of Sierra Leone in May. Now, I did not get on any radio and
26 announce any order, so he's telling the truth when he says he
27 didn't hear it. Yes, that's good of him, because I didn't get on
28 the radio, so he could not have heard me, so that part is true.
29 As to whether that order was to Mekunagbe, that order was not to

1 Mekunagbe. That order - the general that went to withdraw the
2 men was General Dopoe Menkarzon that went to withdraw the men, so
3 that's wrong. So it's a mixed bag of some truth and some not
4 whatyamacallit, but we did withdraw our people with General
15:37:53 5 Menkarzon, and that order came from me.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: This was May of which year?

7 THE WITNESS: That was May of 1992, your Honour. This is
8 after the famous Top 20, Top 40, Top Final. That's when the
9 withdrawal occurs.

15:39:14 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Page 16385, 16 September 2008:

12 "Q. Sometimes during the war in Sierra Leone when there
13 were media reports on the radio and in the newspaper that
14 Charles Taylor had sent soldiers into Liberia, soldiers
15:39:32 15 into Sierra Leone, often times that was because there were
16 some Liberians who had chosen to fight with the RUF, would
17 you agree?

18 A. Yes, Liberians were there and so if they said Liberians
19 were amongst us they were not lying, they were amongst us.

15:39:50 20 Q. But it didn't mean that Charles Taylor had sent them,
21 did it?

22 A. He sent them. It is just like when you have a child, a
23 child that is not guided well, if you send that child on a
24 mission sometimes they will go and do something that you
15:40:03 25 did not actually send them to do. Those are the type of
26 children. They were wayward soldiers."

27 Now, yes or no, Mr Taylor, did you send Liberian fighters
28 into Sierra Leone?

29 A. It's very difficult to say yes or no because it is yes and

1 no. Yes in dealing with the period between 1991 August to 1992
2 May, and it is no at any other time. So it is both yes and no.
3 But that's why time - being time specific that he's not talking
4 about that. If he's talking about this period of the withdrawal,
15:40:53 5 then it is yes. But it is yes and no.

6 Q. Right. That's all I want to ask you about that witness,
7 Mr Taylor. So let's move on. Now, Mr Taylor, we are now going
8 to move on to deal with another witness. But, again, we need to
9 proceed with care. Do you follow me?

15:43:48 10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. No names.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. Now, this witness, TF1-274, gave evidence in December 2008,
14 okay? Now, General D-E-G-B-O-N, who is that?

15:44:35 15 A. General Degbon was a Special Force.

16 Q. Is that the same - this is page 21318 of the transcript, by
17 the way. Now, is that the same individual as the person referred
18 to as General Devon, D-E-V-O-N, by another witness we looked at?

19 A. I would say that he's talking about the - not speaking for
15:45:06 20 that witness. He could be talking about the same person.

21 Actually, the man's name is General Yegbeh Degbon, okay. He
22 called it Devon. He could be talking about the same person.

23 Q. Help me. How many generals were there in the NPFL with a
24 similar name?

15:45:34 25 A. None. None. This is Degbon. Yegbeh Degbon, one of the
26 Special Forces.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: So is he one and the same person, is that
28 your evidence?

29 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Now, this witness accepted that General Degbon was a member
3 of the Special Forces and then he speaks of someone called One
4 Man One. Who's that?

15:46:17 5 A. I didn't know him.

6 Q. Did General Degbon have a nickname?

7 A. Well, a nickname? No, I don't know of his nickname.

8 Q. Or did he have a code name?

9 A. He did have a code name, but forgive me, I can't help. I
10 don't remember. I don't remember it. He did have a code name.

11 Q. Well, listen to what the witness had to said:

12 "Q. Okay, I'm asking you just about General Degbon.

13 A. Yes, that is what I am describing. He had a code name
14 Energy. He was code named Energy."

15:47:11 15 Ring any bells, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, I think that was Degbon. Yeah, that's Degbon's code
17 name, Energy, yeah, but he was Minister of Lands, Mines and
18 Energy. Yes, I have no reason to doubt that that is it.

19 Q. When was he Minister of Lands, Mines and Energy?

15:47:36 20 A. That is during the wartime, our government behind the line,
21 not when I was elected. That was around - we're talking about -
22 this is around 1991.

23 Q. Now, the witness goes on to deal with Black Kadaffa,
24 Mr Taylor.

15:48:18 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And this is at page 21324 of the transcript for 1 December
27 2008:

28 "Q. You said that the Black Kadaffa unit was 90 per cent
29 Sierra Leonean. Approximately 90 per cent Sierra Leonean.

1 Is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, the Special Force unit, do you know the
4 composition of this unit in terms of its nationality?

15:48:48 5 A. They were purely Liberians.

6 Q. You also referred to the Zimbabwe unit. Can you
7 explain anything you know about this unit?

8 A. Yes, they were combatants. And that was one of the
9 groups from which reinforcements used to come from to go

15:49:07 10 and fight in Sierra Leone, to reinforce the RUF to fight in
11 Sierra Leone.

12 Q. Do you know who was in charge of this unit?

13 A. I do not know the commanders exactly who were in charge
14 of those units.

15:49:22 15 Q. And you also referred to a Scorpion unit?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Again, can you explain what you know about this unit?

18 A. The Scorpion unit also was one of the fighting units
19 that used to go and reinforce us in Sierra Leone, as a
15:49:42 20 reinforcement to fight against the Sierra Leone Army, and
21 most of them were Liberians.

22 Q. Were some others non-Liberians?

23 A. I wouldn't recall that, whether there were others who
24 were not Liberians, because I did not actually come across
15:49:58 25 them directly face-to-face. But with my interaction with
26 them I can say most of them were Liberian.

27 Q. You mentioned three units, the Zimbabwe unit, the
28 Scorpion unit and the Special Task Force unit. Do you know
29 where these units were based?

1 A. Well, I do not know the exact base where those units
2 were, all of them.

3 Q. And do you know who sent these units into Sierra Leone?

15:50:28

4 A. The units, sometimes we would be in the station when
5 General Degbon would come and call for reinforcement, say
6 from, like - there was another unit called SS Cobra, yeah,
7 SS Cobra, and the other one Zimbabwe that was - that
8 happened more when the enemies pressured us on the front
9 lines and One Man One would Degbon and Degbon will give

15:50:57

10 instruction or he would discuss with some of his other
11 colleague commanders from the various areas to coordinate
12 their efforts so that - sometimes he would in fact send
13 message to Ebony, that was Mr Charles Taylor, and he was
14 the commander-in-chief, saying that he needed

15:51:15

15 reinforcements to reinforce him on the front line because
16 of enemy threats."

17 Now, taking things in stages, have you heard of the
18 Zimbabwe unit, Mr Taylor?

15:51:28

19 A. No, I haven't. There was no such unit called Zimbabwe that
20 I know of, no.

21 Q. Did you know of the Scorpion unit?

22 A. No, I did not know of the Scorpion unit.

23 Q. Have you heard of the Special Task Force unit?

24 A. Yes, I have. There was a Special Task Force unit.

15:51:44

25 Q. Where do you know about them from?

26 A. The Special Task Force unit was mostly the police unit that
27 was put together to help to police, along with the MP, unruly
28 soldiers, so there was a task force. We called them the task
29 force. When there was a problem with soldiers and civilians,

1 either the MPs or the task force would go there and quell it,
2 yeah.

3 Q. Right. So we've heard that name before, have we not,
4 Special Task Force, in relation to Sierra Leone?

15:52:25 5 A. Yes, yes. I've heard that.

6 Q. Are you talking about the same STF?

7 A. No, no, no. No, that's a different thing. The STF in
8 Sierra Leone is different, no. This task force is a police unit
9 that is policing. And the time that we're talking about here, I
10 don't know if it's mentioned, but he cannot be talking about -
11 because I hear him talking about Yegbeh Degbon, so he cannot be
12 talking about any time beyond 1991. So this is early - the early
13 part of the NPFL activities.

14 Q. Now, what he speaks about here of contact being sent to
15:53:16 15 you, Ebony, Charles Taylor, requesting reinforcements, do you
16 recall such contact?

17 A. No. The procedure used in the NPFL is so different. Maybe
18 that's how they got it wrong. If somebody needed reinforcement
19 in the field, he doesn't call the officer commanding. There are
20 senior regional generals, he's going to call me? And at this
21 particular time in question, I'm way in Buchanan. I'm living in
22 Buchanan by this time of this situation. I haven't moved to
23 Gbarnga. I don't move to Gbarnga until the middle of 1991. So
24 all these generals in the field, many of them, all of my Special
15:54:07 25 Forces, training bases all over the place, somebody in the field
26 will call me in Buchanan to say, "I need reinforcement"? That's
27 not the way our organisation operated.

28 In fact, no general in the field, none of them in the NPFL
29 could call me. None of them could get on the radio or anything

1 to call me. They would know better than being in the field and
2 calling me for something that they can call a senior commander.
3 Maybe they are used to the way their organisation ran, but the
4 NPFL didn't run this way. Even if there was something that had
15:54:49 5 to reach to me, it would go through channels before it would
6 reach to me. So that's not true.

7 Q. Okay. Does the name Dixon Wolo mean anything to you,
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. No, I don't know Dixon.

15:55:31 10 Q. He was supposed to be a Liberian commanding Sierra Leoneans
11 in Sierra Leone, Dixon Wolo?

12 A. No, this is a Liberian name. This is not a Sierra Leonean
13 name. I don't dispute that there is a Dixon Wolo, but I do not
14 know him. He's not one of my Special Forces, so most of these
15:55:56 15 people I wouldn't know them by their names or what, no.

16 Q. Very well. Now at page 21329 of the transcript from 1
17 December 2008 we find this:

18 "Q. Okay. Then you said in your answer before Degbon
19 would give instruction or he would discuss with some of his
15:56:37 20 other colleague commanders from various areas. When you
21 said Degbon would give instructions, who would he give
22 instructions to?

23 A. He would call some other radio stations and he will
24 send instructions, saying that they should send
15:56:53 25 reinforcements immediately and those were the immediate
26 areas not too far from our own areas. And he would contact
27 some of his other colleagues in the Special Forces who were
28 in charge of those units whom I have said before that I did
29 not know their names. They are the ones that he would

1 contact and explain to them that they were under pressure
2 and that they should try and reinforce. The moment
3 Mr Taylor came in - that was if there was a delay in
4 receiving the reinforcement - at that time he would
15:57:33 5 directly call the commander-in-chief, Mr Taylor, who was
6 commonly known as Ebony, Degbon. Degbon would call
7 Mr Taylor, the commander in chief, for him to make it
8 possible to tell the other men to rush in, sending the
9 reinforcements for him on the front lines.

15:57:50 10 Q. Okay. So then later on in the same answer you said
11 'sometimes they sent message to Ebony', that is
12 Mr Charles Taylor. Who sent message to Ebony? When you
13 say 'they', who are you referring to?

14 A. General Degbon. Sometimes Anthony Mekunagbe, Dry
15:58:10 15 Pepe, also known as Dry Pepper.

16 Q. And then you said, 'and he was the commander in chief,
17 saying that he needed reinforcements'.

18 A. I did say that General Degbon used to send message to
19 the commander-in-chief, Mr Taylor. That is what exactly I
15:58:28 20 am trying to say here in this case."

21 Now, what he appears to be suggesting there, Mr Taylor,
22 that you had resorted to where contact had been made with other
23 commanders, that hasn't resulted in the necessary movements, and
24 so then you would be brought in. Isn't that how it worked?

15:58:51 25 A. No, that's not how it worked. There were so many other
26 people you would have to go through. Besides the chief of staff
27 you would have to go through the defence minister at that
28 particular time, Tom Woweiyu. But he makes another very - I can
29 see he makes serious mistake here. Look, I see what they did

1 here. The name Ebony, the name - this code name Ebony that
2 they're using so, they missed it. Because while "Ebony" is used
3 at a particular period, this was not a name that stayed in place.
4 The code name - my code sign - once we knew that enemy and other
15:59:29 5 people - so there was Ebony, there was 047. There were so many -
6 I'm sure if we can get one of the radio operators here, they
7 would know. No, my code name did not remain stable to say that
8 throughout the years 1990 and 1991 I'm called Ebony. No, no, no,
9 no, no, no, no. No. I don't know how it works in other
15:59:51 10 countries, but you do not keep the code sign of the President or
11 the leader in our time - it changed very frequently. A question
12 was asked here, you know, to me and I said yes, I was called
13 Ebony, but this did not stay into place. It changed several
14 times. I can say - I can say over the years this code name
16:00:13 15 probably changed about two or three times a year. It would be
16 called different things, because you didn't want the enemy to
17 identify the code of the leader. So at this particular time,
18 number one, he's wrong, I'm not called Ebony at this time. We
19 have moved to 047, and the fact that the procedure that he
16:00:35 20 outlines here is not the procedure. It would not get to me. If
21 anybody would get to me to tell me about a problem in the field,
22 it would either be the chief of staff or the defence minister
23 would come ask tell me, but I would not intervene and do anything
24 in the field like that.

16:00:52 25 Q. But this witness actually says, Mr Taylor, at page 21348
26 line 26:
27 "I was in a radio room at another time when General Degbon
28 sent a radio message to Ebony for him to send reinforcement
29 for the enemies not to overrun the NPFL/RUF fighters on the

1 front line towards Sierra Leone. And the message - we saw
2 the reinforcement come. Within four to five days' time the
3 reinforcement came from different areas."

4 So he's actually in the room.

16:01:36 5 A. This man - assuming he is a stranger - is a foreigner, he's
6 in there, and he said earlier that 90 per cent of their unit, I
7 think, is supposed to be Sierra Leonean, Black Kadaffa. He's in
8 the radio room with General Degbon calling me to tell me - or
9 sending a message to me. If he says that General Degbon sent a

16:02:00 10 message, I can understand that General Degbon would probably call
11 the chief of staff or the minister of defence and say well, you
12 know, try to get this information to the leader. I was not
13 called President then, I was called the leader. So that is a
14 possibility. But General Degbon would not get to me. And if a

16:02:22 15 message got to me about any difficulties in the field, it would
16 come through the chief of staff or the defence minister.

17 Q. Now, there's something that I'm struggling to understand,
18 Mr Taylor, and perhaps you can help me. Ebony, was that a code
19 name for you, or was it a code name for a radio station used by
16:02:45 20 you, the leader?

21 A. No, Ebony was a code sign for me.

22 Q. Personally?

23 A. Personally, yes.

24 Q. So where the witness says, "I was in a radio room at
16:03:03 25 another time when General Degbon sent a radio message to Ebony
26 for him to send reinforcements", that's not talking about a
27 message going through a radio operator; it's coming directly to
28 you?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Now, did you used to sit by the radio manning it,
2 Mr Taylor?

3 A. No, no. The radio would be far from me. It would be far
4 from me. At least in another building close to where I reside
16:03:35 5 and with a whole staff down there. No, that would not happen.

6 Q. Because you've told us earlier about your radio operator,
7 Butterfly?

8 A. That is Butterfly, yes.

9 Q. What was Butterfly there for if people could call you
16:03:54 10 directly?

11 A. Nobody in the NPFL like that could get on a radio and call
12 me directly because I was not present at a radio, no.

13 Q. Now, again he says that he was in the radio room at one
14 point in time when a message came from the front line, the
16:04:41 15 Pujehun area, to Degbon, that the enemies, that is the government
16 troops, the Sierra Leone government troops, had crossed the
17 bridge again and that they were advancing. They had come past Bo
18 Waterside and they were advancing towards the Wangeko area,

19 "... and I was there when General Degbon sent that message
16:05:07 20 to Ebony. I was there when he sent the message to Ebony.

21 Q. Where were you?

22 A. Bomi Hills. Bomi Hills in the radio station.

23 Q. So how were you able to hear this message?

24 A. The message, he went there and told Demmy that Demmy
16:05:27 25 should send so and so message to explain that this was the
26 situation, and the message itself would be written by Demmy
27 and General Degbon will write - sign it, because we had a
28 message logbook where we kept records of all messages. So
29 any operator whosoever entered the radio room, you will

1 turn the pages of the logbook and you will familiarise
2 yourself with the updates of the day."

3 Do you recall such an incident?

4 A. No, but am I right in saying that this witness now is
16:05:59 5 working with the NPFL? Because he's in this radio - is he
6 speaking - I need some help here. I don't know if he's talking
7 about what's happening in Sierra Leone, or is he working in an
8 NPFL radio station in Liberia?

9 Q. Well he, says:

16:06:22 10 "Q. Where were you?

11 A. Bomi Hills. Bomi Hills in the radio station."

12 A. Well, then this is a strange thing. I can't see how -
13 well, if we look at this thing in the full context, I would have
14 to say the following: One, if we look at the group that he talks
16:06:43 15 here about earlier, the Black Kaddafi; and we look at the fact
16 that he says that about 90 per cent of this Black Kaddafi group
17 with Degbon, okay, are Sierra Leoneans; and we look at the extent
18 of the communication between General Degbon, and knowing what's
19 happened in Sierra Leone, this adds even more to my understanding
16:07:16 20 of the whole activities of Black Kaddafi, because I can see now
21 that this is - we were right all along about Black Kaddafi, and
22 this is because of the very Black Kaddafi and his dealing across
23 the border and trying to use Sierra Leoneans and a few Liberians
24 in their counterattack against me with this Black Kaddafi that
16:07:41 25 got him court-martialled, found guilty and executed.

26 So the details that he's giving here, I'm not sure if I can
27 cast all of it as being wrong, because he's giving information
28 here that I have no knowledge of but could be, in a way, factual
29 about Degbon dealing with the Black Kaddafi and what all, because

1 some of this information came by our way when we got to find out
2 exactly - why would you have a group in Liberia as a general of
3 the NPFL working their way all the way near Kakata with 90 per
4 cent Sierra Leoneans trying to move against the leadership of the
16:08:24 5 NPFL? So I can't understand what he's saying here without
6 knowing that it is - no, I think he's giving a lot of information
7 here that I'm not aware of and I wouldn't knock down because it
8 is because of the activities of Black Kaddafi and what they were
9 up to that caused General Degbon and Oliver Varney and rest of
16:08:47 10 them to be tried by court martial board and executed.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help me with this. Your account is that
12 Black Kaddafi was this anti-Taylor group formed in Libya who
13 connived with Foday Sankoh to launch the RUF into Sierra Leone?

14 A. No, no. You are almost right. I'm not saying it was a
16:09:15 15 group that was formed in Libya. It was not formed. There was a
16 group in Libya that had made this organisation. Black Kaddafi
17 was formed on the ground in Liberia following our - this is
18 around 1991 - to carry out the plan that had been constructed in
19 Libya, okay. So you're right about that.

16:09:36 20 Q. I'm grateful for the explanation, but help me with this:
21 If this invasion of Sierra Leone orchestrated by the General
22 Degbons from within the NPFL, this witness appears to be
23 suggesting that you were involved, that you knew about this, that
24 you were being kept in touch with developments at the front?

16:10:06 25 A. But that was not - that is totally wrong. The mere fact
26 that here I'm learning that here is a Sierra Leonean involved in
27 an NPFL radio room, I can see Degbon, then were - they were deep
28 into this. And why under God's heaven would I organise a group,
29 place Special Forces in charge of the group and then have them

1 court-martialled? He doesn't know what he's talking about.

2 And the fact that General Degbon gets on the radio and says
3 he is passing a message to Ebony, which at this time there is not
4 an Ebony - but, I mean, how sure is he that this message is even
16:10:50 5 getting to me? How sure is he? So you're an operator in a room
6 and General Degbon say, "Oh, I'm passing the information" -

7 because these boys played a lot of tricks. Ammunition that had
8 been captured for the NPFL that was given to Degbon to carry from
9 point to point to Kakata, we get to find out he is stashing it
16:11:09 10 away from the counter-operation. So a lot of this - I don't know
11 if this is radio simulation. By that I mean, you know, you're
12 making a call and informing operators that you're trying to get
13 in contact with the leader and you're planning something.

14 But Degbon then confessed that, in fact, they were doing
16:11:27 15 this and they asked to be pardoned but they were soldiers and
16 they were not. They planned this. That unit, Black Kadaffa, was
17 never put together by me. It was never authorised by me as the
18 leader. And following their arrest, their trial and execution,
19 Black Kadaffa never existed any more. So he does not know what
16:11:50 20 he is talking about. He doesn't.

21 Q. Mr Taylor, at the time of this court martial, were you
22 aware of the composition of Black Kadaffa as suggested by this
23 witness; 90 per cent Sierra Leoneans?

24 A. No, not 90. We heard that the majority of them were Sierra
16:12:16 25 Leonean, but I couldn't assign - we didn't know the percentage of
26 90 could be applied. I was thinking more like maybe 60, 65 per
27 cent, but not 90.

28 Q. Now, furthermore, following the execution of Degbon and
29 others, what happened to those Sierra Leoneans, the 90 per cent

1 of Black Kadaffa that this witness is talking about? What
2 happened to them?

3 A. When Degbon and these people were arrested, everybody
4 vanished. Everybody vanished out of Liberia. Apparently they
16:12:54 5 all went back and they were in - they all vanished. We picked up
6 the commanders for investigation. And as soon as we picked up
7 the principal commanders for investigation, everybody vanished.
8 Everybody vanished. We did not catch any of them. But we knew
9 that Sierra Leoneans were involved with them.

16:13:17 10 Q. And did you hear anything further about Black Kadaffa after
11 that?

12 A. None. Black Kadaffa died. Nobody could even mention Black
13 Kadaffa.

14 Q. Another matter, Mr Taylor. Does the word "Treetop" mean
16:13:37 15 anything to you?

16 A. Yes. Treetop, yes.

17 Q. What does it mean?

18 A. Treetop, to the best of my recollection - Treetop was a
19 radio - the principal - I think one of the principal radio posts
16:14:04 20 in Gbarnga, if I'm not mistaken, was called Treetop.

21 Q. The principal radio post?

22 A. Principal radio post in Gbarnga, yeah, I think was called
23 Treetop. There were about three, four, five radio posts in
24 Gbarnga, but one of them - I think the principal one was called
16:14:31 25 Treetop.

26 Q. Now, in relation to that phrase Treetop, the witness said
27 at page 21342, and I invite your comment, line 4:

28 "Q. When you say 'control station', what do you mean when
29 you say the phrase 'control station'?

1 A. Control station, like Treetop at that time was the
2 control station. Treetop was Mr Taylor's radio station.
3 One operator whom I can recall now that I used to
4 communicate with most often was Butterfly at Treetop.

16:15:13 5 Q. Before you give an example, what is a control station?
6 Just define it.

7 A. A control station was the station which had authority
8 over all the other radio stations in the movement, that is
9 the NPFL movement at that time.

16:15:30 10 Q. So at the time you were based in Bomi Hills during the
11 course of your training, do you know where the control
12 station for the NPFL was?

13 A. To the best of my knowledge it was in Gbarnga."
14 Now, is that accurate?

16:15:46 15 A. No, that's not accurate. That's not accurate.

16 Q. What's inaccurate about it?

17 A. The control stations are located wherever the leader is.

18 So it's not - when I was in Buchanan, the control station was in
19 Buchanan. When I moved to Harbel, the control station moved to

16:16:11 20 Harbel. So it's nothing stationary. When I moved to Gbarnga, it
21 would move to Gbarnga. And what that station is - they tell you
22 Charles Taylor, Charles Taylor, Charles Taylor. My operator for
23 me is Butterfly. There are about five radio stations in Gbarnga.

24 The reason why there is a control station, if, for example, while
16:16:35 25 in Gbarnga there is an order that would go out directly, let's
26 say, to the chief of staff or a message from me to any senior
27 official, once that message comes through, it will be given to
28 the station in Gbarnga and they would know it's coming. So
29 Treetop was not a code assigned to a radio in particular place,

1 but wherever the leader was, that ordinary station became
2 Treetop. So it changed.

3 Q. So was Treetop the name assigned to the control station for
4 you wherever it was located?

16:17:22 5 A. No, it's the control station for the NPFL wherever - it's
6 the control station of the NPFL but would be based in whatever
7 city I am residing in.

8 Q. Yes?

9 A. Yes.

16:17:36 10 Q. But did the name Treetop remain constant? Was it always
11 called Treetop?

12 A. Yes, it was always called Treetop.

13 Q. Whether it was Buchanan, whether it was in Kakata, whether
14 it was in Gbarnga, it was always called Treetop?

16:17:54 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And wherever it was located, your radio operator located
17 there was Butterfly?

18 A. No, no, no, no. My radio operator would not be located
19 where Treetop is. My radio station, Butterfly would be located

16:18:14 20 within the same compound. Treetop would be located at the
21 ministry - where the Ministry of Defence was. This is what makes
22 it the control. It would be located at the Ministry of Defence.

23 And whatever city I moved in, wherever the minister would live,
24 the defence establishment would establish an office in that city.

16:18:35 25 Then Treetop would be set up at the defence as the control
26 station. You understand me?

27 Q. I'm not quite sure, Mr Taylor. I'm sure it's my fault.

28 A. Okay, let me go through it. Treetop is the control station
29 that is attached to the Ministry of Defence that controls all of

1 the operations around the country.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. Because we are a movement, we are moving from city to city.

4 When I move, for example, from Gborplay to Tappita, everybody

16:19:08 5 moved to Tappita with me. The defence minister, everybody

6 established. The defence headquarters are established there.

7 That radio is Treetop. All communication, even from the defence

8 minister, when they hear from Treetop from the defence minister,

9 that's it. When I moved to Buchanan, nobody stayed - they did

16:19:29 10 not stay in Tappita. Everybody moved to Buchanan. They

11 established their residence and offices. The defence ministry

12 moved to Buchanan.

13 Q. Right. I understand that. So Treetop is not something

14 attached to you personally as leader?

16:19:43 15 A. No, no, no. What's attached to me is the station

16 Butterfly.

17 Q. Right. I understand. So Butterfly and Treetop are two

18 different --

19 A. That is correct.

16:19:53 20 Q. Right. I understand now.

21 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, the witness was asked - the

22 witness that you were reading from was asked: "So at the time

23 you were based in Bomi Hills during the course of your training,

24 do you know where the control station of the NPFL was?" So there

16:20:13 25 is a time frame attached.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, there is.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And I'm not sure that the answer

28 Mr Taylor gave relates to that time frame.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Well, perhaps we can approach it in

1 this way:

2 Q. Mr Taylor, can you help us as to when Treetop moved to
3 Gbarnga?

16:20:44

4 A. Treetop moved to Gbarnga in mid-July of 1991. But the
5 training that the honourable justice is talking about in Bomi,
6 that could be at a totally different period though, according to
7 the comment from the honourable justice.

8 Q. And perhaps I can assist in a time frame in this way, if I
9 go to page 21359 of the transcript of 1 December 2008:

16:21:29

10 "Q. When did you leave Liberia?

11 A. It was in late 1992.

12 Q. So from mid-1992 to late 1992, what did you do?

16:21:55

13 A. Well, we were in Bomi Hills and then myself and other
14 fighters, the NPFL and all of us, that is what I'm
15 referring to, when the ULIMO attacked us in Bomi Hills and
16 they captured Bomi Hills from us. So from there we
17 retreated through Maca crossing point and the next place I
18 was based was Kakata and we were in Kakata until the time
19 Foday Sankoh came from Liberia, when Foday Sankoh came from
16:22:18 20 the front line from Liberia, that is Monrovia, he came
21 together with Mr Taylor. That was during the Operation
22 Octopus some time in September 1992, something like that,
23 yes. Yes, I am sure. September, during Operation Octopus.
24 When they came from the front line they met us in a
16:22:39 25 formation because he left behind a message saying that
26 because we have now been scattered all over Liberia, that
27 is Foday Sankoh, he sent a message so that Rebel King and
28 the others like CO Lion would put us together to go and
29 join our brothers in the Kailahun area to continue the arms

1 struggle. That was the time he and Mr Taylor passed
2 through Kakata. They were going in around the areas to
3 Monrovia."

4 So we've got a time frame there. Now, Mr Taylor, there's
16:23:16 5 something significant there, isn't there?

6 A. Well, quite frankly, I will say yes and no. Because if
7 Foday Sankoh had been seen --

8 Q. No, no, no. Tell us, first of all, what's significant
9 there?

16:23:36 10 A. The date, September 1992. September 1992, Foday Sankoh
11 could not have been seen in Kakata or any NPFL area. September
12 1992, it's impossible. Impossible.

13 Q. Let me ask you a different question then and I'll come to
14 the point. When was Operation Octopus?

16:23:55 15 A. Operation Octopus - I'm not sure - 1992. It happened in
16 1992.

17 Q. What date? What time? Help us with a month, say.

18 A. I would say, what, September/October 1992, Operation
19 Octopus occurred.

16:24:20 20 Q. Now, you see, the witness has got that bit right then,
21 hasn't he?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. And then he goes on to say that you're with Foday Sankoh, a
24 man with whom you've allegedly - a man you've allegedly divorced
16:24:40 25 in May/June 1992. Yet here he is in September.

26 A. In September, yes.

27 Q. So what do you say, Mr Taylor?

28 A. It is not true, but this is consistent with the pattern
29 that they've organised with these lies. If Foday Sankoh had been

1 seen in Liberia in September of 1992, I don't think he would have
2 survived. We just had this major fight in May where NPFL people
3 are killed, some of his people killed. We withdraw all of our
4 people from Sierra Leone that OTP witnesses have said here that
16:25:18 5 there was a disconnect. June, July, August, September, three
6 months later he's at the combat front with me in the operation -
7 it would never happen. It did not happen. It did not happen,
8 but this is the way that they construct these things. Get a
9 little bit here and a little bit there, and try to make it sound
16:25:41 10 as though it's real. There's nothing real about - how - in fact,
11 where would Foday Sankoh have passed to get through ULIMO in Lofa
12 to get to me in September of 1992? It's a lie. Totally, totally
13 untrue.

14 Q. Now, in light of what you say there, Mr Taylor, let's just
16:26:06 15 read a little further on this page, 21360:

16 "Q. Okay, Mr Witness, before you go on, when approximately
17 did ULIMO attack you - attack your group in Bomi Hills?
18 When approximately did that happen?

19 A. It was during the rains, around late June to July.
16:26:31 20 Around that - around late June to July. It was raining.

21 Q. Of what year?

22 A. 1992.

23 Q. And you said that you retreated through Maca crossing.
24 What exactly did you say; which crossing?"

16:26:46 25 Now pausing there for a minute, Mr Taylor. Would you agree
26 with that time frame; ULIMO attacking, capturing Bomi Hills round
27 about June/July of 1992?

28 A. No. In fact, ULIMO would have captured most of Bomi
29 earlier than that. It would have captured most of Bomi earlier

1 than that, because ULIMO had already - by August of 1992 they
2 have sealed off most of Lofa. So coming down that side it would
3 be earlier. It would be earlier than this time as far as Bomi.

4 Q. He is suggesting June, July 1992?

16:27:39 5 A. No, no, no, no, no. Far, far earlier than that. Far, far
6 earlier than that.

7 Q. Now, does that help you with the suggestions that you
8 "... came from the front line from Liberia, that is, Monrovia.
9 He came together with Mr Taylor."

16:28:07 10 A. From Monrovia?

11 Q. Yes, that's what he said at page 21360:

12 "Sankoh came from the front line from Liberia, that is,
13 Monrovia. He came together with Mr Taylor. That was during the
14 Operation Octopus sometime in September '92."

16:28:31 15 From Monrovia.

16 A. Maybe he misspoke. I'm sure he misspoke, because he knows
17 that I was not in Monrovia. So maybe he misspoke, I'm sure.
18 Because I would not be here today if I was in Monrovia during
19 Operation Octopus. So maybe this is just - the interpretation
16:28:53 20 here could be a little different, but --

21 Q. Where were you during Operation Octopus, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Most of Operation Octopus I was in Harbel.

23 Q. Harbel?

24 A. I was in Harbel.

16:29:06 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient point?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We'll adjourn now until 9.30
27 tomorrow morning.

28 Mr Taylor, I remind you of the order not to discuss your
29 evidence.

1 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
2 to be reconvened on Thursday, 17 September 2009
3 at 9.30 a.m.]
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	28989
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	28989