



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 17 AUGUST 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr William Romans
Mr Artur Appazov

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Monday, 17 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:26:18 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will take appearances first, please.

6 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
7 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A
8 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Brenda J Hollis, and our case
9 manager, Maja Dimitrova.

09:32:02 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Ms Hollis. Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
12 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself Courtenay
13 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah,
14 Mr Silas Chekera and Mr Terry Munyard.

09:32:17 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Thank you, Mr Griffiths. I
16 understand you had some submission to make.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, the first matter I would like to raise
18 is an application for some time. A matter arose unexpectedly
19 over the weekend. I had the opportunity of mentioning it to
09:32:33 20 Mr Taylor this morning but, unfortunately, had insufficient time
21 to discuss it both with him and with my learned friends. And,
22 consequently, I would ask, initially, for 30 minutes in order to
23 discuss the matter thoroughly with Mr Taylor and with my
24 colleagues. It is that important.

09:32:55 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. This came to your knowledge just
26 this morning, is it?

27 MR GRIFFITHS: No, no, it came to my knowledge over the
28 weekend, but we were unable to meet over the weekend because we
29 were all in various locations around the world.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are only asking for half an hour?

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, yes.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have any difficulties with that,
4 Ms Hollis?

09:33:21 5 MS HOLLIS: Absolutely none, Mr President.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: We take it, as you say, that it is
7 important, Mr Griffiths, so we will give you that time. We will
8 resume at, let's say, five past 10.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

09:33:45 10 [Break taken at 9.33 a.m.]

11 [Upon resuming at 10.00 a.m.]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths. We have given you the
13 time. What's the problem?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, half an hour has expired and
10:00:28 15 we still have not been able to see, Mr Taylor, because --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why not?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: There is apparently a rule that only three
18 lawyers at a time may see Mr Taylor at the back of the Court, as
19 if undoubtedly we're going to attack the guards and free him.
10:00:47 20 And we are talking about a matter here which is so important, it
21 could result in this trial being aborted. Now, each of us on the
22 Defence side have been looking at different aspects of what is a
23 very novel situation and we need the input from all four of us in
24 this discussion. Yet we have come up against the brick wall of
10:01:14 25 this stupid rule, and I say that quite bluntly, which means that
26 we can't have the meaningful discussion that we require and
27 that's the problem.

28 Short of us rising at this stage, Mr Taylor being taken
29 back to the prison in Scheveningen and we all travel to

1 Scheveningen in order to see him, it is impossible for us to have
2 the discussion with our client which the exigencies of this
3 situation demand.

10:01:49 4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Tell me, Mr Griffiths, why can't three of
5 you speak to Mr Taylor and pass it on to the fourth one? What's
6 wrong with that?

7 MR GRIFFITHS: No, Mr President. We find that unacceptable
8 in the circumstances because of the various work we have each
9 individually done since I brought this matter to their attention
10:02:06 10 and the need to have a collective decision on this.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't know what matter you're talking
12 about, but surely you can have a collective decision by three of
13 you passing it on to the fourth one and then getting his input as
14 well.

10:02:24 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, Mr President, I don't want to appear
16 difficult on this, but it's not as if we are demanding a great
17 deal here. All we are asking for is for Mr Taylor's four
18 lawyers, instructed by him, to see him and have a discussion - a
19 consultation with him. That's all we are asking for.

10:02:42 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I wouldn't have thought you
21 are asking for a great deal either, but the ICC security have
22 their rules. I am with you when you say what do they think
23 Mr Taylor is going to do, or what do they think the four Defence
24 counsel are going to do; attempt a break-out or something that
10:03:05 25 impossible? But the fact of the matter is the ICC detention
26 people are bound by their rules and I guess they suffer
27 consequences if they go outside them, except hearing from
28 superior authority.

29 My understanding is there is no superior authority

1 available to give my instructions which is a wonderful way to run
2 a trial, I agree. But tell me this: The matter you are talking,
3 about does not stem from an unbidden email sent by the UN to you
4 and a copy to me? Is that the one?

10:03:47 5 MR GRIFFITHS: It is the matter.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, look, Mr Griffiths, isn't it a
7 totally unacceptable proposition that some person, who is not a
8 party to this trial, who doesn't have any right of audience
9 before the Court, can send an email and thereby - completely
10:04:08 10 unbidden email thereby cause a delay to this trial. That's a
11 ridiculous situation too.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: I total agree, Mr President.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Why can't we get on with the trial. I am
14 taking no action at all on the email I saw. I don't know who the
10:04:25 15 person, I don't know what they are talking about. They are not
16 entitled to address the Court and the email is not about any
17 issue before this Court and it hasn't been put in issue before
18 this Court by either of the parties. So why are we suffering
19 these delays?

10:04:40 20 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful for that indication,
21 Mr President, and in the circumstances my submission is that we
22 should get on with the trial.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let's get on with it. If there is any
24 issues to be raised from that email, they will be done in the
10:04:55 25 proper manner by a party.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: I totally agree, Mr President.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

28 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Mr President. You are talking about an
29 email and parties raising matters, but the Prosecution has no

1 such email so we don't know what you're talking about, so we
2 couldn't raise anything if we wanted to because we don't know
3 what this is.

10:05:23

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's exactly my point, Ms Hollis. But
5 let's get on with it.

6 MS IRURA: Your Honours, if I may be permitted to inform
7 the Court about the present situation with regard to the ICC
8 security. There has been a development.

10:05:41

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's all right. We are getting on with
10 the trial.

11 Mr Taylor, can you step into the witness box, please.

12 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

13 [On former affirmation]

14 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

10:06:13

15 Q. Mr Taylor, last week when we adjourned we were looking at
16 events in the autumn of 1999. Do you recall that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. And the last document we had looked at a letter sent to
19 you, do you recall, by President Kabbah on 27 October? Do you
20 recall that?

10:06:56

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Now, the peace accord in Lome --

23 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, your Honour, I am not hearing
24 anything through here. Maybe there is a problem. I don't know.

10:07:27

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you hear me, Mr Taylor?

26 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just before Mr Griffiths continues, I
28 will give you that direction that you are still bound by the
29 declaration to tell the truth.

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honour.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the Lome Peace Agreement had been met with
4 a great deal of expectation by all parties involved, hadn't it?

10:07:52 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. By late October 1999, what was the situation on the ground
7 in Sierra Leone so far as the acceptance of that agreement was
8 concerned?

9 A. Well, there were several problems following the arrival of
10:08:14 10 Sankoh and Johnny Paul back into Freetown. There appeared to
11 have been some calm, but not too long after that cracks started
12 appearing in the - at least I would call it the thinking of some
13 of these individuals that were not party to the agreement.

14 I received a letter, as you mentioned, from
10:08:42 15 President Kabbah mentioning a couple of things. One including
16 the fact that some RUF individuals wanted to return and to
17 Kailahun District and how they would be disarmed before going.
18 And so I then fired off some letters to Kabbah, Sankoh and Johnny
19 Paul Koroma, but there were cracks in their own thinking about
10:09:07 20 what should have happened with Lome.

21 Q. Now, we dealt with the letter from President Kabbah dated
22 27 October, Mr Taylor. Did you receive any letter from anybody
23 else involved in the agreement?

24 A. Yes. A little later I received, along with all of the
10:09:34 25 members of the committee may I say, a letter from Foday Sankoh
26 detailing somewhere that's going into November, if my
27 recollection is correct - detailing problems that he saw and
28 possible violations on the part of Kabbah in line with the
29 agreement.

1 Q. I wonder if the witness could be shown, please, volume 2 of
2 2, week 32 disclosure, please. It's the smaller of the two
3 volumes. It's behind divider 62, I'm sorry?

4 Now, on the first page, Mr Taylor, we see a fax cover
10:10:54 5 sheet. But when we come to the second page of this document, we
6 see that it's a letter addressed to President Kabbah from 56 Spur
7 Road, Freetown, and if we go to the page of the letter we see
8 that you copied into the letter along with President Eyadema and
9 President Blaise Compaore. Is that right?

10:11:27 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now, the letter reads as follows:

12 "Your Excellency, I write with regard to the announcement
13 of the appointments you have made to commissions and the new
14 cabinet and to thank you for the inclusion of my nominees in the
10:11:45 15 government.

16 In doing so, however, I will be remiss in my
17 responsibility, both as leader of the my movement and signatory
18 to the Lome Peace Agreement, if I did not draw attention to the
19 following issues of concern:

10:11:59 20 In the first place, you will recall that I had initially
21 insisted on your indicating the specific ministries you were
22 going to appoint my men to before I could submit their names. I
23 had suspected that the three senior ministries mentioned in the
24 agreement were a rouse, and I wanted to avoid any possible
10:12:23 25 misunderstanding. I discussed this extensively with the Heads of
26 State who were in Lome, and they reassured me that I had not
27 cause for concern. But, true to form, you have retained your men
28 in those ministries. I do not feel that this indicates fair play
29 and strict adherence to the agreement. It sends the wrong

1 signal."

2 Let's pause there for a moment, Mr Taylor. "I discussed
3 this extensively with the Heads of State in Lome." Was it
4 discussed?

10:12:56 5 A. Yes, he is talking about during the back room discussions,
6 remember, the nights that I mentioned to this Court that we did
7 not sleep, yes. We all gave assurances. Obasanjo, everybody.
8 And then even on the day of the agreement, as we - before even it
9 got signed, these were all concerns. Will Kabbah live by the
10:13:26 10 agreement? That was the concern.

11 Q. "It sends the wrong signal.

12 Article V, section 3(i) of the agreement clearly states
13 that the government shall expand the cabinet moderately to 18.
14 This was after we had been asked to make a concession in the
10:13:45 15 interest of the peace process, as we had earlier required an
16 expansion to 23, even indicating the ministries we wanted
17 assigned to us. Now you have expanded the cabinet to 22, an
18 action that we believe goes against the spirit of the agreement
19 and does not augur well.

10:14:06 20 Both in a letter signed by the attorney general and
21 minister of justice, who was leader of the government delegation,
22 and in the negotiations leading to signing the agreement, it was
23 indicate that the Commission For the Management of Strategic
24 Resources, National Reconstruction and Development would be
10:14:25 25 placed under my chairmanship with the status of Vice President of
26 the Republic. In the press release announcing my appointment,
27 the important detail of my status as vice president was left out.
28 This is an omission with far reaching implications and needs to
29 be corrected.

1 According to Article IV, section 3 of the agreement, both
2 parties are supposed to meet and agree on the appointment of the
3 RUF/Sierra Leone members to positions in parastatals, diplomacy,
4 and any other public sector. However, announcements are being
10:15:02 5 made about ambassadorial appointments without our meeting to
6 agree. This is also a breach of the agreement and should be
7 corrected.

8 According to Article III, section 4 of the agreement, the
9 parties shall approach the international community with a view to
10 mobilising resources, including setting up a trust fund, for the
11 purposes of enabling the RUF/Sierra Leone to function as a
12 political party. Without these resources, we have not been able
13 to register and function as a political party. We would,
14 therefore, urge that this issue be addressed urgently, as any
10:15:39 15 more delay will only hurt the peace process.

16 On several occasions, I have raised with you the question
17 of accommodation and transportation for the men and women joining
18 the" - and that problem with the page is because this is a faxed
19 document and the original is in this state as well.

10:16:01 20 Over the page then:

21 "... necessary action to solve this grave problem.
22 Providing food for the overextended household and fuel for
23 proposition is proving extremely burdensome.

24 I had also discussed with you my serious misgivings about
10:16:18 25 the unfortunate incidents at the Sierra Leone Ports Authority. I
26 do not believe that there should be any areas where I, any of my
27 people, or any other persons should not go in this country. If
28 there are any reported disturbances in the Ports area, they
29 should be properly investigated instead of restricting anybody

1 who wishes to go to that area. I would thus ask you please to
2 ensure that nobody's free movement is impeded.

3 I have felt constrained to draw your attention to the above
4 mentioned issues because I feel that after the sad experience
10:16:56 5 with the Abidjan Peace Agreement, we must all strive to ensure
6 that the Lome Peace Agreement is sustained. It is my fervent
7 hope that you will take a close and critical look at these
8 concerns and let us find positive solutions that can serve the
9 country and us well."

10:17:14 10 Now, what were your feelings when you received that letter,
11 Mr Taylor?

12 A. Well, I knew then, as I talked to some of our colleagues,
13 because everyone, as he mentioned, involved with Lome were all
14 sent this letter. And the usual thing is for a telephone
10:17:43 15 messages to begin to fly right away. I am calling them; they are
16 calling me. What can we do? Like I say, we are beginning to see
17 cracks in the agreement. We want to make sure that some of these
18 issues are resolved so the agreement doesn't fall apart. Because
19 in addition to this, there are other matters that are creeping
10:18:09 20 up. We are trying to hurry up and get the disarmament process
21 going, but with this now, we see it as a major problem and we
22 begin to encourage them, especially President Kabbah - in fact,
23 Obasanjo was given this assignment to, what we call, lean on
24 Kabbah to follow the agreement. But we were very concerned by
10:18:37 25 these developments. Very concerned.

26 Q. Tell me, did you respond to the letter, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes, I did write Sankoh back and I wrote President Kabbah
28 back. I wrote President Kabbah to at least tell him about some
29 of my ideas that I had, yes.

1 Q. Have a look behind divider 65, please. Now, behind divider
2 65, everyone should have copies of letters to Sankoh, Koroma and
3 President Kabbah. Can I check that that's the case? I am
4 grateful.

10:19:30 5 Now, we see here, Mr Taylor, that on 5 November, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You write to Corporal Sankoh in these terms:

8 "I have learnt with great trepidation indications of
9 disagreements between the AFRC and the RUF, which poses a threat
10 to the smooth implementation of the Lome Peace Accord for
11 Sierra Leone."

12 Now, help us. This letter, was it a response to the Sankoh
13 letter to President Kabbah, or are we dealing with different
14 issues here?

10:20:05 15 A. We are dealing with a slightly - it's a combination. It's
16 a little different issue here. Sankoh's letter is one thing, but
17 this is more of a reply to a combined letter sent by Kabbah on
18 the 27th. I am responding to Kabbah, but I am raising the
19 general issues of trepidation, my concerns, okay. But this is
10:20:33 20 more a response to the 27th letter that Kabbah had written me
21 even before Sankoh sent out this.

22 Q. Now, that was the letter we looked at on Friday last,
23 wasn't it?

24 A. That is correct.

10:20:47 25 Q. Which dealt with, among other things, the desire of some
26 RUF members to return to Sierra Leone through Kailahun with their
27 arms, yes?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. But what I am specifically asking you here, Mr Taylor is

1 this: In the Sankoh letter and in the Kabbah letter dated the
2 29th and the 27th respectively, neither makes mention of
3 disagreements between the AFRC and the RUF. So what is it that
4 we are talking about here?

10:21:21 5 A. Well, this incident is an incident where we get reports
6 from a conversation with President Kabbah about fighting between
7 the AFRC and the RUF, okay? That there is - there are clashes
8 occurring between them, okay? Now, President Kabbah writes me on
9 the 27th. He is talking about these returning combatants. I
10:21:53 10 don't know where he gets this thing from that they are supposed
11 to have arms in Liberia, but there are clashes between the AFRC
12 and the RUF. Kabbah raises that in a telephone conversation with
13 me, so I now respond, okay, by writing Sankoh and Johnny Paul
14 Koroma telling them to stop this while I write Kabbah responding
10:22:19 15 to his 27th letter. That's what's going on here.

16 Q. Let's just pause for a moment then and just take stock of
17 what's happening which might endanger the Lome Peace Accord.
18 We've got Kabbah's concerns about RUF people returning?

19 A. Yes.

10:22:35 20 Q. We've got Sankoh's concerns about not getting enough
21 ministerial posts?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. You are also hearing about actual fighting between the AFRC
24 and the RUF?

10:22:48 25 A. That is correct. Those are the cracks that I am referring
26 to.

27 Q. Right:

28 "I have learnt with great trepidation indications of
29 disagreements between the AFRC and RUF which may pose a threat to

1 the smooth implementation of the Lome Peace Accord for
2 Sierra Leone.

3 As you are aware, the ECOWAS sub-region has worked
4 assiduously over the past several years to bring about the
10:23:16 5 current workable solution for lasting peace in your country.

6 In recent weeks you participated in reconciliatory talks
7 held in Monrovia, which created the atmosphere for your
8 triumphant return to Sierra Leone to be part of the process of
9 demobilisation, disarmament and the restoration of peace and
10:23:38 10 security throughout your country.

11 I hereby urge you to continue to work in the spirit of
12 reconciliation, accommodation and patriotism to ensure that the
13 peace plan for Sierra Leone succeeds at all cost.

14 Let me reassure you of my personal commitment and that of
10:23:56 15 the ECOWAS authority for the restoration of peace, security and
16 democratic governance in Sierra Leone."

17 Yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Now, when we go over the page, we see that you write in
10:24:14 20 identical terms, do you not, to Johnny Paul Koroma?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And then when - there is a third letter now right at the
23 back. I won't go through the Johnny Paul Koroma letter because,
24 as we note, it's in the same terms?

10:24:35 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. But you write in slightly different terms to
27 President Kabbah, do you not?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. And that is the third letter behind this divider. Again

1 this letter is dated 5 November 1999.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "Dear President Kabbah:

4 I have received with concern your communication of October
10:25:00 5 27 relating to some hindrances to the smooth implementation of
6 the Sierra Leone peace process.

7 I would like to reassure you of my personal commitment to
8 do all I can for the success of this process.

9 Further to that, I have directed a special communication to
10:25:20 10 both Corporal Foday Sankoh of the RUF and Lieutenant Colonel
11 Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC urging them to put aside their
12 differences and work together for the successful implementation
13 of the Lome agreement.

14 Our usual cooperation in all matters concerning the passage
10:25:41 15 through Liberia of RUF personnel free of conflict and
16 misunderstanding is hereby assured."

17 Let us pause there. When you say there, Mr Taylor, "Our
18 usual cooperation in all matters concerning the passage through
19 Liberia of RUF personnel", what are you talking about?

10:26:07 20 A. The historic passage coming from Bockarie, going into the
21 passage earlier beginning April of RUF personnel going through to
22 Lome and coming back. The normal passages. This has been going
23 on for some time with their knowledge and so I am just reassuring
24 him here that the usual cooperation in these matters will remain
10:26:39 25 intact.

26 Q. So, Mr Taylor, what are you telling us? That you had been
27 discussing with President Kabbah the passage through Liberia of
28 RUF personnel?

29 A. Of course. Of course. We have - not only Kabbah. We've

1 been talking about this. Most of these people are on travel ban.
2 They cannot come through unless we get the permission for them to
3 travel out of Sierra Leone and come through Liberia. We support
4 United Nations resolutions regarding these travels. I mentioned
10:27:18 5 to this Court that we even assisted with the knowledge and
6 acquiescence of everyone with certain travel documents to enable
7 people to go to Lome for the talks. So there is nothing hidden
8 here. We are working together.

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, what does the witness means
10:27:37 10 by commission, obtaining a commission to let the RUF through?

11 THE WITNESS: Permission, your Honour?

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Did you say commission or permission?

13 THE WITNESS: Permission.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: From?

10:27:51 15 THE WITNESS: Before those on travel ban travel, you must
16 get an okay from the sanctions committee, your Honour.

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And your evidence is that in every case
18 this happened?

19 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, these individuals that came through
10:28:07 20 to go to Lome for the talks were in direct conjunction with the
21 United Nations. They would never have travelled unless the
22 sanctions committee approved it and they lifted them themselves.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. "I look forward to meeting you and your brother
10:28:28 25 President Lansana Conte at the forthcoming Mano River summit in
26 Sierra Leone. Warm personal regards" - and you sign it, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Now can I ask, please, before we get too far
29 ahead of ourselves, that the letter from Foday Sankoh to

1 President Kabbah, copied to President Taylor and others, dated 29
2 October 1999, be marked for identification, please.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
4 identification MFI-115.

10:29:04 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, could I ask that the three
6 letters we have just looked at all bear the same MFI number but
7 we number them A, B, and C given that they are all on the same
8 date. So they would become respectively, the Sankoh letter would
9 be MFI-116A, the Johnny Paul Koroma letter MFI-116B, and the
10:29:30 10 letter to President Kabbah becomes MFI-116C, if that meets with
11 your approval.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Those documents are marked
13 accordingly.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

10:29:52 15 Q. Now, did those letters have an effect as far as you're
16 aware?

17 A. Well, the cracks are there. There is this fighting that
18 first starts between the RUF and the AFRC. Then there is another
19 problem that develops where the whole question of disarmament as
10:30:26 20 we are trying to get ceasefires on the ground, we have this
21 serious problem that begins to develop where there are questions
22 about whether the RUF will disarm, how, when and where, and it
23 creates even a bigger problem in November. It becomes very tense
24 within the RUF and this now becomes the biggest threat. We
10:30:55 25 manage to get the AFRC/RUF situation quelled a little bit, but
26 the bigger concern now develops within the RUF between Foday
27 Sankoh and Sam Bockarie.

28 Q. And just help us, what is that problem?

29 A. Foday Sankoh demonstrates that he wants to show the world

1 that he is serious and he wants to start at least the disarmament
2 process. Because of these clashes that had occurred between the
3 AFRC/RUF and this problem with Kabbah and the cabinet positions,
4 Sam Bockarie decides that disarmament should not take place and
10:31:46 5 that Kabbah cannot be trusted. So now it appears that Bockarie
6 is beginning to challenge Foday Sankoh.

7 Q. And did you attempt to do anything about that?

8 A. Yes. This matter fell in my lap. I discussed it with
9 President Kabbah, I discussed it with other individuals on the
10:32:13 10 Committee of Six and it was decided that I should intervene and
11 see what I could do about it. So I invited the Vice-President,
12 then Sankoh, and Sam Bockarie to come to Monrovia to meet with me
13 to see if we could get it resolved. And they accepted that
14 invitation and Vice-President Sankoh came and Sam Bockarie came
10:32:44 15 to Monrovia and we had a meeting.

16 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, that meeting between you, Sankoh
17 and Bockarie, who knew about it?

18 A. Everyone.

19 Q. Everyone like who?

10:32:57 20 A. By everyone I am talking about the Committee of Six. The
21 United Nations in Monrovia - the special representative of the
22 United Nations in Monrovia Downes-Thomas knew about, the special
23 representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone knew
24 about it, President Kabbah knew about it. This was an open
10:33:17 25 invitation. Kabbah came as Vice-President of Sierra Leone. He
26 didn't slip out of Sierra Leone. He came from Freetown through
27 Lungi with an aircraft provided with the assistance of the
28 United Nations to see if we could broker some peace between them.
29 At this first meeting though it did not work.

1 Q. Now, you say that - who was it who was brought by
2 United Nations aircraft from Lungi?

3 A. Sankoh. Sankoh with the assistance of the UN.

4 Q. And how did Bockarie travel?

10:33:49 5 A. Bockarie came via road through - because he was not in
6 Freetown. He came via Foya, Kolahun, Voinjama and down to
7 Monrovia.

8 Q. That route that we have become familiar with?

9 A. That is correct.

10:34:01 10 Q. Now, you say that that meeting wasn't a success, Mr Taylor.
11 Did you have any further meetings with them?

12 A. Yes. I thought we had --

13 Q. Pause for a moment.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I just wanted to seek a
10:34:17 15 time frame when this initial meeting happened.

16 THE WITNESS: November, your Honour. I would say about the
17 middle to the third - about the third week of November,
18 your Honour.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:34:29 20 Q. And you say there was a further meeting?

21 A. Yes. Following this meeting, I had full consultations with
22 all of our colleagues amongst the Committee of Six,
23 President Kabbah, everyone, and discussed that we had - we
24 thought that we had brokered an agreement. But by the first week
10:34:59 25 in December things were still not under control. By this time
26 consultations were held, messages had passed through to the
27 Secretary-General through his representative. Then President
28 Obasanjo, upon understanding the delicate nature of this matter,
29 decided that he would join me in Monrovia. This is now coming to

1 about close to the third week in December now, that he would join
2 me in Monrovia in a meeting with Sankoh and Bockarie and see if
3 he could help to get things moving, of which he did.

10:35:57 4 Q. Pause there. Now, you said during the course of that
5 answer, "By this time consultations were held, messages had
6 passed through to the Secretary-General". Passed through whom?

7 A. The special representative. I called the special
8 representative into my office. I had asked him to come to see
9 me. And I gave the United Nations at that time my personal
10:36:22 10 assessment of what I had said to my colleagues. I shared it with
11 them to be passed on to the Secretary-General.

12 Q. Pause there. Could we have a look behind divider 66,
13 please. Yes, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes.

10:36:49 15 Q. As we can see, there is a covering interoffice memorandum
16 from Felix Downes-Thomas to the special representative of the
17 Secretary-General in Liberia and we see it's headed "Message from
18 President Taylor to Secretary-General". Do you see that?

19 A. That is correct.

10:37:12 20 Q. And it goes on:

21 "During this morning's telephone conversation with
22 President Taylor, he requested that I convey to the
23 Secretary-General the information provided in the attached note.
24 I would be grateful if it is brought to the Secretary-General's
10:37:27 25 attention."

26 Let's go over the page:

27 "Note to the Secretary-General, telephone conversation with
28 President Taylor. I spoke with President Taylor this morning.
29 He requested that I inform you personally as follows."

1 Now, let us pause. Mr Taylor, why did you consider it
2 necessary to be informing the Secretary-General of this?

3 A. This matter in Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General and the
4 Security Council remained what they called seized of this

10:38:05 5 Sierra Leonean matter. Because I am the practical mediator in
6 this problem, and because of the many accusations, I spare no
7 time in making sure that the Secretary-General and the United
8 Nations Security Council are informed every step of the way,
9 every action that I am taking in concert with my colleagues in
10:38:31 10 ECOWAS, because I see the firestorm that is already behind me.

11 So I keep them informed at every instance, I do.

12 Q. Now, at this stage, Mr Taylor, in late 1999, those
13 accusations, are they still being made?

14 A. Oh, yes. And they just never stopped. Yes, they are still
10:38:54 15 being made, yes.

16 Q. Accusations of what?

17 A. That I am supposed to be aiding the rebels in Sierra Leone,
18 that arms are still coming from Liberia with my knowledge. These
19 are still out there in the press, yes.

10:39:12 20 Q. "The Sierra Leone situation.

21 He is currently holding talks in Monrovia with Messrs
22 Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh in an effort to ensure that the
23 peace process remains on course. The rift between these two men
24 has widened to the point where Sam Bockarie and a significant
10:39:37 25 number of RUF officers are up in arms against Sankoh whose mental
26 stability they now question."

27 Pause there. What does that mean, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Well, what Bockarie and his people were saying was that,
29 well, the old man, they call him, is not thinking right. He

1 wants to trust Kabbah and Kabbah is lying to him and now we are
2 under attack and he wants us to disarm, so he is not thinking
3 right. And they even went further, you know, trying to accuse
4 him of corruption. It was a big mess. It was a big mess.

10:40:21 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let us just examine a few more details
6 about this, shall we. On the first occasion in November when
7 Sankoh and Bockarie came to Monrovia, question number one: How
8 long did they stay for?

9 A. Just a few days. They stayed for a few days.

10:40:42 10 Q. Question number two: Where did they stay?

11 A. We put - the old man, Sankoh, was at the guesthouse and we
12 put Bockarie up in a hotel.

13 Q. On the second occasion in December, how long did they stay
14 for?

10:40:59 15 A. This took a little longer. They were in Liberia for more
16 than a week, because they had to wait for Obasanjo to come. For
17 more than a week.

18 Q. And where did they stay?

19 A. Sankoh at his guest - at the guesthouse, the RUF
10:41:15 20 guesthouse, and Bockarie at the hotel.

21 Q. "According to President Taylor, Sam Bockarie and the
22 anti-Sankoh elements of the RUF are accusing Sankoh not only of
23 financial sharp practices, but also of issuing orders for the
24 death of former President Momoh, Johnny Paul Koroma and Sam
10:41:42 25 Bockarie.

26 President Obasanjo will be flying into Monrovia on Monday,
27 20 December, to assist President Taylor resolve related
28 difficulties."

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And going on:

2 "President Taylor would like you to know that he is
3 displeased by the attempts of President Kabbah to portray him as
4 the bad guy during last week's ECOWAS meeting in Lome where
10:42:13 5 President Kabbah thanked everyone but President Taylor for the
6 successful completion of the Lome Peace Accord."

7 Pause there. Is that true, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes, diplomatically this happened, and I think Kabbah did
9 it - he could have made an honest mistake. But if you thank all
10:42:33 10 of the Presidents, you know I am a part of the Committee of Six
11 and practically brokered that agreement, when you knew that I had
12 to leave Liberia in a hurry to run to Lome, spend two nights, and
13 you knew what we went through. You were not present, but you saw
14 Obasanjo, myself, Compaore and Eyadema working overnight, and you
10:42:55 15 go to a meeting and say, Well, I want to thank John Brown, Peter
16 Doe and this and leave me out. I look at that as a slap in the
17 face and I didn't like it. I don't know as to whether he did it
18 inadvertently, but that was not a very good move on his part and
19 I didn't like it.

10:43:14 20 Q. "President Taylor would also like you to know that the
21 Government of Liberia has reliable information that Messrs Amos
22 Lincoln and George Dewey, Liberian dissidents who accompanied
23 Roosevelt Johnson into exile, are currently in Sierra Leone. As
24 the President puts it, 'I don't know why Kabbah wants to do
10:43:35 25 this.' President Taylor will be sending a delegation to
26 President Kabbah on Saturday, 18 December."

27 Now, there are a number of things in there which I would
28 like us to look at, please, Mr Taylor. Now, there is mention,
29 first of all, of last week's ECOWAS meeting in Lome. Now, when

1 we look at the date of this, this is 14 December. So in early
2 December there has been an ECOWAS meeting in Lome, had there?

3 A. Yes, that is correct.

4 Q. And you had attended it?

10:44:09 5 A. I am sure. Once - yes, I could have attended it, yes.

6 Q. Secondly, this: The Roosevelt Johnson exile, are we
7 talking about his movement from Monrovia at the end of the Camp
8 Johnson Road incident?

9 A. That is correct, yes.

10:44:32 10 Q. When he had initially been taken to Sierra Leone?

11 A. That is correct. That is correct.

12 Q. Now, these two individuals you are mentioning now, Amos
13 Lincoln and George Dewey, who are they?

14 A. That's General Amos Lincoln, the principal commander in
10:44:48 15 ULIMO-J; George Dewey, more of a political adviser at the time,
16 were two of the individuals that were held up in the US embassy.
17 Remember the group that were found in the embassy? These were
18 people that were holed up in that embassy.

19 Q. Right. And why was it of concern that they were currently
10:45:09 20 in Sierra Leone?

21 A. General Amos Lincoln is a very well known general and
22 very - we always used to say wherever Amos Lincoln appeared,
23 there was trouble coming. George Dewey, not a combatant, but he
24 is a political - very strong minded person. So with George Dewey
10:45:33 25 and Amos Lincoln together at that time, that smelled - that
26 spelled some possible trouble and we were concerned.

27 Q. And help us. At this stage, Mr Taylor, we are talking
28 about 14 December, you having written to Kabbah as recently as 5
29 November, was there now some bad blood between of two of you?

1 A. I wouldn't know. I wouldn't put it that way. I wouldn't
2 say bad blood. You know, whether Kabbah wants to be fair to me
3 or not, that's his problem. But I want to be fair. He was under
4 tremendous pressure and so I wouldn't say - no, I wouldn't say
10:46:22 5 there was bad blood.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm only looking at the words. This is a record
7 of a conversation you had with the writer, and you are saying
8 that Kabbah is trying to portray you as a bad guy. It doesn't
9 sound as if the two of you are getting on then, does it?

10:46:40 10 A. Oh, you know, these diplomatic quarrels, sometimes - they
11 cannot be described all the time as bad blood. I am saying that,
12 listen, you are trying to take me as the bad guy, but I am not
13 the bad guy. I know his pressure. I am just trying to remind
14 him to sober up, that's all. But I would not really justly
10:47:04 15 describe, you know, the relationship between us as bad blood.

16 No, I wouldn't go that far.

17 Q. And then you go on, you see, to say: "I don't know why
18 Kabbah wants to do this."

19 A. Yes.

10:47:18 20 Q. So should we take it that you felt that President Kabbah
21 was acting unfairly towards you?

22 A. Yes. If this information was true - let's remind the
23 Court, we are getting information about possible attacks out of
24 Sierra Leone. We are preparing for these attacks. We are
10:47:45 25 experiencing some difficulties. Let's go back. We've had a few
26 incursions, and so when you hear that this general, Lincoln, is
27 in Freetown and if Kabbah, who threw them out before - and he had
28 told me that he had thrown all of them out - if he is now
29 encouraging these same people to return, then that's what I mean:

1 I do not know why he would want to do this. I just don't
2 understand it. I mean, is this a change in policy now that he
3 has decided to support the insurgency, or just what is the
4 problem? That's what I am referring to.

10:48:30 5 Q. "Liberian priorities: Liberia is making diligent efforts
6 to implement the implicit and explicit recommendations expressed
7 by the recent World Bank-led donor assessment mission. The
8 Government of Liberia recognises that there are shortcomings in
9 the modus operandi of its security personnel."

10:48:54 10 What does that mean?

11 A. Remember we had described in another document the attitude
12 of some of them. They were not as professional as they should
13 be.

14 Q. "In this connection, the President would be grateful for
10:49:11 15 whatever assistance or contributions the United Nations can make
16 towards capacity building, especially with respect to the
17 training and restructuring of the armed and paramilitary forces.

18 The President has also requested your personal intervention
19 to move the UN system to quickly provide capacity building
10:49:33 20 assistance to the judiciary and to expand the current UNDP
21 programme, which arranges for the return of qualified Liberian
22 nationals to their country.

23 In the light of the above, our meeting tomorrow provides an
24 opportunity to examine a few concrete ways to build on the
10:49:52 25 constructive relationship which you have opened up with Liberia,
26 especially over the past two years."

27 Now, Mr Taylor, the issue of the armed and paramilitary
28 forces and the judiciary, were those priorities for you at the
29 time?

1 A. Yes, they were. They were. Remember the - we don't have
2 trained personnel. They are assisting some way with the police,
3 but getting a trained armed force was about the best thing that
4 we could do, because we needed people that understood the law and
10:50:27 5 how to react, especially with the civilian population coming out
6 of war. So that was very important.

7 The judiciary was always important to me. You cannot have
8 a nation of laws and not of men where the judiciary is neither
9 independent nor qualified. And what we were trying to do was to
10:50:54 10 help in the restructuring process, train more lawyers and get
11 better qualified judges in the judiciary and build our capacity.
12 And even a part of this process where we talk about the UNDP
13 programme, what we were trying to do - there are a lot of
14 Liberians - there was a virtual brain drain following the war,
10:51:22 15 and we were trying to stem this brain drain by asking the UNDP -
16 that's the United Nations Development Programme - to help to pay
17 the salaries of some of the qualified Liberians in the diaspora
18 to bring them back to fill these sectors that would help to, you
19 know, train our people.

10:51:50 20 The trained Liberian lawyers practising in the
21 United States, they studied law, could we bring some of those
22 that could be good advocates, that some of them could become
23 [indiscernible] good judges, people that understood the law. You
24 talk about an independent judiciary. How would it be independent
10:52:08 25 if the judges and lawyers don't know what they were doing? So we
26 were trying to build that. There was this matter of economies
27 and other - civil servants. The problem is the money is being
28 paid by a government so small, nobody wants to come home and
29 leave a \$150,000 job to come home to Liberia to get \$1,000 a

1 month. So under this programme, we are trying to get the
2 United Nation to help by funding qualified Liberians abroad,
3 bring them back, and through this we will begin to build from
4 that system. Yes.

10:52:44 5 Q. Can I just go back for a moment, Mr Taylor, briefly to ask
6 you about a particular detail. Now, mention was made on the
7 previous page of this document to that Heads of State and
8 government summit in Lome, yes?

9 A. Uh-huh.

10:53:01 10 Q. Now, can you recall who attended that summit from
11 Sierra Leone?

12 A. I'm not - I can't recall, really, but Heads of State
13 summits are normally attended by the Heads of State. And this
14 statement here would be Kabbah himself, I mean, his - this first
10:53:25 15 page, this had to be Kabbah.

16 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that Bockarie and Sankoh, on
17 this second visit to Monrovia, spent over a week because you were
18 waiting on Obasanjo to arrive?

19 A. That is correct.

10:53:42 20 Q. And why was that? Why was he coming?

21 A. Well, Obasanjo, I called him and said, listen, we have got
22 a problem on our hands. We were determined that Lome would not
23 fail. By "we", again, I am talking about the members of the
24 Committee of Six, ECOWAS, and I can almost say the entire
10:54:03 25 international community was determined that Lome would not fail.

26 So I am reporting to my colleagues what's going on. On this
27 second trip there is a real stalemate. I mean, Bockarie, by this
28 time has become a little more belligerent. I mean, he is very
29 firm and this was unlike him, trying to take on Sankoh. This was

1 a little strange to even me. So I explained it to Obasanjo and
2 others. So Obasanjo said, "Okay, my brother", in his usual way,
3 "Okay, keep them. I'm coming. I'm coming to see what we can do
4 together." And surely, he came down. By that time we had - I
10:54:51 5 had formulated some ideas in my mind. He came, we shared them,
6 and we agreed.

7 Q. Ideas such as?

8 A. Well, we decided that, look, everything must be done -
9 everything - that Lome should not fail. And Sankoh was the
10:55:15 10 recognised leader of the RUF. Sankoh signed the agreement. Now,
11 yes, little Bockarie came along with his own concerns, but we
12 could not let Bockarie stop this whole process over. So we sat
13 and we concluded that Bockarie - that disarmament will happen at
14 all costs. That disarmament will happen and if Bockarie
10:55:44 15 obstructed the process and seemed to be indifferent to the
16 process, that I would in fact virtually arrest him and keep him
17 in Liberia and make sure that this process happened.

18 So we called in the UN special representative, Thomas, and
19 we also told him that look, this is the deal. We are going to go
10:56:08 20 through with these fellows, and Nigeria had a history of holding,
21 remember that they arrested Sankoh, that if Bockarie did not
22 agree to the terms we decided that he would stay in Liberia until
23 after the disarmament was over and that nothing should stop this
24 disarmament. That was the conclusion made by Obasanjo, myself
10:56:31 25 and we informed Downes-Thomas.

26 Q. Now, before we go and look at another document, Mr Taylor,
27 another detail about these visits by Bockarie and Sankoh. On the
28 two occasions in November and December when Bockarie came to
29 Monrovia, did he come alone?

1 A. No, Bockarie brought a delegation.

2 Q. And were they armed?

3 A. No, no, no, no. They would not enter Liberia armed, no. I
4 said before, except for maybe a couple of side pistols like
10:57:12 5 Bockarie would probably have a pistol and his chief of security,
6 but no, no rifles or things like that, no.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before we move on to look at another
8 document, could I ask, please, that this record of a telephone
9 conversation between President Taylor and Felix Downes-Thomas
10:57:33 10 sent by code cable to UN headquarters on 14 December 1999 be
11 marked for identification MFI-117, please.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you including the following pages as
13 part of the one document?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: As part of the one document, please.

10:57:54 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. That document is marked
16 MFI-117.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Now, you told us that this discussion and conclusion
19 arrived at by yourself and President Obasanjo, that Felix
10:58:19 20 Downes-Thomas was informed of it, yes?

21 A. Fully, fully, fully informed, yes. He was briefed and
22 asked to convey it to UN headquarters.

23 Q. Look behind divider 67, please. Do you have it?

24 A. Yes, I do.

10:58:44 25 Q. Now, we see there another of these code cables to which we
26 have become used to now. On this occasion it's dated 21 December
27 1999. Yes, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, remember that the previous code cable dated 14

1 December mentions that you are currently holding talks. That's
2 the previous document we looked at, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

10:59:33

4 Q. Now, this one that we are looking at now behind divider 67
5 dated 21 December says:

6 "Discussions on the Sierra Leonean situation.

10:59:58

7 Further to our cable of 20 December, we wish to inform you
8 that during President Obasanjo's stopover at the Roberts
9 International Airport, President Taylor and Obasanjo held talks
10 regarding the implementation of the Lome Peace Accord on
11 Sierra Leone. UNOL has been informed that the two leaders have
12 reached an agreement by which Sam Bockarie and some of his
13 followers can be temporarily relocated to other countries."

11:00:23

14 Now, let us pause there and look at that paragraph in a bit
15 more detail. Now, President Obasanjo's visit, Mr Taylor, how
16 long did he stay for?

17 A. This was just a stopover. A few hours, several hours we
18 spent together.

11:00:44

19 Q. Now when it says he stopped over at Roberts International
20 Airport, does that mean that he didn't go any further than the
21 airport?

22 A. No, he didn't go any further. That's exactly what it
23 meant.

24 Q. So you met him at the airport?

11:00:52

25 A. I drove to the airport, yes.

26 Q. And were Bockarie and Sankoh also taken to the airport to
27 meet him?

28 A. Yes, they were taken there.

29 Q. So we are to understand then that there's a meeting at

1 Roberts International Airport attended by yourself, President
2 Obasanjo, Sankoh and Bockarie?

3 A. That is correct.

11:01:22

4 Q. And just help us, Mr Taylor, before we go on, what was the
5 atmosphere like in that meeting?

6 A. It was cordial, I would put it. It was cordial. By this
7 time - let it be very clear, by this time a lot of discussions
8 have taken place. The decision of Obasanjo to come did not mean
9 that he was also coming to re-open a whole set of new

11:01:50

10 negotiations. We had gone through it --

11 Q. How?

12 A. -- on the phone. On the telephone. I had spoken to
13 Obasanjo, but I keep emphasising I had also spoken to other
14 members of that committee. And Obasanjo's trip from Nigeria to

11:02:07

15 Roberts International Airport for this discussion is not one of
16 those things, you just don't call a Head of State and say I want
17 to see you and they come running. Decisions - we had decided
18 that he was coming just to reinforce some strong medicine. I
19 would put it this way. And so he came to reinforce what the
20 decision would be. Bockarie, disarmament. No, you are out.

11:02:28

21 Q. Now, by the time of this meeting, Mr Taylor, what had been
22 happening in Sierra Leone so far as the RUF was concerned?

23 A. There had been clashes.

24 Q. What do you mean by clashes?

11:02:57

25 A. There were little problems. I think the UN had picked
26 up - where they say had disarmed some of their people
27 involuntarily. There were little problems all over the place.
28 And they had tried to surround UN bases. All kinds of trouble.

29 Q. But on the ground in Sierra Leone, this rift which you tell

1 us had developed between Bockarie and Sankoh, had that manifested
2 itself in any kind of violence or anything like that in
3 Sierra Leone?

11:03:36 4 A. Yes, to a great extent, yes. The RUF split. Sam Bockarie
5 and his group and then Issa Sesay defending Sankoh, there were
6 clashes between - within the RUF.

7 Q. What kind of clashes?

8 A. I am talking about armed clashes between them.

9 Q. With people dying?

11:03:51 10 A. I am not sure, because I would be asked for numbers, but I
11 think people did get wounded. Lines were drawn. I am not too
12 sure if people died or how many, but I know that there were some
13 arms exchanges between them.

11:04:16 14 Q. "During a Christmas tree lighting ceremony held at the
15 Executive Mansion this evening, President Taylor announced that
16 RUF leader Foday Sankoh will leave Monrovia for Freetown within
17 the coming two days.

18 This afternoon, the BBC correspondent in Monrovia, Jonathan
19 Paye-Layleh, reported that President Obasanjo and Taylor had met
11:04:40 20 with Sam Bockarie at the Roberts International Airport. The two
21 leaders reportedly informed Sam Bockarie that it had been decided
22 that he would stay out of Sierra Leone until the end of the
23 disarmament process. He was given the choice to stay in Liberia
24 or in any other third country. It was also reported that the
11:05:04 25 security officials along the Sierra Leone-Liberia border had been
26 instructed to ensure that he does not cross the border into
27 Sierra Leone during the specified period."

28 Pause. Now, Mr Taylor, "this afternoon", so this is just
29 before Christmas 1999?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And it's said, "Had met with Sam Bockarie at the Roberts
3 International Airport. The two leaders reportedly informed
4 Sam Bockarie." Was there any discussion about it or were you in
11:05:46 5 effect telling him what was going to happen?

6 A. In effect we told him. Following the second meeting with
7 Bockarie where there was outright belligerence on his part, on
8 the one hand. On the other hand, the determination of ECOWAS and
9 the international community to see Lome work and that we were not
11:06:14 10 prepared to permit anyone to obstruct the process, on the other
11 hand. And even on another track, Sam Bockarie's new ideas, a
12 decision was taken by, I can say, ECOWAS, because when Obasanjo
13 came we had discussed it with virtually everybody that Bockarie
14 would be kept in Liberia until the disarmament process was over.

11:06:40 15 He had a choice of staying in Liberia or going to a third
16 country, but that he would not be permitted to obstruct the
17 process.

18 So when I hear in this Court that Bockarie left, Bockarie
19 did not voluntarily leave Sierra Leone. We, I would call it,
11:06:59 20 extracted. ECOWAS extracted Bockarie from Sierra Leone. That's
21 how he left. He did not leave from Sierra Leone voluntarily when
22 he came to Liberia in December of 1999. People did not know the
23 inside story of it, but this is what happened.

24 Q. So, Mr Taylor, can we take it then that Bockarie arriving
11:07:22 25 in Liberia wasn't at your personal invitation?

26 A. It was an ECOWAS extraction. I would like to use that word
27 extraction. We took him out of Sierra Leone. He had no choice.

28 Q. Because it goes on, "It had been decided". Does that mean
29 it had been decided prior to this meeting at Roberts

1 International Airport?

2 A. That's why Obasanjo came. We just came to reinforce that,
3 hey, this is the end of the road. This Lome is going to work.
4 We are not going to let you spoil it.

11:07:59 5 The inside discussion was a little tough and we made it
6 tough and this is why maybe alone he would have taken it
7 otherwise, but this was why Obasanjo came and there was some
8 tough talking.

9 Q. When you mean alone he might have taken it otherwise?

11:08:14 10 A. Well, you know, one Head of State, I am a member of the
11 Committee of Six, expressing ECOWAS's views, maybe he could have
12 said, "Well, maybe this is only President Taylor's views".

13 Q. But Mr Taylor, you were his Papay?

14 A. No, what Papay?

11:08:33 15 Q. He did whatever you told him to do, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Well, if this was true, according to what has been alleged,
17 then I would not have had to call Obasanjo. Why would Obasanjo
18 come if - then that means that my little son was disobedient. I
19 mean when I called Obasanjo to come down, he said, "Okay, I'll be
11:08:54 20 down there. Keep them, I'm coming." It simply meant that Sam
21 Bockarie was never under my control. Never under my control.

22 Q. And then he would stay out of Sierra Leone until the end of
23 the disarmament process. Now, looking at that, at this stage,
24 Mr Taylor, how long was it anticipated that disarmament would
11:09:18 25 take in Sierra Leone?

26 A. This process sometimes, if I take it from historical facts
27 that I know, it could take anywhere from three to six months or
28 more to put together a full disarmament programme. We were
29 looking at at least three to six months.

1 Q. And was the decision that, come what may, Bockarie would
2 remain in Liberia throughout that process, however long it took?

3 A. Oh, yes. He would remain there. He would be watched. And
4 we would make sure that there were no disruptions from his part.

11:10:03 5 As long as it took, he had remain in Liberia.

6 Q. Now, was it just Bockarie who would remain in Liberia?

7 A. No, no, no. Bockarie and those that had committed
8 themselves to his leadership would all follow him, because by
9 this time the tension between the two groups was just so high

11:10:25 10 that if you were associated with Bockarie against Sankoh of
11 course you wouldn't want to stay in there. So it would be
12 Bockarie and his supporters.

13 Q. And what kind of numbers are we talking about?

14 A. Well, I can only give a number at the time of his
11:10:48 15 departure. At the time of the discussion we were not thinking in
16 terms of numbers, but upon his return to pack up and leave,
17 finally he arrived in Liberia, including some of the combatants,
18 women, children, extended family members, the whole group
19 numbered three to four hundred persons that finally came into
11:11:13 20 Liberia, after he went, packed and returned.

21 Q. So, again, let's just be clear about what you are telling
22 us. After Bockarie is told at Roberts International Airport,
23 "You are staying in Liberia until the end of the disarmament
24 process", does he at that stage go back to Sierra Leone?

11:11:38 25 A. Once we gave him the straight talk, yes. He is only
26 permitted to go back and pack up and leave and we were waiting
27 for him. So he returns, he packs up, and he leaves.

28 Q. And comes back into Liberia?

29 A. Back into Liberia with his family, extended family,

1 combatants and all.

2 Q. Now, help us, Mr Taylor, who was going to pay for the
3 living costs of such a large group of individuals in Liberia?

11:12:19

4 A. The discussion that I held with Obasanjo I did tell him
5 point blank, I said, "Listen, this burden that you guys are about
6 to put on me is just too heavy for me and this little country. I
7 am going to need some assistance." And he said, "Okay, fine. We
8 are going to talk to our colleagues to contribute some little
9 monies for their upkeep in Liberia."

11:12:39

10 Q. And did they?

11 A. Not everybody. From time to time - Obasanjo I think on at
12 least one occasion initially did help.

13 Q. Was that financial help?

14 A. Financial, yes.

11:12:52

15 Q. And so how much money are we talking about to look after
16 this group?

17 A. Not very much. I think Obasanjo at that particular
18 time - because we processed it through to the defence ministry.
19 I am not too sure. It could have been something in the
20 neighbourhood of about \$50,000 or something like that.

11:13:14

21 Q. Did the United Nations provide any assistance?

22 A. No. They promised. They did not. The United States
23 promised that they would assist not the upkeep of the people, but
24 the discussion was held as to what to do with Bockarie and we had
25 promised Bockarie and they had said that they would probably help
26 him and give him a scholarship to do extended military training
27 at one of their military bases in the United States. But that
28 did not come to pass.

11:13:41

29 Q. So do I take it then that the United States knew about Sam

1 Bockarie's relocation to Liberia?

2 A. Of course they did. Of course they did.

3 Q. So it wasn't just the United Nations, the United States as
4 well knew?

11:14:12 5 A. Through their embassy in Monrovia knew fully and promised
6 that from a military line that they would help him, they would
7 retrain him. This was their promise. They did not say that they
8 would assist with the upkeep of the personnel in Liberia, but the
9 training of Bockarie they expressed interest in.

11:14:33 10 Q. "It was also reported that the security officials along the
11 Sierra Leone-Liberia border had been instructed to ensure that he
12 does not cross the border into Sierra Leone during the specified
13 period."

14 Was that done?

11:14:47 15 A. Oh, yes. During the disarmament period in Sierra Leone,
16 after Bockarie was brought to Liberia, Bockarie did not go within
17 50 miles of that border. He was not permitted to enter Lofa at
18 all.

19 And, in fact, we did two things when Bockarie came to
11:15:11 20 Liberia. Under the constitution of Liberia, individuals of Negro
21 descent, according to the constitution, are entitled to
22 citizenship in Liberia. We can grant citizenship to any black
23 man from anywhere in the world within 48 hours, you are entitled
24 to citizenship and land. So what we did immediately Bockarie
11:15:40 25 came, Sam Bockarie and all of the individuals that came with him
26 were granted upon their own acquiescence citizenship in Liberia.
27 The combatants were granted citizenship and we will explain this
28 later where they were put into security. They were retrained
29 into certain security agencies, but they were granted full

1 citizenship that we would have control over them.

2 Q. Did that include Sam Bockarie?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, that document is dated 21 December 1999, Mr Taylor.

11:16:35 5 If we look behind the next divider, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. We see another of these code cables, don't we?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we come to look at it could I ask,
11:16:57 10 please, that code cable dated 21 December 1999 from Felix
11 Downes-Thomas to Prendergast at the United Nations be marked for
12 identification MFI-118, please.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-118.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

11:17:40 15 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, so now can we look behind divider 68,
16 please.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, we see another code cable here, don't we, dated 22
19 December 1999, and again we see that it's from Mr Downes-Thomas
11:18:01 20 to Prendergast at the United Nations, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And it's headed on this occasion "Discussions on
23 Sierra Leone, Liberia-Guinea relations and the Mano River Union
24 summit", yes?

11:18:16 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. "Further to our code cable of 21 December 1999, we wish to
27 inform you that at our request, foreign minister Monie Captan
28 shared with us today some pertinent information regarding the
29 talks between Presidents Taylor and Obasanjo during President

1 Obasanjo's stopover at the Roberts International Airport on
2 Monday 21 December 1999."

3 Mr Taylor, were you aware of this information being shared
4 by your foreign minister?

11:18:56 5 A. No foreign minister will give information unless he is
6 instructed. He was instructed to give this information to the
7 special representative of the Secretary-General.

8 Q. And we see "at our request"?

9 A. Yes.

11:19:15 10 Q. So this was information requested by the special
11 representative, yes?

12 A. Yeah, but there is a little nuance here. He may request
13 it, but getting it is another thing. So, yes, he requested it,
14 but upon instructions he was provided it.

11:19:34 15 Q. Upon instruction by whom?

16 A. My instruction. The foreign minister takes instruction
17 from the President.

18 Q. And why were you instructing him to provide this
19 information?

11:19:45 20 A. Because at all times we wanted to keep the special
21 representative who would report faithfully to his office, we
22 wanted them in the loop at all times, that there would be no
23 question about any one saying, "Oh, we did not know, we did not
24 know." So we wanted to keep the UN in the loop and we are
11:20:08 25 providing this information to them.

26 Q. "During President Obasanjo's stopover at the Roberts
27 International Airport on Monday 21 December 1999. The minister
28 indicated that the talks centred on the question of the
29 implementation of the Lome Peace Accord in Sierra Leone,

1 Liberia-Guinea relations and the issue of the convening of the
2 long awaited summit of the Mano River Union, which he elaborated
3 as follows:

4 Sierra Leone.

11:20:44 5 On the issue of the peace process in Sierra Leone,
6 President Taylor informed his guest that he had been engaged in
7 resolving the problems between Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie. It
8 was his assessment that Sam Bockarie was defying the orders of
9 the leader of his movement at a critical moment in the
11:21:08 10 implementation of the accord. Under these circumstances, he felt
11 that it was essential that the integrity of the accord be
12 protected by ensuring the continued participation of Sankoh as a
13 signatory to the agreement. He had thus reached the conclusion
14 that arrangements should be made to ensure that Sam Bockarie and
11:21:33 15 his immediate followers stay out of Sierra Leone until the end of
16 the disarmament process. President Taylor, however, indicated
17 that the arrangement would entail substantial expenditures which
18 Liberia alone could not shoulder. He therefore appealed to
19 President Obasanjo and other leaders in the region to assist his
11:21:59 20 country in meeting this challenge."

21 Now, we have already discussed the financial implications
22 of that, haven't we, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes, we have.

24 Q. "President Obasanjo welcomed President Taylor's initiative
11:22:15 25 and promised to approach other colleagues in the region so as to
26 solicit their support for such a worthy project."

27 Over the page, please:

28 "With regard to the Liberia-Guinea relations, President
29 Obasanjo briefed his host of the discussions he had held with

1 President Conte on the problems undermining normal relations
2 between the two countries. He indicated that President Conte had
3 informed him that there was no serious problem between the
4 countries and that the problem was essentially between him and
11:22:56 5 the Liberian leader. It was President Conte's contention that
6 their commitments to peace differed. The Nigerian leader
7 therefore appealed to President Taylor to do his utmost to
8 contribute to the enhancements of confidence building among the
9 two countries."

11:23:16 10 Let's look at that, please. Now, were relations between
11 Liberia and Guinea not normal at this time, Mr Taylor?

12 A. They were not.

13 Q. Why?

14 A. Well, you have these attacks coming out of Guinea. Conte
11:23:39 15 is denying that he is aware of them. He is not doing anything to
16 - at least they are continuing. We see it as not stopping them.
17 And you know Conte and I had this problem before when we were
18 just rebel leaders at the time. NPFL, he supported Alhaji
19 Kromah, and so this is why he is taking it - for him it's
11:24:11 20 personal. For me it's not. But relations were not - I would say
21 even the relationship with Kabbah was better than with Conte.

22 Q. Now, tell us, Mr Taylor, we discussed last week incursions
23 from Guinea in the August of 1999. Was that an isolated incident
24 or had those incursions been continuing?

11:24:31 25 A. We had, what, about two quick ones, and so it was - for us,
26 it was an ongoing situation.

27 Q. And did you regard it as President Conte had obviously
28 conveyed to President Obasanjo? Did you feel that it was just a
29 personal matter between you and President Conte?

1 A. No, I didn't feel that way. I regret that he felt that
2 way. I just - and I always gave Conte the benefit of the doubt.
3 Like I say, it is a forest region, so for me it was not personal.
4 And I still must say - even though he is late, I still must say I
11:25:19 5 had no evidence that Conte had directly supported the insurgency.
6 Some of these accusations as they come out, they come out to
7 flush ideas out and are not necessarily factual. And so in all
8 fairness to him, I still have no proof at that time that he was
9 in direct support of the insurgency, and so for me it was not
11:25:44 10 personal.

11 Q. "In reacting to President Conte's assessment of the state
12 of relations between the two countries, President Taylor admitted
13 that there was a degree of mistrust between him and the Guinean
14 leader. He argued, however, that the state of affairs has its
11:26:03 15 roots in the activities of Liberian dissidents operating out of
16 Guinea?

17 Mano River Union summit.

18 On the issue of the summit, President Obasanjo appealed to
19 President Taylor to agree to the convening of the proposed Mano
11:26:23 20 River Union summit in Conakry as suggested by President Kabbah.
21 While welcoming the idea of the convening of the summit itself,
22 President Taylor indicated to his guest that the new venue,
23 Conakry, was not acceptable to him. He further argued that
24 Liberia forfeited its initial opportunity to host the summit in
11:26:45 25 Monrovia because it was felt that its convening in Freetown would
26 have the advantage of giving a boost to the Sierra Leonean peace
27 process. The two leaders agreed that under the circumstances it
28 would be prudent to hold the summit in Abuja."

29 Why didn't you want to go to Conakry?

1 A. Look, the problem is that Conte, for me, had crossed a line
2 that I was not prepared to accept. We - remember, we had already
3 gone to Conakry for Mano River Union meetings. And the only
4 problem with Kabbah, he was maybe too afraid to tell Conte the
11:27:26 5 truth. And that's one of his faults, okay.

6 Q. Truth about what?

7 A. Well, he was afraid to confront Conte. The Mano River
8 Union meeting was scheduled for Monrovia. It was my time to host
9 the meeting. So I said to my colleagues, "Okay, gentlemen, look,
11:27:44 10 this is my time, but we are at a crucial time of the
11 Sierra Leonean peace process. Let's hold the meeting in Freetown
12 to give Kabbah a boost. Let's give Kabbah a boost at this time.
13 This would look good for him," that things are being normalised
14 in Sierra Leone, and so the Mano River Union is meeting there.

11:28:08 15 Conte says he is not going to Freetown. "We should hold
16 the meeting in Conakry." I said, "No, I am not going to" - I
17 told Conte, "I am going to have none of that. You've had this
18 meeting before and this is my meeting. So if I ask for us to go
19 to Conakry" - and if Kabbah had stood up and said, "Well, you
11:28:28 20 know, my colleague Taylor is right" - but I didn't expect that
21 from him anyway, when it comes to Conte. So I just told him,
22 "Well, if we can't hold it in Freetown, then let's go to Abuja."
23 That was it. And I think it was fair. Why would we hold every
24 Mano River Union meeting in Conakry? And he, Kabbah, sat there,
11:28:47 25 you know, having a good opportunity to show himself, refusing to
26 do that. So I said I was not going to have any of that, that we
27 would go to Abuja or I would not attend the meeting.

28 Q. Why wasn't Kabbah willing to stick his neck out, so to
29 speak?

1 A. Kabbah and Conte, business, I don't - really, I can't
2 really help the Court. But they were very close, very close.
3 Remember, Kabbah, during his exile, he stayed in Guinea. I guess
4 he always felt this deference to Lansana, that he didn't want to
11:29:28 5 challenge him. That's the best I can help with.

6 Q. "Minister Captan's observations.

7 Following his remarks on the issues which transpired in the
8 talks mentioned above, the minister underscored the risks that
9 Liberia was taking by according Sam Bockarie and his immediate
11:29:46 10 followers some sort of temporary asylum. He noted that the
11 decision was reached primarily because it would not be possible
12 to solve the problem by merely granting temporary asylum to
13 Bockarie alone, as one of his officers in the field could assume
14 the role of a field commander. It was also his contention that
11:30:09 15 Sam Bockarie did not seem to be willing to reside in another
16 country. In any case, the plan is to ensure that he lives in
17 Monrovia and not in the hinterland, so that the government can
18 keep an eye on his movement. He appealed to the United Nations
19 to assist Liberia in meeting this challenge."

11:30:31 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Again, I can't see the clock from here,
21 Mr President.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, it's almost right on time,
23 Mr Griffiths.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: We will look at this after the break. I'm
11:30:41 25 grateful.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will take the short adjournment and
27 resume at 12 o'clock.

28 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

29 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

3 Q. Mr Taylor, before the break we were looking at the last
4 paragraph in that document dated 22 December 1999, yes?

12:00:08 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when your foreign minister underscored the
7 risks that Liberia was taking by according Sam Bockarie and his
8 immediate followers temporary asylum, what risks are we talking
9 about?

12:00:30 10 A. Well, there are several risks. Here we are being accused
11 from almost everyone within Sierra Leone for assisting the
12 rebels. Internally we have our own problems with our
13 ex-combatants. We have not properly demobilised them. We're
14 about to bring in a whole new set of combatants from another

12:01:09 15 country. Hardly any means to take care of them. They could
16 come, secretly deal in the way and probably go back and we would
17 be blamed for assisting them in their return. Everything was
18 possible in terms of Liberia getting a bad name, getting mixed up
19 again with new - even renewed accusations. It was a major risk,
12:01:46 20 but we were prepared to take it in the interests of peace because
21 we had said all along that Liberia could never enjoy peace unless
22 there was peace in Sierra Leone.

23 And so there are these kinds of risks that were involved in
24 these actions for peace that were real that could have, what you
12:02:09 25 say, backfired on us. They could have backfired by these people
26 coming in, Bockarie getting out of place, maybe disappearing.
27 The combatants going back in. These are all serious risks
28 regarding our own image internationally, what it would mean to
29 us. All of these were very, very, very present.

1 Q. Now, the penultimate sentence in that paragraph: "In any
2 case, the plan is to ensure that he lives in Monrovia and not in
3 the hinterland." Why?

4 A. Oh, in Monrovia he would be observed. In fact, he would
12:02:57 5 have security assigned to him, quote unquote, for his protection
6 but actually the security that's assigned would also be
7 individuals that would be watching his every move. And even
8 though we did not expressly tell him that he could not leave the
9 city of Monrovia, there was always a reason for him not to leave
12:03:21 10 Monrovia, and that's the way it is put sometimes. That is, if
11 you want to go someplace that is - let's say if he wanted to
12 travel in the direction of Lofa, of course we would tell him that
13 there was no need. What you are looking for, it may be further
14 south. I mean all these kinds of things. But we didn't want him
12:03:44 15 living in - the hinterland is what we call the interior where he
16 could vanish without trace and then we would be blamed again for
17 assisting in that process.

18 So he would be kept in the city. He would be given
19 adequate security in the city. He would be watched. His every
12:04:03 20 move would be monitored that we could account for him at all
21 times and in fact that did happen. Kabbah spoke to him while he
22 was there. Other officials came to Liberia from the
23 United States. Jesse Jackson spoke to him. The US ambassador
24 spoke to him. So we kept - that was the whole purpose of keeping
12:04:23 25 him in focus. That's why we said Monrovia.

26 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor. Where was he in fact accommodated
27 in Liberia?

28 A. What we did when he finally - he just went, packed and came
29 back. We gave him - we leased three buildings in a compound

1 fenced in - fenced in just off Congo Town near the area of
2 Liberia called Paynesville. It's a fenced-in three compound and
3 that's where we put him, his immediate family, and some of the
4 principal combatants that he brought.

12:05:16 5 But we pull another one. The granting of citizenship like
6 I said was also for control. So what we did immediately also, we
7 granted them citizenship but not - as for him, we excluded him
8 not from citizenship, from certain training programmes, but all
9 of the physical and able-bodied combatants that he brought with
12:05:39 10 that citizenship, we inducted them into a training programme of
11 the ATU and they were given real training, proper training at the
12 level that can be compared anywhere. We hired trained military
13 people from outside and put them in that training and under that
14 we had control because income was not forthcoming. Most of the
12:06:10 15 West African countries I guess were too busy and maybe they felt
16 that we could handle it. You know we were sweating under the
17 weight, but we were prepared to do it for peace. We put them
18 into the army, kept him away from them, took the boys - the
19 military personnel that he brought with him, we in effect took
12:06:32 20 them from under his command.

21 Now, I hope the Court understands what I'm talking about.
22 The process of putting those combatants that came with
23 Sam Bockarie into the ATU was meant to take them from under his
24 direct command. He was not put into the ATU. That way he had no
12:06:56 25 control over them and he could not order them. So these were - I
26 have described a series of steps taken in that control process.

27 Q. Because as members of the ATU from whom would they take
28 orders?

29 A. They took orders from their commander. They started off

1 with my son and then it changed later on to General Dgiba, but
2 under the ATU - and we were not talking about no six week - we
3 are talking about they were trained as professional military
4 people with a professional programme by a general and the whole
12:07:37 5 team of officers and they were very disciplined people. I think
6 one of them, to the best of my recollection he is not a protected
7 witness that appeared before this Court, did in my recollection
8 testify as to their training.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you told us that Kabbah spoke to Bockarie.
12:08:02 10 How?

11 A. Via telephone. At some point later on, not at that
12 particular period. I'm just trying to say that the process was
13 so controlled that even Kabbah spoke to him at some later point.

14 Q. And Jesse Jackson spoke to him as well?

12:08:19 15 A. That is correct. That is correct. In fact, he met with
16 them in Monrovia, a US delegation, including Jackson, including
17 Howard Jetter. They met with Bockarie while he was in exile in
18 Liberia.

19 Q. And what about the US ambassador?

12:08:40 20 A. Oh, yes, Bismarck Myrick, yes.

21 Q. Did any of those combatants who came with Sam Bockarie
22 become members of the SSS?

23 A. No, not to my recollection, no. They were all - the
24 combatants were placed in the ATU, to the best of my
12:09:12 25 recollection. If any of them were used in the SSS as maybe
26 bodyguards to - maybe to Benjamin or somebody, I'm not too - I'm
27 not - I don't know the details of that. But most of them were
28 put into the ATU.

29 Q. And another matter, Mr Taylor: When Sam Bockarie came to

1 Liberia in late December 1999, did he come armed?

2 A. Those - yes. The individuals that crossed the border, they
3 had some difficulties and they had to protect themselves almost
4 to the border.

12:09:57 5 Q. What difficulties?

6 A. By this time, tension had developed between the pro-Sankoh
7 and the anti-Sankoh groups. And as Bockarie was pulling out, by
8 that time, Issa Sesay, the most senior personnel, was so upset
9 with Bockarie because of his behaviour, and I think what Bockarie
10 said, there was information that, I think, Issa was supposed to
11 be on his way to attack him or what, but they came into Liberia
12 with arms. At the border, they were all disarmed. All of the
13 arms and ammunition brought were taken away at the border under
14 the control of the Government of Liberia.

12:11:01 15 Q. When you say that Issa was upset with him, did that reach
16 the stage of violence or what?

17 A. What was reported to me, and I don't know the details
18 inside, was that Issa was amassing to come to attack him. This
19 is what Bockarie had said. And so they were, you know, moving
20 out, even though he had made it very clear to so many people that
21 he was leaving. But I think fear of this - I'm not sure if they
22 actually came to blows inside, but it is believed that Issa was
23 upset that Sam - Issa and some of the other officers - that he
24 had disrespected Sankoh to a point where he had to be extracted.

12:11:45 25 Q. Did you send any of your officials to meet Sam Bockarie at
26 the border?

27 A. Yes. I don't - I don't quite remember all of the details
28 of who actually went, but at my level, orders were given to
29 receive them. I don't know exactly. I can't recollect who went,

1 but that type of situation of that movement, I'm sure Benjamin
2 Yeaten was involved, because he was responsible for the security
3 of RUF personnel going all the way back from the initial time
4 Bockarie came into the country and all other individuals that
12:12:30 5 came. The Secret Service, the SSS, was responsible for their
6 protection. And it could have very well included other
7 officials, but I don't know. But he would be one of those, and
8 I'm sure the defence ministry commander in that area would
9 probably be involved. I don't know the mechanics, but the orders
12:12:52 10 were from him directly.

11 Q. And another detail you could help us with: By this stage,
12 Mr Taylor, December 1999, you've explained that Bockarie was
13 accommodated near Paynesville.

14 A. That is correct.

12:13:06 15 Q. On the outskirts of Monrovia.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So what had happened to the guesthouse on Tubman Boulevard
18 by this stage?

19 A. By this stage, the guesthouse remained an RUF guesthouse.

12:13:21 20 Q. It was still being used?

21 A. Still being used by the RUF. Sam Bockarie was no longer
22 RUF.

23 Q. Did any of Bockarie's men stay at the guesthouse?

24 A. No, to the best of my recollection, no. There was such bad
12:13:41 25 blood between them by this time, I don't think they would go near
26 that guesthouse. I can't be certain. But then again, like I'm
27 saying, I can't be certain because these boys, you would not
28 believe how these fellows behaved. There were RUF people at the
29 guesthouse, I mean '98, that were talking to people at the Sierra

1 Leonean embassy. I mean, these boys - these people, you never
2 can tell what is what.

3 So some of the very combatants that came along with
4 Bockarie, maybe have - still had some friends on the other side
12:14:12 5 and saw no need not to speak to them. You'd be surprised at what
6 these boys - these boys fight, shoot at each other in the morning
7 and in the afternoon have lunch together. It's just difficult to
8 understand how people behave.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, did you provide radio equipment to
12:14:31 10 Sam Bockarie at his compound?

11 A. No. If Sam Bockarie had a radio at his compound, it was
12 not with the knowledge of the government. There was no need for
13 Foday Sankoh - I mean, for Sam Bockarie to be in touch with
14 anybody. I've heard some evidence to that, but we did not
12:14:51 15 provide it to him, no.

16 Q. Did you provide him with other assistance such as vehicles?

17 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. I - we gave Sam Bockarie - I gave him a
18 jeep. We provided an monthly stipend for Bockarie.

19 Q. How much?

12:15:19 20 A. We were giving Sam Bockarie, if I'm not mistaken, up to
21 about \$1,000 a month for he and his immediate family. The other
22 individuals with him, some of them got \$100, \$200. Those that
23 were in the ATU received the military pay, which was pretty good
24 at that time. An officer cadet in the ATU could have received as
12:15:42 25 much as \$300, \$400 a month. So they were well paid. That was
26 also a way of reducing the burden on the government.

27 Q. Was Bockarie provided things like medicine?

28 A. Oh, yes. If he needed assistance for the children and
29 family, yes, that assistance was given to him. When Bockarie

1 came to Liberia, I met with him. I was told and led to believe
2 by him that he had no money and that he had nothing. We did not
3 go investigating him, what he had or didn't have. He probably
4 very well could have been lying. But he was a guest now of the
12:16:26 5 Government of Liberia, so we provided food, rice, on a monthly
6 basis, a little stipend for him, to make sure that things were
7 calm until the disarmament period was over.

8 Q. Now, was it not an option, Mr Taylor, to just have Bockarie
9 come to Liberia without all of his entourage as well, 200-300
12:16:56 10 people? Wasn't that a possibility?

11 A. No. The bad blood that had built up over the periods
12 beginning October into November into December had reached a very
13 serious point. The camps were divided, the RUF was divided. And
14 after several hours of discussions on the first trip between
12:17:25 15 Sankoh and Bockarie and by the second trip, the belligerence on
16 the part of Bockarie, that was very different, it was apparent
17 that there were two sides in the RUF. Now, for us in ECOWAS,
18 that would have meant a new agreement, and we were not prepared
19 to permit a new agreement by having Sam Bockarie not disarm and
12:17:50 20 having all this problem. And so leaving anybody behind could
21 have resulted into some form of violence. And so they - what you
22 will call the loyalists, felt that coming to Liberia was in
23 effect protecting their lives from danger that they perceived -
24 at least, I would say, that they perceived had they remained in
12:18:21 25 Sierra Leone.

26 Q. Now, this removal of Bockarie, was it discussed with
27 Kabbah?

28 A. Oh, Kabbah knew that very well. Oh, yes. Kabbah knew very
29 well, yes.

1 Q. Was it discussed with Sankoh?

2 A. Yes, Sankoh agreed. Remember now, Sankoh and Bockarie are
3 in Monrovia at the time. He agreed that - Sankoh was anxious,
4 from what we saw, to begin the disarmament process and to get the
12:18:44 5 peace process going, and a little shocked, as he put it, that
6 Bockarie had grown so - I mean, at a level where he was prepared
7 to disrespect him. So for Sankoh, this was a welcomed
8 development, that Bockarie could leave and not put up any more -
9 what he saw as a challenge to his authority.

12:19:07 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I don't think you got an
11 answer to your question, whether this was discussed with Kabbah.

12 THE WITNESS: I said yes.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Knowing and discussing, in my view, are
14 two different things.

12:19:20 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Was it discussed with President Kabbah?

17 A. Yes, it was discussed with President Kabbah. That's true,
18 your Honour.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move on, can I ask, please, that
12:19:42 20 that code cable, dated 22 December 1999, from Felix Downes-Thomas
21 to Prendergast, be marked for identification MFI-119, please.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, marked MFI-119.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, following the extraction of Bockarie, did
12:20:16 25 that totally solve the difficulties in Sierra Leone?

26 A. No. No, it did not. It did not.

27 Q. Did you thereafter receive any further communication from
28 Foday Sankoh?

29 A. Yes. We received - this time it is a communication to

1 ECOWAS detailing problems in the - the agreement and what Kabbah
2 was doing, some of the defaults, the cracks in the agreement.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'll just interrupt you there for a
4 moment. That last document that was marked for identification, I
12:21:03 5 notice it's got a --

6 MR GRIFFITHS: There's a handwritten note behind it, we can
7 ignore that.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Well, that document marked
9 MFI-119 does not include the handwritten note behind it.

12:21:19 10 Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes:

12 Q. Mr Taylor, can we look behind divider 69, please. Do you
13 have it?

14 A. Yes, I do.

12:21:36 15 Q. Is that the letter you're referring to?

16 A. Yes. This is a document now not to - this is a document to
17 ECOWAS that is addressing the different fault lines as Sankoh
18 sees it in the whole agreement.

19 Q. Yes. Now, let's have a look at this document. We see it's
12:21:57 20 dated 27 December 1999. Now, pausing there, by this stage has
21 Bockarie been extracted?

22 A. By December 27, 1999, yes.

23 Q. "Violations of the Lome Peace Agreement. Attached is the
24 position of the Revolutionary United Front on the violations of
12:22:22 25 the Lome Peace Agreement. The RUF is hereby requesting through
26 this medium that serious and urgent action be taken to correct
27 these points raised as a matter of concern in order to give
28 lasting and sustainable peace to the people of Sierra Leone."

29 Now, let us pause and note that by this stage it's the

1 Revolutionary United Front party, as we can see from the heading,
2 yes, Mr Taylor?

3 A. That is correct.

12:23:01

4 Q. And we see that it's a letter addressed to, amongst others,
5 President Kabbah, President Eyadema, yes?

6 A. Yes.

12:23:28

7 Q. Yourself, Blaise Compaore, Obasanjo, Jerry Rawlings,
8 President Bedie, Adeniji, the British high commissioner, the
9 United States of America's ambassador to Sierra Leone, the
10 Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations, et cetera, and
11 if we go over the page it appears to a number of African
12 countries, Republic of Russia and so on, so on, and so forth,
13 yes.

14 A. Yes.

12:23:45

15 Q. We won't go through all of them. Let's go immediately to
16 the first page of this document. And we see that it's headed
17 "Position paper on the various violations in the Lome Peace
18 Agreement signed on 7 July 1999 by His Excellency Alhaji Dr Ahmad
19 Tejan Kabbah and Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh":

12:24:16

20 "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (now
21 transformed into a political party named the Revolutionary United
22 Front Party) mindful of the peace agreement signed on 7 July 1999
23 at Lome, Togo, with the Government of the Republic of Sierra
24 Leone. The RUF is deeply concerned about the various violations
25 within this agreement which is not currently being implemented
26 according to its spirit and letter. In this regard we wish to
27 bring to the attention of the Government of Sierra Leone, the
28 moral guarantors, civil society of Sierra Leone and the
29 international supporters the following issues of concern:

12:24:44

1 Part One, Article II - ceasefire monitoring.

2 The Revolutionary United Front is deeply concerned about
3 the nonfunctioning of this committee. Representatives from the
4 RUF are ready to be assigned to their various areas of location.

12:25:26 5 The RUF in this instance will only accept ceasefire violations
6 that have been monitored, verified and reported by the ceasefire
7 monitoring committee personnel assigned on the ground which is in
8 consonance with the Lome Peace Agreement. The RUF has noticed
9 that other groups are in the habit of using the name of the RUF
12:25:50 10 to attack various locations in Sierra Leone which has caused the
11 RUF to have a negative image; which in our opinion, have nothing
12 to be responsible for since July 7, 1999. The RUF
13 representatives on this committee are ready to take up their
14 positions at their assigned locations."

12:26:13 15 Pausing there, Mr Taylor. There appears to be a suggestion
16 there that violence is still occurring in Sierra Leone?

17 A. That is correct, yes.

18 Q. On what kind of scale is that occurring still?

19 A. Well, I couldn't really get into the details but only from
12:26:40 20 a little briefing that we still have, you know, trouble inside
21 Sierra Leone. The real details of the violence I couldn't get
22 into the details of that, but they still have problems.

23 Q. "In light of this issue under review, the RUF will not
24 allow any further deployment of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL officials
12:27:08 25 until the JMC and CMC are set up to function in accordance with
26 the terms of the Lome Peace Agreement."

27 I think CMC is the ceasefire monitoring committee?

28 A. Uh-huh.

29 Q. But I'm struggling to see where the JMC comes from?

1 A. I think that should be joint monitoring committee, JMC.

2 Q. Joint monitoring committee, I'm grateful:

3 "Are set up to function in accordance with the terms of the
4 Lome Peace Agreement so as to attain everlasting peace in

12:27:57 5 Sierra Leone. The joint monitoring commission, according to

6 Article II, 3 should receive funds and other logistics from the
7 international community to enable it to carry out its mandate.

8 This should be done by the Government of Sierra Leone and the
9 RUF Sierra Leone as agreed in the Lome Peace Agreement. So far

12:28:18 10 the efforts made by the RUF to be involved in this venture has

11 not received any positive encouragement.

12 Article III - transformation of the RUF Sierra Leone into a
13 political party.

14 The Revolutionary United Front Party has registered and
15 duly received its certificate from the interim national electoral
16 commission. However, the RUF would like to draw attention to

12:28:34 17 the fact that violations exist in Article III, 2 and 4, of the

18 Lome Peace Agreement in that it has so far not received

19 unhindered access to the media and the Government of Sierra Leone

12:28:57 20 has not assisted in any way to mobilise resources for the

21 purposes of enabling the RUF to function effectively as a

22 political party on all fronts as stated in (i) to (iii) of the

23 agreement. The party has only received a satellite telephone

24 from the British high commissioner, His Excellency Peter Penfold.

12:29:22 25 Other items to be received from the DFID for chairman Sankoh's

26 home and office are still pending since November 2, 1999.

27 Article IV - enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public
28 office.

29 The RUF feels that the delaying tactics employed by the

1 Government of Sierra Leone to appoint RUF/AFRC nominees into
2 positions in parastatals, diplomacy and any other public sector
3 is totally against the letter and spirit of the Lome Peace
4 Agreement. His Excellency, the President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan
12:30:13 5 Kabbah has not met with the leader of the RUF/AFRC to discuss and
6 agree on the appointments of RUF/AFRC nominees into the positions
7 aforementioned. This we believe is a deliberate act which will
8 subsequently not auger well for the smooth implementation of the
9 Lome Peace Agreement.

12:30:38 10 The RUF/AFRC further notes that most of those detained at the
11 central prisons, Pademba Road, have been reinstated and in some
12 instances have received all backlog of salaries and are presently
13 in active public service whilst others have not been reinstated.
14 However, there are names of RUF/AFRC nominees which had earlier on
12:31:00 15 been presented for appointment into positions as aforementioned
16 in this article who are still waiting on the Government of
17 Sierra Leone.

18 Legal impediments still exist in the form of the ban on
19 travelling placed on all RUF/SL/AFRC personnel which the RUF/AFRC
12:31:21 20 believes should be lifted immediately and permanently."

21 Now, Mr Taylor, let's have a look at that, please. Is that
22 the travel ban imposed by the United Nations?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. So it was still in force at this stage?

12:31:38 25 A. Oh, yes.

26 Q. So help us, how was Bockarie able to travel to Liberia
27 then?

28 A. Because the sanctions committee had to approve it. We had
29 to get the approval for him to move out.

1 Q. And did you obtain their approval?

2 A. Oh, yes. That's why Downes-Thomas was involved and if I'm
3 not mistaken I could have spoken to the Secretary-General about
4 this. I'm not too certain, but we did get their approval.

12:32:05 5 Q. Over the page, please:

6 "Article VI - commission for the consolidation of peace.

7 The RUF is greatly concerned on appointments made,
8 especially in line with the chairmanship of the commission for
9 the consolidation of peace, which is in gross contravention of
10 the Lome Peace Agreement. The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel
11 Johnny Paul Koroma was done solely by the President without
12 notifying the leadership of the RUF.

13 Realistically and practically speaking the RUF is deeply
14 concerned about the nonperformance of the commission for the
15 consolidation of peace. This commission is yet to create the
16 various commissions and committees and ensure their positive
17 implementation according to the terms of the Lome Peace
18 Agreement. This commission is very important for the smooth and
19 effective implementation of the Lome Peace Agreement, but it
20 seems it is in a stagnant position which the RUF believe is
21 delaying the peace process immensely.

22 According to the RUF's representative to the commission
23 for the consolidation of peace, no proper office space has been
24 identified and the commission is not operational. The RUF
25 speedily awaits the immediate and effective operation of the CCP
26 and its attendant commissions and committees.

27 Article VII - commission for the management of strategic
28 resources, national reconstruction and development.

29 So far office space as befitting the status of the chairman

1 of the CMRRD as status of Vice-President of the Republic of
2 Sierra Leone has not yet been identified and the commission has
3 not yet been formed according to the terms of the Lome Peace
4 Agreement. The RUF has now transformed itself into a political
12:34:17 5 party as required and is awaiting the subsequent formation of the
6 commission as it has the list of its names of representatives.

7 Efforts have been made by the RUF to work in close
8 cooperation with the Government of Sierra Leone towards the
9 successful commencement and operations of this commission to no
12:34:39 10 seeming avail."

11 Then we see at 6:

12 "Council of elders and religious leaders.

13 The representative to this council is awaiting the
14 formation in order to actively participate in its operations."

12:34:56 15 Then we see:

16 "National electoral commission.

17 The RUF notes with concern the fact that it has not yet
18 been contacted with regards to the setting up of the national
19 electoral commission as per the terms of the Lome Peace
12:35:10 20 Agreement. The RUF also wants to note that the training of
21 election officers has commenced and the RUF has yet to benefit
22 from this training."

23 "Article XIII - transformation and new mandate of ECOMOG.

24 The two additional troop contributions from ECOWAS is still
12:35:34 25 awaited by the RUF according to the Lome Peace Agreement."

26 Then article I think that should be XIV:

27 "New mandate of UNOMSIL.

28 According to the sincere opinion of the RUF, the change of
29 mandate from UNOMSIL to UNAMSIL is threatening. This is because

1 there is a move from diplomatic to a military option which the
2 RUFPP believes should be based only on the diplomatic option so as
3 to encourage dialogue between different representatives present
4 at the DDR centres."

12:36:18 5 "Article XVI - encampment, disarmament, demobilisation and
6 reintegration.

7 The emphasis from the Government of Sierra Leone on the
8 Revolutionary United Front Party towards this article is seen as
9 being too strong on the DDR and seeming deliberately ignoring
10 other articles of the Lome Peace Agreement which, in the view of
11 the RUFPP, should work simultaneously in order to bring lasting
12 and sustainable peace to the people of Sierra Leone.

13 It has also come to the notice of the RUFPP that 6,059
14 soldiers and officers have so far been newly trained in a way and
15 manner which does not reflect the geopolitical structure of
16 Sierra Leone. The RUFPP is calling for an immediate halt to
17 further training of the new Sierra Leone Army in order for all
18 the parties of the agreement to meet and decide on the ratio of
19 ex-combatants which are to be conscripted. At this instance, the
12:37:05 20 RUFPP is suggesting a limit of 12,000 for the total strength of
21 the new Sierra Leone Army."

22 Then this: "Withdrawal of Mercenaries.

23 It has been brought to the attention of the RUFPP through
24 reliable security reports that foreigners coming to invest in
12:37:49 25 mining companies and other investment interests are bringing in
26 their own private security guards (mercenaries) which the
27 Government of Sierra Leone intends using as a rapid deployment
28 force to cause further instability in the forthcoming electoral
29 process. Infiltration of other mercenaries into the Kamajors and

1 STF setups are also noted here for reference. These foreign
2 guards and mercenaries are presently located on Bonthe Island,
3 Ribbi, Sierra Rutile and other sites in and around Sierra Leone.
4 The RUF believe that the aforementioned are brought in by the
12:38:35 5 Government of Sierra Leone. Other sources say, former civil
6 fighters, specifically the DONSOS, are now incorporated into
7 UNAMSIL for the purpose of retrieving information and
8 subsequently acting as agents in the interest of the Government
9 of Sierra Leone."

12:38:58 10 Pause there, Mr Taylor.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was there an issue here as to the further
13 recruitment of Liberians into these private security firms
14 referred to as mercenaries in this letter at this time?

12:39:16 15 A. Well, yes, I think this is the reference. That's why he
16 mentioned STF, yes.

17 Q. "Article XIII - Guarantee of the Security of Displaced
18 Persons and Refugees.

19 Several violations on the Lome Peace Agreement have
12:39:39 20 occurred in this instance and one such is the Bailor Barrie
21 Displaced Camp event. The leader and members of the RUF have
22 made all efforts they could to alleviate the plight of these
23 displaced persons in their own way which in the spirit and letter
24 of the Lome Peace Agreement. This is an act that should be done
12:40:02 25 by the Government of Sierra Leone. To exemplify this, the leader
26 of the RUF visited the chairman of the present national
27 commission for resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction
28 and pleaded on their behalf to guarantee them their basic human
29 rights. The leader also provided food and medicine for these

1 displaced persons. The RUF hereby emphasises that the displaced
2 persons and refugees must be guaranteed total security as per the
3 terms of the Lome Peace Agreement."

4 And then reference is made to the guarantee and promotion
12:40:42 5 of human rights, human rights commission, human rights violations
6 and humanitarian relief, which I don't proposing to into unless
7 asked to do so.

8 Then over the page we see "Withdrawal of Mercenaries: The
9 RUF is still insisting that 'all mercenaries, in any guise ...'
12:41:16 10 be withdrawn with immediate effect from Sierra Leone."

11 Now, can we just go back, please, Mr Taylor, to page 4 of
12 this document?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And that paragraph 11?

12:41:39 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. Now, you see that the allegation being made there by
17 Foday Sankoh on behalf of the RUF, three lines from the bottom,
18 is "that the aforementioned are brought in by the Government of
19 Sierra Leone". Do you see that?

12:42:00 20 A. Yes, I do.

21 Q. And earlier that "the Government of Sierra Leone intends
22 using as a rapid deployment force ..." Were you aware of this?

23 A. No. Quite frankly, I was not.

24 Q. So that if Mr Sankoh is right, the Government of
12:42:25 25 Sierra Leone at this time is busy recruiting mercenaries in order
26 to augment its own military capacity?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Now, what effect would such a development have on peace in
29 the area, Mr Taylor?

1 A. If this is true, of course, it would have a chilling effect
2 on the peace process and probably could be used as an excuse by
3 Sankoh not to disarm, and so this would be serious.

4 Q. Were you aware of any such recruitment going on?

12:43:11 5 A. Well, in terms of new recruitment, no, I was not aware, but
6 I had been aware for some time that there were Liberians that
7 were being used in Sierra Leone by the government. We were aware
8 of the presence of the STF and the movement of Liberians in and
9 out. Remember, we talked about Liberians being a part of the
10 Kamajors that had been recruited by ECOMOG, so we were aware of
11 the presence. As to new recruitment, I can't speak to.

12 Q. Let us just complete this document by noting - going to
13 page 6, that amongst the other issues raised were guarantee of
14 the security of displaced persons and refugees; over the page,
15 the special fund for war victims; education and health; and joint
16 implementation committee. And the letter concludes in this way:

17 "In reviewing the above points and issues of concern
18 regarding the Lome Peace Agreement, the Revolutionary United
19 Front party wishes to bring to attention the fact that nearly six
12:44:39 20 months have elapsed since the signing on 7 July 1999 with little
21 or no positive results in concurrent performance on all the
22 articles aforementioned. The emphasis on DDR is not the answer
23 to peace in Sierra Leone, but the committed participation of all
24 parties to the Lome Peace Agreement, along with the encouragement
12:45:06 25 of the moral guarantors and the assistance from the international
26 supporters, is a clear manifestation to the Lome Peace Agreement.

27 The RUF also believes that unless and until the other 36
28 articles of the Lome Peace Agreement are met, no proper peace
29 would be expected in Sierra Leone. So we are, therefore, urging

1 the Government of Sierra Leone, the international community,
2 civil society and the moral guarantors to please advise all
3 parties concerned to play fair in the full implementation of the
4 Lome Peace Agreement.

12:45:49 5 To conclude, the RUF is urging all parties concerned to
6 please see to it that every part, particle, article or portion of
7 the July 7, 1999, Lome Peace Agreement is fully implemented in
8 our beloved country in the spirit of peace, love and unity so as
9 to create a peaceful environment in our beloved country,
12:46:18 10 Sierra Leone."

11 Now, what did you think when you received that letter,
12 Mr Taylor?

13 A. Frankly, I smelled trouble. I got very concerned. And as
14 one of the guarantors - when he talks about the guarantors here,
12:46:42 15 he is talking about those that pushed through this agreement -
16 were very concerned. But I was very - it's like that typical
17 thing, "Oh, oh, here comes problems." That's what came to my
18 mind.

19 Q. Now, did you discuss these concerns with your colleagues on
12:47:00 20 the Committee of Six and within ECOWAS?

21 A. Of course, we did. Yes, I did.

22 Q. And was there a consensus as to what approach should be
23 adopted?

24 A. Well, it was said that everything had to be done. We had
12:47:22 25 to use all of our wit to making sure that this agreement worked
26 and that we would stop at nothing in making sure that it worked.
27 And so we went to work immediately, you know, as we normally do,
28 exchanging telephone calls and trying to come up with ideas and
29 suggestions with everybody saying, "Listen, this is still your

1 baby. Do what you got to do and just keep us informed." So we
2 went to work immediately in trying to resolve this issue - these
3 new issues being raised by Sankoh and trying to ascertain these
4 were not just bogus issues he was raising but that he was
12:48:14 5 genuine, because while he raised these issues, strangely, we got
6 to find out that Johnny Paul Koroma, who had become chairman of
7 the commission for the consolidation of peace, had a different
8 view. So he had a different view from Sankoh's views.

9 Q. And what was his view?

12:48:38 10 A. Well, he had - he was more amenable to the agreement and
11 saying that, "Look, we got to move forward," that Sankoh is
12 trying to tip toe out of the agreement, and he felt that no
13 delays should be accepted; that disarmament should start. So we
14 then knew that there were differences of opinions on the ground,
12:49:06 15 and then we went into full gear in trying to make sure that the
16 disarmament did start.

17 Q. So, Mr Taylor, is it the case, then, given that you were
18 getting a conflicting report from Johnny Paul Koroma, that there
19 were concerns even at this stage about Foday Sankoh's commitment
12:49:26 20 to the agreement?

21 A. Oh, yes. I had those concerns, and I - in fact, I made
22 those concerns very, very clear to the - I could remember I had a
23 meeting with the - sent, with my frustration, I sent for the
24 special representative, after I told my colleagues that I felt
12:49:54 25 that - you know, in fact, my exact words were, "I'm fed up with
26 this Sankoh business." And I said that I think Sankoh is pulling
27 a fast one. He is not committed as he wants us to believe, and
28 that it was no longer acceptable that we should accept any
29 excuses from him. And I made that very clear to the United

1 Nations, of what my views were, and my colleagues, and it's very
2 well documented, my conversations. And I asked that it be passed
3 on that I started developing doubts about his commitment to this
4 process, and I conveyed that to the representative and my
12:50:33 5 colleagues - the representative of the Secretary-General and my
6 colleagues.

7 Q. Now, we'll come to that in a little while.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: But can I, before we move on, ask that this
9 document be marked for identification? So it's the letter from
12:50:48 10 Foday Sankoh to various Heads of State, governments and
11 organisations, dated 27 December 1999, be marked for
12 identification MFI-120, please.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
14 identification MFI-120.

12:51:08 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can I just advise the following: We've
16 looked at all of the photographs which follow hereafter in this
17 bundle, so we can now put this bundle away:

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, before we move into 2000, can you just
19 briefly summarise for us, please, 1999, from your point of view?

12:51:47 20 A. Well, 1999 for me was a very - for all of us, I would say
21 was a very troubling period. Here I am, the villain, so to
22 speak, in West Africa and I'm seized with all of the difficulties
23 in trying to work to bring peace in Sierra Leone. And if we
24 remember, in January we wake up on 6 January with the unfortunate
12:52:33 25 attack on Freetown. We begin to work around that to - with us
26 having to report and do a full statement to the Secretary-General
27 and everybody about trying to get away from all of the
28 accusations coming out - I mean, against us as being involved,
29 which we were not. We are very successful in trying to organise

1 a ceasefire agreement by late - by middle - a little later in
2 January we are able to at least obtain a commitment to a
3 ceasefire, but we don't actually get it going until a little
4 later on in February/March, where ECOWAS Heads of State meet.

12:53:32 5 The Secretary-General of the United Nations is fully engaged in
6 Sierra Leone.

7 Lucky for us, and I'm using the word "lucky" because I
8 think it's luck under some of these conditions, we begin a
9 process of trying to realistically bring peace into Sierra Leone
12:53:53 10 by setting up a time for the negotiations of a ceasefire, and
11 that process begins for us in April, where we are able to get a
12 ceasefire going.

13 While that is going on, for me in Liberia we come under our
14 first incursion into Liberia in April. That is in Voinjama. So
12:54:24 15 while I'm dealing with Voinjama I'm also dealing with trying to
16 secure this peace in Sierra Leone because I know that everything
17 that is happening in Liberia is as a result of Sierra Leone.

18 So we begin the process. We are tied up throughout April
19 in getting Sierra Leoneans for this agreement moving to Lome,
12:54:50 20 process them up, get them through Liberia into Lome, send my
21 former foreign minister, the late D Musuleng-Cooper, into Lome to
22 make sure that this agreement is put together. We finally get a
23 ceasefire around May/June that leads into the final - the
24 discussions into the agreement which we finally get in July. But
12:55:22 25 before that happens I have to rush back out of Liberia to Lome to
26 try to get this agreement put together. We finally get the
27 agreement signed, only to have the difficulties in trying to get
28 Foday Sankoh to go to Sierra Leone - to go to Freetown to
29 implement the agreement.

1 While that is going on, a big situation breaks out into
2 Sierra Leone with the West Side Boys. They take UN individuals
3 in August or thereabouts. We have to negotiate that process. Go
4 in, negotiate and get the hostages released, the officials
12:56:10 5 released, and then bring Johnny Paul Koroma to Liberia, taking
6 all of these risks. With the consent of everybody, the United
7 Nations, ECOWAS and everybody, we bring Johnny Paul Koroma in.
8 That is followed by his own men, where we bring his men in from
9 Okra Hills. I meet with everybody, talk to them. Some of them
12:56:40 10 go back. Some of them remain. Foday Sankoh eventually comes
11 into Liberia in late September, but before that comes we get a
12 second attack.

13 So I'm working with Sierra Leone. I'm working with
14 Liberia. Fighting off - trying to fend off all these accusations
12:57:02 15 about what we are not doing. There's supposed to be arms going
16 in that we are not involved with. We work successfully, bring
17 Johnny Paul Koroma together with Foday Sankoh, make peace between
18 them. We are very successful in getting the problem of the SLA
19 resolved. Johnny Paul Koroma gets a position which is the
12:57:32 20 chairman for the consolidation of peace, and I think in a
21 document that we just read from Foday Sankoh about the
22 appointment of Johnny Paul Koroma as chairman for the
23 consolidation of peace and stating that he was not consulted, I
24 think that's a little disingenuous because he was aware of that
12:57:55 25 position before they left Monrovia on 2 October.

26 We finally get them into Sierra Leone. It's still not
27 working. I'm seized with that matter where my colleagues are
28 calling me, the UN calling. We've gotten letters of commendation
29 from all around, Kofi Annan. We've seen commendations that have

1 come from other areas. We have to now go in again and deal with
2 Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie in trying to get the disarmament
3 process going because we are determined. We fight very hard. We
4 cannot break it, so we decide to break it by all means. And,
12:58:39 5 quite frankly, we're being diplomatic here, but we really had to
6 threaten Bockarie to get him out of Sierra Leone and some of the
7 things that I've heard people describing here, like I say they
8 really are not aware what of happened. Bockarie was promised -
9 he was threatened and then promised some assistance upon leaving.
12:59:07 10 We finally get him out, only to find out that Foday Sankoh is not
11 moving forward with his end of the bargain, and we begin to
12 create doubts in our minds about his own sincerity in dealing
13 with the process.

14 So for the year 1999 it's a very tough year for me, because
12:59:30 15 I'm being vilified on the one hand, but there's nothing happening
16 where they are not calling me and working with me and I'm working
17 - we're working together to bring about this peaceful resolution,
18 only some other sides for it to be misinterpreted. It was just a
19 tough year for me. I really don't know what else to say about
13:00:01 20 1999. It's a mixed bag of maybe pushing too hard for peace and
21 getting vilified. So --

22 Q. What do you mean, Mr Taylor, when you say, "I know that
23 everything that is happening in Liberia is a result of
24 Sierra Leone"? What do you mean by that?

13:00:19 25 A. Well, we can't move - we cannot. There's no aid. There's
26 no assistance. Nothing. Because the issue of Sierra Leone is
27 right in front of us. The major countries that are making
28 accusations without proof are capable and they do stop everything
29 that's supposed to happen good for Liberia. I talked about we

1 can - yes, we're talking to the World Bank but that's just talk.
2 We're talking to the IMF, that's just talk. You don't get
3 anywhere with them. These institutions work with major
4 countries. Unless they get the green light from some of these
13:01:07 5 countries you get no help.

6 So everything that is negative in Liberia, whether we're
7 talking about the attack in April, there's another attack in
8 August, so everything that is happening is a result of
9 Sierra Leone not being settled. Because once Sierra Leone is
13:01:26 10 settled, Liberia will get settled. That's what I'm saying.

11 Q. Now, we know that one prominent event in Liberia during
12 1999 was the commencement of the destruction of those arms
13 collected during the disarmament period?

14 A. That is correct.

13:01:50 15 Q. By January 2000, the beginning of the new century, what was
16 the situation so far as that process was concerned?

17 A. In fact, that process had gone a long way, and what we do
18 get - let me emphasise, the Government of Liberia is not
19 responsible for that process. It is the United Nations, the
13:02:17 20 international community, so to speak, and ECOMOG. We get a full
21 accounting from the United Nations as to the destruction - the
22 process of destruction, what had been accomplished at that
23 particular time. That's one of the first things that I'm
24 confronted with in the new year.

13:02:39 25 Q. And what form did that full accounting take?

26 A. Well, they did a breakdown. That breakdown involved the
27 different classifications of arms, whether artillery, rifles,
28 mortars. It also provided the quantities and it also provided
29 the origin of these arms. There's a full breakdown and

1 accounting of that process.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I please invite attention to volume 1,
3 week 33, behind divider 32, please. Can I enquire whether we all
4 have it?

13:04:40 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. As we see, Mr Taylor, this is a letter or a note dated 5
8 January 2000 from the office of the representative of the
9 Secretary-General. It is a note to His Excellency Monie Captan,
10 minister of foreign affairs, statistics on arms and ammunition
11 destroyed by the UN, ECOWAS and the Government of Liberia:

12 "As per your request I am attaching copies detailing the
13 status of the arms and ammunition destroyed by the UN, ECOWAS and
14 the Government of Liberia between July and October 1999. I trust
15 that you will find them useful."

16 It's signed by Ambassador Bariyu Adeyemi, officer in
17 charge, UNOL. Let's go over the page. "Type of heavy weapons"
18 it's headed:

19 "Type A, field artillery. 122 millimetre multiple rocket
20 launchers; BM21. 122 millimetre rocket launchers and one extra
21 barrel. 105 millimetre Howitzer; M2A2. 85 millimetre anti-tank
22 gun. 75 millimetre Howitzer; M1A1 plus two barrels.

23 Mortars. 120 millimetre mortars. 81 millimetre and 82
24 millimetre. 60 millimetres.

13:06:41 25 Anti-tank rocket launchers. RPG7."

26 And then small arms: AK-47, 25 per cent of which came from
27 the USSR or China. M16s, 25 per cent from the USA. Famas, 15
28 per cent from France. Beretta, 15 per cent from Italy. Uzi, 10
29 per cent from Israel. Rifles, 5 per cent from the USA, and

1 various others, 5 per cent.

2 And then let's go over the page, please:

3 "Final Status of the Weapons Destruction Exercise on 18
4 October 1999.

13:07:38 5 Summary: Total rounds of ammunition of all sizes
6 destroyed, 3,164,849; total number of arms of all sizes
7 destroyed, 19,297.

8 Estimated amount of weapons made upon opening the
9 containers: Rounds of ammunition, 3,000,000; small arms, 18,000;
10 mortar and heavy machine guns, 1,000.

11 2. The destruction of ammunition of all sizes was
12 completed on 18 October 1999."

13 So by that date, Mr Taylor, all of that ammunition had been
14 destroyed?

13:08:35 15 A. Everything, yes.

16 Q. "The following was the status of the ammunition destroyed:
17 Total rounds of ammunition destroyed, 3,164,849.

18 The destruction of weapons of all sizes was completed on 20
19 September 1999. The following are the categories of weapons that
13:09:00 20 were destroyed and disposed of between 25 July and 20 September
21 1999: Small arms, 18,420; heavy machine guns, 626; anti-tank
22 launchers, 150; mortars, 63; recoilless rifles, 26; guns and
23 Howitzers, 9; rocket launchers, 3. Grand total of 19,297.

24 At the end of the exercise on 18 October 1999, the
13:09:40 25 following were the remaining detonation devices that were sent to
26 Sierra Leone through ECOMOG: Plastic explosives, 1,200
27 kilograms; detonation cord, 1,500 metres; boosters, 160;
28 detonators, 2000."

29 Now, help us with this, Mr Taylor: When it says here, at

1 the end of the exercise, the following were the remaining
2 detonation devices that were sent to Sierra Leone through ECOMOG,
3 what's all that about?

13:10:27 4 A. I don't know. I'm sorry, I can't help. At that particular
5 time, the Government of Liberia had no control over these
6 materials, and we had no knowledge that they had taken these out
7 and sent them to Sierra Leone. And I'm sure ECOMOG used them,
8 you know, for whatever they wanted to do, but we had no direct
9 control.

13:10:45 10 Q. Hold on. It says "were sent to Sierra Leone through
11 ECOMOG", not for the use of ECOMOG. So who is receiving these
12 plastic explosives?

13 A. That's the problem. "Through ECOMOG", that's the same
14 ECOMOG people. It says through them. They probably told them,
13:11:06 15 "Ah, we will take it." But ECOMOG is - it's in their custody.
16 We had no idea that this was going on, because from the time we
17 disarmed for elections, all of these materials, as you see them -
18 and this diplomatic phrase about - on page 1, where these things
19 are destroyed by the UN, Liberia - Liberia gave her acquiescence,
13:11:38 20 but the process, they he did it, and we had no control over the
21 decision. And this decision, we were not a part of. And I will
22 wonder, even today, what did ECOMOG do with these? I have no
23 idea.

24 Q. Now, did the Government of Liberia receive any of the
13:11:59 25 usable arms which had been collected?

26 A. Not a piece. Not even one piece. All arms that were taken
27 from the militants from the war were destroyed 100 per cent. The
28 Government of Liberia had no arms, no.

29 Q. Now, when we look at the quantity of arms being destroyed,

1 help us, Mr Taylor, were you importing weapons during this
2 period?

3 A. No, we were not. We were not importing weapons.

13:12:39

4 Q. Did the Liberian government have the finances to be
5 importing weapons during this period?

6 A. No, we did not have it and we did not have a reason yet to
7 try to even secure weapons, no.

8 Q. Because we're talking here, aren't we, about a substantial
9 quantity of weapons?

13:12:55

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So help us. If this is being destroyed, Mr Taylor, where
12 did you get the arms from to send to the RUF?

13:13:16

13 A. That's what makes the whole theory bogus. We had no arms
14 to send to anywhere, and they should have known this from the
15 very beginning of all these accusations. We had no arms. None
16 whatsoever. They probably - I think this is where the thing goes
17 wrong. They probably chose to forget that we were not in
18 possession of any of these arms through the period, and they
19 forgot that all the arms were destroyed by the UN. So all these
20 accusations in 1998, 1999 about arms going across the border,
21 except for what we all now know, that arms went across in little
22 amounts by people who hid arms during the war from ULIMO and
23 selling them on the border, the Government of Liberia, my
24 government, had no arms to send to anyone.

13:13:39

25 Q. Now, let us just remind ourselves, Mr Taylor: When did the
26 disarmament process begin in Liberia?

27 A. The disarmament process started in 1996 and ended about six
28 months later.

13:14:04

29 Q. Right. Help us with a time frame. Roughly when in 1996

1 did it again?

2 A. I would say - I know it ended in December of 1996. So
3 backing up, that would be about July or August, I would put it.

13:14:52

4 Q. Right. So it begins about July or August 1996; it's
5 concluded by about December 1997, yes?

6 A. Yes - no, no, December '96.

7 Q. December '96, my fault.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thereafter, the arms are held by ECOMOG?

13:15:08

10 A. And the United Nations, yes.

11 Q. So throughout '97/'98 they are held by ECOMOG?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. They are held down to, it would appear, 1999, when the
14 destruction begins?

13:15:32

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Because when we look at the covering letter, note
17 "destroyed by the UN between July and October 1999", do you see
18 that?

19 A. That is correct, yes.

13:15:41

20 Q. And so this quantity of weaponry is destroyed by end of -
21 by 18 October 1999, yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. So bearing that time frame in mind, disarmament beginning
24 mid-ish 1996?

13:16:09

25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Destruction of weapons concluded by 18 October 1999, yes?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. Superimpose upon that timeline the periods of the
29 indictment: November 1996, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Through 2002, bearing in mind that the critical period is
3 ECOMOG intervention, February 1998, through to Freetown invasion,
4 January 1999. During that period, Mr Taylor, did you have access
13:16:52 5 to arms to send to the RUF?

6 A. No, I did not have access to arms to send to the RUF, not
7 even for me in my government to be able to use adequately, no.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask, please, that that letter,
9 Statistics on Arms and Ammunition Destroyed by the United
13:17:24 10 Nations, ECOWAS and the Government of Liberia, dated 5 January
11 2000, be marked for identification MFI-121.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-121.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you recall, do you not, that in the
13:17:56 15 briefing your foreign minister gave to the UN special
16 representative in late December mentioned the risks to Liberia of
17 having this group in - on Liberian soil?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And the concerns which you harboured, that this could, if
13:18:24 20 things went wrong, cause difficulties between you and
21 Sierra Leone?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Now, did any such difficulty, in fact, transpire in due
24 course?

13:18:39 25 A. Yes. True to what we suspected, we - the foreign ministry
26 of Sierra Leone dispatched a diplomatic note to the foreign
27 ministry of Liberia raising some of the very issues that we had
28 anticipated when we talked about the risk.

29 Q. Such as?

- 1 A. People amassing to attack Sierra Leone from Liberia and
2 those associated with some of the people that crossed the border
3 and the presence of armed men inside Liberia to wage war on
4 Sierra Leone but at a diplomatic note level, which means that
13:19:28 5 it's an official complaint.
- 6 Q. Now, what did you do about it?
- 7 A. Well, we responded --
- 8 Q. If anything?
- 9 A. We responded.
- 13:19:36 10 Q. How?
- 11 A. We responded by, you know, letting them know that there was
12 no such thing and that we were still a reliable partner in the
13 process.
- 14 Q. Now, did you communicate with President Kabbah about this?
- 13:19:52 15 A. Yes, I did.
- 16 Q. How?
- 17 A. I called him and I wrote a letter to President Kabbah.
- 18 Q. When did you write him a letter?
- 19 A. This had to be - that, I would say, coming around the end
13:20:10 20 of January of - towards the - I would say the second half of
21 January of 2000.
- 22 Q. Can we look behind divider 33 in the same bundle, please.
23 Is that the letter, Mr Taylor?
- 24 A. Yes, this is it.
- 13:20:30 25 Q. Now, we see that it's written on the letterhead of the
26 Office of the President of the Republic of Liberia. Is that
27 right?
- 28 A. That is correct.
- 29 Q. And it is dated 26 January 2000?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. It's addressed to Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President
3 of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Freetown, Republic of Sierra
4 Leone. What's the first handwritten word, Mr Taylor?

13:21:05 5 A. "My Dear Brother."

6 Q. "My Dear Brother:

7 I am pleased to present my fraternal greetings and wish to
8 inform you that a note from your ministry of foreign affairs sent
9 to my ministry of foreign affairs, no 3079/10 dated January 21,
10 2000, has been brought to my attention. According to the note,
11 your ministry of foreign affairs alleged that: 'We have strong
12 evidence that the former RUF commander, Sam Bockarie, also known
13 as Maskita, who is currently residing in Liberia, has mobilised a
14 unit for incursions into Sierra Leone."

13:22:05 15 Now, was any such thing going on, Mr Taylor?

16 A. There was no such thing. That's why we were shocked by
17 this diplomatic note and decided to respond immediately. There
18 was no such thing. Just the rumour mills of West Africa, I
19 guess.

13:22:22 20 Q. Now, the note makes mention, as we see from the passage
21 quoted from it, of strong evidence. What evidence did they claim
22 to have?

23 A. That's what the note said. The presence of the note was
24 the evidence. There was nothing beyond that. Nothing beyond
13:22:47 25 that. Only the statement, "We have evidence." That's it. There
26 was nothing said about it because, factually, there were some
27 facts. Sam Bockarie is in Liberia, but you know he is there.
28 But what is not factual is the mobilisation part, that he is
29 supposed to be mobilising. We are shocked, and this is why we

1 respond immediately. But there is nothing mentioned in that note
2 beyond the statement.

3 Q. Because by this stage, Mr Taylor, what had happened to the
4 combatants who had accompanied Mr Bockarie across the border?

13:23:27 5 A. By this particular time they are being - they are being
6 processed. This is just what? We're talking about less than
7 three weeks Bockarie - not quite a month. Bockarie comes into
8 Liberia late in 1999. Very late, the last week or thereabouts.
9 So by 20 January we're talking about a period of about three
13:23:53 10 weeks. We are getting all the identification process done,
11 getting them processed through immigration and all that kind of
12 stuff. So they have not even moved yet for ATU training. We're
13 just in the process of dealing with the identification, the
14 housing problem. Because the number of people that came, we were
13:24:16 15 still trying to settle people, so we had not even gotten into the
16 ATU phase of this yet.

17 Q. But let's just pause for a minute and add things up, shall I
18 we. Bockarie arrives, as you've just told us, in the last week
19 of December?

13:24:34 20 A. Yeah, or thereabouts, yes.

21 Q. There are various administrative matters to be dealt with?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. In addition you've told us repeatedly that the Sierra
24 Leonean government were informed about their extraction?

13:24:50 25 A. Of course, yes.

26 Q. Along with the United Nations and others?

27 A. Oh, yes.

28 Q. And that President Obasanjo was party to that decision?

29 A. Very much so.

1 Q. Now, we're here now three weeks later having to respond to
2 a diplomatic note sent on 21 January that within that time frame
3 Bockarie has been allowed to mobilise a unit for incursions into
4 Sierra Leone. So within a matter of weeks?

13:25:22 5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Did you permit that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Never. No. There was no truth whatsoever to this. It
8 didn't happen this time and never happened throughout the stay of
9 Bockarie into Liberia.

13:25:39 10 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. What do you surmise to be the
11 motivation behind that diplomatic note?

12 A. Rumour mongering I'm telling you in our part of the world
13 is very serious and that's why probably I'm suffering. Rumours.
14 I've got to find out as President of Liberia - whenever somebody
13:26:07 15 came and said, "Mr President, this is going on". I said, "Are
16 you sure?" He would say yes. I said, "Did you see it?" If that
17 person tells you, "Oh, yes, Mr President, I saw it", I will tell
18 him to leave my office because it's not true because rumour
19 mongering is almost as factual in Liberia and most of West Africa
13:26:29 20 as you could ever believe. People talk about things that they
21 have never seen or heard, okay.

22 And, for example, a typical express in West Africa, I don't
23 know if it's in other parts of Africa, when someone says, "I know
24 this person", it's not the "know" that you and I maybe in Europe
13:26:50 25 or other places would say I know. They will just say I know John
26 Brown. It simply means I saw him or I have seen him before. So
27 you have to be very careful with the nuances. Oh I know him.
28 You don't know him, you probably just saw him. So it's just
29 rumour mongering.

1 Somebody comes up and says Mosquito is now in Liberia, we
2 hear that he is planning to attack. We used get this all the
3 time. Always planning. That's why it was essential for Kabbah
4 and myself to always be in direct communication on the telephone.
13:27:26 5 Like the famous 5,000 men at the border that were not true. We
6 called each other and settled it. Rumour mongering. That's all
7 this is.

8 Q. Let's go back to the letter, bearing in mind who the letter
9 is written to:

13:27:41 10 "As you may recall, it was through my instrumentality and
11 efforts that chairman Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma
12 returned to Freetown."

13 "As you may recall", had you discussed it with Kabbah
14 before the event?

13:28:01 15 A. Every step of the way, yes. Every step.

16 Q. So when you say "as you may recall", you are asking him to
17 recall the very discussions which led to Mosquito relocating in
18 Liberia?

19 A. That is correct. That is correct.

13:28:22 20 Q. So Kabbah knew about it all along?

21 A. Yes, he did. Of course he did.

22 Q. "It was through my instrumentality and efforts that
23 chairman Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma returned to Freetown
24 to facilitate the implementation of the Lome agreement.

13:28:41 25 Likewise, when it appeared that the peace process was in danger
26 due to a rift between Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie, I again
27 intervened by providing exile for Sam Bockarie in Monrovia in
28 order to ensure that the Lome agreement was faithfully
29 implemented. It would be contrary to the efforts that I have

1 made if my government would countenance any activity by
2 Sam Bockarie to derail the ongoing peace process in Sierra Leone.
3 I wish to therefore assure you that the Liberian government will
4 not permit any activities that would have a negative impact on
13:29:24 5 the peace and stability in Sierra Leone.

6 I wish, however, to bring to your attention a matter which
7 Sam Bockarie has complained to me of and which could be the basis
8 of further enmity between him and Foday Sankoh if not addressed.
9 According to Mr Bockarie, Foday Sankoh has custody of his
13:29:48 10 four-year-old son whom he claims is being held as a hostage. As
11 President of Sierra Leone and in the interest of peace, I urge
12 you to intervene in finding an amicable solution to this matter.

13 Excellency, you may rest assured that despite the
14 allegations and rumours of incursions into Sierra Leone from
13:30:13 15 Liberia and its attendant propaganda, you may consider this
16 subject and that of Sam Bockarie closed.

17 Please accept the assurances of my highest esteem."

18 Would that be a convenient point, Mr President?

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's a convenient point,
13:30:29 20 thank you, Mr Griffiths. We'll adjourn for lunch now and resume
21 at 2.30.

22 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

23 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

14:29:30 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, yes:

26 Q. Mr Taylor, just before the adjournment we were looking at
27 the document behind divider 33?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. That letter to President Kabbah dated 26 January.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, you see that the last paragraph that we read was to
3 this effect:

4 "... despite the allegations and rumours of incursions
14:30:01 5 into Sierra Leone from Liberia and its attendant propaganda."

6 So were there still at this time, Mr Taylor, suggestions
7 that you were aiding and abetting the RUF in Sierra Leone.

8 A. Yes, yes, yes. That's the - this had been all in the
9 newspapers in Sierra Leone, and every once in a while they would
14:30:30 10 throw a little piece maybe if they can get it on international
11 radio. They were always throwing that out there.

12 Q. Now, this was a letter that you addressed to President
13 Kabbah on 26 January.

14 A. That is correct.

14:30:50 15 Q. Now, by this stage, Mr Taylor, did you have concerns about
16 the situation in Sierra Leone?

17 A. Yes, I had very, very, very serious concerns. Quite
18 frankly, I'm between the rock and a hard place with this Sierra
19 Leonean matter, and so I'm fighting hard to get things done so it
14:31:24 20 can really go away. It's like a monkey on my back, it can't go
21 away, so my best option is to keep pushing for peace. By this
22 time I have discovered that we have no movement yet. Sam
23 Bockarie is out of Sierra Leone. This was the concern before.

24 Now we still haven't started the disarmament. And let it be very
14:31:54 25 clear, these concerns that I'm talking about, I'm talking about
26 amongst the leaders we are concerned. I'm being called, I'm
27 calling some of my colleagues, they're calling me. And so we are
28 so frustrated that nothing is going on, then I'm telling them, I
29 said, "Well, listen, I'm observing something here. What is it

1 about this matter now that Sankoh, first he wanted to disarm.
2 Sam Bockarie was the obstacle, we've moved him. We can't get him
3 to move, we're talking to him, he's promising, I don't see what's
4 going on. I'm beginning to observe that there is a problem here,
14:32:38 5 and this problem could be Sankoh him very self that could be
6 trying to manoeuvre like this in a way that I don't understand."
7 They throw it around their minds too and said, "There could be
8 something to that." But I called in down - about a day after I
9 write this letter to Kabbah - the special representative, and I
14:33:03 10 really ask him to send a message out to the Secretary-General to
11 detail this whole thing and how I'm seeing it, because I have
12 already conveyed this to my colleague. But I'm more on the
13 offensive because I'm on the firing line for supporting, and so
14 the longer this process remains, the more problems I have.

14:33:27 15 So I called him in. I say, "Well, look, you've got to get
16 an urgent message out. There is a problem here that we may have
17 to solve as far as Foday Sankoh is concerned." I explained to
18 him about certain plans that we as Heads of State had discussed
19 about what to do with the RUF as far as helping them, whoever
14:33:54 20 could afford to assist the RUF basically with office equipment,
21 getting them functional. I said we may have to do this because
22 this dragging of feet on the part of Sankoh, this could be the
23 problem. So maybe if we hurried up our assistance to Sankoh in
24 getting the RUF going, this could maybe move him a little
14:34:20 25 faster. But basically, I see some problems with Sankoh now that
26 he may not be as forthcoming with the process as all of us
27 thought he would be, and I'm just raising some little flags that
28 we all can be aware and get this out to the Secretary-General
29 too.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, before I move on to look at this
2 conversation you had with the special representative in a bit
3 more detail, can I ask, please, that the letter to President
4 Kabbah from President Taylor, dated 26 January 2000, be marked
14:35:03 5 for identification MFI-122, please.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That document is marked MFI-122.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now, you were talking about a conversation, Mr Taylor, you
9 had with the special representative of the Secretary-General
14:35:24 10 regarding your concerns about how matters were developing in
11 Sierra Leone, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Was a record made of that conversation?

14 A. Yes. He had to. Yes, there was a record and he was asked
14:35:43 15 to convey this monthly - we almost met on a monthly basis. This
16 was about the end of the month - to convey this directly to
17 Secretary-General, and he conveyed the direct message that was
18 given by me to him, he conveyed it to the Secretary-General.

19 Q. Could you go to behind divider 34, please. Is this a
14:36:14 20 record of that conversation?

21 A. This is it. This is it. This a direct message from me to
22 the Secretary-General.

23 Q. And we see that it's marked "confidential" and "only"?

24 A. That's correct.

14:36:31 25 Q. But even though it's marked "confidential" and "only", it's
26 a record of a conversation you had with the writer, yes?

27 A. That is correct. That is correct.

28 Q. Because we see it's from Downes-Thomas to Prendergast
29 again, dated 27 January 2000, "Conversation with President Taylor

1 on 26 January 2000", yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So this conversation is on the same day that you wrote the
4 letter to Kabbah?

14:37:04 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. "President Taylor asked me to the Executive Mansion at 7.15
7 p.m. on 26 January 2000 for the usual once-a-month informal
8 discussions on matters of mutual, institutional and political,
9 concerns."

14:37:28 10 So you were meeting with him that regularly, were you?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Why?

13 A. Well, if you go all the way back to what I said to the
14 Court, because of the accusations coming and jumping left and
14:37:40 15 right, we saw the UN as our only - as the only place of refuge
16 that we could get the information to, that they could research it
17 and report to the rest of the international community that we
18 were not at fault as was being alleged by some quarters. So we
19 relied on the UN significantly, and in fact once a month, that
14:38:03 20 was the official - but every time there was a problem we called
21 the special representative and asked him to convey to New York
22 what was going on. This was our only hope.

23 Q. "During our conversation he touched on certain matters
24 which could be of interest to you as follows:

14:38:21 25 Sierra Leone. The President expressed what struck me as a
26 certain dissatisfaction with some of the manoeuvres of Foday
27 Sankoh. Based on his utterances, I have the distinct impression
28 that he is not very much convinced that the former RUF leader has
29 indeed been actually urging his men to disarm and be demobilised.

1 In short, the President seems to have private doubts about
2 Sankoh's sincerity regarding the current demobilisation exercise
3 in Sierra Leone."

4 Did you?

14:39:05 5 A. Oh, definitely. It was just - he just didn't seem to be
6 getting on with that. That was the problem. There were just
7 excuses, excuses and, you know, I had these concerns.

8 Q. "He also shared with me his apprehension concerning the
9 withdrawal of ECOMOG and any possible withdrawal or draw down of
10 Nigerian soldiers from Sierra Leone. As he sees it, sole
11 reliance on a UN force (which he asserts on the basis of
12 experience will not enter into combat, even when necessary) would
13 make matters easy for Sankoh were he (Sankoh) to reactivate the
14 previous Sankoh plan to mount an offensive in Freetown."

14:39:58 15 Pause. Now, Mr Taylor, why were you concerned about the
16 Nigerians leaving Sierra Leone?

17 A. As the process was going on, he had always insisted on UN
18 involvement more and less of ECOMOG. But my experience in
19 dealing with the UN forces, when crisis erupt they don't fight.
14:40:26 20 And so you know that a disarmament process is not over, and these
21 discussions are on the table for the withdrawal of UN - I mean,
22 of ECOMOG forces. I'm saying no, you cannot withdraw ECOMOG
23 forces from Freetown and only leave UN forces that in case of
24 crisis would not act. You need to keep ECOMOG in Sierra Leone
14:40:52 25 until you are sure that the disarmament process is over and that
26 the situation is secured. What if Sankoh tried to mount a
27 comeback? What would you do about it?

28 So I'm saying that ECOMOG should remain there until this
29 process is resolved and I'm very - and I insist on that. I said

1 - because I saw in Liberia at some times the Blue Helmets are not
2 very well armed anyway, but once crisis erupt they get a call
3 from their home capital, "Do not get involved in the crisis," and
4 they pull back to their barracks. The only people that will
14:41:31 5 fight will be the Nigerians. So I'm saying to them, "Don't let
6 the Nigerians leave now until this matter is under control."

7 Q. Did you fear at this stage, Mr Taylor, that Foday Sankoh
8 might revert back to armed struggle?

9 A. Honestly, yes. I had no - I had no proof of that, but I
14:41:55 10 got concerned when I started getting all of these excuses about
11 not disarming. Remember now, I have - we have pulled Sam
12 Bockarie out. That was the first problem. Sam Bockarie doesn't
13 want to disarm. Sam Bockarie is disrespecting me. So good, we
14 pull Sam Bockarie out. Disarm. We're getting these delays. So
14:42:19 15 now I'm saying - I'm an old combatant myself, but what's the
16 problem? Then ECOMOG is about to pull out and I'm saying no, no,
17 no, no, no, you guys are about to make a big mistake here. If
18 you pull ECOMOG out of this place the UN will not fight, the
19 disarmament is not going on, you only bring about a recipe for
14:42:42 20 maybe reverting to armed struggle again. And I must add here, I
21 had no proof of his intention. I'm just looking at it from my
22 experience.

23 Q. "President Taylor advised that he has conveyed this view to
24 President Obasanjo." Had you?

14:43:01 25 A. Oh, yes, I told him.

26 Q. "With emphasis on the dreaded consequence of such an
27 eventuality on the present process in Sierra Leone and on
28 stability and development in Liberia.

29 In a fairly dismissive manner, he talked about a recent

1 letter from Sankoh (brought by Liberia's foreign minister) that
2 is apparently full of complaints and details of (according to
3 Sankoh) plans by Sam Bockarie to overthrow or destabilise the
4 government. In this context, the President remarked that Johnny
14:43:42 5 Paul Koroma was the most stable, reliable and educated of that
6 lot."

7 Had you made that comment?

8 A. Yes, yes, yes.

9 Q. And was it true?

14:43:58 10 A. Yes. I think to a great extent, yes. Johnny Paul was a
11 very quiet, stable fellow. When I talked to him, the several
12 times I spoke to him, he appeared to be reasonable. I would say
13 I didn't know his education standpoint, but his level of
14 reasoning, he was a pretty astute fellow.

14:44:18 15 Q. And when you say "of that lot", who is included in that
16 "lot"?

17 A. I'm talking about that whole RUF/AFRC, that whole set-up.

18 Q. "He let me know on a confidential basis that Foday Sankoh
19 is holding and refusing to send to Monrovia Sam Bockarie's five-
14:44:40 20 or six-year-old son. He also intimated that there was a
21 continuing discord within the RUF ranks and that certain RUF
22 elements have confiscated some of Sankoh's mining equipment. The
23 RUF elements concerned are apparently disgruntled because Sankoh
24 has not been sharing with them the proceeds of the loot obtained
14:45:07 25 from his private diamond mining activities which, apparently with
26 technical assistance from non-African expatriates, is ongoing."

27 Where did you learn that from, Mr Taylor?

28 A. This is what Bockarie had alleged, that there were problems
29 that the old man - this was the basis of some of the disrespect.

1 That the old man is carrying on mining. He's not even thinking
2 about the consequences of disarmament. He's bringing in people
3 to mine. He's got his contacts. This was some of the basic
4 points that maybe made Sam Bockarie so belligerent. He was very,
14:45:49 5 very, very much - he complained a lot about this during our
6 discussions.

7 Q. And what was happening to the proceeds of that Foday Sankoh
8 sponsored mining?

9 A. I have no idea. This is what Bockarie was concerned about,
14:46:06 10 that they didn't even know what he was doing and he was just in
11 Freetown doing as he pleased.

12 Q. Go over the page, please:

13 "By his own acknowledgment, President Taylor has been under
14 some pressure from the United States and the United Nations to
14:46:29 15 deny Bockarie, aka Maskita, asylum, temporary or otherwise, in
16 Liberia."

17 Pause there. But, Mr Taylor, we've seen that the UN were
18 made aware that Bockarie was moving to Liberia and why, weren't
19 they?

14:46:50 20 A. Very much aware.

21 Q. But were they still at the same time putting pressure on
22 you publicly to disarm him?

23 A. It's a strange thing that I cannot explain. They
24 encouraged this process, they knew about it, they worked with the
14:47:06 25 process. This is about two or three weeks after the man gets
26 there and you see this note now from the foreign ministry of
27 Sierra Leone saying, "We're getting these reports." The same
28 people - the same diplomats say, "Well, we think it's not a good
29 idea to keep him here." But I just brought the man in. You just

1 encouraged this process. You just helped to bring this - to make
2 this. All of a sudden some of them begin to say, "Ah, well, we
3 think now that the Government of Sierra Leone is complaining. We
4 think that you shouldn't let him stay here. I think you should
14:47:44 5 put him out." I'm saying to them, "Look, we don't behave this
6 way. We Africans, we're a little different, okay. People don't
7 make friends in the morning, afternoon you are enemies. I mean,
8 we invited these people here, there are women, children, this
9 man. Now the man has just come and you're telling me now, after
14:48:04 10 you agreed to bring him in, that I should throw him out." I
11 said, "We don't behave this way." I said, "My own idea here is
12 for this process to be completed, and I'm not just going to jump
13 out ..." - these same people that were part of the process that
14 knew. The very US talking about here had promised that Bockarie
14:48:22 15 would be helped to be given training at some US training base
16 somewhere, that he will become a soldier and not an old rebel,
17 but that he would be a trained man. Everybody knew, so what's
18 the complaint now? Three weeks. And I said, no, I wouldn't do
19 that.

14:48:41 20 Q. "For reasons that I fully understand, this pressure is to
21 have Bockarie resettled in a third country. However, President
22 Taylor let me know that he was not inclined to yield to such
23 pressure for reasons which included, primarily, human
24 considerations."

14:49:07 25 What were those human considerations?

26 A. The man comes from Sierra Leone with a couple of hundred
27 people, women, children, some combatants. No money. Where do
28 you put these people? Some of them left because they were
29 convinced that they would have a better life and that this was

1 under ECOWAS. You throw them out of Liberia, they're going to
2 end up in some refugee camp, maybe somewhere in Ghana or some
3 other place. I mean, you don't treat people this way. You just
4 brought the people in.

14:49:31 5 My biggest concern was the control, making sure that Sam
6 Bockarie, one, did not participate in any way in the Sierra
7 Leonean process, and two, he was out of commission that he could
8 not stage any attacks directly or indirectly on Sierra Leone.
9 Once that happened for me, I was satisfied.

14:49:56 10 Q. "In that connection I informed him that it is held within
11 certain quarters that:

12 1. He had recruited or incorporated into his security
13 apparatus Sam Bockarie as well as Bockarie's entourage.

14 2. Bockarie's and his entourage should be financially
14:50:22 15 self-sufficient since they have banked and are banking in
16 Liberia, as well as elsewhere, the funds obtained through their
17 trafficking in diamonds and as I had mentioned to him on a
18 previous occasion.

19 3. He and his government were benefitting directly from
14:50:39 20 such trafficking."

21 Let's take that in turn. "Held within certain quarters",
22 which quarters?

23 A. The rumour mill - this is it. Remember, let's go - if we
24 go as far back as this case is concerned, you will see how the
14:51:01 25 rumours start. Remember that June document from Okelo, just a
26 rumour mill is coming on, that's what they're talking about. "We
27 believe, look here, that he's banking in Liberia. You go check
28 it." The man doesn't even have a bank account. But they just
29 say this.

1 Q. Now, it is a fact that you had incorporated into your
2 security apparatus many of Bockarie's ex-combatants, hadn't you?

3 A. That is correct. That is very correct. We had - now they
4 are not his people. They are citizens of Liberia that are

14:51:45 5 brought into the ATU, and here where it says "Sam Bockarie as
6 well as Bockarie's entourage", a part of his entourage, yeah, but
7 Sam Bockarie, no. And evidence has been led in this Court where
8 one of those individuals that was brought before this Court did
9 say that there were no contacts in terms of orders from Sam

14:52:12 10 Bockarie to them from the time they entered the ATU. We made
11 sure that we did that separation.

12 Q. So that this suggestion that "Sam Bockarie as well as his
13 entourage" was false, was it?

14 A. False. False. Not Sam Bockarie. False.

14:52:32 15 Q. Moving on to the second proposition that Bockarie was
16 banking substantial sums in Liberia and elsewhere. Were you
17 aware of any such financial activity?

18 A. Not at all. Not at all. We were never aware. I don't
19 even think Sam Bockarie had a bank account in Liberia. We never
14:52:58 20 saw one. They never brought any account of any of them. I have
21 no idea that he was banking in Liberia. No, it's just the rumour
22 mills.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, if there was such activity, did the Liberian
24 state have the apparatus to detect it?

14:53:24 25 A. Well, we could investigate to find out, but - yes, it could
26 be detected, if that happened.

27 Q. And at any stage, was it brought to your attention that
28 Bockarie was, for example, trafficking in diamonds as suggested?

29 A. No, no, no. It had never been brought to my attention. In

1 fact, if we look at the whole - if we look at the whole diamond
2 situation, let's say, what are we talking about, this is
3 beginning 2000? There are other legal issues that probably my
4 government would have raised, because when you look at Security
14:54:10 5 Council resolution placing, let's say, embargoes on the movement
6 of diamonds in West Africa during that particular period of
7 time - in fact, I cannot recall any Security Council resolution
8 that had restricted any movement of diamonds in that period. So
9 it would have been useless anyway for anybody to either come
14:54:35 10 because the trafficking of diamonds - let's not kid ourselves.

11 Diamond movement had been going on in that West African
12 area for a long time. So it would not have been strange to me if
13 Sam Bockarie had brought diamonds to Liberia. There's nothing
14 strange about that. There's nothing strange about that. Anybody
14:54:55 15 thinks that there is something strange about that, then there's
16 something wrong with them. There's nothing strange about the
17 movement of diamonds in Liberia, out of Liberia, in Sierra Leone,
18 out of - nothing.

19 At this particular time, if somebody had raised it with me
14:55:10 20 in line with a United Nations Security Council resolution, we
21 would have acted. Outside of that, it would not have been my
22 business. I would not have moved a stitch because it was none of
23 my business, okay, because I know - I know then and as I know now
24 that diamonds moved in and out of those countries. Even The
14:55:32 25 Gambia, Mali, where you have no diamonds, you can buy diamonds in
26 those countries because they come from Sierra Leone, Liberia and
27 other places.

28 So, in answer to your question, nobody had brought this to
29 my attention. A mechanism would have been able to investigate,

1 but there was no such thing.

2 Q. On that same note, you mentioned that Bockarie might have
3 taken diamonds with him. After he had arrived in Monrovia, did
4 Bockarie have lines of communication with Sierra Leone, apart
14:56:09 5 from the telephone which you said he used to speak to Kabbah
6 with?

7 A. I tell you, it's possible. It's possible.

8 Q. I mean, were members of his entourage going backwards and
9 forwards between Monrovia and Sierra Leone?

14:56:28 10 A. None of that. No, no, no, no, no. We did not - that would
11 not have happened. Number one, even if we did not catch you,
12 going back to Sierra Leone would have been a risk. They left in
13 a hurry, so it would have been a big risk for them to go back.

14 To the best of my knowledge - and especially, let me emphasise,
14:56:53 15 and especially the combatants, we did not let you leave to go
16 anywhere within Lofa County or near that border. No, we did not.

17 Q. So was there any kind of movement between Bockarie's people
18 and Sierra Leone during this period, Mr Taylor?

19 A. None whatsoever.

14:57:25 20 Q. Thirdly, you and your government were benefitting directly
21 from such trafficking, were you?

22 A. No, not at all. Not at all. That's that same rumour that
23 persists until today. Not at all, no.

24 Q. "While asserting that the above pieces of information were
14:57:52 25 both untrue and ridiculous, President Taylor informed me that
26 Bockarie et al were indeed penniless. As he put it, 'If I don't
27 give that boy money, he does not eat.'"

28 Was that your belief?

29 A. Well, I had to take him for his word. I put him on a

1 salary. He was getting \$1,000 a month. All of his people got -
2 I gave them food. I took care of their medical expenses. I took
3 these other boys and I put them in the ATU and trained them. We
4 paid them now, as Liberians, good salaries. There was nothing
14:58:29 5 that I saw Sam Bockarie doing - and maybe he was hiding it, I
6 can't speak for him. But there was nothing that came to my
7 attention that he was doing that convinced me that he had money.
8 I mean, if he had it, he was hiding it very well. But everything
9 - I gave him a vehicle. We leased houses for them. It was said,
14:58:52 10 I think, in this Court that Sam Bockarie bought a house. Those
11 houses were leased by the Government of Liberia for them. We
12 provided the light for the place. We provided whatever they
13 needed to help them. In fact, whilst Sam Bockarie was in
14 Liberia, what was brought to my attention was that he made some
14:59:12 15 attempts to try to get into mining diamonds in Liberia to try to
16 help himself. So from this general thing I just have to
17 conclude, as I did at that time, that he was penniless. That's
18 what he told me.

19 Q. And, Mr Taylor, we see that you mention to Mr Downes-Thomas
14:59:32 20 that you were providing that boy with money. Did you consider
21 anything surreptitious or illegal or untoward about paying
22 Bockarie money?

23 A. No, no, no.

24 Q. Something you had to hide?

14:59:53 25 A. No, no, no. This was a salary, and it was being done
26 through government parastatals. No, no, no. I just look at it a
27 genuine assistance to him and his family and his extended family,
28 everybody else that would be able to not make them becoming
29 beggars on the street of Monrovia. That's all.

1 Q. "He went on to tell me that Bockarie and his entourage will
2 be confined to, and in, Monrovia."

3 Again is that true?

4 A. That is 100 per cent true, yes.

15:00:32 5 Q. "They are being watched very closely, he added". Is that
6 true?

7 A. Yes, that is true.

8 Q. Can I pause there for a moment, Mr Taylor, and ask you
9 this: Now, it was said by a witness TF1-585 on 5 September 2008
10 at pages 15591 to 15592 of the transcript that she operated a
11 radio from Bockarie's compound and she was assigned to do that by
12 Benjamin Yeaten - she was assigned to be a radio operator for
13 Benjamin Yeaten by Bockarie. Is there any truth in that?

14 A. I would not really know. But what I can say, if in that
15 group - if in that group there was a trained radio operator that
16 knew radio work, it is possible that such person would be
17 utilised by some service. Like I said, every one of those people
18 was given citizenship. Some of them were going for security
19 training in the SSS - excuse me, in the ATU, and so it would not
15:02:20 20 be strange if it were to happen. But I don't know the details

21 whether it did happen or not, but I'm just saying that it is
22 possible. And may I say bluntly it is even probable that it
23 could have happened. If this was a professional that had come in
24 with the Bockarie group, trained, and somebody was needed once
15:02:45 25 they had been given citizenship, it is even probable that they
26 could have been used.

27 Q. And as far as you're aware on that note - as far as you're
28 aware, was there any kind of relationship developing between
29 Yeaten and Bockarie?

1 A. Oh, they became very - yeah, they were close. They were
2 close. As SSS director he was responsible for the security, yes.
3 They got close. They were just about the same age, former
4 combatants. Yes, that possibility exists.

15:03:19 5 Q. Let's go back to the document:

6 "President Taylor also requested that I convey to the
7 Secretary-General appreciation for the Secretary-General's
8 efforts in seeking ways to assist Liberia in connection with the
9 financial burden it has assumed in connection with its various
10 contributions to the peace process in Sierra Leone. In this
11 regard, he speculated that perhaps the hands of the
12 Secretary-General are tied."

13 What did you mean by that quote, "the hands of the
14 Secretary-General are tied"?

15:03:57 15 A. You know, we know the Secretary-General is sitting there,
16 everybody writes him for information at this time, but the
17 Secretary-General of the United Nations is just that. He wields
18 no real authority. The authority of the United Nations rests
19 with the Security Council, and so that's what I mean by his hands
15:04:17 20 are tied, because the Secretary-General doesn't make decisions at
21 the United Nations. He is informed, he distributes information;
22 but the decision is made by the Security Council, as simple as
23 that. So his hands are tied.

24 Q. "He nevertheless went on to further state for formal
15:04:41 25 transmittal to the Secretary-General that he, President Taylor,
26 is agreeable to the deployment, inside Liberia, and along the
27 Sierra Leone-Liberia border, of United Nations observers monitors
28 who could, among other things, deter or report on any
29 cross-border traffic of diamonds, arms or security personnel."

1 Mr Taylor, why was it necessary to be making that request
2 in February 2000, almost a year after the Lome Peace Agreement?

3 A. Well, this is a long-standing request that goes all the way
4 back even before then, two or three years.

15:05:29 5 Q. Yes, I know, we've tracked it.

6 A. Yes, we are pushing. It's to at least do whatever we can
7 to get someone to say, "Okay, we are convinced that these
8 allegations are not true." We are just desperate, I will call
9 it.

15:05:48 10 Q. So, Mr Taylor, are you telling us, then, that in February
11 2000 these suggestions were still being made that diamonds were
12 being trafficked across the border along with arms and security
13 personnel?

14 A. Yes, diamonds being the newest of the allegations. It was
15:06:08 15 not diamonds before. Diamonds came in just not too long, but the
16 arms thing go all the way back. Diamonds was the newest. They
17 added diamonds somewhere in '98 - in '99. That's when they
18 started adding diamonds to the whole - now diamonds, diamonds,
19 diamonds. But it just got added, but yes.

15:06:31 20 Q. "My own assessment is that President Taylor is
21 disillusioned with Sankoh. He describes him 'the problem in
22 Sierra Leone'."

23 Did you consider him to be that?

24 A. After all of my assessment and viewing everything and
15:06:50 25 seeing that we were not moving, yes.

26 Q. "It appears safe to speculate that a basic reason for this
27 disillusionment is that President Taylor does not have Sankoh's
28 ear."

29 Pause there. But you're supposed to be running the RUF,

1 Mr Taylor. You're the commander-in-chief. How come you didn't
2 have the ear of your underling, Mr Sankoh?

3 A. Because I was never commander-in-chief and never his boss,
4 as has been alleged.

15:07:35 5 Q. "Also keenly aware of the likelihood that should things go
6 awry in Sierra Leone fingers would be pointed, rightly or
7 wrongly, at him, President Taylor wishes to make clear that
8 neither his relationship with, or influence over, Sankoh is what
9 it is touted to be; and (2), by his proposal for UN deployment
15:08:02 10 within Liberian borders, obtain reliable confirmation of
11 Liberia's non-involvement in any derailment of the current
12 process in Sierra Leone through diamond trafficking or the supply
13 of arms or fighters.

14 This all leads me to the somewhat worrisome conclusion that
15:08:26 15 President Taylor is preparing the way for what I suspect could be
16 a public announcement disassociating himself and his government
17 from all future matters and activities related to the Sierra
18 Leone peace process."

19 Were you contemplating doing that?

15:08:45 20 A. Oh, yes, and I did.

21 Q. Why?

22 A. The years '97, '98, '99, I'm putting whatever little time I
23 have in this one Sierra Leonean problem. Everything that I can
24 do, I do. We press for ceasefires, we press for agreements, we
15:09:14 25 are moving people, we're bringing them together: Foday Sankoh,
26 Johnny Paul Koroma; I have brought Bockarie out. These things
27 just don't go away, so I decided that this is it. I've had
28 enough of it. I'm pulling out of this committee. I don't want
29 to talk about Sierra Leone, and I've warned him. I don't want to

1 talk about Sierra Leone business any more, and this is it, and
2 what I'm prepared to do. In fact, I do it just as I have
3 promised. I tell my colleagues and they said no - and it's
4 contained in subsequent committees - communique from ECOWAS on
15:10:00 5 my stance on this matter, that I've had it. I mean, if what -
6 all I'm doing for this one Sierra Leone business that Taylor
7 never gets through to anybody as working for peace, then the
8 little resources that I'm trying to hold for the Liberian people,
9 I'm not going to spend it any more, because there are these
15:10:20 10 trips. We're sending foreign ministers this way. We are paying
11 for whatever little money we have. Maybe we need to take it and
12 try to help our country. I was just over and through with it.
13 Q. Well, why would such a withdrawal from the process be
14 somewhat worrisome?
15:10:46 15 A. Because I guess they all figured the contribution that I
16 had made throughout the entire time, my commitment to the
17 process - he, as special representative, and a lot of other
18 diplomats accredited near my Monrovia had seen, along with my
19 colleagues, my contribution, and pulling out would mean - it's
15:11:08 20 like if we took a typical example: If China got angry right now
21 and pulled out of the six-party talks with North Korea, you know
22 what that would mean; that means that the process would fall
23 because China is the principal mediator in the six-party talks on
24 North Korea. So it's this type of thing. I pull out, they will
15:11:29 25 lose - remember, Guinea has no contact with the RUF. They don't
26 even talk. If I pull out, that means that in the future what if
27 things broke down, travelling becomes a problem, where do you
28 transit people? It's a whole lot of problems to have the
29 principal mediator in the process pull out. I mean, that's bad

1 news. So it was a little worrisome for him, and I'm sure the UN
2 people, when they first heard about it.

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've come to the end of the passage
4 dealing with Sierra Leone and we're at the end of January now of
15:12:17 5 the year 2000. How concerned were you at this stage about the
6 whole peace process in Sierra Leone?

7 A. I was very concerned. I was worried. I was worried that
8 things were not moving as fast as all of us wanted it to move,
9 and the rest of my colleagues were worried too that we might be
15:12:46 10 headed for some additional problems. I was very, very worried.

11 Q. Now, you've told us a moment ago that you were the
12 principal mediator in the process, were you?

13 A. Yes. Nothing happened that they didn't call me when they
14 needed - when they got stuck in the agreement, they called me,
15:13:06 15 along with others. When the Okra Hill thing occurred, they
16 called me and said, "Listen, you've got to use whatever
17 experience you've got to settle this matter." When Sam Bockarie
18 and Foday Sankoh had this clash, they called me and said well -
19 when I say - not just saying - you know, they called me and said,
15:13:28 20 "Listen, we've got to get together, let's get this done." As you
21 see, Obasanjo came all the way and even joined me in helping to
22 get some of this accomplished.

23 Q. And was that by choice, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Well, I think, yes, to a great extent. I'm not sure if
15:13:58 25 they had a choice or didn't, but I'm sure they called upon me.

26 Q. Now, let's go back to the document. So the next topic
27 discussed with Mr Downes-Thomas was the Mano River Union. Is
28 that correct?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "The President confirmed that President Konare during his
2 recent visit to Liberia, tried to convince him to agree to the
3 convening of the Mano River Union Heads of State meeting in
4 Conakry. In the connection, President Taylor explained that he
15:14:43 5 could not understand President Conte's unwillingness to attend
6 such a meeting were to be held in Freetown. He rejected as not
7 valid President Conte's apprehension concerning security in
8 Sierra Leone. As he put it, 'You have Guinean soldiers in Sierra
9 Leone. You have ECOMOG there. The UN force is there. What
15:15:03 10 could then be Conte's security concerns?' According to President
11 Taylor, those concerns relate to Guinea and not Sierra Leone. He
12 believes that his Guinean counterpart considers it very risky to
13 travel out of his country. It is in the light of that
14 observation that President Taylor remarked, 'I'm not going to let
15:15:27 15 him off the hook by going to Conakry.' He conveyed this point of
16 view to President Konare and they both settled for either Abuja
17 or Bamako as possible venues for the MRU meeting."

18 Now, that idea that Conte was scared to leave Guinea, why?

19 A. These countries have a lot of issues. Lansana always had
15:16:03 20 problems in Guinea. So I guess at that particular time he just
21 felt that he didn't want to leave.

22 Q. Why?

23 A. In most cases, if you're unlikely, you get - I mean, I
24 think you probably could have a coup d'etat or something. But
15:16:18 25 there were some little security concerns at that time, this is in
26 January, that he didn't want to leave, because, like I said, I
27 couldn't understand it.

28 UN - and Kabbah is almost like a small brother or son to
29 you. He's stayed with you in Conakry. You have thousands of

1 Guinean troops on the ground in Freetown. Nigeria has got
2 thousands of troops. If anybody should have been concerned about
3 going to Freetown, it should have been Charles Taylor, who - even
4 Tejani, all of them, had been saying about supplying arms to the
15:16:50 5 RUF and all this type of nonsense. So if anybody that should
6 have really been scared, it should have been me. Why should
7 Conte be afraid to go when I don't have troops in Freetown? He's
8 got troops on the ground. Why is he afraid? So I said I was not
9 going to let him off the hook. He either go there or I'm not
15:17:09 10 going to Conakry. So that's how it ended.

11 Q. Now, let's move on to the next topic of discussion:

12 "Liberia: I conveyed my positive impressions about the
13 candour of his statement to the 51st Legislature. He concurred
14 with my view that ways and innovative mechanisms have to be
15:17:37 15 devised to ensure and maintain a continually improving good
16 relations with the United States of America. In this connection,
17 he agreed with my analysis which concluded on the note that
18 Liberia will find it difficult to move forward or make
19 significant gains without the blessing of the USA. At present, I
15:18:00 20 told him, 'It would appear that being in amity with the Bretton
21 Woods institution; making observable moves towards good
22 governance, including respect for human rights, would be
23 prudent.' I also raised the matter of the denial of the
24 shortwave frequency to Star Radio."

15:18:24 25 What's that about?

26 A. The Star Radio issue, during the elections in Liberia, the
27 IFES, this - this electoral reform something in the State
28 Department in America, brought to Liberia a major radio broadcast
29 network. The intent of that network was, what they said, to

1 level the playing field, that all sides taking part in the
2 elections in 1997 would have access to the populace.

3 A similar thing had been tried somewhere in east Africa. I
4 have forgotten the direct country. But they bring in these radio
15:19:28 5 stations. They use them just as the UN network is in West Africa
6 right now. But in the case of this east African country - and I
7 will have to rethink about what's the country - the station was
8 donated to government.

9 In the case of Star Radio, following my election as
15:19:47 10 President, we asked if they could turn the radio station over to
11 us. They said no. And they wanted to continue broadcasting in
12 Liberia. And I said, no, that Liberia - under Liberian law, a
13 foreign entity cannot own a broadcast station as such, and I
14 said to them, "I don't know of any foreigner with a radio station
15:20:23 15 in the United States." I've stayed in America almost ten years.
16 You fly out of here and just want to go and set up a radio
17 station in America to get on the US airwaves is not going to
18 happen. I said, and it's not going to happen in Liberia.

19 I said to them that they could give this to the Liberian
15:20:40 20 government. They said, "No, we refuse." I said, "Well, give it
21 to the University of Liberia." They said, "No. There are some
22 Liberians that are working with us and we - and so this will
23 constitute Liberians." I said, "Well, look, if you say that they
24 own this station now, give the title to them. Because under the
15:21:04 25 laws of Liberia, I am President, I have to make sure that the
26 laws of Liberia are respected and protected. The laws of Liberia
27 tell me, whether I like it or not, that you cannot own a station.
28 So if you say that these people own the station give, them the
29 title, then broadcasting - I don't care who works there. It's

1 not a matter of who works there. It is the ownership and
2 operation of the radio station. Okay. Just going to a country
3 and having an airwave - taking to the airwaves is not something
4 that is possible." And they made a big fuss about it. Oh, did
15:21:36 5 they fuss about it. They fussed and made all kinds of
6 statements, and I told them, "The radio station will either be
7 turned over to Liberian ownership or it had to be closed down."
8 They did not turn it over to Liberian ownership. IFES, the US
9 embassy in Monrovia took it over, and I said, "No." And I closed
15:21:55 10 the radio station down. It remained closed until I left Liberia
11 as President. I understand it's open now. Whoever has it open,
12 it's a violation state of the law, except it is amended. That's
13 the Star Radio case.

14 Q. Well, let's go on and have a look at paragraph 10:

15:22:13 15 "In response to my queries and advice on the shortwave
16 issue, the President informed me that the United States of
17 America, through ambassador Howard Jetter, had also raised the
18 same issue with him and that he was going to be plain and direct
19 with me, as he had been with Ambassador Jetter. 'Star Radio will
15:22:37 20 not be permitted to obtain a shortwave broadcast facility during
21 my term of office. There will be no further discussion on this
22 matter.' The President further explained that Star Radio was
23 started as a covert and propaganda operation against him and his
24 organisation during the NPFL days, which should have ceased
15:23:02 25 following the elections."

26 Is that true?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. "'I am not against press freedoms or freedom of
29 expression,' he emphasised, 'but I will not allow Star Radio to

1 poison the minds of my people and that of the world against me.' "

2 Was that being done?

3 A. That was being done.

15:23:28

4 Q. "In response to a related observation on my part, the
5 President stated that if ownership of Star Radio were to be
6 turned over to Liberians in the private sector, consideration
7 would be given to its request for a shortwave broadcast
8 facility."

9 We've discussed that.

15:23:43

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. "Also in this connection, the President drew my attention
12 to the fact that there are other privately owned stations
13 operating in Liberia with shortwave facilities and that
14 permission has recently been granted to ELWA (station) to
15 broadcast on shortwave. Therefore, he concluded, neither he or
16 the government was anti-freedom of expression. Incidentally on
17 this matter, the Press Union of Liberia has advised Star Radio
18 (publicly and in private) to pursue its complaint through
19 available legal channels."

15:24:31

20 And then the final topic discussed:

21 "Cote d'Ivoire : Concerning the coup d'etat in Cote
22 d'Ivoire ..." - pause. Help us. When had that occurred?

23 A. When was that? '99, if I'm not mistaken. Robert Guei
24 overthrew Bedie.

15:25:03

25 Q. Overthrew whom?

26 A. Konan Bedie. There was a coup d'etat.

27 Q. And when in '99? Late in '99 or early '99? When?

28 A. It escapes me a little bit. It had to be, I would say
29 probably more towards the late part of 1999.

1 Q. "... the President informed me that, on the basis of the
2 telephone request from President Bedie, he had made appropriate
3 plans to intervene on Bedie's behalf. These plans were not
4 effected because Bedie failed to meet the condition that the
15:25:42 5 request for Liberia's assistance be reconveyed in writing, and
6 two, intelligence information available to Liberia at the time
7 revealed that there was little support for Bedie within the ranks
8 of the Cote d'Ivoire army, police force and gendarmerie. The
9 President further informed that he conveyed this information
15:26:02 10 concerning plans to intervene in Cote d'Ivoire to the current
11 leader, Robert Guei, during his visit to Monrovia.

12 President Taylor confirmed that he knows Robert Guei very
13 well and on a first-name basis."

14 From where?

15:26:22 15 A. Robert Guei is - he was - I first met him when he was a
16 colonel in the Ivorian armed forces. He is from the Gio. He's a
17 Gio. That's the Dan in Liberia. On their side they're called
18 Yakuba. So he's a Gio, that I had known for the years that I was
19 in between Ivory Coast. I knew him when he was a senior member
15:26:51 20 of the Ivorian armed forces. He later grew to general.

21 Q. "He further told me that he explained to the military
22 strong man, as well as to Presidents Konare (Mali) and Obasanjo,
23 that Cote d'Ivoire is of strategic importance to Liberia. This
24 is so because of contiguity, ethnic affiliations and the fact
15:27:13 25 that Liberia's other contiguous neighbours, Sierra Leone and
26 Guinea, are either hostile or potentially so. For these reasons,
27 he further explained, he would enjoin Liberia to any move that
28 would ensure stability in Cote d'Ivoire. This meant that he
29 would support Robert Guei. However, he went on to say that such

1 support would not be for an indefinite period of military or
2 non-elected government in Cote d'Ivoire. In this connection, he
3 again repeated his already publicly expressed position that Guei
4 should be allowed a sufficiently reasonable period to put things
15:27:52 5 in order. On this, as he informed me, he and President Konare
6 agreed on the notional period for around October 2000 for the
7 beginning of the democratisation/election process. He also
8 informed me that the French government has intimated its desire
9 to discuss Cote d'Ivoire with him."

15:28:18 10 Had the French government done that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And what were they wanting?

13 A. Well, this whole process of a return to democratic rule
14 through the electoral process, you know, France has, until now,
15:28:41 15 strategic interest in Cote d'Ivoire, and when Robert Guei came to
16 power he visited Liberia immediately. At this particular time,
17 of interest to the Court, Alpha Konare is now chairman of ECOWAS.
18 So as a matter of interest, and I expressed that when they get to
19 find out that I know Robert Guei - in fact, upon the ending of
15:29:05 20 the coup some senior government officials have been arrested, the
21 foreign minister Amara Essy and some generals of the army, I had
22 intervened in getting all of those released from jail, and then
23 Alpha raised the subject matter with me, Alpha Konare, Chairman
24 of ECOWAS, as to what I thought. And I mentioned to him that I
15:29:31 25 thought that it was proper to return to the democratic process,
26 but that it would be important to give him a little bit of time,
27 and, like he said here, we were looking at October of 2000 for
28 elections, and this apparently was favourable - well, I wouldn't
29 use the word "favourable". This apparently was of interest to

1 the French, and I was contacted just to get my views on what I
2 felt about the whole process, and I did give them my views.

3 Q. Right. So there we have, Mr Taylor, synopsis of your views
4 on four important topics concerning the sub-region at the end of
15:30:18 5 January 2000. Now, at or about this time did you have any
6 contact with the United States?

7 A. Yes, we had contacts at all times with the United States.

8 Q. What about with the President of that country?

9 A. Well, earlier during the year he had sent a Christmas - I
15:30:48 10 mean, a card that I received later in January and the ambassador
11 - this is customary, nothing special. This is customary to send
12 these greetings from Head of State to Head of State, and there
13 was a press release from the UN embassy detailing some of the
14 US's views on what they were looking forward to in the year 2000.

15:31:15 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, I'll come and look at that briefly, but
16 before I move on can I first ask, please, that this document be
17 marked for identification MFI-123.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
19 identification MFI-123.

15:31:56 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. You were talking about the greetings sent by the American
22 embassy. Let's just briefly look behind divider 31, please.
23 What are we looking at here, Mr Taylor?

24 A. This is a note from the US embassy to the minister of state
15:32:32 25 concerning a greeting card that was sent to me and my then wife
26 from the President of the United States, Bill Clinton.

27 Q. Now, we see there's a covering letter, is there not, dated
28 3 January?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "Dear Minister Taylor:

2 United States President Bill Clinton asked me to forward
3 the attached greeting card to President Taylor and Mrs Jewel
4 Howard-Taylor. I add my personal best wishes for a bright new
15:33:03 5 century, as stated in my enclosed New Year's message."

6 And that's signed by Bismarck Myrick, the ambassador, is
7 that correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. And it's addressed to your Minister of State, Chief of
15:33:20 10 Staff, at the Executive Mansion, Jonathan Taylor?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Let's go over the page, and we see the page: "US Embassy,
13 Office of Public Affairs", yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:33:36 15 Q. "Immediate press release: New Year's marks from United
16 States Ambassador Bismarck Myrick.

17 As this year comes to a close, I would like to extend best
18 wishes to His Excellency Charles Ghankay Taylor, President of the
19 Republic of Liberia, and to the government and people of Liberia
15:34:08 20 on behalf of the United States Embassy in Monrovia and the
21 American people.

22 We commend you for the steps you have taken in 1999 towards
23 strengthening your democracy and searching for ways to rebuild
24 your economy. After nearly a decade of human suffering and
15:34:24 25 internal turmoil, Liberians have been blessed this year with a
26 period of increasing peace and good will. We take pride in the
27 partnership that we have enjoyed with you over the past year,
28 and, as you have all witnessed by now, the United States Embassy
29 believes in the promotion of people diplomacy. During 1999 the

1 ambassador and members of the embassy staff have travelled to
2 many of the country's counties. Through mutual cooperation, the
3 embassy has joined hands with thousands of ordinary Liberians,
4 both in the urban centres and in rural areas, to inspire them to
15:34:56 5 transform their dreams and hopes of a better quality of life into
6 realities.

7 As we enter the 21st century, I encourage all of you to
8 build on the successes of 1999. In individual ways and through
9 organisational efforts and vision, we can, and should, move
15:35:16 10 beyond the status quo to take more control over our destinies.
11 It is my hope that the year 2000 will begin an era of political,
12 economic and social dynamism that will ensure better education,
13 jobs, health and an overall improved standard of living for every
14 Liberian. Let me reassure you that the United States will remain
15:35:44 15 a true friend of Liberia as you move to achieve these goals.

16 Over 400 Liberian youth joined me recently at the
17 Ambassador's residence for a day of activities and a meal.
18 Seeing their untapped potential made me realise more than ever
19 that in the year 2000, all of us can, and should, redouble our
15:36:04 20 efforts to make this world a safer and more prosperous place for
21 us and our children. They are our future."

22 Followed by the usual salutation. Now, in 1999 one of the
23 major events in Liberia, Mr Taylor, was the destruction of those
24 weapons which we looked at earlier and the statistics thereof,
15:36:31 25 yes?

26 A. Yes, that is correct.

27 Q. Now, what had been the attitude of the government of the
28 United States towards that decision to destroy the weapons?

29 A. They were very - well, I would say happy, and in fact I

1 received a letter from President Clinton commending us for that
2 decision, and I responded to that letter in January. He sent me
3 that letter somewhere late in '99 and I responded somewhere in
4 January, acknowledging receipt of that letter and thanking him
15:37:25 5 for the kind words.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I move on, could I ask, please, that
7 that note from the US embassy dated 3 January, along with the
8 press release, be marked for identification MFI-124, please.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That document is marked MFI-124.

15:37:51 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Now, speaking - you say you responded to President
12 Clinton's letter sometime in January, Mr Taylor, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Look behind divider 35, please. Is that the letter?

15:38:17 15 A. Yes, this is the letter.

16 Q. We see that it's dated 3 February 2000.

17 A. Yes, that's it. I'm off with the date there, yes.

18 Q. "Dear President: I thank you immensely for the kind words
19 of commendation contained in your letter of 13 November 1999,
15:38:39 20 regarding our decision to destroy weapons of war, as well as your
21 expression of satisfaction in efforts we have made in paving the
22 way to peace in neighbouring Sierra Leone.

23 As so much is possible with the clarity of compromise and
24 conciliation, we will continue to uphold the conversations of
15:39:02 25 democratic principles along leaders of the world, particularly
26 with your Excellency."

27 And the normal salutation, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. So we're into February now, Mr Taylor, yes? Are things

1 improving in Sierra Leone?

2 A. Not quite. They're still a little - a little shaky, but
3 what I'm trying to do by this time is to still continue the
4 process of trying to exonerate Liberia from these things, and we
15:39:58 5 see the first real green shoots of progress where the UN begins
6 to take interest in our request to have people stationed on the
7 border to observe. And so we begin to get some communication
8 through the offices of the special representative as to some of
9 the interests and some of the detailed questions that the UN is
15:40:23 10 asking now regarding quantity of people, position of deployment,
11 and this kind of stuff.

12 Q. So it looks now as if your repeated requests for the
13 monitoring of the border might be bear some fruit?

14 A. That's what it appears, yes.

15:40:39 15 Q. And what gives you that appearance?

16 A. Well, we begin to get messages. There's a direct message
17 to me through the UN offices to become more detailed in what do I
18 really want - you know, what is Liberia actually requesting the
19 UN to do.

15:41:11 20 Q. Have you look behind divider 36, please. Do you have it?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, we see here a style of document we've become used to
23 you. It's a code cable. On this occasion we see that it's
24 addressed to Mr Downes-Thomas from Prendergast?

15:41:37 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. And it's dated 10 February 2000 and the heading is "Recent
27 cables":

28 "Thank you for your note of 27" --

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

1 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, Mr President, perhaps I missed it,
2 but was there any mention that this was part of the accused's
3 archives?

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say, Mr Griffiths?

15:42:08 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, not what I said:

6 Q. Mr Taylor, was this part of your archives?

7 A. This was a document that became part of my archives because
8 it involves a direct message to me. It was sent asking me
9 specific questions as to how I wanted deployment done, what did I
10 want. It came from the Under-Secretary-General through the
11 special representative's office, but all of the details of this
12 referred to me, and so it was given to me. It was part of my
13 archives.

14 Q. "Thank you for your note of 27 January concerning your
15:42:55 15 conversation with President Taylor on 26 January. We took note
16 of the message that President Taylor wished to convey to the
17 Secretary-General, namely, that he would be agreeable to the
18 deployment inside Liberia and along the Sierra Leone-Liberia
19 border of United Nations observers or monitors who could, amongst
15:43:21 20 other things, deter or report on any cross-border traffic of
21 diamonds, arms and security personnel. We have discussed the
22 content of this message with the DPKO and it was suggested that
23 one practical way to approach this issue could be for the
24 Government of Liberia to set out in writing exactly what it wants
15:43:51 25 the UN to do."

26 Now - so in light of the question, Mr Taylor, this is
27 Prendergast, the under-secretary, requesting you as President of
28 Liberia, in light of your earlier suggestion, to set out in
29 writing what it is you want?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. So this is what Mr Downes-Thomas, the under-secretary's
3 representative, mind you, in Monrovia, communicated to you, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

15:44:31 5 Q. "The Government of Liberia, in particular, should address
6 the following: The proposed deployment locations."

7 So these are the details the Secretary-General wants from
8 you?

9 A. Exactly.

15:44:44 10 Q. "... the proposed deployment locations; the number of
11 military observers they envisage; whether they also envisage
12 armed troops or only military observers; the level of support to
13 be provided by the Government of Liberia in terms of
14 accommodation, security and liaison with the Sierra Leonean
15:45:09 15 authorities; their readiness to sign a status of forces or
16 mission agreement; and their willingness to accept and assist any
17 technical survey team which the United Nations might decide to
18 send, including guaranteeing its security and facilitating its
19 transportation to the border area.

15:45:43 20 We would appreciate your views on the above approach and
21 any other practical suggestions for following up on the
22 President's request. In the meantime, President Taylor's message
23 will be transmitted to the Secretary-General.

24 We also read with interest your note of 4 February which
15:46:09 25 included a report on remarks made by the French ambassador to
26 Liberia on the arms embargo during his recent visit to Monrovia
27 from his base in Abidjan. We have checked with the French
28 mission on this issue and were informed that during the visit,
29 Foreign Minister Monie Captan informed the ambassador that the

1 Government of Liberia had written to President Konare requesting
2 that ECOWAS write to the United Nations to ask for a lifting of
3 the embargo. If ECOWAS agreed to intervene in such manner, the
4 Government of Liberia wished to send a delegation together with
15:46:50 5 Mr Kouyate to UN headquarters to try to push the issue forward.
6 However, the ambassador did not report making any particular
7 statement to Mr Captan on the issue. The mission also noted that
8 while France was in support of lifting the embargo, contrary to
9 the marks reportedly made by the ambassador, France was not
15:47:13 10 currently and did not plan to take action with members of the
11 Security Council towards attaining the lifting of the embargo."

12 Pause there. Mr Taylor, so Liberia at this time was still
13 unable to buy arms on the open market?

14 A. Still unable, yes.

15:47:28 15 Q. And you were still attempting to get that embargo lifted?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And there was discussion at this time, was there, with
18 President Konare, who, as you helpfully indicated earlier, was at
19 this time chairman of ECOWAS, yes?

15:47:51 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. You were hoping to secure his support for a mission to go
22 to the United Nations to raise the issue, yes?

23 A. That is correct. Remember, we have been attacked twice
24 already, so we are pushing.

15:48:22 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Could that document, code cable dated 10
26 February - no, let me start earlier. The letter to President
27 Clinton dated 3 February 2000, could I please have that marked
28 for identification MFI-125.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is now marked MFI-125.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: And in relation to the document we've just
2 looked at, a code cable dated 10 February 2000 from the United
3 Nations headquarters to Felix Downes-Thomas regarding the
4 deployment of military observers on the border between Liberia
15:49:11 5 and Sierra Leone, could that be marked MFI-126, please.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-126.

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Now, those concerns which had led to the discussion which
9 resulted in this letter of inquiry being sent from UN

15:50:04 10 headquarters to Mr Downes-Thomas, were there further discussions
11 with Mr Downes-Thomas regarding these issues?

12 A. There were further discussions this time coming through
13 other personnel in the system that came through him regarding
14 this very subject matter.

15:50:38 15 Q. What do you mean "regarding this very subject matter"?

16 A. The matter of the deployment, what we needed to do, how
17 many personnel, what would happen, there was a follow-up almost
18 immediately on this particular matter.

19 Q. Follow-up through whom?

15:50:58 20 A. This came, again, from - if I'm not mistaken, it came from
21 the Under-Secretary-General to another member of the team, not to
22 Downes-Thomas himself, but one of the persons that was associated
23 with the team on this issue.

24 Q. Now, we note that the document we just looked at was dated
15:51:26 25 10 February, and you've just said that almost immediately there
26 was a follow-up?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. "Almost immediately" meaning what?

29 A. I would say within a few days. Three, four, five days, not

1 too much longer, there was a follow-up on it.

2 Q. Have a look behind divider 37, please.

3 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, we would ask again that further
4 foundation be laid for this in terms of the connection with this
15:52:00 5 accused.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths?

7 MR GRIFFITHS:

8 Q. Mr Taylor, you say there was a follow-up communication on
9 this, yes?

15:52:11 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. What form did that take?

12 A. It was another cable. I think the gentleman - I'm not too
13 familiar these UN names. I think it could have been Miyet, but
14 it's somebody associated with this whole UN operation that talked
15:52:31 15 about this whole issue of the deployment.

16 Q. And tell me, Mr Taylor, did you have a copy of this
17 communication in your archives?

18 A. Yes, I did. Yes.

19 Q. How did you come to have such a copy in your archives?

15:52:46 20 A. That was presented to me. It was given to me.

21 Q. Who by?

22 A. By the UN officers in Monrovia.

23 Q. Why?

24 A. Because of our normal contacts. And anything that concerns
15:52:57 25 the Government of Liberia --

26 Q. It concerned the Government of Liberia, did it?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. I mean, the deployment of troops that you'd been asking for
29 for months and months and months, that concerned the Government

1 of Liberia, did it?

2 A. Of course.

3 Q. And is that why I ask, because I don't understand these
4 things, you ended up with a copy of the document?

15:53:19 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Well, help me, please. Now have a look behind divider 37.
7 Do you recognise that document?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Is it familiar?

15:53:33 10 A. Very.

11 Q. How do you come to recognise it, Mr Taylor? Help us.

12 A. It is from the Under-Secretary-General to its office in
13 Monrovia, and it concerns this very deployment.

14 Q. And does it happen to read in the subject line: Message
15:53:59 15 From President Taylor?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you see those words?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. What is it you take that to mean, that it's a message from
15:54:05 20 you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So obviously it's something you know about, yes?

23 A. Of course, it's my message.

24 Q. Thank you. It's dated 14 February, we see.

15:54:16 25 Let's go over the page, shall we:

26 "Note to Mr Ri za. Message from President Taylor. In his
27 code of 27 January 2000, Special Representative Downes-Thomas
28 reported in detail on the conversation he had held with President
29 Taylor the previous day.

1 President Taylor had, among other things, requested that
2 Mr Downes-Thomas convey to the Secretary-General his appreciation
3 for the United Nations' efforts in seeking ways to assist Liberia
4 in connection with the financial burden it had assumed in
15:55:02 5 connection with its various contributions to the peace process in
6 Sierra Leone.

7 President Taylor also wanted Mr Downes-Thomas to convey to
8 the Secretary-General that he was agreeable to the deployment
9 inside Liberia, and along the Sierra Leone-Liberia border, of
15:55:24 10 United Nations observers or monitors who could, among other
11 things, deter or report on any cross-border traffic of diamonds,
12 arms or security personnel.

13 The proposal by President Taylor for such a deployment of
14 observers comes as a result of numerous allegations from various
15:55:41 15 sources of diamond smuggling into Liberia from Sierra Leone, as
16 well as cross-border activities by the RUF and Liberian fighters
17 with the alleged connivance of the Liberian authorities. The
18 allegations have been a major obstacle in the way of renewal of
19 bilateral donor assistance to and foreign investments in
15:56:08 20 Liberia."

21 Pause. Now, this is dated, as we see, 11 February 2000,
22 yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And we note who it's from, Kieran Prendergast. Who is he?

15:56:29 25 A. Prendergast is the Under-Secretary-General.

26 Q. And we see that it's being copied to, amongst others,
27 Mr Downes-Thomas, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now, let's look at the wording again, please. "... from

1 various sources of diamond smuggling into Liberia from Sierra
2 Leone, as well as cross-border activities by the RUF and Liberian
3 fighters with the alleged connivance of the Liberian
4 authorities." Note the word used, Mr Taylor, "connivance" not
15:57:06 5 "control". What did you understand by that?

6 A. Connivance here would mean that there is something that is
7 - well, connivance, in cahoots. That there is some complicity on
8 the part of the Liberian government. That's how I would look at
9 it.

15:57:32 10 Q. And note also what this important figure within that world
11 body, the United Nations, is saying:

12 "The allegations have been a major obstacle in the way of
13 renewal of bilateral donor assistance to and foreign investment
14 in Liberia."

15:57:50 15 Now, Mr Taylor, how important was bilateral donor
16 assistance and foreign investments to your government?

17 A. The very life of the country depended on this, and this is
18 why I struggle so hard to end these accusations. The very life
19 of my people depended on this.

15:58:13 20 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. When you were requesting the
21 stationing of observers on the border to monitor this situation,
22 were you being totally hypocritical?

23 A. Not at all. Not at all. This was the real McCoy. This
24 was real. Nothing hypocritical about it.

15:58:41 25 Q. "President Taylor, who made a similar proposal prior to
26 signing of the Lome Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone on 7 July,
27 believes that the deployment of UN observers is his only chance
28 of convincing the international community of Liberia's
29 non-involvement in either diamond smuggling or military

1 assistance to the RUF, despite his close relationship with Foday
2 Sankoh and Sam Bockarie. The latter is being kept in Liberia
3 until the end of the DDR process in Sierra Leone."

4 Pause again. "His only chance". Was that true?

15:59:33 5 A. 100 per cent true.

6 Q. For how long had you been maintaining, Mr Taylor, that
7 these allegations were false?

8 A. This goes all the way back to, I would say, late 1997 after
9 my election. By the first few months in office, 1997,

16:00:01 10 allegations were popping up all over the place like mushrooms
11 were popping up, and we just could not get rid of them. They
12 expanded and expanded and expanded. But from back in '97 - late
13 '97.

14 Q. And had anyone listened to you?

16:00:26 15 A. No one. We did everything. No one. And I guess now we're
16 in a court of law it's a little different, but out there in
17 diplomatic circles these accusations are considered normal. They
18 are considered - there is nothing irrational about accusations in
19 diplomatic circles. Accusations fly all the time. It's

16:00:54 20 different in a court of law - where you get into a court of law
21 and you have to deal with them, but out there I accused Kabbah,
22 he accused me, I accused Conte, Conte accused me. We meet at
23 meetings, we shake hands, it didn't happen. It goes on. It's
24 happening right now. Big countries accuse each other. So it's a

16:01:18 25 part of it. So it persisted, and I guess in certain circles it
26 is used as a way of applying pressure. It's used as a way of
27 applying pressure. Some people get to a point where they almost
28 are - I do not know if it's a form of prophecy or this is more
29 than trying to hypothesize. Some people just say it's a way of

1 getting to find out what makes the other guy tick. It's a game
2 in the international community. It's a real game out there. You
3 accuse the guy, you accuse the country. There will be denials,
4 the country will come back and accuse you. There are denials.

16:02:02 5 Sometimes it stays for years. Except that now it's different.
6 We have to try to prove it factually in a court of law that these
7 things never happened. But that's how it works.

8 Q. Now look also at this: "... despite his close relationship
9 with Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie." Did you have a close
16:02:25 10 relationship with them?

11 A. This is his description. It's Prendergast's description.
12 The fact that I knew Sankoh and Bockarie is in Liberia, maybe
13 he's describing me as close because I, along with my colleagues,
14 could get them to do a lot of things. I guess we can make
16:02:46 15 similar conclusions in other negotiations around the world right
16 now, and there are quite a few of them, that people may want to
17 claim - whether we are talking about the Great Lakes region, or
18 whether we are talking about Southeast Asia, wherever there is a
19 conflict, whoever - or maybe even in Honduras right now, they may
16:03:15 20 end up saying that the mediator, who is not too well right now,

21 is very close to the Honduran government. So these descriptions
22 are things that sometimes you hear, and sometimes it's good to
23 see that you're close to - if you accomplish your mission and
24 sometimes people what they call distance themselves. I'm not
16:03:34 25 sure what led him to this conclusion being close to, but I do not
26 deny that I know them very well.

27 Q. And we note that the involvement appears at this stage,
28 depending, of course, of how you interpret the phrase "military
29 assistance", to come down to diamonds and military assistance.

1 No mention, it would appear, on the face of it, of Liberian
2 fighters being sent by you. Do you see that?

3 A. At this phase, no.

16:04:24

4 Q. Now note also, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind, of course, who
5 is writing this note:

6 "... the latter, Sam Bockarie, that being, is being kept in
7 Liberia until the end of the DDR process in Sierra Leone."

8 So obviously he knew what had been agreed?

9 A. Of course. Of course he knew. They all knew. Of course.

16:04:47

10 Q. "We are currently discussing with DPKO and UNOL how best to
11 follow up on President Taylor's request should he make a formal
12 submission."

13 Now note, Mr Taylor, amongst those sent this note is
14 Mr Fall. Remind us, what's his position in the United Nations?

16:05:09

15 A. Fall is Assistant Secretary-General.

16 Q. Now, did you at this point, Mr Taylor, believe that finally
17 something was going to be done about this border situation?

16:05:43

18 A. The UN system, for some of us that knew it, yes - I can say
19 yes, finally. But when you see it like this where they are
20 beginning to take interest, while it's a beginning, but it's a
21 beginning to a long process. So, yes, we see it as maybe the
22 beginning of the first green shoot of what may happen a few years
23 down the road.

16:06:08

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I indicate there are
25 another two pages behind that page, but it's merely a duplication
26 of the previous document. Save that for completeness, because
27 the second one was underlined in parts, so that the full picture
28 is available, it was included. Whether or not we need now to
29 mark all of it for identification I leave in the Court's hands.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think at this stage, Mr Griffiths,
2 we'll mark all of the documents for identification as part of the
3 one document. When you're tendering it perhaps you may move for
4 some different --

16:06:55 5 MR GRIFFITHS: But I will make reference to the very last
6 page, which is just that short page.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Mr Taylor, could you turn to the very last page behind that
16:07:16 10 divider, please, and you see now - and this is on the same date -
11 we have this response by Mr Downes-Thomas when he says, paragraph
12 2:

13 "I am currently seeking appointments to discuss this
14 matter, deployment of UN military observers along the
16:07:39 15 Liberian-Sierra Leone border with the concerned authorities,
16 including President Taylor."

17 Yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So obviously thereafter the matter was brought to your
16:07:54 20 attention?

21 A. That is correct.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Could all of that document behind that
23 divider be marked for identification please, MFI-127.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we'll mark the cable from
16:08:07 25 Prendergast as 127A and the reply from Downes-Thomas as 127B.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, for some time there had been discussions,
28 as we've mentioned on a couple of occasions already today, about
29 the holding of a Heads of State of the Mano River Union summit,

- 1 yes?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. And there had been discussions about holding it in
- 4 Freetown, yes? Conakry?
- 16:09:11 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And Abuja?
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Did it finally take place?
- 9 A. Yes, a little later it finally takes place.
- 16:09:21 10 Q. Where?
- 11 A. We finally decide we'll go to Bamako.
- 12 Q. To Bamako?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. And as is normal at such meetings, was it followed by a
- 16:09:37 15 final communique?
- 16 A. Yes. We go to Bamako. Yes, there is a final communique.
- 17 Q. And did you attend?
- 18 A. Yes, yes. Early - very early. Not in February now. This
- 19 is in very early March.
- 16:09:52 20 Q. And did you receive a copy of the final communique?
- 21 A. Yes. Yes, I did.
- 22 Q. And did you retain such a copy in your archives?
- 23 A. Yes, I did.
- 24 Q. And could you recognise the document if you saw it?
- 16:10:07 25 A. Yes, I would.
- 26 Q. Have a look behind divider 38, please. Do you recognise
- 27 that document?
- 28 A. Yes. This is the final communique of the consultative
- 29 meeting of the Heads of State of the Mano River Union meeting.

1 Q. What's the date of it?

2 A. This is - it should be early March. 2 March. Very early.

3 Q. If we look at the bottom right-hand corner we see "Bamako,
4 2 March 2000", do we not?

16:10:51 5 A. Yes, we do.

6 Q. Let's a look at this document, shall we:

7 "At the invitation of His Excellency Mr Alpha Oumar Konare,
8 President of the Republic of Mali, Chairman of the Authority of
9 the Economic Community of West African states, and in the
10 framework of the regular consultations on issues of peace,
11 security and stability in the sub-region, a follow-up meeting on
12 the decisions of the ad hoc committee of the ECOWAS Heads of
13 State and government (Abuja, 6 September 1999) was held in Bamako
14 on 2 March 2000."

16:11:33 15 The consultation meeting was attended by the follow Heads
16 of State: President Konare of Mali, President Conte, Guinea;
17 yourself, President of Liberia; and we also see that present was
18 Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra
19 Leone.

16:12:07 20 "The ECOWAS executive secretary attended the meeting
21 together with the special representative of the UN
22 Secretary-General for Sierra Leone and a representative of the
23 OAU Secretary-General.

24 The Heads of State exchanged views on the relationships
16:12:24 25 between the three Mano River Union member states, with the view
26 of implementing the decisions made by the ad hoc committee of
27 ECOWAS heads of state and government held in Abuja on 16
28 September '99."

29 Mr Taylor, I pause. Can you clarify something for us,

1 please. Which countries were members of the Mano River Union?

2 A. There were only three countries. Now it's a little
3 different because of the time you're asking the question.
4 Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia are the Mano River Union.

16:13:03 5 Q. So why was the President of Mali present?

6 A. In his capacity as Chairman of ECOWAS and hosting the
7 meeting, he attended.

8 Q. Over the page, please:

9 "The Heads of State of the three countries reiterated their
16:13:31 10 will to immediately reinstate dialogue at all levels in order to
11 promote goodwill, neighbourliness and cooperation among
12 themselves.

13 They reaffirmed their attachment to the Mano River Union
14 Nonaggression Agreement concluded in 1996 and their strong will
16:13:52 15 to have it implemented.

16 In this regard they reaffirmed their commitment to refrain
17 from any act of aggression against the territorial integrity of
18 each of their countries, to ban the use of their respective
19 territories for undertaking actions of destabilisation, and they
16:14:14 20 agreed to coordinate their activities in the area of border
21 security.

22 The Heads of State of the three countries committed to
23 keeping on fostering confidence-building measures at all levels
24 and expressed their determination to develop, without delay,
16:14:32 25 neighbourly relationships and to establish regular summit
26 consultations.

27 In this framework, the Heads of State of the three
28 countries decided:

29 (1) To convene a meeting of the ministers of foreign

1 affairs on 18 March 2000 in Monrovia in order to define all
2 practical modalities for the revitalisation of the Mano River
3 Union. Such meeting shall be formally convened by the executive
4 secretariat of the Mano River Union, which shall be immediately
16:15:13 5 made functional;

6 (2) To hold a summit meeting of the Heads of State and
7 government on 7 and 8 May 2000 in Conakry."

8 Now, that summit in Conakry, Mr Taylor, did you attend?

9 A. Yes.

16:15:39 10 Q. Now, just jumping forward to come back, do you recall
11 hearing on 8 May 2000 that there was an incident in Sierra Leone,
12 a shooting in Spur Road at Foday Sankoh's residence?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, we'll come back to that in due course, but just
16:16:06 15 continuing with this document:

16 "The Heads of State, after hearing the report of the
17 meeting convened by the ECOWAS chairman of the authority on the
18 situation in Sierra Leone, approved the final communique of this
19 meeting and insisted, among other things on:

16:16:28 20 (A) The immediate removal by the RUF of all obstacles to
21 the deployment of the UNAMSIL."

22 Now, what we are talking about "all obstacles", Mr Taylor?

23 A. At this particular time we have UNAMSIL wanting to carry
24 out its duties and they can't. There are all kinds of hiccups in
16:17:07 25 permitting them to doing their work and so we are just, in other
26 words, saying, "Listen, just stop all these things and get
27 UNAMSIL get on with its work."

28 Q. "The immediate return by the RUF of the large quantities of
29 weapons and military equipment seized from the Guinean troops, as

1 well as the immediate return by the RUF and the AFRC/SLA of the
2 weapons seized from the Kenyan troops."

3 Now, were you aware of this large quantity of weapons and
4 military equipment seized from the Guinean troops, Mr Taylor?

16:17:50 5 A. Yes, that was brought to the Heads of State meeting, that a
6 very large amount of - not just arms and ammunition, but
7 artillery equipment - a huge amount was seized from the Guinean
8 forces by the RUF or the SLA, one of them, in this process was
9 brought to us.

16:18:13 10 Q. But I thought that they were dependent on arms and
11 ammunition sent by you, Mr Taylor?

12 A. I didn't have arms for myself. That's not true.

13 Q. "The simultaneous removal of roadblocks throughout the
14 country by all combatants before the follow-up meeting scheduled
16:18:33 15 to take place on 20 March 2000 in Freetown.

16 The acceleration of the setting up of more DDR centres,
17 once the UNAMSIL deploys, and the exploration of new imaginative
18 ways of funding the DDR.

19 They requested the President of Liberia, His Excellency
16:18:54 20 Dankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, to get personally involved
21 in solving the issues which hamper the peace process in Sierra
22 Leone and to seek adequate solutions in consultation with the
23 other Heads of State."

24 Mr Taylor, were you meddling in Sierra Leone, or had you
16:19:29 25 been requested to get personally involved; which is right?

26 A. I was requested to get personally involved and could have
27 never been meddling. As a matter of fact, remember the threats
28 that were made by me earlier where I had said that I was - I'd
29 had it and that I would get out of this whole thing and didn't

1 want to have anything else to do with the Sierra Leonean problem,
2 the fear expressed by Downes-Thomas in that memo to --

3 Q. Worrisome?

4 A. Well, you know, he said it was worrisome to him. It comes.

16:20:08 5 I get to this meeting and I tell them, the chairman of ECOWAS and
6 them, "This is it. I don't want to have anything to do with
7 Sierra Leone again. I want to get off the Committee of Six. I
8 don't want to have anything to do with it. I'm just fed up that
9 there is nothing that I'm gaining from this in Liberia but just
16:20:27 10 pure trouble where my people - I hardly have time for my own
11 people with these accusations every day." So this is where they
12 then get together and reinforce, say "No, no, no, you've got to
13 get personally involved", and so this is what they are voicing
14 here.

16:20:44 15 Q. Now, we can't move on just yet. We also need to note the
16 following, don't we: They requested you to get personally
17 involved.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Let's go back to the second page, please. Have a look at
16:21:03 20 who was present. Does the "they" include President Kabbah?

21 A. Of course. Of course Tejani. Yes.

22 Q. "In the face of the natural disaster which struck southern
23 African countries, in particular Mozambique, the Heads of State
24 sent a message of sympathy to the distressed peoples and
16:21:42 25 government, and they appealed to the international community to
26 provide them with relevant emergency aid.

27 The Heads of State expressed total satisfaction for the
28 atmosphere of brotherhood and confidence in which their
29 deliberations were held."

1 Is that true?

2 A. Well, yes, to the best of my knowledge it's true. This one
3 meeting we didn't fight, and so it's true.

4 Q. And then over the page, the normal expression of gratitude
16:22:17 5 to the host. And we see your signature penultimate on that page,
6 Mr Taylor, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, do your Honours have another
9 copy of this document behind this first copy?

16:22:47 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I've actually got another copy, and then
11 after that it looks like a list of other people who may have
12 attended.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: For my part I'm not interested in those.
14 I'm only interested in the one document.

16:23:03 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We'll just mark the document
16 that the witness has been questioned on.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: So the final communique of the consultation
18 meeting of the Heads of State on the Mano River Union dated 2
19 March 2000, can I ask that that be marked for identification
16:23:29 20 MFI-128, please.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-128.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. Now, can we just remind ourselves before we finally put
24 that document away: Was there any representative of the United
16:24:07 25 Nations present at that meeting?

26 A. Yes, yes.

27 Q. Paragraph 3, the UN Secretary-General for Sierra Leone and
28 the representative - the special representative of the UN
29 Secretary-General for Sierra Leone. Now tell us, Mr Taylor, do

1 you recall who that person was by this stage? Was it still
2 Mr Okelo?

3 A. No. In Sierra Leone at the time? No, no, no, it's
4 Adeniji. Adeniji.

16:24:37 5 Q. Adeniji?

6 A. Yes, Adeniji is the special representative at that time.

7 Q. So we have that meeting in March, Mr Taylor.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, at this time what's the situation like on your
16:25:24 10 contiguous borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone?

11 A. Well, by this time there are some developments regarding
12 the disarmament process, minor developments, and that is ongoing
13 in Sierra Leone.

14 Q. Now help us with this: At or about this time had you been
16:25:55 15 on any official visits out of Liberia apart from the Mano River
16 meeting in Bamako?

17 A. We're talking about March - March 2000. I can't really
18 recall at this time if I went outside of the region. If I
19 recollect properly, a month or two later on I go to a couple of
16:26:29 20 meetings, but I don't recollect right now.

21 Q. Where?

22 A. But that's further down in May I travel to - quickly to
23 Nigeria, where I attend the Committee of Six meeting, and then a
24 Head of State meeting. I don't quite recall leaving the region
16:26:51 25 at that time.

26 Q. And during this period - we're talking about March/April
27 now, so we're still in the first quarter of 2000 - what's your
28 relationship like with President Kabbah?

29 A. We are - as far as I'm concerned, not too bad. We are

1 talking. In fact, there is some - he does a press release about
2 certain things that we say, but it's cordial. As normal, it's
3 cordial.

16:27:41 4 Q. And there had been in the past, had there not, accusations
5 about Liberians massing to invade Sierra Leone and Sierra
6 Leoneans massing to invade Liberia. Any more of such
7 allegations?

8 A. Yes, it went on. We did a major press interview stating
9 that it was not true, and Kabbah responded about certain things
16:28:08 10 that we had said that he said were not true. But normal tit for
11 tat, that's all.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President. Would it be
13 convenient for us to adjourn at this stage?

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. You were going to move on to
16:28:29 15 another document, I take it, Mr Griffiths? We've got two
16 minutes, but I think it's probably better for the morning.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm most grateful.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn now until tomorrow morning
19 and, Mr Taylor, I remind you you're ordered not to discuss your
16:28:45 20 evidence with any other person. We'll adjourn until 9.30.

21 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.
22 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 18 August 2009 at
23 9.30 a.m.]

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I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	26831
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	26831