



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 12 AUGUST 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Terry Munyard

1 Wednesday, 12 August 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:17:04 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Brenda J Hollis and our case
09:33:00 10 manager, Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, counsel
13 opposite. For the Defence today are myself Courtenay Griffiths,
14 assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah, Mr Terry Munyard
09:33:12 15 and we're joined today by Ms Kathy Hovington who is an intern
16 with us.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths.

18 Mr Taylor, I'll just remind you that you're still bound by
19 your declaration to tell the truth.

09:33:31 20 Yes, Mr Griffiths.

21 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

22 [On former affirmation]

23 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

24 Q. Yesterday when we adjourned, Mr Taylor, we were looking at
09:33:36 25 events in April of 1999. Do you recall that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. And we had looked in some detail at the arrangements made
28 to transport RUF representatives to Lome for peace talks. Do you
29 recall that?

1 A. Yes, I do.

2 Q. And we had also looked at the fact that coincidentally
3 during the middle of those arrangements an incursion took place
4 from Guinea into Liberia?

09:34:11 5 A. That's right.

6 Q. And we had ended proceedings yesterday by looking at a
7 statement issued by your government regarding that event, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So we had reached then towards the end of April 1999. Is
09:34:33 10 that correct?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Were there any further events in April, Mr Taylor, which
13 are of significance to us?

14 A. No, I think that's about the most significant part, because
09:34:52 15 that incursion is around the 21st. We come out with a report.

16 No, we move right on into May, where there are - where almost
17 immediately following our official statement about invoking
18 certain parts of the treaties of the Mano River Union we receive
19 a very - how would I want to call it? A very questionable letter
09:35:27 20 from the British government moving into May that we had to deal
21 with almost immediately.

22 Q. And that letter from the British government, can you help
23 us as to what effect it was?

24 A. Yes, we - I received - our government received a letter
09:35:53 25 from the British government through its ambassador stationed in
26 La Cote d'Ivoire. Let me clarify that that ambassador was also
27 accredited to Liberia, but was stationed in La Cote d'Ivoire and
28 had been there during the crucial time of the year and they were
29 planning to return. That letter in a way was a little cynical,

1 because it twisted in a way the intent of what we had done in our
2 major policy statement where we granted amnesty to ex-combatants
3 or those individuals fighting in Sierra Leone. By twisted I
4 mean, yes, we were not born with the so-called Queen's language,
09:36:53 5 but there was something cynical about that letter that did not go
6 down too well with the government because --

7 Q. Well let's have a look at that letter, shall we, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness, please, be shown the

09:37:09 10 document behind divider 34:

11 Q. Do you have the document now, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, first of all let's look at the date. What
14 date is it?

09:38:12 15 A. This is 10 June 1999.

16 Q. Now before we look at this letter, had you been anywhere
17 outside of Liberia prior to 10 June?

18 A. Yes, early June I made two external visits.

19 Q. Where to?

09:38:40 20 A. To Nigeria and then on to Tripoli, Libya.

21 Q. And help us, the purpose of the trip to Nigeria?

22 A. Well, Abacha had - let me not say Abacha. Obasanjo had
23 just not been in office too long. We had exchanged telephone
24 messages - in fact, I think I had attended the inauguration - and
09:39:11 25 so coming in we had not had an opportunity to really sit to talk
26 about the situation in the region. So en route to Libya I
27 decided to do a stopover for, you know, a tete-a-tete to brief
28 him and bring him up to snuff about what was going on and to hear
29 from him, because again let's not push the issue, but Nigeria is

1 still the powerhouse of West Africa and so a new President coming
2 in, you know, all of us tried to see if we are in synch with each
3 other's views and exchange ideas as I had been dealing with the
4 Sierra Leonean problem all along and that was central on our
09:40:07 5 agenda.

6 Q. Now, can you help us as to how long before that visit
7 Obasanjo's inauguration had taken place?

8 A. Let's see, Obasanjo is in not too - it's not very long
9 before this. Not very long.

09:40:24 10 Q. And you went to Nigeria for that inauguration, did you?

11 A. Yes, I did.

12 Q. So this visit en route to Libya, was that the second visit
13 you had made to Nigeria since Obasanjo had come to office?

14 A. That is correct.

09:40:44 15 Q. And normally when these events occur, Mr Taylor, they are
16 concluded by an issuance of a communique?

17 A. That is correct. All visits end with a communique where at
18 least the public must know what were these guys talking about.

19 At the inauguration, for example, you really can't talk. There
09:41:07 20 are a lot of people and you may exchange greetings, but there's
21 no opportunity, but on what we will call a working visit like
22 this you come up with a communique explaining the principal
23 issues of discussion.

24 Q. Now before we look at this letter from the British
09:41:28 25 ambassador, could we have a look behind divider 35 please. Do
26 you have the document, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes, I do.

28 Q. What is this document?

29 A. This is the joint communique issued by the two Heads of

1 State on my one day working visit to Nigeria on 5 June 1999.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can I enquire from your Honours whether
3 you have a number of duplicate copies of this document? It
4 should only be a three page document.

09:42:25 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: You mean behind the same divider?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Behind the same divider. Do you have
7 several copies of the same thing?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: I've only got the one copy.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Well, it's just my bundle then:

09:42:38 10 Q. Now let's have a look at this communique then, shall we,
11 Mr Taylor:

12 "At the invitation of His Excellency General Olusegun
13 Obasanjo, President, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of
14 the Federal Republic of Nigeria, His Excellency Mr Charles
09:43:07 15 Taylor, President of the Republic of Liberia, paid a one day
16 working visit to Nigeria on 5 June 1999."

17 So it follows then, does it, Mr Taylor, that it was at
18 President Obasanjo's invitation that you attended?

19 A. That is correct.

09:43:18 20 Q. "During the visit, the two Heads of State exchanged views
21 on a wide range of subjects", such as?

22 A. We talked about Sierra Leone, peace in the sub-region and
23 let's just get one thing clear here, because when you see, "at
24 the invitation", we had spoken several times on the phone. He
09:43:42 25 knew I was going to Libya. "Well listen, my brother, on your way
26 could you stop for us now?" That's an invitation. "On your way,
27 could you stop over for a talk as you go?"

28 Because Nigeria is actually out of - when you fly out of
29 Kano, that's directly into North Africa. So when you see an

1 invitation here this doesn't mean that we had not talked about
2 it, but as it's expressed when these documents are being done you
3 say "at the invitation", but it doesn't mean that that's like a
4 written letter or something.

09:44:17 5 Q. "At the bilateral level, the leaders commended the
6 excellent relations existing between their two countries and
7 explored further ways of consolidating their relations. In this
8 regard, the two leaders agreed that the Nigeria-Liberia joint
9 commission should be resuscitated and revamped."

09:44:42 10 What was that joint commission?

11 A. Economic cooperation and other things are dealing. We were
12 looking at how we could get Nigerians to invest in Liberia.
13 There are quite a few very rich people in Nigeria and business
14 people. This joint commission to look across the board at
09:45:08 15 cultural, economic and other ties.

16 Q. "On sub-regional matters, the two leaders reaffirmed their
17 determination to work for the achievement of peace and stability
18 in West Africa so that the process of economic development in the
19 sub-region could be speeded up."

09:45:31 20 Mr Taylor, did you see a link between peace, stability and
21 economic development?

22 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely, definitely.

23 Q. "The two leaders commended the efforts of ECOWAS in the
24 search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Sierra Leone.

09:45:48 25 They welcomed the recent ceasefire agreement between the
26 Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front and
27 urged both parties to conclude, as early as possible, a final
28 peace agreement that will bring a lasting solution to the crisis
29 in that country."

1 Tell us, Mr Taylor, what was the hot topic for discussion
2 between yourself and the new incoming President of Nigeria?

3 A. Sierra Leone, as I've just mentioned before. And this
4 issue of talking about the ceasefire, let's just clarify. We are
09:46:28 5 looking here at June and let's remind ourselves that the
6 delegations are in Lome as of April. Between the middle to the
7 end of April they are there and they take most of April and May
8 and hammer out first of all a ceasefire agreement. And may I
9 just mention sadly, may peace be unto her, the former foreign
09:46:58 10 minister of Liberia D Musuleng-Cooper, that name has been
11 through, just died about a month ago in Liberia, was present. I
12 had - Liberia had a permanent negotiating group in Lome as of
13 April and my former foreign minister - not my - the former
14 foreign minister, like I said, Mrs Cooper was there.

09:47:24 15 So I briefed him and he already knew what was going on over
16 there and we expressed our satisfaction with this ceasefire but
17 now the sticking point had to be how do we get a final agreement?
18 Because there was several major issues that I'm sure we'll get
19 into later before we could get in agreement and we were now
09:47:48 20 looking at some of the possible scenarios in how we could manage,
21 you know, a peace agreement out of that Lome meeting.

22 Q. Help us a little further with the Liberian delegation which
23 was present during that period, Mr Taylor. You've mentioned one
24 individual, the late D Musuleng-Cooper?

09:48:15 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. How many others were sent as part of that delegation? Just
27 a rough idea?

28 A. We had about three persons. Mrs Cooper. We also had a
29 senior military personnel on the ground there, former General Joe

1 Tuah and an assistant to Mrs Cooper, I don't remember his or her
2 name. But they were there because again - because of my role, we
3 wanted somebody on the ground that kept me in touch with the
4 daily occurrences. Even though I was speaking to

09:49:03 5 President Eyadema all of the time but we had somebody there that
6 any time something got stuck that I heard from Eyadema on this I
7 could get to Mrs Cooper and we could add pressure. Let it be
8 very clear these negotiations were not simple and I'm sure we
9 will talk more about it, but it called for a lot of arm twisting.

09:49:23 10 A lot of things went on I'm sure we'll get into later.

11 Q. And when had the Liberian delegation arrived in Lome?

12 A. In April along with everybody else. We were stationed
13 there.

14 Q. Let's go back to the document then, shall we:

09:49:42 15 "The two leaders paid tribute to the chairman of ECOWAS,
16 His Excellency President Gnassingbe Eyadema, for his initiatives
17 and actions towards the resolution of conflicts in the
18 sub-region.

19 His Excellency President General Olusegun Obasanjo
09:50:02 20 congratulated President Taylor of the Republic of Liberia on his
21 recent decision to destroy the arms and ammunition surrendered by
22 the former warring factions during the disarmament process in
23 Liberia. They noted that the destruction of these arms will mark
24 the final disengagement of ECOMOG from Liberia."

09:50:25 25 Pause there again. Now, Mr Taylor, in tandem with all the
26 other matters that we've been discussing over the course of 1999,
27 was this theme of arms destruction running in the background?

28 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

29 Q. And what kind of practical or logistical issues were thrown

1 up by that?

2 A. Practical issues had been resolved. The United Nations was
3 paying for the destruction of the arms. They were sending in
4 their experts to carry out the destruction. On the logistical
09:51:11 5 side, what was of concern to us - I would say logistical and
6 security. What our concern was, we were now in a period where
7 arms are about to be destroyed. The armed forces situation is
8 not settled because we have not restructured. ECOMOG is drawing
9 down at a faster rate than anticipated. And what do I mean by
09:51:37 10 that? Let's not forget that ECOMOG is now moving seriously into
11 Sierra Leone.

12 So we are concerned that all of these taking place at the
13 same time could cause some problems and we discussed how we could
14 begin to look at the possible restructuring problem, the
09:51:59 15 financial implications for such a restructuring project. All of
16 these were just thrown around to get ideas.

17 Q. Well, can we discuss that a little further, please. At
18 this stage was there a Liberian army?

19 A. No. Not in the true sense of the word, no. The army, by
09:52:27 20 virtue of being partisan during the war - by "partisan", remember
21 I said here before to this Court the army split itself into
22 ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J, LPC, so they could no longer be looked at,
23 quote unquote, as an Armed Forces of Liberia. But we come into
24 office. There is no one to look at.

09:52:55 25 So what we are referring to when you see other statements
26 here about Liberia deploying forces at the border, what we are
27 doing, we are using what was the remnants of the Armed Forces of
28 Liberia, the LPC, the ULIMO-J, the ULIMO-K, who have all said
29 that they were loyal to our government. These are the people

1 that we're sending out. But they are not a disciplined,
2 coordinated group. So what we do need is to formally train them.
3 So at this time we do not have - as a matter of fact it is now,
4 now as we sit in this Court, in Liberia that the Armed Forces of
09:53:41 5 Liberia is being trained, now. Right now.

6 Q. Let's put those facts together, shall we. So, on the one
7 hand, there isn't an organised army as such. On the other hand,
8 ECOMOG is withdrawing their forces much more quickly than
9 anticipated?

09:53:57 10 A. That is correct, yes.

11 Q. On the third hand, you've just had an incursion from Guinea
12 in April?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. On the fourth hand, what arms and ammunition are present in
09:54:13 15 Liberia are about to be destroyed?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. What capacity did you have at this
18 stage to defend your country?

19 A. Virtually, virtually, virtually none. What we were doing
09:54:31 20 at that particular time, those dis-earnest individuals during the
21 disarmament, demobilisation process that had a rifle here or
22 rifle there brought them out. This is as simple as I can put it.
23 Remember we are using ECOMOG at that time. I think that evidence
24 was given in this Court where ECOMOG carried out cordon and

09:55:02 25 search operations in Monrovia and they were in some grave - in
26 the graveyard areas weapons were recovered. These are the type
27 of little weapons that are available to whatever forces are there
28 to resist this incursion from LURD and principally that's why
29 LURD made such rapid advancement, because we had no defence.

1 Q. "On the situation in Africa both leaders expressed concern
2 at the increase in the number of conflicts as well as their
3 intensity. They called on all parties to these various conflicts
4 to embrace dialogue, in the traditional African manner so that
09:55:48 5 peaceful solutions can be found to these crises.

6 His Excellency Mr Charles Taylor, President of the Republic
7 of Liberia, expressed gratitude to His Excellency General
8 Olusegun Obasanjo, the government and people of Nigeria, for the
9 warm and brotherly welcome extended to him and his delegation
09:56:09 10 during the visit and President Taylor extended an invitation to
11 President Obasanjo to visit Liberia. This invitation was
12 accepted."

13 Did he later visit Liberia, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Yes, he did.

09:56:29 15 Q. When?

16 A. He made a quick visit to Liberia for the 26 July
17 celebration.

18 Q. Celebration of what?

19 A. Of the independence of Liberia. If I'm right, the 152nd
09:56:51 20 anniversary of Liberia's independence.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, please, that that communique be
22 marked for identification. Communique on visit to Nigeria, 5
23 June 1999. MFI-85, please, Mr President.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-85 for
09:57:10 25 identification.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Now from Nigeria as you indicated you travelled on to
28 Libya?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Why?

2 A. I was seeking economic assistance. We were trying to get
3 Libya to help us with a major problem that was giving us trouble,
4 the problem of oil, oil is a major problem for small countries,
09:57:46 5 and trying to get some concessions on rights to purchase refined
6 products at some reduced brotherly rate. This is what we went
7 there for, economic reasons.

8 Q. And how long did you spend in Libya?

9 A. Only a couple of days.

09:58:07 10 Q. And did you visit the Mataba?

11 A. By this time, no. By meeting with Gaddafi you are already
12 - I didn't have to go to the Mataba. I didn't have to go to the
13 Mataba but I spoke to Gaddafi at length.

14 Q. Let's go now then, please, back to that letter from the
09:58:31 15 British embassy behind divider 34. Where were you when the
16 letter actually arrived, Mr Taylor?

17 A. By 10 June I was not in Liberia. I think I may have been
18 en route back from Libya. I'm not sure if I was in Liberia at
19 this time.

09:58:59 20 Q. And we see it's addressed to the President of the Republic
21 of Liberia, dated 10 June and it reads as follows:

22 "Your Excellency, my government have followed with interest
23 your recent public comments on developments in Sierra Leone.

24 This is a crucial matter for all of us. We share your
09:59:21 25 expressed desire for a sustainable peace there. This will bring
26 benefits not only to the people of Sierra Leone but also to the
27 region itself, including to Liberia."

28 Were you unaware of that fact, Mr Taylor?

29 A. I was not unaware of that fact.

1 Q. "Like you, we are following closely the discussions now
2 taking place in Lome between the Government of Sierra Leone and
3 the RUF. They offer the opportunity for a fresh start and for
4 lasting peace. We hope that all involved will seize that
09:59:57 5 opportunity. You are conscious that the talks also offer
6 Liberia, and you personally, Mr President, a chance to play a
7 constructive role in the sub-region.

8 We therefore welcome your recent positive comments on the
9 Lome negotiations and your assurances that Liberian diplomatic
10:00:21 10 support for the rebels will cease."

11 Pause there. "Liberian diplomatic support for the rebels".
12 How did you interpret that?

13 A. That's what I mean - in fact, that's what I meant when I
14 said that this letter did not go down well because if you see the
10:00:41 15 language here is being twisted as we go along and let me just
16 comment to the Court. This letter, even looking at it from a
17 diplomatic standpoint, it is not - it is not usual, or may I just
18 say it is unusual, for an ambassador to write a letter directly
19 to the Head of State and government of a country that he or she
10:01:15 20 is accredited to.

21 Now there are two ways of looking at these kinds of
22 letters, because an ambassador is supposed to represent the views
23 of his or her government. Now, all of us know that the Head of
24 State of Great Britain is the Queen and the Prime Minister is the
10:01:39 25 head of government.

26 Now this ambassador is writing this letter and these things
27 develop like this when people want to develop what you call a
28 plausible deniability, because let's look back, if you don't
29 mind, counsel. Where she says in paragraph 3, if you want to

1 Look at it, "We are conscious that the talks also offer Liberia
2 and you personally, Mr President, a chance to play a constructive
3 role in the sub-region", that is really suggesting that I'm not
4 playing a constructive role, okay?

10:02:20 5 We tore this letter apart, you know, literally in terms of
6 a response to it. You are alleging here that, "Okay, you have
7 not been playing a constructive role. We hope that you will
8 play", and where she says, "Like you, we are following closely."
9 Well like me, you are not like me because I am not following
10:02:41 10 closely the talks. I'm a part of the talks. So these are the
11 little nuances you find in these documents that build up over
12 time.

13 And so then we go to what you just asked about, this
14 diplomatic support. Again, it's subjective. There is no
10:03:04 15 diplomatic support that Liberia is giving to the rebels. Liberia
16 is a part of the Committee of Five and the Committee of Six,
17 charged with the responsibility, known by their government that
18 sit on the Security Council as a permanent member, so to infer
19 here that there is diplomatic support being given by Liberia to
10:03:26 20 the rebels is total nonsense and this didn't go down well with me
21 and the government and we took exception to this kind of
22 language.

23 There's no such thing as diplomatic support for the
24 rebels - none. If by permitting in line with the United Nations
10:03:43 25 and ECOWAS and the African Union, if by permitting delegates to
26 pass through Liberia constitute a diplomatic support, well, then
27 I'm guilty, but that's not what she is referring to here. This
28 is an inference here that is negative and has a type of
29 antagonising annotation that is improper and so we took serious

1 exception to this.

2 Q. And you note also in the second paragraph, Mr Taylor, the
3 reference to, "This is a crucial matter for us all." Coming from
4 the British embassy, how did you interpret that?

10:04:25 5 A. That diplomatically, "Hey, we have serious interests in
6 Sierra Leone and we are not just going to let go." That's how
7 you could interpret that. They are expressing clearly, "We have
8 interests", and they normally add another word diplomatically to
9 this "vital interest." This is where she is trying - this
10:04:54 10 ambassador is trying to point out.

11 Q. Now, let's go back to the paragraph where we paused:

12 "... your assurances that Liberian diplomatic support for
13 the rebels will cease unless they remain fully committed to the
14 peace process. We hope that you will continue to use your
10:05:12 15 influence with the rebels to ensure that a peace agreement is
16 secured and fully implemented."

17 "Your influence with the rebels", how did you interpret
18 that?

19 A. That's the round about way, "You are providing support."
10:05:31 20 "Command, control" that you hear in this indictment, that's it.
21 "Your influence" is just, "Your command and your control of them,
22 we hope that you will take care of your little puppets that you
23 have. Control them." That's what she is saying here and I'm
24 saying it didn't go down well with us because this is far from
10:05:49 25 the fact. That's what she is pointing to here.

26 Q. But Mr Taylor, forgive me, but you do recall that you had
27 made some rather caustic remarks about the United States and
28 Britain earlier in the year in a statement made in London?

29 A. Oh, yes.

1 Q. "We also welcome your undertaking to destroy the weapons
2 left over from Liberia's own civil conflict. We look forward to
3 the completion of this destruction. It will be a valuable
4 practical expression of your commitment to building confidence in
5 the region."

10:06:30

6 How did you interpret that, "your commitment to building
7 confidence in the region"?

8 A. You know, like I said, this letter was just loaded with
9 nonsense and you wouldn't even know whether this is the British
10 government's view, or the ambassador writing that they will later
11 on say, "Well, this doesn't represent the view of the British
12 government", but this is one of those - this is just another one
13 of those curve balls that, you know, he is sending that just
14 doesn't give the reality of the situation.

10:06:49

15 Q. Then we come to this, "We continue to believe that Liberia
16 can also use its influence to stop the supply of arms to the
17 rebels in Sierra Leone." Again, what did you make of that?

10:07:15

18 A. That, you know, "You're controlling them, you're sending it
19 and so we are just asking you to stop sending arms." Again, this
20 is peddling - I mean, he is peddling this that just, you know, a
21 tricky word "use your influence", but he is really trying to say
22 "Stop sending arms."

10:07:35

23 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Did this same British government
24 ever provide you with proof or any kind of evidence that you were
25 engaged in that kind of activity?

10:07:58

26 A. Nothing. Nothing. We're still waiting for it. Nothing
27 whatsoever.

28 Q. "Such supply can only bring further isolation to the
29 countries involved." "Further isolation", at the time how

1 isolated was Liberia?

2 A. Oh, very, very. With all of these accusations I've
3 mentioned to this Court, Bretton Wood Institutions blocked, donor
4 countries blocked, they are trying to diplomatically stop you.
10:08:37 5 Everything begins to dry up when they put these kind of things
6 and he's just saying that things are going to get worse.

7 Q. Did you view it as a threat?

8 A. Well, I viewed it as both a threat and an ongoing
9 situation. This is something that is - this is an active
10:09:01 10 situation I would just say as an additional threat.

11 Q. "Further isolation"?

12 A. Uh-huh, yes.

13 Q. "For our part we will continue to do all we can to help
14 bring about a sustainable political settlement and reconciliation
10:09:17 15 in Sierra Leone." Help us, Mr Taylor. Did the British have a
16 representative in Lome during those peace talks?

17 A. Oh, yes, they had. All of the principal countries had
18 people around what we call at the side bar issues. I'm sure the
19 British representative ambassador in Lome, the US ambassador,
10:09:39 20 there were side - everybody was present not participating
21 directly, but you were on the fringes of the meeting getting
22 information, putting in your little word, passing messages. All
23 of these things happened during negotiations and they were
24 happening in Lome at that particular time.

10:10:03 25 Q. "Our practical support for the rebuilding of a new
26 democratically accountable Sierra Leone Army is part of our
27 efforts."

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now do you have a comment to make about that, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Yes, there are just too many things hidden in here that you
2 know the British are always very well dressed in top hats and so
3 you very rarely know.

4 Let's go back to something that the Court ought to see:

10:10:33 5 "For our part we will continue to do all we can to help bring
6 about a sustainable political settlement and reconciliation in
7 Sierra Leone."

8 Don't forget there is this tussle between the British that
9 I have talked about and what they interpret as Nigeria's role in
10:10:56 10 West Africa and Nigeria wanting to dominate West Africa and
11 exercise hegemony in Sierra Leone.

12 So with the vital interests of Britain there are two words
13 here "political settlement". Britain is saying that, "We have
14 vital interests", and don't let's forget while President Kabbah
10:11:19 15 is out of power the British fund, okay, a covert radio station,
16 they pay for the Kabbah government in exile and so they have
17 vital interests.

18 Then they go one step to say, "Our practical support for
19 the rebuilding of a new democratically accountable Sierra Leone
10:11:41 20 Army." They are now hinting that they are going to rebuild the
21 army, which they did. And let's remind ourselves who is
22 commanding the Sierra Leonean army at this particular time?
23 Khobe, the Nigerian. They are now saying, "We are going to take
24 care of the army", and they do later on, but ECOWAS is trying her
10:12:06 25 best to make sure that we take credit for Sierra Leone, but that
26 is not to be, as ECOWAS had taken credit for Liberia.

27 I don't want the Court to lose sight of this play going on,
28 because when we begin to look at responsibility for prolonging
29 that war in Sierra Leone I will say categorically without fear

1 that Britain has to take responsibility for some of these
2 blockages and snares. Yes, the end result peace came, but they
3 want to make it appear as though Britain was responsible for
4 peace in Sierra Leone. That is not true. Without ECOWAS and
10:12:52 5 ECOMOG and what all of the nations did, peace would still not be
6 in Sierra Leone.

7 So these obstacles are being listed and you will not catch
8 this unless you go back to what I mentioned to this Court before
9 about some of the diplomatic messages that were reaching to some
10:13:13 10 of us in terms of veiled threats, "Well, we will not let this
11 happen. We will not let that happen." And what am I talking
12 about? "We will not let this operation go on in Sierra Leone the
13 way it is being planned. It will not work." And I have
14 mentioned to this Court that this attack on Sierra Leone by
10:13:39 15 ECOMOG was not approved under Chapter 7. I have mentioned that
16 to this Court. So this is basically explaining in subtle
17 diplomatic language what the British role will continue to be.

18 Q. Now just expanding on that role as you call it, Mr Taylor,
19 during the period of the AFRC government where was Kabbah?

10:14:13 20 A. During that time President Kabbah was in Conakry, Guinea.

21 Q. And during that time you say that he was funded by the
22 British government?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And did he ever visit the United Kingdom?

10:14:31 25 A. I cannot say with any certainty. I don't have that - I
26 can't help the Court with that information.

27 Q. And this radio station that you say - the covert radio
28 station - funded by the British government, where was that
29 located?

1 A. To the best of my recollection, that was located at Lungi
2 and President Kabbah broadcast from there and the British didn't
3 hide it that they funded the radio station. They made it - they
4 did. It was funded by them.

10:15:04 5 Q. And what was that radio station used for?

6 A. I would really say to a lot of analysts at that particular
7 time it was voicing the views from Kabbah, but it was also termed
8 as a type of hate radio because some analysts at that time
9 interpreted some of the statements coming out of the radio
10 station as not being helpful and caused a lot of hatred between
11 and amongst the different groupings in Sierra Leone. Now I'm in
12 no position to ascertain whether these analysts are right, but
13 that was the view of some intelligence analysts and diplomats at
14 the time.

10:16:00 15 Q. Now let's go over the page, "I would like to stress that
16 Liberia has nothing to fear from the delivery of lethal equipment
17 for the new Sierra Leone Army."

18 So the British government is making it quite plain that
19 they will be rearming the Sierra Leone Army. Yes, Mr Taylor?

10:16:26 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. At a time when, as you've just told us, Liberia itself did
22 not have an army?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And did you view that as a threat?

10:16:40 25 A. Yes. In so many ways, more than one. Here we are - in the
26 first instance the army had not been trained at the time but they
27 are saying that we are going to equip them, but of concern to my
28 government particularly with this - Sierra Leone is a sovereign
29 state and they had a right to an army. Of concern were reports

1 that we received that Liberians - that some Liberians were being
2 brought into that new Sierra Leonean army and it is my
3 understanding as I sit here today that is still true today; where
4 there are Liberians that are officers in that - in this present
10:17:25 5 Sierra Leonean armed forces.

6 We were concerned about that kind of activity over there
7 and that arming this army that was going to be comprising of the
8 old SLA, the combatants of the war, that it would pose a possible
9 problem in the very near future if these individuals had just
10:17:56 10 been brought into a new army and armed. This was of concern not
11 just to me, but a lot of military people were concerned. And let
12 me expand on that a little bit.

13 During the discussions in Lome we are discussing - in fact
14 it has come up during the preliminary discussions for the
10:18:20 15 ceasefire. The SLA, the Sierra Leonean army, or what we called
16 the AFRC, are not - are not present in Lome. They are not a part
17 of this agreement. But they are arguing that they are the armed
18 forces of Sierra Leone. But these are the very individuals that
19 had attacked and removed Kabbah from office. So you rebuild this
10:18:51 20 army quickly and rearm them, we saw that as a recipe for
21 disaster. This is what we were looking at.

22 Q. Why a recipe for disaster?

23 A. That's the very junta force we are talking about and if you
24 bring them in and it is - if everybody becomes the Sierra Leonean
10:19:11 25 army and you just equip them, you are equipping the people that
26 just removed the government, you are just rearming them. So we
27 were advising caution on this as we had not fully decided on the
28 fate of the SLA that was before the junta. That was the
29 question. That issue had not been fully decided while they were

1 thinking about equipping a new army.

2 Q. "This is exclusively for use within Sierra Leone and
3 provided against the background of the UN Secretary-General's
4 encouragement of the international community to assist the
10:19:54 5 process of rebuilding the army. A new properly trained army will
6 be needed to take over responsibility for security when ECOMOG
7 departs.

8 We believe furthermore that the RUF may also stand to
9 benefit from our assistance in the longer term, given that a
10:20:13 10 final peace agreement may include provision for integrating some
11 of the current rebel forces into a new Sierra Leone Army."

12 And it's signed, "Yours sincerely, Haydon Warren-Gash, Her
13 Majesty's ambassador." Mr Taylor, did you attach any
14 significance to the timing of this letter?

10:20:41 15 A. Yes, they know we are in Lome. We are in Lome discussing
16 trying to bring peace. We do not see this letter as - quite
17 frankly as a letter - as a complimentary letter. We see this as
18 laying out certain yardsticks that we just want you guys to know
19 that you are talking in Lome but here's where we are. And I
10:21:15 20 think this is a very serious letter and this happens sometimes
21 when you are passing messages.

22 They know that this letter getting to me - they ought to
23 know that we will understand this letter and we will convey to
24 our colleagues our interpretation of these kinds of letters of
10:21:35 25 which we did. So it is the type of situation that we felt it
26 could have been construed as some type of interference into the
27 Lome talks, but I just advised all of my colleagues about this
28 letter and I'm sure - and our own analysis of it and we just
29 guided ourselves accordingly.

1 Q. So you discussed it with your colleagues, did you?

2 A. Definitely. When you get these kinds of letters from major
3 countries, you share them with your colleagues and try to get
4 their own input and what they think about it and you have to
10:22:19 5 share notes with these kinds of letters.

6 Q. Did you respond to the letter, Mr Taylor?

7 A. No, I did not respond to the letter. I'm sure the foreign
8 minister - we noted certain things and the foreign ministry
9 responded to the ambassador.

10:22:47 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask that this letter from the
11 British embassy in Abidjan, dated 10 June 1999, be marked for
12 identification, please, MFI-86.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-86.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:23:08 15 Q. So we're up now, Mr Taylor, to 10 June. Help us then.
16 What happens next?

17 A. Well, there are just so many things. While this is going
18 on, we - remember we've had the incursion that has come about in
19 April and the United Nations headquarters begin to - especially
10:23:42 20 the Undersecretary-General for political affairs begins to look
21 at this attack in Lofa as the beginning of a process of Liberia
22 sliding back into instability. Now, we are all caught off guard
23 with this assertion coming from UN headquarters where - after we
24 had the combat in Monrovia with Roosevelt Johnson back in
10:24:18 25 September of '98, we did not have this particular analysis
26 coming.

27 But this incursion now in Lofa, the Undersecretary-General
28 sends out to Liberia and he asks the special representative to
29 look into what he had assessed as Liberia sliding back into

1 instability. So the special representative of the
2 Secretary-General confronts us with this particular situation,
3 and we take serious issue because as the people came in, they had
4 abducted several European ambassadors that went through Guinea
10:25:03 5 but the matter was settled almost immediately, and we were
6 beginning to wonder why the Undersecretary-General of the United
7 Nations, on his own, will suggest that Liberia appears to be
8 sliding back into instability.

9 With this, we take it very seriously because we begin to
10:25:30 10 think back again. You know, these things sometimes they creep on
11 you, but if you keep them in mind you begin to put the pieces
12 together. And I hate to delay the Court, but I'm on trial here
13 so I just have to mention these things.

14 My ambassador has warned - and by my ambassador, my
10:25:52 15 ambassador in Guinea - way back in August that there was this
16 thing afoot to destabilise my government. September we get the
17 Johnson situation. Now we have exactly what we were afraid of.
18 We have been getting information about a possible attack out of
19 Sierra Leone. Remember we suggested from Zimmi. Now this attack
10:26:27 20 has come out of the Guinean side, Macenta, and the
21 Undersecretary-General in New York is saying that, "Uh-oh,
22 Liberia is on the verge of drifting into instability." Putting
23 all of these pieces together, we begin to demand some explanation
24 from the Undersecretary-General through this special
10:26:50 25 representative as to what does he know that we do not know. And
26 it brings about a serious matter.

27 So for about two or more weeks we are really involved in
28 intensive diplomatic discussions and then the special
29 representative finally responds to his boss in New York based on

1 his assessment and, because it involves Liberia, we are provided
2 a copy and basically what we suggest to the international
3 community, we suggest to them that - in fact we point out to them
4 that the absence of assistance to our government and in fact to
10:27:40 5 any state coming out of a war situation that does not get
6 assistance as far as proper demobilisation, proper readjustment,
7 proper resettlement of ex-combatants and helping the country to
8 get back on its feet economically and stabilise the situation -
9 because we had tried to stabilise the situation politically by
10:28:08 10 having a broadbased government, that all of these combined,
11 without that assistance from the international community, there
12 will be failure.

13 So this was the argument that we made as a government very
14 strongly and the special representative responded to his boss,
10:28:25 15 stating categorically what was some of the shortcomings of the
16 international community and, to prevent this apparent slide that
17 the Undersecretary-General was talking about, that it would take
18 the active participation of the international community along
19 these lines.

10:28:48 20 Q. So that's a couple of weeks after you had received that
21 letter, Mr Taylor, you are engaged with that?

22 A. Yes, that's going toward the end of June, yes.

23 Q. Now, beginning of July are you still in Liberia?

24 A. July I'm back in Liberia.

10:29:09 25 Q. Yes. And do you remain there?

26 A. No, no, no, I do not.

27 Q. Where do you go?

28 A. By the end of June, beginning of July, my colleague
29 President Gnassingbe Eyadema is getting concerned about the

1 process of the - about the progress of peace - of the peace talks
2 and so we talk about it --

3 Q. Who is we?

4 A. Eyadema and I talk about it and he tells me that he has
10:29:55 5 also spoken to Obasanjo about it, he has spoken to Blaise
6 Compaore about it and he has also informed President Kabbah
7 because even though Kabbah is carrying out the negotiation, but
8 he is President and so there are some discussions he is privy to,
9 but there are others, as a part of the negotiations, he is not
10:30:16 10 directly privy to. So we are sensing possible failure. We are
11 sensing possible failure and we agree that the only way we can
12 get this agreement to work is for all of us to come down to Lome
13 and bear down on all sides to make sure that we get an agreement.

14 And so I had asked him and he sent - in fact just before
10:30:55 15 then, as this is going on, the RUF is really putting up a stiff
16 resistance to this. Some additional - they wanted some
17 additional people. We arranged for them to come. So Eyadema
18 sent me his plane to Monrovia to pick me up on 5 July to come
19 down to Lome where all of us would meet. So I went to Lome,
10:31:23 20 Obasanjo flew from Abuja there, Compaore came from Ouagadougou
21 down to Lome and all of us met there on 5 July.

22 Q. And did you discuss your departure with the special
23 representative of the United Nations?

24 A. Oh, definitely. The UN is as deep into this as everybody
10:31:46 25 else. Don't let's forget they are transporting the people, they
26 are involved and so the special representative is aware of the
27 talks in Lome. He is aware of our movement on the 5th and
28 faithfully, I'm sure, he reported it to his head office that we
29 were proceeding to Lome.

1 Q. Have a look behind divider 36, please. Do you have it,
2 Mr Taylor?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. Just for the purposes of clarity, let's see what this says.
10:32:36 5 It's dated 6 July 1999:

6 "Subject: President Taylor leaves for Togo to attend Lome
7 peace talks. President Taylor left Monrovia today for Lome,
8 Togo, to attend an emergency summit of West African leaders."

9 Was it an emergency summit, Mr Taylor?

10:33:01 10 A. Well, yes. Yes, we call it an emergency summit because
11 there's this sticking problem down there. So once several of us
12 are there it's a summit of a kind, yes.

13 Q. "According to a MICAT press release" - what's MICAT?

14 A. That's the ministry of information, culture affairs and
10:33:24 15 tourism.

16 Q. "... press release issued on July 5, 1999, the President
17 is to join President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and current
18 chairman, President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, among other
19 leaders to discuss regional issues including the crisis in

10:33:48 20 Sierra Leone. The President's delegation included amongst others
21 his foreign minister, Monie Captan; Senate President pro tempore
22 Keikura Kpoto; information minister Joe Mulbah; the director
23 general of the institute of public administration, Dr James Teah
24 Tarpeh; the director general of the institute for strategic

10:34:11 25 studies, Earnest Eastman; and the deputy minister of state for
26 public affairs and press secretary to the President, Reginald
27 Goodridge. The summit comes in the wake of misgivings expressed
28 by the RUF about the draft peace agreement. The summit is
29 expected to break any related stalemate."

1 Had they reached stalemate in Lome, Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is exactly what I'm saying, yes. They had reached
3 stalemate and this is why we are called to see if we can break
4 this stalemate, yes.

10:34:50 5 MR GRIFFITHS: Could that be marked, please, Mr President,
6 for identification, outgoing code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas
7 dated 6 July 1999, MFI-87.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-87.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:35:09 10 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, help us please. What happened when you
11 arrived in Lome?

12 A. Well, we get to Lome - and by "we" I mean Obasanjo, Blaise
13 Compaore and myself get there - and Eyadema briefed us
14 immediately about the problems. There are several problems:

10:35:46 15 One, Sankoh is not satisfied with - he does not believe that
16 Kabbah is serious and genuine. The number of cabinet positions
17 being made available to them, he is not happy with that. There
18 is a side issue of what to do with what was the AFRC, what to do
19 with those soldiers and as to whether they could be represented
10:36:21 20 under this agreement with the general term of just RUF. There is
21 also the issue of security for Sankoh, his return and what
22 position he will hold in that government. Just these little
23 sticky things.

24 Sankoh gets very belligerent and is not going to sign this
10:36:47 25 agreement unless these key issues are resolved. He's threatening
26 to break the whole thing down. So we go there and we begin - we
27 are briefed by Eyadema and we begin to throw ideas around and I
28 begin consultative discussions immediately.

29 When you see this delegation, all of these people are

1 seasoned negotiators and diplomats that are taken to split them
2 up into the different groupings. By the same time we will be
3 holding meetings and trying to break the stalemate, and we go
4 into high gear right away in trying to resolve these problems.

10:37:32 5 It takes - I mean, we hardly sleep.

6 Q. Well I've never been to such talks, Mr Taylor, and so help
7 us. Just in practical terms, what goes on at such peace talks?

8 A. Well, you take it informally. For example, on this day we
9 get there and just the Presidents talk. I'm there, Eyadema is

10:37:56 10 there, Obasanjo, Blaise Compaore. We begin to - we form a
11 strategy, first of all, to begin to talk to the sides to find out
12 what is their bottom line, so to speak, and then once we get to
13 know their bottom line how can we come up with compromises. So
14 we begin that process.

10:38:22 15 The first person we invited to come in to see us was
16 President Kabbah. President Kabbah came in and so we had a
17 meeting with Kabbah. We do have pictures to those meetings. We
18 hold - after Kabbah, we hold meetings with Sankoh. We --

19 Q. Can I interrupt you for a moment. When was the last time
10:38:50 20 you had seen Sankoh?

21 A. Oh, that was - the last time I laid my eyes on Sankoh was
22 back in 1982.

23 Q. '82?

24 A. I mean '92. '92. And I had not seen him since - that was
10:39:07 25 the first time I had seen him since then in Lome.

26 Q. Had you spoken to him since?

27 A. Never. Never. I had never spoken to him and I think
28 there's evidence presented in this Court. There's no such thing
29 as a conversation. Even when Sankoh went in '96 to Abidjan,

1 there were no discussions. I had never, ever spoken to him.

2 So in explaining what happens, so you are talking and
3 sometimes it takes so long. I arrived in Lome the first night on
4 the 5th. I think we went to bed about 4 o'clock in the morning.

10:39:45 5 By talking, exchanging ideas, the Presidents would break up. We
6 broke up. I mean, for example, we decided that in dealing with
7 Kabbah - and I don't think Kabbah knew this, but he will hear
8 this now because I'm sure he's listening. It was decided that
9 Nigeria - that Obasanjo will manage the Kabbah side.

10:40:14 10 Q. Why?

11 A. Because Nigeria was the big country and they had the
12 largest force in Sierra Leone, so they - they had a better chance
13 of what we call applying pressure and extracting compromises. On
14 our side myself, Eyadema and to a great extent the OAU chairman
10:40:43 15 would put pressure on the RUF side because we share a border with
16 them and we had the experience, okay, as former guerrillas too
17 and that we will be able to tie, because if we shutdown totally
18 there will be problems, okay. Shutdown their guesthouses. We
19 had put into place a little mechanism to squeeze them to. We
10:41:12 20 tell the RUF, "Okay, we're going to take our passports back from
21 you", because I had mentioned that to facilitate this travel we
22 also helped with travel documents.

23 You know, we could threaten too, which we did. "We'll take
24 all our passports from you. We'll shut it down. We'll do this."

10:41:30 25 So it was just a little internal strategy that, okay, this group
26 is responsible. You put pressure on that side. This other
27 group, you put pressure on this side to seek compromises and then
28 we break up into little groups.

29 And so Sankoh comes - in fact, Blaise Compaore visits me.

1 I visit him. Sankoh comes to visit me and you see Senator
2 Keikura Kpoto here. Keikura Kpoto is Liberian, but he
3 practically grew up in Sierra Leone and went to school in
4 Sierra Leone and has deep roots in Sierra Leone. So he speaks
10:42:04 5 Krio as fluently as - you wouldn't even know he is Liberian. So
6 we put all of our people, the director general of the institute
7 of strategic studies - we just put our best minds to work
8 circulating amongst the different groupings and trying to extract
9 whatever little compromise we could get along the way.

10:42:27 10 Q. Was Blaise Compaore OAU chairman at the time?

11 A. Oh, he - Blaise had been chairman. I think it was he was
12 about to go out. I'm not too certain if he was still, but
13 because of the role he had played during that time I'm sure - and
14 the extent - the amount of experience he had with it, he was
10:42:50 15 invited, yes.

16 Q. Now you mentioned travel documents, Mr Taylor. What are we
17 talking about in terms of travel documents? Are we talking about
18 passports, or what?

19 A. Laissez-passers. It's a document. Let's not forget that in
10:43:08 20 West Africa, amongst the West African states, unlike the rest of
21 Africa, you do not need a visa as a member of ECOWAS to travel to
22 an ECOWAS member state. All you need is a laissez-passers. It's
23 just a sheet of paper with your picture. It gives your name,
24 date of birth and vital statistics on you and you can travel
10:43:35 25 throughout West Africa without a visa.

26 Q. And who had provided those laissez-passers?

27 A. The Liberian government.

28 Q. And did you require any approval from anyone to do that?

29 A. Well, not approval. The Liberian government grants what it

1 wants, but it took the acquiescence, the knowledge of and
2 whatever of everybody. They had to travel with documents and
3 part of that circulation from Sierra Leone coming into Liberia,
4 moving, part of that logistical requirement required a travel
10:44:13 5 document which we provided.

6 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Members of the RUF were on a
7 travel ban imposed by the Security Council, weren't they?

8 A. Oh, but the Security Council lifted the ban for those that
9 were on the travel ban. Not everybody. Those that were under
10:44:33 10 travel ban, they had to lift the ban for them to travel.

11 Q. So the issuance of those laissez-passers, was that done
12 with the full knowledge of the United Nations and ECOWAS?

13 A. Oh, it had to. They knew. Of course, they saw the
14 documents. It was required. They couldn't enter Togo just
10:44:51 15 swinging their hands. Yes, they knew.

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we have photographic records of this visit.
17 So could I ask everyone, please, to take up the smaller of the
18 two bundles for week 32, and we will be looking at some 40
19 photographs of this visit, and they begin behind divider 72.

10:45:59 20 Mr Taylor, I think we're going to have to change positions
21 because I would like you as we go along, please, to indicate who
22 various individuals are?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. The first photograph we're looking at is DP33, Defence
10:46:28 25 photograph 33. Yes, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Now, we see you, the second individual coming down the
28 stairs, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Who is the gentleman in front of you with the red tie?

2 A. This is the director of Special Security Services, General
3 Benjamin Yeaten right here.

4 Q. Who is the white haired gentleman behind you?

10:47:08 5 A. This is - this name has come up before. This is the chief
6 of protocol RL, John During. That name came out. The aircraft
7 is the presidential aircraft of the Republic of Togo.

8 Q. The gentleman with the gold braid around his cap, we've
9 encountered him before, haven't we?

10:47:36 10 A. Yes, we can't see his face very well but that's my
11 aide-de-camp, General Momo Dgi ba.

12 Q. Can you help us with any of the other four individuals we
13 see in the foreground of the photograph?

14 A. Yes. Right here is the chief of protocol for the
10:47:57 15 presidency, Ambassador Musa Cisse. We have that on the record.
16 Back here I can't tell. It looks like deputy director of SSS,
17 Joseph Montgomery, who may have been on the advance party. The
18 gentleman standing here is a Liberian Secret Service personnel.

19 Q. And so this is your arrival in Lome, I take it?

10:48:38 20 A. This is correct, yes.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, Mr President, can I seek some guidance
22 here. Because of the number of photographs I'm wondering what is
23 the most efficient way of us marking these for identification?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think, unless there are any better
10:49:00 25 suggestions, I would mark them separately.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Because I think given that there
27 are 40 of them it would be very difficult to give them
28 sub-numbers within an overall reference.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think if we mark them - are you

1 referring to giving them one number with sub-numbers?

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I was wondering whether that would work,
3 because all of these photographs relate to this visit to Lome and
4 it might be useful to have them all on the one reference.

10:49:53 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: What we will do, my learned colleagues
6 have suggested and it sound a good idea, is we'll give them one
7 main number and sub-numbers going from A, B, C, et cetera, and
8 then back to AA, BB.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Starting with that process then,
10:50:21 10 the overall reference is MFI-88 and this will be 88A
11 consequently.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph with the Defence
13 numbered DP33 will be marked for identification MFI-88A.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

10:50:51 15 Q. Could we go over the page now, please, Mr Taylor. Who do
16 we see in this photograph, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Here I'm being greeted by the President of Togo, the late
18 Gnassingbe Eyadema.

19 Q. That's President Eyadema of Togo?

10:51:24 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Can you help us with anybody else in the photograph?

22 A. No, I'm sorry. These are all Togolese officials. This
23 looks like a security person. But I don't know any of them. It
24 is just the welcoming party here. I don't know them.

10:52:03 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask that this then be marked for
26 identification and we can call it "Being greeted by President
27 Eyadema". Is this at Lome airport, Mr Taylor?

28 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: "Being greeted by President Eyadema at Lome

1 airport".

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that will be marked for
3 identification 88B. I'll just note that it also bears the
4 Defence marking DP34.

10:52:54 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Can we go over the page behind divider 74, please, so DP35.
7 Mr Taylor, is this still at the airport?

8 A. Yes, we are still at the airport. This is still
9 President --

10:53:15 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just one point. Sorry to interrupt.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That last photo we dealt with was behind
13 divider 73, wasn't it?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, it was. The sequence of photographs
10:53:45 15 begin behind divider 72.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Not 71?

17 MR GRIFFITHS: No, behind divider 71 should be Chapter 11
18 of the Liberian penal code.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: The compilation of the folder I've got is
10:54:33 20 obviously incorrect, because behind 71 I've got the photo that's
21 been marked for identification 88A.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I inquire whether anybody else has that
23 difficulty? I think you may have been given a rogue bundle,
24 Mr President.

10:55:06 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: It looks as though I have been, yes. If
26 you can just bear with me, Mr Griffiths, it looks as though the
27 folder markings are incorrect in mine but the photos appear to be
28 in order, so you go ahead.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm just wondering whether during the short

1 adjournment someone could reorganise your bundle.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: One of the Chambers officers could
4 reorganise your bundle so that it's in accordance with everybody
10:56:37 5 else's.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. I've just been offered a new
7 bundle but I would have to go through it and mark all of other
8 exhibits that I've already marked in here. Better minds than
9 mine are organising this now, Mr Griffiths. I'm going to extract
10:57:09 10 all the photos from one bundle and transfer them to mine.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thanks for that, Mr Griffiths. I've now
13 got the correct dividers.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Not at all. So now we've dealt with the one
10:58:21 15 behind 72. We've dealt now with the one behind 73 and I'm now
16 inviting attention to the photograph behind 74, which should be
17 DP35.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's correct, yes.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:58:38 20 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, where are we in this photograph?

21 A. We are still at the airport exchanging pleasantries. Here
22 is President Eyadema. Here - by then I think it's still the
23 foreign minister at the time I think. This is Mr Koffigoh.

24 Q. Could you spell that?

10:59:05 25 A. I think it's K-O I think F-I-G-O literally for now. This
26 is Koffigoh.

27 Q. And he is the foreign minister for whom?

28 A. Togo. To the best of my knowledge now he is either foreign
29 or prime. But this is Koffigoh. I will stand corrected on the

1 position. I think he is foreign minister. At one time he is
2 Prime Minister, at another time he is foreign. I think at this
3 time he is foreign minister. I stand corrected on that. The
4 gentleman here, I don't know his name but this is the protocol
10:59:42 5 officer for the Republic of Togo right here. I don't know his
6 name, sorry, but I know he is the protocol officer.

7 Q. Anybody else you can help us with?

8 A. No. This is just again the welcoming party. I don't know.
9 These are all Togolese.

11:00:13 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. Can we mark that for identification
11 then, DP35, MFI-88C.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-88C.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Over the page, Mr Taylor, DP36. Yes, Mr Taylor?

11:00:53 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, we can see the red carpet and in this photograph it's
17 quite obviously still at the airport, yes?

18 A. That is correct. We are walking now from the aircraft into
19 the presidential lounges, having a minor conversation.

11:01:18 20 Q. Now help us. Can you assist with a few identities now?

21 A. Yes. Oh, names I may not be able to help with and so I'm
22 not sure how much help I can be when it comes to identities, but
23 this gentleman here is the interpreter. This is the chief
24 interpreter for the Republic of Togo. I don't know his name. I

11:01:42 25 know he is the interpreter. Of course, this is President Eyadema
26 here. Now we can see this face much better, this face now we may
27 have to correct the records. On the first photo we could not see
28 the face and I had misspoken and probably misinformed the Court
29 that it was Momo Dgiba, but the face is clearer now. This - the

1 aide-de-camp on this visit is Musa N'jie and not Momo Dgiba.

2 Q. How do you spell N'jie?

3 A. I think that's N'J-A-I, N'jie. He is Gambian and so that's
4 a name that we may have to look into the spelling of N'jie.

11:02:31 5 Q. He is of Gambian origin?

6 A. Origin, but he is a Liberian citizen now.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I whilst we're on the topic then invite
8 everyone to go back to behind divider 72 and correct the record
9 by crossing out the reference to "Momo Dgiba" and put in "Musa

11:02:53 10 N'jie", the gentleman with the gold braid whose face cannot be
11 seen in the background just about to depart from the aircraft. I
12 am helpfully told that N'jie is spelled N'J-I-E:

13 Q. Okay, Mr Taylor, can we go back to behind divider 75 to
14 DP36?

11:03:48 15 A. Yes, we're still there.

16 Q. And now that we've corrected that, can you help us with any
17 other identities on this photograph?

18 A. No, these are predominantly Togolese Secret Service
19 personnel. I don't want to guess here. This looks like Musa

11:04:11 20 Cisse, but I can't be certain and so I'll just leave it. I don't
21 know any of the faces here.

22 Q. Well let's leave it at that, okay?

23 A. Yes.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: DP36 marked for identification, please,
11:04:28 25 Mr President.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked for identification
27 MFI-88D.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Let's go over the page, please, Mr Taylor. Now we know who

1 is in this photograph, don't we?

2 A. That is correct, yes.

3 Q. That is yourself and President Eyadema?

4 A. That is correct.

11:04:55 5 Q. And what's happening at this point?

6 A. This is the official reception of the - receiving the guard
7 of honour.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: I take it you want all of these photos to
9 be part of the same exhibit number and so I'll mark that 88E,

11:05:28 10 that photograph.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the photograph DP37.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Can we go over the page, please, Mr Taylor. Where are we
11:05:53 15 now?

16 A. We are walking - after the honour guard we are now walking
17 toward the presidential lounge. All we are doing here is
18 greeting - I'm greeting well-wishers that have come to welcome
19 me.

11:06:10 20 Q. And is that gentleman in the gold braid just behind you the
21 same Musa N'jie?

22 A. This is General Musa N'jie. Of course this is President
23 Eyadema right here.

24 Q. And the gentleman with the red tie between the two of you,
11:06:26 25 who is that?

26 A. That is a Togolese I'm sure Secret Service personnel. All
27 of these are Togolese Secret Service personnel. It's good to
28 note here that when a Head of State visits a country, it is the
29 responsibility of the security of that country to secure him. So

1 even though there are Liberian Secret Service personnel, they
2 don't have priority here. The Togolese have. So that's why we
3 don't know these people because that's their responsibility.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: I think we're up to F, Mr President.

11:07:11 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photograph DP38 is marked MFI-88F.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Now over the page, Mr Taylor. Now we know who is present
8 in the photograph, but where are you?

9 A. We are now in the presidential lounge, sitting down, just
11:07:41 10 chatting and probably waiting for the convoy to be arranged for
11 departure.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: G, Mr President.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's MFI-88G.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:07:59 15 Q. Over the page, please. Who is this now?

16 A. Now, we are already in the hotel. We are now seated. This
17 is - President Blaise Compaore is conferring here with me in my
18 suite. He has come to visit me to confer. After we break up
19 from this big meeting, these are the consultative meetings going
11:08:40 20 on and so he has come to my suite to visit with me. I think you
21 can tell the difference here, because he is properly attired and
22 I'm half attired and so I'm at home. That's why you can tell who
23 is visiting who.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: H, Mr President.

11:09:05 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, MFI-88H.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Over the page, please. Right, I would like your help with
28 who we can see here, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, this is my suite again. I mentioned a gentleman, the

1 deputy minister of foreign affairs that was the principal man
2 responsible for the Sierra Leonean portfolio on a day-to-day
3 basis. I mentioned his name, I think, yesterday, Tambakai
4 Jangaba. That's in the records. That's this gentleman right
11:09:49 5 here, Dr Tambakai Jangaba. That's me right here. Right here is
6 Foday Sankoh visiting my suite at this time. The gentleman right
7 here is the President pro temp of the Liberian Senate, the late
8 senator Keikura Kpoto. That name has come up.

9 Q. Is he the gentleman you told us spoke fluent Krio?

11:10:23 10 A. Fluent Krio, fluent French. In fact, he did all of his
11 studies in France. So fluent Krio, fluent French. He studied, I
12 think, at the Sorbonne in France.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, I wonder if you could help us with a few details
14 now that we have a photograph like this before us?

11:10:49 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was this the first occasion you were meeting with Sankoh
17 again, or what?

18 A. This is the first occasion. After the split-up, now the
19 consultations begin. Yes, this was the first meeting that I'm
11:11:05 20 meeting with Sankoh, yes.

21 Q. Is it the first time that you saw him in Lome?

22 A. Yes, that's the first time.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: So DP41, photograph of first meeting between
24 President Taylor and Foday Sankoh.

11:11:31 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-88I.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Over the page. Now, it's the same individuals in this
28 photograph, isn't it, Mr Taylor?

29 A. That is correct, yes. Just further --

1 Q. So we need not delay overlong with this one. DP42?

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-88J.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Let's go over the page. Who is in this photograph now,
11:12:19 5 Mr Taylor?

6 A. Now, these are the consultative meetings that I talked
7 about. Over here, I'm here. This is Obasanjo right here. This
8 is Blaise Compaore, and this is Gnassingbe Eyadema. We are now,
9 the four of us, involved in a strategy session trying to find out
11:12:53 10 how and what we can do in this process.

11 Q. Now, help us. Who is the host on this occasion?

12 A. The host is - it's President Eyadema.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: DP43, Mr President.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's marked for identification 88K.

11:13:31 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. DP44. Now that you've identified the personalities in 43,
17 Mr Taylor, we needn't delay overlong on this one, need we?

18 A. Just further discussions. You can see we're talking. In
19 this case it appears that I'm talking, they are listening. Just
11:13:49 20 exchanging ideas.

21 Q. When we go to 45 over the page, same scene?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let's mark these as we go rather than
23 backtrack. DP44 is marked MFI-88L.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes.

11:14:15 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: And you want the next one marked 88M?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, please.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's DP45.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you.

29 THE WITNESS: I think what is important too about these

1 photos - I think gestures in these photos are very important.
2 You can see who is talking here. Eyadema is making a point, so I
3 think as we analyse them we'll get to know.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:14:49 5 Q. Let's go over behind 85 now, please. Now, we see aspects
6 of this room now which were unseen hitherto. The gentleman in
7 the light suit sitting to your left, he is the interpreter you
8 mentioned earlier, isn't he?

9 A. That is correct.

11:15:17 10 Q. Whose feet can we see sticking out on the right?

11 A. We have to get another picture. This is the foot of Tejani
12 Kabbah. There's another picture we'll be able to tie that in.
13 That's - Tejani Kabbah now has joined us for these discussions at
14 that point. That's his foot.

11:15:38 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's just pause for a minute before we see
16 the rest of his body. Now, had he arrived in Lome at the same
17 time as yourself and the others?

18 A. Quite frankly, I don't --

19 Q. If you don't remember --

11:15:56 20 A. I don't remember. But I would - I would state that on the
21 day that I arrived in Togo, it was evident that President Kabbah
22 was there. He could have arrived in the morning, but --

23 Q. Or he could have arrived before you?

24 A. Or before me. But he was there.

11:16:19 25 Q. So he was there before you?

26 A. Exactly.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: We're up to N with this one.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph, DP46, is now marked
29 MFI-88N.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. Let's go over to 47 now. Now we see the rest of his body.

3 A. Yes. I think because of the camera shot now, you can see
4 me on the other side.

11:16:50 5 Q. But let's just flick between 46 and photo - DP46 and DP47.
6 You and he appear to be sharing a joke?

7 A. Yes. We are not at war. Yes, we are - in fact, all of us
8 are laughing here.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: We're up to 0, I think, Mr President.

11:17:17 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph, DP47, is marked for
11 identification 880.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Over the page, please. Now, Mr Taylor, where are we now?

14 A. Now we are on our way to the conference centre.

11:17:49 15 Q. Hold on a second. I think we've got a problem here.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Behind 87 should be a photograph which looks
18 like that.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's the one I've got. We've got that
11:18:03 20 one.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: That one that's on the screen now comes
22 after, and I think we need to keep these in sequence, otherwise
23 we'll get confused. The one that should be up now is DP48. Yes:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we're kind of familiar with the faces now.
11:18:29 25 Kabbah is wearing the maroon coloured hat?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. You are next to him?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Then Blaise Compaore?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Then Obasanjo?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Then Eyadema?

11:18:43 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And appears to be security officers in the background?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Now, where are you at this time?

9 A. We are now - let me see. We are on our way, because this
11:19:02 10 is the general area of the conference centre. We are walking
11 together from the hotel to the conference centre that is not too
12 far away.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: P, Mr President.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. The photo, DP48, is marked for
11:19:22 15 identification MFI-88P.

16 MR GRIFFITHS:

17 Q. Over the page. Now, it looks like the same location here,
18 doesn't it, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That is correct, except that this is a wider angle.

11:19:43 20 Q. And let's see if we can deal with this quickly. Going from
21 left to right, and I'm only interested in the main personalities:
22 Man in the white --

23 A. This is Foday Sankoh right here.

24 Q. Next to him?

11:19:56 25 A. Tejani Kabbah.

26 Q. Then?

27 A. Charles Taylor.

28 Q. Then?

29 A. Blaise Compaore.

1 Q. Then?

2 A. Obasanj o.

3 Q. Yes. Then?

4 A. Eyadema.

11:20:10 5 Q. Now, can you help us with anyone in the background?

6 A. These are just all of the aides and assistants. No, I'm
7 sorry, I can't make them out.

8 Q. Very well.

9 A. But aide-de-camps all lined up behind Presidents.

11:20:31 10 Q. Don't worry about it. Okay.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll mark that photo. DP49 will be
12 marked MFI -88Q.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Over the page. Same shot, Mr Taylor?

11:20:53 15 A. Yes, but just a little different take. You can see here
16 I'm sharing a joke apparently with Kabbah and we are all walking.
17 Same situation.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: R, Mr President.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photo is MFI -88R.

11:21:16 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Another shot of the same thing at DP51, isn't there,
22 Mr Taylor?

23 A. That is correct.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: S, Mr President.

11:21:35 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: That DP51 will be MFI -88S.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Now, over the page, Mr Taylor, DP52.

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Have you all joined hands?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Except Mr Sankoh, I see.

3 A. Well, he is clapping. You can see he is clapping. We are
4 looking at something. There could be maybe either cultural
11:22:16 5 performances out there, but you can see everybody has got a
6 smile, so there is something going on in front of us.

7 Q. Right.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: We're up to the letter T, I think.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's right. That photograph, DP52, is
11:22:29 10 marked MFI-88T.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. Right. Mr Taylor, what's this one, DP53?

13 A. We are now inside of the conference hall receiving the -
14 I'm sure here, with the salutes, the national anthems are being
11:22:59 15 played and we're just taking a salute inside the conference
16 centre.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: We're up to the letter U, Mr President.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-88U.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:23:26 20 Q. DP54. You're all seated now in the same location?

21 A. That is correct.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: That one, DP54, is marked MFI-88V.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Over the page, Mr Taylor. A wider shot of the same scene,
11:23:57 25 yes?

26 A. Yes. A little wider though. Now it includes Blaise
27 Compaore. Cannot --

28 Q. Who is the gentleman sitting to your left?

29 A. That flag looks like - it looks like Equatorial Guinea's

1 flag. I'm not too sure. But this is, I'm sure, another member
2 of ECOWAS sitting here. The flag looks like Equatorial Guinea.
3 I can check that.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photo is marked MFI-88W.

11:24:51 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Same scene, Mr Taylor, yes?

7 A. Yes. Just a close-up, yes.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photo is marked MFI-88X.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:25:07 10 Q. And 57, Sankoh and Kabbah having a little tete-a-tete?

11 A. That is correct, at the table.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photo is marked MFI-88Y.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Over the page. Right. What's happening here now,
11:25:37 15 Mr Taylor?

16 A. We are now witnessing the agreement. [Indiscernible]. We
17 are - all of the members of the Committee of Six witness as the
18 guarantors of this agreement, all of us are - we are signing the
19 agreement now, the Lome Peace Agreement.

11:25:58 20 Q. You are actually signing the agreement in DP58, yes?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. So that's signing the Lome Peace Agreement. Now, I just
23 want you to help us with --

24 MR GRIFFITHS: No, don't take that one just yet. Let's
11:26:25 25 just linger for a little while:

26 Q. Mr Taylor, the man over your left shoulder witnessing your
27 - observing your signature, who is that?

28 A. This is a senior ambassador in the office of the President.

29 Q. Which President?

1 A. Liberia. This is Ambassador Hansford. H-A-N-S-F-O-R-D.
2 You have - a lot of Presidents do that. You have a senior -
3 maybe former diplomats, experienced, old hands in government that
4 participate in these kinds of things. This is a senior
11:27:05 5 ambassador in the office of President.

6 Q. Now, the reason why I want to linger on this photograph is
7 this: The signing is the culmination of the process, Mr Taylor,
8 yes?

9 A. That is correct.

11:27:15 10 Q. How long had you been in Lome by this stage?

11 A. From the 5th. We had spent most of the day of the 5th, the
12 night of the 5th, the 6th, all night. While it looks good here,
13 but we had hammered out a final solution, and that's why you see
14 us coming, walking, holding hands. But we had hammered this out.

11:27:44 15 Q. So how long had it actually taken?

16 A. For the Heads of State, two - I would say two full days,
17 from the 5th until the 7th.

18 Q. And working until - working what kind of hours?

19 A. Oh, we - on these two days, we probably went to sleep not
11:28:06 20 before 4 o'clock at night. We were --

21 Q. 4 o'clock at?

22 A. Night. In the morning. 4 o'clock in the morning.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. 4 o'clock in the morning, before --

11:28:17 25 Q. Did that include all of you?

26 A. All of us.

27 Q. Including Sankoh?

28 A. Well, most of these cases - well, I can say yes, because he
29 was not present with us in the - in these different rooms at

1 times. He didn't come and stay in one location. But he couldn't
2 sleep because if he was needed, he was called upon. If any
3 member of the Kabbah side was needed, they were called upon. So
4 President Kabbah himself didn't sleep. No one could sleep
11:28:48 5 because they were up until the late - the early morning of the
6 7th. We were just on a little hair string of this thing not
7 working.

8 Q. When?

9 A. The morning of the 7th. By the morning I mean late morning
11:29:09 10 of the 7th. Because by 4 a.m., that's the 7th. By 4 a.m., the
11 evening of the 6th, you are already into the 7th. So we finally
12 knockout this agreement I would say about 4 - we only had
13 sufficient time to go take a bath, get fresh breakfast and try to
14 relax a little bit before going back to the hall. So we - it
11:29:36 15 took us a full two days, I'd say, and nights to finally hammer
16 this out.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, I note the time and there are a few more
18 questions I would like to ask you about the process you've just
19 been describing. Would that be a convenient time, Mr President?

11:29:58 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. We'll adjourn now until 12 o'clock.

21 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

22 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

12:02:08 25 Q. Mr Taylor, when we adjourned we were looking at photograph
26 DP58, which is the signing ceremony, yes?

27 A. Yes. Would I have to move back?

28 Q. I think it would be helpful if you did.

29 A. Okay.

1 Q. Although, can I implore you, please, to keep your voice up
2 with this microphone because I've had complaints in the past that
3 this particular microphone doesn't pick up as well as the other
4 one.

12:02:46 5 Now, Mr Taylor, you were telling us that there'd been two
6 long days of hard graft, working until 4 in the morning up until
7 this event, yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And you also told us that almost at the 11th hour there was
12:03:09 10 a hitch, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, just help us, please. What did you have to do in
13 order to achieve this agreement? Let's take, for example, your
14 dealings with Foday Sankoh. What did you have to do and say to
12:03:31 15 him?

16 A. The process starts with demands on both sides. The
17 Government of Sierra Leone has her demands. Sankoh and the RUF
18 have their demands. The Government of Sierra Leone, rightly so,
19 is demanding that, first of all, the presidency of President
12:04:04 20 Kabbah was not for debate, that's not debatable, he's President
21 of Sierra Leone, finished, great. And President Kabbah is also
22 looking, to the best of my recollection, at the situation
23 involving the so-called SLA, because while the discussions are
24 going on, there are side bar discussions about what to do with
12:04:31 25 the army. There are some people that want to just bring them
26 back as a part of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces. Others are
27 rejecting this.

28 On the RUF side, they are concerned, again, about security.
29 They are concerned about --

1 Q. Security in what sense, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well, when we disarm and go back to Sierra Leone, what will
3 happen to us? Do we expect that people, you know, will get
4 arrested? Will people violate the agreement and do things
12:05:08 5 against us once we are not armed? Because when it came to
6 disarmament, the Kabbah government was saying that the forces now
7 that were considered the armed forces of Sierra Leone were not to
8 be disarmed. These were developing to be the regular army of
9 Sierra Leone.

12:05:29 10 As a reminder, we did mention here that at the time of the
11 AFRC junta, some soldiers of the SLA remained loyal to the
12 government. So you have an evolving armed forces now that will
13 not be disarmed, but the RUF must be disarmed. And those
14 individuals that will become a part of a future Sierra Leonean
12:05:59 15 armed forces will have to be trained. In fact, they will have to
16 be recruited and trained, and there was nothing automatic about
17 coming into the Sierra Leonean armed forces. They had to go
18 through a process. They saw that as being insecure. That once
19 they gave up their guns, they were going to be insecure.

12:06:24 20 The next little sticking point came about cabinet positions
21 and portfolios, the number of cabinet positions that would be
22 given to the RUF side. It started from about two objections, it
23 went up to three, then it went on to four, and I think it ended
24 up a little higher than four. But this is why this special
12:06:47 25 position was worked out where Sankoh would become Vice-President.
26 That was part of another sticking point where it was finally
27 ironed out.

28 So by the end of the day --

29 Q. And can I just interrupt. Apart from being Vice-President,

1 Sankoh also ended up being in charge of --

2 A. Minerals.

3 Q. -- minerals, didn't he?

4 A. That is correct, yes.

12:07:10 5 Q. And was that part of the bargain as well?

6 A. That was part of the bargain. Everything you see, all the
7 positions that followed Lome were agreed in those back rooms. We
8 agreed on all of those things. But it's sounding short now
9 because we can't take up the whole Court's time, but these are
10 long hours. Sometimes you almost give up. You think that it's
11 going to break down. People sometimes walk out in their little
12 committee rooms. They don't want to talk. You have to call them
13 back. It was a very difficult process, and arm-twisting came
14 about.

12:07:47 15 Remember I told this Court that Sankoh did not go to Lome
16 as a totally free man. This was what I was talking about.
17 Sankoh still had hanging over him the aspect of his appeal. That
18 appeal was still pending. He was taken there. And while he was
19 partially free, Sankoh could not just - at Lome, for example, if
12:08:16 20 Sankoh had said, "This is it. If I have had it. I'm out of
21 here", he was not going any place. He was going right back to
22 Sierra Leone in jail. So this is what I meant by when I said he
23 was not a free man. He was only free if an agreement was
24 hammered out, that's when he became free. And subsequently I
12:08:34 25 will tell you what - some of our difficulties came up after that.

26 But there were subtle threats, you know. Maybe that word
27 "threat" may be a little harsh. Maybe I'll just call it subtle
28 reminders where, "Look, don't forget that you're not really free.
29 And if this is not going to be worked out, you can expect that

1 you're going to back to jail." And so these little reminders, if
2 you want to call them that, were all present during the
3 discussions. And there were little threats from all of us.

12:09:18 4 The borders issue came up with where we were going to close
5 down the guesthouse, we were going to put all the RUF people
6 outside from the guesthouse, and we were going to make it very
7 difficult across the borders, and we were going to ask for
8 reinforcement. All kinds of threats.

9 There was also the threat of the use of force, again, where
12:09:38 10 all West African countries would just combine and put an end. So
11 all of these things were going at that particular time. There
12 was nothing simple about this.

13 So, finally - and I will be very, very, very, very bold
14 about this. Even with these agreements - and I'm calling them
12:10:00 15 "these" because there were several elements of this - not
16 everyone came out of there happy. Not everyone got what he
17 wanted from this, but it was the best possible solution. And we
18 do see some of the after effects almost immediately. After Lome
19 we see some of the after effects coming up where again we get
12:10:22 20 involved in more discussions. But we are happy that we ironed
21 this out. Now this was the agreement between the Government of
22 Sierra Leone and the RUF/everybody, and I helped - later on we
23 will see from documentation how later on we helped to massage
24 this process when Johnny Paul Koroma begins to raise an issue on
12:10:46 25 the other side. That's coming up a little later. But these are
26 the issues that we are confronted with and the difficulties at
27 the meeting.

28 Q. And you say there was a last minute hitch. What was that,
29 if you recall?

1 A. Yes. That hitch was about the SLA, what would happen to
2 it. And the second hitch - maybe we can say hitches. The second
3 hitch was about the number of cabinet positions available and the
4 position of Sankoh himself in the new government.

12:11:17 5 Q. And, Mr Taylor, those photographs that we've just looked at
6 which show all of the personalities walking hand in hand towards
7 the conference centre for the signing ceremony, what was the
8 feeling like amongst you all?

9 A. We were all happy, like brothers. Look, maybe that's the
12:11:44 10 way these things go. This thing out there that Kabbah and I were
11 archenemies and probably we didn't want to see each other is a
12 bunch of nonsense. That's all it is.

13 And let me just inform the Court, throughout the crisis in
14 Sierra Leone, Liberia maintained a charge in Freetown. And, in
12:12:09 15 fact, just before this meeting in June, it's important to inform
16 this Court, we formally named an ambassador accredited near
17 Freetown in person of McDonald Boam. That name is on the record.
18 So there's no war going on where Kabbah and I are using abusive
19 language to each other on the telephone. We're talking. We're
12:12:35 20 holding hands because - actually, there are differences, but it's
21 not at the point where we are enemies. We never looked at in
22 that particular way. We're holding hands because we are all
23 happy and we are friends and we had been exchanging jokes
24 throughout this particular period. There's no such thing as this
12:13:00 25 - you know, like when a cat meets a dog and they flare up.

26 There's none of this nonsense. None of it.

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I just want to ask you about another
28 detail. We saw photographs amongst those we have looked at so
29 far of Sankoh, it would appear, visiting your hotel suite, yes?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Did he also visit the hotel suites of the other leaders
3 present?

4 A. Definitely. Definitely. These are our photographs. He
12:13:36 5 visited Compaore, he visited Eyadema, he visited Obasanjo, and
6 I'm sure he and Kabbah sat down. But these are the Government of
7 Liberia photos that - each President going to these conferences
8 carry their press team, their photographers, their state
9 photographers and they take these pictures for historical
12:14:04 10 purposes. But I'm sure all the other Presidents have photos of
11 this particular situation.

12 Q. The point I'm getting at is this, Mr Taylor: Was there
13 some kind of special relationship between you and Sankoh?

14 A. No. There was nothing special about - special relationship
12:14:20 15 between me and Sankoh. I knew Sankoh. As I said, we had worked
16 together briefly during those years before we split up over this
17 Top 20, Top 40 situation, and those pictures should in no way
18 lead anyone to believing that he is on those pictures because of
19 the special relationship. Every Head of State, they had to - it
12:14:44 20 was almost like a turning - you had to go from room - from one
21 place to another place.

22 And let me just emphasise, I think it may be important,
23 because of the significance of this meeting, all of the Heads of
24 State are lodged in one hotel. So we are on different floors.
12:15:02 25 So you may just get in the elevator, one Head of State may need
26 you at this place. So everything is happening in one building in
27 different suites. He will visit me, he will visit Compaore, the
28 protocol officers are running up and down, the hotel is really
29 controlled. So it's not difficult to get to other Heads of

1 State.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: The letter Z, Mr President, for DP58.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Photo DP58 is marked MFI-88Z.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:15:52 5 Q. Over the page please, Mr Taylor. DP59. Signing ceremony
6 as well, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Just out of interest, Mr Taylor, to your left, who is
9 seated?

12:16:03 10 A. I tell you, I can't help. It's been so long. This is -
11 sitting here must be a senior official representing his
12 government, even though he would not be at this table. I don't
13 quite remember who this person is, but where he is seated, he is
14 representing his President. I can't help with this.

12:16:31 15 Q. Okay. Let's move on. Letter AA, Mr President.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's MFI-AA. That's photo DP 59.
17 MFI-88AA

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. DP60, Mr Taylor. Same scene?

12:16:54 20 A. That is correct. A little wider angle now. Eyadema is on
21 this side. Same scene. We are signing.

22 Q. Right. Let's move on. BB, Mr President.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: MFI-AB. That's the marking on that
24 photograph, photograph DP 60.

12:17:18 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. DP61, Mr Taylor. Now, here we have a wider shot?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Yes. And the gentleman to your left - we can now see the
29 flag. Does that assist in any way?

1 A. I am sorry. This flag - I do not want to help the Court in
2 the wrong way. Maybe the reason why I don't know him, he's
3 probably a foreign minister. He's not a Head of State, I don't
4 think, at this time.

12:17:55 5 Q. Well, let's not delay over it, Mr Taylor. But as we can
6 see, engaged in the signing process from left to right, Foday
7 Sankoh, yes?

8 A. That's Foday Sankoh right here.

9 Q. President Kabbah?

12:18:08 10 A. President Kabbah.

11 Q. Blaise Compaore?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. President Eyadema?

14 A. That is correct.

12:18:14 15 Q. President Obasanjo?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Yourself?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And the gentleman whom you can't identify?

12:18:20 20 A. Exactly. Right there.

21 Q. And looking to the right of that photograph, do we see a
22 United States flag?

23 A. Yes. They are there representing the interests of the
24 United States government. They are there. And further coming

12:18:42 25 along - so we will probably - United Nations personnel. Everyone
26 is there. They are all guarantors of the agreement.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: AC, Mr President.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, photo DP61 is marked MFI-88AC.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. We're not going to delay on DP62, Mr Taylor.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you want it marked?

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, please.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Photo DP62, MFI-88AD.

12:19:21 5 MR GRIFFITHS:

6 Q. Over the page, please, DP63. Now, we know who the
7 personalities are.

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. At what stage is this, Mr Taylor?

12:19:35 10 A. This is after the signing ceremony.

11 Q. And we see President Kabbah embracing --

12 A. Foday Sankoh.

13 Q. Yes?

14 A. That is correct.

12:20:05 15 MR GRIFFITHS: AE, Mr President.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photo is marked for
17 identification MFI-88AE.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Then over the page, a photograph with which we are all
12:20:17 20 familiar, DP64.

21 A. That is correct. We've seen this picture given here I
22 think as - the little girl is given as an exhibit, but this is
23 the Sierra Leonean, apparently, protocol or security personnel
24 handing the girl, this kid, over to President Kabbah who
12:20:48 25 eventually holds up the young girl to the conference.

26 Q. And as we can see, that little girl's right arm is
27 amputated.

28 A. That is correct.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: AF, Mr President.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photograph number DP64 is marked for
2 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 88AF.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

4 Q. Over the page, Mr Taylor, DP65. Yes?

12:21:45 5 A. Yes. We've signed the agreement, and Kabbah and I are
6 talking here. All the other Heads of State are standing,
7 listening. This is Obasanjo's back turned here. This is Blaise
8 Compaore here. We can surmise, except there's objection, this is
9 a side view of Eyadema, and it could be subject to objection, but
12:22:12 10 this is Eyadema. And Kabbah and I are just sharing some thoughts
11 as we are standing up.

12 Q. And let's go over to DP66.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Before you do, we'll mark that photo DP65
14 as MFI-88AG.

12:22:43 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Over the page, Mr Taylor.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, we see there everyone seemingly sharing a joke, yes?

19 A. That is correct.

12:23:02 20 Q. Now, can we just pause at this photograph for a moment,
21 Mr Taylor, and can I invite your assistance to this extent:
22 Having spent time negotiating with Foday Sankoh, help us, what
23 kind of a man was he?

24 A. Well, at this time Sankoh appeared to have changed
12:23:45 25 substantially. He appeared to have wanted peace. He was very,
26 very serious about some of his demands. But at this time he
27 appeared to me, and I can almost say all of us, as being ready
28 for peace. That was our interpretation of it, and we took it at
29 that. And I guess not being able to psychoanalyse Sankoh, I

1 would say that he may have been serious at this time. That's how
2 he appeared to us.

3 And we will get to know later that maybe some of our
4 judgment at the time may not have been 100 per cent, because if I
12:24:42 5 answer your question and thinking about what I encounter in the
6 future and how upset I get later on, on a bar of 1 to 10, I would
7 say at this time he's around 6/7, because of my experience later
8 on and what I had to do on that committee later on. And that's
9 after the fact, may I say.

12:25:19 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. AH, Mr President.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph DP56 is marked
12 MFI-88AH.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Over the page, please, Mr Taylor. Now, Mr Taylor, this is
12:25:35 15 the aftermath again of the signing, is it not?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And we're all familiar now with the personalities, so let's
18 not delay on this one, yes?

19 A. There's another important person here, counsel.

12:25:55 20 Q. Who is that, Mr Taylor?

21 A. Representing here - representing President Jerry Rawlings
22 of Ghana is the then foreign minister Victor Gbeho representing
23 the Government of Ghana here. He's the Ghanaian foreign minister
24 Victor Gbeho.

12:26:23 25 Q. Can you help us with a spelling or shall we look it up on
26 the internet?

27 A. Please. G-B-E, Gbeho, H-O. This is an Ewe name so I am
28 not familiar with it. Victor Gbeho.

29 Q. G-B-E-H-O, I'm told.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll mark that photograph DP67 as
2 MFI -88AI.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Over the page, please. A little victory celebration seems
12:27:08 5 to be in order here, Mr Taylor, yes?

6 A. That is correct. That is correct. We are holding hands up
7 in the hall in a very joyous mood, all of the principal players
8 to this agreement. If you watch here from a protocol level the
9 Ghanaian foreign minister is not holding hands up and that's just
12:27:38 10 maybe because of protocol, that's all. But all of the heads and
11 state and the parties are here in celebration.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll mark the photograph DP68 as
13 MFI -88AJ.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

12:28:08 15 Q. Another shot of the same celebration, Mr Taylor, over the
16 page, yes?

17 A. Yes, now Gbeho is holding Kabbah's hand here. This is just
18 really we're saying, "We did it." I don't know this other
19 official here. This is a different stage. Sometimes, like, when
12:28:26 20 you are taking group photographs, you may have one stage of one
21 set of people, then another stage. I don't recall who this is.
22 But this is really saying, "Yes, we did it."

23 MR GRIFFITHS: AK, Mr President?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photograph is marked MFI -88AK.

12:28:58 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. DP70, Mr Taylor.

27 A. Yes, we see President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh sharing a
28 conversati on here.

29 Q. Now, help us. Both are dressed differently from what

1 they're wearing in the previous photograph, so which occasion is
2 this?

3 A. This is a different time. When I look at the background,
4 this could be probably even before the signing ceremony. This is
12:29:41 5 inside the hotel. So they could - throughout the discussion
6 there were tete-a-tetes here and there. This could be one of
7 those tete-a-tetes before the signing ceremony.

8 Q. Now after the signing ceremony was any kind of official
9 function held?

12:30:02 10 A. Yes, there was a dinner.

11 Q. What kind of a dinner?

12 A. A state dinner hosted by President Eyadema for everyone.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: AL, Mr President?

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, photograph DP70 is marked MFI-88AL.

12:30:24 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Let's look at the final photograph then, Mr Taylor?

17 A. This is the dinner.

18 Q. This is the dinner?

19 A. That is correct.

12:30:37 20 Q. And if we look, Foday Sankoh is wearing the same outfit as
21 in the previous photograph, yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. So where do you think the previous photograph was taken?

24 A. It had to - this is still - the dinner was held in the
12:30:54 25 hotel, so this is the in the hotel. This could be following the
26 signing before we actually go to sit for dinner. There are
27 little discussions, and I think - because when I look back, this
28 is the dinner and they're not - and the background of the other
29 photograph is similar to this.

1 So I can say before the dinner, and that is possible
2 because at these programmes, with the number of Heads of State
3 and government here, people come down from your suites in a
4 sequence, okay. Each person would have maybe a three to five
12:31:40 5 minute interval. So let's say if the dinner is at 9, we will
6 begin to come down at about 8.30 in order not to crowd up the
7 elevators with all of the different things. So they were
8 arranging - maybe they start from the lower level. So those that
9 are representing Heads of State, let's say, will come down first.
12:32:07 10 So they may say at 8 o'clock the delegation from, in this case
11 Ghana, will come down. At 8.05 this delegation will come down.

12 So as people are coming down, from the first delegate - or
13 delegation to the last you may have about 20 or 25 minutes in
14 between. So people are chatting before you finally get to - so
12:32:35 15 the last person that may come down - in fact, one of the first
16 that may come down may be the host, who is greeting everybody,
17 and the last person will be all of us that will come down that
18 were invited as Heads of State, and I think this is one of those
19 times, let's say, that Sankoh and Kabbah had come down a little
12:32:58 20 early and were just exchanging maybe pleasantries, I would put it
21 to.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, could we have that marked for
23 identification, please?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. That photograph DP71 is marked as
12:33:12 25 MFI -88AM.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, that's the end of the photographs that I
28 want to ask you about. So could I invite you, please, to resume
29 your normal seat. Now, Mr Taylor, following the signing of the

1 Lome Peace Agreement did you speak to any journalists about the
2 event?

3 A. Yes. In fact, ECOWAS reported on these matters and there
4 were a team of ECOWAS journalists that were present putting
12:34:07 5 together this programme for a future ECOWAS journal, and a lot of
6 us - in fact, all of the Heads of State, I can say, were
7 interviewed, including myself. I can remember the gentleman, the
8 senior correspondent for ECOWAS at that time - I'm not sure if I
9 can pronounce his name. I remember the last name was Godwin.

12:34:37 10 Godwin. He did that interview with me. He also interviewed
11 Eyadema and most of the other Heads of State for an ECOWAS
12 magazine.

13 Q. Very well. Let's look at the document behind divider 37,
14 please. Is this the publication, Mr Taylor?

12:35:26 15 A. This is it. It's an ECOWAS publication, yes.

16 Q. And we can see that the document is headed at the top,
17 barely legible, "ECOWAS Review", yes? "President Eyadema and the
18 wise men of ECOWAS savour the fruits of collective endeavour in
19 Lome", and we see a photograph to the left which we've seen when
12:35:58 20 going through the various photographs. Yes, Mr Taylor?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And we see that the document is also headed "Crisis
23 resolution: Saga of ECOWAS peace in Sierra Leone", yes?

24 A. That is correct.

12:36:23 25 Q. We're just going to flick through the pages until we get to
26 page 37, where there's a record of an interview with you,
27 Mr Taylor, yes?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Just to see what the headlines are. So if we just flick

1 past the table of contents and go to page 2, yes, and we see
2 that's the opinion piece, yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. I'm not going to delay on that, and it goes over the page.

12:37:04 5 A. Maybe we could get the spelling for Godwin. That's at the
6 top.

7 Q. At the top. Ebow Godwin, yes?

8 A. He's the publisher, yes.

9 Q. Is he the person who interviewed you?

12:37:19 10 A. He's the one.

11 Q. We go to page 4: "President Eyadema's rising profile as a
12 peacemaker".

13 A. Yes.

12:37:55 14 Q. And let's just look quickly at the second paragraph in the
15 middle of that page, Mr Taylor:

16 "In the words of the Togolese leader, 'There can be no
17 progress and economic development first without the maintenance
18 of peace, security and stability in the sub-region.'"

12:38:14 19 That echoes various statements you had made to the same
20 effect, doesn't it?

21 A. It does, yes.

22 Q. And was it a general view amongst the ECOWAS leaders?

23 A. That is correct, yes. That's why we fought so hard for
24 peace, yes.

12:38:31 25 Q. I'm not going to delay on that. Let's go to the next
26 headline on page 6, just so that we get an overall picture of the
27 stages involved in coming to this agreement. You see the
28 headline, "RUF warfront commanders pledge support for Togo
29 talks"?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And in the box at the top left:

3 "RUF rebel army chief, Sam Bockarie, alias Mosquito, and

4 former Sierra Leone an AFRC military junta boss Johnny Paul

12:39:16 5 Koroma, last week provided the ongoing peace talks in Togo a

6 further boost when they pledged their total support for ongoing

7 talks aimed at bringing sustainable peace to Sierra Leone."

8 Do you see that?

9 A. Yes, I do.

12:39:33 10 Q. And bottom right, photograph of your nemesis, UN diplomat

11 Francis Okelo, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Over the page, please. "Foday Sankoh calls for ceasefire

14 in Sierra Leone", is that right?

12:40:12 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Over the page again. A topic you'd touched on before,

17 Mr Taylor: "RUF wants unconditional release of Foday Sankoh",

18 yes?

19 A. That is correct.

12:40:38 20 Q. Because as you indicated, he was still, in effect, a

21 convicted prisoner at the time?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And if we just briefly look at the last paragraph in the

24 left-hand column:

12:41:05 25 "He assured that his organisation does not believe in the

26 military option. 'We believe in the negotiated settlement.' At

27 this stage the chairman of the War Council, SYB Rogers, delivered

28 the message of preconditions and appealed for the unconditional

29 release of Foday Sankoh to enable him to take part in the

1 negoti ations. "

2 Yes?

3 A. Yes. If we look at that date, you see that date is 11 May.
4 This is a magazine that covers that period. There are already -
12:41:38 5 remember, the first two that go to Lome are Bah and the lawyer.

6 Q. Omrie Golley?

7 A. Golley. So this is now in May when they are fully involved
8 in the negotiations, and by now they are sensing certain things
9 and they are beginning to put some pressure on for unconditional
12:41:59 10 release to participate. But we managed to control it by telling
11 them that there was no threat to Sankoh while in Togo and they
12 should not worry.

13 Q. Over the page, please. Headline at the bottom of the page,
14 "US government throws weight behind ceasefire agreement in Sierra
12:42:28 15 Leone", yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And we see in the first paragraph, just to help ourselves:
18 "Efforts to restore peace to Sierra Leone received a major
19 boost when US presidential envoy Reverend Jesse Jackson on
12:42:36 20 Tuesday threw the full weight of the American government behind
21 ECOWAS chairman Gnassingbe Eyadema to broker the much awaited
22 ceasefire agreement in Sierra Leone."

23 Yes?

24 A. Yes.

12:42:53 25 Q. That article continues over the page and it need not delay
26 us. Over the page, "Agreement on Ceasefire in Sierra Leone"?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And if we count down three paragraphs, have jointly decided
29 to, one, agree to a ceasefire as from 24 May, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Two, maintain their respective positions in Sierra Leone as
3 of that date and refrain from any hostile or aggressive act which
4 could undermine the peace process, yes?

12:43:41 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Three, commit to start negotiations in good faith,
7 involving all relevant parties in the discussions not later than
8 25 May in Lome?

9 A. Yes.

12:43:52 10 Q. And also:

11 "4. Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian
12 organisations to all people in need and establish safe corridors
13 for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers
14 behind RUF lines and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines?

12:44:12 15 5. Immediate release of all prisoners of war and
16 non-combatants.

17 6. Request the United Nations, subject to the Security
18 Council's authorisation, to deploy military observers as soon as
19 possible to observe compliance by the government forces, ECOMOG
12:44:31 20 and CDF, and the RUF including former AFRC forces with this
21 ceasefire agreement. "

22 Yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Over the page, please: "I am prepared to negotiate even
12:45:00 25 with the devil for peace. Foday Sankoh bares his mind in a chat
26 with journalists." Yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Let's just look at the underlined paragraph on the left:

29 "'I do not trust anybody except God', says Mr Sankoh. 'But

1 I am prepared to negotiate with the devil if that will only bring
2 peace to the people of Sierra Leone', he declared. "

3 Yes?

4 A. Yes, I said before that he'd never trusted Kabbah.

12:45:34 5 Q. Over the page, please. We'll ignore the press conference
6 on page 14 and let's ignore the RUF opening address at the Lome
7 peace talks. In fact let's go as far as page 21, please, just to
8 get an idea of what the negotiations involved, "Key demands by
9 the RUF". It's interesting looking at this document:

12:46:56 10 "After his reinstatement in 1998, President Kabbah
11 announced to the country and the world that the back of the
12 People's Army had been broken and that what remained were
13 ill-equipped remnants. In January 1999, however, the so-called
14 remnants invaded the capital Freetown and Kabbah and his team had
12:47:19 15 to flee, leaving behind the people helpless and unprotected.
16 Even the United Nations peace monitors who had been sent for the
17 disarmament and demobilisation exercise were caught in this
18 deception and they too had to flee as the People's Army marched
19 into Freetown.

12:47:38 20 Both the Abidjan and Conakry Peace Agreements were aborted
21 because of lack of sincerity and commitment on the part of the
22 Kabbah government. "

23 Now that indicates a deep degree of distrust, doesn't it,
24 Mr Taylor --

12:47:50 25 A. Yes, it does.

26 Q. -- which had to be overcome?

27 A. It was mutual, really. It was mutual.

28 Q. "It is now time, therefore, to be serious and committed and
29 to draw the necessary conclusions from the failure of these two

1 earlier agreements. We firmly and unequivocally share the
2 aspirations and desire of all Sierra Leoneans for a genuine and
3 lasting peace and reconciliation in our beloved country. In this
4 regard we consider that we should all work towards creating a
12:48:23 5 climate where lasting peace becomes a reality and not a dream.
6 We wish to fully participate in building this climate when we all
7 share the prize of peace. The desire for genuine and lasting
8 peace should not and cannot be mere words but must be by
9 affirmative actions and deeds. It should not or could not be
12:48:44 10 predicated upon a preparation for war.

11 After the past eight years of our liberation struggle which
12 we'd commenced with reluctance, it is now crystal clear that our
13 conflict is essentially sociopolitical and cannot be resolved by
14 military means but through genuine negotiation."

12:49:15 15 Now that's a position which you had adopted at a much
16 earlier stage, wasn't it, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Definitely, yes.

18 Q. "It is in this regard that peace talks must be seen as an
19 important first step in creating the necessary environment in
12:49:32 20 which confidence building and respect restoring measures can be
21 pursued and installed. In saying so, however, we must enter a
22 caveat, because as the leader of the RUF so aptly puts it we deem
23 as more dangerous the quick fix and prescriptive hidden agendas
24 of self-seeking mediators. We have every right to be suspicious
12:49:58 25 of those who have made careers out of Africa's plight. They
26 invariably end up as meddlers in internal conflicts prolonging
27 the suffering of our people."

28 Now you made mention of such a meddler this morning, didn't
29 you?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Prolonging the suffering in Sierra Leone?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Who was that, Mr Taylor?

12:50:21 5 A. I said Britain was the meddler. If anybody was meddling at
6 that time it was Britain.

7 Q. "After taking sides in this conflict, it is now time for
8 the international community to restore its bona fides by being
9 proactive and evenhanded. We do believe that an important first

12:50:43 10 step in the process of peace we are inaugurating would be the
11 immediate and unconditional release of the RUF leader Corporal
12 Foday Sankoh. All charges against him should be dropped, thus
13 sign posting a move away from the path of the politics of revenge
14 and recrimination into the highway of healing and national

12:51:02 15 reconciliation. In the same vein, there shall be a blanket
16 amnesty for all AFRC personnel and so-called sympathisers and
17 collaborators and all combatants with effect from the signing of
18 the agreement.

19 All hostilities should cease and a ceasefire be immediately
12:51:25 20 established throughout the country upon the signing of the new
21 peace agreement by the various parties.

22 There should be a new political landscape which should be
23 underpinned by the setting up of a transition government which
24 shall remain in power for a period of four years."

12:51:43 25 Pause there. Now that seems to undermine the suggestion
26 that the Kabbah government, democratically elected, was not up
27 for negotiation, doesn't it, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Yes, that's one of the sticking points that I had mentioned
29 earlier.

1 Q. So this is the one of the hurdles which had to be overcome?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "This government shall have the task of establishing a
4 proper democratic framework that is people-focused rather than
12:52:08 5 leader-oriented. The transition government shall appoint a
6 commission which would come up with recommendations about the
7 creation of a structure, composition and training needs of a new
8 Sierra Leonean army and police and security service, a
9 corruption-free and efficient civil service, an independent
12:52:30 10 judiciary and legal system, and government departments and
11 parastatals. It shall, through the participation of all Sierra
12 Leoneans and civil society, map out a new order in which
13 tribalism, nepotism, corruption, economic and social
14 mismanagement become an unwelcome thing of the past.

12:52:51 15 The transition government shall have the task of drafting a
16 new constitution.

17 A neutral peace monitoring group shall oversee the
18 encampment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all
19 combatants.

12:53:08 20 A ceasefire monitoring group, comprising the People's Army,
21 the Kamajors and the neutral peace monitoring group shall be
22 responsible for monitoring, verifying and taking appropriate
23 action against all violations of the ceasefire and must be in
24 place before any ceasefire is effected.

12:53:30 25 All foreign troops and mercenaries must leave Sierra Leone
26 within 14 days upon the signing of the peace agreement.

27 The transition government shall ensure the encampment,
28 disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all combatants
29 upon the signing of the peace agreement.

1 A new national electoral commission, the status of forces
2 agreement between the SLPP government and Nigeria shall be
3 terminated with immediate effect."

12:54:16 4 That, in effect, meant that ECOMOG would have to leave
5 Sierra Leone, didn't it, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Not exactly. The status of forces agreement between the
7 SLPP government and Nigeria was different; that is as far as it
8 concerned Nigerian soldiers in Sierra Leone that were not under
9 the command structure of ECOMOG. When Maxwell Khobe took over
12:54:47 10 that position as commander of the Sierra Leonean armed forces,
11 that was under a separate agreement between Sierra Leone and
12 Nigeria. So this status of forces agreement is between Nigeria
13 and Sierra Leone of what Nigerian troops will do, which is
14 outside of an agreement with ECOMOG.

12:55:06 15 Q. "The transition government shall carry out a national
16 population census. The RUF/SL shall be given every opportunity
17 to transform itself into a political party. The transition
18 government shall suspend and review all business contracts
19 entered into with government and all other contracts relating to
12:55:31 20 the mineral and natural resources of Sierra Leone."

21 It then sets out a number of economic priorities. Then
22 moving - having gone through past the letter F in the middle
23 column:

12:55:52 24 "The transition government shall introduce compulsory free
25 primary and junior secondary school education as well as free
26 primary health care in the towns and villages for the vulnerable
27 population. Ongoing health programmes shall be reactivated with
28 the special emphasis on prevention.

29 The RUF recommends itself to a peacefully negotiated

1 settlement of the Sierra Leonean crisis which is what the silent,
2 unheard people want. "

3 Now, Mr Taylor, I have gone through these demands for this
4 reason. Now you recall that it's said that you were a party to a
12:56:35 5 design to terrorise the civilian population of Sierra Leone, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And it is said that the instrument of that design was the
8 RUF?

9 A. Yes.

12:56:48 10 Q. And we see here what the demands were of that so-called
11 terrorist organisation, don't we?

12 A. Yes, we do.

13 Q. Free primary school education, yes?

14 A. Yes.

12:57:03 15 Q. Renegotiation of contracts made by the government, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And various other social reforms, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Does that sound like terrorism to you?

12:57:17 20 A. It doesn't sound like terrorism to me, but we know
21 historically the ANC was a terrorist organisation, wasn't it? So
22 that's what they do when they want to label you.

23 Q. Let's jump forward to page 28, please. Another headline,
24 "Obasanjo praises Eyadema's peace efforts". Page 30, please.

12:58:27 25 "RUF rebels win the war, but Kabbah wins the peace. Ahmad Tejan
26 Kabbah enters negotiations arena with RUF rebels with
27 disadvantage". Let's just quickly look at the bottom paragraph
28 in the middle of that page:

29 "Corporal Foday Sankoh, who had a death sentence imposed on

1 him in Sierra Leone after he was detained by the Abacha regime in
2 Nigeria in 1996, became a serious bargaining trump card before
3 the negotiations actually began. 'We want to see our leader,
4 Corporal Foday Sankoh, before we can take part in any peace
12:59:05 5 negotiations. He must be released to a neutral country where we
6 can see him face to face to ascertain the true state of his
7 health,' demanded number two stand-in RUF leader Mosquito."

8 See that?

9 A. Yes.

12:59:24 10 Q. And the penultimate paragraph in the right-hand column:
11 "Barely seven days after he arrived" - that's Sankoh, so this
12 helps us with the chronology of events.

13 "Barely seven days after he arrived in Lome aboard a United
14 Nations chartered aircraft led by Solomon YB Rogers, an old
12:59:59 15 potbellied civil servant who claims to be the chairman of the RUF
16 Peoples War Council, Lieutenant Colonel Womandia, Colonel Idri
17 Kamara of the remnant AFRC military junta, and hardly visible,
18 but potentially dangerous, Brigadier Mike Lamin, the presumed
19 number two man to General Sam Bockarie."

13:00:21 20 Yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Let's leave that document now and let's move immediately to
23 your interview, Mr Taylor. Page 37, do you have it?

24 A. Yes, I do.

13:01:03 25 Q. Now, let's see what you had to say, Mr Taylor. And we see
26 the headline: "Furore over Sierra Leonean peace agreement.
27 Ex-warlord reveals how peace deal was reached at midnight in
28 Lome":

29 "Against a background of mounting criticisms and a barrage

1 of condemnations, Liberian President Charles Ghankay Taylor, one
2 of the four ECOWAS Heads of State, who salvaged the peace talks
3 from imminent collapse at the critical tail end of the
4 negotiations in Lome, has come out strongly in defence of the
13:01:42 5 final peace document signed in Lome on Wednesday, 7 July, but
6 warns Sierra Leoneans against the danger of playing politics with
7 the latest peace accords.

8 President Charles Taylor, together with Olusegun Obasanjo
9 of Nigeria, Captain Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, and
13:02:10 10 Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, current ECOWAS chairman, sat through
11 a nailbiting marathon session from Tuesday evening lasting
12 several hours into the two hours of Wednesday morning of 7 July
13 1999 in a collective effort to break a nightmarish deadlock at
14 the 2 Fevrier Hotel in Lome.

13:02:35 15 Though the Liberian Head of State, a former warlord, has
16 been accused in the past of supporting the RUF rebels, President
17 Taylor regarded the outcome of the protracted negotiations as a
18 significant victory for collective ECOWAS diplomacy.

19 He debunked criticism of the final peace agreement on
13:02:58 20 Sierra Leone by various human rights activists and other foreign
21 self-righteous pundits. He appealed to the international
22 community to accept and give due respect to the collective wisdom
23 of the leadership of ECOWAS because the sub-region was evolving
24 its own peculiar style of building and making peace.

13:03:25 25 Over the pages that follow, President Taylor reveals how
26 the strings were pulled behind the scenes to strike a peace deal
27 on Sierra Leone to our correspondent, Ebow Godwin.

28 Q. Sir, you helped in so small measure to save the
29 negotiations from imminent collapse. How did you manage to

1 achieve that feat?

2 A. After several years of war, one can understand the
3 frustration, the fears and anxieties. One of the key roles that
4 I played as a friend and as a brother was to convince Mr Sankoh
13:04:05 5 that the time for peace is now and that with the coming in of
6 President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, who has played a very
7 constructive and positive role, and that the issue of security
8 and other burning issues and concerns could be taken care of by
9 President Obasanjo upon his personal commitment to us, and that
13:04:28 10 it was time to make a move and that great men had to take
11 chances.

12 Q. From a bush warlord, you have become the head of state
13 of Liberia. You seem to be gradually assuming the role of a
14 peacemaker in the sub-region. How do you see your changing role
13:04:50 15 under the circumstances?

16 A. Well, some ways, somehow, my potential, I will admit,
17 were obscured by virtue of the war in Liberia. As the world may
18 know, I am not a soldier. I have never been a soldier. I am an
19 economist. I went into this war to bring some relief to the
13:05:16 20 Liberian people, an agenda for the new Africa. For example, what
21 can be expected of an African at this particular period when the
22 rest of the world is moving forward, with the new millennium
23 coming, can one not play a role? I have to play a constructive
24 role. And as I look at peace being made in different parts of
13:05:40 25 the world, whether it is in Britain, Northern Ireland or in the
26 Middle East, I think the world, knowing my background as an
27 economist, I know without peace there can be no economic
28 development, so I have to play a role. I have to make sure that
29 Africa takes a new line because Liberia, after all, has always

1 been in the limelight of African unity, economic stability.

2 Q. Some of us in the early stages of your struggle
3 believed that you had a political agenda, as you rightly stated.
4 Do you think Corporal Foday Sankoh has an agenda?

13:06:28 5 A. Sighs. My quest for peace in Sierra Leone is not for
6 Foday Sankoh. My quest for peace in Sierra Leone is for Sierra
7 Leoneans in general and the West African sub-region. "

8 Pause there. "My quest for Sierra Leone is not for Foday
9 Sankoh." But he's your co-conspirator, Mr Taylor?

13:06:56 10 A. That's what they want to make it sound like. And I have
11 stated this over and over in my testimony to this Court: It was,
12 and still remains, a general belief if - in fact, at that time if
13 there were no peace in Sierra Leone, there would never be peace
14 in Liberia. There will not be development in Liberia, there
15 would not - nothing would happen in Liberia unless peace came
16 into Sierra Leone, and, like I said, I didn't come to the
17 presidency some first grade student. I came as an economist
18 educated in the west too, and I always knew that we had to bring
19 stability in Sierra Leone. If not, the peace dividend from

13:07:21 20 Liberia would have meant nothing. How do you progress in Liberia
21 when there is a war across the border? Not adding the
22 accusations - even if there were no accusations against Liberia,
23 there was still problems in Sierra Leone. We still had some 90
24 plus thousand refugees in Sierra Leone, okay? We had - no

13:08:08 25 investor is going to come into Liberia knowing there's war across
26 the border. So from the get-go it had never - this was never
27 about Sankoh, as though he was supposed to be my twin brother or
28 something like that. You know, in trying to construct theories,
29 they build up all of this thing about how close they are supposed

1 - Look, this was never about Sankoh. This is all - this was then
2 - and I'm speaking all the way back in 1999 - it was about Sierra
3 Leone and trying to hurry up and bring peace, because I was a man
4 in a hurry, trying to do something for my country that I knew
13:08:49 5 would have never worked unless Sierra Leone was solved. That's
6 as simple as it can get.

7 Q. "My quest for peace in Sierra Leone is for Sierra Leoneans
8 in general and the West African sub-region.

9 And so he has a duty now to prove himself to Sierra
13:09:18 10 Leoneans; the sub-region; Africa. And so he has a duty to prove
11 to the world community that he has the capacity to be a leader
12 and to play in this big league. There is this big catch here.
13 He must now present himself as a statesman, one with an agenda.
14 He has to spell out that agenda, and I think he owes it now to
13:09:42 15 the Sierra Leonean people and those who have followed him all
16 over the years to prove himself as worthy of their trust. And I
17 think that is an obligation that he must fulfill.

18 Q. Now, what are your general impressions about the peace
19 agreement? In your case, you were a rebel leader. You fought a
13:10:05 20 war, and later you went through the democratic process through
21 legitimate elections. You won. But it appears RUF rebel leader
22 Foday Sankoh has entered government through the back door.

23 A. Laughs. Chuckles. Well, I'm not sure if you can call
24 this entry as clearly by the door. Maybe it is not through the
13:10:34 25 back door, maybe it is through the window. But what I think will
26 have to happen now is this: We know that there will be elections
27 coming up in less than two years, and I think that opportunity
28 will afford Corporal Foday Sankoh to come in.

29 This is a peace process, and I do not think he should rely

1 fully and just sit supinely on the fact that he's part of the
2 government. He must transform the RUF into a political machine
3 and go to the Sierra Leonean people and prove himself."

4 Pause there, Mr Taylor. And I pause again to ask this:

13:11:20 5 Remember, this agreement is 7 July 1999, yes?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In 1999 there is still two years left in terms of the
8 indictment period. Do you understand me?

9 A. Yes, I do.

13:11:43 10 Q. So it means that despite your words as recorded here, the
11 Prosecution are alleging that you were nonetheless supporting the
12 RUF and continued to do so after Lome as a military terrorist
13 machine. Do you follow me?

14 A. I follow you. That's what they want to say.

13:12:07 15 Q. Now, when you were saying here that he must transform the
16 RUF into a political machine, what were you saying?

17 A. I'm saying the war is over. You are now in government.
18 You have to prove yourself to the people. You fought all these
19 years. People have died. People have been injured. So now you
13:12:30 20 have to get into the political arena to prove yourself. And the
21 only way now to do it is to organise yourself in a political
22 party. A political machine, a particular party, that's what I'm
23 referring to, and begin to do what politicians do. This is no
24 longer war. It is not the guns any more. It is time now to move
13:12:57 25 into the political arena and begin to convince the people of
26 Sierra Leone that you are worthy of all this fight over the
27 years. I mean - and all of us had to do it. Yes, from time to
28 time you had to --

29 Q. What do you mean all of us had to do it? What had happened

1 to the NPFL, Mr Taylor?

2 A. We had to move into the political arena.

3 Q. And become what?

4 A. A particular party.

13:13:20 5 Q. Called?

6 A. The NPP.

7 Q. And what were you advising Mr Sankoh here to do?

8 A. Stop the war. Move into politics, not violence. This is

9 what I'm talking about here. This is time to put the guns down

13:13:36 10 and move into the political arena and you do not do that by guns.

11 Put together political machinery and begin to do - you know, and
12 prove yourself as worthy of what you've been fighting for.

13 Q. "But, you know, I want to mention one little problem there

14 I want to alert the world about. We are very happy and thank God

13:14:03 15 that we got this peace agreement and I am very thankful that

16 Today Sankoh saw wisdom in what we have been talking about where

17 as I have referred to, not using the power of power but the power

18 of wisdom to achieve what we have. This peace I think the world

19 must know is an ECOWAS peace. I do not want us to confuse this

13:14:29 20 peace with the rest of the greater international community. This

21 ECOWAS peace, as always, we expect that the UN, speaking for the

22 greater international community, will respect the wishes of the

23 West African sub-region in bringing about this peace.

24 Now I know there are different schools of thought about

13:14:52 25 what should be happening in West Africa. I have a great amount

26 of appreciation for the style of peace that is now being

27 developed in Great Britain with the IRA and the rest of them. I

28 think I give a lot of credit to the British and Irish Prime

29 Ministers for the way they have handled the peace process and I

1 think ECOWAS respects them for what they are doing. We also have
2 a great amount of appreciation for the way the peace is being
3 handled in the Middle East.

13:15:27 4 The point being that every part of the world, and this is
5 acceptable by the UN, every region is now carving out its own
6 style of peace building and peacemaking. We would not want to
7 have any intervention or imposition. I think ECOWAS must stand
8 strong. ECOWAS has proven its capacity in helping to bring peace
9 in Liberia. ECOWAS now stands at the threshold of entering the
13:15:58 10 new millennium with no conflict in the sub-region. Liberia was
11 before, Sierra Leone resolved, Guinea-Bissau was handled, we had
12 a possible situation in Niger with the coup d'etat against the
13 late Mainassara Bare and that was handled. Even the coup d'etat
14 against Mainassara Bare is being handled regionally.

13:16:30 15 There must be a great amount of appreciation and respect
16 for the ECOWAS methods of handling conflicts. There may be
17 disagreements, but I think the region's own actions must be
18 respected. I am not convinced that the region will accept
19 anything outside of what it has managed to put together."

13:16:50 20 Sounds a bit like a pat on the back there, Mr Taylor?

21 A. More than that. It's also a warning too. It's a warning
22 to the outside world to leave us alone because this - we've been
23 talking about this and that's why we go at length to talk about
24 this. Here is a pat and a warning that because around the side
13:17:14 25 bars of this agreement we are still hearing murmuring from major
26 western countries as to what they want to see. ECOWAS leaders
27 are now saying, "Uh-uh, this is what we want to see" and this is
28 why I go at length to talk about other parts of the world where
29 they're carving out their own peace and, you know, leave us

1 alone.

2 And we are pointing out - in the case of Mainassara Bare of
3 Niger, I can remember this case very well. He was overthrown by
4 Malam Wanke. I think that M-A-L-A-M W-A-N-K-I or K-E-E. I
13:17:58 5 personally went to Niger after the coup d'etat because Mainassara
6 was my very, very good friend and brother. In fact Liberia one
7 was of the countries in ECOWAS that protested and refused to
8 recognise that government. So eventually we got together and I
9 had to go to Niger myself, I sat down with Malam Wanke. Later on
13:18:25 10 he came, visited Liberia and under the auspices of ECOWAS a date
11 for election was put into place.

12 So I'm just pointing out here that everyone is having it
13 their own way. The British had it their way. Tony Blair and I'm
14 sure I can't call the name properly, I think it's a Bertie Ahern
13:18:45 15 of Ireland, put together the famous Good Friday Agreement. We
16 knew about all of that. So I'm just trying to say that if - I
17 didn't call it properly, your Honour, you can help me with that.

18 JUDGE DOHERTY: You spoke properly, Mr Taylor.

19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honour. Where, you know,
13:19:02 20 they carved out that agreement and the Middle East was carving
21 out its own agreement and we are trying to say that regions of
22 the world have their own style under certain specific conditions
23 and that we should be left alone. After all of us had mumbled,
24 Heads of State, we knew what they were thinking around these side
13:19:24 25 bars and we were determined to move away. So in a way I'm
26 patting ourselves on the back, but I'm also voicing out some of
27 the frustrations that we were beginning to say to each other and
28 I'm just putting it out there.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Next question:

2 "Sir, now during the negotiations did you at any point have
3 to resort to some little bit of arm twisting?

4 A. Well, I want to give credit to all of my colleagues,
13:19:49 5 President Eyadema, President Obasanjo, President Compaore. We
6 all sat down and reasoned together. I do not want to call this
7 arm twisting. I think the analysis is very clear. Our brothers
8 saw a need and mind you both sides gave up a little more last
9 night, on the nail biting protracted night.

13:20:09 10 I want to commend President Kabbah for seeing the wisdom to
11 take one extra step. I also want to commend Corporal Foday
12 Sankoh for seeing the wisdom for bending over backwards a little
13 more. So I want to give credit to my colleagues who were
14 present. We did what we had to do in a typical Africa vein and
13:20:31 15 as African brothers we sat down and we resolved that we were not
16 about to go to the OAU summit without peace in Sierra Leone. And
17 that was one focus. The second focus was that the millennium
18 must meet West Africa and possibly Africa where a West Africa can
19 export our style of conflict resolution. We might be able to
13:20:53 20 help in the Great Lakes region, in Angola and between Ethiopia
21 and Eritrea and so on and so on. We believe the new millennium
22 must meet Africa as stable as possible."

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Then the question, Mr Taylor, over the page:

13:21:15 25 "I hope you do not mind me asking you this question. You
26 have been accused severally of giving tacit support to the RUF
27 rebels in the past. Does this worry you? And how far has this
28 affected Liberia's image with the international community?"

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Question asked, what, three years before the indictment is
2 unveiled?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. So let's have a look at your answer:

13:21:48 5 "Quite frankly it has not just affected, it has done
6 serious damage to Liberia. I am reminded of the old saying that
7 public sentiment can be greater than law, perceptions can be very
8 dangerous. We are in a new world now. We left what I call the
9 Cold War and now we are in a period that I describe as the warm
13:22:17 10 disorder. And this warm disorder gives certain countries the
11 right to decide what is right and what is wrong and leaves little
12 countries with very little defence. But having said that, we now
13 have peace. We have denied this vigorously. People have never
14 understood how the RUF made it and I guess the RUF will be able
13:22:45 15 to tell its own story. But now that we have peace we must
16 sustain the peace and I want to spend a lot of the time working
17 with all of the parties.

18 I hope to visit Sierra Leoneans in the not too distant
19 future to make sure that Sierra Leoneans understand that and I
13:23:05 20 want to take this occasion to call upon all of the young men and
21 women in arms, guerillas in Sierra Leone, whether in RUF or the
22 Kamajors, to call upon them to support the peace.

23 We need to build on confidence. We need to send our young
24 men to school. We need them to understand that the time for war
13:23:28 25 is over. I had the same problem before, you know, where I had to
26 explain to most of my combatants the need to understand that
27 during wars things appear easier for the combatants. When you
28 can strong arm someone with a gun you think that is macho. There
29 is nothing macho about it. It is time to end the war.

1 And I want to call upon the RUF combatants to follow their
2 leader. He has made the right choice. He has made the best
3 decision. I want to call upon the Kamajors and all the rest of
4 the people to follow President Kabbah. He has made the right
13:24:13 5 decision. And to urge all Sierra Leoneans not to play politics
6 with this peace. Oh you gave too much, oh you did this. Look,
7 we must begin to reunite this region and I think this is the best
8 way to go."

9 Now, Mr Taylor, "warm disorder". What are you talking
13:24:39 10 about?

11 A. Following the Cold War we have one major superpower. We
12 have one major superpower. And quite frankly from - I put
13 together this whole phraseology "warm disorder". I have been of
14 the opinion, and this is what I put together to call it a warm
13:25:09 15 disorder, if based on my thinking - democracy is very important
16 as far as the human existence is concerned. When we look at the
17 pillars of democracy, and I have great respect for American
18 democracy, so by America becoming the world's only superpower,
19 while there are problems with that, it's something that you can
13:25:46 20 live with, you know, thinking about how they deal with that
21 power, whether it is soft power or whether it is hard power.
22 Now, this warm disorder has to do with looking at the pillars
23 that protect democracy in the United States. You have the three
24 branches of government and there is the concept of checks and
13:26:15 25 balances; the legislative branch, executive and the judiciary.

26 These three branches are essential for the support of
27 democracy, and that's why it works so well in the United States,
28 a country, quite frankly, I think is great. If any one of those
29 three were to fail, you'll have chaos in the United States - any

1 one of those three. Let's go back to the Nixon years. I was in
2 school in the United States. I can remember a famous judge John
3 Sirica. This was a strong judge. The judiciary took a very
4 strong position in the United States. Even when they had what
13:26:58 5 was called then the Saturday Night Massacre, not actually
6 killing, but Elliot Richardson out of Massachusetts was dismissed
7 as Attorney General. But the judiciary stood firm, and so they
8 averted chaos in the United States at that particular time, and
9 any one of these failing would have meant problem.

13:27:20 10 We come all the way down to other very strong Presidents in
11 America. So when you look at this new era of the world's only
12 superpower where there is not that issue of checks and balances,
13 that's what I referred to as the warm disorder. Because there's
14 a degree - whether people accept it - there's a degree of
13:27:47 15 disorder when one nation can speak and decide, and you follow or
16 else. That's what I call the warm disorder, because really in
17 the world right now when America speaks, it's virtually over. I
18 mean, I am jealous? Maybe, yes. I will never - no little
19 country will get to that point, but it's factual. So that's what
13:28:07 20 I call the warm disorder, this process where there is not that
21 process of checks and balances in the global community where two
22 or more powerful nations can sit down and really speak and
23 compete and draw lines like they all do. There are red lines for
24 this states. Now in the world there are no more red lines.

13:28:30 25 There are no more red lines, really, to speak about. That's what
26 I call the warm disorder. There is this total semblance of
27 peace, but under there there is disorder because dissatisfaction
28 - and so if you look now realistically, you have more conflict
29 since the end of the Cold War than you had during the Cold War

1 because there were red lines.

2 Q. You sound nostalgic, Mr Taylor, for the Cold War?

3 A. Well, it may sound that way, but --

4 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President.

13:29:13 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's a convenient place to stop.

6 We'll take the lunch adjournment now and resume at 2.30.

7 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

8 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue, Mr Griffiths.

14:31:59

10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, before the luncheon adjournment we were looking
12 at an interview conducted with you at the conclusion of the Lome
13 summit, yes?

14 A. Yes.

14:32:15

15 Q. We are behind divider 37.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Now, can we deal with the final question posed to you,
18 please:

14:33:11

19 Q. "With regards to ECOMOG, as former warlord who has got
20 previous experience with ECOMOG, how did you address the
21 anxieties and fears of the RUF about the future role of ECOMOG in
22 Sierra Leone?"

23 A. I shared my experience. I will tell you. My
24 experience with ECOMOG in the beginning was a very unpleasant
14:33:30 25 one. But I must give ECOMOG one credit. Most of all the
26 soldiers are professional soldiers and they carry out orders.
27 When the order was finally given to ECOMOG to exhibit neutrality,
28 I must say candidly, they did exhibit neutrality. That is why I
29 left Gbarnga to Monrovia. I told the RUF leadership that, 'Look,

1 ECOMOG is our hope'."

2 Now, you covered that in the past, didn't you, Mr Taylor,
3 in relation to your discussions with General Abacha?

4 A. Yes.

14:34:05 5 Q. President Abacha?

6 A. Uh-huh.

7 Q. "I told the RUF leadership calling for the total withdrawal
8 of ECOMOG from Sierra Leone was an impossible request. They
9 understood that. What I told them to fight for was the

14:34:22 10 assurance, and they got the assurance. President Obasanjo, you
11 know, some great things have happened to Nigeria, the outgoing
12 Head of State, General Abubakar, was the right man at the right
13 time. He brought into being a democratic government. President

14 Obasanjo, a very decent man. He and I have met now a total of
15 about three times. We had hours of discussion. A very simple,
16 down to earth, decent man, and within the short time he has been
17 President, he has - without a big stick or threat, he has won the
18 admiration and respect of all his colleagues in the sub-region.

19 And when he said, 'Look, I am in charge. I will guarantee you
14:35:13 20 that ECOMOG troops will henceforth do peacekeeping in
21 Sierra Leone and will only fire back in self-defence,' he did not
22 have any problems getting anyone to believe him, and so it was
23 very simple. He got the full assurance that ECOMOG troops in
24 Sierra Leone will get involved in peacekeeping and will only fire
14:35:33 25 in self-defence, and it was all over."

26 Now, Mr Taylor, that's the conclusion of that interview.

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now, just to complete the picture of what is available in
29 this publication. If we go over the page, we see there is a

1 question and answer session with Foday Sankoh, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Which goes over several pages talking about his life and
4 development, and then beginning at page 44, as is normal

14:36:29 5 following those meetings, there was a communique, wasn't there,
6 Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And we see the final communique of the Lome meeting - no,
9 I'm sorry, I am misleading everyone. This is on the peace

14:36:44 10 process in Guinea-Bissau. Because that was going on at the same
11 time, wasn't it?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Yes. I think we can leave this document now, Mr Taylor.

14 So by this stage then, Mr Taylor, the Lome peace talks have
14:37:05 15 been brought to a successful conclusion, yes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you and the other ECOWAS leaders leave feeling a sense
18 of achievement, no doubt?

19 A. That is correct.

14:37:21 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I move on to what happened next, can
21 I ask, please, Mr President, that that document, "Saga of ECOWAS
22 Peace in Sierra Leone, Special Report," be marked for
23 identification MFI-89, please.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-89.

14:37:57 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, following that meeting in Lome, what did
27 you do?

28 A. I had to rush back to Monrovia.

29 Q. Why?

1 A. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
2 was scheduled to come to see me on 8 July, and so I rushed right
3 back to Monrovia that evening to receive him the next day.

4 Q. And what was the purpose of that meeting?

14:38:27 5 A. It was in conjunction with the whole West African peace
6 situation, the successful outcome at Lome. He had apparently a
7 plan to visit to Sierra Leone, and so he just decided to extend
8 it on. So even if Lome had not been completed, that was a
9 scheduled trip, anyway. So I just rushed back and received him.

14:38:57 10 Q. And help us, was there a record made of that meeting?

11 A. Oh, yes. We had long discussions. He held a press
12 conference. We did a press conference together in Monrovia on
13 the 8th before his departure.

14 Q. Yes, and was there a record kept of that?

14:39:14 15 A. Yes, yes, yes.

16 Q. Have you seen that record?

17 A. Oh, yes, I have it. It was a part of my archives. We have
18 the records.

19 Q. Can we look behind divider 38, please. As we see from this
14:39:59 20 frontispiece, Mr Taylor, this is an outgoing code cable from
21 Felix Downes-Thomas to Prendergast, at the United Nations,
22 attaching a record of the Secretary-General's visit to Liberia on
23 8 July 1999. Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, records and a transcript of the press conference.

14:40:36 25 Q. Right. Turn over the page, please. We see when we look
26 overleaf that this document is headed "Note to the File: Meeting
27 between President Taylor and the United Nations Secretary-General
28 Kofi Annan, held at the Executive Mansion on 8 July 1999":

29 "In his opening remarks at the official talks with

1 Secretary-General Kofi Annan and selected government officials
2 held at the Executive Mansion on 8 July, President Taylor thanked
3 the Secretary-General for his visit to Liberia and pointed out
4 that Africa was going into the new millennium at a time when she
14:41:38 5 was trying to solve her problems. This was more so given the
6 recently signed peace agreement on Sierra Leone. The President
7 conceded that the peace talks were tough but the negotiators were
8 able to put it together. He went on to say that it was now time
9 to pursue peace. The President informed Mr Annan that he had
14:42:05 10 asked RUF leader Foday Sankoh to go and establish himself and his
11 party in Freetown. The Government of Liberia was sending a high
12 powered delegation to Freetown and was also establishing a hot
13 line between Monrovia and Freetown to assist the peace process."

14 Pause, please. Did you send such a delegation to Freetown,
14:42:33 15 Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, we did.

17 Q. Who were the individuals sent?

18 A. It was the foreign minister and other ministers. The
19 defence minister I am sure went along, but it was a high powered
14:42:50 20 delegation to see the government and to begin to establish
21 ourselves on the ground there to assist the peace process
22 ongoing.

23 Q. "... and was also establishing a hot line"?

24 A. Uh-huh.

14:43:01 25 Q. By that what do you mean?

26 A. Direct frequent calls with the President and with Sankoh
27 where it became necessary. Kabbah and I had this calling
28 situation, but this hot line would be that we would make it
29 almost a usual situation where any problems, anything, he could

1 pick up the phone and call me. If I had a problem I could pick
2 up the phone and call him.

3 Q. "He said West Africa was coming together at a time when the
4 whole world was yearning for peace and security.

14:43:47 5 President Taylor stated that there were different methods
6 of solving problems and that no country on this planet would
7 support atrocities of man against man. He stressed that Liberia
8 condemned atrocities that were committed in Sierra Leone. It was
9 important that Sierra Leone had finally opted for peace rather
14:44:13 10 than war. He requested Secretary-General Annan to call on the
11 international community to give respect and support to the work
12 ECOWAS was doing in the region.

13 The President expressed his appreciation for the work the
14 United Nations was doing in Liberia. He praised the
14:44:40 15 representative of the Secretary-General for the good job he was
16 doing particularly on the issue of weapons disposal. The
17 President pointed out that there was no need for a real diplomat
18 to go on radio and the special representative's quiet diplomacy
19 had helped to ensure that his message got through, even though he
14:45:07 20 had had to endure criticisms from the press."

21 Is that right, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Who, Felix Downes-Thomas?

24 A. Oh, you know, sometimes the press would want him to come
14:45:21 25 out and talk about these things, but he was more what you call -
26 Downes-Thomas, when he retired from the United Nations I think he
27 was a 30 year veteran of the UN. He was not one of these new
28 people. So they always believe in people working and dealing
29 with his main boss and so he was not the outspoken press man,

1 "Oh, I just did this. I just sent this message." He dealt with
2 it very quietly.

3 Q. "He informed the Secretary-General that all the weapons
4 would be burnt and destroyed at an abandoned iron mine in Bomi
14:46:04 5 County. In calling for wide publicity on the destruction of
6 weapons, the President observed that if Cambodia could get wide
7 international publicity for destroying its stock of arms,
8 Liberia, which was destroying 10 times more, should also get wide
9 publicity.

14:46:25 10 President Taylor further pointed out that ever since
11 Liberia held multi-party elections, it had not received any
12 direct assistance from governments except from NGOs. But while
13 NGOs might be useful, they also had their own political agendas.
14 He lamented the fact that while the international community had
14:46:50 15 assisted post-conflict countries, the same could not be said of
16 Liberia. He went on to say that if it was not for the grace of
17 God, there would have been chaos in Liberia because of the level
18 of poverty among its citizens.

19 The President also informed Mr Annan that he would be
14:47:19 20 visiting New York in September to address the General Assembly."

21 Mr Taylor, can I just pause for a minute. Did you make
22 that trip to New York in September?

23 A. No, I did not.

24 Q. "In response, the Secretary-General thanked
14:47:43 25 President Taylor and President Taylor and Kabbah for their
26 efforts in helping bring peace in Sierra Leone. He expressed the
27 hope that the spirit that made the Lome peace talks possible
28 would sustain the whole peace process. He said for Africa to
29 take up its position in the world, there was need to take on the

1 development challenges not just through aid, but through its own
2 development efforts. The Secretary-General stated that he has
3 been involved in endorsing the sub-region on international fora
4 and would continue to do so.

14:48:31 5 The Secretary-General also stressed the need to resuscitate
6 and sustain the Mano River Union and urged its leaders to meet
7 regularly, or even monthly, and that there was no need for a
8 predetermined agenda before a meeting could be made. He further
9 thanked the President for his leadership in agreeing to destroy
14:48:53 10 the weapons collected during Liberia's disarmament period. The
11 Secretary-General promised the President that the United Nations
12 would work to ensure that the destruction of the weapons received
13 as much publicity as possible and including such news outlets as
14 the CNN.

14:49:17 15 The Secretary-General conceded that the international
16 community had not been forthcoming in its assistance to Liberia
17 and that he had been urging with the IMF Managing Director
18 Michael Camdessus to exercise flexibility in IFM's lending to
19 distressed African countries. Secretary-General Annan went on to
14:49:45 20 say that he had urged donors not to judge governments by their
21 past record but by policies they were currently pursuing.

22 Mr Annan assured President Taylor that the United Nations
23 would continue pushing donor nations to be more generous and show
24 compassionate towards African countries. He added that he had
14:50:11 25 been assured by donors that resources would not be diverted to
26 Kosovo at the expense of Africa. The Secretary-General assured
27 the President that United Nations agencies would continue to
28 operate in Liberia and that their mission was to support
29 government programmes and not to have programmes of their own."

1 And you see that that is signed by Masi mba Tafi renyika,
2 whose name cropped up when we were looking at the transport
3 arrangements to take the RUF delegation, yes?

4 A. That is correct, yes.

14:50:50 5 Q. Now you said that the Secretary-General held a press
6 conference whilst he was in Monrovi a, Mr Tayl or, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. When we go over the page we see "Unoffi ci al Transcript of
9 Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Press Conference in Monrovi a",
14:51:15 10 yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "Mr Presi dent, Excel lenci es, Ladi es and Gentl emen. Let me
13 first say how happy I am to be here in Li beri a, to be back in
14 Li beri a again. And in a rel ative ly short time, the Presi dent,
14:51:34 15 mi ni sters, have made me feel very much at home. And the ceremony
16 we wi tnessed just now reconfi rms the feeling, the sense that I am
17 home where ever I am in Afri ca. I would want to also thank the
18 Presi dent and the lead ers of the sub-re gi on who played an active
19 role in making peace possi ble in Si erra Leone. In parti cu lar, I
14:52:00 20 would want to thank you Mr Presi dent, Presi dent Obasanjo,
21 Presi dents Eyadema and Compaore and all other forei gn mi ni sters
22 of countri es who parti ci pated in the agree ment.

23 This is an important step forward. But now we have to
24 focus on the hard part of implementation of making it work. I
14:52:23 25 think it is essential that we all come together and pull our
26 efforts to solve the political crises and conflicts in Africa, in
27 this region and elsewhere. Because if we do not do that we
28 cannot focus on the essential task of economic and social
29 development. If we do not do that, we are not going to be able

1 to attract investors in this region, local and international.
2 No-one invests in a" - and there is an inaudible word there -
3 "and this is why the process of establishing peace and calm in
4 your region is so essential for the dreams of prosperity and
14:53:08 5 civility that we all have. And I have been touched by the
6 message I have received that the entire West African community
7 here is saying: Yes, peace has taken hold in Liberia, let's move
8 on to the economic and social development, appealing to the
9 international community to help. I share that desire, and I have
14:53:32 10 been working on that and will continue to work on that."

11 Now, Mr Taylor, that phrase "the entire West African
12 community here is saying: Yes, peace has taken hold in Liberia",
13 was that happy condition to remain?

14 A. Not really.

14:53:59 15 Q. Did things change?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. How quickly?

18 A. Well, at a very slow but increasing rate things started
19 changing with the situation at hand. This incursion really never
14:54:20 20 dies, and by incursion I mean the incursion out of Guinea that
21 attacked Lofa County.

22 Q. We will come back to that:

23 "Your representative who spoke on your behalf said there
24 are some that I should think about Liberia. Let me assure you, I
14:54:44 25 don't need a plane ride from New York to think about Liberia. If
26 I didn't think about Liberia, I wouldn't be here. But we will
27 continue to work with you and to ensure economic development, and
28 I hope as we resolve the conflict in the region, there have been
29 very positive developments the last few months. Nigeria has gone

1 through a peaceful democratic transition, peace has taken hold
2 here in Liberia. Yesterday a peace agreement was signed in
3 Sierra Leone. The situation in Guinea-Bissau I hope will resolve
4 within the next few [inaudible] and if this region can really
14:55:28 5 consolidate this peace and work together, I think we will see a
6 difference in the sub-region.

7 But, of course, yesterday there was also an issue of
8 another agreement in Lusaka on the Democratic Republic of Congo,
9 and I hope that will also be signed by the Heads of State and
14:55:50 10 bring stability to that large country in the middle of Africa.
11 So, my brothers and sisters, let's continue our efforts in search
12 of viable and long-term peace, to be able to work on the
13 essential issues of economic and social development. And I am
14 convinced that if we do our part and sustain these efforts, the
14:56:11 15 help from the international community will also come. We have to
16 do our part and then pressure the outsiders to join us in our
17 journey towards stability and prosperity."

18 And then there was a question and answer session. Were you
19 present throughout all of this, Mr Taylor?

14:56:32 20 A. Yes, I was.

21 Q. Let's go over the page and look - let's just have a quick
22 look at these answers:

23 "First of all, I hope that my visit will underscore the
24 solidarity that the UN and I personally feel for the plight of
14:56:51 25 the Liberian people and the efforts to rebuild a society. And I
26 have also come to the region to encourage the peace processes
27 that are taking place and really encourage the leaders and people
28 of the region to work together to stabilise the region so that we
29 move on with economic development. I think on your second

1 question, when we talk of the United Nations, we refer to the
2 United Nations as if it's some abstract and somewhere in
3 New York. We ought to be careful, because the United Nations is
4 you and the government and the people of the world. The
14:57:35 5 United Nations is as strong as its members want to be. But I
6 would want to say is for us to avoid these regular conflicts,
7 these unnecessary killings, these unnecessary destructions that
8 we see around today. We need to develop a culture of peace,
9 tolerance. We need to accept diversity. We need to celebrate
14:58:00 10 diversity. We need to build society based on based on the rule
11 of law and respect for human rights. And since I became
12 Secretary-General, I have wished for this. We have tended to be
13 so consumed and concerned by state security. I hope we will
14 begin to shift that concern to the security of the individual
14:58:23 15 within the State. We should put the human being at the centre of
16 everything that we do. And I hope that as we move into the next
17 century, this mission will take hold and if it does, the world
18 will be a better place for all of us."

19 Now, I want to deal with the next answer, because of a
14:58:46 20 matter we will be coming up to deal with in due course:

21 "The Secretary-General: I think what is important is that
22 not only has the conflict ended, but we should really get away
23 from the whole question of armaments. In my report to the
24 Security Council on conflicts in Africa and economic and social
14:59:12 25 development on the continent, one of the issues I highlighted was
26 the need to reduce expenditure on armaments and that governments
27 should not be encouraged to spend more than 1.5 per cent of their
28 budgets on armaments. I was talking to Michael Camdessus of the
29 IMF a few days ago, and he said we have to find ways of even

1 discouraging those who give credits to government to bring in
2 armaments instead of helping them develop their economic and
3 social infrastructure. And in this, having achieved the peace
4 here - and I said peace seemed to be taking hold in the region -
14:59:54 5 I was very pleased when the President informed me that he had
6 decided to burn all the weapons that were collected during the
7 conflict which have been stored here since the end of the
8 conflict, and his plan to is to burn these weapons on 26 July. "

9 Now, we know the significance of that date, don't we,

15:00:14 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes, we do.

12 Q. Independence Day, yes?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. "... and have a big bonfire of peace, and I hope the flame
15:00:23 15 will rise as high as possible when the time reaches so that the
16 entire region can know that it is not well spending money on
17 weapons and that what the people demand and are asking for is an
18 economic and social development, food, shelter, education,
19 health, and that is where our efforts should go. And I hope we
15:00:45 20 will understand the symbol of burning the arms on 26 July. "

21 And then on what the UN is doing on the arms embargo on
22 Liberia:

23 "On the issue of embargo, these are issues discussed by the
24 Security Council periodically, and I am sure this will be
15:01:10 25 reviewed. But in my discussions with President Taylor, I don't
26 think the question of armaments or expenditure on arms is the
27 first thing on his agenda. "

28 Was that true, Mr Taylor?

29 A. That was true.

1 Q. So what was the first thing on your agenda?

2 A. Economic development. Getting the country stabilised so we
3 could begin receiving aid and assistance for our people.

4 Q. So let me then move on to your second question:

15:01:38 5 "I think the UN and the international community has an
6 obligation to work side by side with Liberia and Sierra Leone in
7 reconstructing this economy and pushing ahead with development.
8 In fact, in my discussions with President Taylor, and also early
9 this morning with President Kabbah" - pause there. So the
10 Secretary-General had visited both of you on the same day?

11 A. Yes, he came through Freetown into Liberia, yes.

12 Q. "... we did talk about reviving and energising the
13 Mano River Union to encourage sub-regional cooperation and
14 economic, political and security issues, and I think we will be
15:02:23 15 working very, very closely with the President and his colleagues
16 in the sub-region. Thank you very much."

17 And then there is this question:

18 Q. "On the peace agreement in Sierra Leone and the issue
19 of giving amnesty to people who committed atrocities.

15:02:41 20 A. Let me say that the peace agreement which was signed,
21 with a clause on amnesty, the parties to the conflict signed an
22 agreement. The parties to the conflict won the peace.
23 Obviously, peace and justice must go hand in hand. But perfect
24 peace is hardly ever achievable. And if one were to pursue
15:03:04 25 perfect peace, the peace that will bring stability, the peace
26 that will, may prove to be very elusive. Having noted that there
27 is an amnesty clause in the agreement, I would like to stress
28 that in the United Nations, the international humanitarian human
29 rights law will continue to apply. Thank you very much."

1 Now, pausing for a moment, Mr Taylor. There was that
2 amnesty clause in the Lome agreement, wasn't there?

3 A. There is.

4 Q. And you having been present at those discussions, help us.
15:03:54 5 What was seen as the purpose behind that?

6 A. All of the agreements around - where you have had conflict
7 in Africa, they have put this clause in to make sure that they
8 move away from any future problems that one government may come
9 in wanting to go after certain people, that they will use that as
15:04:19 10 an opportunity to do that.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, as we see, that was your meeting with
12 the Secretary-General on 8 July. Before we move on,
13 Mr President, can I ask that that document be marked for
14 identification, please? It's outgoing code cable from Felix
15:04:54 15 Downes-Thomas dated 10 August 1999 attaching notes on the
16 Secretary-General's visit to Liberia on 8 July 1999, MFI-90.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we will mark that all as one
18 document, MFI-90.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

15:05:18 20 Q. So, Mr Taylor, that's 8 July immediately following your
21 return from Lome. So what's the next stage in events, can you
22 recall?

23 A. Yes. Following that, we are now in July. I begin
24 preparing for two events: The July 26 Independence celebrations;
15:05:44 25 and also the symbolic burning of the arms as referred to by the
26 Secretary-General here in this big bonfire. And so I am
27 beginning to - first of all I receive a letter - we sent out
28 invitations. I receive a letter from President Obasanjo
29 confirming he will be coming, and by this time we are beginning

1 to receive goodwill messages from around the world. Mostly on
2 Independence Day, countries send out goodwill messages wishing,
3 you know, that country well, and we are receiving all of those in
4 preparation for the 26 July celebration.

15:06:37 5 Q. Okay. Now, you say you received a letter from which
6 President?

7 A. Obasanjo writes me and tells me that he is coming.

8 Q. And this is when?

9 A. This is in July.

15:06:55 10 Q. Can we have a look behind divider 40, please. Do you have
11 it, Mr Taylor?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. "Dear President and Brother, I have the honour to
14 acknowledge receipt of your most thoughtful letter of 16 June
15:07:39 15 1999 and to thank you most sincerely for your kind words about
16 me. It was indeed a great honour to host you during your last
17 visit to Abuja, as it underscored the close and friendly
18 relations that currently exist between our two countries and
19 peoples. I also welcome the opportunity provided by your visit
15:08:01 20 for a full and frank exchange of views on matters of common
21 concern, including the search for options for restoring peace and
22 promoting security in the West African sub-region.

23 I am pleased to note that the 152nd anniversary of Liberian
24 Independence will be marked by a symbolic destruction of the arms
15:08:25 25 and ammunition surrendered to the United Nations and ECOWAS by
26 the former military factions in your country. The significance
27 of the occasion certainly underscores your government's
28 commitment to bringing about lasting peace in Liberia and other
29 countries in the sub-region. I am certain that this gesture of

1 compliance with the wishes of the international community will be
2 fully reciprocated by an appropriate response from all concerned.

3 Your appreciation of the positive contribution and huge
4 sacrifice made by ECOMOG forces to bring about peace in Liberia
15:09:05 5 is, indeed, most welcome. We as leaders must strive to ensure
6 that these sacrifices are not made in vain by providing
7 conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in our
8 countries and, indeed, the rest of the continent.

9 I am glad to accept your invitation to attend the
15:09:24 10 celebrations marking the 152nd anniversary of Liberian
11 Independence on 26 July 1999 as an expression of my support for
12 the efforts to secure lasting peace in our sub-region. "

13 And then the normal salutations. So that's on the 14th,
14 Mr Taylor.

15:09:50 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So we are talking about, what, just over a week before the
17 actual event?

18 A. A little more than that, yes. But there are several
19 other - we are very busy at this time. There are several other
15:10:04 20 goodwill messages coming in from almost all member states of the
21 UN. We received from Germany, we received from West African
22 countries. Just goodwill messages; on the occasion of the 152nd
23 anniversary we wish this and that. But these are coming while we
24 are preparing. We do get confirmation at this time on who is
15:10:35 25 really coming to the celebrations. Obasanjo accepts, Kabbah
26 accepts, I think Idriss Deby from Chad, Blaise Compaore from
27 Burkina Faso. Several Heads of States come and we begin the
28 preparation for such a gathering in Monrovia.

29 Q. And just to see an example of the kind of goodwill messages

1 received, let us just quickly move behind divider 41. Before we
2 do so, can I ask, Mr President, that the letter from President
3 Obasanjo dated 14 July 1999 be marked for identification MFI-91,
4 please.

15:11:31 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: That document is marked MFI-91.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

7 Q. So now let's go over the page. What do we see here,
8 Mr Taylor?

9 A. The goodwill message from - this is a note from the foreign
15:11:45 10 ministry on President Rau of Germany of the federal republic on
11 our independence. This is just the transmitter from the foreign
12 ministry. The message is attached.

13 Q. When we go behind, we see the message in English, don't we?

14 A. That is correct.

15:12:05 15 Q. And when we see go behind that, we see the message in
16 German?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Is this the kind of format adopted for such messages,
19 Mr Taylor?

15:12:20 20 A. I wouldn't say form, but this is the style that - each
21 country may have its own style, it's not a direct form, but it's
22 more a style. They all would just send - some would be straight
23 letters, some would be maybe one paragraph, two paragraphs, but
24 they come from all over.

15:12:38 25 Q. And, for the record, the message from Johannes Rau,
26 President of the Federal Republic of Germany, reads to this
27 effect:

28 "On the occasion of Independence Day in the Republic of
29 Liberia, I convey to you my own and the German people's cordial

1 greetings.

2 On this day, I would also like to wish the Liberian people
3 a prosperous future, economic progress and peace within their
4 society.

15:13:10 5 I am confident that you and your government will succeed in
6 making constructive contributions in the spirit of cooperation
7 based on partnership towards the re-establishment of peace and
8 stability in the region of West Africa."

9 Now, let's come then, Mr Taylor, to the particular day
15:13:33 10 itself. Before I move on, could we mark that for identification
11 MFI-92, please.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's marked MFI-92. We will mark
13 it as one document.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:13:49 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just talk us through, please, precisely
16 what happened on 26 July. Let's start, first of all, with this.
17 Which Presidents attended?

18 A. We have Presidents Obasanjo, Kabbah.

19 Q. Kabbah was there, was he?

15:14:09 20 A. Yes. Tejani was there. He was there, yes. We also had
21 President Compaore, Blaise Compaore, of Burkina Faso. We had I
22 think the foreign minister of Ghana and other foreign ministers.
23 I think probably the Prime Minister of Togo. But we a full house
24 for the celebrations.

15:14:38 25 Q. And help us, what else happened on the day, if anything,
26 apart from celebrating Independence Day?

27 A. Well, we also had in circulation at that particular time a
28 letter that a good friend of President Clinton had written to him
29 to assist Liberia.

1 Q. But mention was made in some of the correspondence about
2 the destruction of arms?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did that take place on Independence Day?

15:15:14 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was there any particular ceremony to mark that?

7 A. We burnt it, yes. There was a big bonfire.

8 Q. Where was that bonfire?

9 A. At the Barclay Training Centre. We had the UN personnel,
15:15:32 10 the experts that were there and all of the representatives. The
11 Barclay Training Centre is - it's come up before, it's the
12 military barracks in Monrovia. We had the physical burning,
13 symbolic burning of a large quantity of arms. No ammunition,
14 because they would have been popping. There was no ammunition.
15:15:54 15 But the arms, we burned.

16 Q. Was President Kabbah present for that?

17 A. Yes, Kabbah was there.

18 Q. Now, you have mentioned a letter, Mr Taylor. Who wrote
19 that letter?

15:16:53 20 A. That letter was written by Lester Hyman.

21 Q. To whom?

22 A. To President Clinton.

23 Q. And who is Lester Hyman?

24 A. Lester is a lawyer, a very strong stalwart of the Democrat
15:17:19 25 party and one of the - from the old stock of that whole Kennedy
26 set. Very good friends - he has come from the old democratic
27 stock. And he had known President Clinton for some time, and had
28 been used to do some work for Liberia and the new government in
29 terms of helping to re set-up the whole aspect of our maritime

1 programme and had really gotten used to what was going on in the
2 country and was writing the President to advise him that to the
3 knowledge of him, that it would be very good if the United States
4 could begin a policy of rethinking its whole attitude towards
5 Liberia.

15:18:20

6 Q. Have you seen a copy of that letter?

7 A. Yes. It was written to me. I read the letter, yes. I
8 mean it was written to President Clinton, but I have a copy.

9 Q. Have a look behind divider 42, please. Is that the letter?

15:18:47

10 A. Yes, this is it.

11 Q. Yes. We see it's dated 28 July. So two days after the
12 Independence Day celebrations, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And we see it's addressed to the Honourable Bill Clinton,
15 President of the United States, the White House, 1600
16 Pennsylvania Avenue:

15:19:12

17 "Dear Mr President, I write to ask you to meet informally
18 with President Charles Taylor of Liberia when he comes to
19 Washington September 15-19 just prior to his address to the
20 United Nations General Assembly in New York on the afternoon of
21 September 21."

15:19:33

22 Pause. Question number one: What prompted Mr Hyman to
23 write this letter? Was it at your request?

24 A. No, not at my request. No, not at all. What was going on
25 at this time, remember now in 1998, I don't go. We have some
26 problems and there is this letter before the Court from Ramsey
27 Clark dealing with this matter.

15:19:55

28 Q. That was in the year of your election as President?

29 A. Exactly. Now, we come to a situation now where

1 historically, with this good relationship between Liberia and the
2 United States, the President of Liberia, upon undertaking this
3 trip to the United States, had a full programme. He went to the
4 United Nations. After that, he went to Washington DC. He met
15:20:35 5 with the President. Not at the side bar in New York, but he met
6 with the President in Washington DC. And then there would be
7 visits to maybe one or two American cities, like probably it
8 would be like Chicago or maybe Atlanta, Georgia, or maybe even
9 California where in conjunction with the United States government
15:21:03 10 investors would be put together. You talk to them in trying to
11 get investment and it's a good thing to do.

12 I am about to go to the United States and we have not
13 settled this issue yet. There are suggestions that there will be
14 a side bar meeting at the United Nations with President Clinton.
15:21:26 15 And I said no, that that was not sufficient because the mere cost
16 of flying to the United States - you know, what, you go to
17 address the General Assembly, you address the General Assembly,
18 everybody's addressing the General Assembly. But for me, in
19 order for us to benefit, that trip had to be inclusive of many
15:21:49 20 other constructive actions.

21 So we're going to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars,
22 you charter a plane, you go, you are at New York, the Waldorf
23 Astoria, you are paying huge sums of money. There is a huge
24 delegation. We don't have the money. But the benefits, if you
15:22:14 25 were to meet the President and meet investors and encourage
26 investment to the country, that would be an opportunity, because
27 I am speaking as an economist now, that there would be some
28 way you gain some money back. So why spend all this money only
29 to go to address the General Assembly when your foreign minister

1 can read the speech. So I said, well, you know, if there is not
2 an agenda where I will meet with Bill Clinton in Washington DC I
3 was just not going there. It just isn't worth my while.

4 So these discussions are ongoing. And so Lester, remember
15:22:51 5 I have said, is a lawyer who is an old hand in the Democrat
6 establishment, who knows President Clinton very well and is
7 helping to do some work with the maritime programme. We have
8 talked about that here before, the ships that fly the Liberian
9 flag. Good. And so he, knowing President Clinton, writes. He
10 knows the Secretary of State very well, Madeline Albright, and
11 so he writes and puts in his little word to see if he can get
12 this thing going.

13 Q. Okay. Now, at this stage in July, Mr Taylor, was it your
14 intention to attend the meeting of the UN General Assembly.

15:23:45 15 A. Full intention. We were making preparations and
16 everything, yes. I had full intentions.

17 Q. Let's go back:

18 "Specifically, I understand that you will be attending the
19 congressional black caucus dinner on Saturday evening, September
15:24:02 20 18th, at the DC convention centre where President Taylor also
21 will be a guest. It is my hope that you would meet briefly with
22 him in a private room or in the holding room prior to your
23 entrance into the hall."

24 Why should you see Charles Taylor?

15:24:21 25 (1) Because in recent weeks President Taylor has been
26 instrumental in bringing the rebels in Sierra Leone to the table
27 for diplomatic settlement of that country's horrible civil war;
28 he has just presided over the destruction of all the weapons
29 seized during Liberia's civil war; and next month he will mark

1 two years of his presidency with his country at peace. In my
2 opinion, good deeds such as these should be reinforced by US
3 commendation, just as less helpful actions have been criticised
4 by us in the past.

15:25:00 5 (2) Because as the democratically elected President of the
6 Republic of Liberia, he needs to demonstrate to his people that
7 the United States recognises its special historic relationship
8 with Liberia (the only country in Africa with such a
9 distinction).

15:25:21 10 (3) Because despite the fact that President Taylor has
11 already has been received in formal state visits by President
12 Chirac in France, President Mandela in South Africa, and
13 President Obasanjo in Nigeria (with both the latter, as well as
14 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recently visiting
15:25:43 15 President Taylor in Liberia), to my knowledge, no high-ranking
16 official of the United States government has indicated an
17 interest to meet with Mr Taylor when he comes to Washington in
18 September, even though it is an unofficial visit?

19 I respectfully suggest that an encouraging word from the
15:26:07 20 President of the United States (as you did when you called
21 Mr Taylor from Air Force One during your recent triumphant trip
22 to Africa) will do wonders in helping to further the democratic
23 process in Liberia. (You will recall that Hilary received the
24 First Lady of Liberia, Jewel Taylor, at the White House last
15:26:30 25 year, and in doing so, helped focus attention in that country on
26 issues benefiting women and children, health and education.)

27 For the record, the past year I have tried to help Liberia
28 on the road to recovery strictly on a pro bono basis. I know
29 Charles Taylor probably better than any other American, and I

1 sincerely believe he possesses the intelligence, sophistication
2 and political skills to lead his country in a constructive manner
3 if only he is given some help and encouragement by the
4 international community.

15:27:10 5 I think you know me well enough, Mr President, to conclude,
6 that I would not recommend a meeting between you and President
7 Charles Taylor unless I believed it would result in positive
8 benefits for the people of Liberia, who are the sole reason I
9 have been so involved with that country. I do hope you can grant
15:27:34 10 my earnest request and looked forward to your response. Warmest
11 regards."

12 Now, you have told us, Mr Taylor, that in due course you
13 didn't make that trip.

14 A. That is correct.

15:27:57 15 Q. As far as you are aware, did President Clinton respond to
16 that letter?

17 A. I think he did. In fact, there was such a mixup that
18 things went a little bad. I think in the final analysis,
19 something was worked out for such a meeting at the caucus that is
15:28:19 20 mentioned here. But in these different messages getting across,
21 I think in his response to Lester, I think he had mentioned that
22 it probably just got caught up, I guess, along the way, and I did
23 not get the time enough and really didn't go. Some people
24 considered that a lost opportunity, but it was not intentional
15:28:45 25 because the message just didn't get to me that, in fact, such a
26 meeting could take place or would take place. And so I didn't
27 make the trip.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: Before I move on, can I ask that that letter
29 from Lester Hyman to President Clinton, dated 28 July 1999, be

1 marked for identification, please, MFI-93.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
3 identification MFI-93.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:29:31 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just going back a couple of days to the
6 events on Independence Day when the arms were burnt, was that
7 ceremony reported in the media?

8 A. Yes. Mark Doyle of the BBC did a full article and
9 reporting on it in a written publication. Mark Doyle, yes.

15:29:59 10 Q. Let's look behind divider 43, please.

11 A. Yes, this is it. Mark Doyle did this.

12 Q. And we see it's dated Monday, 26 July 1999, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. By BBC West Africa correspondent Mark Doyle in Monrovia:

15:30:27 15 "Liberian President Charles Taylor has announced that his
16 country has closed a dark chapter in its history after almost a
17 decade of civil war.

18 Mr Taylor was speaking at a United Nations monitored
19 ceremony to mark the destruction of tens of thousands of weapons
15:30:49 20 and millions of rounds of ammunition collected from armed
21 factions at the end of the main hostilities in the civil war
22 three years ago.

23 The destruction of the large cache of weapons, held under
24 lock and key since the war, is one of the largest weapons
15:31:12 25 destruction programmes the world has seen in recent years.

26 Several African Heads of State attended the ceremony, and
27 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent a message
28 congratulating regional leaders on taking an important step
29 towards peace.

1 The Presidents of Sierra Leone and Nigeria, two countries
2 that used to be firmly opposed to Mr Taylor, arrived in Monrovia
3 on its Independence Day for the colourful ceremony.

4 President Taylor came to office by being the most powerful
15:31:56 5 warlord in a conflict which destabilised the entire West African
6 region, leaving hundreds of thousands of people dead.

7 Now elected to office and keen to portray himself as a man
8 of peace, he hopes that putting a lighted torch to the huge pile
9 of weapons will send a message to the outside world."

15:32:20 10 Were you seeking to do that, Mr Taylor, send a message to
11 the outside world?

12 A. Yes. I don't know if the message got to them. Yes.

13 Q. What was the message you were trying to send out?

14 A. That we had put war behind us; that we wanted peace; and
15:32:40 15 that we wanted to move our people forward in the direction of
16 prosperity. This is the message we were trying to send. I don't
17 think it got to them.

18 Q. "Essentially, Mr Taylor wants respect and crucial foreign
19 investment." You've said that more than once during the course
15:33:04 20 of your testimony, Mr Taylor, so we won't dwell on that. "With
21 peace deals now signed in Liberia and neighbouring Sierra Leone,
22 it is just possible that this will happen." And the timely
23 intervention of the letter from Mr Hyman gave some optimistic
24 hope of that, did it?

15:33:21 25 A. It did.

26 Q. "But Mr Taylor's opponents, many of them in exile or
27 otherwise silenced, say he has to show a greater and continuing
28 commitment to democracy and human rights if Liberia is really to
29 become a normal country once more.

1 Nigeria's General Felix Mujakperou, who has headed the
2 ECOMOG peace enforcement army in West Africa, told the BBC that
3 the weapons destruction programme was a mess and several weeks
4 behind schedule."

15:33:54 5 Is that true?

6 A. This is a man that is just coming in, so what does he know
7 about this? Don't forget, it was Shelpidi that was just
8 around - this man replaced Shelpidi in Sierra Leone. I don't
9 think he knows what he's talking about.

15:34:16 10 Q. "General Mujakperou said his peacekeeping troops, who have
11 been guarding the surrendered weapons, would leave Liberia within
12 days in accordance with the long-term plan.

13 The general, who has intimate knowledge of the situation in
14 Liberia, warned that the unarmed UN monitors were incapable of
15 protecting these weapons, not yet destroyed, from possible
16 seizure from armed groups which might want them."

17 Yes, Mr Taylor.

18 A. Yes, that's what he says.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Can that BBC news report by Mark Doyle be
15:34:56 20 marked for identification, please, Mr President, MFI-94?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for
22 identification MFI-94.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want to show you now a document and ask
15:35:23 25 for your explanation as to its origin. Could you look behind
26 divider 38-39, please. What is this document, Mr Taylor?

27 A. This is a commercial invoice for a satellite telephone.

28 Q. Where does it come from?

29 A. Quite frankly, I really - this, I really don't know.

1 10/07/99. I am not sure whether that is 10 July or --

2 Q. Well, if it's 10 July, then it's a couple of days after the
3 Lome peace agreement, isn't it?

4 A. Yes, and that would not be practical. The 10th --

15:36:34 5 Q. Mr Taylor, was this document ever in your possession?

6 A. It's possible it could have been among my papers, but I
7 really don't really know the origin of this document.

8 Q. Why would such a document be in your papers?

9 A. I don't know. I don't know. Because this is a collection
15:36:56 10 of papers. I don't know.

11 Q. Because let's note what this is about. The consignee -
12 that is the person who is to receive this item - is chairman
13 Foday Sankoh, yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:37:13 15 Q. Care of Pallo Bangura, Cape Sierra Hotel, Freetown,
16 Sierra Leone, yes?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. And the date, as you have noted, if the middle digit is the
19 month, is two days - well, three days after the signing of the
15:37:41 20 Lome Peace Accord, yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And what's it for? It's for a satellite telephone.

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. Did you provide Foday Sankoh with a satellite telephone?

15:37:56 25 A. No, I did not provide Foday Sankoh with a satellite
26 telephone at this particular time, no. No.

27 Q. Is there any reason why you might have supplied Foday
28 Sankoh with a satellite telephone?

29 A. Yes, there is reason why I might have.

1 Q. Such as?

2 A. To remain in contact with him. But if you look at the 10th
3 here, Foday Sankoh is nowhere around Sierra Leone. In fact, we
4 fight hard to get - to finally get Foday Sankoh to Sierra Leone.

15:38:37 5 And this is why I have said that I - this particular document, I
6 don't know how it could have gotten among my papers. But I
7 cannot recall this, because Foday Sankoh doesn't get back into
8 Sierra Leone in October. There should be no reason why I should
9 provide him a satellite telephone bought and delivered in

15:38:56 10 Freetown two days after the thing. I don't know. It could be
11 just probably one of those documents that, as you compile
12 documents - and I moved from the mansion with a bunch of papers,
13 I don't really know how this got in there. But I did not provide
14 this to him. I had reason to. But I did not, no.

15:39:18 15 Q. Yes, you had reason to because, as we noted in the notes of
16 the meeting with the Secretary-General on 8 July, you said,
17 amongst other things, that you would be establishing a hotline
18 between Monrovia and Freetown?

19 A. Yes.

15:39:39 20 Q. And that hotline was to include Mr Sankoh?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. So was this - was the provision of such a phone part of
23 that process?

24 A. No, no, I would remember very clearly if I gave Foday
15:39:59 25 Sankoh a phone. I did not at this particular time. This hot
26 line is for Foday Sankoh and for Tejan Kabbah, but I did not give
27 him this particular phone - even though I had reason to, but I
28 did not give him this phone. I want to believe that somebody in
29 Freetown probably bought this phone for Sankoh but, no, I did

1 not.

2 Q. Now you say, Mr Taylor, that Mr Sankoh was not in Freetown
3 at this time, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

15:40:32 5 Q. But you will note that the consignee is not Sankoh himself.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. It's care of somebody else. Do you see that?

8 A. I see it's in care of Pallo Bangura.

9 Q. Yes, which means, of course, doesn't it, that Sankoh not
15:40:51 10 being in Freetown is somewhat irrelevant? Wouldn't you agree?

11 A. I would agree.

12 Q. Tell me, alternatively, Mr Taylor, if the month is in fact
13 October and this date is 7 October, Sankoh would be back in
14 Freetown by then, wouldn't he?

15:41:21 15 A. If it's October, yes.

16 Q. Now by October 1999, would you have good reason to provide
17 a satellite phone to Sankoh?

18 A. I would have very good reason to provide a satellite phone
19 for Sankoh, yes.

15:41:48 20 Q. Did you, Mr Taylor, provide a satellite phone or phones to
21 any member of the RUF?

22 A. Oh, yes, I provided a satellite phone to Sam Bockarie. A
23 handheld satellite phone.

24 Q. Can I pause you there. We will continue the list of names
15:42:14 25 in a moment, but let's just clarify as we go along. When did you
26 provide such a phone to Bockarie?

27 A. On his second trip to Liberia, as mentioned.

28 Q. Which was when, remind us?

29 A. Sam Bockarie came to Liberia, what we are talking about,

1 1998.

2 Q. Yes. And you told us the first trip was in September. Did
3 you provide it to him on the first trip, the second trip?

4 A. I said the second trip I provided him a phone.

15:42:56 5 Q. Why?

6 A. Because we had to be in contact with him and we needed to
7 talk to him when he left and went back into the bush, so we had
8 to talk to him.

9 Q. Thank you. Who else did you provide with a satellite
10 phone?

11 A. I also provided a satellite phone later on in 2000 to Issa
12 Sesay.

13 Q. Why?

14 A. To be in contact with him after he was made leader of the
15 RUF in July/August of 2000.

16 Q. Anybody else?

17 A. No, not that I can recollect right now. No.

18 Q. Now having admitted, Mr Taylor, that you have bought
19 satellite phones for Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, yes?

15:43:46 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. Do you have any reason to deny buying this phone for Foday
22 Sankoh?

23 A. Listen, I don't know what the real issue is in trying to
24 help the Court. I am in touch with Sankoh. I am calling him by
15:44:08 25 landlines. I am calling him. If I had recollected that I had
26 bought this phone for Sankoh I would say that I did it, because I
27 had every reason to be in touch with him and I called him many
28 times. I do not recollect buying a satellite phone for Sankoh.
29 I am in touch with Sankoh and so that is not the issue for me.

1 If I had bought it, I do not recollect that I bought this phone
2 for Sankoh.

3 I am calling Foday Sankoh in Freetown when he gets there.
4 I send him to Freetown from Liberia. I just don't recollect that
15:44:38 5 I bought this phone. If I had bought it, I would say I did. I
6 don't recollect. That's simple. I am on landlines with Sankoh
7 every day calling him. Sankoh gets there. By the time he gets
8 back into Sierra Leone we are talking about there is conflict on
9 the ground. I am in touch with him. I just don't recollect this
15:44:58 10 parti cular phone.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, understand my purpose. We have access to a
12 large volume of documentati on and it's my duty to give you an
13 opportuni ty to comment on all relevant documentati on. Do you
14 understand that?

15:45:15 15 A. I do.

16 Q. So that's why I am asking you about this, to give you an
17 opportuni ty now to explain if you have an explanati on. Do you
18 have one?

19 A. I do not recollect this phone. I've said it.

15:45:32 20 Q. Very well.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I ask then that invoice
22 for satellite phone, dated either 10 October 1999 or - no, sorry,
23 7 October 1999 or 10 July 1999, be marked for identi fication
24 MFI-95. No, I am sorry, did I mark for identi fication the BBC
15:46:34 25 news article?

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: That was 94, wasn't it?

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that is 94.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: So this now becomes 95.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, this present document is marked
2 MFI -95.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, by this stage now we have reached the end
15:47:06 5 of July of 1999, haven't we?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, as we recall, you had met with the Secretary-General
8 on 8 July, the day after the signing of the Lome Peace Accord,
9 yes?

15:47:20 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Coming into August, did you have reason to speak to him
12 again?

13 A. Kofi Annan?

14 Q. Yes, that's right.

15:47:33 15 A. Yes, yes, yes, yes.

16 Q. Did you have particular reason to want to speak to him at
17 this time?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What was that?

15:47:48 20 A. Around the beginning of August, for some framework here, we
21 have come from Lome and Foday Sankoh is still not in
22 Sierra Leone.

23 Q. Can I just pause you for a moment.

24 A. Yes.

15:48:15 25 Q. Foday Sankoh is still not in Sierra Leone. Can we
26 investigate that a little further, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Sure.

28 Q. Because, remember, he went to Lome as a convicted criminal.

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Following Lome and the signing of the accord, what's his
2 status?

3 A. He is now free.

4 Q. He is now free.

15:48:37 5 A. He is now a free man.

6 Q. And now a free man and now according to the agreement
7 appointed vice-president of Sierra Leone and ministry of Lands
8 and mines, or whatever the department is?

9 A. No, not minister. He is vice-president of Sierra Leone,
15:48:57 10 but he is in charge of natural resources.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Why does he not return immediately to Sierra Leone, do you
14 know?

15:49:09 15 A. Really I can't tell, but it is a source of discomfort for
16 us. In our little circles, I mean the Heads of State, following
17 that agreement our first thing is that we have to get Sankoh back
18 into Freetown. Remember, as the UN is making arrangements to fly
19 the delegates of the RUF to Lome, they insist on the use of a UN
15:49:45 20 plane to make absolutely sure that quote unquote they do not go
21 to other places. So our concern now is that we have got to get
22 Sankoh into Freetown and not back into the bushes. That is he
23 must not go into his controlled area of Kailahun, or whatever
24 area of the country. We must make sure he returns to Freetown
15:50:09 25 and returns as quickly as possible.

26 So the first thing is there is agreement that he will come
27 through Liberia, but he will not go into Sierra Leone by road,
28 because by road he will end up into his controlled area and God
29 knows what could happen after that.

1 Now - but there is this lingering problem out there.
2 Remember the AFRC, or the armed forces people, are not a part of
3 this agreement and they are making small noises in the
4 background. Of principal concern - and I am going to your
15:50:54 5 question did I speak to Kofi Annan.

6 Q. Take your time so that we get the full picture, please,
7 Mr Taylor.

8 A. Yes. And these are all things happening behind - this is
9 not newspaper stuff I am talking. I am talking about internally
15:51:09 10 Heads of State telephone calls going from Monrovia to Abuja,
11 Monrovia, Freetown, Freetown, Abuja, up and down. We have a
12 situation now where there is a group of these - remember when the
13 junta or the SLA attacked Freetown on 6 January, based on the
14 evidence before this Court I think a day or so ago now they were
15:51:47 15 all not driven back into the interior. A group evolved calling
16 themselves the West Side Boys that take a position around the
17 hills around Sierra Leone called Okra Hills.

18 Now early in August they had been asking for Johnny Paul
19 Koroma, who does not show up outside of Sierra Leone. He is
15:52:21 20 somewhere up country. Nobody knows - at least I don't know and
21 the Heads of State don't know - where he is. He is up country
22 and these boys from the SLA want to speak to him to ask him why
23 was it he was not involved in the negotiations in Lome.

24 It erupts into a problem where the West Side Boys arrest
15:52:46 25 some United Nations officials in Sierra Leone around Okra Hills.
26 They arrest some ECOMOG soldiers and some journalists and whatnot
27 and said that they would not release them until they could speak
28 to and account for their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma.

29 So this is happening now coming towards the end of July.

1 All of this problem is evolving. We begin exchanging messages
2 and --

3 Q. Who is "we"?

4 A. The Heads of State of the members of the Committee of Six.
15:53:27 5 "What can we do about it?" I am told again to get into high
6 gear. We begin this process of negotiating to try to get the UN
7 officials released.

8 We practically work out the modalities of getting them
9 released, but the West Side Boys are saying that they cannot and
15:53:50 10 President Kabbah is involved every step of the way. This is a
11 direct coordination with Kabbah. There is a direct coordination
12 with Sankoh, even though Sankoh is not yet in Sierra Leone by
13 August. He remains in Togo. I am on the phone. I talk to him
14 in Togo. I talk to President Eyadema.

15:54:15 15 After we work out the details on one thing, what we would
16 remove Johnny Paul Koroma from Sierra Leone and bring him to
17 Liberia, and upon getting to Liberia, the release of these
18 officials would occur. The difficulty here is that Johnny Paul
19 Koroma is on a travel ban. He and his people cannot travel. So
15:54:40 20 then I call the special representative of the Secretary-General
21 and tell him to get a call to New York right away, I need to
22 speak to the Secretary-General. And so we finally get to speak,
23 after I have spoken to Kabbah, to Sankoh and everybody else, to
24 get the okay for Johnny Paul Koroma to be able to move from
15:55:02 25 Sierra Leone to come to Liberia, thereby resulting to the release
26 of the UN and other officials that are being held by the West
27 Side Boys at Okra Hills. So I speak to Kofi Annan, and he
28 agrees, and that process now gets into motion.

29 Q. Can we have a look behind divider 44, please. Now, we have

1 another of these code cables from Felix Downes-Thomas to someone
2 called Riza for the Secretary-General?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. We see it's marked "urgent and immediate", yes?

15:55:52 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. It's dated 6 August 1999.

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. "Further to our telephone conversation" - no.

9 "Subject: Sierra Leone, urgent issues, President Taylor's
10 request for telephone conference with the Secretary-General.

11 Further to our telephone conversation, I wish to confirm
12 that President Taylor telephoned me just now requesting that I
13 arrange for him and the Secretary-General to talk to on the
14 telephone about the detention of UN officials, ECOMOG soldiers,
15 journalists in Sierra Leone by ex-members of the Sierra Leonean
16 army."

17 That's the West Side Boys you referred to?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor?

15:56:51 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. "President Taylor informed me that he had already spoken
22 twice to President Kabbah." Yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "Once to Foday Sankoh"?

15:57:04 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. "And once to President Obasanjo on the matter"?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Which what you have just told us?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "On learning that the RUF commander in charge of the area
2 in which the abduction and detention has taken place was in
3 Liberia." Was he?

4 A. Yes.

15:57:25 5 Q. Who was that?

6 A. Gee, I don't quite remember. This is one of Foday Sankoh's
7 officials. They come, they go to Lome, some of them come back to
8 Liberia waiting for Sankoh to return en route to Freetown. But
9 this is one of his senior commanders. I don't remember the name.

15:57:43 10 But when this issue arose, one of them said that he knew this
11 area and could go back.

12 Q. "On learning that the RUF commander in charge of the area
13 in which the abduction and detention has taken place was in
14 Liberia, he, President Taylor, with the knowledge and consent of
15 President Kabbah, has chartered an airplane to transport this
16 particular commander from Monrovia to Lungi Airport, Freetown,
17 for the commander to assist in defusing the crisis."

15:58:01

18 Pause again. As suggested there, was Tejani Kabbah kept
19 abreast of everything you did?

15:58:28

20 A. Fully. Fully. They are landing at Lungi Airport. This is
21 no private matter. This is no private matter. Tejani knows. We
22 are in contact with everybody. Yes, the Secretary I am trying to
23 get in contact with, and we do charter a light aircraft to take
24 this commander, because of the urgency of this matter, to Lungi
25 for him to be able to get to the area to try to get these people
26 released. Yes, he knows.

15:58:46

27 Q. "President Taylor also informed me that according to his
28 own sources, an element in the ongoing crisis in Sierra Leone is
29 the contention that Johnny Paul Koroma (AFRC) is being held

1 against his will by Sierra Leonean authorities in Sierra Leone."

2 Pause there. Where had you learnt that from?

3 A. Well, there is an error here in this: Not by
4 Sierra Leonean authorities, but by really RUF. When - during the
15:59:30 5 process of putting together this whole thing, in the
6 investigation the RUF people at the guesthouse in Monrovia had
7 informed us that, in fact, Johnny Paul Koroma was being held in
8 detention. For the first time, I think everybody got to know
9 that Johnny Paul Koroma was being held against his will, okay?

15:59:54 10 And this was the first time that we get to know this.

11 Q. So, Mr Taylor, we should cross out "Sierra Leonean
12 authorities" and put in "RUF"?

13 A. "RUF". It should be "RUF authorities". He made an error
14 here.

16:00:07 15 Q. "President Taylor feels that if Johnny Paul Koroma could be
16 brought to Liberia for related discussions, that could contribute
17 significantly to defusing, if not ending, the crisis. He also
18 informs me that he has discussed this idea with both Presidents
19 Kabbah and Obasanjo, who do not seem to have any problem with
16:00:34 20 it."

21 Had you?

22 A. Oh, yes. Counsel, yes. These matters - that's why I was
23 sitting over here and I am hearing these boys talking about
24 things that they do not know. This boy, I forgot his name who
16:00:50 25 sat here who eventually came to Monrovia after Johnny Paul, these
26 boys don't know. They see things happening, and maybe OTP people
27 are talking to them, and they are trying to make up stories about
28 things that they have no knowledge of.

29 We are dealing at a level - everything open, aboveboard on

1 the table, and they are speculating, talking about things that
2 they do not know. They have no idea about what's going on. We
3 are - this thing is aboveboard. All the movements,
4 communications, agreements between and amongst officials, the
16:01:27 5 United Nations know, I know, Tejani Kabbah knows, Obasanjo knows,
6 Eyadema knows. Everybody is aware of what is going on. So I
7 have been hearing some things here that are very strange. They
8 do not know what they are talking about. Everyone knows,
9 counsel. Everyone.

16:01:44 10 Q. "President Taylor wishes to discuss with the
11 Secretary-General this current crisis in Sierra Leone, his
12 efforts at contributing towards ending it, as well as of Johnny
13 Paul's travel. The President is apprehensive about moving ahead
14 with arrangements for Johnny Paul Koroma's travel, in the light
16:02:05 15 of the Security Council travel ban currently in force on
16 Sierra Leoneans."

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And then we see a contact number for you.

19 A. Uh-huh.

16:02:15 20 Q. So, Mr Taylor, did you make the telephone call, or did the
21 Secretary-General make the telephone call?

22 A. The Secretary-General finally got in touch with me and we
23 discussed the matter, and the arrangement for the
24 Security Council, that committee - in fact, the lifting of the
16:02:33 25 ban doesn't require going back to the council. There is a
26 sanctions committee responsible, and the Secretary-General
27 arranged the modalities. That same day - the same day we talked,
28 we - by the - I think a day or two after my discussion with the
29 Secretary-General we were able to move Johnny Paul Koroma into

1 Li ber i a.

2 Q. We will come to that in a second.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: But can I just conduct a little clean-up
4 operation here, please, Mr President. Firstly, can I ask that
16:03:10 5 this code cable, dated 6 August 1999, marked "urgent and
6 immediate" from Felix Downes-Thomas, be marked for identification
7 MFI-96, please.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-96.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can I invite your Honours' and
16:03:36 10 everybody's attention behind divider 45 in order to clear
11 something up. Behind divider 45 you should have the identical
12 document we have just looked at. Yes? So what I suggest we do
13 is discard that so it doesn't cause later confusion.

14 Q. So you say that you managed to get, Mr Taylor, a response
16:04:22 15 from the Secretary-General the same day?

16 A. The same day, yes.

17 Q. Which enabled his movement?

18 A. Which enabled - by "his", the movement of Johnny Paul
19 Koroma, yes.

16:04:34 20 Q. Let's go to behind divider 46, please. Here we have
21 another outgoing code cable, don't we, Mr Taylor?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And we see again it's marked "immediate", suggesting some
24 urgency, yes?

16:05:04 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. It is from Felix Downes-Thomas again, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And it's to Miyet Prendergast - you explained who that was?

29 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. And also coping Ri za for the Secretary-General , whose name
2 appears on the previous code cable we looked at, yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. It's dated 7 August 1999; is that right?

16:05:35 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And the subject matter is "The arrival the Johnny Paul
7 Koroma in Liberia"?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. "Further to my code cable to Ri za for the Secretary-General
16:05:49 10 dated 6 August", that's the previous day?

11 A. Uh-huh.

12 Q. "I wish to advise that President Tayl or called me at 11
13 p.m. and requested that I convey the following to the
14 Secretary-General :

16:06:03 15 Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in Monrovi a around 5.30 p.m.
16 today, and arrangements were made for him to talk with the BBC
17 and, among other things, he called for the unconditional release
18 of those detained at Okra Hills."

19 Now, let us pause. Two things: Firstly, how had you
16:06:32 20 managed to get the RUF to release him?

21 A. These negotiations went on for more than a week. They had
22 come before and coming to that time. Foday Sankoh was involved
23 in Lome. We were talking to Sam Bockarie on the other side. We
24 told them that this was a major obstruction to the peace process
16:06:58 25 and that they could not hold United States personnel - when I say
26 United States, excuse me - United Nations personnel ; they should
27 release the people; and if the issue - if the issue was Johnny
28 Paul Koroma, we would do everything to convince the RUF to
29 release him outside of Sierra Leone. Because they were saying

1 that they would accept nothing short of Johnny Paul Koroma
2 getting totally out of that area. For them it was not just a
3 matter of release - I am talking about the West Side Boys now -
4 because I have heard things going on to - look, there is
16:07:36 5 conflict. I don't know how people were able to bunch up the SLA
6 and the RUF.

7 There was no love between these two organisations as far as
8 I can see; you understand me? There were problems, okay? There
9 were problems over many months, and just the mere fact that these
16:07:59 10 guys were brave enough to hold Johnny Paul Koroma meant that
11 there were problems. So they, the West Side Boys, said that they
12 were not going to accept any information where Johnny Paul Koroma
13 was released. They wanted him out of Sierra Leone. They wanted
14 to come and see him physically, and so we told the RUF that they
16:08:19 15 had a peace agreement now; Sankoh needed to come back to
16 Sierra Leone and they needed to start work; that this was not
17 helpful to the process and that they should release him, and they
18 consented.

19 Q. Now, there is a lot in there which I would like to unpack.
16:08:35 20 First of all, we note that the code cable from Felix
21 Downes-Thomas to the Secretary-General is dated - the first one
22 is dated 6 August. Now, the discussions which had been taking
23 place, Mr Taylor, had they preceded that date?

24 A. Yes.

16:08:59 25 Q. By how much?

26 A. Oh, I would say - this had been going on for maybe a week
27 of negotiations. I did not get to the Secretary-General to speak
28 to him about getting the acquiescence of the sanctions committee
29 until we had a deal. That's the whole point of talking to the -

1 I did not call him to say, "Well, guess what? I am negotiating
2 here." No, no, no, no, no. When we get to the Secretary-General
3 we have a deal, and it's only to get the immediate action on the
4 part of the sanctions committee to move the men out as quickly as
16:09:37 5 possible. Because there are UN personnel being held also, so
6 they are anxious, okay? So it precedes this.

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, were you able to so swiftly obtain the
8 release of Johnny Paul Koroma because you were in charge of the
9 RUF?

16:09:52 10 A. No, no, no, no, no. I said - first of all, it takes about
11 a week or more. But because of my position as - I am not
12 speaking ever or dealing with the RUF ever as President of
13 Liberia alone. No, no, no. If not, I would have nothing do with
14 it. Nothing. And I don't want to veer off here.

16:10:15 15 Listen, my long life ambitions were never going to be
16 thrown away, messing around with some rebel group in
17 Sierra Leone. Listen, I had goals and desires throughout my life
18 and I was not about to throw it away trying to control some group
19 in Sierra Leone. No, no, no, counsel. No.

16:10:35 20 I am dealing as a member of Committee of Six, the principal
21 person responsible for the Sierra Leone crisis. That's what how
22 I am dealing.

23 Q. Mr Taylor, was there something surreptitious or underhand
24 about this?

16:10:53 25 A. Nothing. Nothing. Everything is in the open.

26 Q. Why did you allow him to speak to the BBC if this was all
27 hush-hush?

28 A. Well, you know, because it was not hush-hush, that's why we
29 told him to speak. He did not come to Liberia in custody. He

1 was a free man. Everybody knows - by so speaking I mean the
2 international community, the Secretary-General knows, West Africa
3 knows, everybody knows. So there is no point in hiding him. So
4 he had access to the BBC to speak his piece about what had been
16:11:30 5 going on, the conditions and what were some of his concerns about
6 this whole peace situation.

7 Q. Let's move on:

8 "Appropriate radio facilities have now been made available
9 by the Government of Liberia to Mr Koroma who is expected to use
16:11:49 10 those facilities to communicate to his people tomorrow morning
11 when he will repeat his call for unconditional release."

12 Is that true?

13 A. That is true.

14 Q. A small detail here, Mr Taylor. What were the appropriate
16:12:08 15 radio facilities provided?

16 A. This is a long range radio to be able to call. Johnny Paul
17 Koroma has not seen or heard from these people for some time, the
18 boys at Okra Hill. His own means of communicating with them,
19 first of all they have to be assured, not by BBC reporting, they
16:12:32 20 want to talk to him. So what we did was make available a long
21 range radio. Maybe we should add, when Johnny Paul comes he
22 doesn't come alone. He has a few of his bodyguards with him, he
23 has radio operators. So this is internet to link Johnny Paul
24 Koroma directly with the boys at Okra Hill to tell them, first of
16:12:55 25 all that he is free, he's in Liberia and to give them these
26 instructions that all of us wanted because even though he is
27 released, he is now in Liberia on this day, but the UN people are
28 still being held, okay. So we need contact.

29 Q. Where was this radio located?

1 A. The radio was located at where Johnny Paul Koroma was put
2 up at the hotel. We installed a radio.

3 Q. Which hotel?

4 A. When he first came, he was he have put up at Hotel Africa.

16:13:30 5 Q. In?

6 A. In Monrovia. Just in Virginia just outside of Monrovia a
7 little bit.

8 Q. I have good reason for asking about these details,
9 Mr Taylor. Was he housed at the RUF guesthouse?

16:13:45 10 A. No, no, no, no. We did not put him up there.

11 Q. Why not?

12 A. Because they were not friends. Oh no, in fact Johnny Paul
13 was a very angry man. Johnny Paul was being held against his
14 will. He was a very angry man. He made that very clear to me.

16:14:03 15 He was angry.

16 Q. With whom?

17 A. With the RUF people, with Foday Sankoh, everybody. He was
18 angry. He was very angry. Very angry.

19 Q. "According to President Taylor, Mr Koroma's problems seem
16:14:22 20 to be minor. Koroma contends that the Lome Peace Agreement makes
21 a distinction between the RUF and the group which is of concern
22 to him. This distinction, according to Mr Koroma, expressed
23 itself by omission in the text of the Lome Peace Agreement of
24 appropriate and explicit references to his group.

16:14:50 25 In this connection, President Taylor assured him that the
26 facilitators at the Lome meeting did not intend to make any such
27 distinction and 'RUF' as used in the text is meant to be
28 inclusive, embracing, so to speak, Mr Koroma's group. He also
29 informed Mr Koroma that the text of the Lome Peace Agreement will

1 not be rewritten or redrafted."

2 Pause. We have already gone through this to an extent,
3 Mr Taylor, but I would like to revisit it in light of this
4 paragraph here. Was there any reference to the AFRC in the Lome
16:15:37 5 Peace Agreement?

6 A. Not directly. Not directly, no. And it was intentional
7 because it would have meant negotiating with the AFRC on another
8 term. So we just - we put "RUF" and we say that it included
9 everybody.

16:15:55 10 Q. So when you're saying to Mr Koroma here that the "RUF" as
11 used in the text is meant to be inclusive, were you telling
12 Mr Koroma that the use of that phrase also included the AFRC
13 members who he, Koroma, had led?

14 A. In a way, for this purpose, yes. But you can see I added a
16:16:26 15 caveat. I said it's not going to be rewritten. We are trying to
16 really - let's be honest here. We are playing with words here.
17 I was really playing with words with Koroma because Koroma was
18 saying we, the armed forces and AFRC, "We want this and they
19 should have put it in this way". And I am saying to him, really

16:16:50 20 playing around with words, "Oh no, this really means that it
21 includes everything. You know, we didn't have to put RUF and
22 AFRC, but, as it is written, it means everybody. But listen, we
23 are not going to change this for you or anybody else. Forget it.
24 There is no way ECOWAS it going to convene a new meeting to
16:17:11 25 change this". So actually if you look at it, it's really playing
26 with words and trying to soften the situation.

27 Q. Be a politician?

28 A. I am an economist, not a politician.

29 Q. Over the page, please:

1 "President Taylor was not able to reach President Eyadema
2 today. He intends to do so tomorrow when he will also talk to
3 President Obasanjo to obtain the concurrence of both Presidents
4 with regard to President Taylor's interpretation that the use of
16:17:58 5 RUF in the text is meant to be inclusive, incorporating the
6 category of persons of concern to Mr Koroma."

7 Why did you feel that was necessary?

8 A. Because we never do things in isolation. Never. You will
9 be left out there and I - even though I was charged with a
16:18:19 10 responsibility by ECOWAS, but I had to keep everybody informed,
11 okay. Koroma's concern is, "What's going to happen to my
12 people?" And I am trying to tell him, no, everybody is included.
13 Now this kind of conversation will be repeated. So I have to now
14 spread the word, and get the concurrence because don't let's

16:18:39 15 forget now, who is Obasanjo now? Obasanjo takes over now as the
16 new chairman. So it's important for --

17 Q. Chairman of what?

18 A. Of ECOWAS. Of ECOWAS. So it's important now to inform
19 him, and the outgoing chairman who was instrumental in getting
16:18:58 20 this agreement together, to get them on board, and they would
21 help to spread the word and once we agreed that this was the
22 method that we could use to appease Koroma and get his concerns
23 allayed, I think this is what I am doing here. I can't do it
24 alone.

16:19:18 25 Q. Yes:

26 "Johnny Paul Koroma has expressed a desire to travel to
27 Lome to meet with Mr Foday Sankoh so as to establish that there
28 is unity within the ranks."

29 Can we pause there. Now, as far as you are aware,

1 Mr Taylor, had there been prior contact with between Sankoh and
2 Johnny Paul Koroma?

3 A. No, no. As far as I am aware I am not aware of that, no.

4 Q. For example - I want to explore that further. You
16:20:02 5 appreciate, of course, that on 25 February 1997, when the AFRC
6 took power through that coup, a request was sent out to the RUF
7 to join them?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you recall that a message was received from the then
16:20:22 10 incarcerated Foday Sankoh in Nigeria that they should?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. To your knowledge, following the communication of that
13 order by Foday Sankoh, was there any communication between Koroma
14 and him?

16:20:39 15 A. I really can't say. I have no knowledge. I really don't
16 know. We got to hear about the radio - the recording that was
17 played on the radio. I have no knowledge. I can't help.

18 Q. Now, Johnny Paul Koroma, what was he wanting to discuss
19 with Foday Sankoh?

16:20:58 20 A. All the problems, he said, about - we didn't let him go
21 though. But all of the problems, his incarceration, how the RUF
22 boys behind there treated him, their disrespect to him. He
23 wanted - and this anger in him, he felt that he wanted to meet
24 with Sankoh to thrash it out. But we assured him - I assured him
16:21:24 25 that Sankoh would be coming through and that could be taken care
26 of in Monrovia. Instead of him going all the way to Lome, that
27 he should wait in Monrovia.

28 This was just a way of holding him in Monrovia you know for
29 Sankoh to come, because just to add a little bit, not to take too

1 much of the Court's time, we are sitting on pins. We want Sankoh
2 to get out of Lome and come and go on to Freetown. So we didn't
3 want to start a new set of discussions in Lome that would prolong
4 this process. So we all agreed the best thing was no, no, no,
16:22:04 5 you can't go. He's coming, so you wait here for him. Because
6 that would have been another reason for Sankoh to delay being
7 outside of Freetown and we thought - and by "we" I am still
8 referring to the committee thought that the fastest way of
9 getting this agreement working was to get Sankoh back into
16:22:22 10 Freetown.

11 Q. Mr Taylor, can I just push you a little further on that.
12 What reason was Sankoh giving you Heads of State as to why he
13 wasn't hot footing it back to Freetown in the wake of that
14 agreement on 7 July?

16:22:40 15 A. Well, he had said, and some of us agreed, in fact Eyadema
16 agreed, he was in prison all this time, he had nothing, before he
17 goes back to meet the boys he needs a little something. So what
18 Presidents Eyadema and Obasanjo were trying to do, I think they
19 did end up putting together a little envelope for him.

16:23:05 20 Q. What do you mean by a little envelope?

21 A. Some money. They made some money available to him, buying
22 little clothes and having things together. He had not seen his
23 family, getting them to him. There were a lot of little things.
24 And he had a delegation with him in Lome. So they decided that
16:23:24 25 there was good reason not to delay too long, but to find him some
26 money. And I think they did. Eyadema did give him some money.

27 Q. Hold on a second, Mr Taylor. We are now in August, a month
28 after the agreement.

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. You don't need four months to do a bit of shopping in Lome.
2 So what was going on?

3 A. Well, to the best of our knowledge, these were some of the
4 things - the man is a free man now and of course we are using
16:23:53 5 some psychology to hurry him up. And as it goes, he still
6 doesn't come in August. He manages to go to a couple I think of
7 other countries. He is assisted by President Eyadema in getting
8 to these places with the hope that he can hurry up and get back,
9 you know, to Freetown. So he travels out. But his biggest thing
16:24:20 10 is that he wants to put his house in order and he is permitted to
11 do so.

12 Q. Very well. Going back to this note: "President Taylor
13 conveyed this to President Kabbah." Why?

14 A. Well, before Johnny Paul Koroma came to Liberia, like I
16:24:47 15 say, Kabbah knew and it's a part of this exchange of information.
16 Tejan Kabbah is not outside of the loop. As the elected
17 President of Sierra Leone that is recognised, we feel at that
18 particular point - surely I do - everything that is going on in
19 Sierra Leone he is informed, he is a part of it and it is done
16:25:14 20 with his acquiescence. Whether it had to do with moving Johnny
21 Paul Koroma out, moving him in, or whatever, even the desire for
22 Johnny Paul Koroma to travel, we felt that it would not be proper
23 to move Johnny Paul Koroma from Liberia and send him to Lome
24 without Kabbah knowing, because Kabbah is the President and we
16:25:35 25 recognise him.

26 Q. "During the telephone conversation which the two Presidents
27 had this evening, President Kabbah has no objection to Johnny
28 Paul Koroma's travel to Togo. President Taylor is making
29 arrangements accordingly."

1 So, hold on. So Kabbah was happy for Johnny Paul Koroma to
2 go to Togo?

3 A. Well, I wouldn't quite describe it that way. Kabbah had no
4 objections once it was in line of getting this process moving. I
16:26:14 5 will put it that way.

6 Q. Did Johnny Paul Koroma in due course go to Lome?

7 A. We found sufficient reason to have him wait for Foday
8 Sankoh in Monrovia.

9 Q. And just help us, so that we have an idea where we are
16:26:38 10 going, for how long did he remain in Monrovia?

11 A. Up until October 2. Sankoh comes in September, there are
12 all the meetings, I make peace between them, all of our
13 colleagues are happy about it and eventually I put the two of
14 them - along with Obasanjo, who helps, he sends a presidential
16:27:03 15 plane to Monrovia, Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma are put on a
16 Nigerian plane, Obasanjo sends money, \$25,000, to me for them,
17 they board a plane with the US ambassador, Sankoh and Johnny Paul
18 Koroma, and on October 2 they leave Monrovia. I charter a second
19 plane for their families and they fly into Freetown on or about
16:27:32 20 October 2, 1999. So he was there up until that time.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Now we will come to the next stage in events
22 tomorrow, if that's convenient, Mr President, although can I ask
23 that this document, code cable from Felix Downes-Thomas dated 7
24 August 1999 on the arrival of Johnny Paul Koroma in Liberia, be
16:27:59 25 marked for identification MFI-97, please.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-97.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: And would that be a convenient point,
28 Mr President?

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that's a convenient time. We will

1 adjourn now until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

2 Again, Mr Taylor, I remind you that you are ordered not to
3 speak about your evidence with any other person.

4 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honour.

16:28:28 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: We will adjourn now. Thank you.

6 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.
7 to be reconvened on Thursday, 13 August 2009 at
8 9.30 a.m.]

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WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR | 26545 |
| EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS | 26545 |