



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 30 JULY 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

---

**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Mr William Romans  
Mr Lionel Nichols

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Thursday, 30 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:24:40 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. Appearances, please.

6 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,  
7 opposing counsel. For the Prosecution this morning, Mohamed A  
8 Bangura, myself Brenda J Hollis and our case manager Maja  
9 Dimitrova. We are also joined this morning by our legal intern,  
09:32:12 10 Nargess Tavassolian.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,  
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself Courtenay  
14 Griffiths assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah, Silas  
09:32:33 15 Chekera and with us still is Ms Priyanka Reddy.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, I'll remind you again that  
17 you're bound by your declaration to tell the truth. Yes,  
18 Mr Griffiths, please continue.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours.

09:32:51 20 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

21 [On former affirmation]

22 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

23 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday afternoon when we adjourned we were  
24 dealing with February of 1998. Do you recall that?

09:33:05 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. And do you recall that I asked you what you stood to gain  
27 in February 1998 after the ECOMOG intervention by allying  
28 yourself with the AFRC. Do you recall that?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. And remind us, what did you stand to gain?

2 A. Nothing. Absolutely nothing.

3 Q. Now help us, when they were kicked out of power by ECOMOG,  
4 what did they control?

09:33:42 5 A. They had controlled the capital and they had what they term  
6 a government.

7 Q. But after they had been kicked out of the capital, what  
8 then did they control?

9 A. Well, speaking generally, I can just say in actual fact  
09:34:08 10 they really controlled nothing but they did retreat to the bushes  
11 really.

12 Q. Yes. So help us, what could they provide you with which  
13 was of use or assistance to you?

14 A. Absolutely nothing.

09:34:24 15 Q. Now help us with this, Mr Taylor: We know from the  
16 Prosecution's opening and from the dates listed in their  
17 indictment that the high point of the orgy of violence which  
18 afflicted Sierra Leone began with the ECOMOG intervention in  
19 February of 1998 which lasted through until January 1999. Now  
09:34:53 20 help us, let us deal with this matter right at the outset. What  
21 did you stand to gain by encouraging, inciting, aiding and  
22 abetting - any of the modes of liability suggested. What did you  
23 stand to gain from encouraging either the AFRC recently kicked  
24 out of power or the RUF from embarking on such a course of  
09:35:21 25 action?

26 A. Absolutely nothing. Everything to lose.

27 Q. Well, help us, Mr Taylor, because we are looking at the  
28 core of the allegations here. 1998 to 1999, can you think of any  
29 rational or logical reason why during that period you would be

1 behaving in the way alleged by the Prosecution?

2 A. There's absolutely none, rational, logical, nothing.

3 Q. Please take your time and think about it, Mr Taylor. What  
4 did you stand to gain?

09:36:07 5 A. Absolutely nothing. Here I am, just been elected as  
6 President of my country, wanting to move my people forward,  
7 engaging at all levels, ECOWAS, the OAU, the United Nations, even  
8 with the type of budget that has been shown to this Court of  
9 about \$41 million, we are making sure we are at all of the  
09:36:38 10 meetings, all of the discussions, complete acquiescence. What -  
11 there is absolutely nothing. Everything to lose.

12 I do not understand except where maybe Taylor just became a  
13 marked man. There is absolutely - it beats me how this whole  
14 thing has ballooned into this whole set of irrational arguments  
09:37:14 15 about terrorising people and going in for the wealth of the  
16 country. It really - all I can say, if Taylor was a marked man,  
17 well, you got Taylor. But there's nothing - nothing on this  
18 planet that any sound leader - and I know I'm sound - would have  
19 pursued at that time except peace in his country, peace with his  
09:37:39 20 neighbours, moving his country forward from a period of war to a  
21 period of peace and prosperity. Nothing I had to gain from this  
22 process. Absolutely nothing. Everything to lose.

23 Q. Well, help us with this: What did you stand to lose?

24 A. I would not build my country. Everything that I fought to  
09:38:06 25 do or planned to do from a young man wanting to help my people, I  
26 went through struggles to educate myself, I never was on any  
27 government scholarships, I went to the United States and I worked  
28 in factories to get my education and while in the United States  
29 it's been stated in this Court the Union of Liberian Associations

1 we put it together. Everybody that I tried to build throughout  
2 my young life coming on into adulthood, everything I had to lose.  
3 Everything. I had demonstrated on the streets. I had gone to  
4 Liberia to speak to President Tolbert about changes in democracy.  
09:38:54 5 Everything that I set out to do in my life as a Liberian, as a  
6 pan-Africanist, I had to lose. Everything.

7 Q. Now, did the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998 have any  
8 consequences for Liberia?

9 A. Well in terms of the action on the part of ECOMOG as the  
09:39:25 10 intervention goes, I do not want to give any impression here that  
11 Nigeria was - and the community were wrong for intervening. I do  
12 not want that impression left at all. The issues were making  
13 sure that we did it under the proper auspices of the United  
14 Nations. So as far as the intervention goes, except for the use  
09:40:04 15 of ex-combatants with the Kamajors I do not see any other real  
16 serious effect that it had on Liberia.

17 Q. Now you appreciate that the ECOMOG intervention had the  
18 impact of removing the AFRC and their allies, the RUF, from  
19 Freetown?

09:40:31 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Now so far as movement across the borders between the two  
22 countries were concerned, did anything happen as a result of that  
23 intervention?

24 A. Well after the intervention, you recall we did shut our  
09:40:54 25 borders and we did have some observers on that border of UN and  
26 ECOMOG people along strategic points of the border.

27 Q. Now prior to this intervention, were there any refugee  
28 camps in Liberia?

29 A. Oh, yes. I would say anywhere up to about 100,000 or more

1 Sierra Leoneans were still in refugee camps in Liberia. Yeah,  
2 there were large quantities of Sierra Leoneans.

3 Q. This is in February 1998?

4 A. Oh, yes.

09:41:36 5 Q. And after the ECOMOG intervention, did those numbers remain  
6 the same?

7 A. No.

8 Q. What happened?

9 A. After President Kabbah returned, the three countries,  
09:41:49 10 Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, started a process of trying to  
11 move people. There were some reductions as we went on, but  
12 people did move back. In fact, Liberians in Sierra Leone. You  
13 know, it's a funny war and the Court must understand there were  
14 Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, but there were also Liberian  
09:42:12 15 refugees in Sierra Leone, even though, you know, you wonder how  
16 this is happening, and there are Sierra Leonean and Liberian  
17 refugees in Guinea, okay? So you wonder why Sierra Leoneans will  
18 flee from Sierra Leone to Liberia for protection and Liberians  
19 are at the same time fleeing to Sierra Leone for protection.

09:42:29 20 It's a funny thing, but there are refugees in the three countries  
21 and beyond, Ghana and all.

22 Q. And help us, were you able to cope with the Sierra Leonean  
23 refugees in Liberia?

24 A. Yes, to the best of our ability we did. With the  
09:42:47 25 assistance of international organisations, the World Food  
26 Programme, you had I think Oxfam and you had Medecins Sans  
27 Frontieres and another famous one Save the Children. There were  
28 many international organisations operating to help in the field  
29 of - in the medical area, food distribution. There were these

1 assistances, so we as a government did not have to shoulder any  
2 serious responsibility at that particular time.

3 Q. Now yesterday, Mr Taylor, I asked you about - and you told  
4 us about - a publication you had received from the Nigerian  
09:43:40 5 embassy in Monrovia. Do you recall that?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: I would now like, please, unless there is  
8 objection, to look at the document behind divider 10 in volume 1  
9 of 3.

09:44:26 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Ms Hollis, was this the document you  
11 objected to yesterday on the basis that you hadn't had time to  
12 consider it?

13 MS HOLLIS: No, Mr President, that was a different  
14 document.

09:44:37 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Okay, thank you.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm looking at the document behind divider 9  
17 in volume 1. It's the same document.

18 MS HOLLIS: I'm sorry I thought I heard 10, not 9.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: If I said 10 then I was in error. It is  
09:44:55 20 behind divider 9.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think this is the one that you did  
22 object to, Ms Hollis, now that we have the correct reference.

23 MS HOLLIS: That is correct and, as promised, we looked at  
24 it last night and we have no objection.

09:45:24 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you for that, Ms Hollis. Yes,  
26 please go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

28 Q. Mr Taylor, is this the document you were telling us about?

29 A. This is the document.

1 Q. Now, as we see from the frontispiece, this is a Nigerian  
2 newsletter bearing the crest of the embassy of Nigeria, Monrovia,  
3 Liberia, volume 1, number 5, February 1998, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

09:45:55 5 Q. And if we go to the table of content on the second page,  
6 you'll see that item number 1 is "ECOMOG terminates rule of the  
7 military junta in Sierra Leone", yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Item number 2 is "Communique of the 9th meeting of  
09:46:22 10 ministers of foreign affairs of the Committee of Five on  
11 Sierra Leone in Addis Ababa, 25-27 February 1998." Do you see  
12 that?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. Now, do you recall telling us about such a meeting which  
09:46:36 15 took place in which month?

16 A. This occurred in February, I said, on the margin of the OAU  
17 foreign ministers meeting. This is the meeting.

18 Q. And then we see listed at item 3 "African foreign ministers  
19 resolve to maintain OAU and UN mechanisms for the management of  
09:47:00 20 conflict in Africa", yes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And then there are one or two unimportant items before the  
23 most important item, item 11, the Reggae Boys of Jamaica draw 2-2  
24 with Nigeria. Do you see that?

09:47:20 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. A country of 3 million people drawing with a country of 60  
27 million, Mr Anyah, who happens to be Nigerian. Now let's go,  
28 please, over the page to page 2. Now, this is the first item:  
29 "ECOMOG terminates rule of the military junta in



1 Sierra Leone:

2 The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring  
3 Group recorded another significant military feat when it  
4 successfully dislodged the Major Johnny Paul Koroma led military  
09:48:06 5 junta in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on February 12, 1998."

6 I note that in passing their date is different from the  
7 date we've judicially recognised of the 14th:

8 "In a well conceived and carefully executed military  
9 operation code named 'Operation Sandstorm', the regional military  
09:48:30 10 intervention force overwhelmed forces of the rebel regime and  
11 their collaborators which had illegally entrenched themselves in  
12 power for about nine months in Freetown. It should be recalled  
13 that on May 25, 1997, the democratically elected government of  
14 President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was overthrown in a coup d'etat by  
09:48:59 15 rebel officers of the Sierra Leonean army in collaboration with  
16 the Revolutionary United Front. The coup was widely regarded as  
17 a set back for the forces of democracy, the rule of law, peace  
18 and stability in the sub-region. It was universally condemned by  
19 the international community and all international organisations,  
09:49:20 20 including ECOWAS, the OAU and the United Nations.

21 In addition to these condemnation, ECOWAS embarked on  
22 concrete measures to restore constitutional rule in Sierra Leone.  
23 A Committee of Five countries consisting of Nigeria, Cote  
24 d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Liberia was immediately set up and  
09:49:44 25 charged with the responsibility to monitor developments in  
26 Sierra Leone and explore ways and means of restoring  
27 constitutional rule in the country. In this connection, the  
28 Conakry agreement was concluded ..."

29 That was the meeting on 20 October 1997, is that right,

1 Mr Taylor?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. "... and a series of meetings were held in Abidjan, Abuja,  
4 Conakry and New York to find and work out a mutually agreeable  
09:50:20 5 plan for ending the impasse."

6 New York, when was that meeting?

7 A. Well, there were two meetings now. One was early February  
8 and one immediately following the 27 February meeting, where the  
9 foreign ministers of the Committee of Five went for the second  
09:50:44 10 time round about 27/28 February.

11 Q. I'm grateful:

12 "... to find and work out a mutually agreeable plan for  
13 ending the impasse. However, while ECOWAS peacemakers approached  
14 their difficult task with tact, patience and good faith it became  
09:51:03 15 apparent that the rebels were more interested in clinging to  
16 power and not interested in any negotiated settlement. For  
17 instance, this became apparent when during a peace meeting in  
18 Abidjan in July 1997 the junta suddenly announced a four year  
19 programme for its stay in power."

09:51:26 20 Now we dealt with that, did we not?

21 A. Yes, we did.

22 Q. "Thus the summit of the authority of ECOWAS held in Abuja  
23 in August 1997, the Head of State of the sub-regional  
24 organisation ..." - well, it should be the Heads of State of the  
09:51:42 25 sub-regional organisation, "... were compelled to impose economic  
26 and arms embargo on the illegal regime in the face of its  
27 continued intransigence. This was to be reinforced by the  
28 Security Council resolution 1132 which imposed embargo on the  
29 importation of oil, arms and other travel restriction on the

1 junta, their families and collaborators.

2 In spite of the above measures which were meant to enable  
3 the junta to see the futility of their actions and retrace their  
4 steps, they continued to build up their war arsenal and recruit  
09:52:22 5 mercenaries from all parts of the world in preparation for war  
6 against the West African peacekeeping force. However, ECOWAS  
7 still left the doors for peaceful negotiations wide open. The  
8 peace agreement signed in Conakry, Guinea on October 22, 1997,  
9 between foreign ministers of the Committee of Five on  
09:52:48 10 Sierra Leone and representatives of the junta which was designed  
11 to end the crisis, consisted of ..."

12 Pause there. That meeting in Guinea on October 22,  
13 Mr Taylor, did it merely involve representatives from the  
14 Committee of Five?

09:53:10 15 A. To the best of my knowledge it would have also included an  
16 observer from even Sierra Leone.

17 Q. "Consisted of:

18 (i) immediate cessation of hostilities throughout the  
19 length and breadth of Sierra Leone.

09:53:28 20 (ii) commencement of humanitarian assistance to displaced  
21 persons and other victims of the civil strife with effect from  
22 mid November 1997.

23 (iii) disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of  
24 combatants with effect from 1-31 December 1997.

09:53:52 25 (iv) return of displaced persons with effect from 1  
26 December 1997.

27 (v) restoration of the constitutional government of  
28 President Tejan Kabbah and broadening of the power base with  
29 effect from April 22, 1998.

1 (vi) immunities and guarantees with effect from the  
2 restoration of constitutional government, that is, from April 22,  
3 1998.

4 Regrettably, later developments conclusively showed that  
09:54:31 5 the rebels never had any serious intention of abiding by this or  
6 other agreements. In their statements and actions they never  
7 concealed their disdain for the agreements they had freely  
8 entered into. They indeed deliberately delayed the whole peace  
9 process by introducing extraneous arguments questioning ECOMOG's  
09:54:56 10 right to disarm members of the Sierra Leonean army as an  
11 infringement of sovereignty. They further demanded the reduction  
12 of Nigerian participation in ECOMOG and considered her presence  
13 as overbearing. While they continued with these diversionary  
14 tactics, they continued their military build-up in preparation  
09:55:22 15 for confrontation with ECOMOG."

16 Pause there. Mr Taylor, do you know anything about that  
17 military build-up within Sierra Leone by the AFRC junta regime?

18 A. No, I have no knowledge of that build-up except from  
19 briefings from the ECOMOG command to various Heads of State at  
09:55:52 20 the time.

21 Q. And what was the contents of such briefings?

22 A. It's basically what he said here, that they appeared to be  
23 - you know, to be making arrangements for arms to come into the  
24 country and that they are showing no efforts to abide by the  
09:56:13 25 April deadline.

26 Q. Now, do you recall hearing evidence in this Court about a  
27 shipment of arms which entered Sierra Leone during that period in  
28 1997 by air into Magburaka?

29 A. Yes, I do. I did hear it.

1 Q. And do you recall that there was one delivery made which  
2 was followed by Alpha Jets bombing the airfield in Magburaka and  
3 a second proposed shipment was consequently aborted? Do you  
4 recall hearing that evidence?

09:57:02 5 A. Yes, I did hear that.

6 Q. Now help us. Do you know anything at all about the  
7 arrangements made for those shipments, Mr Taylor?

8 A. Nothing whatsoever.

9 Q. During the briefings you received as a member of the  
09:57:15 10 Committee of Five, did you receive information about that  
11 shipment into Magburaka?

12 A. We did receive briefings that arms were being brought into  
13 the country. We did get to know about the landing of that plane  
14 at Magburaka. We also got to know that there were other

09:57:40 15 attempts, but it had been thwarted. And so we knew. We knew.

16 Q. Let's go back:

17 "This was the situation when the rebels attacked ECOMOG  
18 positions early on 5 February and in what a Nigerian defence  
19 spokesman described as 'a defensive-offensive action', ECOMOG was  
09:58:03 20 compelled to respond and commence the operation that finally  
21 dislodged the rebels. Meanwhile, at its eighth meeting in  
22 New York on February 5-6, foreign ministers of the ECOWAS  
23 Committee of Five reaffirmed their faith in the three options in  
24 the Conakry agreement as the best framework for resolving the  
09:58:30 25 crisis and restoring President Kabbah's constitutional  
26 government."

27 Pause. That meeting in New York, February 5 to 6, is that  
28 the meeting you told us about, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, that immediately starting the beginning of the crisis

1 when questions arose and those countries that had interests in  
2 Sierra Leone started querying the right of ECOMOG to begin this  
3 operation in Sierra Leone, the Committee of Five dispatched -  
4 this is the first meeting that I talked about with the Security  
09:59:07 5 Council where we dispatched all of our foreign ministers to  
6 New York immediately to explain what was going on.

7 Q. Right. So now we have a firm date on which to fix that in  
8 terms of our overall chronology?

9 A. Yes.

09:59:24 10 Q. That's 5 to 6 February 1998?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. "The options are: Pursuit of dialogue; imposition of  
13 sanctions or embargo and; the possible use of force.

14 Without detracting from the role of ECOMOG in terminating  
09:59:42 15 the rule of the junta, due tribute must also be paid to the brave  
16 Sierra Leonean people for their resilience and commitment to the  
17 enthronement of democracy in their fatherland. It is noteworthy  
18 that Sierra Leonean workers, students and market women  
19 courageously defied all odds to embark on civil disobedience  
10:00:07 20 throughout the rule of Major Johnny Paul Koroma. They must now  
21 heave a sigh of relief with justifiable pride in living to  
22 witness the dislodgement of the AFRC junta and the historic  
23 return of President Kabbah back to power. Indeed, President  
24 Kabbah's return (scheduled for March 10, 1998) marks a new era of  
10:00:35 25 hope and peace in Sierra Leone and the sub-region and a final  
26 rebuff for anti-democratic forces."

27 Pause there. Mr Taylor, were you opposed to the return of  
28 Tejan Kabbah?

29 A. No, not at all. Not at all.

1 Q. Tell me, did you have anything to lose from him returning?

2 A. Nothing whatsoever.

3 Q. "We sincerely hope that all international organisations,

4 NGOs and humanitarian bodies will join hands with President

10:01:09 5 Kabbah's government in its onerous task of reconciliation,

6 reconstruction and rehabilitation. We believe that this is the

7 only way to ensure continued peace and stability in the West

8 African sub-region. We also join men of goodwill everywhere in

9 congratulating the gallant men of ECOMOG for their remarkable

10:01:35 10 courage and historic achievement."

11 Let us pause. Mr Taylor, were you pleased to see the end

12 of the junta in Sierra Leone?

13 A. Definitely.

14 Q. Why?

10:01:48 15 A. Because if they - if we had to maintain the rule of law and

16 democracy in West Africa and abide by what had been decided that

17 military coup d'etats would not be tolerated we had to take a

18 stand to making sure that that particular junta did not remain in

19 power.

10:02:14 20 Q. Let us now go, please, to the second document over the page

21 at page 6. We see that this is a communique of the ninth meeting

22 of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Committee of Five on

23 Sierra Leone in Addis Ababa, 25 and 27 February 1998:

24 "While in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to attend the OAU annual

10:02:58 25 ministerial meeting the foreign ministers of the ECOWAS Committee

26 of Five on Sierra Leone met on 25 and 27 February, 1998."

27 Mr Taylor, is this the meeting you told us about earlier?

28 A. Yes, this was the meeting.

29 Q. "The meeting was mainly to review the situation in

1 Sierra Leone against the background of recent developments in  
2 that country following the liberation of Freetown, its environs  
3 and the ousting of the illegal regime. As the restoration of the  
4 democratically elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah  
10:03:40 5 in Freetown on 10 March 1998 looks certain we commend the  
6 gallantry of the Nigeria-led ECOMOG task force and its commander  
7 Colonel Maxwell Khobe for their exemplary and professional  
8 performance in ensuring that the initiative of our West African  
9 leaders became a resounding success. We reproduce below the  
10:04:05 10 communique of the ECOWAS ministerial meeting of the Committee of  
11 Five on Sierra Leone held in Addis Ababa on 25 and 27 February  
12 1998."

13 When we go over the page we see:

14 "Economic Community of West African States, Ninth Meeting  
10:04:25 15 of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on  
16 Sierra Leone, Addis Ababa, 25 and 27 February 1998, Communique.

17 The Economic Community of West African States, ministerial  
18 Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, held its ninth meeting in  
19 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 and 27 February 1998. All members of  
10:04:57 20 the committee were present."

21 And we see that the Republic of Liberia was represented,  
22 don't we, Mr Taylor?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. "Attending as observers were the Republic of Sierra Leone,  
10:05:09 25 represented by its minister of foreign affairs and the special  
26 envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General to Sierra Leone.  
27 The ministers considered the report of the chairman of the  
28 Committee of Five on the fact-finding visit to Freetown and its  
29 environs undertaken upon the instructions of the chairman of



1 ECOWAS, His Excellency General Sani Abacha, in the company of the  
2 executive secretary of ECOWAS following the liberation of the  
3 city."

10:05:54 4 Now, were you aware that such an investigatory visit had  
5 been undertaken, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "They also considered the report of the ECOMOG force  
8 commander on the situation in Sierra Leone. The ministers  
9 commended the two reports and noted that they were clear, frank  
10:06:09 10 and useful. The ministers reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone  
11 against the background of these reports and the recent  
12 developments in that country following the liberation of  
13 Freetown, its environs and a substantial part of the country as  
14 well as the ouster of the illegal regime. They welcomed the  
10:06:32 15 return of normalcy to Freetown and its environs. The ministers  
16 noted that the recent military operations in Freetown were  
17 triggered by the unprovoked attacks on ECOMOG positions which  
18 reached a climax on 5 February 1998."

19 Do you recall telling us about an attack on Lungi Airport,  
10:06:56 20 Mr Taylor?

21 A. Yes, I said it.

22 Q. And who was in control of Lungi Airport at the time?

23 A. ECOMOG.

24 Q. "In the circumstances, ECOMOG had no option but to defend  
10:07:09 25 itself in accordance with international rules of engagement for  
26 peacekeeping operations. They also noted with satisfaction that  
27 these military operations in Freetown resulted in minimum loss of  
28 life and property. In this connection they commended ECOMOG and  
29 its high command for their bravery, gallantry and

1 professionalism.

2 The ministers realised the need for ECOMOG's capacity to be  
3 considerably enhanced to enable it effectively and successfully  
4 carry out its mandate in Sierra Leone. In this regard, they  
10:07:50 5 noted that Nigeria and Guinea have recently deployed additional  
6 troops to ECOMOG's operation in Sierra Leone. They called on  
7 those ECOWAS member states that have pledged troops for the  
8 operations in Sierra Leone to urgently dispatch such troops.

9 They also called for the early deployment of a United Nations  
10:08:12 10 military observer mission in Sierra Leone, alongside the ECOMOG.

11 The ministers noted that the ECOMOG high command has  
12 produced a comprehensive list of ECOMOG's personnel and logistic  
13 requirements in order to effectively carry out its operations in  
14 Sierra Leone. They called on members of the international  
10:08:35 15 community to urgently provide the needed assistance and logistic  
16 support on the basis of the list.

17 The ministers noted that ECOMOG is presently holding a  
18 number of military and civilian detainees arising from its  
19 operations in Sierra Leone, including some senior members of the  
10:08:59 20 ousted junta. They also noted with satisfaction that these  
21 detainees are well looked after and have actually been visited by  
22 the International Committee of the Red Cross.

23 The ministers affirmed the need for the early return of  
24 President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to Sierra Leone in an atmosphere of  
10:09:23 25 guaranteed safety and dignity. In this connection, they  
26 requested the chairman of ECOWAS and Heads of State and  
27 government of ECOWAS member states; the chairman of OAU and the  
28 chairman of Africa's subregional organisations; the  
29 United Nations and other members of the international community;

1 to participate in the formal ceremony to mark President Tejan  
2 Kabbah's return to Sierra Leone on 10 March 1998.

3 The ministers called on all Sierra Leoneans to heed the  
4 call for national reconciliation. They particularly called on  
10:10:01 5 all combatants to lay down their arms and join the process of  
6 national reconstruction and development in order to ensure a  
7 speedy return of peace and security to the entire country.

8 The ministers expressed the view that the Abidjan agreement  
9 of 30 November, 1996 and the Conakry peace plan of 23 October,  
10:10:28 10 1997 contain elements for the attainment of peace, stability and  
11 national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. They reviewed the  
12 Conakry peace plan against the background of recent developments  
13 and its three objectives, namely:

- 14 - the early reinstatement of the legitimate government of  
10:10:52 15 President Tejan Kabbah;  
16 - the return of peace and security; and  
17 - the resolution of the issue of refugees and displaced  
18 persons.

19 They noted that the objective of ECOWAS, OAU and UN for the  
10:11:07 20 restoration of constitutional order and the reinstatement of the  
21 legitimate government would be accomplished with the return of  
22 President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to Sierra Leone. They also  
23 expressed their readiness to cooperate with the government of  
24 President Tejan Kabbah in the realisation of these objectives.

10:11:25 25 They also noted that ECOMOG will continue to play a major role in  
26 the restoration of peace and security to the country in the  
27 immediate future.

28 The ministers noted that the crisis in Sierra Leone brought  
29 great suffering and hardship upon the people of that country and

1 created colonies of refugees in ECOWAS member states particularly  
2 in the neighbouring countries."

3 Pause there. That's what we were talking about earlier,  
4 yes, Mr Taylor?

10:11:58 5 A. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. "They also noted that the ECOWAS secretariat in  
7 collaboration with the United Nations and ECOMOG has established  
8 a framework for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. They  
9 called on the international community to urgently provide the  
10:12:17 10 needed humanitarian and relief assistance through the established  
11 framework.

12 The ministers decided to brief the chairman of ECOWAS, the  
13 UN Secretary-General and the Security Council on the outcome of  
14 their deliberations."

10:12:33 15 Pause there. That's the second visit to New York by the  
16 foreign ministers, yes, Mr Taylor?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. "The ministers expressed their profound appreciation to  
19 the government and people of the Federal Democratic Republic of  
10:12:50 20 Ethiopia, the Secretary-General of the OAU and the executive  
21 secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa for their  
22 hospitality ...", and so on.

23 Now, this is dated 27 February 2008.

24 A. 1998.

10:13:10 25 Q. 1998, sorry. Now, can we move to the next document. This  
26 document is headed "African Foreign Ministers Resolve to Maintain  
27 OAU and UN Mechanisms for the Management of Conflicts in Africa":

28 "The annual OAU ministerial meeting was held as usual in  
29 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 and 27 February 1998."

1           So, Mr Taylor, this is right, is it not? There were two  
2 meetings going on in Addis Ababa at that time, is that right?"

3       A.     Yes, this is what I meant when I said the Committee of Five  
4 meeting was held on the margin of this meeting.

10:14:17 5       Q.     Right:

6           "One of the agenda items was the report of the  
7 Secretary-General on the various initiatives aimed at enhancing  
8 Africa's capacity in the area of peace support operation.

9           After considering the Secretary-General's report, the  
10:14:39 10 ministers resolved that the existing mechanisms for conflict  
11 prevention, management and resolution within the OAU and the UN  
12 charters should remain the platforms for enhancing Africa's  
13 capacity in resolving intra-African conflicts as well as  
14 maintaining peace, security and the stability of the continent.

10:15:07 15          This position was a clear indication of the determination of  
16 Africans to take charge of their destiny, as well as preserve the  
17 unity and cohesion of the continent in the face of divisive  
18 foreign inspired initiatives.

19          Published hereunder is the unedited intervention of the  
10:15:30 20 Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of  
21 Nigeria, Chief Tom Ikimi."

22          Now we've encountered Mr Ikimi before, haven't we,  
23 Mr Taylor?

24       A.     Yes.

10:15:42 25       Q.     We encountered him first of all at the chiefs of staff  
26 meeting in Abuja in August of 1997?

27       A.     Yes.

28       Q.     Now, let us - and was he still the foreign minister for the  
29 Republic of Nigeria in February 1998?

1 A. He was, yes, and also chairman of the Committee of Five  
2 foreign ministers.

3 Q. And we see when we go over the page at page 11 that this is  
4 headed "Intervention by the Honourable Minister of Foreign  
10:16:24 5 Affairs Chief Tom Ikimi on the Various Initiatives from Outside  
6 Africa to Enhance Africa's Capacity for Peace Support  
7 Operations":

8 "Mr Chairman, I thank you for giving me the floor on this  
9 important agenda item dealing with the report of the  
10:16:43 10 Secretary-General on the various initiatives aimed at enhancing  
11 Africa's capacity in the area of peace support operation.

12 This item covers an issue that has generated a lot of  
13 passion and emotion as a result of the numerous initiatives  
14 emanating from various sources outside the African continent.

10:17:04 15 Indeed since the establishment of the central organ of the OAU  
16 mechanism for the prevention management and resolution of  
17 conflict in Cairo in 1993, there has been a sudden proliferation  
18 of initiatives from various countries outside Africa in a most  
19 uncoordinated manner.

10:17:28 20 For a long time before the establishment of the central  
21 organ, several countries outside the continent pursued  
22 interventionist policies for the exclusive protection of their  
23 interests, so much so that at the height of the Cold War there  
24 appeared to be a new scramble for Africa.

10:17:49 25 However, many African countries believed that the end of  
26 the Cold War would bring peace dividends that would reallocate  
27 resources from destructive conflicts to socioeconomic and  
28 political development of our countries.

29 This has unfortunately turned out not to be the case.

1 Today, our continent is plagued with more conflicts than ever  
2 before and as we struggle to find African solutions to African  
3 problems, we have discovered to our dismay that there is an  
4 increasing reluctance on the part of the major powers to get more  
10:18:29 5 involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa. They, in fact, do  
6 not want their soldiers to die in Africa.

7 It is significant to recall that thousands of Africans have  
8 lost their lives in many non-African wars and conflicts in  
9 various parts of the world. They laid down their lives defending  
10:18:58 10 not African, but extra-African interests. At the end of the  
11 Second World War, Africa's contribution to the allied victory was  
12 conveniently ignored. The victorious powers proceeded to  
13 establish an international system designed to protect their own  
14 interests. Africa, completely marginalised, had to wage years of  
10:19:27 15 armed struggle for freedom and total liberation from colonialism,  
16 racism and apartheid. The United Nations organisation which was  
17 established at the end of the Second World War was designed to  
18 protect succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The  
19 Security Council was charged with the primary responsibility for  
10:19:54 20 the maintenance of international peace and security.

21 Today, as the voluminous report of the Secretary-General on  
22 this issue points out, the United Nations Security Council  
23 appears to be making exceptions when it comes to conflict  
24 situations in Africa. This is the reason why we should always  
10:20:17 25 reaffirm Africa's determination to assume its responsibility for  
26 the peace, security and stability of the continent within the  
27 framework of the provision of the charters of the United Nations  
28 and of the OAU.

29 Mr Chairman, it is a matter of concern that every time

1 Africa succeeds in formulating a common position on any critical  
2 issue, our external friends always manage to come up with an  
3 alternative solution. This has become a pattern on political,  
4 economic or social issues.

10:21:01 5 When the priority of the OAU was focused on the liberation  
6 of the continent from colonialism, racism and apartheid, they  
7 came up with a formula for human rights and democratisation.  
8 When we moved on to economic liberation, they came up with  
9 structural adjustment, liberalisation and globalisation. Now  
10:21:25 10 that we have succeeded in establishing a continental mechanism  
11 for conflict prevention, management and resolution, we are being  
12 confronted with a proliferation of uncoordinated initiatives  
13 ostensibly designed to enhance our capacities in peace support  
14 operations."

10:21:49 15 Mr Taylor, can we pause there. What do you think about  
16 those sentiments?

17 A. Well, I think if we put the whole thing in context I think  
18 it would help better. I went through this the other day in some  
19 detail. This document expresses the outrage and anger on the  
10:22:14 20 part of all of us. This is not just --

21 Q. All of us who?

22 A. West African states. Tom Ikimi - because this Committee of  
23 Five while it is in operation is representing ECOWAS. This is  
24 the extent of our frustration with this whole process that I had  
10:22:35 25 explain to this Court and Tom is referring to the British that  
26 must take some responsibility for this prolonged war in  
27 Sierra Leone. That's the frustration and this is why this  
28 operation had to take place in February anyway. We were all just  
29 fed up. They kept putting up blockages here and there. We were



1 all frustrated.

2 You must look at this whole document in the context of the  
3 frustration on all of our parts that whenever we did something  
4 positive - and let me point out before going any further. The

10:23:11 5 previous document, just to help the Court, item 10 on that  
6 document where certain arrests had been made. At this meeting -  
7 in fact before we go to Addis Ababa, some of the arrests that had  
8 been made of junta members and others included Liberians. And it  
9 had been clear to us at that time and it had been cleared up in  
10:23:41 10 the meeting that these Liberians in fact were part of the Special  
11 Task Force that were working along with the junta.

12 So when you look at the indictment and how it continues to  
13 bring up Liberians when in fact ECOWAS member states themselves  
14 are not making this claim, it is strange and I just wanted to  
10:24:04 15 point that out before this document is passed over.

16 It doesn't come up then and it doesn't come up in Addis  
17 Ababa, okay, at all because we are all sure and we have been  
18 briefed by the chiefs of staff that those that were under arrest,  
19 they had investigated them and they were part of a group that had  
10:24:25 20 been used before, so how these Liberian fighters crept into this  
21 thing, I raise this for this point: That in the future as we  
22 tried to link me with, quote unquote, Liberian fighters that  
23 ECOWAS, the chiefs of staff, we are all aware by this time.

24 So back to this document. This is our general frustration  
10:24:46 25 of all of the roadblocks that are being put up into place and  
26 this is factual and what Ikimi does - and don't forget Ikimi as  
27 foreign minister for Nigeria was not speaking for himself, he was  
28 speaking for the chairman of ECOWAS and, as a result of that, was  
29 speaking for all of us. This is our frustration.

1 Q. "Within the United Nations system, Africa accounts for  
2 nearly one-third of its membership. The central organ is  
3 expected to evolve into a mechanism equivalent to the Security  
4 Council of the United Nations. This evolutionary process is  
10:25:33 5 being interrupted by interventionist and decisive policies of  
6 countries outside the continent. The naked pursuit of their own  
7 political and economic interests often ignores Africa's own  
8 interests. A new scramble for Africa appears to be underway."

9 Was that a sentiment you shared, Mr Taylor?

10:25:57 10 A. Definitely. Definitely.

11 Q. "Mr Chairman, at this council of ministers we have taken  
12 time to review conflict situations in various parts of our  
13 continent. The conflict in Somalia has for seven years defied  
14 our collective search for a viable solution. Our external  
10:26:18 15 friends who are now involved in providing these initiatives to  
16 enhance our capacity for peacekeeping operations, abandoned  
17 Somalia after the tragic loss of a few soldiers."

18 What's he talking about there, Mr Taylor?

19 A. He could be speaking about Black Hawk Down.

10:26:39 20 Q. Black Hawk Down?

21 A. The famous downing of American choppers in Somalia that led  
22 to the withdrawal of American forces.

23 Q. "This loss would have been avoided if they had paid  
24 appropriate attention to the complexities of the local situation  
10:27:02 25 in their training and preparations. It is important to  
26 underscore the fact that in the past 40 years many of Africa's  
27 existing military personnel have been trained in various military  
28 establishments outside the continent, from the United States to  
29 Russia, from the United Kingdom to France, from Germany to China,

1 from various countries in Eastern Europe, to many countries in  
2 the developing world. Many of our military personnel have  
3 distinguished themselves in these training programmes. Their  
4 counterparts in all these countries hold them in high esteem.

10:27:50 5 However, there is a clear difference between releasing  
6 cruise missiles from secure aircraft carriers designed to engage  
7 targets thousands of kilometres away and the art of guerrilla  
8 warfare in impenetrable jungles in African locations such as in  
9 Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Congo or Central African Republic. In  
10:28:16 10 some United Nations peacekeeping operations many African military  
11 personnel have distinguished themselves as force commanders.  
12 They did not undergo any special training for these assignments.

13 Mr Chairman, it is essential to recall that since 1995,  
14 both the council of members of the OAU and the assembly of Heads  
10:28:40 15 of State and government have pronounced themselves on the  
16 initiatives which have been launched by various non-African  
17 countries purporting to assist us in enhancing Africa's capacity  
18 in peace support operations. While noting the goodwill of the  
19 sponsors of these various initiatives, the OAU has always felt  
10:29:03 20 that the ownership of these initiatives should rest with Africans  
21 themselves.

22 At the seventh ordinary session of the central organ of the  
23 OAU mechanism for conflict prevention management and resolution  
24 held at ministerial level from 20 to 21 November 1997 here in  
10:29:24 25 Addis Ababa, the central organ emphasised the necessity for  
26 member states of the OAU to determine the parameters for the  
27 implementation of any initiative aimed at enhancing Africa's  
28 capacity in the area of peace support operation, bearing in mind  
29 the need to preserve the unity and cohesion of the continent in

1 this critical era. The central organ also underscored the need  
2 for inclusiveness in the implementation of any initiative to  
3 enable all OAU member states willing and able to participate in  
4 such initiatives to do so.

10:30:07 5 Mr Chairman, there are many questions left unanswered by  
6 these initiatives. In the last four years the United Nations  
7 have witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of  
8 peacekeeping operations worldwide. Many developing countries  
9 from Asia, Latin America and Africa have contributed thousands of  
10:30:28 10 troops to these peace support operations. I am now aware of any  
11 special training programmes that were organised for military  
12 police and civilian contingents involved in these operations.  
13 Indeed, the experiences in Somalia and in Bosnia have shown  
14 without any doubt that training of troops from even the most  
10:30:55 15 developed countries is no guarantee for success in peace support  
16 operations. We therefore need to examine with caution the  
17 intentions behind this sudden desire to train our troops and  
18 build our so-called capacity for peace support operations.

19 Mr Chairman, during the meeting of the central organ at  
10:31:16 20 ministerial level in November 1997, I had categorically stated  
21 that Nigeria had no objection whatsoever to any bilateral efforts  
22 between friendly nations. Indeed, as a country that has, since  
23 1960, contributed more than 250,000 troops to peacekeeping  
24 operations all over the world, Nigeria welcomes any attempt to  
10:31:45 25 help African countries develop their individual capacities for  
26 participation in peace support operations. As a further  
27 manifestation of our consistent commitment to the maintenance of  
28 international peace and security. Nigeria signed last week a  
29 memorandum of understanding with the UN headquarters in New York

1 for a standby arrangement for Nigerian military and police  
2 contingents that could be deployed for UN peacekeeping operations  
3 anywhere in the world.

4 Mr Chairman, we are however very concerned at the attempt  
10:32:23 5 to weaken our continental organisation and our collective efforts  
6 by drawing us into initiatives designed to divide us into  
7 Anglophone or Francophone peacekeepers."

8 What is he talking about there, Mr Taylor?

9 A. The French colonial groupings and the English colonial  
10:32:50 10 groupings in West Africa. That is for the French you would be  
11 looking at Senegal, La Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Benin, Togo. And  
12 for the Anglophone you would be looking at Nigeria, Ghana,  
13 Sierra Leone. Liberia was neither - it was never colonised so we  
14 were not part of those two blocks.

10:33:24 15 Q. "We believe that this will result in a repartitioning of  
16 Africa into spheres of influence and interest that are  
17 incompatible with the objectives of the OAU mechanism for  
18 prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa.  
19 Our organisation, after many years of hard work, has produced a  
10:33:47 20 viable framework which is truly capable of addressing conflicts  
21 in our continent. We have clearly gone beyond the search for new  
22 frameworks and initiatives. The OAU already has an initiative,  
23 the mechanism for the prevention management and resolution of  
24 conflicts. Our principal responsibility is to ensure that both  
10:34:11 25 at sub-regional and continental levels this mechanism is  
26 strengthened by all those countries who genuinely want to help us  
27 find solutions to our conflicts. Africa needs to examine its  
28 sub-regional structures for preventive diplomacy, conflict  
29 management and resolution. For example, ECOWAS and the West

1 African sub-region has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt  
2 its capacity to maintain peace, security and stability in the  
3 sub-region. Most of this was achieved without assistance or  
4 training from external sources. Other sub-regions like SADC have  
10:34:58 5 demonstrated similar determination and capacity.

6 I have no intention here to denigrate any attempt bilateral  
7 or multilateral to enhance the capability of any individual  
8 country in peace support operations. What I am trying to  
9 emphasise is the imperative necessity for Africa to take its  
10:35:21 10 destiny into its own hands.

11 Once again I like to refer this council to the last  
12 ministerial meeting of the central organ held here in Addis Ababa  
13 in November 1997 at which this matter was exhaustively discussed.  
14 In the conclusions of that meeting the ministers decided to take  
10:35:44 15 note of all the various initiatives.

16 On page 26 of the Secretary-general's report now under  
17 consideration I am quite surprised to find at paragraph 86 a  
18 proposal to this meeting that we should express appreciation to  
19 some foreign governments. It is the strong view of my delegation  
10:36:08 20 that this council should uphold the decision and language of the  
21 decision of the ministerial meeting of the central organ and  
22 continue to take note of the initiatives and also welcome the  
23 proposal of holding informal meetings of the peace support group.  
24 As usual, we should request our Secretary-General to continue to  
10:36:30 25 monitor closely the issue of the various initiatives.

26 Our collective position towards these initiatives should be  
27 a reaffirmation of the position already adopted in 1995 by the  
28 assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU. This  
29 stipulates that any initiative which claims to support Africa's

1 efforts at peace support operations must be implemented within  
2 the ambit of the existing OAU mechanism. Such initiatives must  
3 be transparent, inclusive and, above all, respond to the  
4 collective consensus of our leaders, our people and our  
10:37:11 5 organisation."

6 Mr Taylor, do you agree with the sentiments expressed in  
7 that address by Chief Tom Ikimi?

8 A. 100 per cent.

9 Q. Now, help us. We're now, as we see, at the end of February  
10:37:33 10 1998, yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Can we just pause for a moment at this point then,  
13 Mr Taylor, and take stock. The junta has been kicked out of  
14 Freetown, yes?

10:37:51 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. ECOMOG has been the decisive force in achieving that  
17 outcome, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. As we see from this speech from Tom Ikimi, West Africans  
10:38:07 20 are anxious to take credit for dealing with African problems in  
21 an African way; is that right?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And they are anxious to put an end to that history of  
24 foreign intervention in African affairs, is that right?

10:38:26 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. As expressed by British attempts to derail what ECOWAS was  
27 trying to do in Sierra Leone, do you agree?

28 A. I fully agree.

29 Q. So as far as you were concerned, Mr Taylor, did that move

1 by ECOWAS through ECOMOG in February mark a new era in West  
2 African affairs?

3 A. Yes, it did. It did.

10:39:06

4 Q. And this led in due course, did it not, to the return of  
5 President Tejan Kabbah?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now, where was Foday Sankoh at this time?

8 A. At this time Foday Sankoh is still held up in Nigeria.

10:39:28

9 Q. Now the removal of the junta, did that bring some peace to  
10 Sierra Leone?

11 A. Well not exactly, because problems continued over time.

12 The junta is removed, but we have to look back at the new issues  
13 that are coming up. We look back at the, what was it, November

14 1996 agreement between - I stand corrected, November or December,

10:40:02

15 I think it's around November, of the RUF and the government of  
16 President Kabbah, okay? Focus now comes on that agreement  
17 because we have conflict continuing.

18 The removal of the junta from Freetown after the break-up

19 of the junta there was still the problem of dealing with the RUF

10:40:31

20 and ECOWAS, the committee, concentrated now on the conflict as it  
21 continued relating not to the junta. The junta really - this

22 whole junta thing ended with the removal. And all of - all or

23 most of the subsequent activities as the committee looked at was

24 trying to implement that November agreement, which had called for

10:40:57

25 disarmament, demobilisation, all that kind of stuff. So the

26 concentration now is focused on making good on that agreement to

27 bring about stability in the country.

28 Q. Now in the second of the three documents we looked at in

29 this - behind this divider, you will recall that reference was



1 made to - this is at page 7, Mr Taylor.

2 A. Uh-huh.

3 Q. Reference was made to paragraph 2, "Attending as observers  
4 were the Republic of Sierra Leone represented by its minister for  
10:41:46 5 foreign affairs." Is that a representative of the junta, or is  
6 that a representative of the ousted Kabbah government?

7 A. The ousted Kabbah government.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, could I ask, please, that this  
9 document, a Nigerian newsletter, Volume 1, Number 5, February  
10:42:12 10 1998, be marked for identification, please, MFI-32.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked for  
12 identification MFI-32.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm most grateful:

14 Q. Now before we move on, Mr Taylor, is there anything else  
10:43:03 15 you would like to assist us with in relation to February 1998?

16 A. I have touched it, nothing really serious, that we put into  
17 focus what is explained there about individuals arrested during  
18 the time of the intervention. I just want to put up a marker  
19 there, because here we are and the intervention has occurred. By  
10:43:40 20 the way, the use of the 12th in that document is still not wrong.  
21 I think the agreed fact or judicially noticed fact is not even  
22 precise as to date, but it puts it within the vicinity of the  
23 14th, or 13th, and so it depends on what you look at. It is  
24 about that time. You know, different people may look at it as  
10:44:09 25 when the operations concluded.

26 Now, what I want to point out here is that here we are  
27 going throughout. As of August 1997, we are on the Committee of  
28 Five. We are working together. Throughout all of these meetings  
29 - and for those of us that were Heads of State, we all knew and

1 I liked Tom Ikimi. You know, Nigeria being the powerhouse of West  
2 Africa had a very outspoken foreign minister - Tom Ikimi was very  
3 outspoken - and he knew that whenever he spoke he spoke for his  
4 President.

10:44:58 5 There is not one of these nations, including Sierra Leone -  
6 and by Sierra Leone I mean the government of President Ahmad  
7 Tejan Kabbah. There is not one iota of evidence of their  
8 complaining that, "Well, let's get Liberia off this committee  
9 because we observe that Liberia is involved in mischief." There  
10:45:24 10 is none of this. We are all working together.

11 And even the point that I raised when after the  
12 intervention Liberians are arrested and investigated and it is  
13 found out that they are not connected to Liberia as per my  
14 government, that matter is never raised in any official document.  
10:45:47 15 It is discussed internally. It's never raised in any official  
16 document, because we all know that my government is not involved  
17 and those individuals that have been arrested are not sent by my  
18 government.

19 So I just wanted to conclude that we are up to February now  
10:46:06 20 and there is no - there's not one single iota of accusation  
21 against me at this particular time about Liberia's involvement  
22 before we move forward.

23 Q. Let's now move into March of 1998 then please, Mr Taylor,  
24 and I wonder if the witness could be shown the photograph behind  
10:46:40 25 divider 33 in volume 3 of 3. Mr Taylor, what do we see in this  
26 photograph?

27 A. These - maybe I could just point it out on the screen?

28 Q. Yes, if you don't mind changing places please.

29 A. The gentleman standing here is the Honourable Howard Jeter,

1 the deputy assistant secretary of state of the United States.

2 Q. Pause a moment. How do you spell his name?

3 A. I think it's J-I-T-T-E-R. Either J, or G. The gentleman  
4 standing here is the United States ambassador accredited near

10:48:53 5 Monrovia, Ambassador I just know Malan - I think it is M-A-L-A-N  
6 - and this is myself here.

7 Q. And we see in the bottom right-hand corner of the  
8 photograph a date. What date is that?

9 A. That's March of 1998.

10:49:18 10 Q. So 6 March 1998, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. So we're at the beginning of March now, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I ask that that photograph be marked  
10:49:36 15 for identification please, Mr President, MFI-33, a photograph of  
16 Mr Taylor greeting the US ambassador for Liberia and the  
17 assistant secretary of state for African affairs on 6 March 1998.

18 THE WITNESS: The deputy assistant.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I am sorry, the deputy assistant.

10:50:03 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph just described will  
21 be marked for identification MFI-33.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Now can we go over the page to behind divider 34, please.

24 Mr Taylor, what do we see in that photograph?

10:50:56 25 A. This is a meeting in the cabinet room of the Executive  
26 Mansion in Monrovia. Seated here we have a visiting interagency  
27 delegation from the United States of America. You can't see the  
28 left-hand side, but I'm present somewhere in here with my - with  
29 senior members of government.

1 Q. Mr Taylor, could I ask you please just to change seats for  
2 a moment.

3 A. Okay.

10:51:49

4 Q. And if you just indicate for our assistance those  
5 individuals you can identify in that photograph?

10:52:27

6 A. Okay. I'm saying that on this side of the room these are  
7 officials of the United States government interagency group  
8 visiting Liberia. I can only recognise two faces here. Here is  
9 ambassador - I mean, well, deputy assistant secretary of state  
10 Jeter. Here is Ambassador Milan here. But maybe it may help the  
11 Court if we tell you what this interagency committee is?

12 Q. Please do.

10:52:47

13 A. The United States government here includes people from  
14 USAID, the defence department, the state department and other  
15 agencies of the United States government. At this level this is  
16 the beginning of a process that the United States investigates  
17 and evaluates as it begins to look at what possible aid and/or  
18 assistance it might be giving a country, or a government. A  
19 delegation like this will come, sit and discuss with the heads of  
20 the relevant agencies and then go back and decide on what plan of  
21 actions they are prepared to take and this is normally considered  
22 a very good start for any new government.

10:53:16

23 Q. And when did this meeting take place, Mr Taylor?

24 A. This is in March. The first picture this is in March.

10:53:39

25 Q. So this is in March. What part of March?

26 A. This is around - that's about the very beginning of March,  
27 I would put it. The very, very beginning. I would say the first  
28 - not beyond the second week of March.

29 Q. And was that visit productive, Mr Taylor, from Liberia's

1 point of view?

2 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. It puts you - it gives you hope and  
3 it's just a good - it's a good signal and we were well prepared  
4 with our proposals and our arguments and they appeared to have  
10:54:22 5 received our arguments very well.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: That would be '98, I presume?

7 THE WITNESS: That is correct, your Honour.

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Now at this stage, Mr Taylor, we're in early March 1998,  
10:54:42 10 what's the situation like in Liberia?

11 A. Well, we have managed to avert the crisis that developed  
12 over the weeks past and we are still - you know, we are all  
13 elated by what we see as developments along the line and we are  
14 very pleased that things are moving right.

10:55:18 15 Q. Can you move back to your normal chair, please. Mr Taylor,  
16 your concerns about a possible negative impact on Liberia arising  
17 from ECOMOG's intervention in Sierra Leone, were those fears -  
18 did those fears prove to be justified?

19 A. Oh, we may have to look at that in short or long term.

10:56:00 20 Q. Well, let's look at it first of all in the short term and  
21 then let's look at it in the long term.

22 A. Short term, no, but in the long term, yes, because some of  
23 the things that not just Liberia was talking about as we progress  
24 we see that some of the - our concerns come to reality.

10:56:23 25 Q. Such as?

26 A. We were concerned that every effort should be made to come  
27 to a negotiated settlement and that military actions while in the  
28 short run would bring about some calm, but that in the long run  
29 it would not end the problem and that the problem had to be ended

1 through negotiations and this is why ECOWAS through the Committee  
2 of Five begins to concentrate back on the 1996 November  
3 agreement.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. Can I pause for a moment,  
10:57:07 5 Mr President, and provide some spellings. The deputy assistant  
6 secretary of state is Howard H-O-W-A-R-D and Jeter is J-E-T-E-R.  
7 The US ambassador to Liberia is William Milan M-I-L-A-N.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:57:37 10 Q. Now --

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I'm not suggesting  
12 anything, but I'm just enquiring Did you intend to mark that for  
13 identification?

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Oh, yes, I should. The photograph of the  
10:57:48 15 meeting with the US interagency team to Liberia, MFI-34, please.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph is so marked.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful. I'm reminded by Mr Anyah that  
18 there was a spelling I should have notified the Court about from  
19 yesterday. Ashanti, A-S-H-A-N-T-I. That's from yesterday.

10:58:23 20 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Yes, but there was a word Asantehene.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: That's A-S-A-N-T-E-H-E-N-E who is the ruler  
22 of the Ashanti.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

10:59:05 25 Q. Let's catch up on, please, what's also happening in  
26 Liberia's at this time. Can we go, please, to the presidential  
27 papers, volume 3 behind divider 31. That's MFI-28. Can you go  
28 to page 111, please. We're just filling in the details now so  
29 that we are aware of the chronology. Do you see that's a

1 photograph of you receiving letters of credence from the Italian  
2 ambassador?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. And we see the date below, Thursday, 10 March 1998, yes?

11:00:30 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And whilst we're on this topic, if we go to page 117, this  
7 is 10 March, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The same day?

11:01:05 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And that's you receiving the letters of credence from the  
12 Swiss ambassador?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. That's Thursday, 10 March, yes?

11:01:22 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And for completeness, let us go back, please, to page 113.  
17 This is 20 February 1998 and you are here receiving the Libyan  
18 ambassador, yes?

19 A. Yes.

11:01:51 20 Q. At the Executive Mansion?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Right. Now, Mr Taylor, at this time, March 1998, who is  
23 the President of the United States?

24 A. March 1998, it's got to be President Clinton. If I'm wrong  
11:02:30 25 on that, it's got to be --

26 Q. Now help us. In March of 1998, did you have cause to speak  
27 to President Clinton?

28 A. Yes, I spoke to President Clinton on his trip to Africa.

29 That's got to be around March.

1 Q. Yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can we please look behind divider 13 in volume 1. Yes,  
4 Mr Taylor?

11:04:00 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. We see it's an Associated Press report detailing President  
7 Clinton's historic trip to Africa, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And it's entitled "The loud, warm start to Clinton's  
11:04:29 10 historic African trip." We won't delay overlong on this, but if  
11 we look at the second page, let's just pick it up at the fourth  
12 paragraph, please:

13 "Clinton's Independence Square speech was a scene setting  
14 address for the entire trip. 'My dream for this trip is that  
11:05:13 15 together we might do the things so that 100 years from now, your  
16 grandchildren and mine will look back and say this was the  
17 beginning of a new African renaissance', Clinton said. 'With a  
18 new century coming into view, old patterns are fading away', he  
19 said. 'The Cold War is gone. Colonialism is gone. Apartheid is  
11:05:43 20 gone. Remnants of past troubles remain, but surely there will  
21 come a time when everywhere reconciliation will replace  
22 recrimination'.

23 Yet Clinton acknowledged that Africa is not free from  
24 peril. He cited genocide in Rwanda, civil wars in Sierra Leone,  
11:06:06 25 Liberia, Congo and the Republic of Congo, a military dictatorship  
26 in Nigeria and continent-wide poverty, malnutrition, disease,  
27 illiteracy and unemployment.

28 Ghana is considered one of Africa's success stories with a  
29 3 per cent economic growth rate. Yet a severe drought has caused



1 an energy crisis resulting in regular power outages of 12 hours a  
2 day."

3 Let's skip the next paragraph. After a day long stay,  
4 Clinton flew to Uganda. Who was President of Uganda at the time,  
11:06:50 5 Mr Taylor, do you recall?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Who was it?

8 A. My good friend Museveni.

9 Q. "While en route to Uganda, Clinton telephoned Liberian  
11:07:15 10 President Charles Taylor. Spokesman McCurry said the two leaders  
11 discussed Clinton's visit and progress of peacekeeping efforts in  
12 West Africa, particularly in Sierra Leone.

13 Clinton wanted to make the call to encourage Taylor to  
14 continue the democratic reforms he has pursued since his  
11:07:38 15 re-election last July, McCurry said, and also wanted to ensure  
16 that Liberia did not feel slighted because he did not stop there.  
17 Taylor fully understood the President's calendar, McCurry said  
18 and he said he could not rule out further calls by the leaders of  
19 other countries that are not part of Clinton's itinerary."

11:08:05 20 Can we pause there for a minute. Now Mr Taylor, do you  
21 recall that following your election you were due to address the  
22 United Nations, weren't you?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And you didn't make that trip for reasons you outlined,  
11:08:22 25 yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. Was Clinton the President at that time?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And as you explained to us, it was normal during such a

1 visit for the Liberian President to meet with the President of  
2 the United States because of your historic relationship?

3 A. That is correct.

11:08:48

4 Q. But it had not been possible to organise such a visit in  
5 the summer of 1997?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now, how does it come about then that this conversation  
8 took place between you and President William Jefferson Clinton in  
9 March of 1998?

11:09:09

10 A. Well, we had since what we call straightened things out.  
11 You can see the presence of the interagency group. So by this  
12 time we have managed to smooth out the little rough edges. In  
13 fact I had really insisted on President Clinton stopping over at  
14 Roberts International Airport, but we conceded that because of

11:09:42

15 the security situation in the general region - don't forget  
16 there's a major military force at the airport, the Nigerians are  
17 still deployed at the airport, and that that was an insecure  
18 situation for the President of the United States and we conceded  
19 and said that a telephone call would be okay, and we felt good  
20 about that.

11:10:06

21 Q. So what did you talk about?

22 A. Well, I will just start at exactly what is public here by  
23 the press secretary. We spoke about Sierra Leone and our efforts  
24 and that we will continue to work for peace in Sierra Leone and  
25 he just wanted to encourage me to continue the good works. But  
26 let me just point out one thing. If you see the - there's a  
27 diplomatic something here where it states in Nigeria there is a  
28 military dictatorship.

11:10:35

29 Q. I was coming to that.

1 A. Diplomatically that's very strong language. So you can see  
2 like what is going on in the region at that time, everything is  
3 being done to, quote unquote, contain Nigeria and this is a part  
4 of the pattern that I have been telling you about here. So that  
11:11:17 5 is very strong language.

6 Q. Because Sani Abacha was not well liked by the international  
7 community, was he?

8 A. That is correct, he was not.

9 Q. But I want to ask you about something else. We have the  
11:11:32 10 President's spokesman saying that Clinton was encouraging you to  
11 continue the democratic reforms --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- you had pursued since your re-election, yes?

14 A. Yes. I think he misspoke here about re-election. It's  
11:11:51 15 just supposed to be since my election, yes.

16 Q. Which suggests some commendation from the President of the  
17 United States that you were behaving democratically as leader of  
18 Liberia, doesn't it?

19 A. Yes, I'm sure he had received the reports from the  
11:12:10 20 interagency committee, because there present is the deputy  
21 assistant secretary of state Howard Jeter, so before, and it's  
22 normal, before this conversation, in fact even the decision to  
23 make such a call, there's a whole process that Presidents go  
24 through. And I'm sure the United States would not have made this  
11:12:42 25 call if they did not genuinely believe from their different  
26 reports that we were making genuine efforts toward a democratic  
27 reforms in the country.

28 Q. Now what did you say to President Clinton about  
29 Sierra Leone?

1 A. Without going into all of the details, I told him that we -  
2 that we felt that Sierra Leone was a sisterly republic and we had  
3 a responsibility because, as what I have repeated here, peace in  
4 Sierra Leone meant peace in Liberia. That Liberia took the  
11:13:25 5 Sierra Leonean problem seriously because as long as peace did not  
6 prevail in Sierra Leone, we would not be able to move forward and  
7 he agreed.

8 And so I promised that we'll continue to fulfil all of our  
9 requirements under all of our different agreements with ECOWAS  
11:13:45 10 and even as a smaller union that we mentioned, what we call the  
11 Mano River Union. And what is that? Liberia, Sierra Leone and  
12 Guinea have a small union in ECOWAS called the Mano River Union.  
13 I also assured him that we would revitalise this union and  
14 encourage cooperation between and amongst the three states.

11:14:19 15 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, did the leader of the most powerful  
16 country on the planet with its enormous intelligence gathering  
17 activities accuse you of running the junta?

18 A. No, the President did not say that to me. If he had the  
19 press secretary would have stated it.

11:14:41 20 Q. Was there any suggestion by him in that call that you were  
21 interfering in Sierra Leone?

22 A. To the best of my recollection, no, he did not say that.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, please, Mr President,  
24 just to check something?

11:15:12 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Can we put that away, please. Before we do  
27 can I ask that it be marked for identification, please,  
28 Mr President.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, the Associated Press archive article

1 entitled, "A loud, warm start to Clinton's historic Africa trip"  
2 dated 24 March 1998 is marked for identification MFI-35.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Thank you:

4 Q. Mr Taylor, can we go back to the presidential papers now,  
11:16:49 5 please. Can I invite your attention, please, to page 150. Okay?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, just taking things in stages, the top photograph, yes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Who is the gentleman you are greeting?

11:18:14 10 A. That's the archbishop of the Catholic Archdiocese in  
11 Monrovia, Michael Kpakala Francis.

12 Q. Do you remember mentioning this to us yesterday?

13 A. Yes, I did.

14 Q. And it was as a result of a meeting with him that you  
11:18:36 15 decided to set up, you told us, a national conference on the  
16 future of Liberia?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Which, as we see from the caption to that photograph,  
19 eventually took place in July/August 1998?

11:18:53 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. So that's the end of February. Whilst we're on that page  
22 let's look at the bottom photograph. Who is in that photograph?

23 A. That's Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the present President of  
24 Liberia.

11:19:16 25 Q. The caption reads, "The most vocal opposition leader, UP" -  
26 what does UP stand for?

27 A. Unity Party.

28 Q. "... chairman Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf shares a light moment  
29 with President Taylor during a meeting on April 2." At this

1 stage, Mr Taylor, what was your relationship with  
2 Ms Johnson-Sirleaf like?

3 A. Well, it had - it had been rocky. After our years of minor  
4 problems it had gotten rocky and I would just like to say here  
11:20:09 5 again I had mentioned that Ellen was replaced in 1992 by Eric  
6 Scott. He died shortly later, but Ellen continued doing some  
7 work. We won the election and I'm reaching out to everybody,  
8 including Ellen, and we succeeded in getting her to come in  
9 because we had everybody in the cabinet. Remember I have brought  
11:20:43 10 in Alhaji Kromah, I had brought in Hezekiah Bowen, I had brought  
11 in Philip Kamah and all peoples that were associated with the  
12 conflict one way or the other, as I said Liberia was more than  
13 all of us. So I would say that it gradually went away and so she  
14 came in for consultative talks and we appreciated the visit.

11:21:20 15 Q. Have you still got the volume with the presidential papers  
16 in?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Look behind divider 35 in that bundle, please. Who is  
19 that, Mr Taylor?

11:22:02 20 A. That's Ellen also.

21 Q. Can you help us as to a date for this meeting?

22 A. This is about the same time, her arrival and then sitting  
23 for talks.

24 Q. So this is the same meeting?

11:22:15 25 A. This is about the same meeting.

26 Q. That we saw in the photograph on page 150?

27 A. That could very well be. As I look at her dress, Ellen did  
28 visit me in some other time - I'm not sure whether this is the  
29 first or second, but if we look at the dress this may be the same

1 meeting.

2 Q. So if we just hold page 150 open and just compare the  
3 pattern on the dress, it appears to be the same occasion?

4 A. This is the very arrival and then we then sit for a  
11:23:17 5 tete-a-tete.

6 Q. And you seem to be wearing the same tie, Mr Taylor?

7 A. That appears to be the case.

8 Q. So we are looking at the same occasion then, yes?

9 A. It appears to be, yes.

11:23:41 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask that this photograph, DP15, be  
11 marked for identification, please.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photograph which bears the Defence  
13 marking DP15 is now marked for identification MFI-36.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And the previous photographs on page 150.

11:24:17 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, it's part of the same document which  
16 I've already marked for identification, but it might be of  
17 assistance if so far as this photograph DP15 is concerned for  
18 future reference, if we say Taylor meeting Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf  
19 on 2 April 1998 for future reference.

11:24:45 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. The title of that photograph  
21 then MFI-36 is a photograph bearing Defence marking DP15 which is  
22 President Taylor, as he then was, meeting Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf  
23 on 2 April 1998.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

11:25:18 25 Q. Now whilst we're with this volume, Mr Taylor, and with  
26 these photographs at the back of volume 3, can I just invite your  
27 attention to a couple of photographs, please - further  
28 photographs, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can we have a look behind divider 36, please. What do we  
2 see in that photograph, Mr Taylor?

3 A. This is the front of my house with President and  
4 Mrs Carter.

11:26:24 5 Q. Could you just change places for a minute?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Yes, who do we see?

8 A. Here is President Carter. This is Mrs Carter. This is my  
9 ex-wife Jewel Howard-Taylor. I don't quite remember their names,  
11:26:56 10 but these are staff personnel from the Carter Centre. Of course,  
11 that's me here.

12 Q. Right. And we see the date. What's the date?

13 A. That's April of 1998.

14 Q. April 1998. And at which premises is that photograph  
11:27:18 15 taken?

16 A. This is at my house at White Flower.

17 Q. So is that separate from the Executive Mansion?

18 A. Yes. Well, let me just call this White Flower A. The  
19 Executive Mansion is what I described to the Court as the  
11:27:39 20 eight-storey building where I described the offices of the  
21 President being on the fourth floor and the living quarters on  
22 the eighth floor. This is my home that I had before being  
23 elected as President. Some days I would go there.

24 Q. What was it called?

11:28:00 25 A. This I will call White Flower A because that name we've  
26 heard in this Court, White Flower, White Flower, White Flower, it  
27 is just - it is a Secret Service code name for different  
28 residences of the President at the time. So if I'm here this is  
29 White Flower A, I go to Gbarnga on my farm that's White Flower



1 also B. Anywhere the President is outside of Executive Mansion  
2 it's just a Secret Service code. So they are different. You had  
3 White Flower A, White Flower B, White Flower C and even D in my  
4 hometown when I went. So White Flower is just a Secret Service  
11:28:53 5 code word for that particular place where I am.

6 Q. Now this is April 1998?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. For what reason was former President Jimmy Carter coming to  
9 Monrovia?

10 A. Oh, I tell you, I would say whenever President Carter made  
11 a visit like this, it had to do with projects that the Carter  
12 Centre was pursuing, and in the case of Liberia, if my  
13 recollection is correct, this has to be about, I think, Habitat  
14 for Humanity. It's a housing project that is undertaken by  
15 President Carter in helping people to build homes for very, very  
16 low prices. This would be one of those trips for Habitat - to  
17 discuss his Habitat programme.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient moment?

19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, it is a convenient moment, thank  
20 you, Mr Griffiths. We will take the short adjournment now and  
21 resume at twelve o'clock.

22 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

23 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:01:57 25 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor, before we adjourned we were looking at a  
26 photograph taken with yourself and former President Jimmy Carter.  
27 Do you recall that?

28 A. Yes, I do.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: First of all could I mark that photograph

1 for identification, please. It's former President Taylor and  
2 former President Jimmy Carter on 10 April 1998 and I think it's  
3 MFI-37, Mr President.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's correct. That photograph is  
12:02:27 5 marked MFI-37.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Can we now look at the photograph behind 37, please.  
8 Right. Can we look at the one behind divider 37 now, which bears  
9 the appellation DP17. Mr Taylor, help us with this one, please.

12:03:36 10 What occasion does this photograph mark?

11 A. This is inside my living room where President Carter is  
12 being introduced to Vice-President Dogolea, Enoch first name.

13 Q. And is this the same visit as the previous photograph that  
14 we saw, or is this a different visit?

12:04:09 15 A. No, this has to be the same visit.

16 Q. So this is the visit in April 1998?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. So what we see in this photograph, DP17, is yourself,  
19 former President Carter and Vice-President Enoch Dogolea, yes?

12:04:28 20 A. That is correct.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, can I mark that for  
22 identification as well, please, MFI-38.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that is marked MFI-38.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:04:54 25 Q. Can we have a look at the photograph now, please, behind  
26 divider 38. Mr Taylor, can you help us with this one?

27 A. Yes, I might have to point out over there.

28 Q. Yes, change places, please. Tell us first of all where the  
29 photograph is taken?

1 A. This is still in my receiving room at White Flower. This  
2 is my residence.

3 Q. Right. And is this the same visit in April 1998?

4 A. That is correct.

12:05:48 5 Q. And who do we see in the photograph, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Those that I recognise - this is President Carter right  
7 here, this is his son, these are members of the Carter Centre.  
8 Behind here is Mrs Carter, you can only see - I know she is the  
9 one standing here, you can't see her face though, I don't think

12:06:12 10 that's important. But this is President Carter's son, himself  
11 and just individuals travelling with them. I don't recall their  
12 names.

13 Q. Okay, and this is a photograph taken at White Flower?

14 A. That is correct.

12:06:32 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Could I ask that that be marked for  
16 identification, please, Mr President.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph that bears the  
18 Defence label DP18 is marked for identification 39.

19 MR GRIFFITHS:

12:06:53 20 Q. Mr Taylor, two more photographs at this stage. Firstly,  
21 the photograph behind divider 39. Right. First of all, where  
22 are we?

23 A. This is my living room at White Flower. Remember you saw  
24 President Carter greeting Vice-President Dogolea. We are now  
12:07:19 25 seated.

26 Q. So who is in the photograph?

27 A. This is President Carter right here. I am seated here.  
28 This is Vice-President Dogolea.

29 Q. And is this the same visit?

1 A. This is the same visit.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, thank you. Could we mark that for  
3 identification as well, please, Mr President.

12:08:06

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photograph with the Defence  
5 number DP19 is marked for identification MFI-40.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. And the final photograph I would like you to look at at  
8 this stage, Mr Taylor, is behind divider 40, please. Right. Who  
9 is in this photograph?

12:08:30

10 A. This is again President Carter. Right here is the  
11 Honourable Ernest Eastman, the minister of state for presidential  
12 affairs or what some countries would call the chief of staff of  
13 my office. You can see a part of a face here. This is the chief  
14 of protocol RL, Ambassador John Durning, that is D-U-R-I-N-G. That  
15 is the face you are seeing here.

12:09:10

16 Q. Ambassador from where?

17 A. That title, the chief of protocol of the Republic of  
18 Liberia carried an ambassadorial rank. That is internal, not as  
19 external to another country.

12:09:35

20 Q. And is this on the same visit by President Carter?

21 A. This is the same visit.

22 Q. Right, thank you, Mr Taylor. Could you return to your  
23 seat, please. Mr President, can I ask that that be marked for  
24 identification purposes, please.

12:09:50

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: That photograph bearing the Defence  
26 marking DP20 is marked for identification MFI-41.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, those photographs we have just looked at  
29 with you in company with the former President of the United

1 States, Jimmy Carter, they are taken in April as we noted  
2 earlier, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

12:10:30

4 Q. Now, just taking things in stages, are there any other  
5 matters that we ought to bear in mind before we move on from  
6 March to the beginning of April?

12:11:12

7 A. I would say yes. After all of the operations from ECOMOG  
8 in Sierra Leone, let's don't forget that President Kabbah returns  
9 to Sierra Leone as decided at Addis Ababa on 10 March. Following  
10 thereafter, we do have a very important report I think we should  
11 remember because this report would really summarise all of the  
12 activities. The Secretary-General at this point around the end  
13 of March, or going thereto, did a full report to the Security  
14 Council about the activities in Sierra Leone and what had

12:11:41

15 happened. I think that report would enable - would help the  
16 Court in seeing that all of the actions that had been taken by  
17 ECOWAS in conjunction with the OAU had all gone to the United  
18 Nations and so this is a full report I think which would be - it  
19 could help the Court.

12:12:06

20 Q. And it is dated?

21 A. That report could be anywhere I would put it not to be  
22 precise - I would put it to the last two weeks of March,  
23 somewhere in there. Forgive me, I don't quite remember the date,  
24 18/20, but it is a full report.

12:12:28

25 Q. By --

26 A. It is the fourth report of the Secretary-General.

27 Q. It is the fourth report of the Secretary-General?

28 A. That is correct.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be shown the

1 document behind divider 12 in volume 1 of 3, please. It is  
2 behind divider 12:

3 Q. Do you have the document, Mr Taylor? Is that the document  
4 you mean, Mr Taylor?

12:13:32 5 A. This is it, yes. This is the fourth report, yes.

6 Q. Now we see that it is dated 18 March 1998, yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And it is the fourth report of the Secretary-General on the  
9 situation in Sierra Leone and the document introduces itself in  
10 this way:

12:14:00

11 "The present report is submitted pursuant to the  
12 presidential statement issued by the Security Council on 26  
13 February 1998, by which the council requested me to submit  
14 detailed proposals concerning the role of the United Nations and  
15 its future presence in Sierra Leone. It covers the developments  
16 in Sierra Leone since the issuance of my third report on 5  
17 February 1998."

12:14:21

18 And then we see heading "Action by the Economic Community  
19 of West African States and the Economic Community of West African  
20 States monitoring group":

12:14:51

21 "On 5 February 1998, the Economic Community of West African  
22 States, ECOWAS, Committee of Five on Sierra Leone came to New  
23 York to brief the members of the Security Council and myself on  
24 the situation in Sierra Leone."

12:15:06

25 Mr Taylor, was that the visit you mentioned earlier which  
26 came just prior to the ECOMOG intervention; this visit here by  
27 the Economic Community of West African States Committee of Five?

28 A. I would not say prior. During the intervention.

29 Q. Right, during the intervention:

1 "The chairman of the Committee of Five, the foreign  
2 minister of Nigeria, Chief Tom Ikimi, said an impasse had been  
3 reached in the implementation of the Conakry agreement. He  
4 pointed out that the junta had raised three issues which, in its  
12:15:44 5 view, stood in the way of the implementation of the agreement.  
6 Namely, the release of Corporal Foday Sankoh, the proposed  
7 exemption of the Republic of Sierra Leone military forces from  
8 the disarmament process and the composition of the ECOWAS  
9 monitoring group which consisted primarily of Nigerian troops.

12:16:09 10 Minister Ikimi noted that because of this impasse, ECOMOG  
11 had been unable to deploy in Sierra Leone to carry out the  
12 disarmament and demobilisation of the Sierra Leonean combatants,  
13 and it had therefore not been possible to deploy United Nations  
14 military observers alongside ECOMOG.

12:16:32 15 Minister Ikimi requested my support in launching a high  
16 level effort to support ECOWAS through the establishment of a  
17 group of friends of Sierra Leone, and expressed the view that the  
18 Security Council should endorse the 22 April 1998 deadline for  
19 the restoration of constitutional authority and the full  
12:16:56 20 implementation of the Conakry agreement of 23 October 1997.

21 I" - that being the Secretary-General - "referred to the  
22 Committee of Five the desire of the United Nations for close  
23 cooperation between the United Nations and ECOWAS, and stated  
24 that ECOMOG needed to develop a concept of operations on the  
12:17:23 25 basis of which the United Nations could finalise its own  
26 deployment plan. ECOMOG should also compile a statement of its  
27 own logistical requirements in order to attract the necessary  
28 support from potential donors.

29 On the same day, responding to an attack by junta forces on

1 their position at Lungi, ECOMOG launched a military attack on the  
2 junta, which culminated approximately one week later in the  
3 collapse of the junta and its expulsion by force from Freetown  
4 after heavy fighting. The fall of the city on 13 February, which  
12:18:07 5 was accompanied by widespread looting and some reprisal killings,  
6 led to the flight or capture of many soldiers and leaders of the  
7 junta. ECOWAS has assured me that the International Committee of  
8 the Red Cross has been allowed to visit prisoners detained by  
9 ECOMOG in Freetown.

12:18:31 10 However, some of the former leaders of the Armed Forces  
11 Revolutionary Council, including its chairman, Johnny Paul  
12 Koroma, are believed to be still at large. Acting in concert  
13 with the local Kamajors and other traditional hunter militia  
14 (known as the civil defence unit), ECOMOG has subsequently taken  
12:18:56 15 control of the towns of Bo, Kenema and Zimmi in the south of the  
16 country, and Lunsar, Makeni and Kabala in the north. ECOMOG has  
17 also reported the capture of Daru, which would mean that the  
18 remnants of the junta have now been dislodged from every major  
19 town except for Kailahun.

12:19:26 20 Following scattered fighting in the latter part of  
21 February, the country now appears to be quiet. A number of  
22 foreign aid workers and missionaries taken hostage by armed  
23 elements in February were later released unharmed. However,  
24 press reports in mid-March indicated that Revolutionary United  
12:19:51 25 Front members in Kono had murdered civilians and taken 200  
26 hostages, reportedly including foreign nationals.

27 On 18 February accompanied by the executive secretary of  
28 ECOWAS, Mr Lansana Kouyate, Mr Ikimi visited Sierra Leone to  
29 assess the situation on the ground. They interviewed some former



1 junta soldiers now detained by ECOMOG and visited the State House  
2 complex and the parliament buildings. Many of the government  
3 buildings were found to have been looted and were in poor  
4 condition and a number of unexploded bombs were scattered about.

12:20:33 5 However, the ECOWAS team which was enthusiastically greeted by  
6 crowds found that in many respects life had returned to normal in  
7 the capital. As noted below, my special envoy also visited  
8 Freetown on the same day."

9 Can we pause for a minute, Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor, you see  
12:21:02 10 in that paragraph 6 reference to actions by the RUF in Kono?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Did you play any role in that?

13 A. None whatsoever, no.

14 Q. Did you know about it?

12:21:12 15 A. No, I did not know except for maybe a subsequent briefing  
16 that we will have received from the military staff to the  
17 committee.

18 Q. "However, the ECOWAS team which was enthusiastically  
19 greeted by crowds found that in many respects life had returned  
12:21:36 20 to normal in the capital. As noted below, my special envoy also  
21 visited Freetown on the same day.

22 From 25 to 27 February 1998, the Committee of Five met in  
23 the margins of the meeting of the Organisation of African Unity  
24 council of ministers held in Addis Ababa to review the situation  
12:22:01 25 in Sierra Leone."

26 Now we have discussed that meeting, haven't we, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Yes, we have.

28 Q. In the context of that Nigerian newsletter, yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. "The committee issued a communique, which was subsequently  
2 circulated.

3 On 4 March 1998, the members of the Committee of Five  
4 returned to New York and met again with members of the Security  
12:22:25 5 Council and with me. Chief Ikimi briefed me on his visit to  
6 Freetown on 18 February and his subsequent meeting with President  
7 Tejan Kabbah in Conakry. Following this meeting, it was  
8 announced that President Kabbah would return to his country on 10  
9 March 1998.

12:22:48 10 ECOMOG has also prepared a detailed list of logistical  
11 requirements for its operations in Sierra Leone. During the  
12 visit to New York of the Committee of Five, Chief Ikimi requested  
13 the assistance of the United Nations and the international  
14 community in ensuring that these requirements could be met. That  
12:23:12 15 request was reaffirmed by the chairman of ECOWAS, General Sani  
16 Abacha, in his statement at the ceremony held to mark the return  
17 of President Kabbah to Freetown on 10 March.

18 Action taken by the United Nations:

19 On 18 February 1998, a few days after ECOMOG had  
12:23:33 20 established control over most of the city of Freetown, my special  
21 envoy, Mr Francis G Okelo, led a security and humanitarian  
22 assessment mission to the capital and to Lungi comprising United  
23 Nations and non-governmental organisation officials. The mission  
24 determined the most immediate needs of the population. Mr Okelo  
12:23:58 25 handed over a quantity of medicines donated by the World Health  
26 Organisation to local hospitals and began preparations for the  
27 re-establishment of a United Nations presence in Freetown. A few  
28 days later, the World Food Programme delivered 857 metric tonnes  
29 of food to Freetown by ship.

1 Early in February, pursuant to a request by members of the  
2 Security Council for a technical assessment of the humanitarian  
3 situation in Sierra Leone since the coup d'etat of 25 May 1997,  
4 an interagency mission travelled to the sub-region. Its report  
12:24:45 5 is contained in a document. Further information on the  
6 humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone can be found in the third  
7 section of the present report.

8 Pursuant to the statement issued by the President of the  
9 Security Council on 26 February, I have initiated the necessary  
12:25:02 10 action to establish a trust fund for Sierra Leone. Contributions  
11 would help finance logistical assistance to ECOMOG,  
12 rehabilitation assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone and  
13 activities, including disarmament, demobilisation and human  
14 rights.

12:25:25 15 On 7 March 1998, my special envoy reopened the United  
16 Nations office in Freetown which had been closed shortly after  
17 the 25 May 1997 coup d'etat and was temporarily relocated in  
18 Conakry, Guinea. The office is now being strengthened to  
19 comprise civilian, political and humanitarian officers, a  
12:25:50 20 military advisor and, in due course, human rights and civilian  
21 police advisors and public information personnel. The function  
22 of the office is to liaise with the Government of Sierra Leone,  
23 ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the United Nations and its agencies, as well  
24 as non-governmental organisations and to act as the overall  
12:26:11 25 authority for all United Nations activities in the country. My  
26 proposals for deploying military liaison personnel as part of the  
27 United Nations presence on the ground can be found in section IV  
28 of the present report", and he goes on to mention that a small  
29 office will be retained in Conakry, but that will be fully

1 established in Freetown by the end of March.

2 Then let's go to the next section, please, Mr Taylor:

3 "On 13 February 1998, President Kabbah called a meeting in  
4 Conakry of potential donors, including the European Union,  
12:26:55 5 Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
6 and the United Nations to discuss his government priorities, the  
7 nature of the assistance the international community could  
8 provide and, the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance.

9 The President announced that he had created a task force to  
12:27:15 10 prepare the ground for the resumption of work by his government,  
11 to assess damage to the infrastructure, and to prepare for the  
12 resumption of education. President Kabbah identified the  
13 immediate priorities of his government as the provision of  
14 humanitarian supplies and petroleum products, the reactivation of  
12:27:36 15 international aid programmes, and the disarmament and  
16 demobilisation of former combatants. Three other areas that  
17 required special attention have been identified as the training  
18 and restructuring of the police force, the creation of job  
19 opportunities for young people, and the construction of low cost  
12:27:55 20 housing. President Kabbah also indicated that he intended to  
21 streamline his administration and appoint technical experts to  
22 cabinet positions.

23 Following the removal by ECOMOG of the military junta from  
24 power, President Kabbah issued a statement announcing his  
12:28:15 25 intention to submit proposals to Parliament concerning the  
26 rebuilding of his country. The President also spoke out against  
27 the reprisal killings, which, in some cases, had accompanied the  
28 seizure of control from the junta.

29 On 10 March 1998, accompanied by General Sani Abacha,

1 Chairman of ECOWAS and Head of State of Nigeria, as well as the  
2 Heads of State of Guinea, Mali and Niger, President Lansana  
3 Conte, President Alpha Oumar Konare, President Ibrahim Bare  
4 Mainassara and the Vice-President of Gambia, President Tejan  
12:29:02 5 Kabbah returned to Freetown to resume his office as Head of State  
6 of Sierra Leone. He was greeted by large and enthusiastic  
7 crowds. Mr Ibrahim Fall, Assistant Secretary-General for  
8 Political Affairs, delivered on my behalf a message of  
9 congratulations to the President, stating that his return  
12:29:24 10 represented the accomplishment of a major objective, not only of  
11 the people of Sierra Leone, but also of ECOWAS, OAU, the United  
12 Nations and the entire international community. I expressed my  
13 deep regret at the violence, loss of life and property, and  
14 immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone since  
12:29:45 15 the coup d'etat and extended my condolences to the families of  
16 those who lost their lives in opposing it. Furthermore, I  
17 informed the President that the United Nations looked forward to  
18 working closely with him in helping his government to reassert  
19 its authority and strengthen its capacity throughout the country.  
12:30:07 20 In a statement made at the ceremony marking his return to  
21 Sierra Leone, President Kabbah declared his intention to embark  
22 on the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction of  
23 the country to form a broad-based government, and to appoint a  
24 policy advisory committee. In his first meeting with my special  
12:30:28 25 envoy after his return, President Kabbah stressed the need for an  
26 early deployment of United Nations military personnel, the urgent  
27 provision of humanitarian assistance and the prompt establishment  
28 of the truth fund for Sierra Leone.  
29 Military and security situation in Sierra Leone: Freetown

1 is now fully under the control of ECOMOG and is increasingly  
2 secure. Some unexploded ordnance and land mines have been found,  
3 but these are not a threat to security. The peninsula on which  
4 the capital stands has also been secured. With the capture of  
12:31:10 5 almost every other major town in the country, and through its  
6 deployment further in the countryside in the north, south and  
7 east, ECOMOG has established itself successfully across most of  
8 the country.

9 Nevertheless, the fact that many of the senior junta  
12:31:31 10 leaders, including the former chairman of the AFRC, Johnny Paul  
11 Koroma, have not thus far been apprehended, as well as the  
12 continuing violence inflicted on civilians during their retreat  
13 from ECOMOG forces by RUF and other armed elements, indicate that  
14 the security situation in Sierra Leone is still a source of  
12:31:53 15 concern. Though ECOMOG has begun to collect weapons in Freetown,  
16 a major disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration exercise  
17 will be needed to ensure security.

18 ECOMOG has also developed a concept of operations for its  
19 deployment throughout Sierra Leone that sets out the preliminary  
12:32:18 20 planning for the disarmament and demobilisation of Sierra Leonean  
21 combatants. In summary, the tasks ECOMOG has set for itself  
22 include:

23 Deployment throughout Sierra Leone;

24 Manning of selected entry points by land, sea or air in  
12:32:38 25 order to ensure that no arms, ammunition or war material are  
26 brought into the country".

27 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Were you aware of that deployment?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And just so that we're clear now, at this stage then,

1 bearing in mind what you told us earlier, your government had  
2 taken a decision in the autumn of 1997 to close the border with  
3 Sierra Leone. Do you recall telling us about that?

4 A. That is correct.

12:33:17 5 Q. So now we have a situation where, on the other side of the  
6 border, ECOMOG are deployed to prevent arms, ammunition or war  
7 material being brought into Sierra Leone?

8 A. That is correct.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis?

12:33:33 10 MS HOLLIS: I think that is a misreading of this language.  
11 The language says, "The tasks ECOMOG has set for itself include"  
12 as a future tasking, not something that has been accomplished.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Did it happen, Mr Taylor?

12:33:50 15 A. The deployment did occur.

16 Q. So even though the words hear say "Has set for itself" did  
17 it in fact in due course occur?

18 A. Yes.

12:34:13 19 Q. "Disarmament of ex-combatants at designated sites;  
20 establishment of road blocks to check the movement of arms and  
21 ammunition and to assist in extending protection to refugees and  
22 internally displaced persons;

23 Conducting patrols to create an atmosphere conducive to  
24 freedom of movement and the restoration of established authority;

12:34:33 25 providing security for key individuals, United Nations  
26 personnel, including military personnel, and non-governmental  
27 organisations.

28 The plan calls for the deployment of 15,000 troops in four  
29 sectors: Western, northern, southern and eastern. The western

1 sector, comprising Freetown and the airports of Lungi and  
2 Hastings, is further subdivided and would support the deployment  
3 of seven battalions, an air force detachment, and an artillery  
4 brigade. This appears to be an ample level of force for the  
12:35:08 5 protection of the capital and its airport.

6 In the northern sector, ECOMOG would deploy a brigade  
7 headquartered at Makeni with battalions located at Port Loko,  
8 Magburaka and Kabala. In the south, ECOMOG will locate its  
9 brigade headquarters at Bo and deploy battalions at Moyamba,  
12:35:35 10 Pujehun and Kenema. Naval assets would also be required. The  
11 eastern sector is described as strategic in view of its mineral  
12 resources, the presence of heavy RUF and Kamajor concentration,  
13 and the border with Liberia. ECOMOG therefore considers that  
14 operations in the east could prove difficult and risky and demand  
12:36:04 15 a robust approach, alertness and deployment in strength.

16 Battalions would be located at Yengema, Zimmi and Kailahun.

17 ECOMOG would also establish a disarmament committee which  
18 would be charged, inter alia, with selecting disarmament sites;  
19 setting standards and guidelines for disarmament; conducting the  
12:36:32 20 disarmament; coordination of resources and cooperation with other  
21 organisations; classifying and transporting recovered weapons and  
22 ammunition; disseminating information about the process; and  
23 providing security for all participants. A ceasefire violations  
24 committee and a humanitarian services committee would also be  
12:36:55 25 created.

26 My special envoy and his staff are actively discussing with  
27 the government and with ECOMOG the further elaboration and  
28 implementation of its concept of operations, which provides a  
29 suitable basis for the possible subsequent deployment of United



1 Nations military personnel, subject to the authorisation of the  
2 Security Council".

3 Let's skip the next section and the section on the  
4 humanitarian situation and let's just mention - let's just have a  
12:37:53 5 look quickly at paragraph 32:

6 "At the request of President Kabbah, and with the help of a  
7 donation of \$120,000 from the government of Japan, UNHCR has  
8 begun to repair for the repatriation from Conakry of up to 5,000  
9 Sierra Leonean refugees, including 200 civil servants who fled  
12:38:20 10 Freetown after the May coup d'etat and who will be engaged in the  
11 administration of the country.

12 ECOMOG control of major towns in southern Sierra Leone is  
13 also likely to encourage the early repatriation by road of Sierra  
14 Leonean refugees from Liberia. It is further expected that the  
12:38:38 15 removal of the junta could lead to the repatriation of the  
16 400,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the West African sub-region.

17 Of the total caseload of Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone,  
18 some 2,800 have thus far been re-registered with UNHCR, about  
19 half of them requesting repatriation. UNHCR has begun making  
12:39:08 20 arrangements for them to be repatriated by sea".

21 Let us just quickly look at section IV, "Observations and  
22 Recommendations". Paragraph 38:

23 "I commend the consistent diplomacy of ECOWAS and in particular  
24 its Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and the contribution made  
12:39:43 25 by ECOMOG officers and men to the removal of the military junta.

26 I call on ECOWAS and ECOMOG to continue their efforts to bring  
27 peace to Sierra Leone in accordance with the relevant provisions  
28 of resolution 1132 and of the Charter of the United Nations.

29 Sierra Leoneans committed to the democratic system also played

1 their part in maintaining a stubborn resistance to the illegal  
2 regime. These included not only the members of the Civil Defence  
3 Forces, but also countless unarmed civilians who persistently  
4 withheld their cooperation from the regime and denied it  
12:40:25 5 legitimacy. I salute the courage of the Sierra Leonean people  
6 and honour the memories of those who died opposing the junta."

7 Now, Mr Taylor, that provides us, does it not, with an  
8 overview of the situation leading up to the ECOMOG intervention  
9 and its consequences; is that right?

12:41:00 10 A. Yes, that is right.

11 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall at or about this time writing  
12 to the Secretary-General regarding the supposed involvement of  
13 Liberian nationals in the conflict in Sierra Leone?

14 A. Yes, we are discussing this matter and I informed the  
12:41:39 15 Secretary-General about some of the little differences, but I  
16 just don't only write him. I also ask that the UN unit that is  
17 supposed to be coming should be deployed - that a special UN  
18 operation should be mounted at the border.

19 If you look at number 6 on this Security Council report  
12:42:10 20 that you just read, you will realise something in passing there  
21 that led to this request from the United Nations. You will see  
22 that it talks about ECOMOG acting in concert with the local  
23 Kamajors and if you go further they talk about the east being  
24 important and with the Liberian border. That's in number - I  
12:42:46 25 will find it.

26 I raise this because in the east you have the RUF, you have  
27 the Kamajors that are acting in concert with ECOMOG and so that  
28 makes that - that particular part of the country is still in the  
29 war mode. So I am now concerned because of the discussions, even

1 though it has not been raised officially, I now foresee the  
2 importance of beginning to ask the United Nations to look more  
3 closely at the Sierra Leone-Liberian border.

4 Q. And so did you write to them?

12:43:29 5 A. Yes.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Could we look behind divider 11 in this same  
7 bundle, please. Before we move to that document, Mr President,  
8 can I ask that this fourth report of the Secretary-General on the  
9 situation in Sierra Leone be marked for identification MFI-42,  
10 please.

12:43:47

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-42.

12 MR GRIFFITHS:

13 Q. Now behind divider 11, Mr Taylor, you see this is  
14 resolution 1231 adopted by the Security Council at its 3986th  
15 meeting on 11 March 1999. Is this '98 or '99?

12:44:12

16 A. This is 11 March 1998. I don't know why they made this.

17 Q. I think there is a problem with this document.

18 A. Yes, 1998, '99.

19 Q. I think this document has been misdated, because although  
20 at the top it says 1998, when one looks at the body of the  
21 document, in particular paragraph 6, there is reference there to  
22 the letter of the President of Liberia to the Secretary-General  
23 on 23 February 1999. So I think this is out of place. So let's  
24 put this away until we get to it, Mr Taylor.

12:44:53

25 A. Yes, but there is also - the letter requesting this  
26 assistance, there are letters before this, but anyway we can put  
27 this away.

12:45:24

28 Q. Mr Taylor, in fact let's just look quickly at this document  
29 and we can come back to it at a future stage, okay, because

1 although the date on the first page appears to be wrong - and in  
2 fact this is Prosecution exhibit 311, so you might want to mark  
3 that on the front page. It is Prosecution exhibit 311. Let's  
4 just look at paragraph 6 on the second page whilst we have got it  
12:46:25 5 in front of us, Mr Taylor, and we can come back to the substance  
6 of it in due course. Do you understand me?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Right. We see at paragraph 6:

9 "Acknowledges the letter of the President of Liberia to the  
12:46:39 10 Secretary-General of 23 February 1999 and the statement by the  
11 Government of Liberia of 19 February 1999 on the action it is  
12 taking to curtail the involvement of Liberian nationals in the  
13 fighting in Sierra Leone, including measures to encourage the  
14 return of Liberian fighters and directives to the Liberian  
12:47:01 15 national security agencies to ensure that no cross-border  
16 movement of arms takes place and that there be no transshipment  
17 of arms and ammunition through Liberian territory and requests  
18 the Secretary-General to continue to consider, in coordination  
19 with the countries of the Mano River Union and other member  
12:47:22 20 states of ECOWAS, the practicability and effectiveness of the  
21 deployment of United Nations monitors along with forces of the  
22 military observer group of ECOWAS at the Liberia-Sierra Leone  
23 border", yes?

24 A. Well, let's - I think, counsel, we ought to clarify one  
12:47:42 25 thing here because the quote might be a little mixed up.

26 Q. Very well.

27 A. There are documents - there are letters to the  
28 Secretary-General before this time, because in June of 1998 the  
29 President of the Security Council meets my ambassador in New York

1 to tell him about a decision that had been taken by the Security  
2 Council regarding Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone. So even  
3 though we may have the dates here mixed up, what we ought to find  
4 are the previous documents. But my response yes is in fact  
12:48:28 5 correct, because prior to June of 1998 when there was a former  
6 meeting between the President of Security Council and my minister  
7 counsellor at the United Nations, this issue had been raised and  
8 we had made a request even at that time.

9 So my answer is correct, but what we do not have are the  
12:48:49 10 documents relating to that particular time. I think I just  
11 wanted to help the Court with that. And as we get into June of  
12 1998 we will see meeting with my minister counsellor and the  
13 whole issue being raised then after the Security Council denies  
14 Liberia the lifting of our arms embargo. So I just want to  
12:49:14 15 correct that my response is truthful and is correct. We just  
16 have the wrong documents here.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, do you recall that we looked at a speech  
18 you had made where you acknowledged the arrival in Liberia of  
19 special envoy Reverend Jesse Jackson, yes?

12:49:40 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can we please look in volume 3 of 3 behind divider 41. You  
22 should have the photograph as well. It is separate. Tab 41.  
23 Mr Taylor, what is the context of this photograph, please?

24 A. That is the special envoy, Jesse Jackson.

12:51:31 25 Q. Where is the photograph taken?

26 A. In the Office of the President at the Executive Mansion,  
27 Monrovia.

28 Q. And help us, can you give us a date for this? A rough  
29 date?

1 A. This has got to be around I would say April or thereabouts.

2 Q. Of which year?

3 A. 1998.

4 Q. And what was the purpose of his presence in Liberia?

12:52:00 5 A. He comes as a special envoy of President Clinton to deal  
6 with trying to get the Mano River Union countries together and  
7 also the Sierra Leonean crisis.

8 Q. And I don't know if you can help us, how long did his visit  
9 last for?

12:52:28 10 A. Reverend Jackson probably stayed in the region for about a  
11 week or more because he came to Liberia, he went to Conakry,  
12 Guinea and he went to Abuja. So this could have taken him in the  
13 region of about a week or more.

14 Q. And this is some time in April, yes?

12:52:52 15 A. I stand corrected on that. Somewhere in April.

16 Q. Now, apart from his visit to West Africa, Mr Taylor, was  
17 the Reverend Jackson involved in any other initiative concerning  
18 Liberia in the United States?

19 A. Yes, in furtherance of my action of reconciliation, we held  
12:53:21 20 a major programme in the United States in Chicago, Illinois, that  
21 was actually sponsored by Reverend Jackson under the Rainbow  
22 Coalition set-up that he has to bring Liberians together from the  
23 Diaspora, encouraging them to return home, trying to stop the  
24 brain drain. This was not a United States government action.

12:53:56 25 This was the Rainbow Coalition action.

26 Q. Did you attend that?

27 A. No, I did not go to Chicago. I was represented by my then  
28 wife, Mrs Jewel Howard-Taylor.

29 Q. Can we look please behind divider 15 in volume 1.

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, were we going to mark the  
2 Reverend Jackson?

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, former President Charles Taylor and  
4 Reverend Jesse Jackson meeting in or about April 1998, MFI-43.

12:54:39 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I will state at this stage  
6 really, and I am sure you appreciate this, it is not the Trial  
7 Chamber's duty to advise the Defence to mark potential exhibits  
8 and I fully appreciate that you are busy presenting evidence, but  
9 I can't help noting that you have got three other members of the  
12:55:04 10 Defence team there and presumably they are not there for  
11 decorative purposes, so surely one of them should be following  
12 the case closely enough to remind lead counsel if he forgets to  
13 have a document marked. Otherwise, I really can't see what they  
14 are doing there.

12:55:24 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I think Mr Anyah is still saddened by the  
16 Reggae Boys drawing with Nigeria. That is why he is not up to  
17 speed, Mr President.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, that photograph with  
19 Special Envoy Jessie Jackson - and it bears the Defence marking  
12:55:44 20 DP21 - that will be marked for identification MFI-43.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful:

22 Q. Yes, divider 15, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So we see this is the programme of the Liberia Day  
12:56:05 25 Conference convened and hosted by the Reverend Jessie Jackson,  
26 Special Envoy, and we see this is April, 16, 17 and 18 of 1998?

27 A. Yes, that is correct.

28 Q. Mr Taylor, did you have any involvement in the planning of  
29 this programme?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. How much?

3 A. Well, the idea I had an input, you know. After all, this  
4 is about bringing Liberians together in the Diaspora and so, you  
12:56:37 5 know, the whole purpose was this whole effort on my part to  
6 continue the process of reconciliation.

7 Q. And we see that the conference theme was "A Time to Heal -  
8 a Time to Rebuild - a Time For Reconciliation, Reconstruction and  
9 Renewal", and we see that the programme - and we won't spend a  
12:57:06 10 lot of time on this - that the First Lady, Mrs Jewel  
11 Howard-Taylor, was in attendance, yes?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And if we go over the page just to get an idea, we see that  
14 the ULAA, Dr Joseph Korto, they are involved in this, yes?

12:57:35 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And that is the same organisation which you had been  
17 involved in during your student days in the United States. Is  
18 that right, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That is correct.

12:57:44 20 Q. And we also see that present is Dr Amos Sawyer, do you see  
21 that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. A Paramount Chief Jallah Lone?

24 A. Lone, yes.

12:57:58 25 Q. James Kaye and Senator James Chelley, yes?

26 A. That is correct. And may I just note here that that  
27 Dr Joseph Korto is presently Minister of Education in Liberia  
28 right now. The last name on that list, Christiana Tah, is  
29 presently Minister of Justice in Liberia right now.



1 Q. And we see under the time heading 5:30, "US State  
2 Department session". Can you explain what that was, Mr Taylor?

3 A. Well, it says right here question and answer. I guess  
4 there was somebody from the State Department that would answer  
12:58:56 5 basic questions from the visitors there; what was the United  
6 States about to do; what was this and that. But I think this was  
7 just really having an invitee there to answer some questions.

8 Q. And then we see that at 8 p.m. there was a live telephone  
9 message from yourself?

12:59:18 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. What did you have to say to them?

12 A. I just expressed my thanks and appreciation to them for  
13 coming and outlined our plans and our genuine efforts towards  
14 reconciliation and a desire to having them return home as quickly  
12:59:43 15 as possible to help with the building - you know, rebuilding the  
16 nation. We talked about letting the past go behind us and moving  
17 forward, basically. This was put on a live - a loudspeaker that  
18 everybody could hear me from where they sat in the hall.

19 Q. Yes, I don't think we need trouble with any more detail.  
13:00:37 20 Can I ask that that be marked for identification, please,  
21 Mr President, MFI-44?

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document will be marked for  
23 identification 44.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

13:00:50 25 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we are now in April of 1998, so we are two  
26 months after the ECOMOG intervention?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. At this stage, what is the situation in Liberia?

29 A. As far as I can recall, we - this appears to be a very

1 normal time, really, where there is great expectation and great  
2 hope.

13:01:49 3 Q. And what is the situation along the border with the  
4 Kamajors which had exercised you so much on assuming the  
5 presidency?

6 A. We cannot forget - and I guess if we were to look at the  
7 inquiry raised by the Prosecution as to the full deployment,  
8 don't let's forget that ECOMOG is deployed in the major towns but  
9 you don't have peace; you have hostilities there. There are  
13:02:22 10 attacks here and there. There is not a stable environment. So  
11 when you look at the whole situation in Sierra Leone, it is still  
12 - it is still chaotic, even though the major towns are being  
13 occupied by the peacekeepers in a very robust form, but there is  
14 still some trouble.

13:02:50 15 Just like I explained earlier, if you look in the eastern  
16 part of the country, the Kamajors that are working, as described  
17 in the Secretary-General's document, in concert with ECOMOG are  
18 close to the RUF, and so you know that is a recipe for trouble.  
19 So across the border on that side we do not have real calm even  
13:03:14 20 though the deployment is on the ground, but there are  
21 difficulties.

22 Q. And do you have any contact with President Kabbah at this  
23 time?

24 A. Oh, yes, once President Kabbah returns to office there is -  
13:03:34 25 there are communications between us, we call each other.  
26 Everything is being done. In fact, we are talking about refugees  
27 and movement of people. There is full, full contact between  
28 Tejani and myself, yes.

29 Q. Now at this time, Mr Taylor, in coming towards the middle

1 of 1998, do you - does Liberia have a representative at the  
2 United Nations?

3 A. Oh, yes, we do. We do.

4 Q. Who is it?

13:04:11 5 A. Actually, the ambassador that is accredited at that  
6 particular time is Ambassador Nan Dukley. That is D-U-K-L-E-Y.

7 Q. And as far as you were concerned, what had you tasked him  
8 to do in New York?

9 A. No, Nan is a her.

13:04:47 10 Q. Her.

11 A. Well, Nan is doing basically what all ambassadors are there  
12 to do: To seek the interests of the country. But as early as  
13 somewhere in June - because you are talking about the middle of  
14 the year - Nan, I think, has come to Liberia to brief me, and at  
15 this particular point the minister councillor is left in charge.

13:05:18 16 The minister councillor is the second most - the second position  
17 to that of ambassador - is invited by the President of the  
18 Security Council to convey a message in June, and that is what we  
19 are preoccupied with from there on.

13:05:49 20 Q. In June. So in June there is a report from whom?

21 A. The President of the Security Council invited the  
22 representative of Liberia for a formal meeting.

23 Q. And do you recall who was the President of the Security  
24 Council at the time?

13:06:08 25 A. Oh, no, the presidency changes. I don't quite recall his  
26 name. Sometimes the presidency will run for a very short time, a  
27 month or two. But whoever is presiding at that time made that  
28 invitation to my minister councillor.

29 Q. And have you seen a report of that meeting?

1 A. Following that meeting, yes, the minister councillor wrote  
2 a full report for government's observation.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. Could the witness be shown the  
4 document behind divider 16, please:

13:07:49 5 Q. Right. We see this document is headed, "Report on the  
6 meeting between Ambassador Antonio Monteiro, Permanent  
7 Representative of Portugal, and President of the Security Council  
8 and Minister Councillor Christian M Wisseh." Who is Christian M  
9 Wisseh?

13:08:09 10 A. He is minister Counsellor. That is the number 2 at the  
11 mission.

12 Q. Now, it reads as follows:

13 "On June 15, 1998, at his request, and in the absence of  
14 charge d'affaires Famatta Osode, I met with Ambassador Antonio  
13:08:37 15 Monteiro, Permanent Representative of Portugal and President of  
16 the Security Council for the month of June 1998.

17 During the meeting, he informed about consultations held by  
18 the council on Thursday, June 11, 1998, regarding the lifting of  
19 the arms embargo imposed on Liberia pursuant to resolution 788 of  
13:09:02 20 November 19, 1992. In their deliberations, the members of the  
21 council expressed serious concerns about allegations contained in  
22 a letter dated June 5, 1998, from the special representative of  
23 the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone addressed to the chairman  
24 of the Security Council Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone that  
13:09:25 25 there are reports that many of the fighters supporting the former  
26 junta in the east of Sierra Leone are in fact Liberian  
27 nationals".

28 Pause there, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. So, remember we saw in an earlier document that the United  
2 Nations Secretary-General had a special representative in Sierra  
3 Leone, a Mr Okelo, do you remember that?

4 A. Yes.

13:10:02 5 Q. So Mr Okelo has written to the Security Council indicating  
6 that there are reports that many of the fighters supporting the  
7 former junta in the east are in fact Liberian nationals. Now,  
8 firstly, were you aware that such an indication had been given to  
9 the United Nations?

13:10:28 10 A. Well, we become aware here. We become aware here and this  
11 is the real zinger, I would call it. By zinger, I mean the real  
12 beginning of Charles Taylor's problem right here. Here we have  
13 the special representative of the Secretary-General at the time  
14 coming in and making a report and let's pay attention to this.

13:11:06 15 This is the council of the security - the Security Council of the  
16 United Nations reviewing a request from ECOWAS to lift the arms  
17 embargo and all sanctions against me now saying that they have a  
18 letter from the special representative of the Secretary-General  
19 at the particular time.

13:11:31 20 There is a little catch here to this. Remember in all of  
21 the documentations I have told this Court that it is reported to  
22 the committee that there are Liberians that are even killed  
23 during the operation in Sierra Leone and that upon investigation  
24 they had found out that it was not related to my government.

13:12:01 25 Now, they are now saying here that here are Liberian  
26 fighters in the east of Sierra Leone that are supporting the  
27 junta. Now, here is the council. If the council at that  
28 particular time had even thought to enquire back to ECOWAS they  
29 would have understood this. But this begins an avalanche of

1 activities thereafter about Liberians and Liberians and Taylor  
2 and Taylor and as we go forward.

3 So we are shocked by this, because we know and we know that  
4 even the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOWAS know who these  
13:12:49 5 Liberians are that are fighting alongside the junta and it is  
6 very simple; these are the Liberians that have been hired and are  
7 working as the STF that helped the junta to overthrow Kabbah and  
8 are with them. But this is the beginning of a - up until now  
9 there is no question about Liberia or mine or Liberian  
13:13:19 10 involvement in Sierra Leone at this level. This is the first and  
11 I mention this because this begins this whole set of patching  
12 together of information and disinformation and all of that.

13 This is a very, very important meeting and it is very  
14 unusual. When the President of the Security Council calls a  
13:13:38 15 member state into a formal meeting it means that it is a serious  
16 matter and we begin to move immediately on this particular  
17 matter. So this is why when you asked me earlier and I wanted to  
18 mention when we said that we were pursuing this matter, that is  
19 what I meant. This is very serious.

13:13:57 20 Q. Right. Now, let's just develop this a little further,  
21 shall we, before we look at the rest of this document. You will  
22 recall, Mr Taylor, being referred to the evidence that President  
23 Tejan Kabbah gave to the truth and reconciliation council in  
24 Sierra Leone. Do you remember that?

13:14:20 25 A. I remember that.

26 Q. When he spoke about discovering Liberians within the armed  
27 forces of Sierra Leone employed by the Government of Sierra  
28 Leone. Do you remember that?

29 A. Oh, that is correct. Yes.

1 Q. So let's put all of this together, shall we. We have the  
2 President of Sierra Leone acknowledging the presence of hired  
3 Liberians in his armed forces, yes?

4 A. Yes.

13:14:50

5 Q. We have now the special representative of the United  
6 Nations Secretary-General writing to the Security Council  
7 indicating that Liberian fighters are in Sierra Leone, yes?

8 A. Yes.

13:15:14

9 Q. You have told us earlier that you were in contact with  
10 President Tejan Kabbah after his reinstatement on 8 March, yes?

11 A. The 10th. The 10th.

12 Q. 10 March?

13 A. Yes.

13:15:27

14 Q. Tell me, during those conversations with Tejan Kabbah did  
15 he ever complain to you that Liberians were fighting in Sierra  
16 Leone?

17 A. No, he did not complain to me at that time. Some time in  
18 the future he does.

13:15:49

19 Q. But did he, for example, suggest to you at this stage - we  
20 are talking about 1998 - that you were sending soldiers to Sierra  
21 Leone to fight?

22 A. No, not at all.

13:16:17

23 Q. "Specifically the special representative had stated that  
24 ECOMOG believes it has identified some of the dead combatants as  
25 Liberians after clashes with the junta elements; that ECOMOG has  
26 reportedly captured more than 100 Liberian fighters in the  
27 vicinity of Kailahun and Kono District; that according to ECOMOG  
28 in Freetown, there are 65 persons in custody at Pademba Road  
29 Prison who are considered to be of Liberian origin and were taken

1 prisoners during combat; and that the general feeling, therefore,  
2 is that Liberia continues to be involved in the affairs of Sierra  
3 Leone in supporting the rebels in the east."

4 Now, let's pause there again.

13:17:02 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Note that word "continues", yes?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Prior to this notification by your minister counsellor, had  
9 there been any suggestion to you that Liberians were in fact -  
10 had been sent by you to Sierra Leone?

11 A. No, that's what I called the zinger. For the first time  
12 this is raised. It is of a complete shock to me and my  
13 government. It had not been raised before. I said that during  
14 the intervention they did report - the ECOMOG did report to the  
15 committee they captured some Liberians and that an investigation  
16 had been undertaken and they had determined who they were.

17 And if we remind this Court, some of these very Liberians  
18 that were captured and kept at Pademba Road have appeared in this  
19 Court as witnesses and so we can see that even those witnesses as  
20 they have sat here have not said, "Oh, guess what, it was  
21 Mr Taylor that sent us".

22 So within ECOWAS we are aware of who these people are, but  
23 all of a sudden at the Security Council level they are using  
24 words like "Liberia's involvement in Sierra Leone". We are  
25 shocked. We don't know what they are talking about, but that's  
26 why we are taking it so seriously, because for the first time not  
27 from ECOWAS complaints, this is not a complaint from ECOWAS, this  
28 is a letter written by the special representative in Sierra  
29 Leone. This special representative, while he knows that he



1 reports to the Secretary-General, works along with the host  
2 government and if Okelo had taken the time to investigate this  
3 matter, okay, he would have found out that this was a matter that  
4 ECOWAS was aware of and had handled.

13:19:16 5 Now I am just surprised that he did this, but this begins  
6 this whole series of accusations as we continue throughout the  
7 years. This is where it starts.

8 Q. Because you will note, Mr Taylor, that the special  
9 representative states that ECOMOG had identified the bodies.

13:19:45 10 Now, who was in charge of ECOMOG?

11 A. Nigeria.

12 Q. Yes, but they had been sent by ECOWAS, hadn't they?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now at this time were you still on the Committee of Five?

13:20:01 15 A. Of course I am.

16 Q. So help me. Had you received any complaint from ECOWAS or  
17 from your fellow committee members on the Committee of Five  
18 accusing you of sending Liberians to fight in Sierra Leone?

19 A. No, if there had been any such thing one would expect that  
13:20:23 20 a diplomat at Okelo's level would have said to the  
21 Secretary-General, okay, to the Security Council, "Look, based on  
22 my reports, ECOWAS has observed this", but he speaks as an  
23 individual. So it simply means he has not done his work. If he  
24 had done his work he would have known the facts.

13:20:43 25 He did not do his work here, because if he had contacted  
26 the leadership and said, "Well, here is the situation", they  
27 would have told him, "No, no, no, we know this particular  
28 situation. We are talking about identifying dead bodies of  
29 combatants as Liberians". This is all - I don't know how to

1 package this again, but it is just, you know, a mischievous  
2 beginning for Liberia.

13:21:26 3 Q. "Ambassador Monteiro further indicated that in view of the  
4 allegations the council had instructed him to convey to  
5 government the concern of the Security Council, seeking the  
6 reaction of the Liberian government through an official reply on  
7 the matter.

8 On the arms embargo, the President of the council apprised  
9 that a consensus had developed in the council that in principle  
13:21:44 10 the arms embargo should be lifted. However, the objective  
11 worsened security situation on the ground in Sierra Leone  
12 dictated the exercise of caution in doing so at this time.

13 He gave me the assurance that once the Security Council is  
14 convinced that the military situation has stabilised it will take  
13:22:10 15 action to lift the arms embargo imposed on Liberia pursuant to  
16 Security Council resolution 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992.

17 In response, I reiterated government's principled policy  
18 that Liberia will not allow its territory to be used to  
19 destabilise any neighbouring country."

13:22:35 20 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Now, Mr Taylor, talking about  
21 Liberian territory being used to destabilise a neighbouring  
22 country, help us. We have looked at documentation to this  
23 effect. When you came to power, which group was using Liberia as  
24 a springboard to launch attacks in Sierra Leone?

13:23:06 25 A. Two groups: The Kamajors and ECOMOG.

26 Q. Right. And you remember telling us that Chief Hinga Norman  
27 was in Liberia recruiting former combatants?

28 A. Yes, that is true.

29 Q. And you gave us an estimated figure as to the number of

1 Liberians he had recruited to fight alongside the Kamajors, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Apart from those activities, Mr Taylor, were you sponsoring  
4 any group of Liberians to undertake combat operations in Sierra  
13:23:53 5 Leone?

6 A. No, I was not sponsoring any group and I want to qualify  
7 something. I don't want to just lay this on the late Hinga  
8 Norman's shoulder, because Hinga could not have done that without  
9 his boss who is Tejani Kabbah. So I don't just want to say Hinga  
13:24:17 10 Norman did the recruiting, even though he was the front man, but  
11 we knew that this was done with official acquiescence.

12 Q. "Will not allow its territory to be used to destabilise any  
13 neighbouring country. Moreover, I asserted that the government  
14 of President Taylor deprecated in no uncertain terms the  
13:24:46 15 involvement of Liberians in the fighting in Sierra Leone. It was  
16 the considered position of the Liberian government that those  
17 Liberians were acting on their own accord for economic  
18 advantages."

19 What is meant by economic advantages, Mr Taylor?

13:25:04 20 A. They were being hired and paid. They were being hired and  
21 they were there and they were paid. They had all the benefits of  
22 the government, so these are some of the advantages they were  
23 there for.

24 Q. "In that regard President Taylor had appealed to the  
13:25:23 25 Secretary-General for the deployment of United Nations observers  
26 to monitor the situation at the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border."

27 Had you made that request?

28 A. That is what I am saying. I said that, yes.

29 Q. When had you first made that request, Mr Taylor?

1 A. After we got that briefing from ECOMOG about Liberians  
2 being involved, and knowing well that it would have ended up in  
3 our laps, immediately I started pressing for putting people on  
4 the border. We conveyed this to certain members of the council.  
13:26:04 5 That is what I meant when I said to the Bench I had answered  
6 truthfully. We just don't have those papers before us, but that  
7 is why he uses the word "had". We began moving immediately to  
8 try to solve this matter, because we foresaw what was coming.  
9 Because in diplomatic circles people will hint to you what are  
13:26:29 10 some of the possibilities, what could happen, and we were being  
11 told "Well, you know, you have to be careful". So there are a  
12 lot of information in diplomatic circles that are unofficial.  
13 Sometimes you hear people say "We have heard this from sources  
14 that don't want to be quoted", so all of these nuances you have.  
13:26:55 15 But we knew that we were headed for trouble and started running  
16 for cover from this time.

17 Q. "I also stressed government's firm commitment to the  
18 attainment of peace and stability in Sierra Leone which would  
19 contribute to security not only in Liberia, but also to the  
13:27:16 20 entire West African sub-region".

21 Now, Mr Taylor, help us?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. What did you stand to gain from efforts to destabilise  
24 Sierra Leone?

13:27:28 25 A. Absolutely nothing.

26 Q. "In addition, I indicated that efforts are being undertaken  
27 by Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia to resuscitate the Mano River  
28 union, which would give added impetus to the achievement of  
29 ECOWAS's goal of economic integration of the sub-region".

1 Now, Mr Taylor, when you received this briefing, what was  
2 your reaction?

3 A. Oh, we were really, really shocked, because all of the  
4 analysis being done by different agencies of government, our  
13:28:13 5 National Security Council, we saw this as the undoing of  
6 everything we were trying to do; that if this were permitted to  
7 stick, and if it were not properly cleared up, we saw our  
8 destruction. Because we knew that there were Liberians in Sierra  
9 Leone. We knew that they were there. We knew that these were  
13:28:42 10 the former AFL people that had gone. We knew that they were  
11 working for the Sierra Leonean government. There was no doubt in  
12 anybody's mind. So how do we clear up this thing to finally get  
13 this monkey off our backs that these Liberians that are there are  
14 totally unrelated to the Taylor government is the task that we  
13:29:06 15 never completed that has got me in prison today. We never  
16 completed this task of a simple - of putting to rest a simple  
17 fact that: Yes, there are Liberians in Sierra Leone; but, no,  
18 they are not attached to Taylor or the Taylor government. We  
19 never succeeded in doing that, and they just kept this thing  
13:29:34 20 rolling. Every time they wanted to stop us from our economic  
21 development, every time they wanted to - they just kept this  
22 right in our faces knowing the truth. So when I hear Tejani  
23 coming up --

24 Q. Mr Taylor, I will have to pause you there.

13:29:57 25 A. Okay.

26 Q. Because I note the time. We will come back to this after  
27 the break.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, all right. Thank you, Mr Griffiths,  
29 we will take the lunch break now and resume at 2.30.

1 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

2 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please continue, Mr Griffiths.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

14:32:18 5 Q. Just before the break, Mr Taylor, we were looking at the  
6 document behind divider 16, yes, in volume 1 of 3. Now,  
7 Mr Taylor, just to recap somewhat, what we see here is a  
8 situation developing at the United Nations level. Is that right?

9 A. That is correct.

14:33:07 10 Q. Is that situation mirrored at ECOWAS level?

11 A. No.

12 Q. So we have one international body adopting a particular  
13 stance towards you, but we have the sub-regional body closer to  
14 the ground adopting a different stance altogether, is that right?

14:33:33 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, when you received this briefing did you  
17 raise the matter with your colleagues within ECOWAS?

18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. Who did you raise it with?

14:33:50 20 A. Practically everyone. The chairman of ECOWAS at that time;  
21 I raised it with Abacha. The first thing you try to do is find  
22 friends that you're close to. I raised it with La Cote d'Ivoire.  
23 I raised it with Accra. Trying to, you know, get people to look  
24 at what was gathering and they also - in fact, ECOWAS tried to do  
14:34:24 25 some things, because this continues to gather and gather and  
26 gather, but it was clear by some of our colleagues that when they  
27 said: Well, we don't understand where this is coming from. It's  
28 all the way at the Security Council level, but if and when they  
29 need ECOWAS's own input they will ask us, and I don't think they

1 ever did.

2 Q. Now, did you in June of 1998 have an opportunity to raise  
3 this matter with the Secretary-General of the United Nations?

4 A. Yes, I did.

14:35:02 5 Q. How did come about?

6 A. Later in June, I will say about the last week in June, I  
7 received a letter from the now chairman of ECOWAS and Head of  
8 State of Nigeria who now is no longer Sani Abacha. This is  
9 General --

14:35:30 10 Q. Abacha dies, does he?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And he's succeeded by?

13 A. General Abdul sal ami Abubakar.

14 Q. Yes?

14:35:45 15 A. He becomes head of - so he writes me a letter and he  
16 invites me to Abuja for a meeting with the incoming  
17 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. I do accept  
18 the invitation, and he informs me further that our friend and  
19 brother from Sierra Leone would be there, Tejan Kabbah, and  
14:36:03 20 Kabbah was also present.

21 Q. Let's go behind the next divider, divider 17, please. No,  
22 before we move on, Mr President, can I mark that document for  
23 identification MFI-45?

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. The document, which is a report of  
14:36:21 25 the meeting between Ambassador Monteiro and Minister Christian M  
26 Wisseh of 15 June 1998, is marked for identification MFI-45.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. Do you recognise this letter, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Now we see that it's from the Head of State,  
2 Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of  
3 Nigeria?

4 A. Yes.

14:37:19 5 Q. It's dated 27 June 1998?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And it's addressed to you, Charles Ghankay Taylor,  
8 President of the Republic of Liberia, Monrovia.

9 "Excellency and Dear Brother, it is my pleasure to write  
14:37:38 10 this letter and to extend to you my best wishes for your good  
11 health and personal wellbeing.

12 I would like to inform you that for a few days next week,  
13 beginning from Monday 29 June 1998, I will be playing host to the  
14 United Nations Secretary-General, His Excellency Dr Kofi Annan.

14:38:01 15 In the course of the visit I intend to discuss with the  
16 Secretary-General issues relating to peace and security in our  
17 sub-region. These are matters which I believe are of great  
18 interest to your Excellency and your country. It would be  
19 appreciated, therefore, if you could join me for a meeting with  
14:38:22 20 the UN Secretary-General on Wednesday, 1 July 1998, here in  
21 Abuja, when these issues will be discussed.

22 I have taken the liberty also to invite our brother,  
23 President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, to the proposed  
24 meeting. The United Nations Secretary-General is looking forward  
14:38:45 25 to the possibility of your attendance.

26 I would like to suggest that your Excellency should arrive  
27 in Abuja in the morning of Wednesday, 1 July 1998, and for the  
28 meeting to take place in the afternoon of the same day. It would  
29 be convenient for you to stay the night with us and depart for



1 home the next day, Thursday, 2 July.

2 Please accept, Excellency and Dear Brother, the assurances  
3 of my highest esteem."

4 Now, Mr Taylor, we see that the topic for discussion was  
14:39:25 5 issued relating to peace and security in the sub-region. Now  
6 help us, was there a particular reason why the President of  
7 Nigeria was inviting you and Tejan Kabbah to meet with the UN  
8 Secretary-General?

9 A. Yes. It involved the problem of Sierra Leone and the  
14:39:49 10 gathering clouds that are developing with accusations coming  
11 directly from the Security Council.

12 Q. And had you discussed this matter with President Abubakar?

13 A. Not at length. It was mentioned to him. I visited him  
14 when he first took over right after the death of Abacha, but  
14:40:19 15 don't forget now he's aware of all of these things because  
16 General Abubakar is the Chief of Defence Staff of Nigeria and is  
17 aware. He is the general responsible for all military activities  
18 in the sub-region. But also he is something like Vice Head of  
19 State, so he is aware of what's going on.

14:41:01 20 Q. And I'm helpfully reminded that in the agreed facts - it's  
21 agreed fact Number 11 - that Sani Abacha died in June 1998. So,  
22 Mr Taylor, did you attend this meeting?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. So just so that we get the picture, you're at this meeting  
14:41:20 25 with who else?

26 A. The Secretary-General then of the United Nations, Kofi  
27 Annan, and my friend Tejani Kabbah.

28 Q. Who else?

29 A. Abdul salami of course is there.

1 Q. And what is discussed?

2 A. How to continue to maintain a very good brotherly  
3 relationship in face of all of the problems, how I can continue  
4 to help from the Liberian side in the promotion of peace in  
14:41:53 5 Sierra Leone basically and to open and to keep open a constant  
6 line of communication between President Kabbah and myself.

7 Q. Now at that meeting did Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General  
8 of the United Nations, raise the issue which had been raised by  
9 the President of the Security Council with your representative in  
14:42:21 10 New York?

11 A. Well, I will put it this way. We discussed it. I mean, I  
12 was more anxious to raise it than he. I raised it and we  
13 discussed it.

14 Q. And what did you say to the Secretary-General in that  
14:42:35 15 regard, Mr Taylor?

16 A. I expressed to him my complete dismay and surprise at the  
17 fact that at that level we had accusations coming about Liberian  
18 involvement in Sierra Leone when in fact the Economic Community  
19 of West African States had not made such allegations, because the  
14:43:00 20 normal procedure in dealing with the Security Council, the  
21 Security Council doesn't just jump into regional matters and  
22 shouldn't jump into regional matters. The Security Council of  
23 the United Nations is the ultimate body responsible for  
24 international peace and security, but they always stay out of  
14:43:19 25 regional matters until it is brought to their attention, except  
26 there is an extraordinary situation.

27 So here we have a situation where don't forget the entire  
28 Sierra Leonean peace process, how does it go? It comes from  
29 ECOWAS, it goes to the OAU and from the OAU it goes to the United

1 Nations. Very rarely do you find the UN just jumping into  
2 matters like this. It's really - that's really not the function  
3 of the Security Council as such. For all of us that can read the  
4 UN charter, it doesn't work that way.

14:43:57 5 So I expressed to him that I'm dismayed that ECOWAS has not  
6 raised the issue. The OAU has not raised the issue. All of a  
7 sudden there is a discussion at the Security Council at the  
8 moment that Liberia is asking for the lifting of an arms embargo.  
9 What is going on? I mean, I'm amazed. So I raised it because,  
14:44:16 10 as I keep saying, I'm seeing the gathering clouds of problems  
11 coming from us.

12 Q. So tell me, Mr Taylor, why do you think the Security  
13 Council decided to raise this issue in this extraordinary way?

14 A. I tell you - we are not allowed to speculate here and so I  
14:44:45 15 will not. I'm just as amazed as everyone else, because even such  
16 a matter as that there would have been some direct questions and  
17 even the chairman of ECOWAS would be able to look into it. I  
18 really - except where we go back to this squabble between I can  
19 say Britain in trying to contain Nigeria and all of those that  
14:45:16 20 are on - that are in strong support of these views.

21 And by this time, you don't see this here, but some of us  
22 are making some very tough statements on the radio and in  
23 interviews stating our position very clearly why there are  
24 differences behind the door in ECOWAS, but because of these  
14:45:38 25 issues we are very, very strong. We are espousing our  
26 pan-African views and talking about the very things that Tom  
27 Ikimi stated there. We were - I mean, some of us were really not  
28 quiet.

29 So all I can say here is maybe some people saw me as a

1 problem, looking back at the Cold War situation where he was  
2 trained in Libya and they trained people in Libya, and so they  
3 tried to stop me from being elected as President. The Liberian  
4 people did not buy the argument when we go back to, "Even though  
14:46:20 5 he killed my ma, he killed my pa, we'll vote for him", to the  
6 interference in the electoral process of funding political  
7 parties in violation of our laws, I just felt that the - I think  
8 the word came out then, "We must stop or get Taylor", because  
9 there is no reason why whatsoever at this level Okelo should do a  
14:46:47 10 letter to the Security Council and when we are only asking for a  
11 lifting of an arms embargo.

12 It becomes an issue and what the President of the Security  
13 Council does at the end of that letter, he asks for an official  
14 response from my government at the end of that letter. He asks  
14:47:09 15 for an official response, which means it's a very serious matter,  
16 and then we begin the process of trying to explain and explain it  
17 away. And I tell you quite frankly - and this is factual and I'm  
18 sure that people here in these small countries around the world  
19 know - look, what you really need at that level is a Godfather.  
14:47:29 20 If there is no one on that council to say, "No, let's take it  
21 this way. We will not accept this against this little country",  
22 you get smashed and this is what happened to Liberia and this is  
23 what happens to me as President. That's all I can - and that's  
24 all I can put it to.

14:47:48 25 Q. Well help us, Mr Taylor --

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, the witness said - he kept  
27 referring to "they", "they did this" and "they did that". Who  
28 are you referring to?

29 THE WITNESS: When you say - well, the "they" I'm referring

1 to the council and what they are doing. It's the council.

2 MR GRIFFITHS:

3 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, present at this meeting at the beginning of  
4 July is also President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah?

14:48:18 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now given what you were saying to the Secretary-General,  
7 Kofi Annan, did Mr Kabbah support the suggestion that you were  
8 sending Liberians to fight in Sierra Leone?

9 A. No. In that meeting he mentioned that there were Liberians  
14:48:38 10 and he was amazed by the presence of Liberians, but he did not  
11 voice it as an accusation directly against me. No, he didn't.

12 Q. Did he, for example, mention to the Secretary-General that  
13 his own government had been busy for years hiring Liberians to  
14 fight for them?

14:48:58 15 A. No, he did not in that meeting. He did not.

16 Q. So that's the beginning of July, Mr Taylor, yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Now before we move on, can we mark that  
19 letter for identification please. It's a letter from President  
14:49:20 20 Abubakar to President Charles Taylor dated 27 June 1998, MFI-46.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-46.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. So we're up to the beginning of July, Mr Taylor. I wonder,  
24 please, if the witness can be given bundle number 3 and I'd like  
14:50:08 25 us to look at some photographs together at this stage, Mr Taylor.

26 The last photograph we looked at was the photograph behind  
27 divider 41 and I'd like us now to go to the photograph behind  
28 divider 42. Who can we see in that photograph, Mr Taylor?

29 A. You see the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, and

1 myself.

2 Q. What occasion is this?

3 A. This must be July 26, our independence.

4 Q. Why do you say it must be July 26?

14:51:21 5 A. Because at the official programme all Presidents of  
6 Liberia, depending on the time of the day, wear a military  
7 uniform to correspond with the different segments of the armed  
8 forces. So this is really the coast guard navy section, which is  
9 the evening time.

14:51:48 10 Q. So this is Liberian Independence Day, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And you're with the President of where?

13 A. Burkina Faso.

14 Q. Now you go back some time with Blaise Compaore, don't you?

14:52:11 15 A. Definitely.

16 Q. Because when your Special Forces left Libya they went first  
17 of all to Burkina Faso, didn't they?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And he played host to you there before the launch of the  
14:52:26 20 revolution in Liberia?

21 A. That is correct.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I have that photograph marked for  
23 identification, please, your Honour. It's a photograph taken on  
24 Liberian Independence Day, 26 July 1998, with President Blaise  
14:52:47 25 Compaore of Burkina Faso. MFI-47.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. That  
27 photograph is marked for identification MFI-47.

28 MR GRIFFITHS:

29 Q. Now you say in that photograph you're wearing the uniform

1 of the coast guard, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Let us look now at the photograph behind divider 43,  
4 please. What occasion is this?

14:53:22 5 A. This is the inspection of the honour guard earlier during  
6 the daytime. This is the --

7 Q. Which day?

8 A. Independence Day. I mentioned earlier that that white  
9 uniform, that's the evening hours, but this is during the daytime  
14:53:41 10 the inspection of the honour guard at the Barclay Training  
11 Centre.

12 Q. Now what was so special about Independence Day that year,  
13 Mr Taylor?

14 A. Every year it's special, but this is our first real  
14:54:03 15 independence following my being elected as President.

16 Q. Remember when we looked at the notes of the meeting of the  
17 cabinet in January 1998, Mr Taylor, there was mention of this  
18 being was it the 150th anniversary?

19 A. That is correct.

14:54:34 20 Q. Was this then the 150th anniversary celebrations?

21 A. 1998, yes, this is that. This procedure is every 26th, but  
22 this is the sesqui centennial celebration, yes.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay. Could I have that marked for  
24 identification please, your Honour, as MFI-48.

14:55:08 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that photo which also bears the  
26 Defence number DP23 is marked for identification MFI-48.

27 MR GRIFFITHS:

28 Q. So we're now in July of 1998, Mr Taylor. We can put that  
29 folder away for the moment. What is the situation in Liberia at

1 this time?

2 A. Well, things are relatively normal. We were having this  
3 celebration and trying to relax the public, so things are pretty  
4 well normal.

14:56:07 5 Q. And what's happening in terms of the restructuring of the  
6 Liberian armed forces? Is that complete?

7 A. No, no, no, no. We, remember, in the budget had  
8 appropriated some monies to begin to repair certain military  
9 facilities. That is ongoing. And what we do, we appoint a  
14:56:38 10 commission, a national commission, to come up with proposals for  
11 the restructuring of the new armed forces.

12 Q. And in terms of the border with Sierra Leone, what's the  
13 situation there?

14 A. Well, the borders are not that much problem, but inside  
14:57:04 15 Sierra Leone there were problems. I mean, scrimmages here and  
16 there.

17 Q. And were you keeping abreast of those events?

18 A. To the extent that we are a member of the Committee of  
19 Five, yes.

14:57:42 20 Q. Now, do you recall, Mr Taylor, that the minutes of the  
21 cabinet meeting held on 14 January spoke of a conference which  
22 was due to be organised later in the year?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did that conference take place?

14:58:02 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Can we look, please, at the presidential papers, MFI-28.  
27 Can we look at page 255, please. What's this, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That's the speech that I delivered at the opening of the  
29 conference on the future of Liberia, Vision 2024.



1 Q. And let us just put all of this together, shall we. You  
2 recall that your meeting with Kofi Annan and President Kabbah was  
3 at the beginning of July, yes?

4 A. Yes.

14:59:37 5 Q. For a couple of days. We're now towards the end of July  
6 when this conference takes place. Is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And let us just skim certain aspects of this address,  
9 please. As you mention in the second paragraph:

14:59:59 10 "Exactly 367 days ago the people of Liberia delivered an  
11 unquestionable approval, among other things, of our goals and  
12 objectives for national reconciliation and reconstruction."

13 So let us remind ourselves: This is a couple of days over  
14 the first year of you being President of Liberia; is that right?

15:00:32 15 A. Yes, that is correct.

16 Q. So you've been in power for one year. Let us just pause  
17 before looking at the rest of this speech and take stock then.  
18 During that time, Mr Taylor, you had been asked to join the  
19 Committee of Five, yes?

15:00:51 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You'd been involved discussions which eventually led to the  
22 ECOMOG intervention in February of 1998, yes?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. You'd been struggling with very little money to try and put  
15:01:07 25 a war-shattered economy back on its feet, yes?

26 A. That is exactly right.

27 Q. How much progress had you made in that regard, Mr Taylor?

28 A. The best part of this I can look at in terms of progress,  
29 and we had our hopes high, was finally - for us, and for me as

1 President at that particular time, the conversation with  
2 President Clinton and the delegation that came in were high  
3 marks, and really for us I can say these are the high marks.  
4 Because don't forget the \$41 million budget that we talked about  
15:02:00 5 in terms of money, a budget is not what you have, it's what you  
6 anticipate. In our case it was lower than that. But these are  
7 the high marks really. We're looking forward in anticipation of  
8 greater things.

9 Q. Now if we skip the next paragraph and go to the penultimate  
15:02:28 10 paragraph in that column, we see this: "Not too long into my  
11 tenure as 21st President of the Republic of Liberia, I sought to  
12 put into concrete practice our flagship policy of reconciliation,  
13 which would then be the basis for both our domestic and foreign  
14 policy."

15:02:47 15 Do you see that?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What, in fact, are you saying?

18 A. I'm talking about all of the efforts that we've made:  
19 Remember there's the Chicago, USA, conference; we have a cabinet;  
15:02:56 20 Government of National Unity; we now have - this is this national  
21 conference on our future. We've said that there will no witch  
22 hunting. There is not any witch hunting. So we want to make  
23 sure that Liberians in the Diaspora and those at home will  
24 understand that we are serious and mean business, and that's what  
15:03:27 25 we mean by this.

26 Q. Let's go over to page 257, please. Now you see the first  
27 paragraph on that page:

28 "While our government has achieved stability and maintained  
29 security throughout the length and breadth of the country, we

1 have also made noticeable gains in human rights, rule of law, and  
2 valuable contributions to West African diplomacy and stability.  
3 While we have gained grounds in jump starting reconstruction and  
4 renovation of public buildings, including roads and bridges, our  
15:04:13 5 progress in key economic areas such as private sector growth and  
6 industrialisation has not really taken off, hence many of our  
7 citizens have not yet been put to work and therefore consider  
8 their future to be bleak."

9 Now taking that in segments, first of all, had things  
15:04:33 10 remained stable throughout Liberia during that first year of your  
11 office - you were in office?

12 A. Relatively, I can say on - I will give it high marks, yes.

13 Q. Now, in terms of the inability to stimulate the private  
14 sector and industrialisation, what did you put that down to?

15:05:02 15 A. Well, this is why I was so anxious to keep helping out,  
16 even pushing myself to help to get the Sierra Leonean problem  
17 resolved, because I knew that it would - only with stability in  
18 our little sub-region there would have brought investors. No  
19 investor is coming into Liberia just recovering from a war, and  
15:05:38 20 there is still a conflict going on in Sierra Leone. And by the  
21 way, with this conflict going on in Sierra Leone - mind you, here  
22 is the President of the Security Council advising that Liberia is  
23 involved - this kind of news spread out like wildfire. So you  
24 are in deeper and deeper trouble, because right away it's coming  
15:06:04 25 from the UN that: Oh, watch it, there's problems still over  
26 there; Liberia may be doing this. It is just a whole lot of  
27 trouble.

28 So we are trying to do everything to stabilise in order to  
29 get investors to come in for this whole process of what we call

1 the private sector growth and industrialisation. It will never  
2 take place unless there is an atmosphere of peace. Never.

3 Q. Now we've already looked at the photographs of Independence  
4 Day. Can we go to page 262 in this document, please. Now what

15:07:03 5 do you we have here, Mr Taylor?

6 A. That's my sesqui centennial address.

7 Q. This is on Independence Day?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And we've already looked at those photographs, yes?

15:07:13 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Now, again briefly if we start at page 263 just briefly  
12 listing some of the issues you raised. You see on that page you  
13 make reference to the role the United States has made in the  
14 creation of Liberia? Do you see that?

15:07:45 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Where you say, third paragraph on that page:

17 "We must defer to the United States people and government,  
18 to the United States Congress, and to such stars as of the  
19 American Colonisation Society as Bushrod Washington," and you go

15:08:09 20 on to name others; do you see that? And you then hail the United  
21 States Navy in the next paragraph, yes?

22 A. Mm-hm.

23 Q. Now jumping to the next column, you make mention of the  
24 fact that:

15:08:24 25 "In only half a century our national ensign has attracted  
26 the largest maritime fleet in the world and now maintains the  
27 highest safety standards of all", yes?

28 A. Mm-hm.

29 Q. And how:

1 "Liberia participated in peacekeeping activities in the  
2 Congo and championed the independence of that country as well, as  
3 the achievement of sovereignty in many other African nations,  
4 including Ghana and South Africa", yes?

15:08:56 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Do you see that, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Over the page. You note that:

9 "Liberia was a founding member of many international  
10 institutions, including the United Nations, the International  
11 Maritime Organisation, the Organisation of African Unity, the  
12 African Development Bank, the Mano River Union, ECOWAS and the  
13 ECOWAS fund", yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:09:19 15 Q. And go on in addition to point that:

16 "Earlier than America, Liberia granted its female citizens  
17 the right to universal suffrage and produced the first African  
18 lady President of the United Nations General Assembly", yes?

19 A. Fact.

15:09:36 20 Q. Now tell us, Mr Taylor, by this date, 26 July, were you  
21 proud of the achievements you'd made in Liberia over the first  
22 year of your presidency?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can we put that bundle away now, please.

15:10:10 25 A. Are you going to mark those two documents?

26 Q. Well, the whole document has already been marked for  
27 identification. Can I just have a moment, please, Mr President?

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Now you told us earlier, Mr Taylor, that things had  
2 remained fairly peaceful in Liberia in that first year or so,  
3 yes?

4 A. Yes.

15:11:35 5 Q. Did matters change during the summer of 1998?

6 A. Yes, things did change.

7 Q. And what was the first inkling you had that something was  
8 afoot?

9 A. Well, one of my ministers had asked to go for a trip and he  
15:12:08 10 is brought back surreptitiously in the country. In my action of  
11 trying to reconcile, I had invited everyone to a meeting. This  
12 minister doesn't show up. He's very belligerent.

13 Q. Who is he?

14 A. Roosevelt Johnson.

15:12:33 15 Q. Yes?

16 A. And later we have to contain the situation, but we before  
17 this situation still had to deal with this gathering problem  
18 across the border. We were getting messages from our  
19 ambassadors, especially from the West African region, especially  
15:12:53 20 Guinea, about different activities. So things were beginning to  
21 shake on these two levels. Reports coming in from our embassy in  
22 Guinea, coupled with --

23 Q. Reports of what?

24 A. Well we received a letter from the Liberian ambassador,  
15:13:13 25 accredited near Conakry, of the desire of some members of the RUF  
26 to visit Monrovia to speak to me as a member of the Committee of  
27 Five on the problems in Sierra Leone and that there was an  
28 attempt, or that there were contemplations on the part of certain  
29 international organisations - and it's just hearsay - that

1 everything had to be done to remove me from office. So we are  
2 dealing with that issue also.

3 Q. So you said you received a letter from the Liberian  
4 ambassador to Guinea, yes?

15:13:55 5 A. That is correct.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I invite the witness's attention,  
7 please, to the document behind divider 20:

8 Q. Is this the letter, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, this is the letter from my ambassador Tiagen Wantee.

15:15:26 10 Q. What's his name?

11 A. Tiagen, that's T-A-R-G-E-N, and Wantee is W-N-T-E-E.

12 Q. We'll see the name when we go over the page, but let's  
13 begin. We see the letter is dated 12 August 1998. Do you see  
14 that?

15:15:46 15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. "Mr Acting Minister, I have the honour to present my  
17 compliments and to inform government that one Major Eddie P  
18 Kanneh former secretary of state of the military junta RUF of  
19 Sierra Leone on August 8, 1998 called on me and provide some  
15:16:13 20 confidential information regarding security threats against the  
21 Liberian government."

22 Pause there. At this time in August 1998, Mr Taylor, did  
23 you know this man, Eddie Kanneh?

24 A. No, I did not.

15:16:36 25 Q. Major Eddie Kanneh, I should say?

26 A. No, I did not.

27 Q. "According to Major Kanneh his sister has learnt from the  
28 number two of the United Nations representative that they ..." --  
29 "... his sister has learnt from the Guinean number two of the

1 United Nations representatives that they are doing everything  
2 possible to overthrow President Charles Ghankay Taylor. He  
3 emphasised his strong desire of meeting with the Liberian leader  
4 in order to have him informed about the situation."

15:17:23 5 Pause there. Mr Taylor, when you received this letter who  
6 did you think might have an interest in wanting to overthrow you?  
7 A. Exactly what he said - well, you know, Guinea, I would say  
8 Conte and I had never gotten along, so wants to say I think  
9 Guinea at most.

15:18:00 10 Q. "The major who holds a Guinean GSM mobile telephone number  
11 further said that he had contact with a Guinean government  
12 official whose vehicle would drive him up to the frontier. He  
13 then requested the issuance of a Liberian travelling document to  
14 facilitate his travel to Monrovia which we considered illegal  
15:18:28 15 until contacts and proper arrangements were made with the  
16 appropriate authorities."

17 Now note, Mr Taylor, that this man, Major Eddie Kanneh, is  
18 a former Secretary of State of the defunct military junta RUF of  
19 Sierra Leone and according to this letter he is seeking Liberian  
15:19:00 20 travel documents to travel from Guinea to Liberia. Do you follow  
21 that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now help us, according to this Prosecution you're supposed  
24 to be running the RUF. Can you help us as to how it is this man  
15:19:21 25 has to be in Guinea requesting Liberian documents when if you're  
26 in control he could just pop across the border? Can you help us?

27 A. Because I'm not in control and so he cannot just pop across  
28 the border.

29 Q. "Meanwhile Major Kanneh, who remains a strong advocate of



1 the RUF junta forces ...", so he's a major advocate, "...  
2 reiterated his plan of travelling to Liberia along with six other  
3 members of his organisation and would cross into Sierra Leone to  
4 join their men after his meeting with the Liberian leader."

15:20:14 5 Now, look who he names:

6 "He named one Mr Sidi que Janneh ...", and a telephone  
7 number is given. Look who the next name is, "... and Brigadier  
8 Bockarie, Mosquito, both Sierra Leonean nationals, including  
9 ...", note this, "... Mr Sheriff, assistant director of Special  
10 Security Service of Liberia, as contact persons in the country."

11 Let's put all of that together, shall we? We've got a  
12 strong advocate for the junta RUF writing from Guinea, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Not coming over the border from Sierra Leone, yes?

15:21:15 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. He's mentioning that others who might come is a Brigadier  
17 Bockarie who later achieves some notoriety, but look who they're  
18 coming with, Mr Taylor. Your assistant director of Special  
19 Security Services. Who is that?

15:21:37 20 A. Mr Varmuyan Sheriff.

21 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor, what does this tell you?

22 A. Many, many things. In the first place this is shocking, I  
23 cannot understand, and he is now being shown as the contact  
24 person in Monrovia.

15:22:01 25 Q. Who is the contact person in Monrovia?

26 A. Mr Sheriff is the contact person. Now this tells me  
27 immediately that Mr Sheriff, okay, during his ULIMO time, knowing  
28 this man is already in contact with these people, but does not  
29 have an opportunity to get them in the country and now he's

1 trying to get them in officially.

2 Because when I sit here and look at the testimony of  
3 Varmuyan Sherif before this Court, just to paraphrase Varmuyan is  
4 supposed to be sent by me. He crosses into Sierra Leone. He's  
15:22:59 5 arrested. He's arrested and he's held by these people for a few  
6 days. And guess what happens? He has to make a call back to  
7 Monrovia and there is - Mr Montgomery is supposed to take this  
8 call and finally he gets to bring Mr Bockarie from Sierra Leone  
9 across the border into Liberia. This - if I'm paraphrasing  
15:23:33 10 properly and I stand corrected, this is the testimony.

11 Now, here is - he also said that he was half Sierra  
12 Leonean. So here we have this man here, Mr Varmuyan Sherif,  
13 saying that he had gone there for the first time, people hardly  
14 knew him, he was arrested and he had to seek clarification and  
15:23:54 15 here it's very clear I don't even know the Sam Bockarie and  
16 they're trying to come through Guinea, which we do not accept.  
17 Q. Now did you know that Varmuyan Sherif, your assistant  
18 director of Special Security Services, had these contacts with  
19 the junta RUF, Mr Taylor? Did you know?

15:24:21 20 A. I had no idea.

21 Q. Mr Taylor, had you had any prior contact with the RUF?

22 A. Well when you say "prior" now, except for 1991?

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. Okay. 1991, yes. Up to May of '92, yes. Following that,  
15:24:44 25 no, none beyond that.

26 Q. But this is an important letter and so let us spend some  
27 time unpacking it, please. So we have this request from a Major  
28 Kanneh who you've never come across before, yes?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Wanting to enter Liberia and bring others with him, yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And the contact person they have is a former ULIMO general,  
4 yes?

15:25:20 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Varmuyan Sheriff?

7 A. Yes.

8 MS HOLLIS: Your Honour, the plain language of this last  
9 sentence appears to be different than the meaning that is being  
10 given it to by Defence counsel, because this last sentence  
11 doesn't name a contact person. It says he named one Mr Sidiq  
12 Janneh, and he gives a telephone number, and Brigadier Bockarie,  
13 Mosquito, both Sierra Leonean nationals, including one Mr Sheriff,  
14 with his title, as contact persons in the country. He doesn't  
15 say he's bringing Mr Bockarie and Mr Janneh, but that these three  
16 people are contact persons. That's the plain reading of this  
17 language.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say to that objection,  
19 Mr Griffiths?

15:26:31 20 MR GRIFFITHS: I think it might be best if we ask the  
21 witness to explain what his understanding of the letter is, given  
22 that the letter was addressed to him.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, all right. Go ahead.

24 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:26:44 25 Q. Help us, Mr Taylor, what's your understanding of this  
26 letter?

27 A. Well, my understanding of this letter is as follows: There  
28 is Mr Sidiq Janneh, who is in Guinea. There is Mr Bockarie and  
29 Mr Kanneh, two Sierra Leoneans, that want to come to Liberia with

1 a six-man delegation, and they have a contact person in Liberia  
2 who happens to be the assistant director of Special Security  
3 Services. This is my interpretation of this letter. And I think  
4 we ought to make something clear to the Court. The gentleman  
15:27:32 5 writing this letter, the ambassador to Guinea at this time,  
6 Tiagen Wantee, let me remind you, Tiagen Wantee is a trained  
7 Special Forces. In fact, for a little background, so we can know  
8 - because when you go through his letter to see why he's so  
9 concerned - in evidence led before this Court it was stated that  
15:27:58 10 the former President of Liberia, Samuel Doe, had what he called  
11 the SATU, Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, and it was also stated for  
12 the records here that that unit was trained by the state of  
13 Israel. Tiagen Wantee was one of those senior commanders that  
14 were trained in Israel with SATU. He also trained with us in  
15:28:29 15 Libya as a Special Force. So he's very, very, very, very  
16 security minded and he's a very trained personnel. So when we  
17 see the construct, I wanted to give a background who this  
18 ambassador is and why he's taking - he's being so particular  
19 about his descriptions here.

15:28:51 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, just earlier you said:  
21 We'll ask the witness, seeing the letter is addressed to him.  
22 That's not quite correct, is it?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: All right. Let me clarify that:

24 Q. Mr Taylor, did this letter come into your possession?

15:29:12 25 A. A letter of this nature, yes, it came into the possession  
26 of the National Security Council and on to me, yes.

27 Q. Bearing in mind this mention of Mr Sherif, can we just  
28 remind ourselves of one or two things, please. First of all,  
29 Mr Taylor, have a look, please, at this map, which was marked by

1 Mr Sherif, Defence exhibit 1. Do you remember this?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Mr Taylor, I don't think you need to change places. What  
4 was it that Mr Sherif was indicating on this map?

15:30:01 5 A. Well, he was indicating something that only he could have  
6 known because he was a ULIMO general. So this mark that he's  
7 indicating here is only he, as a ULIMO general, could have really  
8 known some of the details of what he tried to talk here about the  
9 bush.

15:30:20 10 Q. And he was marking on that map, wasn't he, the area  
11 controlled by ULIMO from 1992 or 3 through to 1996, wasn't he?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Now bear in mind also, Mr Taylor, do you recall being put  
14 in evidence a salute report from Sam Bockarie to the leader in

15:30:46 15 which mention was made of a trade in arms and ammunition between  
16 the RUF and ULIMO?

17 A. Definitely.

18 Q. Do you remember that?

19 A. Yes.

15:30:54 20 Q. Bearing that in mind, let us now look, please, at another  
21 document which was introduced through Mr Sherif. This is exhibit  
22 P-25. Yes, Mr Taylor?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you remember this?

15:31:22 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, the routes that have been marked on this  
27 map in yellow, red and maroon, those routes, they go through --

28 A. ULIMO areas.

29 Q. So they go through ULIMO areas, yes?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So let's try and put that together then, shall we. ULIMO  
3 control that area for a number of years, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

15:31:55 5 Q. We see marked on this second map what appears to be some  
6 trade routes leading through ULIMO areas, don't we?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. We also know from the salute report that there was a trade  
9 going on in arms and ammunition between ULIMO and the RUF, don't  
10 we?

15:32:17

11 A. We do.

12 Q. Yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And now we have in this letter a suggested link between  
15 Sheriff and the RUF, yes?

15:32:26

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Which appears to predate 12 August 1998?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. What do you make of all of that, Mr Taylor?

15:32:40

20 A. Well, I would say as follows: Look, if we think deep a  
21 little bit, we will see here that one can almost readily say if,  
22 as alleged, there was this contact - and mind you, we are way  
23 into August of 1998 - that there was this contact between  
24 ourselves - by that I mean my government and the RUF - then there  
25 should be no need to be trying to find a means to get to Liberia  
26 in the first instance. Then if that contact is there and there's  
27 an ongoing situation, why, in August of 1998 Eddie Kanneh is  
28 trying to get a delegation in to me, if there was supposed to be  
29 this association all along? And the way he writes this letter,

15:33:21

1 the ambassador here, based on the description - like the  
2 terminology "one this, one that", it must suggest to someone that  
3 these are people that others are not acquainted with. When he  
4 say "one Mr This and one Mr That", it simply means that we are  
15:34:13 5 not acquainted. So we have no contact, and this contact is his  
6 contact from the old ULIMO days of trading on this border when  
7 they occupied this area up until 1996, okay - and I believe a  
8 little - and I know it's a little more than that. And this  
9 really shows that this Sheriff, okay, is trying to do everything  
15:34:36 10 to continue this now with the government. And he really fails,  
11 because for Eddie to go to the ambassador and say: Well, look,  
12 we want to get in there and we want to bring the following  
13 people, it simply means that he has failed in his quest to make  
14 any connection with government.

15:34:58 15 Q. Now, when you say that shows that Sheriff is trying to do  
16 everything to continue this now with the government, continue  
17 what?

18 A. He's trading of arms and ammunition. And I know he knows  
19 that nobody is going to tolerate this, and so this now in my  
15:35:17 20 opinion - in my opinion - shows some anxiety on the part of these  
21 guys now that: Look, since we can't get - you know, since, you  
22 know, we can't deal through this guy and we can't get anything,  
23 let's go through official sources to get to Monrovia. And that's  
24 the official source they go through in Conakry.

15:35:38 25 Q. Now, when you say Sheriff failed, what do you mean?

26 A. Well, I mean here is the assistant director, who has no  
27 real authority in Liberia, dealing with members of the junta -  
28 and if you go further, you see with the ambassador - because all  
29 of our embassies - and the language used by the ambassador here

1 shows that we have - that all of our diplomats around the world  
2 know the official and practical position of the Liberian  
3 government. So if you read what the ambassador is saying, he  
4 knows that he's not supposed to be doing this, and so he's  
15:36:21 5 beginning to say: Wow, there is a question. So I can see  
6 Mr Sherif here now trying to broaden his own contacts at  
7 government level, but it cannot work. That's why they have to  
8 now go through the official ambassador route.

9 Q. But, Mr Taylor, according to Mr Sherif, you were the one  
15:36:44 10 who sent him to make contact with Sam Bockarie?

11 A. Well, if I had sent him, which he is lying, why would he go  
12 to the ambassador in Guinea? But mind you, he said here - he  
13 said here before this Court that he had been arrested by the RUF,  
14 who thought that he - that, you know, he was an impostor, okay?  
15:37:10 15 He never disclosed to this Court that he knew these people. He  
16 knew them; he worked with them; very well. Now Eddie Kanneh goes  
17 to Conakry and says: Well, look, here's the situation but, you  
18 know, this is done through our contact in Monrovia.

19 Q. So Mr Taylor, was Mr Sherif telling this Court the truth  
15:37:35 20 when he said that you sent him to meet Sam Bockarie?

21 A. He was telling a blatant lie. A blatant, blatant lie he  
22 was telling. Never sent him any place to get Sam Bockarie to  
23 come to Liberia when we --

24 Q. Mr Taylor, you're supposed to have had this ongoing contact  
15:37:57 25 with the RUF - for years, according to the Prosecution - so can  
26 you explain the contents of this letter?

27 A. Well, it tells you that the Prosecution is wrong. The  
28 Prosecution is wrong. Because if this contact had existed, as  
29 the Prosecution wants this Court to believe, Ambassador Wantee -



1 ambassadors are representatives of the President - would have not  
2 written this letter this way. He would have written to the  
3 acting foreign minister and said: Oh, guess what? We have some  
4 people here that are close to the President, and as a government  
15:38:36 5 policy we are sending them down. He would not have raised the  
6 technical issues that he's raising in this letter. This  
7 ambassador is being - he's very smart. He's talking about the  
8 illegality of making - of giving these travel documents. And he  
9 goes further on to talk about what this junta is and what  
15:39:03 10 ECOWAS's position - all of our position is on this particular  
11 problem. So it simply tells you that he lied. Varmuyan Sherif  
12 lied.

13 Q. Let's go over the page, please, to the second page.

14 "In the midst of the recent news reports of accusations  
15:39:29 15 against the Government of Guinea, one cannot underestimate the  
16 authenticity of this information or the intentions of Major  
17 Kanneh. On the other hand, why would he want to travel to  
18 Liberia with six RUF junta men for continuation to Sierra Leone,  
19 when in fact ECOWAS leaders yearned for sub-regional peace and  
15:39:52 20 security."

21 Pause there. What's your understanding of that paragraph,  
22 Mr Taylor?

23 A. He is following as a diplomat that he should be - he's  
24 following the policy of the Liberian government and ECOWAS, and  
15:40:04 25 he knows it, because all diplomatic missions are fully informed  
26 about the official position and actions of government. That's  
27 what he's talking about here.

28 Q. That sentence, "On the other hand, why would he want to  
29 travel to Liberia with six RUF junta men", what did you

1 understand by that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. It simply means that why would anybody want to make a  
3 proposal to violate the arrangement under ECOWAS? Why would  
4 anybody want to do that? It would be foolish for anybody to do  
15:40:40 5 this.

6 Q. "In view of the above and in consideration of the  
7 prevailing political situation, coupled with the recent smuggle  
8 of Mr Roosevelt Johnson into Liberia, I would highly suggest that  
9 maximum security measures be mounted at all border posts and  
15:41:05 10 strategic locations in the country to curb any subversive  
11 attempts. With sentiments of my highest esteem, sincerely yours,  
12 Tiagen Wantee, ambassador."

13 Yes?

14 A. Yes.

15:41:25 15 Q. As of 12 August, Mr Taylor, had you ever met Eddie Kanneh?

16 A. No, no, no, never.

17 Q. Had you ever met Mr Sidi que Janneh?

18 A. Never, including Bockarie.

19 Q. Had you met Mr Bockarie?

15:41:46 20 A. No, I had not met Sam Bockarie up to this point.

21 Q. If these people were known to you, Mr Taylor, can you  
22 explain why they would need to provide their telephone numbers?

23 A. Well, it just shows you that they were not known. The  
24 ambassador is just doing his work and giving the straight  
15:42:07 25 information to his boss.

26 Q. Because these are people, according to the Prosecution,  
27 you're supposed to know. So help us, why are they needing to  
28 provide their contact details as if you've never met them before?  
29 Why?

1 A. I have never - I don't know why they did it. I guess it's  
2 a part of their own case, I guess. I have never met these people  
3 and let me just add evidence before this Court, I do not recall a  
4 witness coming here saying that during the period of time that  
15:42:43 5 Foday Sankoh visited Liberia between August 1991 up until May of  
6 1992 there's not one witness who has come before this Court and  
7 said he was accompanied by Sam Bockarie in a trip to Gbarnga.  
8 Never. I had never met Sam Bockarie to this point, ever. Never.  
9 And no witness has come here and said, "Oh, at this time when he  
15:43:08 10 was coming he brought Sam Bockarie along." I never met him.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: Could we have this letter marked for  
12 identification, please. It's a letter from the Liberian  
13 ambassador in Conakry, Guinea, to the acting minister. MFI-49,  
14 please.

15:43:35 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: That letter just described is marked for  
16 identification MFI-49.

17 MR GRIFFITHS:

18 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, let's just pause now please. We're in  
19 mid-August 1998. At this stage do you have any contact with the  
15:44:11 20 junta, or the RUF?

21 A. No. At this stage, no.

22 Q. What was your reaction when you first came across this  
23 letter we've just looked at?

24 A. After I received this letter and the National Security  
15:44:33 25 Council debated the letter, I immediately informed the members of  
26 the Committee of Five of a letter that we had received from our  
27 embassy in Guinea. And by this time let me make something clear.  
28 I had never, ever met Sam Bockarie, but we've been hearing about  
29 Sam Bockarie as being the commander in charge of the RUF. We

1 were hearing it in news reports.

2 I reported to them that I had received a letter from our  
3 embassy in Conakry on the desire of this delegation to come and  
4 amongst them was the individual whose name had been mentioned as  
15:45:25 5 being in charge of the RUF since the incarceration of Foday  
6 Sankoh. There was general agreement that because at this time we  
7 are only recognising and looking at the 1996 agreement and the  
8 crisis --

9 Q. Which agreement in 1996?

15:45:45 10 A. In November of 1996 there is the Abidjan agreement between  
11 the RUF and the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

12 Q. Very well.

13 A. They saw this as an opportunity, because we didn't know who  
14 to talk to. Imagine the junta is driven out of Freetown, there  
15:46:13 15 is fighting going on and actually the outside world has contact  
16 with no-one. Let me say had contact with no-one. So they saw  
17 this as an opportunity to begin to discuss with the committee  
18 with this guy that was in charge of the RUF, they saw this as an  
19 opportunity and felt it would be a good thing to see if we could  
15:46:41 20 invite him to Liberia to find out how we could move the peace  
21 forward.

22 Q. So what steps were taken thereafter?

23 A. After informing them and getting their acquiescence, around  
24 about September - I would say middle to late September - we then  
15:47:04 25 invited Sam Bockarie to come to Liberia.

26 Q. And when was that?

27 A. I would say that's about - I would put it to September of  
28 1998.

29 Q. And who extended the invitation to Sam Bockarie?

1 A. I as President of Liberia and a member of the Committee of  
2 Five did.

3 Q. And by what means did you communicate with Mr Bockarie?

15:47:43

4 A. I had one of my generals to go to the border and send a  
5 message into Sierra Leone, the border between Liberia and Sierra  
6 Leone at Mendekoma, in fact in person of General Menkarzon, to go  
7 and get a message in that a member of the Committee of Five,  
8 President Taylor, wished to meet with Bockarie. It took a few  
9 days and Bockarie was escorted to Monrovia by General Menkarzon.

15:48:07

10 Q. Are you sure it wasn't by Varmuyan Sheriff?

11 A. Varmuyan Sheriff? No, No. Why? No, not at all. Varmuyan  
12 Sheriff is really far from me and something as important as  
13 dealing with the Community of West African States, I would not  
14 put Varmuyan Sheriff in that.

15:48:30

15 Q. Why did you select General Menkarzon to do this?

16 A. General Menkarzon was a very senior and serious general.  
17 We had sent General Menkarzon - remember back at the time of the  
18 withdrawal of the men from Sierra Leone under this famous Top 20,  
19 Top 40 programme, General Menkarzon went in to withdraw the  
20 people. He's one of our Special Forces and, while our men were  
21 deployed in Liberia at the time for the border security, General  
22 Menkarzon went in and out, sometimes inspected, so he knew some  
23 of the fellows on the Sierra Leonean side. So we sent someone  
24 that was acquainted with the region and someone that knew some of  
25 the elements on the other side.

15:49:23

26 Q. Now just so that we can take stock of where we are, in July  
27 of 1998 it's judicially noted fact U that Foday Sankoh was  
28 transferred in July 1998 from Nigeria to Sierra Leone where he  
29 was being detained by the Kabbah government in custody. Do you

1 recall that, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Yes, Bockarie is in control though.

3 Q. And Bockarie in Sankoh's absence is in control?

4 A. That is correct. And excuse me, counsel, your Honours, I  
15:50:20 5 want to add that even though Sierra Leone is not a member of the  
6 Committee of Five, but President Kabbah is aware that this  
7 invitation that we are going to talk to Bockarie. He is not on  
8 the committee - Sierra Leone is not - but they are aware that  
9 this invitation and the bringing of Bockarie to Liberia, he is  
15:50:39 10 fully aware of it.

11 Q. How is he made aware of it?

12 A. Because I communicated that to him.

13 Q. How?

14 A. By telephone.

15:50:47 15 Q. Did you tell him about the letter you'd received from your  
16 ambassador in Guinea?

17 A. I told him about the letter, as I had said to all other  
18 members of the committee and even people outside of the  
19 committee.

15:51:01 20 Q. And what was President Kabbah's view about you meeting with  
21 these representatives of the RUF?

22 A. Well, Kabbah remembered that he had an agreement with these  
23 people. He knew that there were problems still in the country.  
24 He knows that - all of us know that I mean Sankoh is in custody.  
15:51:24 25 His whole interest is how can we stop these scrimmages still  
26 going on throughout all these major cities. There are attacks,  
27 there are counterattacks, there are ambushes. There are a lot of  
28 problems going on.

29 Q. Now in August of 1998, Mr Taylor, at this stage what's the

1 situation like in Lofa County?

2 A. By August of 1998 we have some of our security personnel -  
3 mostly you have ULIMO, all of the ex-combatants, they are in that  
4 particular area.

15:52:32 5 Q. And is the situation calm?

6 A. Well we don't have fighting going on, but it is - it's a  
7 little lawless, I would put it. That is individuals are doing  
8 things that, you know, we did not know about in Monrovia,  
9 disorderly conduct.

15:52:58 10 Q. Like what?

11 A. People were trading, selling produce and other things. I  
12 mean, there was just lawlessness in that general area between  
13 Voinjama, Kolahun, Foya. It was a little lawless, I would say,  
14 and we were not collecting taxes and so there was brisk - brisk  
15 business going on.

16 Q. Did you know about this business at the time?

17 A. Well, government knew that we were not collecting taxes  
18 from the area. Just normally - look, we have all these  
19 combatants. They are not working. We are not paying them. So,  
15:53:51 20 you know, we were looking at things like you get your little  
21 coffee and you sell it, or your little cocoa, or rice. It was  
22 just this kind of thing that we were aware of, you know, with  
23 Guinea, Liberian-Guinea border. It was just - but it was not a  
24 controlled environment where we had tax collectors. That's what  
15:54:13 25 I mean by it was a little lawless.

26 Q. But did you have the capacity to make it more law abiding?

27 A. Well, we were still trying to get in resources to train  
28 police and other people. There were people over there we called  
29 commanders, but in fact they were just the same - you know, all

1 of the top ULIMO people remained in the area and everybody in  
2 these areas, you know, were either generals or colonels. So it's  
3 just this type of environment that I cannot call that, you know,  
4 a totally civil environment. That's why I say it was a little  
15:55:02 5 lawless. But there was not an act of war, like fighting and  
6 shooting, no.

7 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier Roosevelt Johnson. What was the  
8 situation with regard to him, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Well, later on in the same month, I think, of September we  
15:55:27 10 had - things came to a head. We had to break up the little city  
11 state that Roosevelt had created right near the mansion with  
12 armed people and so we - with some assistance from ECOMOG - moved  
13 in and routed him out. He ran to the US Embassy, where he took  
14 refuge. We tried to get them to turn him over, they did not.

15:56:01 15 Then this caused some diplomatic problems between my government  
16 and the United States government where there were a series of  
17 diplomatic notes exchanged, and the United States, seeing the  
18 situation, dispatched the USS Chinook out into our waters. We  
19 demanded that it be removed; they did not. We asked them to  
15:56:29 20 demonstrate that their actions were not hostile by coming and  
21 docking into the port of Monrovia; they did not. It was a very,  
22 very tense time.

23 Eventually Roosevelt Johnson got flown out of the country  
24 to neighbouring Sierra Leone, and because of the good  
15:56:53 25 relationship that had developed between President Kabbah and  
26 myself - between President Kabbah and myself, he was very good  
27 and I will give him high marks on this. We had developed - by  
28 September now I'm talking about - a very good working  
29 relationship, and I insisted that those men not be permitted to



1 stay in Sierra Leone. And true to our conversations, and there  
2 were several of them, he demanded that those people be taken out,  
3 and so Roosevelt Johnson was not permitted to stay in Freetown  
4 based on what Tejani had done, because we had built a very strong  
15:57:43 5 relationship at the time. He said, "My brother don't worry. If  
6 they are bothering you there, we are not going to let them stay  
7 here," and he threw them out, and I give him credit for that.

8 Q. When you say some difficulties arose, what are we talking  
9 about, Mr Taylor, in order to - what are we talking about?

15:58:08 10 Warfare, or what?

11 A. Warfare. We had to move in with arms that we got assisted  
12 with from ECOMOG. They put up some roadblocks across the city,  
13 not getting directly involved, and our own security people - and  
14 by "security people", I mean most of them are the same

15:58:27 15 ex-combatants - moved in and routed him out. He fled. And by  
16 the way, one of those involved with Roosevelt Johnson that we  
17 arrested - we arrested and incarcerated - appeared before this  
18 Court, Mr Abu Keita, who was a part of that rebellion against my  
19 government, was arrested, incarcerated, and later on released as  
15:59:03 20 an act of reconciliation. The very man who sat here and said

21 that I had sent him on a mission to Sierra Leone, he lied. He  
22 was involved with Roosevelt Johnson, and we captured him and  
23 incarcerated him, and it was through the intervention of Musa  
24 Cisse and other Mandingo elements in Monrovia as an act of  
15:59:27 25 reconciliation he was one of those released. One of the same  
26 Varmuyan boys who in his chair, or another one similar to it,  
27 lied and said I had sent him on a mission to Sierra Leone. He  
28 was one of those captured. There was a battle that went right  
29 within the vicinity of the United States Embassy where, in fact,

1 one of the individuals that got hit subsequently died on the  
2 embassy property. But we fought a very bitter war for about, I  
3 would say - it lasted several hours, but we ended it immediately  
4 and tried to restore things to normal.

16:00:07 5 May I just add, by this time - by this time -  
6 interestingly, I should have mentioned before - because of the  
7 gathering storm against my government, we succeed in getting in  
8 Monrovia a special representative of the Secretary-General  
9 accredited near Monrovia. I think it's important, because from  
16:00:37 10 that moment we tried to get the United Nations involved in not  
11 all, but almost everything that we're doing in an attempt to try  
12 to show that we have nothing to hide - that name is Felix  
13 Downes-Thomas - becomes the special representative of the  
14 Secretary-General earlier than this particular time. I thought  
16:01:05 15 to - I forgot to mention it, because it's important as it relates  
16 to all of these actions that are now taking place, whether Sam  
17 Bockarie is coming to Liberia, it is not hidden, or what happens  
18 with this conflict with Roosevelt Johnson. The UN - we get  
19 involved in everything trying to clear the stigma that has been  
16:01:28 20 put on this young government about what's happening in Sierra  
21 Leone with Liberians that they know are not related to my  
22 government's activities.

23 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, this incident with Roosevelt Johnson, was  
24 there a report prepared by the Government of Liberia about that  
16:01:49 25 incident?

26 A. We did a full accounting of what happened, showing all of  
27 the diplomatic notes from my government and from the United  
28 States government, everything. We did a full report for the  
29 United Nations, of which a copy was supplied to the special

1 representative's office.

2 Q. Can I invite attention, please, to the document behind  
3 divider 24. Some spellings while we do that: USS Chinook,  
4 C-H-I-N-O-O-K; Felix, F-E-L-I-X, Downes, D-O-W-N-E-S, hyphen  
16:02:38 5 Thomas.

6 Let us remind ourselves, Mr Taylor, in that letter from the  
7 Liberian ambassador to Guinea there was reference, if you recall  
8 in the last paragraph, to Roosevelt Johnson, yes?

9 A. That is correct.

16:03:33 10 Q. And that letter was dated, if I recall, 12 August 1998,  
11 wasn't it?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Let us now please have a look at this document. Now, first  
14 of all, Mr Taylor, why was it felt necessary to prepare this  
16:03:50 15 document?

16 A. Well, the incident near the US Embassy and this individual  
17 that died within the walls of the embassy after they opened the  
18 gate, Liberia was charged with a major act of being in violation  
19 of the Geneva Conventions as regards the protection of diplomatic  
16:04:26 20 premises, and the United States was saying that this was  
21 unacceptable and if it were determined that that was the case,  
22 there would be grave consequences. Now, when you tell a little  
23 country like Liberia there will be consequences, you know what  
24 that means. Everybody is not just concerned, but you are really  
16:04:50 25 scared.

26 So we went ahead and prepared a full report and a full  
27 accounting, providing them copies, and even invited them to join  
28 the investigation. Because we had claimed that in fact no one  
29 had entered the embassy compound, and we had not broken

1 international law, and that we would prepare a document that  
2 could be scrutinised by the international community. So if we  
3 had to go into probably I think a follow-up discussion that I  
4 don't think we would have won, whether at the Security Council  
16:05:35 5 level or through arbitration I don't think we would have won,  
6 because a little country like ours would never have won, but we  
7 did it anyway for the record.

8 Q. Let's turn to the introduction on page 1, please. Perhaps  
9 I should ask you before we come to the meat of the document,  
16:06:12 10 Mr Taylor, why is this document entitled the "Camp Johnson Road  
11 Conspiracy"?

12 A. The minister asked to go. We gave him money, we helped him  
13 to go out to Ghana for medical treatment. The minister arrives  
14 back into the country, we don't know when and how. He doesn't  
16:06:38 15 come through any of the international airports. He doesn't come  
16 through any of the roads. He is flown in surreptitiously by a  
17 helicopter at night. We don't know whether it was an ECOMOG  
18 helicopter or what other helicopter, but we get to know that the  
19 man is at his residence at Camp Johnson Road, and all of a sudden  
16:07:01 20 hundreds of former ULIMO-J people in the city are armed. He is  
21 from the Executive Mansion going, I would say, northward into the  
22 city of Monrovia I would say about a half a mile from the  
23 Executive Mansion. All of a sudden, ULIMO-J fighters - and let  
24 me just remind the Court. ULIMO-J is practically based in  
16:07:31 25 Monrovia. ULIMO-J - we've gone through this before - ULIMO-J and  
26 the LPC are former AFL people that are based in Monrovia. So  
27 disarmament for them in Monrovia, they've hidden weapons in the  
28 city. So K is out of town, like the NPFL. So all of a sudden,  
29 every little ULIMO-J and maybe LPC soldier within the particular

1 area is armed. Where these arms are coming from, no one knows.  
2 This becomes a grave matter. So the bringing in of Johnson in  
3 this surreptitious fashion, we developed this word "conspiracy".  
4 Q. Let's go to the introduction:

16:08:21 5 "The most recent and disturbing national convulsion, that  
6 ended in a long drawn nightmare to the innocent population of  
7 Camp Johnson Road, involved Mr Roosevelt Johnson and his military  
8 supporters. Its origin goes back several years. It can be  
9 traced to the violent break-up of the ULIMO faction, born not of  
16:08:44 10 what the organisation stood for, but of what it was against;  
11 finding a welcome embrace in the support it obtained from  
12 diplomatic circles in Monrovia, even including sympathy within  
13 sections of the ECOMOG hierarchy."

14 Diplomatic circles in Monrovia, Mr Taylor, what are we  
16:09:08 15 talking about there?

16 A. I'm talking about the United States Embassy that had given  
17 him support. In fact, they had radios, they had everything.  
18 United States Embassy in Monrovia.

19 Q. "Including sympathy within sections of the ECOMOG  
16:09:21 20 hierarchy." What are we talking about there?

21 A. Well, you can remember that buzz throughout Monrovia with  
22 the flying up and down. There is this little bittersweet  
23 relationship with certain parts of ECOMOG. You know, in these  
24 units a major could make a decision down the road there and cause  
16:09:44 25 havoc. By the time it reaches up to the colonel, you know, it's  
26 already done, and we talk about how you can have all these little  
27 players. So certain officers were pro-government, certain  
28 officers were still bitter, so they would make a little mischief  
29 from time to time.

1 Q. "Nevertheless, there was widespread surprise and concern  
2 when it was reported very early in 1996 that ULIMO-J forces had  
3 ambushed a large contingent of ECOMOG soldiers on the Bomi County  
4 Highway, killing many of them, seizing a tremendous amount of  
16:10:36 5 heavy weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition.

6 From all indications, those same arms and ammunition were  
7 used effectively by the ULIMO-J and LPC forces loyal to Roosevelt  
8 Johnson during his initial stand-off against the Liberian  
9 National Transitional Government, when he resisted arrest on  
16:10:58 10 charges of murder. Johnson's actions triggered the April 6, '96  
11 crisis which led to more than a month of fighting in the city of  
12 Monrovia, resulting in heavy looting of businesses and private  
13 property and burning of a significant part of the city."

14 Now you recall telling us about that, Mr Taylor?

16:11:20 15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. That was during the disarmament period, yes?

17 A. Yes, April 6. Yes.

18 Q. "Much of Mr Roosevelt Johnson's truculence, stubbornness  
19 and vituperative utterances in the interim can be traced to the  
16:11:42 20 belief that he could do no wrong and therefore that he could  
21 inflict any sorrow upon Liberia. Thus although he represents no  
22 political party, was never a political candidate, projects no  
23 political viewpoint, he looked upon himself as the favourite and  
24 darling of some important segments of the Liberian society and  
16:12:02 25 the international community, thereby increasing his ego.

26 Dizzy with this kind of thinking, he doubtlessly found  
27 himself able to reject with impunity his writ of arrest, shot and  
28 killed the arresting officer, and succeeded in militarily  
29 defending himself pretty well with formidable arms in spite of

1 the ongoing disarmament process in Liberia, a process that found  
2 approval by the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity  
3 and ECOWAS and orchestrated by the ECOMOG peacekeeping force in  
4 Liberia.

16:12:45 5 When peace was restored following the April 6, 1996,  
6 crisis, Mr Johnson and many of his followers migrated to Camp  
7 Johnson Road, displaced owners and occupants from the latter's  
8 private homes, erected a virtual military citadel, a street city  
9 state within Monrovia".

16:13:13 10 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

11 A. 100 per cent true.

12 Q. So, Mr Taylor, why wasn't something done prior to autumn of  
13 1998 to dismantle that fortress?

14 A. He did not brandish these arms around up until this time.

16:13:37 15 Everybody knew of disarmament and everything. Just as ULIMO-K in  
16 Lofa was able to hide a lot of arms and sell across the border to  
17 the RUF, in Monrovia what Johnson did was he hid his arms to use  
18 whenever he wanted to. So everybody knew that he was very well  
19 armed.

16:14:05 20 Q. "Johnson surrounded himself with a cadre of advisors,  
21 established executive offices in his illegally occupied  
22 three-storied building, and behaved as a commander in chief and a  
23 President in waiting. His personal movements outside his citadel  
24 were rare, except by heavy ECOMOG escort ..."

16:14:33 25 How come he had an ECOMOG escort, Mr Taylor?

26 A. What we did - remember I said that he was brought in  
27 surreptitiously. I don't know, and did not approve, ECOMOG  
28 giving him special security, because they were not providing that  
29 for any of the other former factional leaders. That's also a

1 part of the conspiracy.

2 Q. "... Long after the government had outlawed such escorts  
3 for ordinary citizens and only using his bullet-proof jeep. He  
4 was often an honoured guest at US embassy cocktails and  
16:15:10 5 receptions."

6 Is that true?

7 A. That is 100 per cent true.

8 Q. "And he enjoyed overwhelming hospital in the United States  
9 on his last so-called medical visit."

16:15:19 10 What does that mean?

11 A. He went on his visit; he said it was Ghana. He ended up in  
12 the States, he ended back in the country, and no one knows how he  
13 got in. He left through the international airport and came --

14 Q. To go where?

16:15:31 15 A. To go to Ghana.

16 Q. And ended up where?

17 A. He went to the States.

18 Q. How do you know he ended up in the States?

19 A. Because when he came, he talked about it.

16:15:42 20 Q. "Johnson's return to Liberia following his medical visit

21 was wrapped in secrecy aboard an ECOMOG flight, as if there  
22 needed to be any secrecy about Mr Johnson's legitimate departure  
23 and return.

24 It was therefore understandable, and came as no surprise,

16:15:59 25 when, having started the September 18, 1998, conflict, and as  
26 failure descended upon him, Mr Johnson and his body of men sought  
27 refuge in the diplomatic enclave of Mamba Point, where the US  
28 Embassy is located.

29 This document is the official account of the activities of



1 Mr Johnson and the response of the Government of Liberia to end  
2 the threats caused by the terrifying developments which were  
3 aimed at destabilising the democratically elected government."

4 So let's come then to the official account:

16:16:48 5 "Against the background of deteriorating security  
6 conditions on Camp Johnson Road and its environs within the City  
7 of Monrovia, the government of the Republic of Liberia, in its  
8 continuing efforts to maintain law and order in the country,  
9 concluded negotiations with the Njalah family for the use of one  
16:17:11 10 of their buildings on Camp Johnson Road across the street from  
11 the police barracks to house some members of the Joint Security  
12 forces.

13 On Friday, 18 September 1998, at about 3 p.m. as some  
14 members of the Joint Security sought to relocate in the building  
16:17:29 15 acquired by government for their use, they came under intensive  
16 fire from armed elements loyal to Ambassador Designate Roosevelt  
17 Johnson, thereby aborting the process."

18 Ambassador Designate?

19 A. Yes.

16:17:48 20 Q. What does that mean?

21 A. It means that - simple: We were trying to get him out of  
22 the country. He was causing too much trouble.

23 Q. "In furtherance of the armed element's resistance to the  
24 relocation exercise of the Joint Security, they commenced setting  
16:18:07 25 up illegal roadblocks. They (armed elements) kidnapped  
26 passers-by and residents. They further engaged in suppressive  
27 firing throughout the night using light automatic rifles, rocket  
28 propelled grenades, hand grenades and other assorted weapons.

29 The unsuspecting residents of the city, particularly those

1 residing in the Camp Johnson Road neighbourhood panicked, while  
2 Joint Security forces adopted a crisis prevention posture.

3 At about 6.30 a.m., Saturday, September 19, 1998, there was  
4 an outburst of sustained heavy firing and movements of a  
16:18:54 5 considerable number of armed supporters of Roosevelt Johnson from  
6 the Camp Johnson Road community towards the Barclay Training  
7 Centre area and the Executive Mansion. At this point Joint  
8 Security forces were ordered to engage the advancing forces of  
9 Roosevelt Johnson.

16:19:14 10 As the battle ensued, part of this heavily armed group of  
11 Roosevelt Johnson succeeded in reaching the BTC, where soldiers  
12 of the Armed Forces of Liberia are based. Several members of the  
13 AFL were gunned down. At this point it had become apparent that  
14 Mr Roosevelt Johnson and his collaborators were in the process of  
16:19:41 15 executing their plan to overthrow the Government of Liberia.

16 Radio and telephone communications monitored by the Joint  
17 Security confirmed instructions from Mr Johnson to assault  
18 government facilities, including the Executive Mansion and the  
19 President's residence. A reinforcement unit from the Military  
16:20:06 20 Police and the Alert Force finally dislodged them from BTC after  
21 a fierce battle. As the remnants of the attacking force  
22 retreated they fled towards Mamba Point, where the US Embassy is  
23 located.

24 The armed elements evaded ECOMOG checkpoints and arrived at  
16:20:24 25 the gates of the US Embassy with Roosevelt Johnson and other  
26 coconspirators. About 45 minutes thereafter the director of  
27 police arrived and met the charge d'affaires of the US Embassy,  
28 Mr John Bowman, outside the embassy compound in direct  
29 negotiations with Mr Johnson and his collaborators in an obvious

1 hostile environment.

2 Director Tate radioed the Minister of Justice, Eddington A  
3 Varmah, that he was at the front gate of the US Embassy with  
4 charge d'affaires Bauman and that Mr Johnson and his  
16:21:08 5 co-conspirators were trying to gain entry into the American  
6 Embassy. The Minister of Justice immediately ordered the  
7 Director to report to him for consultation. When Director Tate  
8 departed the scene, a police officer assigned with the vicinity  
9 of the embassy spotted one of Johnson's armed fighters, who, upon  
16:21:33 10 seeing the police, ran in the direction of the embassy.

11 The police officer pursued and attempted to arrest the  
12 armed element. In the process, one of the embassy guards, who  
13 was outside the gate, tried to obstruct the arrest. It was  
14 during this intense moment that a second police officer who came  
16:21:49 15 out to assist was shot and killed by the embassy guard. The  
16 police officer in turn fired and killed the armed loyalist of  
17 Johnson. Thereafter, firing commenced at three points involving  
18 the security forces of the government, armed loyalists of  
19 Roosevelt Johnson, who had escorted him to the embassy, and US  
16:22:16 20 embassy guards."

21 So that's the situation, Mr Taylor, yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Let's go over the page and let's just glance at some of  
24 these details in the five minutes available. Now, second  
16:22:55 25 paragraph on the left:

26 "There were reasons to believe that by strange means, guns  
27 and ammunition were reaching the area and the occupants were  
28 ex-ULIMO-J and LPC fighters who had regrouped under the command  
29 of former ULIMO-J warlord Roosevelt Johnson."

1 Now, let's go to the second paragraph on the right, please,  
2 Mr Taylor:

3 "In keeping with President Taylor's commitment of national  
4 reconciliation and peace building in the country, government felt  
16:23:32 5 compelled to pursue a course of moral persuasion to resolve  
6 whatever issues Mr Roosevelt Johnson felt strongly about."

7 Is that true?

8 A. That is true.

9 Q. "Following consultations with his cabinet and council of  
16:23:49 10 advisors, the President nominated Roosevelt Johnson as Ambassador  
11 Designate to India. Did you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "Shortly thereafter, Mr Johnson became ill due to a mild  
14 stroke and appealed to government for assistance to seek medical  
16:24:04 15 attention abroad. The Government of Liberia, under the kind  
16 auspices of President Taylor, was gracious and generous in  
17 providing more than \$46,000 to cover the cost of medical  
18 treatment for Mr Johnson."

19 Is that true?

16:24:18 20 A. That is true.

21 Q. This is the trip he was supposed to be taking to Ghana?

22 A. That is it.

23 Q. So the Government of Liberia was paying for it?

24 A. Yes. As a minister he was on the job. We don't have  
16:24:29 25 national insurance. When he did have a minor stroke, very minor,  
26 and the cost of his treatment and as a minister - he carried, I  
27 think, an aid or two - we did the total cost of this, yes.

28 Q. And it continues:

29 "Prior to this, Mr Johnson converted to his personal use

1 the amount of US\$20,000 which President Taylor had asked him to  
2 convey to the First United Methodist Church in fulfillment of an  
3 earlier pledge. Johnson had had given the impression that he was  
4 a bona fide member of that church. The President was  
16:25:11 5 embarrassing constrained to replace the US\$20,000."

6 Is that true?

7 A. This is true.

8 Q. "This aside from being the beneficiary of a \$40,000 grant  
9 and a monthly consignment of 125 bags of rice."

16:25:26 10 Is that true?

11 A. Yeah, but you need some context quickly on this. That's  
12 true. This is not just money. It is not payoff. Somebody will  
13 say, "Why did you pay him?" No. Because they still had  
14 combatants that they had to help, we gave them food, a little  
16:25:46 15 allowance to all of the former factional leaders because they had  
16 these boys coming after them every day.

17 Q. And if we go over the page, we see that that in fact is set  
18 out.

19 "Again through the auspices of President Taylor to help  
16:26:03 20 Johnson defray the expenses of relocating and settling members of  
21 the defunct ULIMO-J faction. All together Mr Johnson alone  
22 received a total of US\$106,000 directly through the intervention  
23 of the President of Liberia in addition to liberal ministerial  
24 perks such as free telephone, satellite dish and TV VCR systems,  
16:26:34 25 furnishings, gasoline and fuel, as well as several new Discovery  
26 model four-wheel drive vehicles, all within a period of six  
27 months." Was all of that true?

28 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

29 Q. Why are you providing this man with all of this, Mr Taylor?

1 A. Well, he's not the only recipient of this kind of thing.  
2 The war - you've got ministers, buildings are destroyed. So we  
3 had to try to repair homes and furnish them to help ministers to  
4 avoid the problem. So he's not the only recipient of such.

16:27:09 5 Q. "Many Liberians became critical of government's largesse  
6 towards Johnson and accused the Taylor administration of cowardly  
7 appeasement". Is that true?

8 A. That's not true. No, that's not true. Some people did  
9 interpret it that way. But once he was not getting this alone,  
16:27:32 10 there was nothing cowardly about that, no.

11 Q. "The government saw this simply as an attempt to create  
12 accommodation and reconciliation."

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "While in the United States, the Government of Liberia  
16:27:48 15 received intelligence reports of Mr Johnson's clandestine efforts  
16 to seek funding and support to carry out subversive activities  
17 against the Liberian government.

18 The government made concerted efforts to reach Mr Johnson  
19 to ascertain the reports, but to no avail. Further intelligence  
16:28:02 20 reports revealed that Mr Johnson had left the United States and  
21 travelled to a number of West African states, possibly Nigeria  
22 and Sierra Leone, in pursuit of his diabolical plans."

23 Sierra Leone?

24 A. Well, that's right. You know, we are not too sure, and  
16:28:24 25 we're calling this intelligence report reveal, but I don't really  
26 think that he could have gone to Sierra Leone, because the  
27 attitude of President Kabbah after the attack in Monrovia was one  
28 of being very firm and not permitting him there. So one could -  
29 you know, all of these intelligence reports, some of them are not

1 right. We know what intelligence reports have done in the world  
2 today, so.

3 Q. Let's just take it a little further then, shall we:

4 "The government again alerted the public to the activities  
16:29:05 5 of Mr Johnson. The public openly criticised the President of  
6 aiding Mr Johnson through the large cash payments which they  
7 believed he was converting to preparations in furtherance of his  
8 standoff against the Liberian government.

9 Earlier this year, while undergoing medical treatment in  
16:29:23 10 the United States, Roosevelt Johnson and a number of his  
11 supporters accused the Government of Liberia of abducting and  
12 killing five ex-ULIMO-J fighters whilst en route to the airport."

13 Had that happened?

14 A. No, it did not.

16:29:43 15 Q. "The Government of Liberia endured condemnation, scrutiny  
16 and disdain from local human rights groups, opposition groups,  
17 and some quarters of the international community over the  
18 allegation. There is no way of measuring the extent of bad  
19 publicity and damage to the image of the country caused by  
16:30:03 20 Mr Johnson's allegations, which yet to be investigated and  
21 verified."

22 Mr President, I note the time.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that's right on the expiry of the  
24 tape too, Mr Griffiths. So we'll adjourn now until next Monday  
16:30:19 25 morning.

26 Mr Taylor, the usual caution. You are not allowed to  
27 discuss your evidence with any other person.

28 Thank you. We'll adjourn the Court.

29 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.]

1 to be reconvened on Monday, 3 August 2009 at  
2 9.30 a.m. ]  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29



**I N D E X**

**WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:**

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	25601
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	25601