



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 28 JULY 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Mr Tom Dannenbaum

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Tuesday, 28 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:16:05 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances,
6 please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution are Mohamed A
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, myself, Brenda J Hollis, and our
09:31:15 10 case manager, Maja Dimitrova.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today myself, Courtenay
14 Griffiths, assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah and
09:31:28 15 Mr Isaac Ip.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. You can
17 continue.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, there is a matter that I would
19 like to raise with the Court, not in terms of a request for any
09:31:43 20 particular order, but I think it important, given its
21 significance, that the Court be alerted to it, because it might
22 have implications for the later smooth running of the case. I
23 wonder if it could raise that in private session.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I would like to put - in other
09:32:06 25 words, you want a private session or a closed session?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: A private session will do, Mr President.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I would like to put some reason on
28 record. Is it --

29 MR GRIFFITHS: It involves certain security issues relating

1 to the Defence team.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: That may involve the security of one of
3 the Defence team, or one of the witnesses?

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, all of the Defence team.

09:32:38 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you. Well, those - do
6 you have any objection, Ms Hollis?

7 MS HOLLIS: Not at all.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. Those members of the public
9 that are following this case, we are going to have what I think
09:32:57 10 would probably be a fairly short session in private. That means
11 that you will be able to watch the proceedings while the private
12 session is taking place, but you won't be able to hear what is
13 going on and as soon as that session is over, the sound will be
14 turned back on again. Madam Court Manager, we will go into
09:33:24 15 private session, please. Incidentally, the reason is that it
16 concerns the security of members of the Defence team, and that is
17 why it is being held in a private session.

18 [At this point in the proceedings, a portion of
19 the transcript, pages 25338 to 25342, was
20 extracted and sealed under separate cover, as
21 the proceeding was heard in private session.]

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1 [Open session]

2 MS IRURA: Your Honour, we are in open session.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Yes, continue, Mr Griffiths.

09:51:40

4 MR GRIFFITHS: All that remains is for the witness to be
5 reminded of his oath.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are still on your declaration to tell
7 the truth, Mr Taylor.

8 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

9 [On former affirmation]

10 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

09:52:53

11 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday afternoon when we adjourned overnight
12 we were looking at the final report of the 16th meeting of ECOWAS
13 chiefs of staff, the document behind divider 11 in our bundle of
14 additional documentation for the week of 27 to 30 July. We were
15 at page 7 and, Mr Taylor, we had just concluded looking at the
16 observations which had been made by your representative at this
17 meeting, General Prince Johnson, yes?

18 A. Yes.

09:53:20

19 Q. Now we see below the passage which we concluded yesterday
20 reference to closed session. Now we understand what that means
21 in this Court, but what does it mean in the context of an ECOWAS
22 meeting?

09:53:44

23 A. These would be strictly officials. If there are any press
24 personnel in there they would be put out. In this case we are
25 going to just have the chiefs of staff present in this meeting.
26 All non-military type personnel will probably just leave the
27 meeting.

28 Q. And what is the reason for that?

29 A. There may be some security, or maybe specific military

1 planning or suggestions that they may not want to put out into
2 the public. It could be misconstrued at some future date, so
3 until final decisions are taken they just wanted it to remain
4 secret.

09:54:33 5 Q. Now as we will come to see, we may realise why that may
6 have been deemed necessary. Now it goes on to say that:

7 "Prior to the commencement of its deliberations behind
8 closed doors the meeting was briefed on the situation in Sierra
9 Leone by the Honourable Chief Tom Ikimi, minister of foreign
09:55:00 10 affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and chairman of the
11 ministers of foreign affairs of the Committee of Four on Sierra
12 Leone."

13 It goes on to name others who were present. We need not
14 trouble with that. Let's go over the page, please, and let us
09:55:16 15 commence on that page, page 8, at the second paragraph:

16 "Chief Ikimi observed that the coup d'etat of the 25 May
17 1997 had very peculiar characteristics. It was not only very
18 bloody but was followed by massive looting and widespread
19 vandalism of public and private properties. The putschists
09:55:43 20 opened up prisons and let out all categories of hardened
21 criminals. They also invited the elements of the RUF into the
22 city of Freetown, thereby disrupting the peace and tranquility of
23 that city. These RUF elements had since assumed and taken over
24 the role of the national army.

09:56:05 25 It was worth noting that the coup took place on OAU Day and
26 on the eve of the OAU summit. The OAU therefore wasted no time
27 in condemning the coup. It called for the immediate
28 reinstatement of the legitimate government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah,
29 urged on the world to support ECOWAS and declared that none of

1 its members should recognise the junta in Sierra Leone."

2 And then it goes on to deal with the meeting of the foreign
3 ministers held in Conakry on 26 June which we have already dealt
4 with, so let's skip over that. We have also dealt with what is
09:56:52 5 mentioned at the first paragraph at page 9, so we won't deal with
6 that. Let's pick it up, please, in the middle of that page:

7 "The Committee of Four immediately decided to implement the
8 first option of dialogue. The first meeting with representatives
9 of the junta was held in Abidjan where some modalities to achieve
09:57:18 10 the objectives were agreed upon. A second meeting with the junta
11 on 29 and 30 July 1996, also in Abidjan, however ended in failure
12 following the announcement by the junta of its intention to stay
13 in office until the year 2001.

14 Subsequent attempts at dialogue taken by some ECOWAS states
09:57:46 15 also failed, leaving ECOWAS with no option but to implement
16 sanctions and total embargo.

17 Chief Ikimi ended by calling on chiefs of staff to make
18 appropriate recommendation on modalities for the imposition of
19 the embargo or blockade within international standards."

09:58:10 20 The meeting then continued behind closed doors. Now this
21 is the closed session, Mr Taylor, okay, and we see perhaps why it
22 was held in closed session:

23 "Major General Victor Malu, the ECOMOG force commander,
24 provided the meeting with a progress report on the Liberian peace
09:58:38 25 process which had culminated in the holding of transparent free
26 and fair elections and the subsequent inauguration of
27 his Excellency Charles Ghankay Taylor as the 21st President of
28 Liberia."

29 Pause there, Mr Taylor. Was Major General Victor Malu the

1 force commander at the time of the elections?

2 A. Yes, General Malu was.

3 Q. So these observations being made, transparent, free and
4 fair, is being made by someone in a position of authority at the
09:59:09 5 time of the election, is that right?

6 A. Yes, that is correct.

7 Q. "His report dwelt extensively on ECOMOG's contribution
8 towards the successful conduct of the electoral process and its
9 new role of creating and enabling a security atmosphere to

09:59:29 10 consolidate the peace process. Since the completion of the
11 disarmament exercise, ECOMOG had continued its efforts at
12 creating the necessary environment for the return to normal
13 political activities, social order and lasting peace and
14 tranquility. Its cordon and search operations had led to

09:59:50 15 retrieval of over 6,000 weapons, most from obscure places such as
16 graves and swamps".

17 Let's pause there. What is meant by "cordon and search
18 operations", Mr Taylor?

19 A. Cordon is a military process of securing the environment;
10:00:12 20 that is, moving in securities first, encircling the area, making
21 sure no-one comes in or goes out, and then the search team comes
22 in and conducts a search.

23 Q. Were you aware that such operations were being conducted in
24 Liberia by ECOMOG?

10:00:30 25 A. Oh, yes. Yes, they were - it was a part of their duty.
26 They did not have to ask permission from anyone. Their job was
27 to make sure that Liberia was arms free, and it did it.

28 Q. "All in all, ECOMOG had recovered from the beginning of
29 the disarmament exercise about 35,000 weapons including: Machine

1 guns, assault rifles, bombs, artillery guns, anti-aircraft guns,
2 anti-tank guns, and rocket propelled guns. It had also recovered
3 over 4 million assorted small ammunition".

10:01:22 4 Can we pause there. First of all, Mr Taylor, were you
5 aware of those figures?

6 A. Yes. Besides this there was a subsequent report done
7 jointly by ECOMOG and the United Nations military observer
8 mission to Liberia, an international report, I not only saw, but
9 I may still have a copy in my archives. But it was a report done
10:01:46 10 that was very widely circulated.

11 Q. Now, one detail of that. So far as NPFL forces were
12 concerned, did you issue any order to them as to what to do with
13 their weapons?

14 A. Well, there was a general order for all NPFL soldiers to
10:02:09 15 disarm to the peacekeepers under the process of disarmament and
16 demobilisation. Yes, there was an order.

17 Q. And did that occur?

18 A. Yes, that is how they were able to get most of these. If
19 you see here of the 35,000 weapons, he is claiming he had - 6,000
10:02:29 20 weapons were done through cordon and search operations. So one
21 could very readily see here that the rest of his weapons - since
22 he did not speak of them having been obtained through searches,
23 it means that they were given up under the disarmament programme
24 voluntarily.

10:02:51 25 Q. "Upon creation of a conducive environment, ECOMOG next
26 switched its energies to assist in the electoral process. It
27 provided the necessary security to IECOM, presidential aspirants,
28 other party functionaries, ballot boxes during and after the
29 elections, registration, voting and counting centres, as well as

1 to others and electoral officials.

2 In the area of transportation, ECOMOG assisted in the
3 movement by road and air of election materials, lifting of IECOM
4 officials, international observers, ballot boxes, et cetera.

10:03:37 5 ECOMOG also provided assistance in the area of
6 communications. In the area of manpower and logistics, support
7 for ECOMOG, Major General Malu reported that ECOMOG had received,
8 after the disarmament exercise, additional troops from Benin,
9 Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Niger, thereby increasing its total
10:04:03 10 strength to about 11,000 all ranks".

11 Pause there. So, Mr Taylor, those 11,000 ECOMOG soldiers
12 who were in Liberia, firstly can you assist us as to when the
13 troop strength reached that level?

14 A. I would say somewhere around during the disarmament period
10:04:44 15 and moving into the preparatory stages for elections. They grew
16 to this level because everyone wanted to make absolutely sure
17 that these elections were free, fair and transparent, and so
18 everything was done to make sure - and I think he explains here
19 very well what happened. And it makes one reflect on what was
10:05:12 20 said by a member of the Prosecution, if not the head of the team,
21 about these elections not being free and fair. Nothing could be
22 further from the truth. These elections were conducted by the
23 international community, and you can see here the holding of the
24 ballot boxes, the presence at the polling stations, the movement
10:05:41 25 of the boxes, the protection of election officials, international
26 observers, were all done under the watchful eyes of these forces
27 from the international community, including what he does not
28 mention here - he does not talk about the United Nation side. He
29 speaks about ECOMOG forces. So they are a little over 11,000. I

1 don't claim to know the exact number of UN forces, but this is
2 just dealing with the ECOMOG side.

3 Q. Now it continues - and the second aspect of that is this:
4 Can you help us as to the time period over which the ECOMOG
10:06:32 5 strength remained at those levels in Liberia?

6 A. Oh, these levels had obtained by, I would say, the end of
7 1996 and these levels remained this way, I would say, for a great
8 deal throughout 1998, because ECOMOG did not just summarily pull
9 out of Liberia. So probably not at the exact strength of 11,000,
10:07:07 10 but I would say a minor percentage reduction by the end of 1998.
11 There was a reduction, but not substantial I would want to
12 believe.

13 Q. "The force commander continued by defining the post
14 election role of ECOMOG as: (1) aiding and supporting the
10:07:30 15 government to maintain and consolidate the peace by providing
16 necessary security".

17 And you helped us yesterday by telling us that your own
18 personal security at the time was provided by ECOMOG troops,
19 wasn't it?

10:07:44 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. "Secondly, conducting military operations to rid Liberia of
22 arms". Pause there. So was the operation to collect and disarm
23 a continuing process even after your election?

24 A. That is correct, yes. Successful in some areas. I would
10:08:12 25 like to say in urban areas, yes, but not so successful in other
26 areas. And by that I mean when you begin to look at the regions
27 of the country that are the forest regions that were occupied by
28 other factions --

29 Q. Such as?

1 A. Well, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, we are dealing with the Lofa forest
2 region. That was more difficult. It is very difficult for
3 ECOMOG to conduct the types of cordon and search operations that
4 he speaks about here, but within the general Monrovia area you
10:08:48 5 hear him talking about graves. Of course we are talking about -
6 that is in the city of Monrovia in the urban areas where that's
7 ULIMO-J mostly in the urban Monrovia area. But yes, to answer
8 your question with this qualification: There was an ongoing
9 process by ECOMOG to carry out cordon and search operations at
10:09:18 10 all times based on whatever intelligence they received to
11 continuously move arms from the country.

12 Q. "Thirdly, protecting VIPs in key installations. Fourth,
13 restructuring and training of the armed forces, police and other
14 security agencies".

10:09:40 15 Now that number 4, Mr Taylor, as the new incoming President
16 what role did you have to play, if any, in the restructuring and
17 training of the armed forces, police and other security agencies?

18 A. Well, a lot and not so much, and let me tell you what I
19 mean. There were some central questions, and I got into this
10:10:12 20 only yesterday. Under the constitution of Liberia, the President
21 does not raise an army. It is the legislature, an act of the
22 legislature that authorises the President to raise an army. So
23 when we moved from the period before elections into the period
24 that I described on yesterday as capacity building and not
10:10:38 25 peacekeeping or peace enforcement, we had some difficulties and
26 this is where, if you see in that letter where I wrote to my good
27 friend Abacha telling him that we need to make certain changes.
28 When we begin to look at the law, as President I followed the law
29 trying to get people to understand that, yes, people may want to

1 do things in a particular way, but we have to follow the law.
2 And so these were some of the difficulties that we were having.
3 And so in terms of restructuring and training and armed forces, a
4 new President coming in after war must do it in concert with the
10:11:25 5 legislature and it may have called for new laws as far as numbers
6 and ranks and all of these are concerned. We couldn't have
7 people understand this, and it brought about some difficulties.

8 The same refers to the police. The police - the police
9 forces are established under laws, not just get up today, "Well,
10:11:48 10 we have a mandate to do your police work. Let's do it". So
11 these were some of the difficulties. So when I say I had a lot
12 to do with it as far as following the law, but the legislature
13 had its own part to play in trying to balance this act between
14 the executive and legislative branches of government. I think it
10:12:13 15 caused some delay and confusion that eventually led to the
16 document referred to yesterday, the status of forces agreement.
17 So we did have something to do with that to that extent.

18 Q. Okay. Now it goes on: "To achieve these objectives,
19 ECOMOG personnel were redeployed in adequate numbers all over the
10:12:36 20 country and along the Liberian/Sierra Leone border to prevent any
21 spillover effect".

22 What does that mean, Mr Taylor?

23 A. This simply means that along our borders, Liberia and
24 Sierra Leone, over the period '97 and most of 1998, ECOMOG is
10:13:03 25 still involved in those border areas to make sure that there are
26 no problems, and by "spillover" what he says here - don't let's
27 forget now we are talking about an ongoing war in Sierra Leone.
28 We spoke to the Court about the Kamajors being trained and armed
29 out of Liberia and more specifically the issue of former ULIMO-J

1 and ULIMO-K fighters that have been recruited in their thousands
2 by ECOMOG to help the Kamajors. Then we look at on another
3 track. My own concern is, after being raised with President
4 Abacha, that is why you see the terminology here "were being
10:14:04 5 redeployed", which means that some actions are beginning to be, I
6 mean, undertaken to take care of the issues that have been
7 raised. So it simply means that people are sent back to the
8 border to try to starve of the movement of arms and personnel
9 across the border.

10:14:28 10 Q. "In addition a National Security Council with the President
11 of Liberia as chairman was constituted". Is that right,
12 Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, that is normal. We have - there is a National
14 Security Council that is in most countries the President, the
10:14:45 15 Vice-President, the defence minister, the interior minister, the
16 justice minister, the head of the National Security Agency.
17 These all --

18 Q. And also the ECOMOG force commander as we see from the
19 last sentence in that paragraph?

10:15:01 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. "The 20 miles embargo zone along the Liberian coast was
22 lifted to allow ships to come in without hindrance and without
23 the hitherto required war risk insurance."

24 When was that 20 miles embargo imposed, Mr Taylor?

10:15:22 25 A. That embargo goes all the way back to the actual years of
26 fighting when the Security Council - I don't quite - I can't help
27 the Court with an exact date, but far in the war, I would just
28 project it could have been as far back as 1993. I stand
29 corrected on this one. There was a Security Council resolution

1 that imposed an arms embargo on Liberia and these are the
2 residual effects, blockade to make sure there were no arms and
3 things coming in of which the Nigerians were in charge of
4 carrying out this blockade.

10:16:03 5 Q. "On the important issue of the restructuring of the AFL,
6 the force commander reminded delegates that the Liberian crisis
7 had factionalised the Liberian army necessitating its complete
8 restructuring together with the police and other security
9 agencies. He emphasised the need to have a disciplined, well
10:16:26 10 equipped armed forces that would be capable of carrying out this
11 function. Major General Malu called on the meeting to make
12 appropriate recommendations that would successfully guide the
13 conduct of this vital and important exercise.

14 The restructuring of the armed forces was behind schedule
10:16:45 15 and so a decision should be taken on the matter without further
16 delay."

17 Why was it behind schedule, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Well, we had to get behind us first of all what was the
19 role of ECOMOG post-election and, not to repeat myself, all the
10:17:06 20 difficulties I have mentioned, these were all, and just for the
21 records, and being very brief about it, the Kamajors problem, the
22 disrespect that we saw to constituted authority, ECOMOG wanting
23 to continue to behave as an occupying force. All of these little
24 issues. My own often tete-a-tete with Abacha, on how to resolve
10:17:39 25 it. These were some of the difficulties.

26 Q. It goes on:

27 "When formulating appropriate proposal Major General Malu
28 said that the meeting should bear in mind that the presumption
29 that ECOMOG troops would remain in Liberia for six months after

1 the inauguration of the elected government was not correct; as
2 contributing countries had different timetables for their
3 troops."

4 Let's pause again. That six month time period after the
10:18:07 5 inauguration, Mr Taylor, was that the initial plan?

6 A. There were discussions as to what we should do and normally
7 what ECOWAS did at a particular time, and the United Nations is
8 in the habit of doing this too, you always have a time certain.

9 It could be six months or 12 months and then you renew after
10:18:34 10 every time. There is no real intention under these arrangements
11 to end this kind of thing, but they just tried to set time limits
12 and not leave it open-ended. For example, "Oh, they will be
13 there forever". No. So the first thing that was thrown around,
14 "Okay, after elections give it six months", but that was an
10:18:55 15 impossible situation and so you would expect these renewals.

16 Q. "Whatever the case, Major General Malu cautioned it was
17 unlikely that a trained national army would be in place before
18 the six month period expired. He therefore called on the meeting
19 to make appropriate recommendations so that an acceptable level
10:19:18 20 of ECOMOG troops is kept in Monrovia for the training and
21 restructuring exercise, and even beyond.

22 Major General Malu proposed the training of an army of
23 brigade strength. He also proposed that four ECOMOG battalions
24 with a strength of about 600 men each would be ideal for a stay
10:19:41 25 beyond the six months approved, in addition to two training
26 battalions.

27 The force commander called for a gradual and programmed
28 withdrawal of ECOMOG troops that would not threaten the security
29 of the country and new government".

1 Then there was a contribution from Mr Mahamadou
2 Ouhoumoudou. Over the page, please:

3 "Mr Ouhoumoudou reported on the successful end of the
4 disarmament exercise which paved the way for the conduct of the
10:20:21 5 elections. Members of the independent elections commission were
6 appointed and conducted into office on the 2 April 1997. The
7 Supreme Court was restructured."

8 Is that true, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes, for those purposes.

10:20:38 10 Q. Just for electoral purposes?

11 A. That is correct. Don't forget, we had laws and they had to
12 - the Supreme Court had to be in place to deal with issues that
13 would arise probably after the election.

14 Q. And he goes on to detail what the electoral package was:

10:21:04 15 "IECOM prepared an electoral package consisting of the
16 special elections law, an electoral package, and elections budget
17 and a code of conduct for contending political parties."

18 Was all of that in place before the election, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes.

10:21:22 20 Q. "The elections laws provided for a single constituency for
21 the whole of Liberia while a budget of \$4.7 million was approved
22 for the elections.

23 Following extensive and detailed preparations, elections
24 were held on 19 July 1997 at which Liberians showed their
10:21:44 25 eagerness and determination to put an end to their ugly past by
26 turning out in large numbers to vote. The exercise was conducted
27 under a peaceful atmosphere and at the end it was declared by
28 both local and international observers to have been free, fair
29 and credible."

1 Was the atmosphere peaceful, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Very peaceful.

3 Q. "The elections results as released declared the NPP of
4 Mr Charles Taylor the overall winner.

10:22:20 5 Mr Ouhoumoudou called for the articulation of appropriate
6 modalities to ensure the conduct of free, fair and transparent
7 elections in all member states of the ECOWAS sub-region. The
8 Liberian example, he said, should be a model and a lesson for
9 all."

10:22:49 10 And then we have a contribution from Major General Sikandar
11 Shami, the second paragraph, the UNOMIL chief military observer.
12 UNOMIL, help us, Mr Taylor, what does that stand for?

13 A. United Nations I think Observer Mission to Liberia.

14 Q. "Briefed the meeting on the post disarmament deployment of
10:23:16 15 ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel throughout Liberia. Additional
16 troops for ECOMOG enabled it to deploy to 48 locations all over
17 the country; thus necessitating an increase of UNOMIL's presence
18 from 10 to 16 sites.

19 The strategic deployment of both ECOMOG and UNOMIL
10:23:42 20 personnel provided the requisite atmosphere for elections.

21 Major General Shami went on to inform the meeting of the
22 relatively peaceful and voluntary disarmament exercise, except
23 for an incident in" - help me with a pronunciation of that next
24 word, Mr Taylor.

10:24:07 25 A. Kanweakehn.

26 Q. "...Kanweakehn where a group of ex-fighters had surrounded
27 and threatened the UN compound there. However as this first
28 challenge to ECOMOG's authority since the end of the official
29 disarmament exercise was quickly controlled through prompt and

1 effective action by the local ECOMOG commander, it sent the
2 correct message throughout Liberia.

3 With the successful completion of the disarmament exercise,
4 both ECOMOG and UNOMIL shifted focus to the conduct of the
10:24:39 5 elections. While ECOMOG provided security and logistics support,
6 the UN military observers assisted in preparing grounds for the
7 observation and verification of the electoral process. They
8 provided necessary and vital information on the terrain
9 infrastructure, population shifting patterns, customs and other
10:25:07 10 local conditions in the hinterland of Liberia. This information
11 which was shared with IECOM officials and ECOMOG became the basis
12 for the planning of the 1997 elections."

13 He then goes on to deal with cooperation, paying tribute to
14 ECOMOG, humanitarian assistance and concluded, fourth paragraph
10:25:39 15 on that page:

16 "By expressing satisfaction of the success of the Liberian
17 peace process. He emphasised that this had been the first ever
18 joint operation by the United Nations and sub-regional
19 organisation in which the sub-region had the primary
10:26:00 20 responsibility for ensuring peacekeeping. In spite of the fact
21 that there were no guidelines to fall back on, with experience, a
22 close-knit partnership had evolved that definitely enhanced the
23 Liberian peace process. The elections were universally adjudged
24 as having been free, fair and credible."

10:26:28 25 Did you know Major General Shami, Mr Taylor?

26 A. Not very well.

27 Q. Very well. Now we can skip the following passages and can
28 we now go to page 17, please. Now I just want us to look quickly
29 at the restructuring and the training of the Liberian armed

1 forces:

2 "The chiefs of staff recalled the different agreements
3 which had been provided for the restructuring and training of the
4 Liberian armed forces and defined the role ECOWAS was expected to
10:27:22 5 play in that regard. They noted, however, that it had not been
6 possible to restructure and train the forces before the
7 installation of the elected government, due to the large number
8 of assignments given to ECOMOG as part of the preparation and
9 organisation of the elections.

10:27:45 10 The chiefs of staff agreed that the aim of the
11 restructuring exercise would be to establish a truly national
12 army comprising Liberians from all ethnic groups in the country."

13 Why was that significant, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Because during the war what was the AFL had been
10:28:08 15 factionalised. That is, by the end of the crisis when we talked
16 about the AFL they had splintered, they had joined, as I
17 mentioned, LPC, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K and they had their own other
18 little group that they called the armed forces. And it was
19 mostly based on maybe a very small ethnic section of the country.
10:28:42 20 And so it had been too factionalised and to get a national army
21 would have meant that - and I want to - I apologise to the Court.
22 I misspoke some time back when I said 27 tribes. It is actually
23 17 tribes and I misspoke. They wanted to get all of these 17
24 tribes involved in that process.

10:29:09 25 Q. "They were also of the opinion that the elements of the
26 Liberian armed forces to be trained would include not only
27 recruits, but also future instructors. They felt that while the
28 officers might need to go to neighbouring countries which have
29 qualified instructors and adequate training facilities, the

1 recruits could be trained locally. This is all the more feasible
2 since, given its current situation, Liberia needs only a modest
3 force about the size of a brigade. In that connection, the
4 chiefs observed that the team of instructors must come from
10:29:45 5 Anglophone countries to facilitate communication with Liberians,
6 whose official language is English; however, any Francophone
7 country, if so desired, could provide support for the training
8 programme," and they were of the view, that is, the chiefs of
9 staff, that the restructuring and training of the Liberian armed
10:30:10 10 forces would serve to ensure security and consolidate peace in
11 Liberia.

12 Let's go quickly over the page, please, and look at the
13 Sierra Leone situation:

14 "The chiefs of staff agreed that a final settlement of the
10:30:28 15 Liberian conflict of necessity demanded a definitive solution to
16 the Sierra Leonean crisis. Having been informed by the chairman
17 of the Committee of Four, the Honourable Minister of Foreign
18 Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chief Ikimi, that the
19 phase of dialogue with the junta in Sierra Leone had failed, the
10:30:53 20 chiefs of staff concluded that implementation of the other
21 measures envisaged for achieving ECOWAS's objectives had become
22 inevitable. In this regard, they noted that ECOMOG's mission in
23 Sierra Leone would be possible and effective only if its scope of
24 operation and mandate were duly extended to cover that country".

10:31:20 25 And then they go on to look at the sanctions:

26 "The chief of staff took note of the two types of sanctions
27 proposed by ECOWAS to force the junta to restore the legitimate
28 government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. They pointed out
29 that no distinction could be made between an embargo and the use

1 of force, because both of these would give rise to closely
2 interrelated problems. According to them, extreme poverty and
3 other socioeconomic factors would inevitably lead to the
4 appearance of numerous factions, putting Sierra Leone at risk of
10:32:02 5 disintegration. Under such conditions, the chiefs of staff
6 stated they were convinced that application of the embargo would
7 inevitably lead to the use of force".

8 Let's pause there, Mr Taylor. So this is August 1997 and
9 so we are talking about, what, six months before the ECOMOG
10:32:29 10 intervention in Freetown, yes?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. And according to this, already the chiefs of staff in
10:32:37 15 ECOMOG are contemplating the use of force in that country, is
16 that right?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. "Their conviction was corroborated by available reports
19 which indicated that the illegal regime in Freetown would be
10:32:55 20 unable to withstand an embargo if effectively applied".

21 Now, do you understand that language, Mr Taylor? Can you
22 help us as to your understanding of "Would be unable to withstand
23 an embargo"? What did you understand by the use of that
24 language?

10:33:15 25 A. Well, an embargo - they were referring to it is used in -
26 but you have to look at the pure nature of this. They are
27 talking about - in fact, the whole discussion we are talking
28 about arms, food. I mean, a total shut-off to starve of this
29 particular junta. This is what they are looking at.

1 Q. "For this reason, the chiefs of staff requested a full
2 briefing on the status of forces in Sierra Leone. Having
3 obtained this information, the chiefs of staff decided to
4 recommend imposition of an enforced embargo for four weeks, after
10:33:59 5 which an evaluation would be carried out and appropriate
6 recommendations made to the Heads of State and government. The
7 service chiefs recognised that member states must show firmness,
8 real cohesion and sincerity".

9 And let us look now at the recommendations, please:

10:34:24 10 "The chiefs of staff made the following recommendations to
11 the ministers of foreign affairs:

12 ECOMOG should be authorised to restructure and train the
13 Liberian armed forces.

14 Funds and logistics for this exercise should be sought from
10:34:39 15 ECOWAS member states and friendly countries.

16 ECOMOG's mandate in Liberia should be extended by at least
17 one year".

18 Was it so extended, Mr Taylor?

19 A. It was.

10:34:54 20 Q. "The ECOMOG force commander should be instructed to prepare
21 a detailed timetable for the orderly withdrawal of ECOMOG forces
22 from Liberia.

23 ECOMOG's fields of operation should be extended to Sierra
24 Leone and its mandate expanded to include the strict enforcement
10:35:12 25 of the sanctions recommended.

26 ECOMOG should be mandated to enforce the embargo for a
27 period of four weeks initially.

28 At the end of that period, the Committee of Four should
29 assess the level of application of the sanctions and, if

1 necessary, make appropriate recommendations to the Heads of State
2 and government on further actions to be taken.

3 In order to ensure the effective and successful application
4 of the embargo, member states should contribute troops and
10:35:45 5 equipment as necessary".

6 And then under "Any other matters":

7 "The executive secretariat submitted to the meeting a
8 memorandum which it has received from the Liberian government
9 calling for the lifting of sanctions imposed on the parties to
10:36:07 10 the Liberian conflict by ECOWAS and the United Nations Security
11 Council".

12 Did you send such a memorandum, Mr Taylor?

13 A. Yes, it was approved by ECOWAS in total and sent forward to
14 the United Nations.

10:36:24 15 Q. And then in further elaboration it continues:

16 "Having considered this request, the chiefs of staff
17 expressed the view that since Liberia's security was being
18 ensured by ECOMOG, there was no immediate need for the country to
19 import military hardware. They pointed out that since the
10:36:44 20 embargo decided upon by ECOWAS and the United Nations concerned
21 the supply of arms, ammunition and military hardware, it was
22 neither necessary nor expedient to recommend that this measure
23 should be lifted".

24 Can we pause again. Mr Taylor, in requesting, through that
10:37:03 25 memorandum, the lifting of the embargo, what were you seeking to
26 import?

27 A. Well, the embargo was an economic embargo, a blockade, and
28 so we were seeking to get - in fact, there was a fuel. We could
29 not import - by "fuel" I mean gas, oil and gasoline for

1 operation. What we were seeking to do here was to have that
2 embargo lifted just as it is mentioned here, and subsequently we
3 would have moved on the arms side. But we already had security
4 in the country.

10:37:49 5 Q. Right. Can we put that document away now, please, and --

6 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, before you put it away, if I
7 could please clarify page 14 - excuse me, 13 again and 14. There
8 is a reference to the Independent Elections Commission. What is
9 that body?

10:38:10 10 MR GRIFFITHS:

11 Q. Mr Taylor, can you help us?

12 A. Yes, I can. The Independent Election Commission, your
13 Honour, is the election commission that was put into place to
14 conduct these special elections that occurred in July of 1997.

10:38:32 15 JUDGE DOHERTY: Thank you.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I ask, Mr President, for that document
17 to be marked for identification. I think it would be MFI-23, and
18 its appellation is "Final report of the 16th meeting of ECOWAS
19 Chiefs of Staff, Abuja 26-27 August 1997".

10:38:55 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document just described by
21 Mr Griffiths will be marked for identification MFI-23.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Now I think we can put this folder away for
23 now:

24 Q. Mr Taylor, yesterday I asked you about a publication which
10:39:25 25 you identified as the presidential papers. Do you recall that?

26 A. Yes, I do.

27 Q. And you explained to us the manner of its production and
28 its purpose, do you recall?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. Now, that publication, Mr President, with what events does
2 it commence?

3 A. Basically it starts with my inauguration.

4 Q. And continues through to what?

10:40:04 5 A. It continues throughout '98. It is dealing with many
6 events: Me receiving letters of credence; foreign visits; the
7 Sierra Leonean peace process; visits that I made to Nigeria;
8 receiving the Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan
9 on the subject matter; trips to Guinea. It covers that whole
10:40:38 10 period of my inauguration, dealing with the state of affairs in
11 the country at the time, the programmes that were put into place
12 to try to move our country forward, my dealing with the various
13 international issues, the problem in Sierra Leone. All these are
14 covered in that period.

10:41:00 15 Q. And tell us, Mr Taylor, what role, if any, did you play in
16 the production of that document?

17 A. Personally, not being directly involved, it is a production
18 of the government of Liberia based on factual material.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, I don't know if there is a continuing
10:41:29 20 objection to the use of this document, Mr President?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that correct, Ms Hollis?

22 MS HOLLIS: There is no objection today.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful. Now we have this document,
10:41:44 25 your Honours, in binder 3 of 3 of the three binders which were
26 delivered to the Court recently. It is at tab 31. Now, whilst
27 that document is being accessed by us all, can I make this
28 observation. We have the original, which is in colour, but did
29 not choose to go to the expense of reproducing for all of us this

1 document in colour. So what I am going to suggest is that we use
2 this for the overhead whilst we follow the text in the copies
3 available to us.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that will be satisfactory,

10:42:46 5 Mr Griffiths.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, just to get a flavour of this document, let
8 us please begin at page 19 so that we can observe one of the ways
9 in which this document can assist us. Do you see a photograph at
10 the bottom of the page? It is page 19. 19. One nine?

10:43:18

11 A. Which - I will need some help from the Court. Which
12 divider?

13 Q. Behind divider 31?

14 A. Oh, 31, okay. Okay, that is correct.

10:43:56

15 Q. Okay?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Let's go to page 19, please. I am only interested in the
18 photograph. Now you see there is a picture of a beaming Charles
19 Taylor taken on 24 July 1997. It is page 19?

10:44:33

20 A. I have got it. Yes.

21 Q. Yes?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you see the caption to that photograph informs us that
24 that's a jubilant President-elect Charles Ghankay Taylor,
10:44:52 25 sporting a victory smile, and he is greeted by elections
26 commission chairman the late Cllr G Henry Andrews, while
27 commissioner Cllr Gloria Musu-Scott in the background enjoys the
28 moment. IECOM, that's the reference in the last document we
29 looked at, yes?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And then the date 24 July 1997, yes?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. Now let's just go on a couple of pages to page 22, and
10:45:33 5 there we see a photograph taken where, Mr Taylor?

6 A. This is on Ashmun Street at the Centennial Memorial
7 Pavilion in Monrovia during the time of my inauguration, being
8 sworn in as President.

9 Q. Now we see the caption reads, "Throngs of jubilant
10:46:02 10 partisans escort the presidential jeep of Taylor". Now do you
11 remember we looked at another photograph of a jeep in Gbarnga
12 last week?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is this the same vehicle?

10:46:16 15 A. That is the same vehicle.

16 Q. Does it have a number plate by this time?

17 A. By this time it would have not a number. The presidential
18 plate carries what we call the coat of arms and four stars at
19 each point of the plate. Maybe we may come across what the coat
10:46:45 20 of arms is for Liberia, because it may vary from country to
21 country.

22 Q. Let's look at another photograph on the next page:

23 "Former US President Jimmy Carter on one of his many visits
24 with Taylor. Following the elections, long before the votes were
10:47:08 25 counted President Carter predicted a 70 per cent plus victory for
26 the NPP and admonished his friend to accept victory with
27 magnanimity."

28 Yes?

29 A. That is correct.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, was former US President Carter actually in
2 the country at the time of the elections?

3 A. Yes, he was there.

4 Q. Did he remain there until the inauguration?

10:47:40 5 A. No, President Carter left.

6 Q. Now the next stop I would like to make with this document
7 is at page 26 and this is the 2 August inauguration.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And if we go over the page we see your inaugural address,
10:48:08 10 yes?

11 A. That is correct. That is correct.

12 Q. Now I would like just to look at a couple of selected
13 passages in this please, not the whole thing. Let's start at
14 page 28, yes?

10:48:27 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. "Fellow compatriots, on 24 December 1989 a long, determined
17 and patriotic march was begun. Endowed with only the indomitable
18 will of men and women who characterised the vanguard of an
19 inexorable surge of committed individuals to the task of
10:48:53 20 restoring constitutional government to the Republic of Liberia,
21 we marched to ensure that the rule of law would guarantee the
22 pursuit of individual liberties, restructure a collective
23 industry and accelerate the pace of democratisation of the free
24 market system."

10:49:15 25 Why the emphasis on the rule of law, individual liberties
26 and the free market system, Mr Taylor?

27 A. We want to make sure that we again begin sending out
28 signals to our western partners that we would be a government
29 that they could talk to and do business with, because these are

1 basically what is called the values of a western democracy.

2 Q. Go over to page 30, the top two paragraphs on the left:

3 "Following our years of national tumult, it is all too
4 proper that we reassure all our citizens and foreign residents of
10:50:10 5 our unwavering commitment to the rule of law and the respect for
6 human rights.

7 In the same vein, we pledge not only to uphold and defend
8 our laws and norms, but also to ensure that all citizens,
9 irrespective of tribe, religion or status will receive an equal
10:50:31 10 protection before the law. I wish to assure you that under this
11 administration, there will be no witch-hunting; there will be no
12 recriminations meted out against any citizen or group of citizens
13 by anyone."

14 Pause, Mr Taylor. During your regime were you able to
10:50:54 15 uphold continuously all of those ideals?

16 A. To the best of my ability.

17 Q. What does that mean?

18 A. Well, I cannot claim to know every little thing that
19 happened, but to the best of my ability we carried this out. We
10:51:16 20 first started with - the mere composition of the cabinet we
21 intended as an indication of showing that we meant this. We also
22 did not go after individuals that had participated in the war.

23 One important point here is, just to reflect for the Court
24 to understand, as we came to Monrovia on the Council of State
10:51:47 25 everyone brought his own group and so the civil service had grown
26 maybe by maybe a thousand per cent. We did not try to reduce it,
27 because it would have alienated people. So we did everything
28 that we tried to do. This is what I mean by to the best of my
29 ability we did.

1 Q. And if we go to the right-hand column under "Domestic
2 Policy" and pick it up in the second paragraph:

3 "We shall also seek to decentralise the national economy to
4 intensify rural development, stratify resource allocation and to
10:52:32 5 eliminate corruption in the public sector."

6 Why was that a priority?

7 A. Well, you are coming out of a war and you are confronted
8 with - in fact this phraseology came about a few years, "good
9 governance". And everything we are trying to do here now we are
10:52:55 10 trying to attract the attention of the international community.

11 Corruption is a major problem. You are coming out of a war.

12 People have established their own contacts here and there and we
13 wanted to make sure that we would make this a top priority in our
14 government to encourage foreign investors to come into the

10:53:17 15 country.

16 Q. Skip the next paragraph: "To this end we shall shortly
17 establish national commissions on reconciliation and human
18 rights." Did you do that?

19 A. Yes, we did. We enacted into law both commissions. The
10:53:36 20 commission dealing with reconciliation was headed by a very
21 prominent Liberian lady, Ms Victoria Refell, and the commission
22 on human rights was headed by one of our senior and oldest
23 administrators in the country at that particular time. Yes, we
24 did.

10:54:02 25 Q. Next paragraph:

26 "To members of our business community we pledge our
27 unflinching commitment in ensuring that a stable, secure and
28 enabling environment is provided and maintained to facilitate the
29 smooth conduct of your economic activities under our free

1 enterprise system. We assure you of our full subscription to the
2 principles of the sacred and inviolate right of private
3 investment and property and our determination to utilise all
4 resources available to us to guarantee the same."

10:54:39 5 That's a commitment to a free enterprise economy it sounds
6 like, Mr Taylor?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Was that a principle you were committed to?

9 A. Yes, fully.

10:54:54 10 Q. Now, the final passage in this that I want to draw your
11 attention to is over the page, please, page 31. Let us start at
12 the bottom paragraph on the right:

13 "The baton has been bequeathed to a new breed of West
14 African leaders, a new breed of South African leaders, a new
10:55:23 15 breed of East and North African leaders that Africa is no longer
16 willing or prepared to accept being dictated to by outside
17 forces. Africa will no longer remain a purely consumer
18 continent. Indeed, Africa will no longer be the breeding ground
19 for sowing seeds of discord, nor the marketplace where arms for
10:55:53 20 human destruction are sold.

21 Africa must assume her own leadership. Africa must
22 determine for herself on behalf of its people what its priorities
23 are based on the wishes and desires of the African people.

24 As it relates to human rights let us agree and continue to
10:56:19 25 make sure that this is no longer the business of any individual
26 country. Since it truly affects the international community, we
27 stand committed to outlining plans for the protection and
28 upliftment of the human rights of the citizens of this republic."

29 Let's pause. Why did you find it necessary to include such

1 a passage in this address, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well, it is very simple. We are coming out of a war.
3 There are a lot of blames to go around. There are different
4 sides. We have been broken up by ethnic and this tribal conflict
10:57:12 5 and this is why no one can really claim that we did not have
6 problems in the country.

7 You asked the question earlier during my testimony whether
8 there were some atrocities in Liberia. I want to make it very
9 clear I have a total distaste for impunity and wherever we were
10:57:39 10 able to find out what happened we took action and I think there
11 are records before this Court. But we are coming into a time
12 where all of these questions are pretty new on the international
13 agenda. Human rights, good governance, these are all the buzz
14 words that are being moved around in international circles.

10:58:11 15 What we seek to do here firstly is to reassure our people
16 that regardless of what - and I am referring now to probably
17 about two tribal groups. We are looking at Krahn's that had fled
18 in their thousands. We are looking at Mandingos that had fled in
19 their thousands. We are looking at some of them that are being
10:58:34 20 used outside to fight and could probably be encouraged to restart
21 a war. So we are doing everything here to tell them that, "Look,
22 your rights will be protected. Your human rights will be
23 recognised and that you should have no fears", and I go further
24 when I use the phraseology there will be no witch hunting. These
10:58:59 25 are all words and phrases that are tied into a fabric to convince
26 our people that we must now move forward and put the past behind
27 us.

28 Q. Let's just flick back to page 31, please. I want to ask
29 you about the sentiments you are expressing in that last

1 paragraph, "No longer willing or prepared to accept being
2 dictated to by outside forces". To whom are you addressing that?
3 A. Counsel, I will contextualise it and then I think we will
4 know who I am speaking to. There are words that are floated
10:59:57 5 around: For example, we talk about freedom; and then there is
6 another word flicked around, independence; and then a third word
7 that is played around with, sovereignty. Freedom means that one
8 has the ability to think or act as he or she feels; independence
9 means one - just paraphrasing it - having the free will to act as
11:00:31 10 you see fit; and this sovereignty as to do with the right of our
11 people to exercise free will within their countries. Basically,
12 all of those things mean nothing to Third World countries because
13 they do not really exist. You talk about freedom, you talk about
14 independence, you talk about sovereignty, they don't really exist
11:00:52 15 in real terms, because as long as major Western countries - and I
16 want to group all of them up, whether it is Europe, or North
17 America, you know, whenever these people give you money, most of
18 our little countries have as - there are a few countries, I don't
19 want to give their names here, it would probably be inappropriate
11:01:20 20 - who budgets depend on maybe 40 per cent of their financing come
21 from major donor countries. Some of them are unlucky to have up
22 to 50 per cent of their national budgets covered by these
23 countries. You can talk about being free, when they determine on
24 the very line how they spend the money, where it must be put. So
11:01:41 25 actually as a leader, you find yourself in a position where
26 actually you are being dictated to on a day-to-day basis.
27 And so what I am trying to - I am trying to start a process
28 of really prodding African leaders to begin to - for us all to
29 look at ourselves in the way where we begin to do for ourselves

1 and consider that we should be on our own and not depend on all
2 of this foreign money being thrown out to us, where internally we
3 cannot satisfy the needs of our people because they always come
4 and tell you what they see as being priorities. And so quite
11:02:26 5 frankly, I am talking to major Western countries, all of them,
6 not one excluded. They all bring in money; they all dictate to
7 you; they all demand what they want; and in reality your people
8 really do not get the benefit. It is happening to most Second
9 and Third World countries. And so that is why I am saying that
11:02:46 10 African leaders are - I am putting it in a way that: Okay, watch
11 out. There is a new breed coming that understand this psychology
12 of what is going on in the world. The psychology of: We gave
13 you money. We say: Oh, no, we don't tell you what to do, but in
14 fact you tell us what to do because - when you come and tell us,
11:03:06 15 say, well, you know, we are going to give you some money, but you
16 need to raise more money on your own. You must increase the
17 price of gasoline, you must increase the price of your staple
18 food, and you know our people cannot afford it, and so we raise
19 the price of rice. That is what caused the riot - some riots in
11:03:25 20 countries.

21 So it is this vicious cycle that is going on, but I think
22 we are all tied into this cycle, and this is just maybe a little
23 caution to our - saying: Now look, there is a group of us coming
24 up now that understand this. Yes, we may not be able to do
11:03:43 25 anything about it now, but this new breed of African leaders
26 understand it and, as a result, should begin to do something
27 about trying to correct this kind of imbalance that exists. So
28 basically I am just laying out my understanding and then telling
29 Western countries: Don't think we are stupid. We know what you

1 are doing. We know how you do it. We may not be able to resist
2 what you are doing now, but we understand it. We are not stupid.
3 I think this is what I intended and still feel very strongly
4 about.

11:04:20 5 Q. Go over the page - back over the page to page 32. Now, top
6 sentence: "...nor the marketplace", that is Africa, "where arms
7 for human destruction are sold". Mr Taylor, the cynic might say
8 that this is a bit rich coming from you, having just come out of
9 the years long Liberian civil war. What would you say to that?

11:04:56 10 A. I would remind the cynics about one important thing: We
11 don't make guns in Africa. We don't make guns in Africa. We use
12 them, but we could extend this whole argument. I will tell you,
13 you know, some of the countries that are the first to run and
14 talk about giving aid in - food aid to the country are the first
11:05:25 15 to sell the arms in the first place. While you're selling arms,
16 you know people are going to kill people with arms and then you
17 send food. Are you supposed to be generous when you send food,
18 okay, when we know if you don't send the food - you have problems
19 in your own country, okay? Take the major agricultural areas.

11:05:45 20 If you pile up your grain in your storehouses and no-one buys it,
21 it doesn't help you; it will cause problem in your own country,
22 okay? If farmers cannot sell, they cannot reproduce, you have
23 problems. So it is in your interests to keep - listen, look, we
24 are not going to hide the facts of what some of us - this new
11:06:09 25 breed of African leaders that I am talking about came up - what
26 some of our sentiments were then and still exists.

27 You sell these guns. You can stop selling guns to African
28 countries. But you sell the guns because you want them to keep
29 fighting. Stop selling your guns, okay? And they say: Oh,

1 well, there's humanity. Look, this is all a big business,
2 whether it is humanitarian assistance - we appreciate the
3 humanitarian assistance - but what is it? In reality,
4 humanitarian assistance has its own dragons, okay? And I am
11:06:50 5 talking about it is all political in most of these countries.
6 And some of us were very - yes, we fought a war, and I will tell
7 you something - I agree with certain major Western countries that
8 have said this - I agree that there are some necessary wars. I
9 do agree that there are some necessary wars. I think World War
11:07:11 10 II was a necessary war, okay? There are incidents where there
11 are necessary wars. But the fact of the matter is some of these
12 armed movements and some of these things - some of these things
13 are provoked, and then they go on and find their own reasons why
14 they exist when it is not as they say.

11:07:31 15 Now, on food aid, for example, I have a major problem with
16 this food aid as it relates to war, okay? As it relates to war.
17 As soon as there is war, the first thing you try to clear out
18 your warehouses, okay? It is all economic. So I am very serious
19 what I am talking about here, when I am talking about selling
11:07:55 20 these things for human destruction. I think arms - those that
21 manufacture the arms, the nations that manufacture the arms, must
22 also assume some responsibility for these conflicts. It just
23 can't be they are out there in Africa killing themselves. They
24 bear some responsibility too. That is the point I am trying to
11:08:14 25 make.

26 Q. On the same page, Mr Taylor, fourth paragraph beginning,
27 "We are fully committed," you go on to say at the end of that
28 paragraph, "I am not an NPFL President. I am President for
29 ULIMO. I am President for the LPC. I am President for the AFL.

1 I am President for the LDF".

2 What are you saying there?

3 A. I am just trying to reassure all sides of the conflict
4 that, I mean, I am no longer just the President of one side, but
11:08:54 5 it is now that I am the President of all Liberia and under the
6 constitution I have a duty, a solemn duty and responsibility, to
7 protecting all of our citizens and that all citizens are equal
8 under the law.

9 Q. Now, before we leave the inaugural address, let us just go
11:09:13 10 back to page 27, the beginning of the address, and remind
11 ourselves who was present on this occasion. Left-hand column:
12 The President of Nigeria; the President of Guinea; the President
13 of Guinea-Bissau; the President of Burkina Faso; the President of
14 Chad; the President of Mali; the President of Niger; the
11:09:44 15 President of Cote d'Ivoire; the President of The Gambia --

16 A. The Vice-President.

17 Q. The Vice-President of The Gambia; the Prime Minister of
18 Togo; and the Prime Minister of Benin. Mr Taylor, why such a
19 turnout?

11:10:01 20 A. Oh, ECOWAS was elated. ECOWAS was just overwhelmed by this
21 extraordinary exercise in regional work. I think in trying to
22 look across the world as we saw it at that time, this was about
23 the first time - and I stand corrected - that a region had so
24 ably handled this matter, and this is why ECOWAS is anxious to
11:10:43 25 make the Sierra Leonean situation the second example of the
26 extraordinary work that a regional organisation can do in
27 conjunction with the United Nations.

28 Q. Just at the bottom of that passage I have just directed
29 your attention to we see also present paramount chiefs, town

1 chiefs, elders and Zoes. What are Zoes?

2 A. These are our traditional leaders. When we talk about the
3 various traditions that I have mentioned, the Mende Mair that I
4 mentioned yesterday, in a southeastern part of the country you
11:11:29 5 have another social structure called the Bodeos. These are all -
6 we are trying to hint here the importance of our traditional
7 administrative structures across the country.

8 Q. Okay. Now you mentioned earlier the composition of your
9 cabinet?

11:11:48 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Can I now, please, direct your attention to page 181 of
12 this document please. Do you have it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Yes?

11:12:16 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, what is this - who are these men, Mr Taylor?

17 A. No, these are only people of the security services, that is
18 all. These are not cabinet ministers.

19 Q. Now, I wanted to direct your attention to this for this
11:12:36 20 reason. We have in this picture, do we not, a couple of
21 personalities who have featured quite prominently in the evidence
22 heard by these judges. Who is the man in the very middle of that
23 group?

24 A. That is Benjamin Yeaten.

11:13:00 25 Q. Who is the man standing immediately to Yeaten's left?

26 A. Joseph Montgomery.

27 Q. Now what was Benjamin Yeaten's role?

28 A. General Yeaten was head of the national Secret Service, our
29 SSS, the Special Security Services.

1 Q. And was he appointed to that position right at the
2 beginning of your presidency?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And the man next to him, Montgomery, what is his role?

11:13:34 5 A. Montgomery is the deputy director. One of the deputy
6 directors.

7 Q. And was he too appointed right at the outset of your
8 presidency?

9 A. Yes, I would suggest, counsel, that we use "appointed" with
11:13:55 10 - because "appointed" could just have a short - the position of
11 the director of SSS is appointed with advice and consent, which
12 means that it must be approved by the Senate. So I just wanted
13 to interject with that.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, wouldn't it be better for
11:14:16 15 the witness to indicate on the photograph on the overhead.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well:

17 Q. So, Mr Taylor, first of all, which one is Benjamin Yeaten?

18 A. This gentleman right here is General Yeaten.

19 Q. And which gentleman is Montgomery?

11:14:44 20 A. To his immediate left this is Joseph Montgomery.

21 Q. I don't ask you at this stage for my purposes to name
22 others on that picture. Could I now please - I think it is best
23 if you return to your seat please, Mr Taylor, because I would
24 like to now invite your attention to page 323 in this
11:15:30 25 publication. Now, what we have starting on this page and all
26 subsequent pages is a list of the - firstly, the members of the
27 legislature; yes, Mr Taylor?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Now, I am not particularly interested in that, but can we

1 go to page 328, please. I mention that just so that everyone is
2 aware of the scheme of the document. 328, please. Here we have
3 listed, do we not, the members of your cabinet?

4 A. That is correct.

11:16:11 5 Q. So Minister of Foreign Affairs is Monie Captan, yes? I am
6 not going through all of them. Minister of Defence is Daniel
7 Chea, okay?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Minister of Labour is the Honourable Thomas Woveiyu?

11:16:45 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Is he the same Tom Woveiyu we encountered earlier in your
12 evidence?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Note: No Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Why?

11:16:56 15 A. Well, Ellen did not show any - we did offer Ellen a job
16 later as head of the - what we called the National Social
17 Security Administration. She was not interested. But I think if
18 you look at this list, though, I think it is important to point
19 out, because of evidence that was given by a particular witness
11:17:31 20 in this case, that if you look at number 4 you have Dr Ibrahim
21 Kabbah, a Mandingo. Ibrahim Kabbah --

22 Q. I was coming to that Mr Taylor. Because, you see, you have
23 told us that you had sought to put together a cabinet of
24 reconciliation, if I can style it such?

11:17:55 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. So help us with the backgrounds of these individuals and
27 their prior affiliation, if any.

28 A. You have number 4, Dr Ibrahim Kabbah, he is Mandingo. He
29 was brought on.

1 Q. And was he attached to any faction before?

2 A. Dr Kabbah was, I would say if anything, would have been
3 leaning towards the Kromah, that is, ULIMO-K situation.

4 Q. Uh-huh?

11:18:33 5 A. Dr Lami Kawah, also not leaning towards Kromah.

6 Q. Number 6, that is?

7 A. That is correct. Dr Lami Kawah was not involved in the
8 crisis in Liberia. He was a prominent economist that we brought
9 in.

11:18:58 10 Also number 8, Honourable Maxwell Kaba, he is also
11 Mandingo. He came from - at the time he was LPC leaning and
12 eventually came to our side. General - number 10, is Honourable
13 now, but General Hezekiah Bowen - that name is already spelt in
14 the records - was the chief of staff of the Armed Forces of
11:19:26 15 Liberia during the crisis. At least one of the chiefs of staff.
16 He was made a minister in the government. The chief of staff -
17 you remember we said the armed forces had splintered, ULIMO-J,
18 ULIMO-K, LPC, and actually we fought against them and we brought
19 him in as Minister of Road Development.

11:19:50 20 Also we have number 15, the Minister of Education,
21 Dr Evelyn Kandakai. Not involved in the war at all, but a very
22 neutral Liberian, very well respected educator that worked at the
23 time with the Catholic Archdiocese of Liberia. She accepted to
24 come on because we needed some neutrality. She was never a part
11:20:26 25 of any faction and did not take a part in the war.

26 Then you have number 19. He is honourable here, but he is
27 also General Philip Kamah. Philip Kamah was the chief of staff
28 of the Armed Forces - I may have it in the wrong order - that
29 either preceded or succeeded General Hezekiah Bowen. But he

1 fought against us, and we put him in charge of the very important
2 Ministry of National Security. So these are the cabinet members
3 at this particular time. Most of the other people on this list
4 were either eminent persons, but I named those that may have been
11:21:13 5 involved factually at some part of the war and how we brought
6 them in.

7 Q. Now, below that we see a list of eminent persons, amongst
8 them a Dr Amos C Sawyer. We have heard that name before,
9 Mr Taylor; remind us?

11:21:29 10 A. Dr Sawyer is the gentleman that I associated with MOJA that
11 was selected as interim President at that famous meeting in The
12 Gambia.

13 Q. So you had fought against him?

14 A. Oh, definitely, yes.

11:21:47 15 Q. So why did you give him this appointment?

16 A. Well, the whole point here is that we are trying to - we
17 are trying to get the war behind us and trying to bring the
18 nation together. Because no matter what the differences were or
19 may be, for me Liberia was not about me or Sawyer. Liberia is by
11:22:11 20 far bigger than all of us combined. So for me it is a matter of
21 trying to get the country going and bring about some
22 reconciliation.

23 Q. Third in that list is Ruth Sando Perry. Again we have
24 heard that name before?

11:22:25 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. Who is that?

27 A. Ruth - the Honourable Ruth Sando Perry was the chairperson
28 of the Council of State between 1996 into 1997 and was the
29 individual that I took over from as after being elected as

1 President.

2 Q. Now, the next page I would like us to look at is page 331?

3 Now, do you see "Foreign service"?

4 A. Yes.

11:23:08 5 Q. Ambassador to Libya and Tunisia, who is that?

6 A. The Honourable Moses Z Blah that was a witness in this
7 case.

8 Q. Why give him that appointment?

9 A. Well, Blah at the time - there is very little that Blah
11:23:31 10 really knows about other matters, and so because he had trained
11 with us in Libya and was not very well, in fact through training
12 and the war, we decided to give him a position up to Libya. He
13 appeared to be a very quiet person.

14 Q. How long did he in fact stay in Libya?

11:23:57 15 A. Blah remained in Libya until the death of his colleague,
16 Vice-President Dogolea.

17 Q. Dogolea?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. I know you are not very good with dates, Mr Taylor, but can
11:24:13 20 you give us a date for that, or attempt one?

21 A. Oh, I will have to recollect. That has to be --

22 Q. Don't worry, let's move on. And then we see number 6,
23 Ambassador to the United States, Rachel Diggs?

24 A. That is correct.

11:24:29 25 Q. And Ambassador to the UK designate, William Bull, yes?

26 A. That is correct. These are all seasoned diplomats. In
27 fact, Bull is presently Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the
28 Republic of Liberia on the - most of these are seasoned
29 diplomats.

1 Q. Right. Let's go to page 333. Again, we are looking at
2 familiar names. National Security Service, Director Honourable
3 Benjamin Yeaten, yes?

4 A. That is correct.

11:25:13 5 Q. Deputy Director For Operations, Joseph M Montgomery?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. At number 7, Assistant Director For Operations, who?

8 A. Captain Varmuyan Sheriff.

9 Q. Who is that?

11:25:27 10 A. A gentleman - the very Varmuyan Sheriff that came as a
11 witness, one of the first witnesses in this case.

12 Q. And at number 10 who do we have?

13 A. We have captain Joe K Tuah, Assistant Director For
14 Intelligence.

11:25:47 15 Q. Now of those individuals, Mr Taylor, Joe Tuah, was he
16 Special Forces?

17 A. Yes, Joe Tuah was a Special Force.

18 Q. What about Joe Montgomery?

19 A. No, Joe Montgomery was - is a career member of the Secret
11:26:04 20 Service.

21 Q. What about Benjamin Yeaten?

22 A. Benjamin Yeaten was Special Forces and a military general.

23 Q. Let's go to page 336. And again I am merely seeking to
24 identify familiar names which have been mentioned in these

11:26:25 25 proceedings. Liberian National Police Director, Honourable
26 Joseph Tate?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. How long did he remain in that position? Was it months,
29 years or what?

1 A. About a year to a year and a half. He died in a plane
2 crash.

3 Q. Let's go to page 341, Minister of National Defence,
4 Minister Daniel - Honourable Daniel L Chea?

11:27:07 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Liberia, Prince C Johnson?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Is that the Prince C Johnson who attended that meeting in
9 Abuja from 26 to 27 August?

11:27:21 10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And then we see below that Ministry of Lands, Mine and
12 Energy, Honourable Jenkins Dunbar, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Let's go over the page to page 342. Ministry of Public
15 Works, Honourable John T Richardson, yes?

11:27:44 15 Works, Honourable John T Richardson, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And let's now go to page 344?

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: About two minutes of tape left,

19 Mr Griffiths.

11:27:59 20 MR GRIFFITHS: Okay:

21 Q. 344, Mr Taylor?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. National Human Rights Commission?

24 A. Yes.

11:28:07 25 Q. When set up?

26 A. Immediately following my inauguration.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: That is as good a point as any, your Honour.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right, thank you. We will have the short
29 adjournment and resume at 12 o'clock.

1 [Break taken at 11.28 a.m.]

2 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, continue, please, Mr Griffiths.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

12:01:57 5 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment I was asking you
6 about the members of your cabinet and other ministries and units
7 and agencies within your government. Do you recall that?

8 A. Yes, I do.

9 Q. Now, I want to conclude the initial part of that process by
12:02:26 10 reminding you first that I drew your attention to page 344 just
11 before the break. Let's wait a moment. The National Human
12 Rights Commission, remember that?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. Okay?

12:03:09 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And can I next then draw your attention to page 349, one
17 other name which has been mentioned before. Page 349, Bureau of
18 Maritime Affairs Commissioner, Honourable Benoni Urey.

19 A. That is correct.

12:03:37 20 Q. Now having noted that, can I take you back now, please, to
21 page 333. Now, Mr Taylor, help us with this: Looking at this
22 page, 333, Special Security Service, SSS, help us, please, with
23 the hierarchy. Who is in charge?

24 A. The Director. The Director of Special Security Services is
12:04:23 25 in charge.

26 Q. Who is the second in command?

27 A. The Deputy Director for Administration.

28 Q. What's the next level within the hierarchy?

29 A. Operations come from there, then Training.

1 Q. Yes, then?

2 A. Then Technical Services. These are deputies.

3 Q. Yes. Then?

4 A. You have Assistant Director for Administration, that's the
12:04:48 5 next - that's the highest among the assistants. You have
6 Assistant Director for Operations, and then you have Training and
7 then Intelligence.

8 Q. Now you recall, do you not, Mr Taylor, that the Prosecution
9 divided their witnesses into insiders and crime base witnesses,
12:05:17 10 yes?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now apart from Moses Blah, who is the highest ranking
13 member of your government who has been called to give evidence by
14 this Prosecution?

15 A. Well, to the best of my recollection it's Captain Sheriff.
16 Varmuyan Sheriff.

17 Q. Now help us, please. How far removed was he from you, the
18 President?

19 A. Well, let's look at who is Varmuyan Sheriff first, then I
12:06:03 20 think we can determine. Varmuyan Sheriff is a ULIMO general -
21 ULIMO-K general that is brought into the Executive Mansion at the
22 time of the sitting of the heads of the collective presidency in
23 Liberia where Alhaji Kromah was on the council. He is then put
24 into this expanded version of the SSS. I'm elected as President;
12:06:39 25 I want to reconcile; I begin to bring people together. If you
26 look at the Cabinet, far from what Mr Bility said here - I'm
27 talking about Hassan Bility about the persecution of Mandingos,
28 which is a blatant lie - we bring Mandingos, we bring Krahs, we
29 bring all elements. We bring people that just - can you imagine

1 a general that is just trying to kill me is assisting here
2 Director of Operations.

3 But the important thing to understand here is that Sherif
4 is not in this government because he is some close aid to

12:07:31 5 Mr Taylor and Sherif lied here when he said that he was close to
6 me and got into my fence. And I'm sure if this case is to
7 continue, which it will, there will be more senior people that
8 will have to be brought to this Court to tell - Varmuyan Sherif
9 was not Assistant Director because he was close to me. He was

12:07:53 10 not Assistant Director because he had any formal Secret Service
11 training. Varmuyan Sherif, being a former ULIMO general, I can
12 use - I can say a figurative speech here where saying that
13 molasses - you make molasses available to collect flies. That's
14 figuratively speaking. Be bringing in senior people from these
12:08:20 15 factions served as a way of removing the fear from them not to
16 continue this move into Sierra Leone; to stop joining this new
17 fight in Sierra Leone; and to come and not be afraid of us.
18 Varmuyan Sherif was never close to me.

19 But let's look at the whole government. Of the ministers,
12:08:42 20 deputy ministers, all of these people in my entire government, if
21 you look at for ministers, coming on down through all of the
22 deputies and the various agencies of government, you look at
23 public corporations, you look at what we call autonomous
24 agencies, police and all, here is what this Prosecution brought
12:09:04 25 here: In my entire government Varmuyan Sherif and his boy Abu
26 Keita, who practically stayed in Varmuyan's house, these are my
27 accusers.

28 Q. Just pause there for a moment, Mr Taylor. By way of
29 example, your Minister of Defence, Daniel Chea, as far as your

1 aware is he alive and well?

2 A. Daniel Chea is alive and well.

3 Q. Are you aware of any affliction which might have prevented
4 him from being called by the Prosecution to give evidence?

12:09:37 5 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever. He's alive and well.

6 Q. What about your Foreign Minister?

7 A. Alive and well.

8 Q. What about Joseph Montgomery?

9 A. Alive and well.

12:09:49 10 Q. And apart from Moses Blah, who is the highest ranking
11 official this Prosecution have managed to produce to give
12 evidence against you?

13 A. Captain Varmuyan Sheriff.

14 Q. Was he a trusted lieutenant, Mr Taylor?

12:10:10 15 A. Not at all. Varmuyan could have never been trusted.

16 Q. Why not?

17 A. Because this was a man that just tried to kill me. This is
18 a ULIMO general. This is only an act of reconciliation, and
19 don't let's forget what is the Assistant Director of Operation?

12:10:27 20 This is the person responsible, along with many others that were
21 very - let's just look at number 10, Assistant Director For

22 Intelligence, Joe Tuah. This is a Special Force. So

23 intelligence is very important here. So Varmuyan is there. He
24 makes sure that the convoy - the motorcade is ready when the

12:10:49 25 President is travelling, but he's on top. But there are many

26 other people and everybody is aware that, yes, he is in, but

27 everybody is watching because this is a senior ULIMO general

28 that --

29 Q. Everybody's watching what?

1 A. Watching his movement, his attitude. That's what
2 intelligence is all about. Because you bring an enemy soldier in
3 the midst of your security, I mean, everybody is concerned. And,
4 you know, they used to always say, "Mr President, we don't know
12:11:22 5 why you take these kinds of chances," but we had to do it for
6 reconciliation, okay? But so people were always - the
7 intelligence people, other directors, personnel were always
8 watching to make sure. In fact, Varmuyan was not allowed to bear
9 arms in this position. He was not --

12:11:45 10 Q. Why not?

11 A. Because he could have used it against me and nobody knew
12 what he would have decided later. So he was not - he was not
13 permitted to bear arm any time he was within yards of my
14 presence. He was not permitted to bear arms. And I'm sure there
12:12:06 15 will be officials of this agency that may want to testify to the
16 operations, which I don't know in details, of the SSS. I'm
17 President; I don't know how they operate. But I know that
18 Varmuyan was watched very, very seriously.

19 Q. Let's not anticipate the future, Mr Taylor. Let's just
12:12:26 20 deal with your testimony. Help us: How regularly, for example,
21 would you see that man, Mr Sheriff?

22 A. Not very - not very regularly, and I'll explain to this
23 Court why. My convoy in Liberia, factual, consisted of a -
24 because of the war, consisted of a double convoy. The President
12:12:58 25 had - there were two armoured Mercedes Benz 500 cars. What would
26 happen, the position where the President entered the car, only
27 the Secret Service personnel responsible and the aide-de-camps
28 would enter. The cars come out and take positions in the convoy.
29 So even members of the convoy, okay, could not tell which of the

1 two cars the President was in at a particular time.

2 Now, what am I saying? You've got a very long convoy. It
3 is set. The cars have a position. They are escort cars, as any
4 presidential convoy. The cars are in a garage. At the mansion
12:13:55 5 the President - the elevator comes down to the loading position.
6 The President will be put in the elevator and brought down, and
7 the two cars are in that garage position. The President boards
8 the car and the gates are opened. The two cars move out and
9 enter the positions. So even the convoy members do not - only
12:14:19 10 the director of Secret Service and the aide-de-camps that are in
11 those cars are aware of which of the two cars the President is
12 in. So one like Sheriff, they are outside. Not just him, but
13 many other directors don't know which car. Within the car that
14 the President rides, the director of Secret Service is always in
12:14:45 15 that car. So if you are a Secret Service personnel and you come
16 out, if you are looking from the front of the car - because the
17 presidential cars have - what do they call these glasses? The
18 shaded - they are shaded.

19 Q. Tinted?

12:15:01 20 A. They had tinted glasses and there are curtains. Besides
21 the tint there are curtains. So the only way you know who is in
22 the front of the car except you are at the front of the car and
23 you look through the front of the car, but from the side and the
24 back you cannot see. So I would not see Sheriff for weeks on.
12:15:19 25 Maybe one day maybe driving - you know, when you get out of where
26 you intend to go. Let's say if I'm visiting a site, when you get
27 out, most of the senior people, you look around, you see them.
28 But to say that - even Sheriff would not know what car I'm in. So
29 he didn't have that kind of close access to say he could come in

1 to see the President.

2 And besides, I'm not saying this because I want to make
3 Sheriff look bad. Oh, Mr Taylor is just saying that because
4 Sheriff testified. Let it be clear: Assistant director, deputy
12:16:01 5 director for administration, deputy director for operation,
6 deputy director for training, even senior members of the Secret
7 Service don't just have the privilege of walking to where the
8 President is. It's not their responsibility. It doesn't work
9 that way, okay? So let's forget Sheriff. But even people higher
12:16:21 10 than Sheriff did not have that particular option.

11 The way that they worked, the Secret Service have details
12 in Liberia - I'm speaking about Liberia. They have details that
13 escort the President. Your position as deputy of assistant
14 director did not give you the right at any particular time to
12:16:46 15 serve as an immediate escort of the President. You have other
16 functions that you are carrying on. You have elements that are
17 assigned at different times to the President. Most of the
18 people, I really don't know them by name. You see - and it's not
19 the President's business. The President walks out. It is not a
12:17:05 20 part of his function to be able to identify everything Secret
21 Service around him. They know who is supposed to be there. They
22 are there, and it does not involve senior technical people.

23 That's not the responsibility. So let's get this thing out of
24 our minds about because he's assistant director, so he's always
12:17:23 25 there and he's close. I don't care which - I don't know anything
26 about the Secret Service of other countries, but the only thing I
27 can say is that the Liberian Secret Service is trained by the US
28 Secret Service. Most of the personnel have been trained by them,
29 and our systems are practically the same. So there is no way.

1 The guy that stands behind the President - the guy that
2 stands directly behind the President is the commander of that
3 unit at that time, and he controls the unit at that time. So he
4 can determine - there are some Secret Service, let's say if the
12:18:04 5 President is in this room, some of them cannot even enter the
6 building. They wear pins. There are different colours that tell
7 who is around the President at a particular time, who is supposed
8 to be where. So there's not every one that must be where the
9 President is, and even if you - let's say if the President is in
12:18:23 10 this room and the Secret Service are around him let's say are
11 wearing a red pin, and you are wearing a green pin, which means
12 you should be outside of the room, if you try to enter that room,
13 even though you are a Secret Service you will be stopped.

14 So this young man here, I mean, I don't mean to sound
12:18:49 15 terrible about him and I do not demean him in any way, but
16 Mr Sheriff, frankly, earnestly, was not a very - not a close
17 person to this President. He worked, I know him personally, and
18 for whatever reason he testified, I don't know. But he was not -
19 and even people higher than him were in position and were not
12:19:13 20 privileged to be that close.

21 Q. Put simply, Mr Taylor, and I don't know what your favourite
22 tittle is, is he the kind of person you sat down with a cup of
23 tea or a glass of palm wine on a regular basis?

24 A. The President of the country does not sit down with
12:19:31 25 securities to talk, to eat. That's not a part of the President.
26 In fact, if a Secret Service personnel or any security personnel
27 can sit down with the President for a meal or a glass of palm
28 wine, then he's not a security personnel. That's not his level.
29 In fact, that alone in paramilitary terms would be tantamount to

1 insubordination. I mean, come on. I mean, that doesn't happen
2 anywhere, I don't - at least let me speak more strictly and
3 boldly about Liberia. It would never happen in Liberia. It did
4 not happen with me with any of these personnel, from director on
12:20:21 5 down would have never had that opportunity.

6 Look, people connected with the Prosecution know some of
7 these things, and I guess under cross-examination I will remind
8 them that they know some of these things. Even ministers in the
9 government, your Honours - there are ministers in the government
12:20:47 10 that would not even have the President's telephone phone number.

11 You don't have it. Especially his private telephone. Ministers,
12 senior ministers of government, at most, members of the national
13 security council, may have a direct line to the President. Other
14 than, that I would say two thirds of the ministers do not have

12:21:10 15 the President's personal direct line. You want to talk to the
16 President, you call through the switchboard, the President -
17 there's someone to pick up the phone, will answer. If you want
18 to speak to the President that message will travel through. Not
19 from that board straight to the President. It's coming through,

12:21:27 20 it's probably going through protocol, it's going through the
21 aide-de-camp before the President will even know that somebody is
22 trying to reach him. That's the way it worked for me in Liberia.

23 So some of these notions that because somebody comes here
24 with a title, he's an insider. If Charles Taylor could have
12:21:45 25 taken any general combatant during the war and brought him this
26 close, then maybe I needed to be examined by a shrink.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, let's move on from that, please. Now, yesterday
28 afternoon we dealt with aspects of your foreign policy. I will
29 come back to that in a moment. Before we do, let's change

1 vantage point for a moment and have a look at what your domestic
2 programme was following your inauguration. Please don't remove
3 that document, we'll be going back to it. What your domestic
4 policy was following your inauguration, can you help us?

12:22:41 5 A. Yes. Well, we were concerned about several programmes:
6 Health, education, the basic economy, these were the things that
7 I was concerned with. After looking at the national financial
8 position of the government these were our principal concerns:
9 Reconciliation, looking at education, health and security. These
12:23:24 10 were my principal concerns at that time domestically.

11 Q. Yes. Now, what was Vision 2024, Mr Taylor?

12 A. What most countries around the world were doing at that
13 particular time, they were looking at the future in terms of
14 planning. Where would you like to be at this time, what would
12:23:57 15 you like - what would you want to accomplish at that time. That
16 was more like around the time of the millennium goals that was
17 being set. So ours was Vision 2024, where we wanted to be in the
18 year 2024. And we got into some trouble where the propagandists
19 said that I wanted to remain President until 2024, which was far
12:24:27 20 from the case. I'm a very religious person, and we looked at 24
21 in religious terms and not as people looked at it. But that was
22 just the millennium goal that we wanted to set. By 2024 we
23 wanted to be at a particular point in the country.

24 Q. Now, just to complete that particular circle and so that
12:24:56 25 everyone knows where this can be found, if we flick to page 40 in
26 this document. Do you have it?

27 A. I will soon be there. Yes.

28 Q. Do you see a reference there to Vision 2024?

29 A. Did you say "14" or "40"?

1 Q. "40".

2 A. I'm at 40, yes.

3 Q. Have you got it?

4 A. Yes.

12:25:51 5 Q. And that's what you were talking about, and over the page
6 at 41 another reference and also a national conference?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Yes?

9 A. Yes.

12:26:00 10 Q. I want now to embark, Mr Taylor, on a much more structured
11 chronology of events following your inauguration. Now let us
12 bear the following dates in mind: Inauguration on 2 October,
13 yes?

14 A. That is correct.

12:26:32 15 Q. And we know that was attended by a number of foreign Heads
16 of State?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did they remain in Liberia for any length of time?

19 A. No, no, no, they came after the ceremony's luncheon and
12:26:56 20 they left.

21 Q. And help us: Thereafter how did you, Charles Taylor, spend
22 the ensuing days?

23 A. Well, we went to work almost immediately. In the same
24 month of August we were very happy and lucky to receive, while we
12:27:16 25 were working, our first official visit.

26 Q. And who was that?

27 A. My good friend Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings came.

28 Q. Pause there. Let's go to page 122, please. Do you see the
29 picture at the top?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Who is the gentleman standing next to you?

3 A. That's President Rawlings of Ghana.

4 Q. "Under a downpour of heavy rains, President Rawlings

12:28:02 5 inspected the Guard of Honour before being received by President

6 Taylor at the Roberts International Airport, August 22 1997."

7 Yes?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Was he your first official visitor?

12:28:20 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Why him?

12 A. Well, President Rawlings - Jerry - had worked very hard

13 during the successive peace agreements. Remember we mentioned

14 before this Court the Akosombo Accord and the Accra and the Abuja

12:28:51 15 clarification, so Rawlings had been in fact chairman of ECOWAS

16 during one period of the crisis and he had worked very hard.

17 Ghana had contributed troops to Liberia. I mentioned the first

18 forces commander of ECOMOG was from Ghana, General Arnold Koinon,

19 that's in the records, and Jerry wanted to demonstrate his

12:29:23 20 friendship because if you observe he did not attend the

21 inaugurations and so he wanted to really show our friendship and

22 Jerry and I are all 1948 guys.

23 Q. What do you mean?

24 A. We were all born in 1948. We are 1948 boys. So he really

12:29:41 25 wanted - I think there was a very good and brotherly act on the

26 part of Jerry to show that his absence from the inauguration did

27 not mean that he did not appreciate what was going on and I think

28 he sought to do this in a special way and we were deeply grateful

29 for that.

1 Q. Now, help us. Following that meeting, was any kind of
2 document prepared?

3 A. Yes. Most of these visits with Heads of State you always
4 have - at the end of the visit you have a document that is done.
12:30:21 5 It's a communique that is done by the two Heads of State laying
6 out certain things and expressing good sentiments.

7 Q. Let's go to page 295, please. 295, Mr Taylor, what do we
8 see at that page?

9 A. That's the communique between us, yes.

12:30:59 10 Q. "Joint communique between the government of the Republic of
11 Liberia and the government of the Republic of Ghana", dated 26
12 August 1997, yes?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Let's just quickly review this:

12:31:20 15 "At the invitation of His Excellency Dankpannah Dr Charles
16 Ghankay Taylor, President of the Republic of Liberia, His
17 Excellency Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, President of
18 the Republic of Ghana, paid a one day working visit to the
19 Republic of Liberia on Tuesday, August 26 1997."

12:31:45 20 Now, help us. We've got the photograph which we looked at
21 dated 22 August. The communique now says he came on a one day
22 working visit on 26 August. That's four days later, yes?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. Do you recall this?

12:32:02 25 A. Well, this is a communique and these communiques if the
26 President is in a hurry the communique is - they are dating the
27 communique maybe more at the time of the signing of it.
28 Sometimes Presidents go to meetings and they cannot stay to sign
29 it, but it must be dated as of the time of the communique.

1 Q. All right, "Their Excellencies discussed at considerable
2 length issues relating to Africa in general and to the sub-region
3 in particular." What did you discuss?

4 A. Well, we discussed - Jerry and I talked about the whole
12:32:38 5 war, the peace process going up and down. We even discussed
6 Sierra Leone, about the sub-region and how we could continue
7 working together for peace.

8 Q. And then we see, jumping to the next paragraph:

9 "President Taylor commended President Rawlings, the
12:32:58 10 architect of Akosombo Accord and its Accra Clarifications for the
11 sacrificial role played by the people of Ghana in the peaceful
12 resolution of the Liberian conflict. President Taylor also noted
13 with total satisfaction the exemplary role Ghana continues to
14 play in the maintenance of peace in the West African sub-region.

12:33:26 15 The two Presidents reviewed the current state of political
16 violence in Africa, and in particular, the Republic of Sierra
17 Leone, which they noted poses a serious threat to peace and
18 security in the sub-region, and in this connection Presidents
19 Taylor and Rawlings fully endorsed the decisions of the Economic
12:33:46 20 Community of West African States, the Organisation of African
21 Unity and the United Nations which called for the restoration of
22 constitutional order in Sierra Leone as a prelude to the
23 attainment of peace in that sisterly republic. The two leaders
24 therefore called on the military junta to positively respond to
12:34:04 25 the plea of the international community."

26 Were those sentiments meant by you, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Of course they were. Yes, they were meant by me.

28 Q. And then it goes on to deal with other matters discussed
29 which I needn't trouble you with unless there's anything in

1 particular you want to draw attention to, Mr Taylor?

2 A. No, no, nothing in particular. I just wanted to remind the
3 Court that the references made here to ECOWAS, the OAU and the
4 UN, this is a reference to the June --

12:34:51 5 Q. The 26 June meeting we looked at --

6 A. 26 June meeting, exactly.

7 Q. -- which was then followed by the chiefs of staff meeting
8 which we looked at.

9 A. That is correct.

12:34:59 10 Q. And we're now coming to the third stage of that process,
11 but as we go along I'd like us to keep, please, the chronology in
12 mind. Inauguration on the 2nd, yes?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Visit by Rawlings on the 22nd?

12:35:18 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. This communique dated the 24th?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And we go to the next stage then and the next stage for
19 you, Mr Taylor, was what?

12:35:27 20 A. Oh, boy. Thinking about it it could be - I think I make a
21 speech around this time concerning the national economy, if my
22 recollection serves me right, because we're dealing with all
23 these problems together.

24 Q. This is not a memory test, Mr Taylor. You can't be
12:35:51 25 expected to remember what you were doing from day to day so many
26 years ago, so let's turn to page 193, please, in this document.
27 So remember the 24th is the date of the communique, yes, with
28 Ghana and Rawlings. Do you see the picture on that page?

29 A. Yes, I do.

1 Q. "President Taylor inspects the honoured guard during his
2 arrival at Abuja, August 27, 1997". Now, do you recall attending
3 that meeting a couple of days after that communique was
4 published?

12:36:45 5 A. Yes, this is the first meeting of ECOWAS that I attend.

6 Q. This is the first time you as President of the Republic of
7 Liberia was travelling outside of that country in your capacity
8 as President, is that right?

9 A. That is correct.

12:37:05 10 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. Who was to be present at this
11 meeting?

12 A. Oh, this is a Heads of State meeting.

13 Q. Of?

14 A. ECOWAS.

12:37:20 15 Q. So who is going to be present?

16 A. It is expected that all Heads of State and government will
17 be there.

18 Q. And is there some particular procedure adopted when those
19 heads of government are joined by a newly elected leader?

12:37:37 20 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely.

21 Q. What's that?

22 A. You would have to - you are given the special podium to
23 address your colleagues for the first time coming in. As they
24 welcome you, you deliver your first principal address to your
12:37:55 25 colleagues.

26 Q. On a personal note, Mr Taylor, given this is your first
27 trip abroad, were you nervous?

28 A. Quite frankly, no, because I had - I met most of them
29 before and, you know, they knew me, I knew them and so it was not

1 - well, maybe if you use the word nervous, I was not nervous, but
2 if you have that little, I don't know, maybe a lesser word than
3 nervous, that's normal because this is a sizing up period. You
4 are approaching your colleagues for the first time and you want
12:38:47 5 to do all the right things, because they're going to be sizing
6 you up while you're sizing them up too. So I wouldn't say
7 nervous, but there was a little - I don't know what other word to
8 use, but there was that little - maybe something between a little
9 lower than nervous. We can find a word for that.

12:39:06 10 Q. And we notice, Mr Taylor, from that photograph that gone
11 are the days of the army fatigues and the AK-47s being held
12 aloft. You're in a well cut suit there, aren't you?

13 A. Oh, definitely.

14 Q. Yes, and why the change of image?

12:39:26 15 A. Well, I had never been - throughout the war maybe once or
16 twice during my younger years I would probably just put on
17 uniform just to be in the group, but I have never done any
18 military training and so for the most part from the time we
19 organised the NPRAG and settled in Gbarnga if you watch some -
12:40:00 20 most of the other photos that I took I was in suits because I was
21 interested in projecting the image that really I was not a
22 soldier and have never been a soldier.

23 Q. Now, you mentioned that you were required to address the
24 meeting. Let's go over the page, please. Now we have starting
12:40:33 25 on that page we just looked at the address you gave, don't we?

26 A. Yes. I did address them, yes.

27 Q. Let's cut to the chase. Page 194, column on the right
28 beginning at the top of the page, "Your Excellencies, it is with
29 unbridled pride that I stand here today" - this is you, am I

1 right?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. "...with a popular mandate, as President of Liberia. The
4 pride which we feel in being recognised is not without our
12:41:05 5 appreciation to the many sacrifices which the governments of our
6 sub-region have made in the process. Deep agony was our
7 experience and, but for the stern commitment of ECOWAS, we may
8 have still been at war. This experiment of human sacrifice,
9 material contribution and principles of the highest consideration
12:41:27 10 has dignified the spirit of Liberians, elevated the status of the
11 sub-region and bestowed credit to all on our continent for this
12 novel success."

13 Let's jump to the bottom of the page:

14 "Your Excellencies, today ECOWAS is hailed throughout
12:41:50 15 Africa, and around the globe, as a shining example of an
16 effective and fruitful mechanism of cooperation in West Africa.
17 Our community of West African States is also hailed as one of the
18 best instruments of translating regional plans and programmes
19 into practical action at the sub-regional level. In view of the
12:42:14 20 modest and yet significant contributions it is making to Africa's
21 development programmes in such areas as transport and
22 communications; agricultural development strategy aimed
23 specifically at the task of reducing food losses and improving
24 food distribution and marketing in the region; and ensuring the
12:42:36 25 expansion of trade among community member states."

26 Then this:

27 "If the Liberian peace process was any model in conflict
28 resolution, then we must agree that the fundamental precondition
29 for addressing the Sierra Leone problem is the harmonisation of

1 our policies and objectives for restoring peace to Sierra Leone.
2 The OAU Harare decision, and the recommendations of the final
3 communique of the extraordinary meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers
4 of Foreign Affairs in Conakry on 26 June 1997, have set the basis
12:43:24 5 for a common policy. We must in the most emphatic terms condemn
6 the illegal overthrow of constitutional authority. We must be
7 firm and send a clear message to all would-be coup plotters that
8 our sub-region will no longer tolerate such an affront to our
9 endeavours to achieve greater democratisation. However, whatever
12:43:54 10 our problems, we must seek to be judicious, to weigh with
11 objective scrutiny, the inescapable practical realities on the
12 ground as they relate to the area of conflict. We should be seen
13 as acting in concert with a firm resolution, showing tolerance
14 for our differences of opinion, while respecting the territorial
12:44:19 15 integrity and sovereignty of each member state."

16 Pause there. I want to deal with two aspects of that with
17 you, Mr Taylor. Firstly, this. Where you said, "We must in the
18 most emphatic terms condemn the illegal overthrow of constituted
19 authority", did you mean that?

12:44:42 20 A. Of course I meant that.

21 Q. "We must be firm and send a clear message to all would-be
22 coup plotters that our sub-region will no longer tolerate such an
23 affront to our endeavours to achieve greater democratisation."

24 Did you mean that?

12:45:02 25 A. I meant that.

26 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you appreciate of course that you are
27 charged in this indictment with controlling the AFRC; the very
28 people you're condemning in this statement. Now, help us. How
29 does that come about?

1 A. I am sure - they are all professional people around here.
2 I'm sure maybe if the Prosecution knew some of this they would
3 have changed what they see as the theory that built their case,
4 because that surely is not the case in my mind and that's not the
12:45:41 5 case through my actions. Everything that I'm trying to do from
6 the Liberian peace process coming to my election is to try to
7 make sure we begin to stabilise. From the day I'm in office I'm
8 talking to Abacha. We're meeting. You've seen my letter. We've
9 seen all of these going on.

12:46:04 10 It's an ongoing process. Beginning August I'm laying out
11 straight to the point to my colleagues where my head is, what
12 they should expect from me and what will happen and it continues
13 throughout, if you watch it. Every step of the way from the time
14 I took the oath of office, 1997, you look at my record in 1998,
12:46:29 15 you look at my contribution in 1999, you look at my contribution
16 in 2000. They are all in concert with my colleagues. It's all
17 done with their acquiescence and so there is nothing that is
18 cynical about this. It is real, I mean it and I do it.

19 Q. Now, the second aspect of that to which I want to draw your
12:46:53 20 attention is this. If we go seven lines from the bottom of that
21 left column:

22 "However, whatever our problems, we must seek to be
23 judicious, to weigh with objective scrutiny, the inescapable
24 practical realities on the ground as they relate to the area of
12:47:18 25 conflict. We should be seen as acting in concert with a firm
26 resolution, showing tolerance for our differences of opinion,
27 while respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
28 each member state."

29 What are you hinting at there?

1 A. I'm already under diplomatic pressure in dealing with
2 Sierra Leone. This is all about Sierra Leone and Liberia to a
3 great extent. One of the things that I am agonising over at this
4 particular point is what we described before. I'm agonising over
12:47:56 5 the attitude of this huge military force on the ground in Liberia
6 that continues to behave as if they are occupying, or may I say
7 operating under the same mandate before the elections. I'm
8 having daily problems with these people and for me it's a matter
9 of sovereignty that had to take precedence.

12:48:26 10 Then I'm also looking at Sierra Leone because by the time
11 I'm at this meeting I'm getting all of the reports of what's
12 going on across the border, about the movement of troops and
13 training of Kamajors and all of this, and I am troubled at this
14 point. I am troubled. And this is just diplomatic language of
12:48:45 15 frustration saying that, "Look, we've got to do this thing right.
16 The way that things used to be done we have to try to change."

17 I'm really dealing with this matter in a round about way in
18 trying to keep everybody on even keel in remembering that now we
19 are all - you know, we are all equals now and that we all have
12:49:14 20 concerns, we all have countries in the territories to report to
21 and that we should all turn a new page and respect the
22 territorial integrity, which I'm talking about Liberia now, and
23 the sovereignty of each member state and don't let size be the
24 problem. "Well, we're spending money. We've got the army.
12:49:35 25 We'll do it. We know better." I'm just going round about in
26 laying certain cards on the table of what we would expect from
27 our colleagues too.

28 Q. Let's go back to the right-hand column:

29 "It has been evidenced that no peace can prevail in the

1 absence of confidence and security, and that no level of
2 meaningful economic development can be achieved where there is no
3 peace and stability. We must realise that the objectives of our
4 organisation require a secured and peaceful environment."

12:50:12 5 Let us pause again. Mr Taylor, the economy you had
6 inherited was devastated, wasn't it?

7 A. It was.

8 Q. And what was your first priority as a President of a
9 country?

12:50:31 10 A. Putting together a structure - a mechanism - to begin to
11 turn this around.

12 Q. Now what did you see as the main priority, bearing in mind
13 the sentiments expressed in this paragraph? What was the
14 precondition for economic development in Liberia?

12:50:52 15 A. It had to be security.

16 Q. And anything else?

17 A. It had to be peace. Well, peace and security. There must
18 be those on the ground.

19 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you appreciate you're the warmonger, the
12:51:05 20 Prosecution say, and you had no interest in this. What do you
21 say to that suggestion?

22 A. The Prosecutor, or Prosecution, is just - I would say they
23 are grossly misled by their own thoughts. That's all I can say.

24 Q. "We must realise that the objectives of our organisation
12:51:34 25 require a secured and peaceful environment. Our efforts at
26 conflict resolution must be geared towards creating this
27 environment. The security of our region remains the essential
28 key to the realisation of economic development. We can now take
29 comfort that the ECOMOG experience and attributed success can

1 become the medium for ensuring regional security. However, we
2 must all contribute to the conceptualisation of an ECOMOG, and
3 its role as a regional peacekeeping entity for future conflicts
4 in the region. On this account, therefore, we should support it
12:52:20 5 and bear our fair share of maintaining ECOMOG as a Force. But,
6 it is also imperative to understand that in each instance of
7 conflict, a different modus operandi may be applied to reaching a
8 solution. We cannot allow our novel concept to play havoc on the
9 merits of what we intended. The converse is that on each
12:52:46 10 account, our leadership, in joint session, will give prudent
11 definition to the course of action we resolve to take. Since no
12 state in our region is immune from the problems of refugees and
13 the potential for cross-border spill-over of conflicts, security
14 of necessity must be a collective effort."

12:53:11 15 Pause there. Mr Taylor, did you want to be a team player
16 with ECOWAS?

17 A. Definitely.

18 Q. Over the page, please:

19 "Your Excellencies: From our undaunted courage, we have
12:53:31 20 found that one lesson in particular has been learned from the
21 Liberian conflict: It is the realisation that where there is
22 commitment and trust, and the conviction of neutrality, or its
23 appearance, with determination and the existence of political
24 will, no problem, no conflict, indeed, no crisis, can remain
12:53:53 25 intractable forever. We can thus resoundingly say that ECOWAS
26 has left footprints on the sand of time."

27 And that reference to "conviction of neutrality", are we
28 talking there about the conversation you'd had with Sani Abacha?

29 A. That is correct. That is correct.

1 Q. "Your Excellencies, as the Liberian government assumes the
2 rightful exercise of its sovereignty, and begin to play an active
3 role in the sub-region, our national legislature, in joint
4 session, has fully empowered me, by law, to grant the stay of
12:54:33 5 ECOMOG in Liberia to February 2, 1998, which is in line with the
6 six months extension under the revised Abuja schedule. In order
7 that the status of ECOMOG be regularised, the national
8 legislature has further required that as chief executive, I
9 conclude a Status of Forces Agreement with the community. In
12:55:04 10 respect of this matter, my government reaffirms its acquiescence
11 of the commitment of ECOMOG to assist in the restructuring of the
12 national army and police force, as prescribed by the revised
13 schedule of implementation of the Abuja Accord."

14 And had you required that mandate from the legislature,
12:55:32 15 Mr Taylor?

16 A. Yes, it was required. What is done in a case like this,
17 this is really called an authorisation bill where the President
18 is given some flexibility, because don't forget now the
19 constitution of Liberia is brought back into full force as of
12:55:54 20 noon on 2 August and so right away - because the constitution of
21 Liberia had been suspended throughout the war, so when you hear
22 about the independent election commission as one of the
23 honourable judges asked, these are all programmes that are put
24 into place to deal with this specific case. So here we have -
12:56:20 25 now the constitution is in full force and here is a military
26 force in the country.

27 Now it sounds a little odd, but in politics it is done.
28 For the legislature the first question that came to me was, "What
29 is this force?", even though they know it's ECOMOG, but the

1 question is from a political or maybe legal point, "Mr President,
2 there is a force in this country. We want to know what you know
3 about this force." So we have to report to the legislature the
4 presence of ECOMOG that has been there all along, but it's a
12:56:59 5 procedural matter. We have to tell them, the next question,
6 "Well, how long are they here for?" So we have to tell them that
7 they are here for this time.

8 We had given them this particular date and so all the
9 legislature did was to give the President the authorisation to
12:57:17 10 meet that date, but that was not a fixed date before we hear
11 letter, "Well, ECOMOG was only in Liberia until February 2."
12 That's not the case. What this is an authorisation to cover the
13 six months and you always go back and seek authorisation for more
14 time.

12:57:35 15 Q. Okay. We see you continue, jumping a few lines:

16 "The mandate of an ECOWAS force in Liberia must now be
17 revised from that of peacekeeping to the provision of security
18 and capacity building for national security which conceivably
19 would entail a new acronym, one more accurately suggestive of a
12:57:56 20 posture of security and capacity building."

21 Yes?

22 A. Mm-hm.

23 Q. And then you go on:

24 "Another matter of immediacy to my government is the
12:58:10 25 lifting of all sanctions and embargoes imposed on Liberia during
26 the war."

27 Was that the case?

28 A. Yes, most of the sanctions and other embargoes were lifted
29 except for the arms embargo. In fact, ECOWAS lifted all of the

1 sanctions and embargoes, but this issue on the Chapter 7 embargo
2 on arms was a matter that had to be sent to the Security Council.

3 Q. And you see it continues:

4 "This means that ECOWAS will have to request the same from
12:58:45 5 the OAU and United Nations. Indeed, the importance and urgency
6 of this matter could never be overemphasised."

7 Do you see that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Let's skip and go over the page, please, Mr Taylor, and
12:59:01 10 let's begin at the second paragraph:

11 "Thirdly we have experienced the proliferation of
12 regulatory mechanisms such as the Committee of Nine on Liberia,
13 the Committee of Four on Sierra Leone which have assumed informal
14 prerogatives of national governments. We hope to be of great
12:59:26 15 help as part of this committee."

16 What does that mean?

17 A. That we appreciate what they have done in Liberia, we see
18 what is going on with the Committee of Four and we hope we can,
19 you know, help along this whole process of conflict resolution
12:59:42 20 and conflict management.

21 Q. Now at the end of that paragraph we have some words in
22 parentheses, "We hope to be of great help as part of this
23 committee". What does that mean?

24 A. That's the Committee of Four.

13:00:01 25 Q. Yes, as part of?

26 A. To be a member of the committee.

27 Q. So you are asking to become a member of the committee?

28 A. Well, we are making ourselves available because it's a
29 decision of the Heads of State. I have already been asked in

1 camera about this matter, so I put it in a speech that we hope we
2 can be of great help to this committee, yes.

3 Q. Right, you've already been asked in camera. Let's use
4 English. In private?

13:00:33 5 A. Yes, in private, I mean through discussions --

6 Q. You'd been asked what?

7 A. If I can be helpful with my guerilla experience in dealing
8 with the war and all the problems, if I, you know, felt that I
9 could be helpful in this process and I'm hinting here that, yes,
10 we hope we can be helpful in that process.

13:00:49

11 Q. And who had asked you?

12 A. Sani Abacha had asked me. In fact from the day of my
13 inauguration, colleagues sitting, around this matter was thrown
14 up to me through our informal discussions after my inaugural

13:01:10

15 situation. This is where I jokingly said to you, "Well, you're a
16 guerilla. What can you do now? We've gotten you out of this, we
17 need your help, what would you want to do?" And then I make
18 myself available.

19 Q. And as a consequence of you now become available what

13:01:26

20 happens to the Committee of Four? Does it remain a Committee of
21 Four?

22 A. No, no, no. At the end of the programme in section the
23 Heads of State, the chairman nomination recommends and all
24 parties agree, and I want to mention --

13:01:44

25 Q. Agree to what?

26 A. To my becoming a member of the Committee of Five and let me
27 tell you why this is important, because ECOWAS operates on total
28 consensus. That is if one member state objects, do you
29 understand me, you cannot be. So at this meeting don't let's

1 forget everyone is there including who's representing at this
2 meeting for the Government of Sierra Leone, it's the government
3 of Tejan Kabbah, not the junta. So all member states have to
4 agree on every plan in ECOWAS.

13:02:24 5 Q. So help us. Are you telling us that the representative of
6 the Kabbah government agreed to you becoming a member of the
7 committee, thus transforming it from a Committee of Four to a
8 Committee of Five?

9 A. That's exactly what I'm saying because if the Kabbah
13:02:44 10 government had said no I would not have been, because of the
11 consensus factor in ECOWAS.

12 Q. Going back to the document:

13 "Additionally we have observed the institutionalisation of
14 the peace process through the creation of a bureaucracy
15 especially trained to manage the implementation of a brokered
16 agreement. In this bureaucracy of multi-national staffing
17 involving ECOMOG the Committee of Nine special envoys and
18 external associates, community loyalties have surfaced further
19 maintaining the momentum of integration."

13:03:27 20 Jumping a few lines:

21 "I have mentioned these factors to show that the ECOWAS
22 plan for peace has in a way contributed to promoting integration
23 in our sub-region. While we may have adopted the traditional
24 concept of integration in the economic sector, the spill-over
13:03:46 25 effect potential into other integration sectors remain a positive
26 signal for achieving maximum economic growth, political maturity
27 and regional conflict resolution. ECOWAS must achieve these
28 objectives if our sub-region is to create the environment for our
29 people to obtain a decent standard of living."

1 And then you continue:

2 "What we need today in our sub-region is a renewed, if not
3 new, conceptualisation of man. A consent of our humanity
4 reminiscent of the vision which drove our late colleagues,
13:04:32 5 Dr William VS Tubman, Dr Kwame Nkrumah and President Ahmed Sekou
6 Toure to develop the concept of the OAU in Sanniquellie, Liberia,
7 in July 1959. Frantz Fanon wrote that, 'For ourselves and for
8 humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work
9 out new concepts and try to set afoot a new man'.

13:05:04 10 Peace in Liberia need not have been elusive. We Africans
11 are blessed with a tradition of cooperation in resolving problems
12 from the smallest village to the largest city. We share a
13 genuine brotherly concern that has led us to take our brothers
14 problems as our problems. We eat, we sleep, we dance, we mourn
13:05:32 15 together. We have always lived within the community. We have
16 not known egocentrism. All the ingredients for modern
17 cooperation and integration are imbued in our African tradition.
18 We need only rediscover our culture, our history, and our
19 humanity.

13:06:03 20 Colleagues, if we set to resolve the Sierra Leonean crisis
21 and we apply the wisdom of our tradition, we can succeed as we
22 have in Liberia. The problem in Liberia was not resolved by
23 threat of force or the use of force. Rather its mitigation
24 emerged from trust, the personal commitment of and the
13:06:37 25 understanding and neutrality of our host sister state."

26 I don't know if there are any passages in this address
27 which you think would assist us, Mr Taylor?

28 A. Quite frankly not. We've covered I think the most
29 important parts. We probably don't need anything else here. If

1 you look at where I'm going, I'm identifying the resolve in
2 solving Liberia's problem, how it was done and then reminding
3 Abacha in that meeting of what happened between us. Basically I
4 think we've covered that.

13:07:31 5 Q. Following that meeting, Mr Taylor, was anything decided?

6 A. Yes, there were about three or four things that were
7 decided. One being the lifting of the sanctions and embargo
8 against Liberia. We also - and the efforts on Sierra Leone. It
9 was mostly Sierra Leone and lifting the sanctions and instructing
10 that this matter should be forwarded to the Security Council.

11 There was a short communique that dealt with these matters.

12 Q. A short communique?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I wonder if I can invite everyone's attention back to that
13:08:26 15 smaller bundle which we were looking at earlier of additional
16 documents for weeks 27 to 30, please, behind divider 12.

17 Mr Taylor, is this the document that concluded that meeting in
18 Abuja?

19 A. This is the document.

13:09:42 20 Q. And we see from the frontispiece that it's headed "Economic
21 Community of West African States, 20th Session of the Authority
22 of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28 to 29 August 1997.
23 Decision relating to the lifting of sanctions and embargo against
24 Liberia". Now the next page is not well copied so let's go
13:10:15 25 directly to page 3. I'm picking it up with the first word:

26 "Considering that the need to ensure compliance with the
27 ECOWAS peace plan by the parties to the Liberian conflict led the
28 community decision making bodies to impose sanctions against the
29 parties failing to comply with the said plan;

1 Considering that in order to ensure that peace and
2 stability prevailed in Liberia, member states imposed a general
3 and total embargo on all shipments of arms and military hardware
4 to that country and obtained a similar Security Council
13:11:07 5 resolution in order to make the sanction universal and
6 obligatory;

7 Considering that the successful organisation of the special
8 elections in Liberia in 1997 completed the execution of the
9 ECOWAS peace plan in that country;

13:11:25 10 Convinced that with the restoration of democracy and peace
11 in Liberia, it is no longer necessary to maintain the embargo and
12 any other sanctions imposed against Liberia decides:

13 Article 1. The member states hereby immediately lift the
14 embargo on the import of arms and military hardware to Liberia as
13:11:54 15 well as all other sanctions imposed against Liberia and all the
16 parties to the Liberian conflict.

17 Article 2. The executive secretary shall request the
18 Secretary-General of the United Nations to have the embargo
19 imposed against Liberia by the Security Council lifted."

13:12:16 20 Pause there. Was it lifted by the Security Council,
21 Mr Taylor?

22 A. No, it was not.

23 Q. So your immediate neighbours in West Africa decided that it
24 was an opportune moment to lift the sanctions but the Security
13:12:36 25 Council decided otherwise. Is that right?

26 A. Yes, they always know better from New York.

27 Q. Over the page. Final page:

28 "This decision shall be published by the executive
29 secretariat in the official journal on the community. It shall

1 also be published in the national gazette of each member state.

2 Done at Abuja this 29th day of August 1997", and it is
3 signed by His Excellency General Sani Abacha, yes?

4 A. Yes.

13:13:15 5 Q. And so that concluded your first encounter with your
6 collective brother Presidents in ECOWAS, yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we proceed, Mr President, can I ask
9 that this document be marked for identification. We're up to
13:13:45 10 MFI-24 and the appellation I would suggest is "20th Session of
11 the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28-29
12 August 1997".

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document will be marked for
14 identification MFI-24.

13:14:33 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. So by the conclusion of this meeting, Mr Taylor, you're now
17 a member of the Committee of Five?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now did that committee make any decisions at that stage,
13:14:53 20 August?

21 A. Well, not that I can recall. I mean there were discussions
22 ongoing, but the most important thing that came up was the -
23 since I had come on with my experience, that like La Cote
24 d'Ivoire if you watch the Committee of Four on Sierra Leone at
13:15:27 25 the time, if you look back at the agreements La Cote d'Ivoire is
26 in the lead. La Cote d'Ivoire is in the lead on the question of
27 Sierra Leone. This is why the agreements of 1996 are done in
28 Abidjan. In fact Foday Sankoh by that time has been given
29 working quarters, something like a guesthouse, in Abidjan with

1 communication. So what that decision - the only thing that came
2 up was that Liberia would now take that role that had been
3 assumed by La Cote d'Ivoire on the Committee of Four.

4 Q. Now that meeting in Abuja concluded on 29 August, yes?

13:16:19 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. And bearing in mind that we're looking to deal with events
7 chronologically, can I invite your attention, please, now to page
8 201 of the presidential papers. Do you have it?

9 A. Yes, I do.

13:17:39 10 Q. I only introduce this so that we can bear in mind the
11 schedule of events. You see that, having left Abuja on 29
12 August, now a couple of days later on Tuesday 2 September 1997 in
13 Monrovia, Liberia, you are addressing members of the diplomatic
14 corps, yes?

13:18:11 15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. So we're now in September. Also in that month, if we go to
17 page 130 of this bundle - do you have it?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. The bottom paragraph on that page, "President Taylor and
13:18:48 20 President Mainassara Barre of Nigeria[sic] share a special moment
21 during one of their several meetings in Abuja, Nigeria during an
22 ECOWAS summit September 1997", yes?

23 A. Yes.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: The President is for Niger.

13:19:17 25 THE WITNESS: Mainassara, the President for Niger.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Niger, sorry:

27 Q. So there's a further meeting that you attend in September,
28 Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, I probably, you know, rush back. This is not a full

1 ECOWAS meeting. It's probably one of those probably called to
2 talk, you know, because we were running between Monrovia and
3 Abuja, you know, quite a lot, but this is not a formal - they put
4 it here as a summit. Any time two or three Presidents meet you
13:19:47 5 can call it a summit, but it's not like the regular ECOWAS
6 meeting. That's why it says "one of their several meetings", so
7 it's not a --

8 Q. Now in that month of September, did you travel anywhere
9 else?

13:20:11 10 A. Oh, September 1997, I cannot recollect. I know around
11 October I'm on the road. Around October I'm on the road, but I
12 don't recollect any - I know I have to come back to Liberia to
13 talk about some problems with the economy, but I can't recollect
14 now.

13:20:40 15 Q. Very well. Very well. Not to worry. Mr Taylor, let's put
16 that document away. I have to inform you that we'll be coming
17 back to it again, not just yet though. Help me with this. In or
18 about the summer of 1997, were you due to make an address at the
19 United Nations?

13:21:08 20 A. Yes, that's - yes, that's the annual address to the General
21 Assembly.

22 Q. When were you supposed to have done that?

23 A. Oh, that is around - it comes around - based on your
24 schedule it comes around September. Sometimes it comes in
13:21:31 25 August, because of the scheduling of the Heads of State.
26 Depending on I think either the country, the alphabet of the
27 country, there is a strict - you could be in August one year and
28 the next year September depending on the last person that spoke.
29 There's a whole process that they do at the UN. So I think this

1 is around September that Liberia may have fallen into that
2 particular section.

3 Q. Did you attend the United Nations to deliver that speech,
4 Mr Taylor?

13:22:02 5 A. No, I did not.

6 Q. Why not?

7 A. Well, there were several diplomatic and practical problems.
8 Liberia - we had been fighting very hard to rebuild our ties with
9 the United States. That was in a little bit of a tussle, because
10 following my election as President we had moved to have the legal
11 problems with this alleged escape from jail resolved. So that
12 was one issue that we had insisted that we want to resolve, that
13 the United States government would drop all of those charges of
14 which the Justice Department finally did to meet my visit to the
13:22:31 15 United States.

16 But there was also a second reason why I did not go. There
17 was a tradition that because of the close relationship between
18 Liberia and the United States that at each time of the year that
19 the Liberian President went to the United States to address the
13:23:01 20 General Assembly, following that meeting he would go to
21 Washington, he would meet the President for a discussion, visit a
22 few cities, look at potential investors and all of that.

23 Well, I'm just coming to office and there are discussions
24 along these lines and the United States government is not yet
13:23:21 25 forthcoming on it. There is a partial agreement that there could
26 be what they call a side bar talk at the UN with the President,
27 but I wanted more. I wanted for us to really sit down to talk
28 about the issues as I saw it for my country.

29 And so I had said that to take all of this money and go to

1 the United States just to - this huge delegation charter an
2 aircraft to go to New York to deliver an address and I did not
3 take care of the other important things in the United States,
4 whether I was speaking to the President and sometimes previous
13:24:33 5 governments would meet members of congress, travel, investment
6 talks and different things. Unless there was this meaningful
7 trip, there was no need to take the trip. So these are the two
8 reasons why I didn't go.

9 Q. Now the first reason, those loose ends, the ripples from
13:24:51 10 your escape from prison in the States a few years before, did you
11 instruct anyone on your behalf to deal with that issue?

12 A. Oh, yes, as before I had obtained the services of the
13 former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Now, as
14 President, it was the prerogative of the Government of Liberia
13:25:22 15 through my offices to contact Ramsey to begin to pursue this
16 matter to get it cleared up.

17 Q. And did he?

18 A. Oh, yes. Yes, he did. He did and, as far as the United
19 States government side is concerned, the only last little hitch
13:25:45 20 was I think the - it may have been the sheriff I think of
21 Plymouth County, there was concern that he might raise it as an
22 issue which was a local issue, but as far as the federal
23 government of the United States under the Justice Department the
24 federal side of the case was all taken care of.

13:26:09 25 Q. Now, did you have any correspondence with Ramsey Clark
26 about this issue at this time?

27 A. Yes, Ramsey wrote me a letter explaining some of these
28 issues and encouraging me to take advantage of this trip to the
29 United States and I did not take that advice.

1 MR GRIFFITHS: Now it is my intention to advert to that
2 letter at this stage, Mr President, but I do note the time.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I think that would be more
4 appropriate after the lunch break. We will adjourn for lunch now
13:26:47 5 and resume at 2.30.

6 [Lunch break taken at 1.26 p.m.]

7 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

14:31:23 10 Q. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch we were dealing
11 with correspondence you had received from Ramsey Clark, your
12 lawyer in the United States of America, is that right?

13 A. That is right.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: At this stage could I invite attention
14:31:45 15 behind divider 1 in the first bundle of Defence documents for the
16 week 27 July through 31 July:

17 Q. Do you have the letter, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. We see that it's dated 26 September 1997 and this would
14:33:04 20 appear to be a faxed copy of the letter bearing in mind what we
21 see at the top and also underneath the date we have helpfully set
22 out "By Fax" and the number. It reads as follows:

23 "Dear President Taylor,

24 You were missed at the United Nations. It is very
14:33:32 25 important for Liberia that its newly elected President stand tall
26 in the General Assembly of Nations. Your reception would have
27 been extremely enthusiastic among the great majority of the
28 delegates because they understand what Liberia and you have been
29 through.

1 The United States wants to continue to isolate and
2 marginalise you as it has done for a decade to maintain its
3 domination over Liberia. It will play games with the outstanding
4 state charges in the Bay State to keep you at bay."

14:34:16 5 Now, Mr Taylor, let us pause there. That is the sentiment
6 of a lawyer acting on your behalf, but did you take the view that
7 the United States had been isolating you?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. From when?

14:34:36 10 A. Well, from the time of the elections what they did in
11 interfering by helping to finance the present President who ran,
12 Ellen, and the fact that they were not seriously represented at
13 the inaugural ceremonies, these are all symbols that you watch
14 for. Since then, even up to this point there had been no real
14:35:11 15 constructive contact. You watch these out there.

16 You come - I'm inaugurated on August 2. What will be one
17 of the first things you would get would be maybe a message of
18 congratulations from the President. These are all signs. Those
19 were not forthcoming and don't forget who is speaking here.

14:35:38 20 Ramsey Clark is not just a lawyer. He is former Attorney-General
21 of the United States and so he knows the politics of it all too.

22 Q. And help us. Let's pause for a moment to go forward to
23 come back. Was Ramsey Clark the only senior American figure,
24 Mr Taylor, who was concerned about this isolation at the time?

14:36:00 25 A. No, no, no, no, he was not the only one. We had - I had a
26 friend in congress that had been in congress that had been in
27 congress for a number of years.

28 Q. Who is that?

29 A. He is presently still in congress, Congressman Donald Payne

1 from the State of New Jersey. He had had interests in getting
2 Liberia moving too.

3 Q. And had he made any attempt to get Liberia moving, as you
4 put it?

14:36:27 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What had he done?

7 A. He wrote a letter directly to then President William
8 Jefferson Clinton about the issue of Liberia and the fact that
9 this is a new government that is democratically elected in the
10 free, fair and transparent election and trying to ask him to
11 begin to look at Liberia in a favourable way.

12 Q. So that was a letter by Donald Payne --

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. -- to Bill Clinton?

14:36:56 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Let us look quickly behind divider 2 before we continue
17 with the Ramsey Clark letter. Behind divider 2 do we see that
18 letter, Mr Taylor?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

14:37:09 20 Q. The one that you've just mentioned?

21 A. Yes, that is it.

22 Q. Okay, let's go back to the Ramsey Clark letter then please,
23 "As you remember, the federal charges against you were dismissed
24 years ago. Rick Stearns" - and was that the case?

14:37:24 25 A. That's the case.

26 Q. Now, what federal charges were they?

27 A. Oh, I'll have to probably leave that for the other side.

28 The United States it's a republican form of government and so
29 they have different jurisdictions. You have federal, state and

1 local jurisdictions. So he is speaking about the federal
2 jurisdiction, which had to do maybe with a violation of certain
3 federal laws because I was being held by the federal government.
4 Though I was in the custody of the state down there, I was not
14:38:12 5 what you would call a detainee of any state. I was a detainee of
6 the federal government. In fact, the issue of extradition was
7 looked at not in state court, but in federal court, so that's the
8 federal jurisdiction.

9 Q. "Rick Stearns, the assistant US attorney who handled your
14:38:39 10 extradition hearings, and is now a judge, assured me of that
11 repeatedly. There is however an escape charge brought by the
12 state district attorney because you were held in the Plymouth
13 County jail and the other prisoners were county prisoners.

14 An effort should be made to get the state charge dismissed
14:39:02 15 at the local level where it has been brought. The district
16 attorney Michael J Sullivan, a Republican, and the sheriff's
17 office are the people to persuade?

18 It is better to have the criminal charges simply dismissed
19 by the district attorney if possible. A pardon by the governor
14:39:24 20 implies there is something to be pardoned for. There is case law
21 that says a prisoner who escapes because he reasonably believes
22 his life is endangered is not guilty of escape. You are
23 certainly not guilty. The pardon process is also cumbersome,
24 time consuming, unusual in cases where there has been no
14:39:51 25 conviction and unattractive for a Head of State because it is
26 premised on a plea for clemency from another government.

27 I believe the best approach for public purposes includes
28 the points in the attached statement I prepared for Tom Woveiyu
29 for a Liberian or other delegation to make a in Brockton to

1 District Attorney Sullivan or in Boston to Governor Celluci .

2 If this ridiculous problem is not cleared up in advance you
3 will face the same harassing concerns the next time you come to
4 the US, which I hope will be soon.

14:40:42 5 A recent article in the Boston Globe on the issue of the
6 state charges is enclosed along with the Reuters story on why you
7 cannot attend the UN opening.

8 I hope your trip to South Africa was good."

9 Now we'll come to the trip to South Africa in a moment, but
14:41:02 10 attached to this letter is the document to which the writer
11 referred, the prepared document, which reads as follows:

12 "We are citizens of Liberia and Liberian Americans. Our
13 history with the United States and the state of Massachusetts
14 goes back more than 150 years. We feel particularly close ties
14:41:30 15 with the state of Massachusetts because of its strong leadership
16 in our behalf even before the American Civil War when most states
17 and even the federal government were hostile.

18 The Liberian people have now established their own peace
19 after a period of devastating nationwide violence twice as long
14:41:55 20 as the US Civil War. A period of reconstruction and
21 reconciliation has begun. This is a difficult time. Liberia
22 needs the help, support and friendship of all Americans.

23 Liberians have just chosen Charles Taylor to be their
24 President by a vote of more than 75 per cent of the people in an
14:42:25 25 election proclaimed worldwide for its fairness, including the
26 good voice of former President Jimmy Carter who led a major
27 delegation of election observers. The Liberian people have
28 united behind President Taylor and pray for his success on which
29 all fervently believe the future of Liberia depends.

1 More than a decade ago while being held as a prisoner of
2 the United States government on an extradition warrant from the
3 murderous government of Liberia's then President Sergeant Samuel
4 K Doe, Charles Taylor escaped from the Plymouth County jail. He
14:43:09 5 was a federal prisoner, but the United States has long since
6 dropped all charges against him.

7 President Taylor knew then, as did knowledgeable people
8 everywhere, and as his attorneys stated to the US court in
9 Boston, that if he was handed over to Samuel K Doe he would be
14:43:32 10 brutally tortured and killed. He escaped, later led the
11 overthrow of Samuel K Doe and now leads Liberia towards a new
12 independence and a promising future as Liberia's President
13 elected by the vast majority of the Liberian people from every
14 segment of the society.

14:43:53 15 On behalf of the Liberian people and the large Liberian
16 American community, we implore you to dismiss the pending escape
17 charges against President Taylor, to pardon him, to join us in a
18 new period of truth and reconciliation.

19 We want to pass on to you President Taylor's personal warm
14:44:15 20 feelings and indebtedness to Massachusetts. He lived here during
21 his student years and graduated from your own Bentley College
22 where he was president, among other things, of the Liberian
23 American Students Association. Respectfully submitted."

24 Can we pause. Mr Taylor, was that statement presented to
14:44:40 25 Mr Sullivan, the state district attorney?

26 A. Quite frankly, I cannot be certain that it was but I do
27 know that the charges got finally dropped.

28 Q. So, so far as your escape from Plymouth County jail, were
29 you eventually exonerated?

1 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

2 Q. So all state charges were dropped and all federal charges
3 were dropped?

4 A. That is what I was informed of, yes.

14:45:10 5 Q. Now, we referred earlier to a letter from a congressman,
6 yes?

7 A. Yes.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: Now before I move on, could I have that
9 letter marked for identification, please; the Ramsey Clark letter
14:45:30 10 and attachment.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: The letter to Mr Taylor from Ramsey Clark
12 dated 26 September 1997 will be marked for identification MFI-25.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Let's now go please to this other letter from congressman
14:46:36 15 Donald M Payne, member of the House of Representatives of the
16 United States of America, representative for the 10th District in
17 New Jersey. It's dated 1 October 1997 and it's addressed to the
18 Honourable William Jefferson Clinton, The White House, Washington
19 DC:

14:47:01 20 "Dear Mr President, I would like to express my concern that
21 the relationship between the United States and the newly elected
22 democratic government of the Republic of Liberia is in serious
23 jeopardy because of what appears to be either the unwillingness
24 or the inability of the Department of State and Department of
14:47:30 25 Justice to solve a problem that threatens that relationship. The
26 international community has certified that the recent election in
27 Liberia was free and fair. Since the inauguration of President
28 Taylor a qualified and responsible coalition government has been
29 formed. Also he has sworn in an independent judiciary and

1 freedom of the press has been encouraged.

2 The next step is the rebuilding of the country. In pursuit
3 of that goal the President of Liberia wanted to come to the
4 United States to accept an invitation to speak at the United
14:48:18 5 Nations and then meet with governmental and business leaders to
6 explain his plans for reconstruction and seek their assistance.
7 This, however, did not come to fruition.

8 As the democratically elected leader of a sovereign state
9 that has strong historic and cultural ties with the
14:48:41 10 United States, President Taylor should be allowed to visit the US
11 without the imminent threat of legal recourse.

12 This charge was pre-empted from the Reagan administration
13 accession to the demand of then President Samuel Doe of Liberia
14 to seize, incarcerate and extradite Charles Taylor to Liberia
14:49:13 15 based upon politically motivated charges. President Taylor,
16 justifiably fearing execution if he was returned to Liberia,
17 escaped from the Massachusetts jail. The political and social
18 climate at the time was volatile. The US government dropped all
19 charges against President Taylor in 1987, yet Massachusetts
14:49:39 20 continues to keep a withholding warrant for President Taylor's
21 arrest.

22 The Department of State and Justice have been asked by
23 Liberia to engage in a discussion with the district attorney of
24 Plymouth County, Massachusetts to let him know that it would be
14:50:01 25 in the best interests of US foreign policy for the charges to be
26 dropped. I understand that the Plymouth County authorities
27 informally have indicated that such a message should result in
28 the charges being non-processed. Yet for months now no one in
29 our government has taken this simple step to assure good

1 relations between the US and Liberia. As the direct result,
2 President Taylor has postponed his trip to the United Nations and
3 subsequently has been forced to seek assistance from undemocratic
4 countries."

14:50:43 5 Pause there. Which undemocratic countries are they talking
6 about, or is he talking about?

7 A. I don't know what Donald is talking about. Undemocratic,
8 that - he could have been probably referring to Libya, I suppose.
9 Because the countries - South Africa was surely democratic.

14:51:08 10 Donald may have been talking about Libya probably.

11 Q. "It was correct for our country to send a congratulatory
12 letter to the President of Liberia to begin the new relationship
13 between the countries. However, that expression of goodwill is
14 rapidly being dissipated.

14:51:29 15 I urge you in the strongest possible terms that this issue
16 be resolved immediately and that you keep me informed of your
17 progress. If you may have any questions or concerns please do
18 not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Donald M Payne, Member of
19 Congress."

14:52:00 20 Now, as a result of that letter, Mr Taylor, was there any
21 thawing of the ice between you and the US administration?

22 A. Yes. Some months down the road we see some thawing of the
23 relationship. I think pressure grew and grew and we did begin to
24 build a little relationship, through a delegation to Liberia and
14:52:38 25 my speaking to President Clinton the year after this, but there
26 was some developments.

27 MR GRIFFITHS: Before we move on, Mr President, can I ask
28 that that document be marked for identification MFI-26, a letter
29 to President William Jefferson Clinton from Congressman Payne

1 dated 1 October 1997.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that letter is marked MFI-26.

3 MR GRIFFITHS:

4 Q. So that's 1 October, Mr Taylor. Now we're dealing with
14:53:32 5 matters chronologically, as I indicated earlier, and so I wonder
6 if we could now go back to the presidential papers, please, and
7 relocate ourselves in terms of that chronology. Now I mentioned
8 this page, page 203, please. Could I just have a moment, please,
9 Mr President?

14:55:04 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, of course.

11 MR GRIFFITHS: I just want to check a reference:

12 Q. The reason why I invite your attention to this page,
13 Mr Taylor, is this. We see at the top of this page this caption:

14 "Statement to the Liberian Senate by President Charles
14:55:39 15 Ghankay Taylor upon the safe return home from his successful
16 visits to the Republic of South Africa, the Federal Republic of
17 Nigeria, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Burkina Faso, delivered
18 at the parlours of the Executive Mansion - October 3, 1997."

19 Now, you bear in mind that in the Ramsey Clark letter that
14:56:15 20 we just looked at dated 26 September he made mention of a visit
21 you were making to South Africa. So help us, in the month of
22 September 1997 did you visit South Africa, the Federal Republic
23 of Nigeria, Libya and Burkina Faso"?

24 A. Yes, I made several trips. Yes.

14:56:38 25 Q. And that was in September?

26 A. Yes, that was in September.

27 Q. And we can see that by 3 October, so a couple of days after
28 the Congressman Payne letter, you are back in Monrovia addressing
29 the Liberian Senate, yes?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Let us just put all of that
3 together, shall we? Inaugurated on the 2nd. By the 22nd of
4 August you are receiving Jerry Rawlings. By the end of August
14:57:20 5 you are at the Abuja ECOWAS Heads of State conference?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In September you are in South Africa and these other
8 countries?

9 A. Yes.

14:57:32 10 Q. Meanwhile dealing with Ramsey Clark and that situation in
11 the US?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Meanwhile considering a potential trip to New York to
14 address the United Nations, which was aborted?

14:57:45 15 A. Uh-huh.

16 Q. So help us, those first two months of your presidency, when
17 according to the Prosecution you're supposed to be running the
18 AFRC, tell us, Mr Taylor, were you a busy man?

19 A. I was very busy trying to do what the Liberian people
14:58:07 20 elected me to do - their business. I don't know how anyone could
21 perceive that I could be trying to handle something other than
22 what the Liberian people elected me to do and when I have spent
23 the first two months trying to detail, reassure and strengthen my
24 ties internally and externally. I'm very, very tied up in
14:58:36 25 Liberia.

26 Q. Now remember we're now at the beginning of October, yes?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. Now do you recall, Mr Taylor, at or about this time at the
29 beginning of October any contact with that illegal regime in

1 Freetown?

2 A. Yes, around about that time there was a document sent to
3 us.

4 Q. From whom?

14:59:11 5 A. From Johnny Paul Koroma.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I invite your Honours' attention back to
7 volume 1, documents for 27-31 behind divider 3. This is in fact
8 Defence exhibit 4. This is the document which has been exhibited
9 which is now on the screen. Now the document we have behind

15:00:30 10 divider 3 in the bundle submitted by the Defence, everyone will
11 note some handwriting in the top right-hand side of the document
12 which does not appear on the document which has been exhibited.
13 Can we just put the other document on the screen so we can see
14 the difference:

15:00:53 15 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, whilst that document is on the screen the
16 writing we see on this document, whose writing is that?

17 A. That's my writing.

18 Q. But it adds nothing at all to the contents of the document
19 itself. Right. Could you give that back to Mr Taylor, please,
15:01:11 20 and put this version on the screen. Now, we note from the logo
21 or the crest at the top of the page that this is from the State
22 House, Freetown, Republic of Sierra Leone, it's addressed to "His
23 Excellency Charles G Taylor, President of Republic of Liberia,
24 Monrovia, Republic of Liberia" and it's dated 3 October 1997.

15:01:48 25 Now remember, Mr Taylor, we just looked at the presidential
26 papers. On that day, 3 October, you're addressing the Liberian
27 Senate, yes?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Let's look at the letter:

1 "Your Excellency and Dear Brother,

2 I wish on behalf of every living Sierra Leonean and the
3 Government of Sierra Leone to express our sincere gratitude and
4 appreciation for the staunch supportive position you took during
15:02:18 5 your last intervention at the United Nations General Assembly on
6 the pacific resolution of the crisis in our country."

7 Pause there. What's that referring to, Mr Taylor?

8 A. He must be referring to the - because I didn't go to the
9 General Assembly. He is referring to the speech read on my
15:02:44 10 behalf by my foreign minister to the General Assembly.

11 Q. Yes, and to what effect?

12 A. The speech to the General Assembly had to do with - that
13 section on the Sierra Leonean crisis actually detailed precisely
14 the position of ECOWAS on this matter that had come all the way
15:03:15 15 from June, the Heads of State meeting. A decision had been taken
16 that the junta should be removed, that President Kabbah should be
17 returned to power and that it would be done through negotiations
18 to avoid any further loss of lives in Sierra Leone. Basically,
19 this is the position of ECOWAS which most ECOWAS member states
15:03:45 20 addressing the General Assembly at that time took the same line.

21 Q. Now there isn't a copy of that address in the presidential
22 papers, is there?

23 A. No, that may still be somewhere in the mansion. I didn't
24 move all of my documents, no. It's not in the papers.

15:04:03 25 Q. Very well:

26 "The people of this country shall be ever grateful to Your
27 Excellency for your hand of brotherhood of understanding and
28 friendship in this our moment of dire need."

29 Now pause there, Mr Taylor. Prior to receipt of this

1 letter dated 3 October, had you ever had any contact in whatever
2 form with the junta in Freetown?

3 A. None whatsoever. None whatsoever.

15:04:39

4 Q. Can we take it, then, that this letter constitutes the
5 first ever such contact?

6 A. The first ever such contact and he mentions it right there
7 in the first paragraph. Following this statement I'm sure that
8 all of the delegations followed and here in the line that was
9 consistent with ECOWAS's line he decides to write this letter,
10 but that's the first time, yes.

15:04:57

11 Q. "Your Excellency, in spite of this and in spite of
12 everything that we ourselves here in Sierra Leone are doing to
13 avert disaster for our war-weary people, based on intelligence
14 that we have received, Nigeria appears intent and bent on
15 invading our capital city of Freetown and imposing their will on
16 our people."

15:05:23

17 Pause again. You've already told us, Mr Taylor, this was a
18 suspicion you had, wasn't it?

19 A. Uh-huh.

15:05:38

20 Q. That Nigeria were prepared to use force. You had discussed
21 this with Sana Abacha, as you told us, hadn't you?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. "For a succession of days the Nigerian component of ECOMOG
24 occupying the Lungi International Airport has been
25 indiscriminately shelling and bombarding Freetown on a nightly
26 basis evidently in preparation for their invasion plan. We have
27 no option but to defend our sovereignty and to protect our
28 citizens from the carnage and wanton destruction that will be
29 intensified by such an impending act of aggression by the

15:05:59

1 Nigerians.

2 Your Excellency, we need your help and we call on you to
3 come to our rescue. Let us together defend Sierra Leone for in
4 doing so we shall be defending each other and consolidating peace
15:06:40 5 within our sub-region. We are cognisant of the tremendous
6 constraints that you are currently confronted with at this
7 material time."

8 Now, let's pause there. Let us bear in mind, Mr Taylor,
9 the nature of the allegation you face. It is that you are the
15:07:07 10 controlling hand in the AFRC, do you understand me?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. They are in effect your minions, do you understand?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. Now, help us. Can you explain why, if that is the
15:07:26 15 relationship, the writer of this letter should be saying, "We
16 need your help and we call on you to come to our rescue"? Can
17 you explain why he should be writing in such terms?

18 A. The only reason why he can be writing in such terms is
19 because I am not what they have said I am. That's as simple as
15:07:47 20 that.

21 Q. And then he goes on if we go back over the page:

22 "We, however, entreat you to support us with the following
23 list of arms and ammunitions: 2,000 AK-47 rifles; 500 G3 rifles;
24 300 RPG 7 tubes; 100 sixty millimetre mortar tubes; six 105
15:08:22 25 Howitzer guns. Ammunition: 1,000 boxes 7.62 times 39 CH."

26 What does CH stand for, Mr Taylor?

27 A. I can't help the Court with what CH is. I really can't.

28 Q. Maybe we need the assistance of a military person for that:

29 "500 boxes 7.62 times 51 NATO. 1,000 rounds of 60

1 millimetre mortar. 2,000 rounds of 105 millimetre Howitzer.

2 Your Excellency, our situation is grave and our
3 determination strong. It is our sacred duty to defend our
4 country and to protect our people and to create the basis for
15:09:14 5 lasting peace among all of our people's.

6 The people of Sierra Leone shall be eternally indebted to
7 you. Please accept my assurances of the highest esteem, Major
8 Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
9 and Head of State of the Republic of Sierra Leone."

15:09:40 10 Now, firstly, did you respond to that letter?

11 A. No, we did not.

12 Q. Did you send those arms?

13 A. No, I did not.

14 Q. Did you have those arms to send?

15:09:55 15 A. I did not have any arms to send.

16 Q. Why not?

17 A. Because Liberia was totally disarmed. What we are looking
18 at, October 3? We're two months into our elections. We are
19 disarmed. All the arms are locked up. I do not know why he
15:10:17 20 probably figured that we had arms, but we had no arms. I didn't
21 even have arms for the security. I myself was being protected by
22 ECOMOG.

23 Q. Now prior to this, Mr Taylor, I've asked you about contact
24 with the AFRC regime but let me be more specific. Did you know
15:10:44 25 who Major Johnny Paul Koroma was?

26 A. No.

27 Q. Had you ever met him?

28 A. No. The first time I ever met Johnny Paul Koroma or
29 actually spoke to Johnny Paul Koroma was in 1999.

1 Q. Under what circumstances?

2 A. After I had - as the point man on the Committee of Five,
3 after the Okra Hill incident in conjunction with all of our
4 colleagues in ECOWAS we managed to negotiate the release of
15:11:16 5 certain hostages that had been taken by the West Side Boys. I
6 was then responsible and helped to negotiate the release of the
7 hostages in return for Johnny Paul Koroma being brought to
8 Liberia and that is around - I would say around August of 1999 or
9 thereabouts; the first time I actually had any dealing whatsoever
15:11:50 10 with Major Johnny Paul Koroma.

11 Q. Now help us, Mr Taylor. You having ignored this request as
12 you told us, was any other attempt made by Koroma's
13 administration in Freetown to get in touch with you?

14 A. Yes. But let me just qualify something on this letter
15:12:18 15 business. It's not just the matter of ignoring Johnny Paul
16 Koroma, but there are specific strong reasons. Number one,
17 Liberia did not recognise the junta. So even if Liberia had
18 weapons - even - which was not the case - we would not have sent
19 those weapons anyway. We did not recognise the junta. We are
15:12:47 20 now along with the decision a part of ECOWAS. I'm aware - I am
21 aware as an insider, a member of the Committee of Five taking
22 decisions on Sierra Leone, I'm aware of what's pending.

23 So it's not just that I ignored the letter. Yes, I did
24 that. But in addition is the fact that that junta was not
15:13:12 25 recognised by ECOWAS and my government was no exception. It was
26 not recognised, so I had no formal dealing with that government.
27 So we just had to put it aside.

28 Q. Pause, Mr Taylor. Let us remind ourselves. Remember there
29 had been a meeting of ECOWAS foreign ministers on 26 June

1 immediately after the coup and a three-point plan had been
2 arrived at: Reinstatement of the Kabbah government; embargo
3 sanctions if they don't step down?

4 A. That is correct.

15:13:48 5 Q. And the possible use of force, yes?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. That had been reaffirmed in Abuja at the end of August?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. You had sign up to that plan by the end of August?

15:14:01 10 A. By all means, that is correct.

11 Q. Bearing that in mind, Mr Taylor, could you have, even if
12 you had wanted to, assisted Johnny Paul Koroma in this way?

13 A. No, I could not and in fact I would not have been in any
14 condition to assist him. You don't - you don't play - you don't

15:14:25 15 play those kinds of little games that people - that the
16 Prosecution would like to think that people are not without
17 honour, okay. People have honour.

18 I was not one of those Presidents that went to office maybe
19 learning to write my name. I knew what was going on in the
15:14:46 20 international community. I was fully cognisant of diplomatic and
21 other relationships. I had built up a relationship even with
22 some of the Heads of State before I was elected. You don't as a
23 President of a nation - and even as an individual there is
24 something called honour.

15:15:05 25 You don't have an organisation - here is a country torn
26 apart, trying to get friends, win friends and influence people
27 will be - where is little Charles Taylor? And by that I mean I
28 am a - here is a country just coming out of war. Torn economy.
29 No armed forces. No security. What am I supposed to be doing

1 except trying to bring my country together.

2 So the first real thing from the external position of
3 helping to get Liberia together is to make sure that the Economic
4 Community of West African States is working along with me. So
15:15:50 5 I'm not going to play any games with them, trying to hide and
6 dodge and sneak as is being proposed.

7 It's a matter of honour. It's a matter of integrity. It's
8 a matter of being President. I'm no longer a rebel leader. I am
9 the President of the oldest independent African country and I am
15:16:16 10 one of those new Presidents that recognise it. If you look in my
11 inaugural address there is some very key and hitting things in
12 that address. I'm laying out where we want to go and show how
13 constructive we want to be, our understanding of where Liberia
14 ought to be, what role Liberia must play. I'm not one of those
15:16:46 15 two-by-four Presidents that came to office and so I'm not stupid
16 to play these little games. We're being very earnest. There is
17 no contact with Johnny Paul Koroma and there would not have been.
18 There was a decision that we were a full party to and I intended
19 to stick to that decision and I did.

15:17:09 20 Q. I asked you earlier and I repeat the question --

21 A. There was a delegation again that was sent to Monrovia.

22 Q. From where?

23 A. From Sierra Leone by the junta.

24 Q. Just pause for a moment, Mr Taylor. A delegation sent by
15:17:31 25 the junta?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. To Monrovia from Johnny Paul Koroma?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Now just help us with one practical issue. Given the state

1 of affairs in Sierra Leone at the time, an illegal regime not
2 recognised by other ECOWAS states, how were they able to travel
3 from Freetown to Monrovia; do you know?

4 A. To the best of my recollection, I don't know the exact
15:18:02 5 details of their arrival but it would not be difficult to have
6 probably come - they could have probably flown in. I don't
7 remember the details, but what I do remember is that I was told
8 that there was a delegation in Monrovia led by - I can't call the
9 name. If the Court remembers I think it was last week I wrote
15:18:28 10 two names on a sheet of paper. The male on that paper --

11 Q. That's confidential exhibit 54.

12 A. -- was a part of that delegation that came. I was briefed
13 and told that they were there. I did not meet them, and there's
14 also a reason for that. But I did not receive them.

15:18:50 15 Q. Let's take it in stages. First of all, how did you come to
16 find out that they were in Monrovia?

17 A. I was briefed by my minister of state that he had received
18 a call from the minister - another minister, I think it was
19 public works at the time, John Richardson, who had mentioned that
15:19:14 20 there was a delegation sent to Monrovia by Johnny Paul Koroma to
21 see me and the minister of state informed me and I said that it
22 was not - it was not practical to meet any such delegation and I
23 just did not meet them.

24 Q. Why not?

15:19:34 25 A. Well, the most important is that to have met that
26 delegation would have meant that we were granting some credence
27 to this government that had not been recognised by ECOWAS. And
28 even though I'm on the Committee of Five, once my colleagues did
29 not know - we did not do anything in isolation.

1 For me, if I had been informed before they came to Liberia,
2 maybe I would have met them because what would have happened, I
3 would have called the other members of the committee, informed
4 them that there was a plan for Johnny Paul Koroma or the junta to
15:20:24 5 send a delegation to Liberia. I would have also ascertained from
6 Freetown before the delegation left as to why they were coming.
7 That information would have been shared with my colleagues and we
8 would have agreed that it was either a good thing to receive them
9 or not to receive them.

15:20:43 10 So because that junta was not recognised no one President
11 acting in his rightful mind would just bounce up and do
12 something. You have to consult and that's one thing about
13 diplomacy, you have to consult. So if there were issues after
14 that time all of them would be able to say, "No, no, no, we are
15:21:07 15 aware that our colleague is meeting this delegation". So I did
16 not receive them for those reasons.

17 Q. One detail on that, Mr Taylor, and it's an important detail
18 and it's this: Which came first, the letter from Johnny Paul
19 Koroma dated 3 October, or the delegation?

15:21:48 20 A. To the best of my recollection, I think the letter came
21 first and I think this may have been a follow-up. To the best of
22 my recollection.

23 Q. The reason I ask is this: Did you receive such a
24 delegation sometime in July 1997?

15:22:13 25 A. July of 1997?

26 Q. That's what I said.

27 A. No. How? How is that possible? It's not possible. July
28 of 1997?

29 Q. Were you President in July of 1997?

- 1 A. I was not President of Liberia in July of 1997. I could
2 not have received. Ruth Sando Perry - based on the constitution
3 of Liberia even though I was President elect as of 19 July, under
4 the constitution of Liberia I am not President until I take the
15:22:47 5 oath of office and that is 2 August. No, I never could have.
6 No, no.
- 7 Q. Remember, Mr Taylor, we're now in October of 1997, yes?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. You've now been President for a couple of months, yes?
- 15:23:17 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. Do you recall hearing evidence in this Court about a
12 shipment of arms which arrived in Sierra Leone at an airstrip in
13 Magburaka?
- 14 A. Yes, I did.
- 15:23:34 15 Q. Can you help us with when it is said that shipment arrived?
- 16 A. Oh, I can just recall some time late in 1997. I don't - I
17 don't quite recall the exact month.
- 18 Q. What about October 1997?
- 19 A. Well, that would be late. The last quarter. Yeah, that's
15:23:57 20 late.
- 21 Q. Now, help us. Up to October 1997, had you had any contact
22 with the AFRC apart from that Johnny Paul letter dated 3 October?
- 23 A. No contact whatsoever besides the letter. None whatsoever.
- 24 Q. If a shipment of arms was flown into Sierra Leone in
15:24:27 25 October 1997, did you, Charles Taylor, have anything to do with
26 it?
- 27 A. Nothing whatsoever to do with it, no. In fact the evidence
28 - if I recall quite well, the evidence led in this Court suggests
29 that that plane was piloted by I think a Russian and there were

1 some Sierra Leoneans. There was one person - there was a
2 particular name that was called that was on board and there's
3 another name of I think a Musa who was supposed to be on board.
4 I had nothing to do with any shipment.

15:25:12 5 But let's just catch that part and see why that's a total
6 impossibility. Don't let's forget we're talking about two,
7 maximum three months into my presidency. Number one I have no
8 arms in the Republic, but even equally so what has happened?
9 ECOMOG is still deployed throughout the country as it was before,
15:25:42 10 you understand me? ECOMOG is there, all airports, all seaports,
11 everything is there, so it's impossible to have been even a part
12 of that because number one I don't have the arms and, even if
13 that were to happen, the security of Liberia is being provided by
14 ECOMOG.

15:26:04 15 It would have had to be done with what? The acquiescence
16 of ECOMOG. Because ECOMOG, if you look at the communique, is
17 still given a mandate to continue to work in Liberia and so
18 there's got to be - there's got to be some acquiescence. How is
19 that possible, because I don't have the weapons? So if one were
15:26:31 20 to vaguely assume that weapons are coming out of Liberia and are
21 put on a plane, then where am I supposed to be getting these
22 weapons from? I must be getting them from the United Nations
23 that is in custody of these weapons.

24 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, let's look at another practical issue. At
15:26:48 25 this time, October 1997, who occupies Robert International
26 Airfield?

27 A. That's what I'm saying, ECOMOG.

28 Q. What are they using it for?

29 A. Military operations against Sierra Leone.

1 Q. So Nigerian jets are leaving from Roberts International
2 Airfield to bomb Sierra Leone, yes?

3 A. That is correct, yes, and then at the same time they are
4 supposed to be loading arms and sending them to the junta.

15:27:25 5 Q. Well we're coming to that, but let's just look at all the
6 possibilities, shall we? There's another airport in Liberia,
7 James Spriggs Payne airfield in Monrovia. Who is in charge of
8 that in October 1997?

9 A. ECOMOG is in full control of that airport.

15:27:45 10 Q. Tell us, what's there in the airport?

11 A. They have the entire military down there. They have some
12 additional jet fighter bombers down there. They occupy the two
13 airports as military positions.

14 Q. So tell me, Mr Taylor, unless they were landing or taking
15:28:02 15 off from the roof of the Executive Mansion, where could an
16 aeroplane have left from in Liberia to take arms to Magburaka?

17 A. No place. No place in Liberia could they have left from.
18 No place.

19 Q. Because in that month of October, do you recall any meeting
15:28:41 20 of the foreign ministers of the ECOWAS states?

21 A. In October 1997? There were a series of meetings. I can't
22 really at this point recall a specific meeting, but there were
23 normal meetings all of the time and so it wouldn't be unusual for
24 there to have been a foreign ministers meeting. I don't recall
15:29:19 25 the exact details in October.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Despite that answer, Mr President, subject
27 to objection I'm going to invite the witness's attention to a
28 document we have behind divider 4 in the three bundle list of
29 documents we provided. I do so on the basis that this should not

1 be a memory test and there is a relevant document here which we
2 submit Mr Taylor should have an opportunity of seeing. It's the
3 bundle served for week 27 July to 31 July, bundle 1 of 3 behind
4 divider 4.

15:30:59 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that document the fifth meeting?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: That's the one.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Ms Hollis.

8 MS HOLLIS: Yes, Mr President. We doubt the Defence will
9 take that line when they talk about Prosecution witnesses, that
10 this is not a memory test, but beyond that this witness has no
11 connection with this document. He doesn't say it comes from his
12 archive. He doesn't say he has ever read it. He doesn't
13 remember it. So there are other avenues for the Defence to put
14 in evidence. We can't completely forego all foundational
15 requirements because it's the accused testifying and we do object
16 to that. There has not been a foundation for this document.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say, Mr Griffiths?

18 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. I'll seek - I'll see if I can
19 provide some foundation which might satisfy my learned friend.

15:31:53 20 MS HOLLIS: And we would also ask he do it in a non-leading
21 fashion, unlike most of his questions. We should note the
22 laughter for the record.

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I note for the record that I am laughing and
24 I'm laughing because that last comment was ridiculous. That's
15:32:15 25 why:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, tell me --

27 MS HOLLIS: Read the record and you will see it's not
28 ridiculous.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Mr Taylor --

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, I think that's enough of that.

3 You're about to lay some foundation, Mr Griffiths.

4 MR GRIFFITHS:

15:32:30 5 Q. Mr Taylor, who was your foreign minister in 1997, October?

6 A. The foreign minister of Liberia was Monie Captan in 1997,
7 October.

8 Q. And help me, when your foreign minister goes abroad to a
9 meeting and when he returns, does he hide away from you?

15:33:03 10 A. No, what the foreign minister would do is he would brief me
11 on the nature of the meetings that he had just returned from.

12 Q. Why would he do that?

13 A. Probably because I'm not there and he is not representing
14 his views. He is representing the views of the nation - of the
15:33:25 15 government - and so he must come back and report to me.

16 Q. So you would expect Mr Captan, if he attended a meeting, to
17 told you about it, wouldn't you?

18 A. Yes, he would.

19 MS HOLLIS: Again, he is leading this witness.

15:33:39 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: There's an objection to leading,
21 Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS:

23 Q. Mr Taylor, at this time were you a member of the Committee
24 of Five?

15:33:53 25 A. Well, let me just put this. My comment here is that there
26 are hundreds of these documents coming through. Liberia has just
27 come on the Committee of Five. If we realise this, this meeting
28 around this time must be the meeting of the Committee of Five
29 where we first attended and now we're beginning to put something

1 together.

2 The reason why I said I could not recollect, the problem is
3 this is a time of crisis and I know I've gone through these and
4 I'm not the lawyer here. He will argue that part. But, your
15:34:38 5 Honours, I'm going through hundreds and hundreds of documents are
6 coming before this Court and I will help this Court and I promise
7 under my oath I will be fair.

8 Now there are these foreign ministers meetings, there are
9 defence ministers meetings, there are even later on interior
15:34:56 10 ministers meetings and some of them almost cross over. So some
11 questions will come that I will not be able to grab on, but this
12 October must be the Committee of Five meetings - meeting dealing
13 with the situation in Sierra Leone, okay? And right after that
14 there are some other documents, so I hope I'm helping the Court,
15:35:22 15 you know, this way. That's all I want to do, help.

16 I think this must be the Committee of Five meeting again on
17 Sierra Leone, because it's an ongoing problem that people are
18 trying to look at and it's our first real sitting. This could be
19 that meeting.

15:35:56 20 Q. Mr Taylor, tell me this. At this stage, October 1997,
21 what's the position regarding the border between Sierra Leone and
22 Liberia?

23 A. It's the - we are dealing with the deployment of a certain
24 number of ECOMOG troops along that border.

15:36:17 25 Q. Is the border open or closed?

26 A. To a great extent the border is open and closed by - and
27 I'll tell you what I mean. Normal movement, but it's closed to
28 military activities. But I think the concern here could be
29 trying to get some ECOMOG soldiers along that buffer on the

1 border, because that was one of the key things that were in
2 discussion around this time of 1997.

3 Q. Now did that position regarding the border remain
4 unchanged, or did there come some change at some time?

15:36:59 5 A. Well, let me - as far as ECOMOG's deployment?

6 Q. Yes, and also traffic across the border?

7 A. Oh, yes, that did change. That did change.

8 Q. How?

9 A. Well, eventually we managed to get some people to be
15:37:26 10 deployed at the border - some of our security people deployed at
11 the border - and in fact specific quantities of ECOMOG soldiers.
12 There was a movement of ECOMOG across the border now in line with
13 the new arrangement under the committee and ECOWAS of what ECOMOG
14 would be now doing in Sierra Leone in addition to Liberia.

15:37:53 15 Q. And help us. That decision, was that discussed on the
16 Committee of Five?

17 A. Nothing would happen unless it came through the committee.

18 Q. Now, do you recall a meeting where that matter was
19 discussed?

15:38:09 20 A. That had to be the Committee of Five meeting. This had to
21 be through the Committee of Five meeting around about that time.

22 Q. Around about what time?

23 A. October.

24 Q. Why do you say that?

15:38:23 25 A. Because you would not get single countries making these
26 kinds of decisions. It had to be done through a committee
27 meeting and this October meeting had to be the place that it was
28 determined because we had just had a Head of State meeting in
29 August and this probably would have been the preparation for

1 maybe another meeting of the Heads of State. This is the way the
2 procedure goes.

3 Q. And do you recall seeing any document detailing those kinds
4 of decisions?

15:38:59 5 A. If any decision - all decisions that were made by that
6 committee, I would see it, I would read it and I would make my
7 comments after, yes.

8 Q. Why would you do that?

9 A. Because I'm a member of the committee and if I'm not
15:39:15 10 present my foreign minister has to bring it to me.

11 Q. And do you recall seeing any such document around about
12 October --

13 A. Of course.

14 Q. -- of 1997?

15:39:27 15 A. Of course. Once he attended, and he did attend, I would
16 see the document.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I inquire whether it's possible for me
18 now to show this document to the witness?

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: What's your attitude, Ms Hollis?

15:39:45 20 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, the witness still has not said he
21 recalls the document so we believe that were it any other witness
22 there would be insufficient foundation for this. We are mindful
23 that your Honours have given latitude to this witness because he
24 is the accused, but for any other witness it would be
15:40:03 25 insufficient foundation.

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Ms Hollis. I'll give you a
27 chance to reply to that renewed objection, if you wish to,
28 Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, we say there is sufficient

1 foundation. We're dealing with a President of a country across
2 whose desk one assumes hundreds of documents pass on any given
3 day or during the course of every given week and he cannot be
4 expected to recall, what, over a decade after the event the full
15:40:37 5 details of every such document that he encountered.

6 We submit, he having now recalled such a meeting in October
7 and having confirmed what the normal procedure would be in terms
8 of his interaction with his foreign minister, it seems to us that
9 sufficient foundation has now been laid for this document to be
15:40:59 10 placed helpfully before this Court.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, just pardon me, we'll confer.

12 [Trial Chamber conferred]

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I've been asked to address
14 the parties on this. We are convinced that sufficient foundation
15:44:46 15 has been laid in this regard in that the witness was a Head of
16 State, like you said. He was also a member of the Committee of
17 Five. His foreign minister went and attended this conference.
18 He returned and brought back with him this report and therefore
19 the witness can speak to this document, given those
15:45:12 20 circumstances. So we will allow you to present it to the
21 witness.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm most grateful:

23 Q. Mr Taylor, yes, it's bundle 1 of 3. Behind divider 4,
24 please, Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor, tell us, have you seen this
15:46:07 25 document before?

26 A. Yes, I have.

27 Q. Pardon?

28 A. Yes, I have.

29 Q. Now we see two stamps on the document; one at the top, one

1 at the bottom. Do you recognise those?

2 A. Yes, you can hardly see them here but these are documents
3 coming into the presidency are stamped.

4 Q. With what?

15:46:30 5 A. It's made out of I think a rubber something.

6 Q. Yes, but what does the stamp normally say?

7 A. It shows date received, time and all that kind of stuff.
8 But you can tell. It passes through security and it's stamped,
9 yeah.

15:46:46 10 Q. Now we see that this document is entitled "Economic
11 Community of West African States, Fifth Meeting of the Ministers
12 of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone,
13 Abuja, 10 to 11 October 1997, Communique." When we go over to
14 the second page we see this, "The ECOWAS ministerial Committee of
15:47:21 15 Five on Sierra Leone" - and Mr Taylor by this date in October, if
16 I understand your evidence correctly, you had been elevated to
17 the committee, hadn't you?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. "...met in Abuja on 10 and 11 October 1997 to assess the
15:47:45 20 current situation in Sierra Leone, evaluate the United Nations
21 Security Council resolution of 8 October 1997 and adopt
22 strategies for achieving the early restoration of constitutional
23 order in Sierra Leone."

24 Pause there. Mr Taylor, to what effect was the United
15:48:07 25 Nations Security Council resolution of 8 October, do you recall?

26 A. Yes. This was just a backtracking. It comes all the way
27 down to the ECOWAS agreement, what ECOWAS had processed through
28 the OAU and all the way about the return of the legitimate
29 government, all of that.

1 Q. Because you remember we earlier saw a document which
2 referred to an ECOWAS delegation to the United Nations; do you
3 recall that?

4 A. Yes.

15:48:41 5 Q. "The meeting was briefed on the current situation in
6 Sierra Leone by the ECOMOG force commander. The committee noted
7 that the sanctions and embargo regime established by decision
8 A/DEC. 7/8/97 of the ECOWAS authority of Heads of State and
9 Government were being observed by ECOWAS member states. ECOMOG
10 was also, within available resources, monitoring the embargo as
11 provided by the decision.

12 The committee, however, noted that certain individuals were
13 contravening the embargo and strongly warned them in their own
14 interests to desist immediately from such subversive activities."

15:49:41 15 Mr Taylor, can you recall now who those certain individuals
16 were?

17 A. To the best of my recollections, around this time I think
18 there were some problems about people trying to get arms into
19 Sierra Leone.

15:50:07 20 Q. Which people?

21 A. If my recollection serves me right, there may have been an
22 attempt on the part of a ship or something to enter Sierra Leone.
23 I'm not sure if this is the - but it's about the infiltration of
24 arms into Sierra Leone.

15:50:30 25 Q. And was that a matter being monitored by the Committee of
26 Five?

27 A. Yes. ECOWAS - I mean ECOMOG was responsible for that and
28 we were convinced that this was not being done by any member
29 state. If you look very carefully at paragraph 2 that you just

1 read, we were all satisfied that this was not by any state per
2 se.

3 Q. Let's go back to it:

4 "The committee noted that despite measures taken by ECOWAS
15:51:04 5 to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner, the illegal regime
6 continued to attack and harass ECOMOG troops. The committee
7 therefore called on the illegal regime to put an immediate end to
8 such attacks, failing which ECOMOG would take appropriate action
9 to defend itself decisively."

15:51:34 10 Continuing:

11 "The committee noted with satisfaction and appreciation the
12 United Nations Security Council resolution reiterating support
13 for the ECOWAS efforts in the Sierra Leone crisis and the
14 imposition of sanctions on the illegal regime in Sierra Leone.
15:51:50 15 The committee expressed its appreciation to the Security Council
16 and the Secretary-General for their invaluable support to ECOWAS
17 in finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Sierra Leone.
18 The committee also welcomed the appointment of the United Nations
19 Secretary-General envoy to Sierra Leone and reaffirmed ECOWAS's
15:52:14 20 readiness to cooperate and work closely with him."

21 Can you help us with the identity of that individual,
22 Mr Taylor?

23 A. No, I don't quite recall who the specific name was. I know
24 the event, but I don't remember his name. Because what comes to
15:52:40 25 mind is Jonah, but I don't think it was James Jonah at the time.
26 I'm not too sure about that.

27 Q. "The committee called on ECOWAS member states to strengthen
28 ECOMOG's operational capabilities.

29 The committee welcomed the appeal made to the international

1 community by the United Nations Security Council as contained in
2 the aforementioned resolution to provide technical and logistical
3 support to ECOWAS, to enable it to carry out its responsibilities
4 in the implementation of its mandate. In this regard, the
15:53:20 5 committee called on the United Nations Secretary-General to use
6 his good offices to urgently establish a contact group on
7 Sierra Leone."

8 What's a contact group, Mr Taylor?

9 A. A contact group would be countries that have interests in a
15:53:45 10 particular nation in a special way. In the case of Sierra Leone,
11 you would have Britain, the United States and maybe a couple of
12 European countries. It's just what you would call friendly
13 countries that have either an express or some serious interest in
14 that country. That's a contact group.

15:54:08 15 Q. "The committee also noted the upsurge and influx of
16 refugees into the neighbouring countries of Guinea and Liberia."
17 Is that true?

18 A. Oh, yes.

19 Q. So how was Liberia coping with that given its shattered
15:54:25 20 economy?

21 A. You know, we couldn't push them out. You know, once
22 elections were in Liberia people just felt free and they were
23 coming in and we had the assistance of non-governmental
24 organisations and, you know, you had the World Food Programme.
15:54:46 25 It's a big issue, refugee problems. People always find - and for
26 good reasons find - means to help. So the strain was not
27 specifically on the resources of Liberia and so we welcomed them
28 as brothers and sisters.

29 Q. "Considering the strain on the fragile economies of these

1 countries, the committee reiterated its appeal to the ECOWAS
2 member states, the international community and the relevant
3 United Nations agencies to provide necessary assistance to them.

4 The committee noted with concern the deteriorating
15:55:29 5 humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone due to the illegal
6 overthrow of the constitutionally elected government of that
7 country, the intransigence of the illegal regime, the absence of
8 security and the gross violations of human rights by the regime.

9 The committee therefore directed the ECOWAS executive secretary
15:55:51 10 and the ECOWAS force commander to establish a technical committee
11 to work out appropriate modalities for the:

12 (i) creation of safe havens.

13 (ii) establishment of humanitarian corridors for delivery
14 of relief materials.

15:56:08 15 (iii) registration of NGOs.

16 The technical committee was also tasked by the ministers to
17 advise on all issues relating to the delivery of humanitarian
18 assistance.

19 The committee reaffirmed its willingness to resume
15:56:22 20 negotiations with the illegal regime and in that regard requested
21 its chairman to make appropriate arrangements."

22 Pause there. Who was the chairman of the Committee of Five
23 at this stage?

24 A. Well, the chairperson on the Committee of Five had to be
15:56:44 25 the - wherever the chairmanship rests, that foreign minister is
26 on that committee and is chairman. I'm the point person, but I'm
27 not the chairman of the Committee of Five. No, that had to be -
28 at this particular time it had to be the foreign minister of
29 Nigeria.

1 Q. So it's the foreign minister of Nigeria who is tasked with
2 making this contact, yes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So establishing that contact has nothing to do with you?

15:57:16 5 A. No, no, no, no, no.

6 Q. "However, negotiations shall be subject to the follow
7 conditions." Before we come to the conditions, Mr Taylor, just a
8 little detail here. You recall that a week or so before this
9 meeting on 3 October you had received that letter from Johnny

15:57:40 10 Paul Koroma?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Did you tell your fellow members on the Committee of Five
13 that you had received that letter?

14 A. No, I don't think I did. I don't think I did. There was
15:57:57 15 no reason to. I did not inform them. I could have informed one
16 - one person or two, but not the committee, no.

17 Q. What about the arrival of that delegation in Monrovia? Did
18 you tell your colleagues on the Committee of Five about that?

19 A. I surely - I surely - told the chairman about it. Probably
15:58:20 20 not the rest of my colleagues, but I told the chairman of ECOWAS
21 about it at the time.

22 Q. And who was the chairman?

23 A. We're still talking about - it was still Abacha.

24 Q. Abacha. We will remind ourselves in a moment of that
15:58:40 25 Abacha letter which we looked at yesterday, yes?

26 A. Yes.

27 Q. "However, negotiations shall be subject to the following
28 conditions:

29 (i) representatives of the regime must have requisite

1 mandate to negotiate;
2 (ii) the regime must negotiate in good faith;
3 (iii) the negotiations should strictly be within the ECOWAS
4 mandate as stipulated in the Conakry final communique and
15:59:09 5 as endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.

6 The ministers met and had discussions with Mr Foday Sankoh.

7 The meeting which lasted three hours was very useful."

8 Do you know about that meeting, Mr Taylor?

9 A. Yes.

15:59:26 10 Q. Okay, let's pause. Do you know where the meeting took

11 place?

12 A. It took place in Abuja in Nigeria.

13 Q. In Nigeria. And which ministers met with Foday Sankoh?

14 A. It was the foreign minister of Nigeria.

15:59:47 15 Q. Ikimi?

16 A. Tom Ikimi. It had to be the foreign minister of Ghana and

17 I'm sure the foreign minister of La Cote d'Ivoire.

18 Q. Met with Foday Sankoh in Abuja?

19 A. Definitely.

15:59:59 20 Q. When?

21 A. That had to be in just around October of '97.

22 Q. October of '97. And the purpose of the meeting being?

23 A. Well, I'm sure this is about the - about the participation

24 - now, don't forget that RUF is now a part of the junta, okay?

16:00:26 25 Q. Yes?

26 A. And it had to do with his own, you know, arrest in Nigeria

27 and the part that the RUF was playing with the junta.

28 Q. "The committee accepted the kind invitation of the

29 honourable minister of foreign affairs of Guinea to hold its next

1 meeting in Conakry on 20 October 1997." So we bear in mind that
2 this meeting is on 10 to 11 October and the next meeting is to be
3 in Conakry on 20 October 1997?

4 A. Uh-huh.

16:01:15 5 Q. Do you recall that later meeting, Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, I do recall it. It's important to point out one thing
7 here. When you go back to that meeting of the chiefs of staff,
8 let's just put here now so we can keep a heads-up on it. At that
9 chiefs of staff meeting the chairman, Tommy Ikimi, the foreign
10 minister of Nigeria, is at this meeting - is at the chiefs of
11 staff meeting.

12 There is something unusual about that now. When you see
13 the defence - the chief of defence staff meeting and then - this
14 is a very - the point I'm trying to make is this is a very urgent
15 matter for the committee and don't forget that Guinea has already
16 hosted the first meeting.

17 Remember at a meeting before this Guinea had already said
18 that they wanted some opportunity to speak - to see if they
19 could, you know, speak to the junta people to bring about some
20 peace has been organised by President Momoh, so this return to
21 Guinea is a follow-up of all of these urgent moves that are being
22 made at this particular time.

23 I just wanted to note that, because there was Guinea before
24 and there was Guinea now. Liberia is coming on. Ivory Coast is
25 closer now to Sankoh, because Ivory Coast has hosted Sankoh. He
26 is in la Cote d'Ivoire. He leaves la Cote d'Ivoire before he is
27 arrested. Let's not forget that. He is arrested in Nigeria. He
28 has a very good relationship - in fact, some of his family
29 members are still there - and so it is natural for Ivory Coast to

1 be on this particular delegation in meeting him. Ghana is on
2 this delegation, because Ghana has always been second to Nigeria
3 in terms of contributing troops and different things and
4 finances.

16:03:22 5 So with this in view now we can now move on seeing how we
6 get to these fast meetings that are coming up, because people are
7 growing desperate now. They want to see something happen.

8 Q. Yes. Now just so that we keep things in sequence, do you
9 recall now the outcome of that next meeting that took place in
16:03:53 10 Conakry on 20 October?

11 A. I think President Conte was not successful, as far as I
12 know, in getting anything going between the discussion that he
13 wanted to have with the junta.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. Now, let us just pause for a moment
16:04:14 15 and take advantage of the pause to mark this document for
16 identification please. MFI-27, the fifth meeting of the
17 ministers of foreign affairs of the Committee of Five on
18 Sierra Leone, Abuja, 10-11 October 1997.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, that document is marked MFI-27.

16:04:41 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. Now it's within that context now, Mr Taylor, that on 24
22 October 1997 you wrote to President Sani Abacha?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. A letter which we looked at yesterday now marked MFI-20
16:05:06 25 dated 24 October 1997, yes?

26 A. That is correct.

27 Q. Just to quickly remind ourselves, because we looked at it
28 out of place yesterday, let's have a quick glance at it again,
29 please. Volume 1 of 3 behind divider 5, please. Yes, Mr Taylor.

1 Now we're not going to go through this document verbatim again,
2 but can we just note one or two passages. Let's go to the third
3 page of the document and I just want to highlight a couple of
4 things. You see in the penultimate paragraph on that page
16:06:42 5 mention is made of, "I asked to see Foday Sankoh"? Do you see
6 that?

7 A. Uh-huh.

8 Q. Now by this stage, 24 October 1997, when was the last time
9 you had seen Foday Sankoh?

16:06:59 10 A. Back in 1992.

11 Q. Now you remember in the last document we looked at the
12 ministers of foreign affairs meeting in Abuja in October, the
13 document we've just put away --

14 A. Uh-huh.

16:07:20 15 Q. -- that the ministers met and had discussions with
16 Mr Foday Sankoh?

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. Yes?

19 A. Uh-huh.

16:07:27 20 Q. Remember that reference?

21 A. I remember that.

22 Q. But you yourself, Charles Taylor, had not had such a
23 discussion?

24 A. That is correct.

16:07:36 25 Q. And you've just indicated Foday Sankoh at this stage -
26 well, in 1996 up until his arrest in March 1997 - had been in La
27 Cote d'Ivoire?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Where he had been given a villa by the President?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And do you recall hearing some evidence in January of this
3 year from a Prosecution witness about the RUF external delegation
4 who were also based in Cote d'Ivoire at the time?

16:08:13 5 A. Yes, I do. Yes.

6 Q. So there was an RUF presence in Cote d'Ivoire for a long
7 period in '96 coming into '97?

8 A. From my understanding, the RUF goes to Cote d'Ivoire I
9 would say somewhere around the first quarter, I would say, of
10 1996, but they are given - the government of La Cote d'Ivoire,
11 just as I did in Liberia after I got on the committee and was the
12 point man, gave them a house, a residence, where they stayed and
13 did their work. They provided communication for them. By
14 communication equipment, radios that they could call their back
15 to base in Sierra Leone. They had a long range radio that they
16 could call. And they had - in fact they were given
17 transportation on the ground there.

18 The purpose of that was very simple. The purpose was to
19 make sure that while these talks were going on, the RUF would
20 have access to their people back home that if there were any
21 developments they would call. This is the very - this precedence
22 is what led to what I did in Liberia too by giving them a house.
23 By the time I take over as point man in Liberia they are given a
24 house, they are given communication from Liberia, they are also
25 given transportation and they are given in my - in both cases
26 securities are with them 24 hours to make sure that they
27 practically know their every move. So this is the procedure.
28 They were given a house, just as was done in Liberia.

29 Q. Sorry, Mr Taylor, it's my fault. For how long were those

1 provisions given to the RUF in the Ivory Coast?

2 A. To the best of my knowledge from the day Foday Sankoh went
3 to La Cote d'Ivoire from Zogoda up until I think months after his
4 arrest because he had I think his family down there, he had - he
16:10:35 5 had the facilities.

6 Q. What difference was there between the facilities given to
7 the RUF in the Cote d'Ivoire and the facilities you gave them in
8 Liberia?

9 A. None whatsoever. It was a precedent that had been set, the
16:10:50 10 very same thing, and in both areas, in Liberia and in La Cote
11 d'Ivoire, I'm using the word guesthouse because there's a
12 difference between a guesthouse and a safe house. This was not a
13 safe house. It was a guesthouse. It was known, it was public.
14 Diplomats connected in the West African region and even European
16:11:11 15 countries could go there and discuss. This was a house based on
16 precedents. Identical.

17 Q. And whilst we're on this topic, just so that we have
18 matters clear in our minds, when did you begin providing those
19 identical facilities in Liberia?

16:11:33 20 A. That was going around the mid part of 1998. That is
21 following the - following the intervention in February of 1998 as
22 the Court - there's a lot of evidence before the Court you didn't
23 have calm in Sierra Leone. Their trouble started. So we then
24 stepped up this whole thing. This is when we make contact by
16:12:02 25 this time with Bockarie who is - has retreated back in the
26 country. So this is going around the mid section I would say of
27 1998.

28 Q. And we'll come back to it in detail, Mr Taylor, but whilst
29 we're on the topic let's just deal with one or two other details

1 about that. Why did you decide to provide those facilities in
2 Liberia?

3 A. In order that we would have a day-to-day handle on - I'm
4 using the word "we". I mean that committee. A day-to-day handle
16:12:37 5 on getting this peace process on track and making sure that
6 something is done as quickly as possible. This is why they were
7 aware, we agreed, the house was given. Their ambassadors
8 accredited near Monrovia visited those houses.

9 And may I add, the presence of that house was known by the
16:12:59 10 Sierra Leonean government. There was no secret. The Sierra
11 Leonean envoy in Monrovia, having friends amongst people in that
12 house, went backward and forward. When Foday Sankoh even came to
13 visit or Sam Bockarie they all met there. This was to make sure
14 that we had a day-to-day handle on what was going on.

16:13:21 15 Q. Mr Taylor, before you provided those facilities, did you
16 consult with your colleagues?

17 A. All of them. All of them. And this is how --

18 Q. And did any of them object?

19 A. None. None. No, not one of them objected. It was a
16:13:33 20 precedent that we just took what had happened in La Cote d'Ivoire
21 and they were already aware and transferred that type of facility
22 to Liberia. The precedent was already there.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I just wanted to seek
24 clarification. This assistance in the form of a house, a
16:13:56 25 guesthouse --

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Was it assistance extended to the
28 RUF/AFRC junta or only the RUF?

29 THE WITNESS: Only the RUF, your Honour.

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And why would that be?

2 THE WITNESS: Well, we - at that particular time the
3 situation in the region - quite frankly, once the intervention
4 occurred most of ECOWAS's activities did not focus on the, quote
16:14:28 5 unquote, junta. That is why even as we go forward you will find
6 out that even the Lome Peace Accord did not involve the, quote
7 unquote, junta.

8 After the intervention no one even thought about junta.
9 They dealt strictly - ECOWAS dealt with the RUF as going back to
16:14:51 10 the agreement as of 1996. So what ECOWAS did was to look at the
11 1996 agreement, okay, and work from there. In fact I can say to
12 really isolate the whole concept of a junta existing at that
13 time. This was a full decision on the part of ECOWAS.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think I know the answer to this,
16:15:17 15 Mr Griffiths, but just to make it perfectly clear, you asked
16 Mr Taylor, "Before you provided these facilities did you consult
17 with your colleagues?" Which colleagues were you referring to.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Which colleagues did you --

16:15:33 20 A. I'm talking about the Committee of Five. It was the
21 prerogative - these are Heads of State. The Committee of Five
22 will take decisions and finally report it to the full ECOWAS and
23 whatever came from that committee. The consultation is between
24 and amongst the Committee of Five members.

16:16:04 25 Q. I want us to leave that letter now, Mr Taylor, but can we
26 leave the file there for the moment and if we can put the buff
27 folder including that document away, but we'll be coming back to
28 that folder in a moment. Mr Taylor, before we come back to that
29 folder, and bearing in mind we're looking at events following

1 your inauguration and so far we've got to October 1997 - do you
2 follow me?

3 A. Uh-huh.

4 Q. Can we go back to the presidential papers, please, and pick
16:16:44 5 up the chronology. Page 155. It should be volume 3 of 3 behind
6 divider 31, page 155. The photograph at the bottom of that page,
7 I invite your attention to this because of the date:

8 "President Taylor is flanked by Chief Justice Gloria M
9 Scott on his right and other members of the judiciary on the
16:18:20 10 occasion of their induction into office in the parlours of the
11 Executive Mansion, October 1997."

12 The question is this, Mr Taylor: Apart from your
13 involvement in the Committee of Five, what other duties did you
14 have as President of Liberia?

15 A. All of these. I mean, I get into office and the court -
16 the Supreme Court that was put together that came before the
17 judges earlier I think today, we mentioned that that was the
18 court for the purpose of the elections and being able to
19 adjudicate any controversy that could have arisen as a result of
16:19:11 20 the elections. Now I come to office and I have to nominate the
21 entire Supreme Court of the third republic and that process must
22 go through the Senate, through the process of advice and consent.
23 And so after that they have to be sworn into office and then they
24 move on. So this is the process, this is the chief justice and
16:19:40 25 other associate justices.

26 Q. Now whilst we're on this topic, can we go back, please, to
27 page 131. Now, Mr Taylor, top of that page, that looks like a
28 fairly recognisable face on the left. Who is that?

29 A. That's my good friend Gaddafi.

1 Q. And we see from what's written underneath that you made a
2 visit to Tripoli in November 1997. Do you see that?

3 A. Yes.

16:20:36

4 Q. And also in November 1997 who is that you're meeting at the
5 bottom of the page?

6 A. That's Mandela.

7 Q. So in November you're in Libya and you're in South Africa,
8 yes?

9 A. That is correct.

16:20:51

10 Q. I'll tell you what we'll do. Let's go forward a page. We
11 see another picture there, don't we?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Where is that taken?

14 A. The Republic of China.

16:21:10

15 Q. Not the People's Republic?

16 A. No, the Republic of China, Taiwan.

17 Q. And we see that that is dated 7 November 1997, yes?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you see that?

16:21:25

20 A. I see.

21 Q. How long did you go to the Republic of China for?

22 A. Very early November. I would say around maybe the very
23 beginning of November. Because this has to be - if this is the
24 7th I had to arrive there I would say about the 6th, because
16:21:51 25 normally it's the next day we go through these ceremonies.

26 Q. And what was your purpose in going to the Republic of
27 China?

28 A. We had a diplomatic relationship with the Republic of China
29 and we had gone there to - the Republic of China had assisted

1 with about a million dollars to help the electoral process and we
2 were trying to look at the concept of what I called at that
3 particular time exportable development, where we were trying to
4 get the massive industrial structure in China, Taipei, to begin
16:22:41 5 to export their development technology to Liberia even from a
6 lower level that I referred to at that time as exportable
7 development, economic assistance.

8 Q. And whilst in Taipei, did anything particular happen to
9 you? Go to page 134. Do you normally dress like that,

16:23:28 10 Mr Taylor?

11 A. No, no, no. We talked about this at the beginning. I was
12 asked about the honorary doctorate degree. It was given to me by
13 the Chinese university.

14 Q. So this is the occasion?

16:23:39 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And we see this is 10 November 1997?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. So we've got this situation then, have we: In November of
19 1997 you're in South Africa, Libya, Republic of China, yes?

16:23:58 20 A. Uh-huh.

21 Q. Let's go to page 213. I'm only interested in this page for
22 the caption so we can put all of what we've learnt so far
23 together, yes?

24 A. Yes.

16:24:39 25 Q. On Thursday, 13 November 1997 you addressed the Senate
26 following your state visit to the Republic of China, didn't you?

27 A. That is correct.

28 Q. So we now have an idea of the sequence of events, because
29 when we look at the second paragraph on the left, just to get an

1 idea of the sequence:

2 "Upon an invitation extended to us by His Excellency Lee
3 Teng-hui, President of the Republic of China, to pay a one week
4 state visit to his nation, my delegation and I departed Roberts
16:25:27 5 International Airport on Monday, 3 November 1997 and made
6 connecting stop overs in Abidjan, La Cote d'Ivoire and Paris,
7 France, respectively."

8 Yes?

9 A. Yes.

16:25:38 10 Q. Was that mission a success, Mr Taylor?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now help us, just so that we can concretise the sequence.
13 Was it before or after the China trip that you went to South
14 Africa and Libya?

16:25:57 15 A. This was after.

16 Q. So that's what is happening in November. Let's go to page
17 218, please.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: There's about three minutes left.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: I won't be able to conclude 1997 then:

16:26:56 20 Q. Mr Taylor, page 218, again we're looking at the sequence.

21 We see on 20 November 1997 you gave a nationwide address on the
22 status of ECOMOG in Liberia and the creation of a capacity
23 building force. Do you see that?

24 A. Yes.

16:27:18 25 Q. I think it might be wise for us to come to that tomorrow.

26 A. Okay.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll adjourn for the day, Mr Taylor.

28 The usual warning; don't discuss your evidence with any other
29 person. We'll adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.

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[Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.28 p.m.
to be reconvened on Wednesday, 29 July 2009 at
9.30 a.m.]

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR 25343

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS 25343