



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

MONDAY, 20 JULY 2009
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding
Justice Teresa Doherty
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg
Ms Sidney Thompson

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura
Mr Benedict Williams

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Christopher Santora
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC
Mr Morris Anyah
Mr Silas Chekera

1 Monday, 20 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:30:46 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We'll take appearances
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
8 opposing counsel. In court today for the Prosecution are Mohamed
9 A Bangura, Christopher Santora, Maja Dimitrova and myself, Brenda
09:31:03 10 J Hollis.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Mr Griffiths.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours,
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay
14 Griffiths, and with me are my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah and
09:31:22 15 Mr Silas Chekera.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. Mr Taylor, I'll
17 remind you that you're still bound by that declaration to tell
18 the truth. So, Mr Griffiths.

19 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

20 [On former affirmation]

21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued].

22 Q. Mr Taylor, when we adjourned on Thursday afternoon we were
23 dealing with the composition of the NPFL in or around the end of
24 1990 going into 1991, and you told us that the NPFL at that
09:32:08 25 particular time was a combination of Liberians, Gambians,
26 Ivorians, Ghanaians, a few Nigerians, some Mahn Guineans and you
27 said there were about 200 Ivorians. Now I want to deal with that
28 in a bit more detail, but before we come to that can you help us,
29 please, with this. You had told us that at the start of the

1 conflict in Liberia you remained in the Ivory Coast. Do you
2 recall telling us that?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. Tell us then, when was it that you entered Liberia?

09:32:57 5 A. I finally entered Liberia in April of 1990.

6 Q. And where in Liberia were you initially based?

7 A. I entered and a base had been prepared for me in the town
8 of Gborplay. We tried to search for that the other day - it's on
9 the map, though - where the Special Forces had determined that it
09:33:37 10 was safe enough for me to come into the country.

11 Q. And for how long did you remain at that location?

12 A. I remained at Gborplay for, I would say, a total of about
13 three - maximum four months before moving on to the next nearest
14 town of Tappita that was supposed to be secured at that time.

09:34:07 15 Q. Now based on the timeframes you've given us, that would
16 have been sometime in the summer of 1990.

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Now at that time when you moved to Tappita, what was the
19 state of the conflict situation in Liberia?

09:34:34 20 A. Well, let me just explain this. I've used the word
21 "secured". Let me just state that I mentioned in my testimony
22 that a conflict had erupted with my principal commander Mr Prince
23 Johnson who had done certain things that he was not supposed to
24 do. What do I mean by that? I mean he had killed a couple of
09:35:12 25 our Special Forces against the operational orders.

26 Now let's examine who Prince Johnson is. Prince Johnson is
27 a Gio from Nimba County and when this conflict erupted, Prince
28 Johnson, being frightened, left, along with a few other Special
29 Forces, and was really on the run ahead of us, claiming that he

1 was still a part of the NPFL when in fact he was not. Now
2 because of the situation in Nimba County where we had hoped to
3 really move without any hitches, there were some fear that - or
4 fears, may I say, that developed in my mind. And so this is why
09:36:13 5 it took me so long to enter the country, and so I sought some
6 sort of assistance as far as security goes to make absolutely
7 sure that I would be a bit secured before I entered the country.
8 This is why it took me so long to enter.

9 And so I went back to Burkina Faso and this is when I
09:36:45 10 reluctantly, may I say, sought the assistance of the Gambian
11 Special Forces that were there and my good friend from Libya
12 Dr Manneh. And I used the word "reluctantly" because when we
13 launched the revolution, the President of The Gambia saw Dawda
14 Kairaba Jawara as - in fact that's in the records here - and
09:37:18 15 others had developed the theory that we were about to destabilise
16 West Africa and by bringing Gambians into Liberia would have just
17 made his case stronger, so that's what I meant by "reluctant".
18 But they did agree to come in to provide basically some security
19 for me as a fellow revolutionary brother.

09:37:43 20 Now I bring this at this point because it is important. I
21 have heard all this stuff about Foday Sankoh being in Liberia. I
22 want to make it very clear to this Court if at that time I had
23 met Foday Sankoh in Burkina Faso, I probably would have brought
24 him to Liberia as a source of protection as I had done with the
09:38:13 25 Gambians, but he was not. How or when he entered Liberia, as I
26 have stated to tell the truth here, I don't know when he entered.
27 He could have entered before I got there in August. He could
28 have entered after. I did not bring him. I do not know how he
29 got there. And this is what I mean by bringing in the Gambians,

1 that's how the Gambians got involved. So by the time I moved in
2 in April the Gambians followed and they continued - some of them
3 stayed with me and by May of 1990, as I mentioned in my testimony
4 before this Court, Buchanan had been captured and Dr Manneh took
09:39:01 5 position in Buchanan where he was - used to go from different
6 cities and part of the cities to try to talk to the people to
7 explain to them what the revolution was all about. But the
8 majority of the Gambian Special Forces stayed with me. It became
9 so bad that they cooked for me. I mean, I was that afraid.
09:39:27 10 Because here is a Nimbadien, a Gio man who has left with me a
11 whole bunch of those that he had trained initially, and the
12 families are interrelated. So I really at that point did not
13 know who to trust. They cooked for me. They sat by my doorside
14 when I went to sleep. I mean, this is how bad things were. And
09:39:47 15 that's how the Gambians got in and that's why Sankoh was not
16 there, because he was not in Burkina Faso before I moved on to
17 Tappi ta.

18 Q. I want to ask you about some of the details of what you've
19 just told us. Firstly, when was it that you went to Burkina
09:40:08 20 Faso, bearing in mind you've already indicated that you
21 re-entered the country in April of 1990?

22 A. I went to Burkina Faso - remember I told this Court I had
23 gone back to try to secure some assistance and I received some
24 communication equipment. It was during this time that I - before
09:40:34 25 April that I got the communication equipment, had this discussion
26 with Dr Manneh, and then when I came, in fact, some of the
27 Gambians came along with me as I entered in April.

28 Q. Secondly, why did you choose the Gambians?

29 A. Well, there were several reasons. Number one, these were

1 trained soldiers already. They had revolutionary experience.
2 They were bored in Burkina Faso, they had nothing to do and, you
3 know, sometimes soldiers like action. They wanted to be some
4 place where they were a little freer and they could move around
09:41:23 5 and they had this revolutionary zeal to help, you know, a brother
6 that had asked for their assistance and this was why they were
7 there. We could not use the Burkinabes because it would have
8 been improper to try to get Burkina Faso involved in what we were
9 doing in Liberia. I do not think the government would have
09:41:47 10 agreed. But my main concern was not for the capacity of men to
11 fight. It was more like a security force, and the Gambians were
12 sufficient in number to provide what I was looking for.

13 Q. How many?

14 A. The Gambians totalled at that time I would say to not more
09:42:09 15 than - I would say about 40 men. It could be more or less, but I
16 would put the number to around 40 men.

17 Q. And help us, what was in it for them? What was the quid
18 pro quo?

19 A. Well I had said to them that upon the completion of the
09:42:30 20 revolution they could stay in Liberia, that they would be granted
21 citizenship, of which most of them were granted citizenship, but
22 if by quid pro quo you mean did I say that I would assist them to
23 go back to The Gambia, no. For me that was a no-no and in fact
24 as we go further we will find out that eventually Dr Manneh left
09:42:56 25 in 1993 with most of the men, some of them remained. But, no, it
26 was basically to give them a place of refuge, as Liberia was
27 created to do, grant them citizenship as I could do - and let me
28 just explain to the Court. I'm sure it's going to come up later.
29 By citizenship, Liberia was founded as a place of asylum for the

1 black man and the President of Liberia - and it's even been done
2 by this sitting President, my sister Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, any
3 man of colour entering Liberia can be given citizenship within 48
4 hours and sufficient land to live and farm. That's the
09:43:42 5 constitution of the republic.

6 Q. What was the relationship between yourself and Dr Manneh at
7 this point prior to April when you requested their assistance?

8 A. The three West Africans that were in Libya at the time,
9 Ali Kabbah, Dr Manneh and I became very good friends. Dr Manneh
09:44:13 10 being a revolutionary had led an unsuccessful revolution in The
11 Gambia. I understand he had travelled significantly and he's a
12 very, very sharp individual. He speaks French, Italian, English,
13 reads and writes those languages very well. A very eloquent
14 gentleman and we became very close while the three of us were at
09:44:44 15 the Mataba.

16 Q. Now, what was it that these Gambians provided for you which
17 your own Special Forces could not have done?

18 A. Well, for one thing they provided additional security.
19 That's the whole point. About 80/85 per cent, these - I'm sure
09:45:18 20 during my discussions the percentages, which is a guess
21 percentage, could change. About I would say 80/85 per cent of
22 the Special Forces were Mahns and Dans. That's Gio and Manos.
23 Once a senior commander - in fact two senior commanders had
24 defected, Prince Johnson and I told this Court that there was a
09:45:40 25 colonel that commanded the base of Camp Naama that we had tried
26 to use to go into Naama but failed. Colonel Samuel Varney and
27 Prince Johnson left us together.

28 Now, these were two of the most senior commanders of the
29 Special Forces that arrived in the country. Surely that did pose

1 a security threat to me. They had initially trained some men and
2 he moved along with a good many individuals.

3 If I remind this Court in the - and I remember this
4 vividly. In the testimony given by this human, Zigzag Marzah, he
09:46:28 5 mentions that he was with Prince Johnson and eventually he was
6 captured and brought and he said put in a container before I got
7 at the base and he was subsequently released. I am sure its in
8 the record of this Court. Prince Johnson had left with a good
9 number of Gios and Manos and of course some had left behind, but
09:46:52 10 these were large families. Some families had gone with him.
11 Some were behind. I didn't really know who to trust and it was
12 for reason of security. Not that they could not have provided
13 all, but it does pay sometimes to have an extra insurance policy.
14 That's what that is.

09:47:17 15 Q. So after Dr Manneh entered the country, you told us he was
16 based in Buchanan?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. And did he make any contribution to your war efforts?

19 A. Well, yes, in two ways. One he had already provided men to
09:47:39 20 provide security for me, but he also provided his intellect. I
21 mentioned that he was went from - into those towns and areas that
22 had been already captured by the NPFL and I have provided
23 evidence before the Court to say that civilian administration as
24 we captured and passed were ongoing. In fact, schools were left
09:48:08 25 open. So he went to those liberated areas to speak to the people
26 to tell them about the revolution and what it meant in terms of
27 democracy for the Liberian people. So these are the two ways
28 that he helped.

29 Q. Now you mentioned on Thursday last other foreign nationals

1 who became members of the NPFL and can you just help me with
2 that, please. Now, you said amongst those who joined as foreign
3 nationals were Ivorians. How did that come about?

09:49:13 4 A. I mentioned in my testimony that the borders between Ivory
5 Coast and Liberia, Guinea and Liberia, Sierra Leone and Liberia
6 consist of tribes that are located on both sides of the border.
7 For example, in La Cote d'Ivoire if you look to the far western
8 end of La Cote d'Ivoire you have - on the Liberian side we have
9 the Krahn's that share a border and you have the Grebos. There
09:49:54 10 are Krahn's in La Cote d'Ivoire and there are Grebos in La Cote
11 d'Ivoire, but they are called different names.

12 Also you have the Gios. On the Liberian side they are
13 called Gios. On the Ivorian side they are call Yakuba. It's the
14 same Gio. We're going to have to look for the spelling for
09:50:21 15 Yakuba, but they are called Yakuba. They speak the same
16 language. So there are relatives that are in the town that I
17 live and you have Bin-Houye where I stayed. There's another
18 large town not too far from Bin-Houye. If we got the map some
19 time in the future we will see it's called Zoun-Hounien. It is
09:50:45 20 also a large town of Gios and there are family members living on
21 the Liberian side, there are intermarriages and so when the war
22 started they just came in and they joined, but what I did at that
23 particular time was I kept the Ivorian government informed. As
24 they came over, we kept them informed and so that's how they got
09:51:08 25 involved.

26 That is also true for the Manos that you find on the
27 Guinean side of the border that also having relatives in Ganta.
28 This town of Ganta that we have in the transcripts here - and
29 probably I would demonstrate it on the map. Ganta is right on

1 the border with Guinea - right on the border. There is only a
2 little bridge that separates the big town of Ganta from right
3 across the border into Guinea. So families spread across the
4 border.

09:51:41 5 It is same problem when we get to the Sierra Leonean
6 border, where you have the Gbandis, the Kissies, the Mendes, my
7 own people the Golas, the Vais. They are called one thing on our
8 side and the same Mendes in Liberia speak the Mende in Sierra
9 Leone.

09:52:06 10 As I sat in this Court I speak the local language called
11 Kpelle. I could understand a lot of the Mende words being spoken
12 here and even the - what do they call this other tribe? It will
13 come to my memory, but the words are just about the same. You
14 understand that even though you - so I can say Temne that was
09:52:33 15 spoken here about maybe 20 per cent of the words. If a Temne man
16 is speaking, I will put a lot of what he's saying together. Even
17 though I can't get the hundred per cent, I will get a lot.

18 That's how these tribes are interrelated and that's how
19 these Ivorians got involved. Family connections. There are no
09:52:52 20 borders. A little creek, a little brook, may cross what these
21 Europeans came and told us we're separated. Little brooks and we
22 don't have their kinds of borders, so maybe a border may split a
23 town dead in the centre and that's how they got involved.

24 Q. Well that might explain Ivorians being involved, but how do
09:53:13 25 you explain the fact that there were Ghanaians and Nigerians
26 also?

27 A. Yes, well these were people that were living in Liberia and
28 working in Liberia. By this time and before Liberia was
29 flourishing and when you wanted to get a good job, whether it was

1 the large mining town of LAMCO that was located in Nimba County,
2 or Buchanan that was the seaport that was used majorly for the
3 export of timber and iron ore from Liberia, or whether you are
4 dealing with the Bong Mining companies that's just off the town
09:54:10 5 of Kakata, West Africans came to Liberia in search of jobs.
6 That's how Nigerians were there. That's how Ghanaians were
7 there, looking for jobs. And young men seeing the revolution
8 just came on and joined because they wanted action. That's how
9 they got involved.

09:54:30 10 Q. Were they forcibly recruited?

11 A. No, not at all. No, no, no, no.

12 Q. Now we'll come back to the topic of Sierra Leoneans in a
13 moment, but before we come to that in the summer of 1990 ECOWAS
14 deployed a military force in Liberia called ECOMOG. Is that
09:55:02 15 correct, Mr Taylor?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Now we've already dealt with some of the detail of that,
18 but I want us to deal with some more detail. Who contributed
19 troops to that ECOMOG force?

09:55:18 20 A. To be exact, ECOMOG entered Liberia in August of 1990.
21 Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia. To the best of my
22 recollection now these are the four principal nations that I can
23 remember just at this particular time, with Nigeria and Ghana
24 having the largest contingents.

09:55:54 25 Q. Now as a consequence of that, Mr Taylor, bearing in mind
26 that at this stage the NPFL controlled a sizable portion of the
27 country, did you take any steps against the nationals of those
28 contributing countries who were within your territory?

29 A. Yes, to an extent we did. Doe is killed now in September,

1 but we have warned ECOMOG that because certain contributing
2 states had taken sides we knew that they would not be fair and
3 that we will fight them if they arrived. Now, by October ECOMOG
4 commenced a massive bombing raid, indiscriminate bombing raid
09:57:04 5 across NPFL areas. Some of them were a little too precise, and
6 what we did at that particular time was to begin a process of
7 picking up certain nationals, especially we were really targeting
8 Nigerians because at that particular time there was a free flow
9 of information and a particular point here, I think, of notice
09:57:40 10 would be when ECOMOG deployed in Liberia in August, I have
11 mentioned to this Court that Camp Schefflein was not captured by
12 the NPFL at that time. We had surrounded most of Monrovia, but
13 Camp Schefflein had not been captured. The Sierra Leonean
14 contingent of ECOMOG that came was put into Camp Schefflein, and
09:58:11 15 strangely there's a famous gentleman called Valentine Strasser
16 who was a part of that contingent assigned in Camp Schefflein.
17 But for a period of time there was calm.

18 Q. Where?

19 A. Between Roberts International - on that highway there was a
09:58:33 20 brief cessation of hostilities and our NPFL soldiers used to
21 speak to them, and some of them got to know this very Strasser.
22 I think Strasser may talk about that one day. And what we were
23 surprised about was that there was some quasi I will say
24 precision bombings in certain areas that we felt that the
09:58:57 25 Nigerians were using that lull in the fighting to get
26 intelligence, and so an order was made that certain nationals
27 should be picked up and investigated. We did arrest some of
28 them: Nigerians, Sierra Leoneans, some Ghanaians and different
29 things. They were not held for very long periods of time because

1 it was mostly for an investigation and moving them into areas
2 that if they were close to the front line, to move them away from
3 the front line.

09:59:37 4 Q. Some more detail on that, please. Firstly, can you help us
5 with a timeframe when you implemented that policy?

6 A. I would say it's around October. It's around October 1990.

7 Q. And can you give us any idea as to the numbers who were
8 detained as a consequence of that policy?

9 A. No. No, I cannot give the numbers because those numbers
10:00:07 10 did not come to me. We are in August going through October of
11 1990. I am at this particular time posted in - I would say I'm
12 probably in Buchanan by this time because like I said, Camp
13 Schefflein is still very well equipped so I'm not very close.

14 Those reports did not have to come to me because people were -
10:00:42 15 those orders were passed down that these people should be
16 arrested and investigated, and if anyone was suspected of passing
17 information to the ECOMOG forces during their campaign against
18 us, of course they would be held. But I do not know the numbers.

19 Q. And where were they held?

10:01:03 20 A. Wherever they were arrested. Let's say if you were in the
21 Buchanan area you were held in Buchanan, investigated, and if
22 there was nothing wrong, you were released. If you were in the
23 Harbel area, because that was the Firestone working area, there
24 were a lot of foreigners in that particular area. You were
10:01:25 25 investigated wherever you were arrested and released if there was
26 nothing found.

27 Q. For how long were these people detained?

28 A. To the best of my recollection, not very long. From
29 reports that reached to me, it could not have been a very long

1 time. Some people could have been held for about a week, some
2 people two weeks. But the day-to-day investigation I cannot give
3 you the details of, but what I can say is that the orders were
4 passed by me to arrest and investigate them. How long it took
10:01:59 5 really - I really don't know.

6 Q. Now I want to pause and deal with one aspect of that
7 decision you made and its consequences. Do you recall,
8 Mr Taylor, more than one witness telling this Court that they, as
9 Sierra Leonean nationals, had been detained as a consequence of
10:02:31 10 that decision and that thereafter they had been recruited by
11 Foday Sankoh to join the then fledgling RUF? Do you recall that
12 evidence?

13 A. Oh, yes, I do. I do.

14 Q. Help us, what was your knowledge of that?

10:02:49 15 A. I have no knowledge of that, and I want to be very
16 categorical here. That part of the evidence before this Court I
17 am in no position to dispute that they were utilised by a
18 gentleman called Foday Sankoh. Quite frankly I would not be
19 surprised if it were true, because again - and I'm saying this
10:03:25 20 because as we go on with the crisis, it is during the arrest of
21 Mekunagbe and others following this diabolical plan that they
22 designed with the Black Kadaffa that I get to know a lot of what
23 I'm talking about now. So I'm not surprised that this could have
24 happened. I would not - I'm not in a position to judge them,
10:03:49 25 because I get to find out later what the whole diabolical plan is
26 and we - I get to find out that in fact Foday Sankoh is around at
27 that particular time and it is because of this conspiracy that
28 leads to the arrest, trial and execution of the very Mekunagbe
29 that was involved and the Oliver Varney and the rest. So when I

1 say now that I am in no position to dispute what they are saying
2 because actually I didn't know, I get to find out at the time of
3 the investigation that led to the execution of those that were
4 involved in this undercover plan at the time.

10:04:32 5 Q. Mr Taylor, we need to proceed with caution for this reason:
6 We need to distinguish between your knowledge at the time and
7 what you may have discovered subsequently. Do you follow me?

8 A. I do.

9 Q. So help us, at the time that you implemented this policy
10:04:55 10 did you know that that was going on?

11 A. No, I'm saying I did not know. And I stand corrected on
12 this part, I'm not a lawyer, I'm a politician and that's why I
13 explained it as I did. I did not know and I'm sure this Court,
14 if it is going to be fair to me, when I say that I cannot dispute
10:05:18 15 this argument, it doesn't mean that I knew. I have explained I
16 get to find out years later. So - but in direct answer to your
17 question, I had no knowledge at the time that the gentleman was
18 in Liberia called Foday Sankoh that was recruiting Sierra
19 Leoneans to go to train and arm to go and fight in Sierra Leone.
10:05:43 20 I had no knowledge at that time in 1990.

21 Q. So help us with this then, Mr Taylor. What was it that was
22 occupying your time, abilities and efforts at this time? What
23 were you concentrating on?

24 A. Well, Doe is killed in September. By October 1990 all of
10:06:24 25 these things are going on. There are bombings, civilian targets
26 are being hit, there is confusion all over the place. I am
27 basically trying to secure the civilian population in the
28 country, get them secured. Because later on in the year while
29 that is going on, there is also discussions about peace and we

1 need peace because ECOMOG came in for peace, there is no peace,
2 Doe is dead, the Armed Forces of Liberia now is saying that: Oh,
3 well, listen, since Doe is dead - I forgot the name of who took
4 over, but then there is another attempted coup by I think a
10:07:12 5 gentleman called Julu who takes over in the mansion. So there is
6 a lot going on in that particular time that leads into the last
7 two months of 1990 where we have the - first of all it's the
8 Banjul. Then we have Bamako, Banjul, and before 1990 ends
9 there's the third peace process that's about to take shape, the
10:07:45 10 famous Yamoussoukro. That's - if I can get this spelling right.
11 I think it's Y-A-M-M-O-U --

12 Q. I'm told it's on the record, Mr Taylor.

13 A. It's on the record. Yamoussoukro, S-O-U-K-O. So then it's
14 Yamoussoukro. So not only am I involved with war, but I'm also
10:08:00 15 involved with the peace process because I do go to Bamako. I do
16 go to Bamako and I do go to Yamoussoukro.

17 Q. Did you go to Banjul?

18 A. No, I did not go to Banjul because Kai raba Jawara was dead,
19 so I didn't go to the Banjul.

10:08:23 20 Q. Now you've told us about the use of Alpha Jets to bomb NPFL
21 positions. Did you know where those aircraft were operating
22 from?

23 A. Yes, the aircrafts were operating from two locations: Out
24 of Sierra Leone and --

10:08:46 25 Q. Where in Sierra Leone?

26 A. Well, quite frankly, I can only speculate. One may say
27 Lungi, but it's possible that they could have operated out of - I
28 think there's another airfield there, so I can't be precise. But
29 they were operating mostly out of Monrovia, Spriggs Payne

1 Airport. That's on the record. And in fact I can say that the
2 frequency with which the jets flew meant that they had to be
3 taking off from the most part from Roberts - I mean from Spriggs
4 Payne Airport because they would have take a long - and the time
10:09:31 5 they stayed in the air over us meant that they had to be taking
6 off from Spriggs Payne Airport. And based on our own military
7 people as I was told, if they had to fly one hour almost - maybe
8 less - from Freetown to Monrovia, carry out bombings throughout
9 Liberia and then fly back to Freetown, the length of time they
10:09:55 10 would stay in the air had to be less because of fuel. And so
11 when they stayed in the air a very long time, we would say that
12 they came from Monrovia; and when they only came, dropped two or
13 three bombs, they would return, we would assume that they were
14 coming from Sierra Leone.

10:10:14 15 Now these planes were dropping cluster bombs, little
16 bomblets that children were getting blown apart. In fact it was
17 very sad because we didn't know - I surely didn't know anything
18 about cluster bombs and bomblets. They look like little things,
19 they spread all over the place and children thought that they
10:10:41 20 were toys, and then the sad part of it - this is not like today
21 where - whether it's the United States or Great Britain, where
22 you have precision guided bombs, there was none of this kind of
23 stuff. These Nigerians were just dropping bombs. They didn't
24 know how to target. So, I mean, I can remember a bomb dropped in
10:11:03 25 Harbel in the general market and I - I mean, there were limbs all
26 over the place, I mean, and quite frankly, I was angry.

27 Q. So did you say or do anything about it?

28 A. Well, I used the radios a lot to talk and to warn and to
29 what we call in politics jawboning; using threats as a way of

1 trying to remind them to stop some of this nonsense that they
2 were doing. So I'm surprised sitting here and as though when we
3 were in kindergarten school people repeating recitations, I hear
4 this recitation - one recitation after the other - that Taylor
10:11:58 5 say that there will be the bitterness of war.

6 Now that I would really call a recitation, because I'm sure
7 the Prosecution had all the time in this world to find this
8 so-called BBC interview where I said that they had this
9 recitation before this Court every day that Taylor say that they
10:12:20 10 would taste the bitterness of war and I still hope they can go
11 and find it, okay?

12 I warned, I talked, I jawboned on the radio that Momoh
13 should stop this, we are friends, he should not let this happen,
14 to warn them. But all this nonsense about Taylor saying, there
10:12:39 15 is no human being on this planet that heard in these words that
16 Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of war. It's a
17 fabrication. But I spoke on the BBC and I threatened that if
18 Momoh did not stop I mean he and I would have a problem, because
19 we were old friends and so I just thought to mention this at this
10:12:59 20 particular time. But it was mostly through radio interviews.

21 Q. And during what period of time, because this might aid
22 research and possible discovery of that recording if it exists -
23 what period of time was it that you were giving the interviews
24 along the lines you've just suggested?

10:13:22 25 A. I would suggest that it is - it must be around the month of
26 October/November 1990. This is when the Alpha Jets are just
27 going crazy. They are going mad. They are bombing. In fact,
28 everywhere, even as they are flying and they see a group of
29 civilians that are displaced people moving, they would drop a

1 bomb. This had to be around October/November 1990.

2 Q. And you say you were speaking on the radio. Which radio?

3 A. The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC.

4 Q. And was there any particular radio journalist to whom you

10:14:14 5 were speaking at the time?

6 A. Yes, I spoke for the most part during that entire period to

7 a gentleman called Robin White.

8 Q. So let's put that together, shall we, in the hope that

9 perhaps someone in the public gallery might be able to assist us.

10:14:34 10 This is a recording for the BBC, Robin White, in October/November

11 1990, so that if it exists hopefully we can find it. Do you

12 agree, Mr Taylor?

13 A. I do agree.

14 Q. So in what terms did you address this problem on the radio?

10:15:02 15 Can you recall now?

16 A. In what terms?

17 Q. Yes, what language?

18 A. Oh, I spoke very, very plain English. To the best of my

19 knowledge, I spoke in English.

10:15:16 20 Q. And did you threaten either President Momoh or the Sierra

21 Leonean people?

22 A. No, I warned that this was improper, our people were dying

23 and that this just had to stop.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: Can I pause for a moment and assist with

10:15:45 25 some spellings. Banjul, B-A-N-J-U-L. The middle name of the

26 Gambian President, Kai raba, K-A-I-R-A-B-A. Yakuba is spelt

27 either Y-A-K-U-B-A or Y-A-C-O-U-B-A. And then LAMCO, L-A-M-C-O,

28 in Ni mba N-I-M-B-A County; LAMCO being the Liberian American

29 Swedi sh Mi ni ng Company:

1 Q. Very well. So we're now in October/November of 1990,
2 Mr Taylor?

3 A. That's correct.

10:16:50

4 Q. What else can you tell us about that year before we move
5 on?

6 A. Oh, nothing stands out. I think the most important things
7 I have mentioned already. We talked about the arrival of ECOMOG,
8 the death of Doe. I have mentioned the arrival of this ECOMOG
9 unit again. Then we go into the three peace discussions that are
10 going on. I think these are - there may be more. My
11 recollection is a little weak on that now.

10:17:17

12 Q. So by December of 1990 can you just give us a synopsis of
13 what the position is in Liberia, please?

10:17:43

14 A. By December of 1990 there is again a lull, because of all
15 these negotiations going on, and there are discussions already
16 going on about bringing peace to the country and the role of
17 ECOWAS. This is about - this runs us into the end of the year.

10:18:18

18 Q. Now, 1991. Now we're getting into the critical period in
19 terms of this indictment and so I'd like us to pause at this
20 stage and seek your assistance with this. In terms of the
21 relationship between Liberia and Sierra Leone over your common
22 border, what was the situation at the beginning of that year
23 1991?

10:19:05

24 A. Quite frankly it is relatively good, because the war is
25 going on in Liberia. The Sierra Leonean government, President
26 Momoh, as would be expected of any government with a crisis next
27 door had deployed with my knowledge, I knew this, because I want
28 to emphasise again - and let me be very clear about this on this
29 late gentleman, Joseph Momoh. It's been alleged in a statement

1 made by Tejani Kabbah in his Truth Commission Report that Momoh
2 may have been paid some money to assist the NPFL at that time. I
3 want to state here before this Court categorically Joseph Momoh
4 never asked for any money from me, neither did he receive any
10:20:04 5 money from me.

6 Now, having said that, the situation is normal. There are
7 troops of the Sierra Leonean side deployed on the Sierra Leonean
8 side just as general security, no threat to Liberia, and there
9 are refugees that have crossed into Sierra Leone and are living
10:20:32 10 in different towns. Some of them have returned. There is
11 against our operational order trade going on on that border,
12 looted property here and there from Liberia being sold on the
13 other side, and there is this --

14 Q. Pause there. Just pause for a moment, please. Did you
10:20:58 15 know about that trade that was ongoing?

16 A. No, that's why I said "against our operational order".
17 That's why I said "against our operational order".

18 Q. Well that doesn't really answer my question, Mr Taylor,
19 with respect.

10:21:07 20 A. I did not know.

21 Q. At that time did you know that trade was going on?

22 A. No, I did not know that trade was going on.

23 Q. But you now appreciate that trade was going on, don't you?

24 A. Yes, because of what subsequently happened and this is how

10:21:26 25 I - you know, again you have to - I think that's a part of your
26 job to guide me, but the judges will understand I'm a politician,
27 I'm not a lawyer, and I know there is an exchange of fire on that
28 border and the issue of trade comes to my attention, okay?

29 Q. All right.

1 A. I did not know at the time. There is this clash on the
2 border between the Sierra Leonean army and some NPFL people over
3 looted goods, and I'm saying they should not have been doing that
4 and this caused a little problem that is eventually settled
10:22:06 5 really between Momoh and myself.

6 Q. Well, let's start with the firing then and work backwards.
7 When did that firing take place?

8 A. In January of 1991. There are these altercations --

9 Q. And can you give us a location as to where it took place?

10:22:30 10 A. This happened at - we probably can bring a map later, but
11 there is a Liberian town called Mendekoma.

12 Q. Can we have the map, please. Yes, Mr Taylor, I wonder if
13 you could just briefly change places please. Now, you mentioned
14 a location called Mendekoma.

10:24:29 15 A. I think this is the second time you are bringing me to a
16 map and maybe a town is - for the judges, after the town of Foya
17 right up here in Nimba County there is the road going on to the
18 border. On the Sierra Leonean side there is I think - I think
19 that's Koindu on the Sierra Leonean side, but on --

10:25:06 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm sorry to interrupt, but that map will
21 need to be dropped a little bit because the places that the
22 witness is pointing to can't be seen on the screen.

23 THE WITNESS: Now we may in the future have to get a little
24 better map, but this Foya is up here and - now Foya is up here
10:25:40 25 and this road that goes on here where I'm pointing, right up
26 here, on the Sierra Leonean side they show the town of Koindu,
27 but the last town on the border is called Mendekoma on the
28 Liberian side. It may be shown a little better on another map.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Well I might be able to assist you, although the - I'm
2 looking at Map L7 helpfully provided to us by the Prosecution.
3 It is a map of Lofa County in Liberia. On it, although the
4 typescript is quite small, it gives more detailed information
10:26:28 5 about that part of Liberia adjoining the finger of Kailahun
6 District. It's this one. Can we seek to highlight just this
7 portion, please.

8 A. Okay, on this map you can see Mendekoma. Right here is the
9 town of Mendekoma. That's the last town on the Liberian border,
10 Mendekoma. It is a trading post, right there. Is that okay now?

11 Q. Yes, thank you, Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor, I wonder if you
12 could go back to the other seat now, please. I am sorry to be
13 bouncing you around like this, but I'm told that oftentimes the
14 reception is not as good in that seat as it is in the other. So
10:28:04 15 there has been some firing. There's been some firing between
16 whom, Mr Taylor?

17 A. The exchange is between the armed forces of Sierra Leone,
18 based on investigation that we conducted, and some NPFL
19 individuals under the command of Anthony Mekunagbe, who is the
10:28:33 20 commander for that entire region.

21 Q. And what transpired from the investigation you conducted?

22 A. We investigated and found out that it was an illegal
23 trading of looted goods that Mekunagbe should not have been
24 involved in. The Sierra Leonean army, in trying to chase them to
10:29:00 25 get the property that they claimed that several individuals had
26 paid for, followed them in fact all the way to the town of Foya
27 which is --

28 Q. Which side of the border is Foya?

29 A. Liberia. That's in Liberia. I said that after Foya you go

1 to Mendekoma, so coming into Liberia from Mendekoma Foya is the
2 first major town.

3 Q. And so you're saying that Sierra Leonean forces had crossed
4 the border into Liberia as far as Foya?

10:29:37 5 A. Oh, yes, they did. President Momoh acknowledged that. He
6 said that there were bandits over there and he was determined
7 that it would not happen again. I dispatched Prince Barclay -
8 the late Prince Barclay - who was one of our friends who was also
9 known by President Momoh and Brigadier Toronkai and Dumbuya. I
10:30:09 10 dispatched him to La Cote d'Ivoire, where he called around and
11 obtained the number for our friends in Sierra Leone. I said I
12 wanted to get in touch with President Momoh, he got the number
13 and he brought the number to me. I finally got in touch with
14 President Momoh.

10:30:34 15 Q. How?

16 A. By telephone.

17 Q. What kind of telephone?

18 A. I had a satellite telephone at the time and let me clarify
19 this. I've heard this satellite, satellite phone. Maybe at some
10:30:49 20 point we're going to have to find at least a picture. The year
21 1990 and 1991, your Honours, this whole satellite telephone thing
22 was just coming into play. The telephone system combined I would
23 say it would be about two-thirds of the size of the entire table
24 that your assistants are sitting at. These were huge pieces of
10:31:30 25 equipment and they were just coming into place. In fact, the
26 antenna was almost the size of a big umbrella. So to describe it
27 even better, one unit would fill the back of let's say of a jeep.
28 It was just huge. You know, when these technologies first start
29 up they're just very, very bulky and when you talk about cost at

1 that time, we were paying between 30 to 40,000 dollars for one
2 unit. So I did have a unit and it was expensive to always call
3 on, so we called sparingly.

4 Q. So you were able to speak to Momoh?

10:32:16 5 A. I spoke to Momoh and told him --

6 Q. Which month was this?

7 A. This was in January of 1991.

8 Q. Yes, and what did you say to him?

9 A. Like I said, Momoh and I were friends. I told him
10:32:31 10 sincerely that this was, you know, a mistake and that those
11 involved would be punished, of which Mekunagbe was locked up as
12 an officer in officers' quarter, and that there was no need for
13 us to have this conflict between us and that he should withdraw
14 his forces and he did.

10:32:52 15 Q. So he - so how long were his forces on Liberian soil?

16 A. They did not last for more than two weeks. I would say by
17 the end of January of 1991 he had withdrawn his forces. We did
18 not - after they came in there was no big fighting and massive
19 loss of life, no. After this discussion he understood and he
10:33:22 20 agreed to withdraw and he withdrew.

21 Q. Now, did you have any further communication with President
22 Momoh thereafter?

23 A. Yes, I had. Several months later after the incursion into
24 Sierra Leone, yes, I spoke to him again.

10:33:39 25 Q. But let's just take things month by month as we approach
26 this critical period. So that's January. What happens in
27 February?

28 A. Well by February of 1991 we have already identified Gbarnga
29 as the headquarters for our government, the National Patriotic

1 Reconstruction Assembly Government as we had called it, and
2 inspections were going on in Gbarnga, preparations were being
3 made for me to move to Gbarnga and the location of all of the
4 different organs of our government to identify properties,
10:34:38 5 arrange for the leasing, or maybe asking for the use of some of
6 these properties, that's what was going on in February. But
7 fighting - we were still surrounding Monrovia, but this is what
8 was going on during that particular time.

9 Q. So what was occupying your time at that stage, Mr Taylor?

10:35:01 10 A. Well, war and peace. War and peace. What I'm saying when
11 I say war and peace, we are still being confronted by this
12 problem of the ECOMOG situation, but we in the back of our minds
13 are trying desperately to see how we can deal with the proposals
14 that are before us now because there is this window of
10:35:30 15 opportunity for peace.

16 Q. But were you in that period, the February before the March
17 of 1991, busy organising the RUF for an incursion into Sierra
18 Leone?

19 A. No, no way. I didn't even know about the RUF. By February
10:35:51 20 of 1991 I'm not even living in Gbarnga at the time. We haven't
21 moved to Gbarnga. I am busy trying to set up this government and
22 to get things going. Throughout the rest of our occupied areas
23 the selection process is on now to get members of the national
24 assembly. It's internal politics, it is dealing with the
10:36:19 25 security threat from ECOMOG and it's also dealing with the peace
26 proposals from ECOWAS and the international community on my
27 table. I have no knowledge of what these guys are behind there
28 trying to do whatsoever.

29 Q. And in February 1991 you're not yet in Gbarnga, you tell

1 us, so where are you?

2 A. By this time I have left Buchanan and I move up into - by
3 this time I move into Harbel.

4 Q. Now, Harbel is next to where?

10:37:07 5 A. Roberts International Airport.

6 Q. How many miles outside Monrovia?

7 A. Robertsfeld could be about I would say 23/25 miles outside
8 of Monrovia.

9 Q. So who's making these preparations in Gbarnga, Mr Taylor?

10:37:46 10 A. We have a unit responsible. We have - the military moves
11 in, my security people some of them are going in and there's
12 painting going on because Gbarnga, while it's the headquarters of
13 Bong County, they had to prepare my lodging, moving out of, you
14 know, Harbel. They had to identify - as I said, in fact we ended
10:38:11 15 up using the auditorium of Cuttington University College. We
16 asked them to be used as the seating place of our national
17 assembly.

18 Most of our civilians are now moving into Gbarnga trying to
19 get work done. Woveiyu and other senior members of government,
10:38:34 20 we had some very qualified individuals that had joined us -
21 highly educated people. They had all now starting looking for
22 housing, trying to - so the process of moving. They had to go
23 and negotiate. Some people had houses. We did not forcefully
24 take them. We leased properties.

10:39:03 25 I can remember the CARI, C-A-R-I, that's the Central
26 Agriculture Research Institute, in Bong County. It's an American
27 built and funded place and, you know, it was available. Some of
28 our senior people moved into the housing, because these areas
29 were never destroyed. They were just mint as they were. Our

1 soldiers did not loot or destroy them.

2 So there's this massive process of moving. I drive up to
3 Gbarnga sometimes, inspect, come back, drive up and I eventually
4 move in around mid-1991.

10:39:46 5 Q. Now as far as you were aware at that time, we're in
6 January/February 1991, were there any Sierra Leoneans in Gbarnga.

7 A. At that time in 1991, no, not that I know of.

8 Q. What about in Harbel where you were located?

9 A. It's possible that Sierra Leoneans could have been in
10:40:14 10 Harbel. I didn't know any Sierra Leoneans personally at that
11 time, no.

12 Q. Were you aware of any Sierra Leoneans who were members of
13 the NPFL?

14 A. At that time, no. I was aware that, as I mentioned to this
10:40:38 15 Court, there were a cross section of West Africans, but I did not
16 know them individually.

17 Q. So we come then to March 1991. Help us, Mr Taylor, what
18 happens in that month from your perspective?

19 A. Well, in March 1991 - I forgot the real date - but the
10:41:20 20 announcement is made. But let me just add something to your last
21 question, because I sat here day by day listening to all of these
22 things. Witnesses came before this Court and they mentioned that
23 there were Gambian Special Forces that were in Liberia fighting.
24 Even the Prosecution witnesses have never mentioned Sierra
10:42:02 25 Leonean Special Forces fighting in Liberia.

26 Q. I was going to come to that in a moment, Mr Taylor.

27 A. Okay.

28 Q. Carry on.

29 A. So that's what I mean that there were none of these Sierra

1 Leoneans, because for the type of training that our people did in
2 Libya and the Sierra Leoneans who had been taken there by Kabbah
3 who had left had done, it would show that if there were a Special
4 Force in Liberia if he was not guarding me he had to be fighting,
10:42:36 5 and no-one has come before this Court to mention the very names
6 that we've heard here of Mohamed Tarawalli and all these people.
7 Not one witness has come here and said, "Oh, Tarawalli was
8 fighting at this front in Liberia." They were just not there.
9 In March of 1991 I am as shocked as everybody else to hear that
10:42:56 10 there is an attack inside Sierra Leone. I am still not moved in
11 Gbarnga by March of 1991. I have not moved to Gbarnga yet. The
12 preparations are being made for the government to move and take
13 seat in Gbarnga.

14 Q. Okay, let's pause then and deal with what later becomes
10:43:29 15 known as the RUF. Mr Taylor, did you play any part in organising
16 the RUF?

17 A. I played no part whatsoever - whatsoever - in organising
18 the RUF. None whatsoever.

19 Q. Because you appreciate it is suggested that the RUF was in
10:43:55 20 effect your creation? You know that, don't you?

21 A. Oh, I've heard that here.

22 Q. So tell us, Mr Taylor, what was your knowledge in March
23 1991 of any group of Sierra Leoneans bent on embarking on a
24 revolution in Sierra Leone? What was your knowledge?

10:44:26 25 A. I had no knowledge in March of 1991, or before then, that a
26 group calling itself RUF was either planning or organising or
27 training to attack Sierra Leone. Not at all.

28 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you accept, do you not, that you were aware
29 that there were Sierra Leoneans training in Libya?

1 A. But they were not RUF.

2 Q. What were they called?

3 A. The Sierra Leoneans that I got to know and did not meet,
4 except for the leader Ali Kabbah, was called the Sierra Leonean
10:45:15 5 Pan-African Revolutionary Movement that was registered in Libya
6 at the Mataba. It was not called the RUF at all. So when I
7 heard RUF I was shocked because I had never heard that name
8 before and when they said Sierra Leoneans, but what clicked to me
9 was that, oh, maybe these are the Sierra Leoneans that were in
10:45:39 10 Libya, but they were not called RUF in Libya. Not at all.

11 Q. Now the organisation you encountered through Ali Kabbah in
12 Libya, what did you know about their roots?

13 A. Well, you know, this is another thing, you know? When I -
14 when you go through the rules you talk about weight and I think
10:46:12 15 this is important. Look, this is a matter of, you know, I don't
16 care how these theories and hypotheses come about without any
17 foundation.

18 Sierra Leoneans arrived in Libya before I got there. Now,
19 it did not take Charles Taylor to tell Ali Kabbah and his people
10:46:43 20 that were at Fourah Bay College to plan to fight. Now, am I some
21 Godfather? I'm not a Godfather to go to tell revolutionaries who
22 had gone. I met these people in Libya. They were there in their
23 numbers. I cannot tell this Court how many, I did not meet them,
24 but for God's sake they were there. They didn't go there for a
10:47:08 25 party. They went there to train to fight. So this nonsense that
26 Taylor was supposed to be the brains and Godfather, I didn't take
27 them there. These people went there, they were in a military
28 camp training to launch a revolution.

29 And what Ali Kabbah told me was he had problems at Fourah

1 Bay, he had been arrested a few times, there were problems, there
2 were so many people including senior, senior former politicians
3 that were involved. And in fact Ali told me - how would a little
4 boy, I mean young man, like Ali Kabbah reach all the way to
10:47:52 5 Libya? Ali got that through Tejani. His family met Tejani
6 Kabbah, former President Tejani, was the one who from what Ali
7 told me made the arrangement for Ali to go to Libya and it was
8 done through Ghana. He went through Ghana. So I mean as far as
9 I can tell, from what Ali told me, their revolution was something
10:48:14 10 that they had planned and I can remember vividly.

11 And, you know, it would not be fair to me - it would not be
12 in the interests of justice - if this gentleman, Mr Ali Kabbah,
13 doesn't show himself up and come to this Court to tell the truth.
14 He's alive. We've tried to track him and he's been hiding, for
10:48:32 15 what reason I don't understand, okay?

16 Ali told me that they had contacts in Sierra Leone with the
17 army and the police and that upon returning they were going in
18 and they would start something within Sierra Leone and the armed
19 forces would take over.

10:48:50 20 Now, Ali, if you can hear me, wherever he is in the world,
21 come forward and tell these people that I did not know no Sankoh,
22 because they know I knew him, and I think in the interests of
23 justice if he's got any heart he should come forward. We've
24 tracked him in Canada - and I can tell this Court - and he's
10:49:10 25 dodging. We can't get him. I mean I'm suffering here on a lie
26 that I was supposed to plan this whole thing when he was the one,
27 okay? Their roots come from Sierra Leone based on what he told
28 me from Fourah Bay and this pan-African urge that they had, they
29 put this stuff together. That's as much as I know about the

1 Sierra Leonean Pan-African Revolutionary Movement.

2 Q. Apart from former President Tejan Kabbah, were you told
3 anything else about those behind the setting up of the
4 organisation you knew as the Pan-African Revolutionary Movement?

10:49:54 5 A. Well, I can only - you know, he mentioned Tejani Kabbah.
6 He said there were other people, but I can only state as much.
7 When we look at the AFRC situation in 1997 and you look at the
8 delegation that represented the AFRC/RUF before the Committee of
9 Four in Abidjan, there was Dr Abass Bundu, there were Karifa
10 Smart. And these people you can only assume that they did not
11 just drop from the air and for them to be associated with who was
12 then called the junta and who was called the RUF junta, for that
13 calibre of men to be there it meant that one can only draw his
14 own conclusion that there had to be some level of cooperation if
10:50:59 15 not in, you know, the early stages, but at some level. These
16 calibre of men don't just join organisations blindly and I can
17 just - maybe it's wrong, or you may call that conjecture or
18 whatever, but this is as much as I can say about that.

19 Q. How regularly did you meet with Ali Kabbah in Libya?

10:51:23 20 A. Every trip that I made to Libya and I made - sometimes I
21 would say I would probably visit Libya twice in a three month
22 span and I would stay there anywhere between one to two weeks.
23 For that time I would be with - I mean, Ali and I would meet with
24 Dr Manneh, we would talk together at long hours with other
10:51:51 25 representatives of other African groups, but we spent - the West
26 African group we stayed together a whole lot.

27 Q. And did you know how many Sierra Leoneans were training in
28 Libya?

29 A. I have no idea. I'm not going to mislead this Court. I

1 had no idea. I knew that they were there and really Ali did not
2 even know how many men I had, because leaders of groups were
3 there, they had their men, but you had nothing to do with the men
4 of other groups. There was no way to associate with them.

10:52:31 5 Leaders stuck together. The men that trained in camps knew a lot
6 of each other, but there was no interaction between let's say the
7 leader of Liberia with the Sierra Leonean men, or the leader of
8 Sierra Leone with the Liberian men, no. So I cannot tell you how
9 many men they had.

10:52:49 10 Q. But it's quite clear, Mr Taylor, that at some stage at
11 least some Sierra Leoneans who had trained in Libya ended up in
12 Liberia, because evidence has been placed before these judges of
13 the presence in Liberia of Foday Sankoh and a Mohamed Tarawalli.
14 So help us, what do you know about their entry into Liberia?

10:53:28 15 A. I have no knowledge whatsoever. Again I speak very, very,
16 very frankly about this. I say I'm a politician. I'm not a
17 lawyer. With what I got to know later I do not dispute that they
18 were there, because I got to find out subsequently, okay, after
19 this men got in trouble and the full investigation unfolded.

10:53:57 20 They could have entered Liberia any time between January and
21 April, when I finally move in, or even after the fact.

22 On the Ivorian side of the border, let's be very clear,
23 there were not one entry. There was several entry points to
24 enter Liberia. In fact the little town of Gborplay that I have
10:54:25 25 found on the Liberian map, it's there, is not an entry - a major
26 - it's not a real entry point into Liberia. The official entry
27 point in Liberia is a town that is on the record that I mentioned
28 that where I met in my statements here before this Court former
29 assistant secretary of state Herman Cohen. It's a town called

1 Loguato. That's the main entry. So people were coming and
2 people were going.

3 So this is a mere I would say intelligence guess. Foday
4 Sankoh being in that camp knew the boys, he knew my men, he knew
10:55:07 5 them, but he was an - I mean, I say this - I use this word not in
6 - not trying to dehumanise this man, but in revolutionary terms
7 Foday Sankoh was nothing when it comes to revolutionaries that
8 were in Libya. Nothing. We didn't know him and there was no
9 need to know him. So if Foday Sankoh and two of the trainees
10:55:43 10 entered Liberia I am in no position to dispute that, but not with
11 my knowledge and not with my consent at all.

12 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you appreciate of course, don't you, that
13 the Prosecution suggest that you're lying about this and that you
14 did meet with Sankoh in Libya and made a pact with him to become
10:56:10 15 terrorists. What do you say about that suggestion?

16 A. Well, you know, there a good many things that the
17 Prosecution have said in this Court that we'll begin to look
18 into. There is a lot of conjecture I have heard from this
19 Prosecution and guesswork and where did all of this conjecture
10:56:37 20 come from? A lot of it mere speculation, but most of it I heard
21 from a gentleman and to the best of my recollection he was not -
22 he's not a protected witness, Mr Suwandi Camara, who is really
23 I'm sure by the time we go through my Defence his brothers and
24 his boss and others will tell who he really is, that they want
10:57:01 25 him found and brought here, that really is nothing, but his boss
26 and those he claims that he associated with will come before this
27 Court. I heard this.

28 Now, how - that's the work of the Prosecution. You come up
29 with these theories and there was supposed to be a pact. I'm

1 supposed to be this fool that I'm supposed to make a pact with
2 three men to stage a revolution in another country and invade a
3 country with three men; the Foday Sankoh, okay, the Mohamed
4 Tarawalli and who is the other boy I've been hearing here, Rashid
10:57:39 5 something. I'm supposed to stage a revolution in the
6 neighbouring country with three men. That's a part of their
7 work, but I know they must know better. I know that within their
8 minds they must think differently.

9 And, hey, I would say as ministers of justice they in their
10 hearts know that there must be something funny here, just like
11 some of the other - and I'm going to deal with this conjecture
12 part, just as some of the other issues that are raised about me
13 not only coming to bring them but training, and I'm supposed to
14 send this man that sat before these judges here who calls himself
10:58:23 15 Isaac Mongor who I was supposed to send one man, one human being,
16 not one of my Special Forces, one human being to go and train an
17 entire invading force that I'm such a fool and I don't know
18 better. Within their minds I'm sure they must be thinking
19 there's something wrong with what they're saying here. Do you
10:58:44 20 understand me? There is no way anybody can say or associate with
21 this.

22 This is why I want to be frank. I cannot dispute that they
23 were there. I got to know subsequently and I believe that they
24 were there. I would have never, ever - if Foday Sankoh had been
10:59:00 25 in Liberia with my knowledge he probably would have been a very
26 good security, or Mohamed Tarawalli would have served as a
27 security, but I would not have been stupid enough, okay? And
28 mind you - mind you - all of this stuff that came before this
29 Court, it is not that I sent an army into Sierra Leone, but that

1 one Mongor went and trained who never came back to report
2 nothing, if he ever did, but it was another man who claimed in
3 another trial that he was the training officer and we will get to
4 that. Do you understand me? I don't send an army and so I'm
10:59:44 5 invading a country with three men. Does that make any sense? I
6 mean, yeah, it's good that you want Taylor in jail, I'm in jail
7 already, but we've got to be reasonable here and somebody must be
8 saying in his or her head that something is wrong here.

9 Q. Mr Taylor, I want to ask you about one more detail about
11:00:04 10 Libya before we move on. Do you recall a Prosecution witness
11 TF1-540 saying that you had met Sam Bockarie in Libya? Did you
12 meet Sam Bockarie in Libya?

13 A. I never met Sam Bockarie in Libya and to the best of my
14 knowledge even from evidence before this Court it is very silly
11:00:38 15 for someone to say that, because let's not forget these judges
16 know if you train in Libya you would have been called, what, a
17 Special Force. So if Sam Bockarie had been in Libya then there
18 would not have been three Sierra Leonean Special Forces, then he
19 would have been, what, the fourth. So it's evident he was not
11:01:00 20 there. So this witness, whoever he is, is lying, lying, lying.

21 Everyone that has come before you have only talked about
22 three Sierra Leonean Special Forces. So Sam Bockarie went to
23 Libya and he did not become a Special Force, so what was he doing
24 there if he was there at all? It just never happened. I did not
11:01:21 25 meet him because I could not have met him, because even if he was
26 there he would not have been the type of person I would have met
27 because he was not the leader, but it's very evident that he was
28 not there because he has not been mentioned here as a Special
29 Force.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, bearing mind we're still dealing with the
2 presence of Sierra Leones in Liberia and an imminent invasion of
3 Sierra Leone, on that note let me ask you about another detail.
4 You recall, don't you, more than one Prosecution witness speaking
11:02:07 5 of training at Camp Naama? Do you recall that?

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Taking matters in stages, you've already mentioned Camp
8 Naama in your testimony, haven't you?

9 A. Yes, I have.

11:02:23 10 Q. Where is Camp Naama located?

11 A. Camp Naama is located in Bong County I would say about, oh,
12 30 miles outside of Gbarnga.

13 Q. 30 miles?

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, you mentioned witness
11:02:55 15 TF1-540 and we're instructed by our Legal Officer that there is
16 no such witness. Could you check that number.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: I'll check the reference. If I could deal
18 with that matter at a later stage, Mr President.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

11:03:44 20 MR GRIFFITHS:

21 Q. So Camp Naama is about 30 miles outside Gbarnga?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And is there a road leading from Gbarnga to Camp Naama?

24 A. Yes, and plus you have to go up the Gbarnga-Zorzor Highway,
11:04:07 25 but then you have to branch off near the St Paul River Bridge and
26 then branch off to your right and go perhaps another 10 miles
27 towards the Guinean border for where Camp Naama is located. So
28 in a way, yes.

29 Q. And how big is Camp Naama?

1 A. Camp Naama is I would say the largest military base in
2 Liberia. It is a very huge base. I had mentioned before this
3 Court that during what we call Naama days before the crisis,
4 Naama was so big that it hosted two principal sectors of the
11:04:59 5 Armed Forces of Liberia. It had located at Camp Naama the
6 artillery battalion and it had the engineering battalion located
7 at two extreme ends of Camp Naama.

8 We use the word "battalion" here and if we - and we have
9 military people on the other side. They will understand this.

11:05:30 10 But we are not talking about regular battalions. We are talking
11 about - because Liberia at the time constituted one full brigade
12 of about 6/7,000 men, or maybe a little more, a battalion would
13 not be a normal size. It could have constituted maybe a thousand
14 plus men. But the base was so big that the units were there, but
11:06:00 15 they were located at two different ends of the base and so you
16 could be on one side of Naama and you have to - yes, you could
17 walk but, you know, for a few minutes to get to the other side of
18 the base. This is in the forest on the Guinean border.

19 Q. When did Camp Naama first fall under the control of the
11:06:29 20 NPFL? Can you give us a rough idea?

21 A. Oh, I would put it to - let's see, by July we are around
22 Monrovia and so Naama - and our forces begin to backtrack as I
23 explained to this Court how we cut Gbarnga and Ganta off. I
24 would put it to as, oh, July 1990 - I would say maybe
11:07:19 25 August/September. Almost immediately we go. There's not very
26 much fighting. I would put it to about a month or two after July
27 after we're backing up.

28 Q. So some time round about August/September Camp Naama comes
29 under NPFL control?

1 A. Yes, or thereabouts. Thereabouts.

2 Q. To what use did the NPFL put Camp Naama after it came under
3 their control?

4 A. Camp Naama was immediately set up as a military training
11:07:51 5 base, as other areas had been set up, and I think - I'm now going
6 to stop here. I need to explain this. Everywhere the NPFL
7 captured in a major area they set up a base, so - and these were
8 called real bases. Normally from the little thing that I know we
9 did not train on the front line. There was a training base left

11:08:24 10 in Tappita. There was a training base left behind even in
11 Gborplay that I had moved from. When we took Buchanan in May of
12 1990, there was a training base set up in Buchanan. As we came
13 into Kakata, just off Bong Mines, we set up a training base.

14 There was a training base set up in Naama. So there's not one,
11:08:52 15 but everywhere continuing the training process, so by the time
16 Naama is taken over and established as a base there are at least
17 a half dozen other training facilities going on at the same time.

18 Q. Can you recall now who was in charge of training at Camp
19 Naama after it fell into NPFL hands?

11:09:18 20 A. I don't quite recall, but I can tell you who should have
21 been in charge of Naama.

22 Q. And who is that?

23 A. The commander of that region was one of my Special Forces
24 Anthony Mekunagbe, who was in charge of that entire region and by
11:09:39 25 that region I mean until I moved to Gbarnga. From Bong and Lofa
26 Mekunagbe was a senior commander, he was in charge of the region,
27 so naturally he would have set up a training facility in that
28 particular place, Naama.

29 Q. Now, I'm asking you these questions about Camp Naama for

1 this obvious reason. You appreciate, having listened to the
2 evidence, that evidence has been placed before these judges to
3 the effect that Sierra Leoneans were training at Camp Naama prior
4 to an RUF invasion of Sierra Leone. So, Mr Taylor, what did you
11:10:32 5 know about Sierra Leoneans training at Camp Naama, so-called
6 vanguards?

7 A. I knew nothing of Sierra Leoneans training in Naama
8 whatsoever. I was aware of a training - NPFL training - going on
9 in Naama, not Sierra Leoneans training in Naama for any
11:10:55 10 operation.

11 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, I wish to clarify with the
12 witness was Camp Naama pre-existing - was it a pre-existing base
13 - or was it actually set up by the NPFL?

14 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, Camp Naama was a pre-existing
11:11:20 15 military base, the largest in Liberia. I had mentioned before
16 that before the war it was occupied by the artillery and the
17 engineering battalions of the Armed Forces of Liberia. It was
18 very well constructed, very well built and had been there for
19 many, many years before. In answer to your question it was set
11:11:50 20 up by the Government of Liberia and I can go as far back as I
21 would say the administration of President Tubman, that is all the
22 way in the '60s.

23 MR GRIFFITHS:

24 Q. Did you, Mr Taylor, visit Camp Naama after its capture?

11:12:10 25 A. Not immediately after its capture. I did after I moved to
26 Gbarnga. After I moved to Gbarnga in mid-1991 I did visit Naama
27 on a graduation exercise of several thousand NPFL soldiers.

28 Q. In the period between its capture by the NPFL which you
29 tell us is about August/September 1990 --

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. -- until March of 1991 did you visit Camp Naama?

3 A. No, I did not.

4 Q. Were you during that same --

11:13:04 5 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I think you meant March '92.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: No, I meant March '91:

7 Q. August/September '90 to March 1991 did you visit Camp
8 Naama?

9 A. No, I did not.

11:13:18 10 Q. Help us with this, please, Mr Taylor. In the period
11 August/September 1990 through to about February/March of 1991 did
12 you as leader of the NPFL have full control over the entire
13 territory that was within NPFL hands?

14 A. Well, you're going to have to help me when you say full
11:14:13 15 control.

16 Q. All right. Let me put it differently. How much detailed
17 information was coming to you about what was happening throughout
18 the whole area under NPFL control?

19 A. Well, I have explained to this Court that the whole concept
11:14:36 20 of the Special Forces and their training in their numbers was to
21 be able to come into Liberia and I described this as being the
22 eyes and ears of the revolution. They were posted all over the
23 place and we from the very early stage had set up a defence
24 ministry and a spokesperson. I told you that Mr Tom Womeiyu was
11:15:07 25 defence minister and official spokesperson.

26 We had a decentralised system. I was the leader of the
27 NPFL, but the system was decentralised and no leader would ever
28 have a night of sleep if he had to know every single detail that
29 as we come along. Remember I also told this Court that by the

1 beginning of 1991 decisions are already taken and don't forget
2 now by late 1990 I'm not the one going up to - out to peace
3 agreements. This was not a one man show. It's not a one man
4 show. I didn't go to - you asked me if I went to the Banjul, I
11:15:52 5 did not go to The Gambia. There were other qualified people in
6 the organisation. I was not sitting up there as some big
7 dictator and one man run - I would have never survived, okay.

8 This is a decentralised - but, yes, I am the leader, and if
9 we go by what a famous United States President said, the buck
11:16:13 10 stopped with me. I didn't have to get all of the details. So
11 the thing was decentralised, people went out, they did what they
12 had to do. Here we are now about to put together a government,
13 an assembly with ministries and agencies. We had a system of
14 justice set up. There was a tribunal set up that was also moving
11:16:32 15 to Gbarnga where every one of the people that I accept that came
16 before this Court that it was said that I had executed, they were
17 people that committed crimes and atrocities, they were tried. So
18 I am not the judges, I am not the - there's a system set up.

19 So that whole terminology being in full control, to the
11:16:53 20 extent that I accept I was the leader of the NPFL, yes. To the
21 extent that I was [indiscernible] with the minutest of detail -
22 Look, on the training, let's go back to the training issue. It
23 was a fact - it was a standard - what we call standard operating
24 procedure that they were to set up bases and train people. No
11:17:25 25 one had to come to me and say, "Oh, guess what, we just captured
26 this city, what should we do? Should we set up a base?" We're
27 fighting a war. You capture an area, you set up a base, you get
28 volunteers, you train, you move. Schools must continue, leave
29 the civilians alone. This is why I won 75 per cent of the vote

1 after seven years of civil war. If I had been Attila the Hun,
2 there cutting off heads and doing all type of nonsense I would
3 not have won 75 per cent of the votes. So in short I had control
4 to the extent that I was leader, but we had an organisation.

11:18:16 5 Q. Mr Taylor, I ask for this reason: You tell us, one, you
6 didn't know of the presence of Foday Sankoh and other Sierra
7 Leoneans. You also know from evidence before this Court --

8 A. Excuse me, because I know the Prosecution is coming back,
9 but when you say and other Sierra Leoneans I want us to be clear
11:18:46 10 about that. Are you speaking about the other Special Forces with
11 him, because I knew that there were Sierra Leoneans in Liberia,
12 so when you say other Sierra Leoneans I don't want them --

13 Q. All right.

14 A. Okay.

11:18:59 15 Q. You say you didn't know of the presence of Sierra Leonean
16 Special Forces in Liberia?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. But you appreciate, Mr Taylor, evidence has been heard by
19 this Court to the effect that Foday Sankoh was busy recruiting
11:19:18 20 among Sierra Leoneans in Liberia, transporting them in trucks to
21 Camp Naama, that they were being trained at Camp Naama and you
22 tell this Court that you knew nothing at all about any of that?

23 A. I tell this Court I knew nothing of that. Let's just look
24 at the picture. Let's look at the picture. When we fast forward
11:19:50 25 to the Mekunagbe, the Oliver Varney, the Timothy Mulibah, the
26 Degbon, these people were moving people all of the time. I mean,
27 they were moving people all of the time. I mean, how was I
28 supposed to know as leader of the NPFL that people on board a
29 truck moving from point A to point B are Sierra Leoneans that are

1 going to go train because now, as the evidence before this Court,
2 it is not just Sierra Leoneans that trained, Liberians trained.
3 Do you understand me? Liberians trained along with them.

4 And let's be very thoughtful about one thing here. They've
11:20:42 5 said that Sierra Leone was invaded with NPFL but let's be very
6 mindful. If you were trained by the Special Forces of Sierra
7 Leone in Camp Naama you were not an NPFL because if you had been
8 an NPFL you would not have had to train again. Do you understand
9 what I'm trying to say? And I think that it's important that

11:21:13 10 with all the charade going on about the theory, you cannot be -
11 if you train in Camp Naama for the invasion of Sierra Leone you
12 were not NPFL. You can only be NPFL if you have been trained by
13 the NPFL and were a soldier fighting before. If you were a
14 civilian, as we were told here - these judges were told that

11:21:41 15 civilians were carried over and many of the people that - those
16 people that I cannot mention here because some of them are
17 protected, for example the lady who became jealous and excuse me,
18 your Honours, who used a blunt instrument on another female,
19 she's protected, I can't call her name. These were civilians
11:22:05 20 that were recruited and carried over there and there are so many
21 others that went under these same conditions, okay.

22 So you cannot call them NPFL. If they were NPFL they would
23 have been trained and all they would have needed was guns to go
24 and fight. So they were not NPFL, okay. So I just want to get
11:22:27 25 this whole thing.

26 So the fact that people are moving in trucks, my God, it
27 doesn't really matter. Trucks were moving day and night from
28 point A to point B. People were moving food. Civilians were
29 moving. Displaced people were moving. How am I, as the leader

1 of the NPFL, supposed to know that a certain bunch of men and
2 women in a truck, even if it contained Sierra Leoneans, I would
3 have known or had reason to know that they were being taken to
4 Camp Naama to be trained but now they are - all of a sudden they
11:23:08 5 are NPFL, nonsense. I had no idea of this. Total nonsense.

6 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm quite deliberately dwelling on this topic
7 because of its significance in the overall scheme of things. So
8 let me put another proposition to you, please. What do you say
9 to this suggestion: You're a member of the Mataba in Libya,
11:23:37 10 promoting pan-African inspired revolution and, guess what, six
11 months after - well, a year after you start your revolution in
12 Liberia it just happens that another revolution is launched from
13 territory controlled by you into Sierra Leone. What do you say
14 about that?

11:24:03 15 A. Well, I'll tell you something. I will deal with that in
16 three different ways. One, I am and remain a pan-Africanist.
17 And, two, I'm very proud to have been a part of a pan-African
18 movement that saw South Africa turn into what it should be today
19 and then maybe what it is today and other African countries and I
11:24:34 20 am proud that Gaddafi, like I said before, had the nerve to do
21 that. So I have no apologies for being a pan-Africanist.

22 Now, having said that, now when we look at this whole
23 matter that because I'm a pan-Africanist I'm supposed to do -
24 look, number one, not everyone that went for this training or not
11:25:01 25 everyone that we saw had the type of credentials that you would
26 call pan-Africanist in the first instance.

27 But secondly, even more important, I am out there
28 scrambling trying to make ends meet. I am out there scrambling
29 trying to make ends meet. I don't have the means to do any such

1 foolishness about trying to start a revolution in another
2 country. I went looking for help and even I didn't get all the
3 help I wanted. I said to this Court Gaddafi never gave me any
4 arms to invade Liberia, neither did Burkina Faso. Here I am on
11:25:53 5 the border, buying shotguns, risking lives of people to launch a
6 revolution, what means do I have to even encourage - but even in
7 the darkest knowledge of human intelligence, if Foday Sankoh had
8 come to me in Liberia and had said to me, "I'm one of the guys
9 that was in Libya, I want you to help me" and in my mind if I had
11:26:26 10 the means, which I didn't have, there is no way that he would
11 have started that revolution as he did, okay, and especially
12 against a friend of mine. I would not have accepted it. Just as
13 I did not accept it in Ivory Coast, I did not accept it in
14 Guinea. Do you understand me? There was no way I would have
11:26:50 15 permitted it. Number one, Foday Sankoh did not have the
16 credentials and what do I mean by credentials? Everyone that
17 went to the Mataba, they were not stupid people. They were
18 sound, educated, you were evaluated because, like I say, Libya
19 was not training terrorists. Libya was training pan-Africanists
11:27:14 20 that harboured within themselves this African zeal that Africa is
21 for the Africans and that we can solve our problems.

22 So there was no way that I would have helped him because,
23 number one, he didn't even have the requisite I would say
24 manpower. As we have heard here, three men want to launch a
11:27:40 25 revolution. I probably would have told him he was crazy and used
26 those men to protect myself, but not to go into Sierra Leone. I
27 would have never been so stupid.

28 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President, and I was
29 going to move on to events in March 1991. Would that be a

1 convenient point?

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think it's convenient. You can start
3 the new point after the break.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: But before I leave can I use the remaining
11:28:20 5 few seconds to deal with a couple of spellings, please. Dr Abbas
6 Bundu, A-B-B-A-S B-U-N-D-U. I think the name Kari fa Smart is
7 already on the record. I am right?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

9 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

11:28:37 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. We'll have an adjournment and
11 we'll be back at 12 o'clock.

12 [Break taken at 11.28 a.m.]

13 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, continue, Mr Griffiths.

12:01:18 15 MR GRIFFITHS:

16 Q. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch I was enquiring
17 about your knowledge of --

18 A. Excuse me, I can't hear the counsel.

19 Q. I'm sorry, my fault. Before the short adjournment I was
12:01:37 20 enquiring about the - your knowledge of Sierra Leoneans in
21 Liberia. Having hopefully exhausted that topic now, could we
22 move on, please, and could you help us as to what occurred in
23 March 1991?

24 A. To the best of my knowledge, we were all surprised by the
12:02:15 25 announcement of an invasion in Sierra Leone by a group. That's
26 as much as I hear of 19 - of March of 1991.

27 Q. Taking things then in stages, firstly where were you in
28 March of 1991?

29 A. I was still in Harbel.

1 Q. Doing what?

2 A. Oh, there I was living. I was living in Harbel. Remember
3 I've already told you we are in the process - we're trying to
4 move to Gbarnga, but I'm still living in Harbel.

12:02:59 5 Q. How do you first learn of these events?

6 A. Well, two ways. I was - every day we would have the
7 information officer of the NPFL assigned to me who would probably
8 bring a sheet of paper of summary important news reports, because
9 we were following the ECOMOG bombing, where they have hit, and so
12:03:30 10 there was this briefing time given to me in the morning and I
11 also relayed it on the day, the late evening, of the invasion on
12 the BBC programme Focus on Africa.

13 Q. Now what was it that you heard on Focus on Africa, if you
14 can recall?

12:03:55 15 A. I just heard that a group of armed men - I don't recall if
16 they said RUF, I really don't recall, but that there had been an
17 armed attack on a town in Sierra Leone by, you know, an armed
18 group.

19 Q. And how much detail did you have about the situation?

12:04:22 20 A. Not very much. No more than everyone else heard at the
21 time as it was announced. I don't think anybody really had any
22 real serious details beside what we all had heard on Focus that
23 evening.

24 Q. Did you know how many men were involved, or individuals?

12:04:42 25 A. No, I don't know. I could not have known and it was not
26 announced how many were involved.

27 Q. Did you know where this action was located within
28 Sierra Leone?

29 A. No, I did not know. The area was mentioned, but

1 Sierra Leone - at that particular time I did not know
2 Sierra Leone very well, but the town was mentioned in the news
3 what - I don't quite recall the name, but there was a town inside
4 Sierra Leone that was mentioned.

12:05:18 5 Q. Now, you appreciate from the evidence placed before this
6 tribunal that there is evidence that NPFL combatants were also
7 involved in that incursion. Did you know that at the time?

8 A. I knew nothing of NPFL combatants being involved. Whoever
9 said it before this Court is telling a lie.

12:05:45 10 Q. Had you heard any pronouncements by anyone on behalf of the
11 RUF preceding this invasion?

12 A. Not to the best of my recollection, no. I personally had
13 not heard. I can tell you the way that information is flowing
14 during the war I get a lot of information from my briefings. If
15 there is something that I need to follow up on I may take the
16 time to go and sit down at a radio, because one of the things
17 that we got to find out - in fact, my building in Harbel came
18 under aerial attack several times and what ECOMOG did very
19 carefully during that particular time was because they knew that

12:06:45 20 people sat around --

21 Q. People what?

22 A. That people sat around radios during Focus on Africa,
23 ECOMOG used to launch most of the bombing raids during Focus.

24 Q. What time was that?

12:07:01 25 A. Oh, boy, if I can remember that. That had to be about, oh
26 God, 3.30/4 o'clock in the afternoon. About 5 o'clock. It used
27 to come I think 5/5.09 Greenwich meantime, okay? They knew that
28 people assembled around the radio, so they tried - in fact they
29 missed me a few times, knowing that people would sit around, so I

1 made it a habit not to sit around during Focus time, but to try
2 to take position because they missed me several times and they
3 killed a lot of people during the war who they knew would
4 congregate around radios to listen to this famous BBC.

12:07:42 5 Q. Now, did you appreciate when you heard these reports that
6 this invasion had been launched from Liberian territory from what
7 you've told us under your control?

8 A. I was very, very disturbed by this and I immediately again
9 contacted President Momoh trying to convince him that whatever
12:08:22 10 the situation was we were not responsible. In fact, I ordered
11 the Liberian side of the border closed immediately. By this time
12 things are really getting out of hand. I can remember a
13 conversation that Momoh - Momoh said to me that this group had
14 pronounced their names and that they said that my people were
12:08:49 15 involved and that in fact some individuals had been captured and
16 according to him reports had reached to him that some of them had
17 NPFL ID cards and so there was evidence. I said to him I said,
18 "No."

19 In fact at that particular time some individuals had ID
12:09:18 20 cards, as Liberian ID cards, but the NPFL did not have the
21 machinery or equipment and we did not go around giving ID cards.
22 But he said to me that - and I remember this very clearly. That
23 even the international community say the British and the
24 Americans were convinced that we were behind it and that we had
12:09:50 25 crossed the border with tanks and that they had evidence from
26 satellite that there were tanks.

27 I remember saying to Joseph Momoh I said, "Listen, I don't
28 care who told you that. It's a lie. In fact, we have no tanks",
29 and the very, very statement was subsequently repeated to me I

1 recall vividly in April - in April of 1991. The very thing that
2 Momoh said to me I was questioned by Robin White on the BBC in
3 April of 1991. I remember because it's about a month, or
4 thereabouts, after this incursion. And Robin posed this same
12:10:43 5 so-called intelligence and I said to him that it was a lie. "We
6 had no tanks, we had nothing and if anybody had any photography
7 of such bring it forward. That was a blatant lie. This was a
8 guerrilla force fighting in Liberia and we're not involved."

9 But I tell you, with this incursion in Sierra Leone and the
12:11:06 10 intensity of it Momoh and I really, I guess with all of the news
11 and so-called reports and different things, we started falling
12 apart and he felt that - I think Momoh believed genuinely that I
13 was involved, even though we had stopped the first little crisis
14 in January. This time he really believed it, which was not true.

12:11:34 15 And until - until later on, when he's removed, gradually the
16 communication between Momoh and myself really breaks down because
17 of the big countries that had him convinced that Taylor - just
18 like that, "Taylor should have - he had to know."

19 Q. Now, let us just examine some of that detail together.

12:12:02 20 You've explained you receive a report that this incursion has
21 taken place. How soon after that do you contact Momoh?

22 A. Almost immediately. Almost immediately. I would say
23 within a day, depending on the weather condition. Sometimes with
24 the satellite during those days - it's easy now, but those
12:12:25 25 satellites that we had, if it was raining or there was a heavy
26 cloud - in fact we had to take the system down during the rainy
27 season. If it was a shower you had to take it down because these
28 satellites - and it was not covered in this case, I'm sure we -
29 this Defence would have to cover it. These satellites that they

1 are talking about, you cannot speak on these satellite telephones
2 in the building. You cannot. You have to be in open air to
3 speak on these satellites. Something the Prosecution never told
4 this Court. All this things about Taylor on satellite. You have
12:13:07 5 to be outside. You cannot speak on a satellite telephone even
6 today within a building.

7 So depending on the time, I'm sure within - because I was
8 anxious. It had to happen within I would say the first 48 to 72
9 hours I was able to contact President Momoh and we tried, but I
12:13:26 10 did not succeed in convincing him that I had nothing to do with
11 it.

12 Q. And help us, how many conversations did you have with
13 President Momoh about this developing situation?

14 A. Oh, Momoh and I spoke I would say beginning late
12:13:54 15 March/April I would say maybe a half a dozen times or more.

16 Q. And help us, Mr Taylor, how seriously were you treating
17 this situation?

18 A. Oh, very seriously. I was treating it very seriously.
19 Because don't forget now the NPFL under my leadership, based on
12:14:27 20 what Dawda Kairaba Jawara had said and the theory at the time is
21 that Taylor and this NPFL will destabilise West Africa. I have
22 fought tooth and nail not to get the Gambians involved but for
23 security they are there, but I know they can't do anything
24 because they are all the way in Liberia.

12:14:55 25 To hear that I'm involved in any way in an attack on
26 Sierra Leone is only to strengthen those that are advancing this
27 argument. So I'm taking it very, very, very seriously and this
28 is why I'm calling Momoh to say, "Look, this I have got nothing
29 to do with. I have closed the border. It is none of my doing

1 and I will not accept it", but by this time we are also - as
2 we're approaching April, we are now hearing that these guys are
3 hitting towns and villages, but our intelligence now begin to
4 report to me that Liberians that are inside Sierra Leone seeing
12:15:41 5 this situation by April of 1991 are beginning now to use the
6 crisis to feather their own nests by trying to say to Momoh, "You
7 see what Taylor is doing. We are here. We are available. We
8 can help you".

9 So my own thinking is that the availability of those
12:16:05 10 Liberians, and I'm talking about ex-Armed Forces of Liberia
11 soldiers that are now part of the refugees community in
12 Sierra Leone are now saying to Momoh, "Oh, but listen, you don't
13 have to worry about it. This guy, he is responsible. He's
14 attacking you. We want to help". So I guess that along with the
12:16:23 15 big countries that always have their intelligence that are never
16 wrong and they are always wrong are now pushing Momoh and our
17 friendship is now falling apart.

18 So by April/May of 1991 ULIMO is already formed and armed
19 and it's already - so that's why Momoh and myself - I am taking
12:16:49 20 it very seriously but we just don't get it back together.

21 Q. So tell us, given that you are taking this so seriously,
22 what steps did you take to inform yourself about what was
23 happening on the ground in Sierra Leone?

24 A. I had the defence ministry - because of the acquisition I
12:17:15 25 had the defence minister to launch an investigation to see if
26 there was any truth that Liberians were involved. He launched
27 the investigation and the report came back that there were
28 Liberians that were fighting in Sierra Leone but that they have
29 gone there on their own and that most of the Liberians that were

1 there had some connection from the border areas with this -
2 either they had Sierra Leonean fathers and Liberian mothers or
3 Liberian fathers and Sierra Leonean mothers, but our
4 investigation did show that Liberians were involved in
12:17:53 5 Sierra Leone at the time.

6 Q. And what steps, if any, did you take to do something about
7 the fact that Liberians were involved?

8 A. The only thing we could do was to shut the border, okay,
9 and make sure that the conflict that was in Sierra Leone did not
12:18:13 10 spill over into Liberia. That's all we could do. We did not
11 know who these people were that had gone. We had no control over
12 them. All we did was close the border and before the
13 relationship between Momoh and myself got sour, he was told and
14 he knew that the Liberian side of the border had been closed.

12:18:33 15 Q. Who was your defence minister at the time?

16 A. Tom Womeiyu, one of the founding members of the NPFL.

17 Q. And when was the investigation ordered by you?

18 A. Immediately. As soon as these accusations started flying
19 on BBC, on VOA and diplomatic sources are inquiring we
12:19:00 20 immediately launched the investigation and found out that there
21 were Liberians involved.

22 Q. Now you went on to describe the presence in Sierra Leone of
23 numerous Liberians. How had they come to be in Sierra Leone?

24 A. As we progressed during the war, several thousand civilians
12:19:25 25 fled into Sierra Leone, but equally so a few thousand
26 well-trained Armed Forces of Liberia personnel fled the combat.
27 Our own estimate at the time was between 3 to 5,000 had actually
28 fled into Sierra Leone. Some may argue that that could be a
29 liberal estimate. It could be less - I mean more.

1 Conservatively it could even be less. But our estimates are - I
2 don't think they were less than 3,000 that had fled in total.
3 And an individual that I knew very well was in Sierra Leone.
4 That was a gentleman Major General Albert BS Karpeh.

12:20:22 5 Q. How do you spell the surname?

6 A. That is I think - he spells his I think with K-A-R-P-E-H,
7 Karpeh. He is a Krahn individual that I knew very well. Albert
8 Karpeh had served as defence minister under Doe. He was a very,
9 very well trained soldier. He had trained extensively in the
10 United States. He had - he was what you call in the
11 United States, he was the equivalent of an army ranger. He was a
12 ranger. And he had trained I think both in - I think at both
13 Fort Benning or Bragg at the army ranger training. I'm sure the
14 Prosecution will know better about which bases are ranger
15 training bases.

12:21:19 16 But he was very well trained and I understand from our
17 intelligence at the time, which turned out to be true, he then
18 put together a group calling themselves the Liberians United For
19 Democracy I think, L-U-R-D I think. And he was the leader of
20 that and we got concerned because we knew that General Karpeh was
21 a very trained man and that he could pose some threat to us. And
22 so - but he had control of the initial men that were there.

23 Q. And when did this information first come to your attention?

24 A. It started filtering to us around April of 1991. We
12:22:12 25 started getting this information and we had all reason to believe
26 it, because after we process it we got to know that it was
27 intelligence and it was practically factual. And I'm using
28 information and I'm using intelligence as to state that normally
29 before any what you call news or whatever becomes intelligence,

1 you gather information and you have to really test the
2 information. I mean practical testing, verifying using many
3 sources before it becomes intelligence and if people followed
4 those now you wouldn't have some of the mistakes in the world
12:23:08 5 today where you get - you call it intelligence when it's not
6 intelligence, it's just mere information.

7 And that's what we have in this case. You have lots of
8 information and it's not been verified and tested. Even in the
9 legal profession - I'm not a lawyer, but you have to test these
12:23:24 10 sources even before you do. And if it had happened I wouldn't be
11 sitting in the jail here today.

12 We verified through intelligence that they were there and
13 we then started taking the necessary precaution by trying to
14 further strengthen the border areas to make sure that they did
12:23:46 15 not come in, because all intelligence revealed that they were
16 about to attack.

17 But before then we had also through intelligence verified
18 that as the battle intensified inside Sierra Leone - and quite
19 frankly I want to be earnest, I don't blame Joseph Momoh. I
12:24:15 20 probably would have done the same thing. These men that made
21 themselves available, told President Momoh, were used by Momoh to
22 fight against this invading force that had already entered
23 Sierra Leone.

24 So what we do have almost immediately by April, Liberians
12:24:38 25 that are in Sierra Leone, the trained military people, are now
26 engaged in combat alongside the Sierra Leonean armed forces
27 against this RUF that is fighting in Sierra Leone. That we
28 verified. It is authentic.

29 We also pick up a second set of information. While that is

1 going on another very good friend of mine, he's still - I call
2 him a friend because he is still my friend, Alhaji GV Kromah
3 forms a group called the MRU, the Movement for the Redemption of
4 Muslims. Alhaji, himself a Muslim, believes that the NPFL is
12:25:33 5 killing Muslims. So he joins the fray and inside Sierra Leone
6 those Muslims that are members of the Armed Forces of Liberia
7 that are not fighting yet and have not joined General Karpah now
8 are called to arms by Alhaji Kromah. So you now have these two
9 groups together.

12:26:03 10 So by April/May of 1991 you have a full fledged army ready
11 to attack Liberia, because they are now fighting and are armed
12 and fighting alongside the armed forces of Sierra Leone against
13 the RUF.

14 Q. The organisation formed by your good friend Alhaji Kromah -
12:26:52 15 not the first one, your Honour, the second one. Now, the people
16 who flocked to his banner, did they belong to any particular
17 tribe?

18 A. Yes, the people that flocked to Alhaji Kromah MRU banner,
19 they are Mandingos. Those that flocked to General Karpah are
12:27:21 20 more the Krahs. But by April/May they now - Kromah is now in
21 Guinea and so he has the sympathy of Guinea, so he is prepared by
22 the Guinean government to be backed militarily; that is with arms
23 and ammunition. So they come together - the LURD and the MRU
24 come together - they changed these two individual names and then
12:28:00 25 they come under the banner that we now know called ULIMO. They
26 were two separate organisations that came under the banner of
27 ULIMO and the Alhaji Kromah, being the politician so to speak,
28 became the leader of ULIMO.

29 Q. Two things flow from that. Firstly, can you help us with a

1 date when the two organisations came together to form ULIMO?

2 A. Well, I can only deal with it from a - I'm not there with
3 them and so I would put that to around about May - around about
4 May - of 1991. I would say that this is - and I'm talking about
12:28:50 5 strictly intelligence that comes out to be factual later, so by
6 May they are united.

7 Q. And what do you know as leader of the NPFL as to who is
8 backing this new organisation?

9 A. Oh, the two governments.

12:29:12 10 Q. Which two governments?

11 A. The government of Sierra Leone, President Momoh, has now
12 armed these men that are fighting alongside his forces and they
13 are preparing for their own adventure, and Lansana Conte, the
14 President of Guinea, has already given his assurance to Alhaji
12:29:40 15 Kromah that they will have full support. So now Sierra Leone and
16 Guinea have now come together and are backing this ULIMO.

17 Q. And help us, did you receive any intelligence as to
18 precisely what support was being provided by those two
19 governments?

12:30:06 20 A. Arms, ammunition, artillery, and even before that training.

21 Q. And were you aware as to where this training was going on?

22 A. No, I was not. As to a specific location, no. Where in
23 terms of the general country, yes, I knew it was going on in
24 Sierra Leone.

12:30:33 25 Q. Now, you told us that the initial catalyst for the
26 formation of an organisation by Alhaji Kromah was the belief that
27 Muslims were under attack?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. Mr Taylor, you've heard in this case more than one

1 individual suggest that your NPFL composed in the main of Gios
2 and Manos who were targeting Mandingos and Krahn. Is that true?

3 A. That is not true. Let me qualify that. I will never sit
4 in this Court and tell you that Krahns and Mandingos, because of
12:31:27 5 their little private situation that they had before the crisis
6 with Manos and Gios that there were not times that there were
7 problems. I'll be the last person to say that.

8 Q. What do you mean by problems?

9 A. Well Krahns were killing Gios when they came across them
12:31:48 10 and Gios were killing Krahns, but the main point that we tried to
11 do was to focus on the revolution and even when we found out we
12 made sure that we stopped it.

13 Now, I will tell you this. During the war I have Mandingos
14 with me too. There is not a situation in this whole crisis in
12:32:21 15 Liberia where we are trying to make it appear as some homogeneous
16 group that is exclusively - I had Mandingos with me. You've
17 heard the name Musa Cisse here as my chief of protocol. I had
18 Mandingos fighting in the field, okay? I had Mandingos. There
19 were Krahns that fought alongside us. Remember I have told you
12:32:41 20 in Nimba County there are also Krahns in Nimba County.

21 So there is no doubt and there should be no doubt in
22 anybody's mind here that there were problems. There are little I
23 will call fires arising up here and being put out here and there.
24 I'm not going to sit here and be the perfect guy who, you know,
12:33:02 25 will say that there were not problems on the ground, but what I
26 can say is that whenever we came across it we stamped it out
27 because some of these people were right in our midst.

28 And let me just tell you something that they haven't
29 touched. The administration of this Court is aware I'm one

1 African leader with two wives and I'm married to a Mandingo
2 woman. So I saw Hassan Bility sitting here. I am married to
3 Fatoumatta Yatara, who is half Guinean and Senegalese, and so all
4 this nonsense you've been hearing about Taylor going - is just
12:33:40 5 that nonsense okay. And I'm sure I will bring her and she will
6 be in the gallery here one day soon, you understand me?

7 So, look, there are problems in Liberia. There are these
8 little tribal problems, the Gios and Manos have been ill-treated
9 by the Krahn and at that particular time of the crisis the one
12:34:01 10 other tribe that came that gravitated to Doe were the Mandingos
11 and so in the totality of things it was always like since the
12 Mandingos sided with Doe there were things that happened with
13 them. Yes, Mandingos got killed, but they killed other people
14 too.

12:34:21 15 So we are involved in a national crisis and we tried to
16 make sure that we did not single out individuals, because they
17 were all right there with me. Let's give you an example. Let's
18 give you another example. The Gambian Special Forces that came
19 to me, what were they? Suwandi Camara that sat here is what? He
12:34:43 20 is Mandingo. The Gambian forces, the very Ibrahim Bah you hear
21 talk of, Bah is Senegalese. He is what?

22 I mean, so there were Mandingos with us I mean in important
23 positions. Special Forces were Gambian Mandingos. They are in
24 the field. They speak the same Mandingo that is spoke - Mandingo
12:35:11 25 for this Court is spoken across West Africa. If you are in Mali
26 you understand Mandingo spoken in Ivory Coast, you understand
27 Mandingo spoken in Liberia, you understand Mandingo spoken in
28 Guinea.

29 In fact, Mandingo is one of those languages spoken in West

1 Africa that you don't have to worry about. Once you speak
2 Mandingo in one part of West Africa you are understood across
3 Africa. These were Mandingos too in important position. What do
4 you think Dr Manneh is? Kukoi Samba Sanyang is Mandingo. So I
12:35:43 5 mean this thing about Mandingos were being targeted by us, it was
6 just what you call a red herring that some of them used
7 politically to jump into this whole war for what they wanted or
8 not. And so I'll just stop at that.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Taylor, the stenographer is missing
12:36:09 10 some of your evidence because you are speaking too quickly, so
11 can you please slow down.

12 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Yes.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm going to pause you for a moment and seek
12:36:18 15 your assistance. Firstly the name of the Mandingo or half
16 Mandingo woman to whom you are married, how do you spell that?

17 A. Not half Mandingo. She is full. Her name is Fatoumatta
18 F-A-T-O-U-M-A-T-T-A. The last name is Yatara, Y-A-T-A-R-A. She
19 is my second wife.

12:36:41 20 Q. And you mentioned the name Ibrahim Bah being with you.
21 What do you mean by that?

22 A. Ibrahim Bah was not quote unquote with me. Bah is one of
23 the men that came with Kukoi Samba Sanyang. He was one of the
24 soldiers that came with Kukoi Samba Sanyang.

12:37:05 25 Q. Also known as?

26 A. Dr Manneh.

27 Q. So Bah came with him?

28 A. That is correct.

29 Q. To where?

1 A. Liberia.

2 Q. Can I deal with one or two other spellings here before we
3 move on. Fort Benning, F-O-R-T B-E-N-N-I-N-G. Fort Bragg,
4 B-R-A-G-G. Albert Karpeh, K-A-R-P-E-H. Albert spelled normally.

12:37:44 5 A. Excuse me, counsel, as the President said that the
6 stenographer missed certain things, I want to make sure the
7 records are clear. I'm not sure if the President will want me to
8 repeat. I think it's important, your Honour.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you take a look at your notes,
12:38:16 10 Mr Griffiths. You'll see a notation there at page 68 around line
11 24 from the Court reporter. Page 67 it is, I'm sorry.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes, I've got it.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: If you can look at the evidence before
14 that note and the evidence after that note, perhaps you can
12:38:49 15 assess whether some important evidence has been missed.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr Taylor, it is a passage of your evidence
17 in which you were dealing with Mandingos being found throughout
18 West Africa and that their language is spoken in West Africa and
19 that they are understood across Africa.

12:39:14 20 THE WITNESS: Um-hmm.

21 Q. Could you just rehearse that part of your evidence, please?

22 A. I was just trying to explain to the Court that the language
23 Mandingo is spoken in so many countries across West Africa but it
24 is the same language, and you can understand Mandingo no matter
12:39:36 25 where you are from once you speak it, whether you are from Mali,
26 or you are from Senegal or the Gambia or La Cote d'Ivoire,
27 Liberia, Sierra Leone, you speak the same language. And I think
28 the other point I was trying to make that there were Mandingos
29 who were with me at high levels of the - of authority, including

1 all of the Special Forces that were brought in by Dr Manneh,
2 Kukoi Samba Sanyang, were all Mandingos, including Dr Manneh
3 himself. They spoke the same language and wherever they saw
4 Mandingo throughout the war, they could communicate. They went -
12:40:26 5 they prayed at different mosques. And so this idea that we were
6 trying to single out Mandingos, I think - I'm just saying that
7 there's no foundation to that, because there were a lot of
8 Mandingos with me at the highest levels. In fact, several of
9 them became ministers in the NPRAG. I can remember Dr Bangalee
12:40:59 10 Fofana was a minister and came all the way to Monrovia with me.
11 I mentioned Musa Cisse, and a lot more.

12 Q. You've mentioned the name Suwandi Camara. With what group
13 did he come to Liberia, if you know?

14 A. Suwandi Camara was part of - he was one of those boys. I
12:41:29 15 do not know when he entered, because Dr Manneh's group came in, I
16 think, two or three consignments. I don't know what group he
17 entered in, but he was one of Dr Manneh's boys. I don't know too
18 much about him. He was not one of those that worked close to me
19 as a bodyguard, no.

12:41:51 20 Q. But does the name - did the name back then mean anything to
21 you?

22 A. Well, I'll go further than that. When I saw him here it
23 didn't mean anything to me, because I didn't know him. But I
24 want to believe that he was one of Dr Manneh's boys that may have
12:42:11 25 been in another part of the country. But those that were
26 assigned with me, he was not one of them. He did not even know
27 the gentleman when I saw him sit here.

28 Q. Moving on. You mentioned earlier that you took a decision
29 to close the border. What, in practical terms, did that mean?

1 A. Closing the borders at that particular time simply meant
2 that we would not permit any armed individual coming across into
3 Liberia to enter, that we would not permit that. Because a lot
4 of the civilians that were coming into Liberia - remember at the
12:43:01 5 time of this problem in Sierra Leone that section of Liberia is
6 calm. Lofa there is no problem. Monrovia is hundreds of miles
7 towards the west. So closing the border simply meant that the
8 normal trading that could go on between the citizens was stopped
9 and that if an individual from Sierra Leone wanted to come into
12:43:25 10 Liberia, he could come or she could come but you could not enter
11 with an arm or a warlike materiel.

12 Q. Now, how practically feasible was it to close that border?

13 A. Actually, closing borders in West Africa - I mean, the rare
14 practicality as you do with the sincerity of armed movement,
12:43:57 15 because you are talking about forest, so people can penetrate at
16 any part of the borders. So the borders are not like in Europe
17 where you've got cities on borders, no, no, no. So the
18 practicality has to do with a strict regime that whatsoever comes
19 and goes, and I'm talking about in terms of truck or pick-ups or
12:44:19 20 may I just say in general automobiles, that they did not include
21 warlike materiel and that nobody came across with arms.

22 So virtually what you would do - and again if the soldiers
23 on our side suspected that there was someone coming across that
24 border that did not even have an arm but from a military
12:44:44 25 perspective - and soldiers do that very well - he appeared to be
26 a combatant, we would not let him come in. We would not let him
27 come in. We would tell him he had to go back. And they have a
28 way of looking at how - you can almost tell. You can almost tell
29 them when you see them.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we've gone as far as April of 1991 and
2 you've told us about your knowledge of what had occurred leading
3 up to the invasion in March and the response of the Momoh
4 government to it, but I want to put to you now, please, a detail
12:45:25 5 which emerged during the course the Prosecution case and can I
6 caution you at this point that I do not want you to mention the
7 name of any witness in this context. Do you follow me?

8 A. I do.

9 Q. Do you recall it being suggested that you, with others,
12:45:48 10 were present at a meeting when the invasion of Sierra Leone was
11 planned? Do you recall that?

12 A. I recall that.

13 Q. Now, I don't want you to mention the source of that
14 account. Were you present at such a meeting?

12:46:10 15 A. I was never present. It's a lie. And if I remember that
16 particular testimony, that witness in his explanation also talked
17 about - got confused about whether he was at Phebe or whether he
18 was at another place. It's a lie.

19 Q. Was there such a meeting, Mr Taylor?

12:46:33 20 A. If there was such a meeting, I would not know. I was never
21 present at such a meeting.

22 Q. Now, you do recall that testimony, don't you?

23 A. I do.

24 Q. And you recall that the suggestion was that there would be
12:46:57 25 a two-pronged assault upon Sierra Leone; one through what was
26 described as the Kailahun axis and the other through the Pujehun
27 axis. Do you recall that testimony?

28 A. I recall it.

29 Q. Mr Taylor, I'm asking you again: Were you involved in

1 planning that strategy?

2 A. I was never involved. It is a lie. But let's go one step
3 further, because all of these lies and the questions you are
4 asking me, there's got to be a context for this whole thing to
12:47:38 5 even understand it and this comes to the heart of the
6 Prosecution's whole case, where they get into this theory. In
7 fact, theory is a higher level. I will just say this idea.

8 Look, the Court is very aware here is a situation where it
9 is claimed that I sent a training officer to Camp Naama to train
12:48:31 10 this RUF force to invade Sierra Leone, because we've got to deal
11 with all of that first to even determine how does one prove a
12 negative? You can't prove a negative.

13 Now, but let me remind the Court and my Defence may have to
14 look for this - the Court must be reminded that in the RUF case
12:49:02 15 in Freetown a general from Liberia called John Tarnue testified,
16 produced by this Prosecution as the officer that I sent to Naama
17 to train these people. He testified in the Court in Freetown and
18 my team will have to find the references to that for the Court,
19 and he taught them the rules of war and this general was supposed
12:49:38 20 to be the man that saw them off and led them into this combat
21 into Sierra Leone.

22 We come to my case here in this Court. This Prosecution
23 has brought another gentleman called Issac Mongor who says that
24 he is the training officer. And may I remind the Court there is
12:50:05 25 not one Prosecution witness that came to this Court that
26 mentioned even the knowledge of John Tarnue. All of the - in
27 fact, what they call the - this academic that I cannot call his
28 name who taught ideology, the Court will know who I'm talking
29 about, was present. This big academic that sat here teaching

1 ideology. Never - none of them knew or remembered a Tarnue.

2 Tarnue did not mention a Mongor.

3 Mongor comes to this Court and tells this Court that he is
4 the training officer that I sent and that he is the man leading
12:50:58 5 these things. He does not say several things to this Court, and,
6 you know, as I sat in this Court it must be just as it was - it's
7 been a painful process for the Sierra Leonean people and I know
8 they - I'm sure they are listening. Here is a man that claims
9 that he was captured in Nimba and trained. This man who is not a

12:51:33 10 Special Force, who has just been trained is supposed to be the
11 man that is selected by me and sent to train an invading force.

12 This man in his testimony never claimed before this Court
13 that he came back one day to brief me. If you send somebody to
14 go and train, isn't he going to come one day and say, "Well,
12:52:00 15 look, the training is going on, sir. Here are my problems". He
16 doesn't talk about it. Neither does he mention that I gave him
17 men to carry for this training. That's the one man army. He
18 goes and supposedly he trains this force and he leads them. But
19 throughout the war in Sierra Leone he does not state anywhere in
12:52:25 20 his testimony that he even comes back to visit with me.

21 So who did I send? Did I send John Tarnue or did I send
22 Isaac Mongor? So this whole lie has to be unraveled at the very
23 beginning. So the question of did I sit in a meeting and plan or
24 did I not, it's irrelevant because it's a lie from the very root
12:52:45 25 of it. It's a lie. It's a lie from the very root of it. So it
26 is irrelevant as to whether I was in a meeting. I could not have
27 been in a meeting that I was not a part of putting together. I
28 did not know. It's a lie. The two of them lied. The Tarnue
29 lied.

1 This man came here and I guess some people say, "But
2 Mr Taylor, it's everybody lying". Well, I'm sorry, your Honours,
3 it just happens that these are liars. These are liars and I want
4 to know who did I send for this training? Mongor doesn't know
12:53:20 5 Tarnue, Tarnue doesn't know Mongor. Tarnue claims he is the one,
6 Mongor claims, no, he is the one. Now for God's sake who did I
7 send? So it's irrelevant about these - can you understand the
8 question? It does not come together. It just never - and I
9 cannot understand how these men were brought to the point to sit
12:53:38 10 here bold faced and lie. So I didn't plan because I was not a
11 part of what they were doing and did not know about it.

12 Q. Mr Taylor, just to be on the safe side so that we don't
13 have any mishaps here, that individual who I cautioned you not to
14 mention a name, can you refer in future to {redacted}, please?

12:54:10 15 A. Yes. As soon as I said the {redacted} I'm sure the
16 Court understands. Thank you, I will.

17 MS HOLLIS: I'm going to ask that that connection be
18 redacted.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: What connection?

12:54:33 20 MS HOLLIS: The TF number and the testimony about what the
21 person supposedly did as a function of their involvement.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not quite sure. Are you saying
23 that's going to reveal the identity of the witness?

24 MS HOLLIS: I'm saying that mentioning the substance of the
12:54:55 25 testimony in open court and then identifying the witness violates
26 the closed session order that we're all dealing with and the
27 Prosecution has concerns about that.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Apparently that evidence that the
29 witness has just referred to now was given in closed session,

1 Mr Griffiths.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I appreciate that, Mr President. That's why
3 I cautioned Mr Taylor right at the outset not to mention any
4 name. But I fail to see how evidence given in closed session can
12:55:44 5 be connected in the way suggested by my learned friend with a TF1
6 number. Maybe I am missing something, but it all seems rather
7 obtuse to me; the suggestion of that connection and the need
8 consequently for redaction. But it's a matter for your Honours.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Your application is to redact the TF1
12:56:55 10 number; is that right, Ms Hollis?

11 MS HOLLIS: At this point, your Honours, and especially in
12 light of the fact that there have been other violations in this
13 Court that have linked a name and a number - this number and a
14 name - and now we have in open court what was said in closed
12:57:17 15 session, the Prosecution would ask that the number be redacted
16 and because now it's associated with this information, that the
17 information be redacted from the public record as well.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: We'll grant part of Ms Hollis's
19 application. We'll order that the reference to {redacted} be
12:58:05 20 redacted, {redacted}.

21

22

23

24

12:58:44 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well, your Honours:

26 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, having dealt with that matter, can we move
27 on from April of 1991?

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: What was the spelling of someone in the
29 RUF case, if that is not protected information? There was a

1 spelling of a name that we don't have yet.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: The name was T-A-R-N-U-E.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think I've probably said too much on
4 that {redacted} in that my comment as to the reason why it was
12:59:51 5 redacted does establish a connection.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: We all make mistakes, Mr President.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Luckily I'm in a position where I can
8 rectify mine, so my words as follows, and they are at page 77,
9 line 24 on my record, it commences, "We'll grant part of

13:00:27 10 Ms Hollis's application. We'll order that the reference to
11 {redacted} be redacted." Now, the words after that "I order",
12 they also are redacted. I'm referring to the rest of the words
13 in my comment. They go from page 77, 24 to page 78, line 5.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well. Mr President, it seems to us in
13:01:16 15 the circumstances that perhaps those in the public gallery ought
16 to be cautioned as to what use can be made of that information.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. I think that's wise as well. The
18 members of the public gallery who have heard any reference to a
19 TF1 number and the connection with a person are ordered not to
13:01:51 20 discuss that or disclose that outside of court. Does that
21 satisfy your caution?

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, yes. And one final spelling
23 before we move on. Dr Bangalee Fofana, B-A-N-G-A-L-E-E
24 F-O-F-A-N-A:

13:02:18 25 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor. We've reached April of 1991. Now tell us
26 this: By this stage, April, you've explained about the ULIMO
27 situation. You've explained about the deterioration in your
28 relationship with President Momoh. So how do things develop from
29 there?

1 A. Actually we have now come into May with the combination of
2 the two groups Karpeh and Kromah. What follows after are probing
3 military attacks across from Sierra Leone into Liberia by ULIMO.

4 Q. So that starts when?

13:03:25 5 A. I would say this is by the middle to end of May they begin
6 to carry out raids into Liberia.

7 Q. And what consequence does that have for security within
8 Liberia?

9 A. Oh, very, very, very serious consequences. These attacks
13:03:50 10 are very serious. They are generally in the Cape Mount - now if
11 a new map is found - Gbarpolu region of the country and it is
12 very serious because there are a lot of civilians in that general
13 forest area. People have moved into forest areas, built their
14 little villages and they begin this - these are serious attacks
13:04:24 15 and then people begin to move back out into new areas because
16 they become displaced.

17 Q. This is a matter of some importance, so I wonder if you can
18 assist us again, please. Can we have the map L1 again, please.
19 Mr Taylor, can I trouble you to change seats again, please. I
13:04:55 20 want you to help us with the assistance of the map and explain
21 first of all the areas affected by these incursions. Can you
22 just indicate, perhaps with the use of a pen, what areas we're
23 talking about?

24 A. We are talking about from Sierra Leone here into - from
13:05:32 25 Zimmi, the attack started in the town of Kongo. If you look on
26 Liberian side right here there is Kongo. You have Bamba. You
27 have Damballa. Along this corridor. That's where the attacks -
28 they begin to probe and they are coming in from the town of Zimmi
29 coming across and carrying out these attacks across this

1 particular spectrum.

2 Q. Anywhere else?

3 A. No. They are not in the Lofa area yet. They are simply
4 dealing with - I'll put it to from Kongo all the way down to near
13:06:24 5 where we call Bo Waterside. That's the town here. Right here is
6 Tiene. So they are operating on a long stretch of borders,
7 attacking at different positions coming in.

8 Q. And you were telling us about the consequences of that and
9 what were they?

13:06:41 10 A. People are displaced again.

11 Q. Yes?

12 A. Large amounts of civilians get on the move again. They are
13 now moving from these borders towns and moving towards the city
14 areas inland.

13:06:57 15 Q. And help us. At this time who is controlling that area
16 around kongo, Bamballa, Damballa and so on? Is it ECOMOG or is
17 it the NPFL?

18 A. It is the NPFL under the command of Mr Varney. Oliver
19 Varney.

13:07:19 20 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: The witness did mention a region earlier
21 I think at page 79 that appears in the LiveNote transcript as
22 "popular region".

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I think he said Gbarpolu. We can see
24 Gbarpolu on the map just above the number 2 in the green section
13:07:39 25 of the map.

26 THE WITNESS: The actual pronunciation is Gbarpolu. It's
27 now a county, but that section of the country is now is not -
28 Cape Mount is not Bomi, it is Gbarpolu County.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. I don't follow that.

2 A. Well, it was during my administration that a new county was
3 legally put into place. Before my administration you had Lofa,
4 Grand Cape Mount and Bomi County. There were only three counties
13:08:22 5 on that end of Liberia. During my administration, because of the
6 sheer size of Lofa County and some of the other counties, with an
7 act of the Legislature we created Gbarpolu County that involved
8 these areas to the border.

9 Q. So did this contact involve fighting between NPFL
10 combatants and this force invading from Sierra Leone?

11 A. Oh, definitely. Definitely. Major combat. Major combat.
12 We were fighting along that forest area. They will come in, hit.
13 They started taking positions. This is a general forest area.
14 This is - there are towns and villages in that area, but this is
13:09:17 15 mostly an area of forest.

16 Q. So how do things develop thereafter, Mr Taylor?

17 A. Oh, things are very serious. By the end of - we're talking
18 May these missions begin. June there's heavy fighting. July.
19 Between mid to the end of July of 1991 they have captured an area
13:09:53 20 and are now sitting in the country.

21 Q. In which country?

22 A. Liberia. They are now in Liberia. So they have already
23 seized what we call the territory. They are in, so there's that
24 whole open line into Sierra Leone but now they are going and
13:10:12 25 coming but they have now staged a set-up inside Liberia.

26 Q. Where inside Liberia?

27 A. Well, Kongo may look like it's right on the border but
28 Kongo is an old mining town. It's an old mining town. When we
29 had LMC in Bomi Hills, I mentioned to the Court that LMC was a

1 mining company that was stationed in Bomi Hills, but they had an
2 additional mining site up here at Kongo that they were mining
3 iron ore, bringing it to Bomi Hills, mixing it and coming on to
4 Monrovia. So it may be right on the border, but this was a big
13:11:02 5 town. So they occupied Kongo and some of the little towns and
6 villages that are not mentioned here on the map.

7 Q. And for how long did they maintain control of those areas?

8 A. They maintained control of those areas and really never
9 left them. They continue this probing activity. They captured
13:11:30 10 these areas and eventually captured Cape Mount and Bomi sometime
11 later. But this was not just a place to come and sit down. They
12 are beginning to probe, and this probe continued and held that
13 place until 19 - I would say until 1997. They just never left.

14 ULIMO remained there although sometime in the future, and we'll
13:12:03 15 get to that, where they split where one ULIMO eventually, after
16 the capture of Lofa moved to Lofa, that's the Alhaji Kromah
17 faction of Lofa. The other faction of ULIMO eventually became -
18 or got under the control may I say of a gentleman called
19 Roosevelt Johnson and he maintained that. But ULIMO as we know
13:12:34 20 it never really left from the moment they actually seized
21 territory.

22 Q. Now, thank you for that. I wonder if you could move back
23 now so that we can continue. Now, during the period you've just
24 described where there is this activity by ULIMO in that part -
13:13:04 25 along that part of the Liberian border, what's occupying your
26 time during this period, April through to June/July, Mr Taylor?

27 A. Well, I hear am what you call in military terms now - I
28 have a major insurgency on my hands. For the first time the NPFL
29 is really challenged and we've lost ground, and so we are very

1 much distressed by this. I'm in the process and I finally now
2 don't let this bother me. I move on to Gbarnga, but there is
3 serious fighting now. Remember, I have two wars now on my hands.
4 On the one hand, even though we are dealing with the peace
13:14:08 5 process and I did - as I remember, I did misspeak when I spoke
6 about Yamoussoukro. Yamoussoukro is actually October 1991; in
7 1990 is Banjul and Bamako. But on my hands I have ULIMO
8 attacking me from the Sierra Leonean border. I am still fighting
9 the armed forces of Liberia under what's left of Doe and Doe is
13:14:37 10 already killed, but somebody else is there.

11 Q. Who?

12 A. I forgot the name of the - it was a strange fellow. I
13 didn't really know him as being anything serious, but he didn't
14 last too very long. I think he died. I forgot the name of the
13:14:54 15 armed forces general. But we have ECOMOG also there, so for the
16 first time we have virtually three wars to deal with: that is,
17 the threat come from ECOMOG; the rest of the armed forces of
18 Liberia inside; and now we have ULIMO threatening from outside
19 and now inside. So I'm very, very, very busy with that and I'm
13:15:23 20 disturbed by it all and finally come up with what I thought would
21 be a solution to solve the problem.

22 Q. But Mr Taylor, before we move on to that, you recall the
23 suggestion, including the provision of a chart, suggesting that
24 you were also hierarchically in charge of the RUF at this time.
13:15:51 25 You remember that chart, don't you?

26 A. I remember the chart.

27 Q. Were you?

28 A. Definitely not. In fact, whoever did that chart did not
29 even know what they were talking about. Not - how could I be in

1 charge of an RUF that I knew nothing about? That's one of the
2 grand designs to connect me with this situation, and if that
3 chart is brought before me I will help to take it apart for the
4 Judges. That's total - that chart is as far away from reality as
13:16:29 5 it can ever be.

6 Q. So were you in de facto control of the RUF at this time?

7 A. No, I was not. It's a lie. I had nothing to do with the
8 RUF at that time at all.

9 Q. So help us with this then, Mr Taylor. Can you recall when
13:17:00 10 it was that you first met Foday Sankoh?

11 A. No. We have ULIMO in Liberia. ULIMO has captured
12 territory. They are fighting. There are some individuals
13 fighting alongside still of the Sierra Leonean armed forces
14 against the RUF. There's a large group in Liberia fighting me
13:17:30 15 and making advances moving freely in and out of Liberia. It was
16 about August of 1991 that a solution was found to deal with this
17 problem, and the solution was after we had captured some of the
18 invaders --

19 Q. Which invaders?

13:18:02 20 A. From Sierra Leone the ULIMO invaders. Remember I mentioned
21 here about intelligence and I say it was confirmed those invaders
22 - those captured verified to us that in fact they were getting
23 training, arms and ammunition from the government of Sierra Leone
24 and they - and Guinea, that the material was come through Guinea
13:18:26 25 into Sierra Leone and down to their support. With this
26 information - and I think this information is also verified
27 through testimony - through testimony before this Court about the
28 arming and training by Prosecution witnesses. They verified
29 that. We then took the decision to contact the RUF, or whoever

1 they were across the border, to see if we could put together a
2 programme that would help me to protect my border and fight the
3 common enemy that now is ULIMO. ULIMO is fighting them; ULIMO is
4 fighting us. So the point here now is to see if we can come
13:19:17 5 together to secure the border. I then begin the investigation to
6 find out who knew Sankoh. We got to know that our Special
7 Forces, some of them knew him. I asked for him to be contacted
8 and to come and see me, and he did in August of 1991.

9 Q. See you where?

13:19:37 10 A. In Gbarnga. I have now moved in Gbarnga.

11 Q. And who did you send to contact him?

12 A. I can remember I had - I think it was General Menkarzon. I
13 think Dopoe Menkarzon who went to Mekunagbe, who was the
14 commander over there who had said in the meeting that he knew
13:20:02 15 him, and Dopoe went and Sankoh agreed to come to the border and
16 talk to them. He knew them and they said - well, they used to
17 call me - "The old man wants to see you," and they brought Sankoh
18 to Gbarnga.

19 Q. And this, you say, was in or about August of 199 --

13:20:22 20 A. August of 1991, yes.

21 Q. So help us, what happens when he arrives in Gbarnga?

22 A. Sankoh arrived in Gbarnga. In a way he was happy, because
23 he had heard a lot about me, as he told me, but it was a pleasure
24 for him to have met me. He said he had heard that his leader and
13:20:50 25 I had - you know, were friends and he was glad to come, and I
26 asked him - the first question I asked Sankoh, "But where is
27 Ali?" And he said to me, "Ali left."

28 Q. Ali who?

29 A. Ali Kabbah. He said, "Oh, Ali left us - left a long time

1 ago and we don't know what happened to him, but we understand" -
2 these were his words - "that he received some money for our
3 operation, and he took the money and left". This is what - I
4 have no reason to believe or disbelieve of this - or disbelieve
13:21:29 5 this, excuse me, but this is what he told me. And so I then said
6 to him that I had sent for him to discuss this border problem and
7 ULIMO coming in Liberia. He said, "Oh, but even ULIMO is
8 fighting us". So for him this was a welcome development to come
9 into Liberia to meet me and for me to talk about this common -
13:21:55 10 this common plan to protect the border that ULIMO would not cut
11 behind him. Because his concern was as he was advancing his
12 revolution, ULIMO in Liberia was trying to close him in. And so
13 he was very, very happy to come to discuss this common border
14 security that I had asked to put into place.

13:22:19 15 Q. And what was agreed between the two of you?

16 A. Well, it was agreed that we would protect the border; but
17 that he did not have the manpower to protect the border and to
18 block ULIMO; that if I had the manpower, I could send the
19 manpower to the border, and the manpower could stay at the border
13:22:45 20 and even a little way inside Sierra Leone to prevent ULIMO from
21 carrying on these operations. So I agreed to that.

22 Q. Was anything else agreed between the two of you?

23 A. Well, that he would have - that he could come into Liberia.
24 Now that area of the country is boxed off. And so --

13:23:08 25 Q. How do you mean?

26 A. Well, there were no way to get foodstuff to buy fuel and
27 all - and, you know, and medication for his own soldiers. He saw
28 that as an opportunity that he would be able to come in and out
29 of Liberia to purchase food, fuel. And Gbarnga now is not just a

1 little village. In Gbarnga you had large business in Gbarnga.
2 You had ex-patriots operating in Gbarnga. Lebanese nationals had
3 large businesses in Gbarnga, but there is also an additional
4 part. What we did not have in Gbarnga there is this access road
13:23:54 5 to La Cote d'Ivoire. So you, through that particular - through -
6 by virtue of hooking up with Gbarnga he had an outlet not just in
7 Liberia, but outside of Liberia. And so he was very much
8 interested in that, and I needed that myself because I needed
9 that border secured.

13:24:14 10 Q. So in blunt terms, Mr Taylor, did you agree to effectively
11 assist the RUF at this point?

12 A. At this point I agreed that there would be cooperation
13 between us because in fact we were assisting each other.

14 Q. But by allowing RUF forces to come in and out of Liberia,
13:24:54 15 that's assistance, isn't it?

16 A. Well, I'll tell you - I'll put it this way: At this time -
17 and it's good for this Court to know my head at the time - I'm
18 not thinking about assistant or not assistant. Listen: Momoh,
19 my friend, has armed the armed forces of Liberia. They are
13:25:16 20 attacking me. They are capturing territory. There is massive
21 problem. Momoh has armed an insurgency, and so for me, my head
22 at that time was not whether you're assisting. I considered it
23 in my judgment at that particular time justified. So if the term
24 assistance comes in, I accept that we assisted each other. And I
13:25:39 25 assisted and I feel now, even now, that my actions were
26 justified. Where Guinea and Sierra Leone are arming insurgents
27 and attacking me, I felt justified at that time to use any and
28 all means at my disposal to fight a common enemy. So if you call
29 that assistance, it's assistance.

1 Q. Now, can we just develop that a little further, please.

2 Now, at this time, we're talking about the middle of 1991, ECOMOG
3 forces have been in Liberia for about a year, haven't they?

4 A. Oh, yes. We're talking about - yes, August 1990. Yes, one
13:26:29 5 year.

6 Q. And just remind us, please, who had contributed troops to
7 ECOMOG?

8 A. The very people: Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Gambia.

9 Q. Anywhere else?

13:26:44 10 A. I just cannot recall.

11 Q. What about Guinea?

12 A. Oh, Guinea. I'm sorry, Guinea is there. Oh, in full.

13 Q. And help us, why had ECOWAS ostensibly sent this force to
14 Liberia?

13:27:01 15 A. Well, if I might just cover this a little bit.

16 Q. No, just answer the question first, please, and then you
17 can cover it?

18 A. To stop Charles Taylor and the NPFL from seizing power,
19 pure and simple.

13:27:16 20 Q. Yes. And what are you telling us? That these same people,
21 at least two of them, were arming this force against you?

22 A. Well, yes. The two plus the third.

23 Q. Which is the third?

24 A. Nigeria is still arming the Armed Forces of Liberia even
13:27:41 25 though they have troops. I mentioned to this Court that a strong
26 relationship had developed between Babangida and Samuel Doe.
27 Even though he's dead, whoever comes in there is also that
28 support being given to the armed forces. Besides - beside ECOMOG
29 because as we get to know eventually within that year what

1 happens, the Armed Forces of Liberia now are recruited to fight
2 now - and by the armed forces I mean those in Liberia are now
3 fighting alongside ECOMOG. Okay, so that's what I mean by the
4 third one.

13:28:26 5 Here is Guinea arming, Sierra Leone is arming, but Nigeria
6 is not only supplying her contingent with arms but she is also
7 arming the armed forces ostensibly to work alongside with ECOMOG.
8 So the Armed Forces of Liberia begins to fight alongside ECOMOG
9 against the NPFL.

13:28:46 10 Q. And so is that the context in which this relationship is
11 engineered between yourself and Foday Sankoh?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And what's the immediate consequence of that? Last
14 question before we adjourn. I note the time. What's the

13:29:05 15 immediate consequence of the commencement of that relationship?

16 A. Well, I guess it strengthens what they had blindly been
17 saying, but it results to us sending the men and the cooperation
18 beginning as of that particular time.

19 MR GRIFFITHS: Would that be a convenient time,
13:29:29 20 Mr President?

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Griffiths. We'll
22 adjourn for lunch now and reconvene at 2.30.

23 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

24 [Upon resuming at 2.33 p.m.]

14:24:47 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

27 Q. Mr Taylor, you mentioned the name Tarnue before lunch and
28 having looked at the transcript, for my part I am not quite clear
29 what it was you were telling us. I wonder if you could assist us

1 with that?

2 A. I spent the better part of the past year listening to
3 different evidence presented before this Court, and I referred
4 specifically to the evidence that was given by Mr Isaac Mongor.

14:35:24 5 And, I mean, I was just baffled by the testimony that was given
6 by him and then I started going back. Because if you remember, I
7 think during the statement - and if you look at the indictment
8 and some of the documents that came forward talk about insiders
9 and all of this, and reflected in that whole process was General
14:35:56 10 John Tarnue. So I went through for the most part over the past
11 couple of weeks trying to go back and read the evidence of this
12 John Tarnue, because I knew that what Mongor was saying here, I
13 mean, was just too much to even take. And so I went through
14 Tarnue's evidence in the RUF case and I read it in details, and I
14:36:31 15 am saying that he is the one claiming to be this general that I
16 sent. That is what I am talking about. That I sent to do this
17 training.

18 Q. Sent where?

19 A. Sent to Camp Naama he says in 1990 where he met me and he
14:36:48 20 met Sankoh and I gave him this big assignment to go and train the
21 RUF and he trained them, not just in combat, but --

22 Q. But, Mr Taylor, that is in another trial. What does that
23 have to do with what we're --

24 A. Well, it's a whole lot, in my opinion. The Prosecution is
14:37:15 25 charging that I trained the RUF in Naama in my case it is
26 claiming that I sent Isaac Mongor to train them, a human that I
27 never saw until I saw here. But the same Prosecution presented
28 in the RUF case in Freetown another man that they claim did this
29 same training. So, I mean, they must know that something is

1 wrong. How can Charles Taylor sent John Tarnue; now it is
2 possible to send two people. But this is not what the
3 Prosecution has presented. The Prosecution has presented John
4 Tarnue in Freetown as the trainer. It has presented him as the
14:38:01 5 individual that took all of the instructions. It has presented
6 him as the one man that I relied upon that was so much an insider
7 that did all this job, and this junta man throughout his
8 testimony that I have read never mentioned that he had an
9 assistant called Isaac Mongor. So my - what the connection is
14:38:25 10 for me, what is - Charles Taylor sent - either sent John Tarnue,
11 or he sent Isaac Mongor, or he didn't send either of them because
12 it just never happened. So it's the whole point to draw to the
13 Court's attention that this Prosecution cannot have it both ways.
14 It cannot in one court say one thing with one witness, and in
14:38:49 15 another court say another thing about the same subject matter for
16 another witness because they want to get a conviction. I think
17 it is terrible and it is very painful, okay, when they know it is
18 a lie. They know it is a lie.

19 And it goes further. As you read this gentleman's
14:39:09 20 testimony, which is --

21 Q. Which gentleman?

22 A. Mr Tarnue, this general is involved with - I am supposed to
23 be involved with importing arms and carrying on. All lies, but
24 then to verify the lie this same gentleman, okay, came in a Dutch
14:39:28 25 court, testified and lied, and the Dutch authorities found that
26 he was lying. So the point I am trying to make here is that the
27 connection for me is that - and these judges I am sure will look
28 at it - look, I mean, they have got to determine some of these
29 important cases, because this whole link - this whole link - that

1 they have tried to patch together about me - and there is Libya
2 and we will prove to all of the people that were in Libya that
3 there was no such thing of no Foday Sankoh, but then they connect
4 the whole thing by bringing a trainer that did not exist. So the
14:40:15 5 connection here, counsel, is that this Prosecution cannot have
6 two different trainers for the same matter, none of them knowing
7 the other, none of them mentioning the other, none of the
8 trainees even mention the Tarnue. So the question is which man,
9 if any, did I send as an order. That is the connection that I am
14:40:41 10 trying to draw.

11 Q. And you mentioned a Dutch Court. What are you talking
12 about?

13 A. Well, there is a Liberian Dutch businessman called Guus
14 Kouwenhoven, I think. I don't know the Dutch name very well,
14:40:56 15 that was supposed to be one of the co-conspirators that provided
16 arms for me throughout this period. That never existed. Phantom
17 ships that were never built. The Dutch appeals court threw the
18 whole thing out. The man is free. He was charged with war
19 crimes too. So this whole - I mean pack of lies that have just
14:41:23 20 developed and pieced together is going to take some time, and I
21 know the judges are very genuine about this thing, to put this
22 thing all about. What is this Charles Taylor that has got to be
23 this curving and the twisting, all of these things?

24 Now I hope those - I hope these matters can come before
14:41:44 25 this Court, because on the one hand we are going to get into
26 arms. We are going to get into arms. Just as we got into
27 training and planning, we are going to get into arms. There are
28 no arms. Ships that were never built that were still being built
29 were supposed to be used by me bringing in arms. So it is this

1 whole pattern of lies, okay, that is just so aggravating. And
2 they must know that these are lies. They must know. How come
3 they don't know? How come they don't know? So that is the
4 connection, counsel.

14:42:20 5 Q. Very well. Now that we have cleared that up, can we go
6 back to where we left off before the luncheon adjournment,
7 please. We were talking about the various adversaries you faced
8 in mid-1991. Do you recall that?

9 A. Yes, I do.

14:42:42 10 Q. And you were talking about the role of the various ECOMOG
11 countries and so on. Do you remember telling us about that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. And what were you telling us about that, Mr Taylor?

14 A. Well, we were - by "we", the NPFL - were hit by humungous
14:43:16 15 challenges and, you know, it is a terrible thing that the war in
16 Liberia lasted so long. You have what I - when I talked on day
17 one about deceit, deception, this is what caused all this
18 prolongation of the war in Liberia. Here we have, on the one
19 hand, there is this talk out there about wanting to bring peace
14:43:52 20 in Liberia, but we had two different sets of deception and
21 hypocrisy, and I will deal with the two sets.

22 On the first hand, if you look at the evidence, imagine by
23 July of 1990 we are in possession of 90 per cent of the country.
24 We have encircled Monrovia. The Assistant Secretary of State for
14:44:37 25 African Affairs, Herman Cohen, has come in the forest to me to
26 ask me not to take Monrovia. There are so many lost
27 opportunities at that time, it is the official position of the
28 United States government at that time that they will have their
29 hands off Liberia. We don't want anything to do with this

1 crisis. They want to kill themselves up, let them do it. We
2 will have nothing to do with it. But then on the other hand,
3 they are trying to do something about it. So eventually Herman
4 Cohen comes to see me. We talk about it, and I can remember
14:45:26 5 saying to Secretary Cohen, I said, "Figuratively speaking, if one
6 United States marine came to this country with a blow horn and
7 said 'Ceasefire', everything would stop." I even said to Herman
8 Cohen the NPFL will surrender to a US force. We would disarm, no
9 problems. I mentioned it the other day, and Herman Cohen has
14:45:54 10 written a book. It is contained in there. That book, I hope we
11 can present into evidence, because that is one side I call lost
12 opportunities where this war could have ended.

13 But on the one hand, the main concern was: Oh, they are
14 trained in Libya, and so, you know, you know, you know. When
14:46:14 15 every opportunity was there to end the war, they did not. Now
16 hypocrisy comes on the part - look, let's look at - let's examine
17 the period that we are talking about. By this time Nigeria has a
18 military government headed by General Babangida; Ghana has a
19 military leader, my friend Jerry Rawlings; Guinea has a military
14:46:46 20 leader, General Lansana Conte; Sierra Leone has a military
21 leader, General Joseph Momoh. The only one of these guys that
22 sent - these men that sent troops to Liberia is Dawda Kairaba
23 Jawara, I don't know quite frankly if he has a military
24 background, but I know that he was a civilian. They are scared,
14:47:18 25 they are really afraid.

26 Q. Of what?

27 A. That here is a civilian, Charles Taylor, and I have never,
28 ever taken military training. A civilian revolution in Liberia
29 will cause problems for all of us. They rush in and send troops

1 by the thousands. They are scared that this could affect their
2 countries, because if civilians are to rise up and overthrow
3 military dictatorships it will spell trouble for them, and this
4 is the truth. They are scared, and so the hypocrisy of wanting
14:48:01 5 peace they sent their people in there to remove me and prevent me
6 from power. I, knowing this fact, resisted. That is what
7 prolonged the war. I am in Monrovia by July 1990. They start
8 pushing me, bombing me, killing people, and then start an
9 insurgency out of Sierra Leone, out of Guinea. A bunch of
14:48:28 10 hypocrisy that prolonged the war in Liberia. They were afraid
11 and that is what caused the prolonged bloodshed. Even though
12 they were saying "We want peace", the war continued years after
13 years after years.

14 They went further. In 1994 while they invited me to a
14:48:54 15 meeting in Akosombo, Ghana, ECOMOG, backed by the LPC, ULIMO and
16 invaded my headquarters in Gbarnga, killed so many people. That
17 is the hypocrisy that went on during that particular period. I
18 had to come back and after three months recapture Gbarnga. This
19 is what finally led to the agreement to go to Monrovia even
14:49:28 20 though by 1993 the Cotonou agreement - and we will come to that -
21 has spelt out and laid the entire framework for a government in
22 Monrovia that would have set aside the NPRAG, the National
23 Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government. And let me clarify
24 this. I am sure we will produce documents here to show that
14:49:55 25 ECOWAS approved the two governments in Liberia, the National
26 Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government and the NPRAG, and
27 each new government headed by Sawyer were approved by ECOWAS.
28 And so it is this whole mixture of insurgencies against me and
29 trying to stop me and, I will say, fear and hypocrisy, and on the

1 other hand missed and lost opportunities, that continued this
2 whole problem in Liberia. In short, that is the long and short
3 of it.

14:50:45 4 Q. To date we have reached the middle of 1991 and you have
5 mentioned having met with Foday Sankoh?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Following that initial meeting, how many - on how many
8 further occasions, if any, did you see him?

9 A. Oh, let's look at a period of time. I would say on an
14:51:16 10 average of maybe once every other month when Foday Sankoh met
11 with me and we had agreement - by agreement I am not talking
12 about a signed document, because someone will come up and say
13 "Well you said you had an agreement. Where is it?" I am talking
14 about we had a meeting - let's say a meeting of the minds. I
14:51:44 15 then gave a rented house to Sankoh that could be used as a guest
16 facility whenever he came and went out of Liberia.

17 Q. Can I just interrupt you for a moment. Why?

18 A. Well, we - Foday Sankoh is now the leader of a
19 revolutionary movement in Sierra Leone. We are fighting a common
14:52:11 20 enemy. We didn't have hotels in Gbarnga. There are no hotels.
21 And so what we did was to find a small house and make it
22 available to him, that whenever he - he did not come in the
23 morning and leave in the evening. Sometimes he spent a few days
24 in Gbarnga and if he had do his little shopping or whatever he
14:52:38 25 wanted to do, they did and they returned. So it was a place that
26 was set aside for him that whenever he came, he would have a
27 place to stay.

28 Q. And help us, was that provision made for him immediately
29 following that first meeting?

1 A. Well, not exactly. I would say by the second meeting.
2 When he first came he was - he gave - in fact, he lodged with one
3 of the Special Forces that he knew from Libya.

4 Q. Who was that?

14:53:13 5 A. Dopoe Menkarzon that went for him. He lodged with Dopoe,
6 but to give him some little status we then decided that it was
7 not proper. The guy came - he came not alone. Foday Sankoh
8 didn't. He came with bodyguards and others, and he was no longer
9 their colleague that they knew in Libya. So to give him some
14:53:39 10 little status we decided to find him a little house that he could
11 come with his bodyguards and stay, at least to give him some
12 little respect.

13 Q. And help us, where was this residence in relation to
14 another of residence that we have been told about, White Flower,
14:53:57 15 which you occupied?

16 A. No, no, no --

17 Q. Where were they in relation to each other?

18 A. Foday Sankoh lived a little distance from my area. It was
19 not called White Flower, but he lived a little distance. He
14:54:13 20 lived where we could find an available house and he could not
21 have - he did not live very close to me because where I lived in
22 Gbarnga, Gbarnga was then the headquarters and the superintendent
23 of the county lived in those facilities before. So what we did
24 as a security measure, all of the available houses around where I
14:54:40 25 lived were occupied by security personnel. So he could not and
26 did not live nearby, because all of the houses, for security
27 purposes, it was not proper to have ordinary people living in
28 those houses. They were all occupied by security.

29 So he was a little way in another part of the town. I

1 think it was around the football field. I never visited his
2 house. Whenever I wanted to see him while he was in town I sent
3 for him and he came and he talked to me.

4 Q. Where?

14:55:13 5 A. At the residence in Gbarnga. We just used to call it the
6 ground, or the Executive Mansion, but that title White Flower
7 only applies after I become President to the different locations
8 that I live.

9 Q. So where you lived in Gbarnga at this time in 1991, what
14:55:36 10 was it called at that stage?

11 A. The Executive Mansion.

12 Q. Now, what facilities were made available to Foday Sankoh
13 within that residence?

14 A. Oh, ordinary things. A bed. We have, you know, furniture
14:56:03 15 for the bedroom, living room. He was provided light current. In
16 fact, one of the things that we did install - even in Buchanan we
17 had 24 hour light in Buchanan. Gbarnga was also provided - the
18 entire city of Gbarnga was provided with light current, so he
19 received light. And there is no running water in Gbarnga, but he
14:56:34 20 just had the basic facilities for his bedroom, the living room
21 and kitchen facilities.

22 Q. What about communication facilities?

23 A. Well, whenever Foday Sankoh came he could use - he could go
24 over to the radio room and call. Yes, he could.

14:56:55 25 Q. Which radio room?

26 A. The NPFL had a central radio room in Gbarnga. He could
27 call from there.

28 Q. And where was that facility?

29 A. That was in an area called Boefeh High School building.

1 There was a part of that building that was being used. Boefeh I
2 think is B-O-E-F-E-H, Boefeh. At Boefeh school there was a radio
3 - a national communications set-up there for the commanders to be
4 reached in the field. That's what he used.

14:57:36 5 Q. Now, this Court has been told that Foday Sankoh was a radio
6 operator by training. Did you know that?

7 A. What I did know when I talked to him was that he had been
8 an old soldier. I did not know specifically until I heard here
9 that he was a radio operator. I knew he had been in the army
14:58:04 10 because I wanted to get his background when I first met him and
11 he told me that he had been in the army and that he had trained
12 in Britain for some time on communication, and communication
13 could mean anything, but I didn't know that before then.

14 Q. And to your knowledge did he ever train radio operators for
14:58:29 15 the NPFL?

16 A. No, no, no. We had our radio operators trained before we
17 came. Like I said, we trained whole people. There were radio
18 operators, everything that we needed to launch a revolution we
19 brought. In fact, our principal - our signal man was trained
14:58:49 20 from the base. His name was William Gensen, G-E-N-S-E-N.

21 William Gensen. He is on the list of Special Forces, so we
22 didn't need any other additional training officer, no.

23 Q. Now these further meetings with Foday Sankoh, how were they
24 arranged?

14:59:10 25 A. Whenever I wanted to see Foday Sankoh while he was in
26 Gbarnga I would just send for him. If Foday Sankoh wanted to
27 come to Liberia to see me, all he had to do was to call Dopoe or
28 any of the senior radio people that he had established contact
29 with. Because once Foday Sankoh was accepted by us to help us

1 control that border, there was a tie in to frequencies. If he
2 wanted to call to Liberia he could call on a frequency to get to
3 Dopoe or any of the senior people he wanted to talk to.

15:00:03 4 Q. I am asking for this reason, Mr Taylor: Was it a case of
5 you as the boss summoning your underling whenever you wanted to?

6 A. No, never, that's not true. And if I wanted to treat Foday
7 Sankoh that way I probably would have let him continue to stay
8 with Dopoe Menkarzon.

9 Immediately - look, it may be lost somewhere during this
15:00:28 10 trial, but when I spoke to Foday Sankoh upon his arrival in
11 August of 1991 Foday Sankoh gave me a long history of his
12 grievances and his problems. Foday Sankoh was naught but a
13 little boy. Foday Sankoh mentioned to me that he had been a part
14 of a coup d'etat before in Sierra Leone, had been imprisoned

15:00:53 15 along with other people. I think he did say including the late
16 Hinga Norman. Foday Sankoh was not - in fact he is older, he is
17 older than I am. He was not anyone that I could - if it was
18 anything he probably could give me military training, because he
19 was an old soldier. Even out of the African tradition, he was an
15:01:19 20 older man, older than me, I would not disrespect him.

21 I had no, no control over Foday Sankoh. To an extent the
22 only real control that I had in dealing with Foday Sankoh was if
23 he asked for something that I did not have I could tell him that
24 I didn't have it and in fact, you know, I couldn't help him,
15:01:42 25 because there were great expectations that really I couldn't
26 meet, okay. But, no, it was no such thing.

27 He was the leader of the Sierra Leonean movement. I gave
28 him respect. I gave him a house over there. He did not discuss
29 with me how he planned his revolution. The only thing we

1 discussed when he came about operations was how effective I could
2 be in making sure that ULIMO was kept at bay out of Liberia.

3 This was my preoccupation and my principal concern.

4 Q. Great expectations by whom?

15:02:31 5 A. Well, when Sankoh came and he - I was approached with this
6 proposition, I guess he saw this as a means to really get some
7 help from me in pushing forward his cause, but --

8 Q. What help?

9 A. Arms, ammunition, but I was having problems myself and
15:02:57 10 don't forget I am still fighting a war. I have got everybody
11 fighting me. And so for him, he probably thought that he could
12 have gained from this. But whatever little I could share with my
13 men, and there were times that I did give him some ammunition, I
14 am not going to lie about it. Okay, there were times that I
15:03:22 15 gave, but they were in little quantities, but he wanted more and
16 more that I did not have. I did not have it, because what I had
17 in my possession, I was basically fighting - remember I said the
18 armed forces, the ECOMOG, there is ULIMO. And so whatever little
19 I could scrounge around and get, I had to use it for this purpose
15:03:43 20 because there is nothing coming in from outside.

21 There is no arms. I mean to say there are no arms coming
22 from Burkina Faso, there are no arms coming from Libya. I am
23 dealing with whatever we capture in combat from the Armed Forces
24 of Liberia, okay. So I am being very careful.

15:04:02 25 And I know from his overall behaviour - by that I mean he
26 did not appear very happy when I sent him little material that I
27 would tell my men to share with him. He probably felt that I was
28 holding back on him, but I didn't have it. I was suffering
29 myself. I think if you look in the records the Prosecution did

1 surrender - it was made an exhibit here of a letter that Sankoh
2 wrote me in, I think it was 1992 --

3 Q. We will come to that, Mr Taylor.

4 A. -- complaining about material, but I didn't have it.

15:04:48 5 Q. We will come to that letter in due course, Mr Taylor, but
6 before we get there, if you were not in a position to provide him
7 with that kind of material assistance, why was he always coming
8 to Gbarnga?

9 A. Well, whenever Foday was over there he was in the bush.

15:05:10 10 Whenever he wanted to rest a little bit he would come to Gbarnga.
11 Sometimes, you know, there is this feeling maybe if I go and I
12 see him personally it could make a difference. And maybe he is
13 holding back some things and if he sees me it could make a
14 difference. But he came sometimes to talk to me about the

15:05:32 15 operation that, you know, was going on on the border. And I can
16 remember on a couple of occasions, but this is later on, he had
17 come to me to complain that there were some problems developing,
18 that the men that we had sent for security operations inside
19 Sierra Leone were misbehaving. So at the latter part of his
15:06:03 20 visits he had come to express that.

21 Q. We will come to that. Can I pause for a moment to provide
22 some spellings, please, before they get lost. You mentioned
23 earlier a location in Ghana, Akosombo?

24 A. Yes, Akosombo.

15:06:27 25 Q. The spelling we have is A-K-O-S-O-M-O. Is that incorrect?
26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Isn't there a B in there towards the end?
27 THE WITNESS: Akosombo. I think there is a B. There is a
28 B.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Well, let's clarify this, Mr Taylor, because I am helpfully
2 informed that there is an Akosomo and there is also an Akosombo
3 in Ghana. Which one are you talking about?

4 A. Let me describe it and I am sure we will get the right one.
15:07:16 5 Akosombo as I understand it is the site of the Ghanaian
6 hydroelectric plant. That's where it is located. That is
7 Akosombo as far as I know it.

8 Q. Okay, fine, well now we know. Very well. So autumn of
9 1991 now. What is the situation from your point of view as
15:07:47 10 leader of the NPFL?

11 A. We have these scimmages still going on, there is combat
12 going on, but there are also efforts being made by ECOWAS to get
13 a peace process going to follow up on the discussions at Bamako
14 and Banjul with some assistance on the part of the late President
15:08:26 15 of I a Cote d'Ivoire, Felix Houphouet-Boigny. They had stated
16 that they suspected that I was a little close to the President
17 and that he was then called the doyen of African leaders and so
18 they asked him to intervene and a meeting was held at
19 Yamoussoukro.

15:08:53 20 Q. Did you attend?

21 A. Yes, I did.

22 Q. And what was the outcome of that?

23 A. It is at Yamoussoukro that by this time we agreed that the
24 two governments would be put into place, that is the NPRAG and
15:09:19 25 IGNU.

26 Q. And who?

27 A. IGNU, the Interim Government of National Unity, IGNU. And
28 those talks are now going late into 1991. That is where we are.

29 Q. Late 1991?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Now during this period whilst you are dealing with that and
3 the other scimmages, as you described them, to what extent are
4 you directly involved, if at all, in what is going on in Sierra
15:10:03 5 Leone?

6 A. I am not involved at all. The only thing I am concerned
7 with - and if I can confess, maybe selfishly - is making sure
8 that the borders are protected because ULIMO is not ceasing in
9 any way its attacks. ULIMO is really - by the end of this year
15:10:30 10 around this time ULIMO has made very, very, very serious gains
11 and they are really threatening in a very, very great way.

12 Q. So obviously that is a matter of concern for you?

13 A. Definitely. Definitely.

14 Q. So consequently one would expect you to be paying a lot of
15:10:56 15 attention to that situation?

16 A. Of course.

17 Q. So to what extent, then, were you in contact with your
18 commanders within Sierra Leone during that period?

19 A. Well, the commanders that are in that particular border
15:11:10 20 region - I am present then to try to stop this infiltration.
21 They are getting frustrated because they are being yelled at all
22 the time.

23 Q. By?

24 A. By me.

15:11:26 25 Q. Why?

26 A. Because ULIMO is advancing. I mean, ULIMO is not just in
27 rural area by this time. It is only going to take a map to
28 explain this one.

29 Q. Perhaps we ought to provide you with one.

1 A. We can't speak in abstraction.

2 Q. Because I do want an explanation.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Can we have the map again, please.

4 Q. Yes, Mr Taylor. So what are you telling us, then, about
15:12:11 5 this period in late 1991?

6 A. By late 1991 this little ULIMO band that had come across in
7 Kongo and Damballa and these places, had, by the end of 1991,
8 captured Grand Cape Mount County. They had pushed the NPFL out
9 of most of Bomi County, and so they had gained control of the two
15:13:03 10 counties at that time, Bomi, Cape Mount. By this time the NPFL
11 has had to retreat through the forest back into the Gbarnga or
12 other half of Lofa.

13 Now if the court is looking at this, this place right here
14 I am pointing to called Bopolu, Bopolu is near the edge of one of
15:13:38 15 the major forests of Liberia. It is the Gola forest. So it may
16 look here like this, but this is the Gola forest. If you hear
17 the name Gbarpolu, that is Bopolu and Baima. So here is already
18 under the command of ULIMO. But this is a very strategic
19 position, because from Bopolu there is a St Paul River here.
15:14:14 20 There is the river running this way. You are in - you are about
21 I would say at the edge of the forest, and this posed a major
22 threat to us. And we were right about our assessment, because
23 from this position in Bopolu, ULIMO started a major guerrilla
24 movement that a few months later landed them - can I mark on
15:14:43 25 this?

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Do we have another copy available if this is
27 marked?

28 MS IRURA: Your Honour, that is the CMS copy.

29 THE WITNESS: Okay, I will just run my pen. We were right

1 - because from Bopolu through the forest eventually going on the
2 early 1992, we will get to them, ULIMO cuts and hits Zorzor. Now
3 this was our fear and surely it did happen, so we are taking
4 ULIMO very seriously. We are on the backs of our commanders
15:15:25 5 telling them that they have to do the best that they can, because
6 this effectively ended up putting the rest of Lofa in the hands
7 of ULIMO. Now, I don't know if we are clear on that?

8 MR GRIFFITHS:

9 Q. Well, I am going to ask for a bit of clarification about
15:15:41 10 that. You initially begin by telling us that ULIMO had control
11 of Grand Cape Mount and Bomi?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. You thereafter explained the strategic importance of
14 Bopolu?

15:16:02 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And how, from that location, ULIMO were able to extend
17 their area of control up to Zorzor; yes?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now could you just, using the back of the pen, please,
15:16:21 20 indicate to us the area of Liberia which ULIMO ended up
21 controlling. And I want you to go around the whole area so that
22 we can see the circumference of it.

23 A. Very good. At the end of the day, ULIMO was in control of
24 everything from the St Paul River along here, this entire
15:16:57 25 northern part of Liberia; that is Zorzor, the Fassama that I am
26 pointing here, Belle Yella, coming all the way down here. And
27 our fear is not because we didn't know what we were talking
28 about. During the war - and let the judges understand that
29 Monrovia is down here. None of the warring parties can travel

1 through Monrovia. Liberia does not have many roads. There is
2 one road from Monrovia coming straight up here to Gbarnga. It
3 continues one road all the way here.

4 Now, the warring factions that were fighting, if we wanted
15:17:51 5 - even when we had men in the Bomi region, you have to come up to
6 Zorzor and then track through the forest down to Tubmanburg. The
7 roads that are here - it may be, I do not know, it is looking
8 this way, but these are only forest timber harvesting roads.
9 This is not a major road at all, and I guess you can tell from
15:18:18 10 the legend of the map these are secondary roads and they are not
11 - they are running through this forest with rivers and creeks.
12 Sometimes you can't pass through them, so you must walk through
13 this area here to get to Tubmanburg. So once ULIMO capture Grand
14 Cape Mount County and Bomi County in this region, we knew right
15:18:45 15 away that we were at risk that they would try to come forward.
16 Because the only way ULIMO could get to the NPFL area was to come
17 through the same forest that we had used before, and that is
18 exactly what they did.

19 Q. Now, help us with a timeframe. By roughly what date did
15:19:06 20 they have control of that segment of Lofa, Bomi County, and Grand
21 Cape Mount which you have described?

22 A. Lofa - and I want us to be very careful. Let's deal with
23 Bomi. Because when you say Lofa, I will take the whole county.

24 Q. Okay.

15:19:26 25 A. I would say by the end of 1991 they had full control of
26 Cape Mount, Bomi and the border. Now the rest of Lofa ULIMO
27 started making this push, not without resistance in the forest.
28 So I would say by, oh, March - March of 1992 - ULIMO by then has
29 really consolidated the whole Lofa.

1 But I want to make one point here. When we talk about
2 control, guerrilla warfare is very dangerous. The fact that -
3 Let's take two points here. Let's - follow with the judges.
4 Let's look at Tubmanburg here and let's look at Gbarpolu here.
15:20:35 5 The fact that somebody would report that there are military
6 people in Tubmanburg, that people in Gbarpolu now can relax, you
7 don't do that. This whole area is going into the forest region.
8 Sometimes a guerrilla can be here, but his actual front line
9 could be 15/20 miles away from his point of contact. So once
15:21:04 10 there is combat going in an area you have to be very careful in
11 how you go in, how you come out. So the whole area at this
12 particular time becomes an area of concern. So while it is true
13 that ULIMO did not have full control of Lofa until about, I would
14 say, March of 1992 or thereabouts, certain areas over here
15:21:38 15 approaching places like Zorzor and different things had to be
16 traversed with caution.
17 Q. Very well. Now could I - you having explained that, could
18 I ask you to return to your seat, please. Now with that
19 explanation in place, can I ask you about one or two other
15:22:13 20 details. By March of 1992, you tell us, ULIMO had that area of
21 control. What effect, if any, did that have in terms of your
22 contact with Foday Sankoh and the RUF?
23 A. Well, it started to have some effect. There were concerns
24 that - remember I just explained you have to be very careful.
15:22:58 25 Even though they may say somebody is 20 miles away, in guerrilla
26 warfare you have to be very careful, because they probably have
27 an advanced unit some 20 miles ahead. It started to have a very,
28 very serious effect, and it resulted even in a greater effect
29 when certain problems occurred about a month - they were

1 threatening the area, but I would say by April/May of 1992 it
2 took on a more serious set of consequences as a result of certain
3 things that had occurred.

4 Q. Such as?

15:23:47 5 A. Well, at about April of 1992, I did mention to the Court
6 that Sankoh had complained to me about the behaviour of some of
7 the men that were carrying out these duties.

8 Q. Which duties?

9 A. At the border. The military duties at the border in trying
15:24:18 10 to hold ULIMO back. And I had said to him that we would
11 investigate this matter and that I would send one of our senior
12 generals to go and investigate the matter and try to see what we
13 could do about it to stop it, because we were not tolerating that
14 in Liberia and if any officer that had been sent on assignment
15:24:53 15 was carrying out certain atrocities against Sierra Leoneans that
16 action would be taken.

17 Q. Can we just interrupt you and pause for a moment,
18 Mr Taylor, because you haven't quite told us what this matter is.
19 What was Foday Sankoh complaining to you about?

15:25:10 20 A. Well, he was saying that our soldiers were killing Sierra
21 Leoneans. He reported cases of rape, that they had raped some
22 Sierra Leoneans, and that they would not - in fact they were not
23 paying any attention to him. They were not respecting him as the
24 leader and that if they could not behave themselves then, you
15:25:37 25 know, they would have to leave. And so I said, "Well, okay,
26 because of the heavy war going on I will send a senior general
27 over there to go along with you to investigate" and we did.

28 Q. Who did you send?

29 A. We sent another general called General Francis Menwon was

1 sent to investigate these matters and he came back and before
2 action could be taken they took matters on - into their own
3 hands. By they I mean the RUF. After Sankoh arrives back in
4 April, knowing very well that I am doing everything to try to
15:26:18 5 bring this matter under control, around late April, beginning of
6 May, I guess he lost control and there was this major combat
7 between the RUF forces and the people that we had sent there to
8 protect our border, you know, and keep ULIMO at bay.

9 Q. And what was the consequence of that?

15:26:46 10 A. Oh, people got killed. We lost some soldiers, they lost
11 some soldiers and it was terrible and quite frankly I was upset
12 because I felt that Sankoh had come to me - he is the leader of
13 his revolution in Sierra Leone. I had sent men. They were
14 fighting a common enemy, ULIMO was fighting on my side but they
15:27:19 15 also had men fighting on the Sierra Leonean government, the
16 security at the border benefitted him and myself and I just felt
17 that he was negligent in that he could have, in my opinion,
18 prevented this bloodshed amongst brothers. So I got very, very
19 upset and I ordered immediately that General Menwon should return
15:27:45 20 and that he and General Menkarzon should go and that this was the
21 end of it and that all of our people who were in Sierra Leone
22 should leave. In fact, ULIMO is threatening anyway. They should
23 pull back and come.

24 Q. Now you have said a lot there, Mr Taylor, which I would
15:28:01 25 like to unpack in a bit more detail. Now taking matters slowly,
26 what you have just described in terms of ULIMO controlling that
27 segment of Liberia and its consequences covers what kind of time
28 frame? The last month you mentioned was April/May of 1992, so
29 when should we start this particular period?

1 A. Well, I just - and I tried to caution when you asked the
2 question. I said when we talk about Lofa, ULIMO does not take
3 all Lofa. ULIMO is in control of Cape Mount/Bomi. They are
4 coming through the forest, okay, and I am saying that the area
15:29:01 5 for the rest of Lofa as approaching Zorzor right now is a very,
6 very, very dangerous area. So what we have to do at that
7 particular time, they are threatening Zorzor, okay. So there is
8 still movement. Their withdrawal - by the time we withdraw in
9 May of 1992, we withdraw our men from Sierra Leone, not far later
15:29:25 10 ULIMO hit Zorzor town and cut off that contact.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Because by hitting Zorzor it did several things. Zorzor is
13 the only road between Gbarnga and Voinjama. We have troops in
14 Voinjama. We have troops - and I am by now the judges understand
15:29:51 15 the map maybe better than I understand it, so we don't probably
16 have to go back to it. There are troops in Voinjama. There are
17 troops in Kolahun. All of these are part of the records. There
18 are troops in Foya. But by coming and cutting Zorzor off they
19 leave all of the forces in that part of Lofa what we call
15:30:13 20 militarily in space.

21 So our men then begin to use their own training to begin to
22 track back through other segments of the forest. That tracking
23 back takes them - some people don't reach back to Gbarnga until
24 after a full month before they get there. They track, watch the
15:30:36 25 movement, they came in different different groups. Those that
26 could not track back that were as far as Foya and Kolahun, some
27 of them ended up going into Sierra Leone. My general up there
28 was General Fayia. Fayia had to retreat into Sierra Leone. Some
29 retreated into Guinea. Again, in that area there are tribes and

1 on the other side in Guinea too that are like families. So some
2 of them retreated into Guinea, some of them retreated into Sierra
3 Leone and some of them retreated tracking back until they got
4 back into Gbarnga.

15:31:20 5 Q. But, Mr Taylor, during this period, until ULIMO finally
6 control Zorzor are you providing assistance to Foday Sankoh
7 across that border?

8 A. In May of 1992 there was this war between the RUF and the
9 forces that we sent. I sent and I withdrew those men from Sierra
15:32:00 10 Leone. I was upset, I was angry and I don't think even Foday
11 Sankoh would have tried - not when I was that angry. But a lot
12 of the soldiers who had lost their brothers in Sierra Leone were
13 very upset. It was there and then that all - I mean all - ties
14 with Sankoh and the RUF we stopped.

15:32:29 15 Q. Give me a date?

16 A. May. May of 1992 I cut off everything even - even before
17 ULIMO had fully assumed control of Zorzor. Once those men came
18 out in May, ULIMO subsequently took control of Zorzor I would say
19 a little later, maybe June/July. But even before - before ULIMO
15:32:55 20 assumed full control of that border in May I withdrew everyone
21 and I said I wanted nothing more to do with Sankoh because I felt
22 - and I may have been wrong and I assume if I am wrong, well, I
23 will take my blame for that. I thought that Sankoh could have
24 stopped this and in fact I was doing him a favour and he was
15:33:16 25 doing me a favour so there was no need for him as a responsible
26 person to stay there and let these people fight and kill each
27 other. That's one thing in combat when brothers begin to fight
28 brothers, I mean you just don't accept that. So I was very upset
29 and I said I wanted nothing more to do with them.

1 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, that conflict between brothers, as you put
2 it, to your knowledge did it have a name?

3 A. Well, I was not inside Sierra Leone, but at the end of the
4 day after the men came I understand that all military operations
15:34:06 5 have code names - and then again I mean one of the aggravating
6 things was that it was not one attack. It was not one attack.
7 Sankoh sat there, these boys fought and then fought and fought.
8 It was called - they had three code names Top 20, they had Top 40
9 and after they had - because some of these boys jumped in the
15:34:33 10 bushes that, you know, they did not know, and Top Final was when
11 they searched them out in the bushes and killed as many as they
12 could and I think that and I still believe today that Foday
13 Sankoh was responsible.

14 Q. Now, help me. You say that you withdraw your men from
15:34:50 15 Sierra Leone. Did you issue an order to that effect?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. By what means?

18 A. It was a written order and it was read on the radio and it
19 was physically taken by the two generals to go and withdraw
15:35:08 20 everyone. And I tell you, because they went in, they went to
21 withdraw these men not like two soldiers driving, going in. We
22 sent a full force to withdraw our men, because my concern was
23 that - and this is when maybe things got - we sent a major force.
24 I would think that we probably sent about two or three companies,
15:35:35 25 close to 400 men, to make sure that there was an orderly
26 withdrawal because we are coming out of a combat situation, okay,
27 and we didn't ask to enter. We went in, we went to where they
28 were and the order was delivered and those people that wanted to
29 come returned. Some of them did not return, but that was on

1 their own accord.

2 Q. Who were the two generals you sent in?

3 A. General Dopoe Menkarzon and General Francis Menwon.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: Do we have a spelling for that second name,

15:36:16 5 can I enquire? Thank you:

6 Q. Now you say you were angry with Foday Sankoh, Mr Taylor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you express that anger to him directly?

9 A. Foday Sankoh never came back as of the last time he left in

15:36:43 10 April. My anger was expressed through the men that went into

11 withdraw. I did not speak to him again.

12 Q. What do you mean you did not speak to him again? You did

13 not speak to him ever again, or for a while, or what?

14 A. Well, ever, that's eternity. I mean I did not speak to him

15:37:07 15 during that particular period and I did not get to speak to

16 Sankoh - after that particular incident in May of - in April when

17 he actually came to Gbarnga and we talked about this, the next

18 time that I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, spoke to Foday Sankoh was in

19 July of 1999. That was the next time that I spoke to him in

15:37:33 20 Lome, Togo, when he came to my apartment, suite in fact - suite

21 at the hotel to confer with me.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, I just want us to be clear about this. Are you

23 telling these judges that between, is it April of 1992?

24 A. April of 1992.

15:37:58 25 Q. And July of 19 --

26 A. '99.

27 Q. You did not speak to Foday Sankoh?

28 A. I did not speak to Foday Sankoh and I know of no incident

29 where he even tried to get in touch with me. I guess he must

1 have been a very angry man too. But there is no, no, no, no
2 communication between --

3 Q. That is what I was going on and deal with, Mr Taylor.

4 A. Yes.

15:38:24 5 Q. When you say no communication, what are we talking about?
6 Did you write to each other during that period?

7 A. No, I mean come on. I mean I wouldn't write to Sankoh.
8 Where is he? We cut off everything.

9 Q. I am not joking, Mr Taylor. I am being serious.

15:38:37 10 A. I am serious.

11 Q. Did you write to him at all?

12 A. No, not at all.

13 Q. Did you speak to him on a telephone?

14 A. I did not speak to him on a telephone, did not speak to him
15:38:48 15 on a radio.

16 Q. Did you send envoys to carry messages to him?

17 A. Not at all. Don't forget now, ULIMO has taken over Zorzor
18 and moved and take over the rest of Lofa. So from the Atlantic
19 Ocean where Cape Mount and Bomi are located, all the way across
15:39:12 20 Zorzor to the Guinean border, ULIMO has occupied this entire
21 place. There is no contact with Sankoh.

22 Q. From May through to July 1999?

23 A. No, listen now. May I withdraw my men, but ULIMO do not
24 take control of Zorzor until about June of 1992, okay?

15:39:41 25 Q. Yes.

26 A. Very good. So I am saying even before they formally take
27 it, once this bad blood is created with this fighting between
28 these men that I blame Sankoh for, because I think he could have
29 stopped it, I withdraw the men in May. Even before ULIMO fully

1 takes control of Lofa contact has ceased. When they finally take
2 full control of Lofa, there is - it seals the whole thing. So
3 that means we don't even have men in the whole Lofa area at all.
4 The men begin to what I said to you - some flee to Sierra Leone,
15:40:21 5 some flee to Guinea, some tracked their way back to the bushes
6 and get to us.

7 Q. Very well. Now that we have concretised that aspect of
8 your evidence, can we deal with another aspect of that period,
9 please. You accept, if I understand your evidence correctly,

15:40:46 10 that up until that point, which is April-ish of 1992, from August
11 of the previous year you had provided some assistance to Foday
12 Sankoh. Is that right?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. What level of assistance did you provide, Mr Taylor?

15:41:11 15 A. A very minimum. We had - we provided some ammunition from
16 time to time to him.

17 Q. Yet when you say some ammunition --

18 A. Small amounts of ammunition.

19 Q. Like how much?

15:41:26 20 A. Three boxes, five boxes.

21 Q. Of what?

22 A. AK ammunition.

23 Q. Yes?

24 A. AK ammunition to him.

15:41:37 25 Q. Anything else?

26 A. Even when we could, we would supply some rockets of - RPG
27 rockets. RPG, rocket propelled grenades. We did not send arms
28 because, like I say, we were still fighting. We needed
29 everything that we could get for ourselves, so we did not provide

1 that for him.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder go the witness could now be shown,
3 please, Prosecution exhibit 65. Could I have a look at that,
4 please, just to ensure it is what I am looking for. Yes, please.

15:42:38 5 Could we put that on the screen, please:

6 Q. Mr Taylor, can you see this document on the screen?

7 A. I will just put on my glasses here.

8 Q. Can you read it?

9 A. Yes.

15:43:06 10 Q. Well, I can't see mine.

11 A. I am wearing spectacles, so I can see it.

12 Q. Oh, yes. Now, first of all, do you accept that this is a
13 letter written to you?

14 A. Yes.

15:43:26 15 Q. Do you recall receiving it?

16 A. Oh, I am not too sure. But if it is anything, it probably
17 - it probably reached me, yes.

18 Q. You will see that it is dated 5 May 1992?

19 A. That is correct.

15:43:50 20 Q. So around about the time when, on your account, you fell
21 out with Foday Sankoh?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Now you see that it is directed to his Excellency CIC
24 Charles Ghankay Taylor, President, PPRAG, Gbarnga, Liberia?

15:44:22 25 A. Yes, he made a mistake. It should be NPRAG.

26 Q. Just help us with this. Just for clarity's sake, what does
27 the CIC stand for?

28 A. Oh, commander-in-chief.

29 Q. And the acronym after President, PPRAG?

1 A. No, NPRAG it should be. That should be the - remember I
2 said that by '91 we have put into place a government. That is
3 the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government, a
4 government in the rest of Liberia that is approved by ECOWAS.

15:45:03 5 Yes, that is what that is.

6 Q. Now, let's look at the body of this letter, please, and I
7 would like to seek your assistance: "Dear Brother, I am thanking
8 you very much for the brotherly help you are rendering me in my
9 liberation struggle. This struggle itself has reached a crucial
10 and sensitive stage wherein I cannot afford to give up. However,
11 there is an urgent need to sit and discuss issues on the current
12 development in Sierra Leone and also on the deployment of ECOMOG
13 at the borders. These events are crucial and we need to address
14 ourselves to them. I am therefore requesting an audience with
15 you before I leave".

15:46:01

16 Pause there. Now would you agree, Mr Taylor, that first
17 paragraph suggests that at the beginning of May you still had a
18 continuing relationship with Foday Sankoh?

19 A. Yes, it does suggest that. Maybe Foday Sankoh still thinks
20 that he has that. Remember I have said that since he left in
21 April I have not seen him and I withdraw my men in May. But
22 don't forget the road is still open because ULIMO, as I said,
23 does not capture Zorzor, the main road, until after May. So he
24 sent this probably thinking that they - what had happened - and
25 the withdrawal of my men probably didn't mean anything, because
26 maybe that is what he wanted, but he went about it the wrong way.

15:46:57

27 Q. But help us with this, Mr Taylor. There is a little detail
28 hidden in the last sentence of that paragraph: "I am therefore
29 requesting an audience with you", check out the last three words,

1 "before I leave", which appears to suggest he is in Gbarnga when
2 he is writing this, doesn't it?

3 A. No, no, no, no, no, no. But when he talk about deployment
4 of ECOMOG at the borders.

15:47:32 5 Q. No, I am looking at the last sentence.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "I am therefore requesting an audience with you before I
8 leave"?

9 A. Yes, but this "leave", it could be before he leaves, okay,
15:47:47 10 probably from Sierra Leone. But he is not in Gbarnga at this
11 particular time, and the deployment of ECOMOG at the border I
12 will wonder - I think it is the border with Sierra Leone.

13 Q. I am asking you about this Mr Taylor, because --

14 A. He is not in Gbarnga --

15:48:05 15 Q. -- we need your assistance. Because note also the word an
16 "audience", which suggests somebody who wants to see someone in
17 person?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. So, help us. Was Foday Sankoh in Gbarnga when this letter
15:48:20 20 was written?

21 A. I doubt very much. This letter was brought to me, I am
22 sure, and Sankoh probably sent this from Sierra Leone. I guess
23 this leave before - it could be before he leaves to come. I
24 don't understand this, but he is not in Gbarnga by May 5. No, he
15:48:42 25 is not.

26 Q. But then carry on to the next sentence then: "I appreciate
27 the five boxes of AK-47 rifle ammunition and the ten boxes of RPG
28 gun rockets which I should receive from you today"?

29 A. Uh-huh.

1 Q. Which again appears to suggest, doesn't it, that he is in
2 Gbarnga at the time?

3 A. Yes, but go on further. He says, "But I have just received
4 a radio message from General Dopoe". Why would Dopoe radio him
15:49:17 5 in Gbarnga? Why would Dopoe radio him in Gbarnga? "Received a
6 radio message from General Dopoe that our men have" - I don't see
7 the next word.

8 Q. "Encircled the Daru Barracks".

9 A. "The Daru Barracks and they are wait for material."

15:49:35 10 Q. "To do the final assault."

11 A. Well, I can tell you what. So why would he send a radio
12 message when he is right in Gbarnga? So he is not in Gbarnga.
13 He is not.

14 Q. "I believe that what you have offered is not enough to
15:49:52 15 carry out the Operation Capture Daru"?

16 A. Uh-huh.

17 Q. Pause there. Now, you have already mentioned that military
18 operations tend to have a code name. Now do you agree that that
19 sentence appears to suggest that there had been some discussion
15:50:14 20 between you and Foday Sankoh about this operation, hence his
21 reference to it?

22 A. No, not necessarily. Well, what is Operation Top 20? Did
23 he discuss that with me? No, no, no, no. That is his operation.
24 He is just saying here, in my opinion, that he has an operation
15:50:34 25 called Operation Capture Daru and he needs assistance. Because
26 if one assumes here that by suggesting this it means that he and
27 I had discussed this operation, then he must say that he knew
28 that I knew of the Operation Top 20 and Top 40. But we must
29 remember here now - except I am getting dates mixed up - there is

1 no doubt in my mind, there is no question about Foday Sankoh
2 being with me at this particular time, okay? But to the best of
3 my knowledge, after this operation in May we withdrew our people
4 and Foday Sankoh does not come to Gbarnga.

15:51:14 5 Now whether he is trying to make up with some of the boys
6 and maybe come to the border, I don't know. But he is not in
7 Gbarnga at this particular time, and even the boys that he had at
8 his house cannot be in Gbarnga by this time because they are
9 afraid too. No.

15:51:35 10 Q. Let's continue reading, shall we? "So I am asking you in
11 the name of the Almighty God to kindly increase the number of
12 boxes of AK-47 ammunition to twenty and that of the RPG rockets
13 to 12 plus some Beretta rounds. This will sustain me for some
14 time while awaiting the long-term supply that you have promised
15 me".

15:52:08 16 Pause there. Did you have sufficient munitions in your
17 possession at this time to provide the quantities he was
18 requesting, Mr Taylor?

19 A. That's what I referred to before as expectations. Maybe
15:52:32 20 Foday Sankoh - he always had these expectations and he always
21 wanted me to help him more. I couldn't help him any more,
22 because I was trying to help myself. So while he may be wanting
23 this - now this is one more thing you need to understand here. I
24 think we need to raise it. This is dated 2 May. It all depends
15:52:57 25 on when it reaches me. That is another question, because we
26 don't have any reception date here. But these are part of the
27 expected - the expectations that he had, but I could not help him
28 beyond that which I was helping him.

29 Q. Now the other thing that I want to ask you about in

1 relation to that last passage I read to you is this: "This will
2 sustain me for some time while awaiting the long-term supply that
3 you have promised me". Did you make him such a promise?

4 A. I did not promise any long-term supplies to Foday Sankoh.

15:53:34 5 Foday Sankoh and I had been together now for eight months. Eight
6 months. That is from August of 1991 to May of 1992. That is
7 about, what, seven/eight months. And if he during this
8 particular period is getting what I have, I don't know what his
9 expectations are beyond this. I mean, I was not getting it
10 myself.

11 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you have told us more than once that you
12 are a politician. Is this a political type promise which someone
13 doesn't intend to keep? Is it one of those promises?

14 A. Then you say somebody is trying to tell a lie. No, I will
15:54:13 15 tell you what happened. Foday Sankoh, you know - I guess we all
16 go through these pressures, "Oh, please do this. Please do that.
17 Please help me". Sometimes he's not there and somebody will say,
18 "Okay, I will do the best I can". You are buying time and hoping
19 that if you receive something you give it to him, so it's more
15:54:31 20 like that. I will say to him, "Look, I will see what I can do,
21 but I don't even have it. I'm suffering myself". So I think I
22 could agree with you, counsel, that if you are saying that
23 politicians normally make these kinds of promises, this is one of
24 those that I made knowing very well that it would not get better.

15:54:52 25 Q. Because frankly, Mr Taylor, lies are not often far away
26 from politicians, are they?

27 A. For fear of - I wouldn't characterise politicians as such
28 because tomorrow - I mean this - I just have to - well, they have
29 a way of expressing themselves that I would not characterise as

1 lies. Maybe it is just ways of --

2 Q. Being economical with the truth?

3 A. Well, that is a less harsh interpretation, yes.

4 Q. So let's continue, shall we. "Moreover it will boost the
15:55:36 5 morale of my fighters who are in top form to advance in the" - I
6 can't read that?

7 A. "Advance on the enemies".

8 Q. "On the enemies", yes. Can we move it up a bit, please.

9 Yes, please:

15:55:56 10 "Lastly, today I am a common laughter because of lack of
11 vehicle for my mobility. My only jeep is in the garage beyond
12 repairs. I do ride on a Toyota truck for a long distance journey
13 or beg for lift here in town. Such practices pose a high risk to
14 my security but I have no alternative. I am asking you to arrest
15:56:36 15 the situation by providing me even a second-hand pick-up to
16 enhance my mobility."

17 Now again, Mr Taylor, we see in that passage that phrase
18 "for lift here in town". Where is he referring to?

19 A. I have - well, I will tell you what, but look at the whole
15:56:59 20 sentence. Why would he be at risk in Gbarnga? So what he is
21 probably talking about - where is Foday Sankoh at this particular
22 time? I think he is probably in Kailahun, I am not too sure, but
23 why would Foday Sankoh be at any risk if he is with me? He is
24 not in any risk with me so he cannot be with me at this time. So
15:57:24 25 I am not sure which town he is talking about. He has got to be
26 talking about wherever he is, because if he is in Gbarnga he is
27 not at any risk. I mean what would be the risk? "Such practices
28 pose a high risk to my security". He cannot be a high risk
29 security person in Gbarnga.

1 Q. So, help me. Did you provide him with vehicles?

2 A. No, no, he is asking for a vehicle here. He is asking.

3 Q. But had you ever provided him with that kind of assistance?

4 A. Yes, I had given Foday Sankoh a vehicle before, yes.

15:57:59 5 Q. When was that?

6 A. Oh, I am not sure, but I had given him I think a jeep

7 before. Now he is asking for a pick-up, but he has a jeep.

8 Q. Now before we depart from this document, where reference is

9 made to his appreciation for the five boxes of AK-47 rifle

15:58:34 10 ammunition and the ten boxes of RPG gun rockets, can you assist

11 whether or not that is indicative of the level of assistance you

12 provided, or what?

13 A. Well, let's look. Did he say ten boxes of RPG rockets?

14 Q. He actually says five in the second paragraph.

15:58:58 15 A. Okay, so he says five boxes of AK ammunition and he said

16 ten boxes of RPG gun rockets which actually - well, whilst

17 indicative of the supplies that I am giving to Foday Sankoh are

18 very small amounts, this is I would say typical of the small

19 amounts that he gets over the years because I too don't have

15:59:27 20 them, yes.

21 Q. And help us. Now that you have provided us with that

22 assistance as to the quantities involved, the next question then

23 is with what regularity?

24 A. Oh, I would say not on many occasions.

15:59:55 25 Q. How many?

26 A. Oh, it's almost impossible to tell right now, but I can

27 tell you what. Whenever Foday Sankoh - if he did not come and

28 things were rough there were times as low as two boxes. If there

29 is a problem going on where we are fighting and they are

1 fighting, the men on the border will be ordered to give him - to
2 help him with a few boxes of AK, sometimes with a few rockets,
3 but there was not a frequent thing because he also captured some
4 arms and ammunition inside Sierra Leone that he was using, but in
16:00:32 5 short it was very infrequent.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, this assistance that we see
7 in paragraph 2 as well as the vehicle that the witness alluded to
8 a little earlier, were these free of charge, were they gifts, or
9 were they paid for?

10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, they were not paid for. Foday
11 Sankoh - these were not new items either. They were gifts that I
12 gave him and he didn't have to pay for them.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. Why were you being so generous?

15 A. I am not sure if you call that generous. When you see you
16 can help out, because I needed Foday Sankoh as much as he needed
17 me.

18 Q. So what was in it for you?

19 A. Border protection. I was trying to hold ULIMO down and
16:01:33 20 what he was doing for me was a big favour too. He had his own
21 objective. His objective, he was getting a little ammunition.
22 But for me the biggest objective was the protection of my borders
23 to keep the infiltration of ULIMO that was being armed by Guinea
24 and Sierra Leone from entering and that was primarily my
16:01:54 25 preoccupation.

26 As a matter of fact, to add to that, I think one of the
27 last witnesses - Prosecution witnesses - that appeared before
28 this Court whose name I cannot call, I think put it even better
29 than I am putting it. A gentleman, I can't call his name, he is

1 a protected witness. But I think he put it squarely - and I am
2 saying one of the very, very, very last witnesses. My sole and
3 only reason in dealing with Sankoh at that time was to make sure
4 that my border was protected and fend - to help fend ULIMO off
16:02:46 5 with their advances. I had absolutely no other reason to be in
6 Sierra Leone, even though I have heard through these proceedings
7 that Taylor went into Sierra Leone for diamonds.

8 Q. I was coming to that.

9 A. Taylor went into Sierra Leone to terrorise the population
16:03:10 10 and seize control. My God. When we get to diamonds we will show
11 that we went through diamond areas in Liberia and did not mine
12 because it always disrupted. So my only purpose - my only
13 purpose was to make sure that that border was protected. I gave
14 him a little assistance to help along that process. I sent men
16:03:39 15 to secure it. The men got out of place. I acted. I had no
16 other reason whatsoever than that.

17 Q. Did you think it was worth it, that you were getting a good
18 deal?

19 A. Yes, I think for the time that things were good before
16:04:05 20 things got out of control the progress of ULIMO was not as fast
21 while we cooperated on that border.

22 Q. Mr Taylor, I can't leave this topic without putting the
23 Prosecution's case squarely to you so you can deal with it. You
24 do recall evidence to the effect that Sankoh brought diamonds to
16:04:38 25 you in Gbarnga in return for arms. You remember that being said,
26 don't you?

27 A. I do.

28 Q. Did that happen?

29 A. That never happened. It is blatantly untrue. But let's

1 examine it further. If Foday Sankoh brought diamonds to me for
2 arms and ammunition, then surely he was not getting a good deal.
3 It's as simple as that. If you are getting three, four, five
4 boxes of ammunition, one would expect maybe in this letter for
16:05:17 5 Foday Sankoh to say, "Listen, all the money and all the diamonds
6 I am giving you, is this all you are going to give me?" I mean,
7 come on, this is total - I don't have a manufacturing shop in
8 Liberia to manufacture arms. I am hustling, catching arms
9 myself. It is a blatant, blatant lie. Foday Sankoh never gave
16:05:40 10 me any diamonds for any arms and if he did then he got a very,
11 very bad deal because I didn't have the arms to give him and I
12 did not.

13 Listen, there is something about - I have been using
14 certain terminologies and what. I know, you know, the
16:06:03 15 demonisation and they make you look like you are some scum of the
16 earth so they can destroy you. Nonsense. Listen, I am a
17 pan-African revolutionary and I have respect for myself.

18 Look, all this thing to try to make me look like a scum in
19 order - listen. Never. Not Charles Ghankay Taylor. And this is
16:06:27 20 why we have seen this and my record is clear. You know, all this
21 thing in the public eye. Charles Taylor stole millions of
22 dollars. He has assets scattered around the world. The same
23 lies and constructs to make you appear worse than human until
24 today and I sit in this Hague today before these honourable
16:07:00 25 judges and I challenge the United Nations, I challenge any human
26 being or organisation in this world, I mean on this planet, to
27 bring one bank account that Charles Taylor has money in. They
28 continue to lie.

29 I have heard the Prosecutor blatantly lie saying we found

1 millions. Bring the millions here. Please, today if you have
2 any - if there is any bank anywhere in the world in Europe,
3 Switzerland, wherever that has an account - a numbered account
4 for Charles Taylor or anyone associated with me that brought
16:07:37 5 money to you, I urge you today to come forward here in this
6 Europe and bring it. If anyone anywhere on the planet knows of a
7 building or any property in Europe or the United States, please
8 you are authorised to come forward today. They can hear it
9 throughout the world.

16:07:59 10 This lie about Taylor, I am supposed to be such a scumbag
11 that people bring me diamonds in nothing else but a mayonnaise
12 jar. How much more can you demonise me? How much more? I
13 challenge them today to bring any evidence. It's a lie. Never
14 brought me any diamonds in nothing, just as there are no bank
16:08:18 15 accounts anywhere in the world. I will tell anybody if a bank
16 account is found anywhere in the world that has any money
17 belonging to Charles Taylor then Charles Taylor has lied, his
18 whole life then is a lie. Never happen. Never. What kind of
19 money and diamonds and - never happened.

16:08:40 20 Q. Well, Mr Taylor, what I would like to do in summarising and
21 hopefully concluding this chapter is ask you the following: One,
22 do you accept that for a period you did assist Foday Sankoh and
23 the RUF?

24 A. I will be specific, because a "yes" could go into a new
16:09:11 25 avenue. Between August in 1991 up until May of 1992, yes.

26 Q. Secondly, do you accept that during that period - that
27 rough period - NPFL combatants on your instructions were deployed
28 in Sierra Leone?

29 A. During that period I accept that NPFL combatants were

1 deployed in Sierra Leone - and let me not end it there - for the
2 protection of Liberia.

3 Q. Thirdly, do you accept that that period of NPFL direct
4 involvement concluded following complaints made to you by Foday
16:10:10 5 Sankoh about their behaviour?

6 A. Pardon? I didn't get that good. What - let's be sure.

7 Q. Do you accept that those NPFL combatants you sent to Sierra
8 Leone, that their departure followed complaints by Foday Sankoh
9 about their behaviour?

16:10:39 10 A. Well, regard to - maybe that's the second part of the
11 question. They did not just leave because of the complaint
12 alone. They left because of the complaint and the combat.

13 Q. No, I am coming to the combat.

14 A. Okay, yes.

16:11:04 15 Q. But I'm dealing with matters in stages.

16 A. I would say yes.

17 Q. And do you accept that the complaint being made by Foday
18 Sankoh was that your men were looting, pillaging and committing
19 other atrocities in Sierra Leone?

16:11:22 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. Do you also accept that there was a series of
22 confrontations between the RUF and your men which thereafter led
23 to their departure?

24 A. Yes.

16:11:41 25 Q. Do you accept that you caused to have transmitted a radio
26 message recalling your men from Sierra Leone?

27 A. That is correct. An order, yes.

28 Q. And just so that we are clear, your case is, is it, that
29 thereafter you provided no further support to the RUF?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. And when you say "I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, provided no
3 further support to the RUF", precisely what are you saying?

4 A. I am saying that two things happened: Not just provided
16:12:46 5 assistance; but all ties, communication, were cut. There were no
6 more radio links, there were no physical links, there were no
7 telephone calls, there were no - what else you can use in
8 communication? None of those happened. But there is another
9 side of this that we have to add: But I did act - and probably
16:13:11 10 we will get to this - those people that were withdrawn from
11 Sierra Leone, there were subsequent actions. Probably we will
12 get to that.

13 Q. We will get to that. But I just want to clarify and
14 summarise this chapter before we move on. When you say that
16:13:31 15 there was no further contact, was there ever a time after this
16 period when you, Charles Ghankay Taylor, whether as leader of the
17 NPFL or President of the Republic of Liberia, officially provided
18 arms and ammunition to the RUF or anyone associated with them?

19 A. No. Never. No.

16:14:09 20 Q. Now, what action was taken; the action to which you have
21 just recently referred?

22 A. The commander - let's not forget that - and I take full
23 responsibilities for this. The men that went on that border in
24 Sierra Leone to help to fight ULIMO to keep - I will tell you
16:14:34 25 what, this, you know, if we want to look at something seriously,
26 is almost like a page out of my book. I can remember the former
27 President of the United States, George Bush, after the terrible
28 incident of 9/11, saying that he needed to fight the enemy where
29 they are; that they don't have to fight them in America. So he

1 got that page from my book. So my problem was to fight ULIMO in
2 Sierra Leone before - that I didn't have to fight them in
3 Liberia. So that is the - it is the same scenario, okay? And
4 because we ordered those people into Sierra Leone, the commander
16:15:19 5 of those forces, and one of the names I have come here in this
6 Court, the commander of the forces in Sierra Leone at the time of
7 withdrawal Sam Tuah was investigated, he was court-martialled and
8 the records are here where they talk about Sam Tuah being
9 executed.

16:15:37 10 Q. What for?

11 A. For the atrocities that he committed in Sierra Leone
12 because he went in on orders. And as the officer we
13 investigated. We did. Remember I said in April when Foday
14 Sankoh told me this I told him that we investigated. The
16:15:56 15 investigation did not stop. Because Sam Tuah was ordered to go
16 into Sierra Leone to fight ULIMO to keep them from coming that we
17 did not have to fight them in Liberia, he returned that
18 withdrawal - and the records are here it has been testified here
19 in this Court - Sam Tuah was court-martialled for his behaviour
16:16:16 20 in Sierra Leone and he was found guilty of massive, I mean,
21 atrocities in Sierra Leone. There were cases where it was
22 reported that he personally drew his handgun and shot, you know,
23 people in the head and civilians, and he was court martialled, he
24 was tried and he was executed, Sam Tuah, for the atrocities he
16:16:40 25 committed in Sierra Leone.

26 Q. Now those atrocities, Mr Taylor, did you order them?

27 A. No, no, no. That's why we - that - this one - how - no.
28 That's why he was court martialled.

29 Q. Who?

1 A. Sam Tuah, the commander that commanded the forces in Sierra
2 Leone.

3 Q. No, I asked because we are facing an indictment which
4 suggests that. So help me: During that period when your
16:17:08 5 soldiers were in Sierra Leone, to what extent were you managing
6 that situation?

7 A. No, I did not have day-to-day control, let's say,
8 micromanaging a unit in the field. That was not my job. We had
9 senior generals doing that. But what was important for us at
16:17:31 10 this time, this Court, even from the Prosecution's side, have
11 seen evidence of the types of actions that we took. There is
12 no-one - absolutely no officer in the NPFL that blatantly carried
13 on atrocities during the reign of the NPFL that got away with it,
14 no. And this Court has seen ample evidence of the trials that
16:18:03 15 the Prosecution even admits that there were trials and there were
16 executions, so there was no way we were micromanaging it. What
17 we held fast to was a document I referred to here before, the
18 operational order. That gave the order of conduct of the
19 military. Anyone who disobeyed - not everybody got killed for
16:18:30 20 that. Some people went to jail. But there was no impunity, and
21 so we did not order that. That is why he had to account for what
22 he did in Sierra Leone at the court-martial.

23 Q. Mr Taylor - and again I am asking you this because of the
24 way in which the Prosecution put their case - did you advise
16:18:59 25 Foday Sankoh or any member of the RUF as to what strategies and
26 tactics to adopt in their revolution?

27 A. Never. Never. I probably needed the advice myself.
28 Never. Like I said, Foday Sankoh was a military man; I was not.
29 So if anybody needed the real advice, I needed the advice; not

1 him. Never.

2 Q. You do recall, don't you, in opening their case Mr Rapp
3 telling this Court that you instructed your commanders to follow
4 a certain modus operandi, and let me go through it in toto and
16:19:43 5 then we will come back to it. That that modus operandi - and
6 this is page 54 of that transcript - that: One, you should
7 attack the civilian population; two, that attackers would use a
8 variety of arms and other material to take control; that the
9 attacks included the murder of many civilians; typically the
16:20:09 10 attackers would enslave large numbers of the civilian population
11 to use as fighters, miners, farmers, domestic workers; those who
12 objected would be beaten or killed; typically the attackers would
13 rape women and girls and turn them into sexual slaves; the
14 attackers would mutilate; children were conscripted; the
16:20:32 15 attackers would loot and burn.

16 Now, did you give any such instruction to your commanders?

17 A. No, I did not. But the Prosecutor forgot that after he
18 made those opening remarks, the very Prosecutor brought witnesses
19 to this Court - his witnesses - that said that we executed
16:21:05 20 soldiers for atrocities. A Prosecution witness right in this
21 chair, former President Moses Blah, said very clearly - he
22 explained the execution of Sam Larto for killing a civilian. He,
23 the very Moses Blah, talked about, I mean, all of these trials.
24 He, the Moses Blah, talked about the Court-martial board and the
16:21:32 25 military tribunal. So on the one hand, the Prosecutor cannot say
26 I am ordering these atrocities in another country, and on the
27 other hand he is presenting evidence here that we took stringent
28 measures against senior military people for atrocities. So he
29 cannot have it both ways. He cannot on the one hand say that it

1 happened, and other the other say he took - it doesn't work that
2 way. I had no control over Sierra Leone whatsoever, did not want
3 control over Sierra Leone. In Liberia it was very strict. I
4 tell you, rape in Liberia, you - in fact, a soldier raping a
16:22:19 5 woman in Liberia, you are sure that you are going to be executed.
6 No-one has to tell you that. If it were proven that you violated
7 a woman, you knew you were going because it was spelt out. The
8 operational order spelled out in details what would happen laying
9 out the different crimes. Murder, rape, mutiny, were spelt out.
16:22:47 10 So he cannot have it both ways. His witnesses have sat in this
11 chair and have talked about these - these trials and these
12 executions. They were not for fun. They were because people
13 carried out atrocities, and the very man that carried out the
14 atrocities in Sierra Leone, a Prosecution witness, I don't
16:23:11 15 remember which one, the records can be checked, talked about Sam
16 Tuah, he was executed. Not because of what he did in Liberia but
17 because of what he did in Sierra Leone and why? Because he was
18 sent on orders to carry out a mission. So he cannot have it both
19 ways. It is total, total nonsense that he is talking. He can't
16:23:30 20 have it both ways.

21 Q. Well, did you give such instructions as set out by the
22 Prosecution to Foday Sankoh and the RUF?

23 A. Never, never, never. As a matter of fact, counsel,
24 Prosecution witnesses came before this Court and even said that
16:23:57 25 Foday Sankoh - that Foday Sankoh was very, very strict about his
26 overall behaviour towards civilians. So I mean I don't know,
27 maybe people forget about what they say and what they present in
28 evidence, but his witnesses even in a way praised Foday Sankoh
29 that Foday Sankoh did not permit atrocities. His witnesses did

1 that.

2 So he can't say on the one hand that Foday Sankoh is under
3 instructions - well, then if we assume that these instructions
4 are passed out and Foday Sankoh is supposed to be under my
16:24:36 5 control where I am managing him like driving a car down a
6 highway, then Foday Sankoh is not a very good person to control.
7 Then that means that really, if you look at the logic, this man
8 that is supposed to be under my control, this man that will not
9 do anything except he is told by me, this man that will only take
16:25:02 10 instructions from me is not doing anything like that. His
11 witnesses are saying that this man is a good man in dealing with
12 civilians.

13 So, you know, it is almost like this reverse logic where
14 people are so anxious to demonise me and they forget when they
16:25:20 15 bring their witnesses. So, there is not one witness here - and
16 most of his witnesses talked about how careful Foday Sankoh was
17 in dealing with civilians, so then that means that I either had
18 control over him and he was doing what I told him to do or he
19 didn't. In either case I am not carrying out atrocities against
16:25:40 20 civilians. He is not. So where is the control? This doesn't -
21 it doesn't just jive. It doesn't come together and I think
22 people ought to be more careful with their thinking.

23 Q. Before we move on, when you ordered the withdrawal of your
24 combatants from Sierra Leone did they all return?

16:26:06 25 A. No, all of them did not return. Some of the combatants
26 that went to Sierra Leone again were Sierra Leoneans, half Sierra
27 Leoneans and half Liberians, and some of them just decided to
28 stay. And the sad thing about it, when we look at some of these
29 people that are claiming to be Liberians, Isaac Mongor that sat

1 before this Court was one of the RUF individuals that carried out
2 the Top 20, Top 40 and Top Final. He, Isaac Mongor. Isaac
3 Mongor was one of those individuals that carried out that
4 operation against.

16:27:12 5 So here is a man now who claims he is a Liberian and was
6 supposed to be sent by me to train. This is the same man that
7 has attacked these Liberians and killed them. He was one of the
8 leaders of the Top 20, Top 40. Do you understand me? So this
9 just doesn't come together as they are trying to take it.

16:27:44 10 Q. Now in terms of time frame, Mr Taylor, we are now up to
11 about May of 1992. Now help us. In terms of efforts to achieve
12 peace in Liberia, what has been happening during those first five
13 months of 1992?

14 A. Well, there are ongoing discussions. In late '91 there is
16:28:16 15 Yamoussoukro and there are all these diplomatic movements going
16 on between the IGNU government, our own people, there is war
17 going on. ULIMO now takes on a more permanent role because they
18 have substantial territory. It is mostly the diplomatic fury,
19 you know, going on and along with that war.

16:28:52 20 Q. War with whom?

21 A. We was still fighting. We were still fighting. Remember
22 now ULIMO has taken Lofa, they have come to the St Paul River
23 bridge, they are now trying to make efforts to advance further to
24 get us out of Gbarnga. On the other side you have ECOMOG and the
16:29:12 25 Armed Forces of Liberia still trying to conduct these probes
26 against us, so there is ongoing conflict. Clashes here and
27 there. Not every day fighting, fighting. But, you know, there
28 is maybe a lull in the fighting for a week or two and then it
29 starts up in another area. There is constant trouble. We are

1 still talking about peace and that we want peace, but things are
2 not normal, but we are now in the position of trying to prepare a
3 mechanism for governance.

16:30:01 4 MR GRIFFITHS: Mr President, would that be a convenient
5 point? I want to raise one short matter. You will recall that
6 earlier today you - I made reference to a TF1 number and I made a
7 particular suggestion. I have been trying through my assistants
8 to try and correct that position without any luck and it may well
9 be that I have got that completely wrong. If I have, then I
16:30:28 10 apologise to all concerned. We will seek to correct it further.
11 If not, I will withdraw the question and the answer and perhaps
12 deal with it in another way.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right. We will probably be hearing
14 from you sometime tomorrow or so on that issue.

16:30:47 15 MR GRIFFITHS: Yes.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. Well, I think this is a convenient
17 place to end for today. We will adjourn and reconvene tomorrow
18 morning at 9.30. Mr Taylor, once more I issue that caution. You
19 are not permitted to speak about your evidence with any other
16:31:10 20 person. We will adjourn. Thank you.

21 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.
22 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 21 July 2009 at
23 9.30 a.m.]

24
25
26
27
28
29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	24720
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	24720