



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

THURSDAY, 16 JULY 2009  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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**Before the Judges:**

Justice Richard Lussick, Presiding  
Justice Teresa Doherty  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice El Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

**For Chambers:**

Mr William Romans  
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

**For the Registry:**

Ms Rachel Irura  
Mr Benedict Williams

**For the Prosecution:**

Ms Brenda J Hollis  
Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Christopher Santora  
Ms Maja Dimitrova

**For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:**

Mr Courtenay Griffiths QC  
Mr Morris Anyah  
Mr James Supuwood

1 Thursday, 16 July 2009

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:31:07 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. We will take appearances  
6 first, please.

7 MS HOLLIS: Good morning, Mr President, your Honours  
8 opposing counsel. This morning for the Prosecution, Mohamed A  
9 Bangura, Christopher Santora, Maja Dimitrova and myself Brenda J  
09:31:37 10 Hollis.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Good morning, your Honours, Mr President,  
13 counsel opposite. For the Defence today, myself Courtenay  
14 Griffiths assisted by my learned friends Mr Morris Anyah and  
09:31:52 15 Clir Supuwood. Whilst I am on my feet, Mr President, can I raise  
16 a very short matter.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead.

18 MR GRIFFITHS: It's merely this: We appreciate that we are  
19 now moving a lot faster than we anticipated and I hope the Court  
09:32:11 20 will be pleased to hear that. We will slow down when we get to  
21 the critical time period because of the weight of documentation  
22 we will have to deal with at that stage. But one consequence of  
23 us moving faster is the timing of disclosure of exhibits and that  
24 two-week time frame, so that sadly we have now reached a point  
09:32:41 25 where we may well reach exhibits for which the Prosecution have  
26 not had their allotted two weeks notice.

27 Now, because of the logistical problems that this raises,  
28 what we've decided to do is this: We will serve on the  
29 Prosecution by close of play today all exhibits on the current

1 exhibits list. They will be served today and they will also be  
2 served in chronological order, which is essentially the order in  
3 which we will be using them, so that they will be by date and  
4 year in that order so that the Prosecution can essentially  
09:33:30 5 appreciate the way in which we will be moving through those  
6 documents.

7 Now, we've circulated to all concerned an email outlining  
8 what we propose to do and we do hope, frankly, that, with a  
9 degree of flexibility by all parties, we may be able to approach  
09:33:54 10 that two-week disclosure period with some kind of indulgence for  
11 the Defence which allows the trial to proceed without any major  
12 adjournments or hiccups.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Griffiths. I have noted  
14 those and we do have a copy of that email you referred to as  
09:34:19 15 well.

16 Mr Taylor, I remind you that you are still bound by your  
17 declaration that you have taken to tell the truth. Go ahead,  
18 Mr Griffiths.

19 DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR:

20 [On former affirmation]

21 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS: [Continued]

22 Q. Yesterday afternoon, Mr Taylor, when we adjourned for the  
23 evening we had dealt with your dealings with President Momoh in  
24 Sierra Leone. Do you recall that?

09:34:47 25 A. Yes, I do.

26 Q. And we will of course return to your dealings with him when  
27 we come to 1991, but I now want to pick up the account in or  
28 around 1988/'89. Now, at that stage, were you still resident in  
29 Burkina Faso?

1 A. Yes, I was.

2 Q. And help us. Who was the President of Burkina Faso at that  
3 time?

4 A. Blaise Compaore.

09:35:32 5 Q. And what were your relations with him like?

6 A. Very good. We became very good friends because I had  
7 stayed in Burkina Faso since my expulsion, I will call it, from  
8 Ghana and so we had grown to be very good friends.

9 Q. What was the availability of travel from Ouagadougou to  
09:36:08 10 Tripoli?

11 A. There were regular weekly flights from Ouagadougou to  
12 Tripoli provided by the Russian airline Aeroflot and so it was  
13 very easy at least twice a week to travel between Ouagadougou and  
14 Tripoli.

09:36:39 15 Q. By let's say the middle of 1988, how many men did you have  
16 then training in Libya?

17 A. The full 168 men were on the ground in Libya by that time.

18 Q. Now, did you consider that number, 168, as being capable of  
19 carrying out your project?

09:37:05 20 A. No, not at all.

21 Q. So how did you plan on using such a small number of men?

22 A. Excuse me, your Honour. The whole process of having men  
23 stay in Libya for two years, as I've mentioned previously to the  
24 Court, was to have them train not just as soldiers, but as  
09:37:38 25 revolutionaries knowing very well not just the art of war, but  
26 how to deal with civilians, how to treat the citizenry in  
27 particular and how to remain the what we call eyes and ears of  
28 the revolution.

29 So our plan then was to train these whole men, may I say,

1 and whole I mean in all aspects: the civilian administration,  
2 being military and being able to handle and understand the  
3 intricacies of what is necessary if we were lucky to take power  
4 that there would not be any excesses. They would then go into  
09:38:37 5 the country and because of the sympathy that existed on the  
6 ground, and may I say on an extreme level maybe the desire to  
7 maybe fight back at Samuel Doe, they would be in a position to  
8 take control. So one special force commander, we call them  
9 commandos, was capable of handling on his own. Now, let me --

09:39:04 10 Q. Of doing what?

11 A. Of handling on his own. Let me explain what I mean by  
12 handling on his own. As we got into the country and spread, I  
13 could send one special force commando to a region and he was  
14 capable of organising, identifying people capable of being  
09:39:27 15 trained militarily, looking at the civilian administration and  
16 being able to practically serve as a type of administrator on his  
17 own without having to get that day-to-day instructions from  
18 central headquarters. So that is why it took them so long. It  
19 was a partial academic training, may I say, military training,  
09:39:54 20 administrative. Everything was put into these Special Forces.

21 Q. Now, when did you start moving those men out of Libya?

22 A. By I would say the second quarter of 1989 we started moving  
23 them out of Libya.

24 Q. To where?

09:40:28 25 A. Into Burkina Faso.

26 Q. And where were they being housed and accommodated in  
27 Burkina Faso?

28 A. Because of the sheer size and number of them, we had  
29 requested a place outside of the capital Ouagadougou where they

1 could stay and probably do some work. By work I mean a little  
2 farming, because let me just clarify one thing here. By the time  
3 these men are about to move we are desperate.

09:41:13 4 What do I mean by desperate? Remember I explained to the  
5 Court we have not gotten yet a firm okay to move arms that we had  
6 been promised but had not received to Sierra Leone because of  
7 what I explained of the ambivalence on the part of Momoh and his  
8 own fear of what I explained of having such a large amount of  
9 arms come into the country.

09:41:40 10 Burkina Faso is available, but they really can't help  
11 because they don't share a border with Liberia. The men are in  
12 Libya, the training is over and they are now anxious to move.  
13 Everyone is just jittery about moving. So the only solution is  
14 to move them into Burkina Faso and then provide - ask for a place  
09:42:08 15 that they could stay and do a little bit of farming at a  
16 subsistence level for themselves until something could be worked  
17 out. By something I mean that a mechanism was put into place to  
18 move them to their objective.

19 Q. Right. So that is the second quarter of 1989?

09:42:36 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. And were they moved in one go, or did they gradually move  
22 into Burkina Faso?

23 A. They were moved, to be exact, I would say in about three to  
24 four groups.

09:42:59 25 Q. And help us, who was paying for the transport from Libya to  
26 Burkina Faso?

27 A. The transportation was paid for by the Mataba. That is the  
28 Libyan government, I would say.

29 Q. And whilst in Burkina Faso, how much contact did you have

1 with them?

2 A. By "them" are you referring to the men?

3 Q. To the men?

09:43:32

4 A. Oh, I had all contacts with them. I am living in Burkina  
5 Faso before and I am back in Burkina Faso, so they are taken out  
6 of town to a place where they could do a little bit of  
7 subsistence farming but I visited them regularly.

8 Q. Now those men who moved from Libya to Burkina Faso, what  
9 nationality were they?

09:43:57

10 A. They were all Liberians.

11 Q. Did either Foday Sankoh or Dr Manneh provide logistics for  
12 the move to Burkina Faso?

09:44:25

13 A. No, no, no, no. At the time Dr Manneh was himself  
14 scrambling to get something done, neither he nor I knew Foday  
15 Sankoh. So, no, in fact they needed help - he needed help  
16 himself.

17 Q. So was there any kind of cooperation between you and either  
18 of those two men regarding this issue --

19 A. No.

09:44:40

20 Q. -- of movement?

21 A. Movement not at all, no. In fact, on the Sierra Leonean  
22 side I mentioned to the Court that the Sierra Leonean group that  
23 was in Libya left before the Liberian group, long before the  
24 Liberian group. The only person that was in Burkina Faso, as we  
09:45:05 25 moved in, was Kukoi Samba Sanyang, the Gambian leader.

26 Q. Now did they know, that is Sankoh and Dr Manneh, that you  
27 were moving your men from Libya to Burkina Faso?

28 A. No, I keep hearing the word - the name Sankoh. Sankoh is  
29 not in the picture. I don't know him. He - in fact Kabbah, Ali

1 Kabbah, has disappeared with his men several months before the  
2 Liberian movement, so the only person that is aware as we are in  
3 Burkina Faso and moving is Dr Manneh who has his little group of  
4 men already on the ground in Burkina Faso.

09:45:54 5 Q. So did you consult with anyone at all about the movement of  
6 these men from Libya to Burkina Faso?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So who did you consult with?

9 A. The President of Burkina Faso. He is the only one that I  
09:46:10 10 consulted. I had to get his agreement - his okay - to move the  
11 men back into Burkina Faso. He was explained to - in fact he  
12 knew the difficulties we were running into and expressed some  
13 sympathy for what we were going through, but there was very  
14 little that he could do except help with our lodging because he  
09:46:36 15 didn't have the type of arms and ammunition that would have  
16 helped us to go into Liberia.

17 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, you had told us yesterday about the other  
18 organisers of the NPFL. Did you consult with them about this  
19 movement?

09:46:53 20 A. Oh, yes. Ellen knew. Tom Womeiyu knew. When you talk -  
21 when you use the - I am sorry if the Court got confused. When  
22 you say consulted, they were informed. Discussions occurred. I  
23 interpreted consultations in a little different way, but they  
24 were informed and aware because they were part of the  
09:47:19 25 organisation and did not necessarily need consultations because  
26 they were a part of the whole planning process for movement. So  
27 I am sorry if I misunderstood what you said.

28 Q. And help us, did either of those two visit with you and the  
29 men whilst you were in Burkina Faso?



1 A. Yes.

2 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, this entire line of questioning  
3 has been leading in the sense it's calling for yes or no answers,  
4 it includes in the question suggestions as to the answers and we  
09:47:54 5 would ask that Defence counsel ask open ended non-leading  
6 questions.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Griffiths.

8 MR GRIFFITHS: I totally disagree, Mr President. I suggest  
9 it's not leading at all, because none of my questions have  
09:48:09 10 suggested the answer I submit.

11 [Trial Chamber conferred]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, we will overrule you, Ms Hollis. Go  
13 ahead, Mr Griffiths.

14 MR GRIFFITHS:

09:48:35 15 Q. How did you supply the men whilst they were in Burkina  
16 Faso?

17 A. Well let me just ask the time of the Court. I had not  
18 answered your question did either of the two go to Burkina Faso,  
19 yes. Tom Woveiyu visited us in Burkina Faso. Ellen did not  
09:48:59 20 while we were in Burkina Faso. She visited at another time at  
21 another place, but I will wait for that part.

22 Q. Now, how did you provide for the men whilst they were in  
23 Burkina Faso?

24 A. While in Burkina Faso the Mataba, knowing our dilemma,  
09:49:29 25 continued to assist with a little bit of money - by a little bit  
26 of money I mean a few thousand dollars, \$3,000/\$5,000 - but the  
27 government of Burkina Faso at the time helped to provide some  
28 basic food stuff as sustenance to the men.

29 Q. And at this stage did you have any supplies of arms and

1 ammunition?

2 A. None whatsoever. In fact this --

3 MS HOLLIS: We are going to object again. This is more  
4 than directing the witness. This is indicating what - that in  
09:50:11 5 fact he is talking about supplies. He is directing it. He is  
6 asking for yes or no answers. He is not asking for explanations.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well what I see in these questions, even  
8 though we are now outside the indictment period, is an attempt to  
9 answer in context the allegations in the indictment.

09:50:39 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Precisely.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, and as my learned friend Justice  
12 Sebutinde says and also the Prosecution evidence to the contrary.  
13 So I will overrule the objection and I will allow the question.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful.

09:50:59 15 THE WITNESS: No, we had no arms and neither did we have  
16 any ammunition. Let me just remind the Court that one of the  
17 reasons why we are in this mess - and by mess I mean not going  
18 straight to Liberia - is because we don't have the means to go.  
19 Here is Momoh willing but hedging, Burkina Faso does not have the  
09:51:30 20 arms and ammunition necessary to carry out the objective and so  
21 we are just stuck and have to wait for a mechanism because second  
22 to that without the arms and ammunition we can't enter Liberia  
23 just that way. So we did not have anything at this time and that  
24 is the cause of the delay in Burkina Faso.

09:51:59 25 Q. Now, yesterday you told us that there was another group of  
26 Liberians in Libya. Do you recall telling us that?

27 A. Yes, I did.

28 Q. And they were under the control of whom?

29 A. Dr Henry B Fahnbulleh had taken them to Libya.

1 Q. What had happened to those men?

2 A. At some point during the training the group that he had  
3 taken to Libya was apparently very small. I do not know the  
4 quantity, but a question arose at the Mataba as to the capacity  
09:52:41 5 for his men to be able to stage any successful revolution in  
6 Liberia and, secondly, the wisdom in having two competing  
7 Liberian groups in Libya at the same time.

8 Now, the reason why I know his group was smaller is because  
9 a decision was taken that the two groups should come together and  
09:53:06 10 that their group should join our group because their group was  
11 smaller. And I am using "smaller" just in that sense because I  
12 don't know the numbers. But because their group was said to be  
13 smaller I have to say that it was less than 168.

14 Dr Fahnbulleh did not agree. In fact, we had not sat to  
09:53:30 15 discuss this. He and I did not meet while we were there. And  
16 so, the group broke up.

17 Two persons that were attached to his group decided that  
18 they would not leave. They would join the NPFL. The two - one  
19 was, and I am saying was, because he is deceased, was called  
09:54:04 20 Putu, that's P-U-T-U, Putu Major, that's M-A-J-O-R. The second  
21 is Paul Nimely, who is presently in Liberia - decided that they  
22 would join us and this is what brought the total up to now,  
23 instead of - we've been using the total of 168 in terms of the  
24 final number, but it was 166 plus two that led to the 168. So  
09:54:40 25 I've used in 168 in looking at the total NPFL at the time, but I  
26 think it's appropriate now that we explained that it grew to 168  
27 as a result of these two that were connected to Dr Fahnbulleh  
28 joining the NPFL instead of leaving the training programme.

29 Q. Now, what was the relationship like, Mr Taylor, between you

1 and your men?

2 A. Well, I would say bittersweet, more sweet than bitter, and  
3 let me explain what I mean by this. While we were in training -  
4 and by we I mean the NPFL. Let me note here that I did not take  
09:55:35 5 any military training. A little group within the NPFL decided  
6 that they would use me, put the revolution together. They had  
7 already said to me - remember I explained to this Court that the  
8 decision for the leadership of the NPFL was made by the men and  
9 there was an agreement I mentioned to this Court that upon the  
09:56:13 10 completion of the revolution I would be President, but one of  
11 them should be Vice-President. And I will explain later how  
12 Moses Blah became Vice-President, not because of any big  
13 qualification but because of that promise.

14 They decided - by "they" that little group in the NPFL  
09:56:33 15 decided that great, we want to do this but when we get on the  
16 ground and succeed to a particular point we will kill him. Since  
17 one of us will be Vice-President we will have everything in our  
18 hands. Most of them did not agree. This story broke up and a  
19 bunch of them were found to be involved in this conspiracy.  
09:56:58 20 Those that were found and even disciplined on the base included a  
21 gentleman called Anthony Mekunagbe. That name has come through -  
22 it's on the records. There was Oliver Varney. There was the  
23 late also Samuel Varney. You also had another one called Timothy  
24 Mulibah. Also a part of that group was a gentleman called Yegbeh  
09:57:35 25 Degbon. That is also on the record. That name has come forward.  
26 These are the individuals that formed this little gang. They  
27 were dealt with on the base by being punished, but as we go  
28 further we will know that they still harboured this intention as  
29 the revolution started.

1 Q. What do you mean as we go forward?

2 A. Well, once we get into Liberia something unfolds and I am  
3 not sure I want to jump the gun here, but something unfolds  
4 because that group kicks into motion and begins planning all over  
09:58:16 5 and they are caught and that group of generals that was brought  
6 forward here by the Prosecution, including the Oliver Varney, the  
7 Mekunagbe, they end up being tried and executed in Liberia. That  
8 is what I mean as we go forward, so we will get to that.

9 Q. Okay. Now, as far as you are aware, was the Doe regime  
09:58:48 10 aware of your presence in Burkina Faso?

11 A. I, based on my - and I make this statement based on my own  
12 knowledge of intelligence. I would just say he should have  
13 known. It would have been - it would have been silly if he  
14 didn't know because of the time that it had taken, and knowing  
09:59:16 15 that some people, by some people I mean the group that we left in  
16 La Cote d'Ivoire - by group I mean some of the names like Duopu,  
17 Nyuan, and all of these, Harry Nyuan, had all not gone. There  
18 was, I can say, that distinct possibility that he should have  
19 known.

09:59:35 20 Q. Now, you've already told us of an attempt by the Doe regime  
21 to extradite you from the United States?

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. Was that the only attempt he made to extradite you?

24 A. No. As I was arrested in Sierra Leone by the late  
09:59:58 25 inspector of police Bambi Kamara, that news had spread that I had  
26 been picked up in Sierra Leone. Doe requested at that time that  
27 I be sent back to Liberia.

28 Q. Any other attempt?

29 A. Not that I can recollect at this particular time.

1 Q. So let's go to Burkina Faso then. How long did your men  
2 remain in Burkina Faso?

3 A. From the second quarter of '89 up until I would say the  
4 about the beginning of the fourth quarter of '89. That is I  
10:00:51 5 would put it to around October. We had gotten very desperate.  
6 Things had not changed. There appeared to be no way and we were  
7 within inches of losing the men. Some of them were threatening  
8 to leave. So we decided to leave on or about I would say the  
9 middle to the end of October.

10:01:19 10 Q. And went where?

11 A. We decided to spread in La Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea. Those  
12 that were from the Mahn or the Mano ethnic group could go to  
13 Guinea. Those from the Dan ethnic group could go to La Cote  
14 d'Ivoire. And, for your Honours, you have the Dan ethnic group  
10:01:57 15 predominantly in La Cote d'Ivoire, also in Liberia, and the Mahn,  
16 which are the Manos, are also in Liberia and mostly in Guinea.  
17 So the Mahns are more closely attached to the Guinean side of the  
18 border and the Dans are more attached to the Dans on the Ivorian  
19 side.

10:02:22 20 So we tried to break them up and put them back into these  
21 countries to begin doing minor work while we continued to fight  
22 to see if we could find locally, and by locally, I mean from  
23 security groups and friends - if we could get - you know, maybe  
24 buy a few rifles to at least start something, because these men  
10:02:50 25 were well trained and they kept saying to me: "Chief, look, we  
26 are trained. We will go in without weapons if we have to and we  
27 will have to get weapons even if we have to steal them from the  
28 army until we get sufficient". So they were anxious and so we  
29 split them up in these countries to just stay low and see if we

1 could work something.

2 In the meantime I obtained a few thousands dollars from the  
3 Mataba that would have assisted us if we found such sympathy  
4 amongst the securities either of the Guinean side of the border  
10:03:30 5 or the Ivorian side that we could in fact buy a few rifles if  
6 they were available.

7 Q. So how long did this particular period of dispersal last  
8 for?

9 A. It lasted for close to two months and that is as of late  
10:04:01 10 October, or thereabouts, all November and most of December. By  
11 most of December, if the Court recognises, we launched the  
12 revolution on the 29th, so that's almost I would say a full two  
13 months. So we had pushed and pushed and set a date that come  
14 hell or high waters we would have to do something on that date  
10:04:31 15 and so we were in that area for close to two months.

16 Q. And what were you doing during that period?

17 A. I would say sweating blocks of ice. I was under so much  
18 pressure. I couldn't afford to lose the men and they were on my  
19 back door. I was under tremendous pressure, moving around,  
10:05:00 20 visiting them surreptitiously, going in and trying to stay in  
21 contact, you know, to get something going, between Burkina Faso,  
22 La Cote d'Ivoire. I did not go into Guinea. I would come into  
23 La Cote d'Ivoire. And these men were not concentrated, I am  
24 using the general name La Cote d'Ivoire - not in Abidjan area.

10:05:26 25 They were concentrated on the Ivorian-Liberian border in a major  
26 town called Bin-Houye. I think that's B-E-I-N and I think it's  
27 H-U-E-I. It's a French word. If we have got a map I am sure we  
28 will find it. It's Bin-Houye. These are all Gio towns spread  
29 across the border and so - but I was moving up and down during

1 that particular period, trying to get things to work and finally  
2 resulted to unorthodox tactics to get the revolution started.

3 Q. And what was that?

10:06:10

4 A. We had to end up buying hunting guns, shotguns, 12 gauge  
5 shotguns, and shotguns shells in La Cote d'Ivoire that was  
6 available on the regular market.

7 Q. How many of those were you able to buy?

10:06:39

8 A. We bought a total of three shotguns and a lot of shotguns  
9 shells. The whole point was then what to do with these three  
10 shotguns. It was decided that, look, there was an army post of  
11 not more - I would speculate not more than about a platoon,  
12 that's about 44 men and probably not up to about 50. The whole  
13 point was that we would attack that post, get the ammo dump, by  
14 that I mean where the armoury was kept, and use those weapons to  
15 begin. Now, at that outpost --

10:07:13

16 Q. Where was that?

17 A. In the town of Gbutuo, that is on the records here -  
18 Gbutuo, right on the Liberia-Ivorian border. And that was the  
19 strategy. It was a very risky one. Quite frankly, I didn't  
20 believe it would work. But, like I said, these men were well  
21 trained and they had the confidence and were very brave men and  
22 so we decided to use that method. But we also put into place a  
23 second plan and that is what we are going to get to. We did not  
24 just - that was one of about three plans put into place.

10:07:33

25 Q. Well, tell us about the others, please?

10:07:59

26 A. While we were in training we had established contact with  
27 some of the Mahn and Dan ethnic members of the Armed Forces of  
28 Liberia that were stationed both in the capital of Monrovia and  
29 at Camp Schefflein. We sent regular messages into Liberia. In



1 fact, one of the guys that was being trained as a special force  
2 came periodically from Libya and went into Liberia, so there was  
3 a group within the Armed Forces of Liberia that was aware of this  
4 operation taking place.

10:08:55 5 We also made some contacts at Camp Naama. That is on the  
6 records also, N-A-A-M-A, in Bong County. We had in our midst a  
7 former colonel of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Colonel Samuel  
8 Varney. Varney was a trained veteran of about 25/30 years of the  
9 armed forces. Now, Camp Naama served as the artillery base in  
10:09:35 10 the Republic of Liberia. Naama is about the largest military  
11 base in Liberia. It hosted the artillery command and the then  
12 engineering command of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Now,  
13 Colonel Varney once commanded that base and had sympathy and  
14 respect amongst the officers on that base.

10:10:06 15 Now, what we did was we sent him with that Guinean  
16 delegation on that operation - I am using the word "delegation",  
17 sorry, with that Guinean group, and their job was to try to get  
18 in on the base, find some of the loyalists to Colonel Varney and  
19 use them to start and take over Camp Naama.

10:10:37 20 The third part of this was to send into Monrovia, both at  
21 the Barclay Training Centre and Camp Schefflein, some of our  
22 Special Forces that would be at those bases with their contacts  
23 that once the operation started on the border we anticipated that  
24 the Naama and the Gbutuo operation would take place. That would  
10:11:12 25 draw the Armed Forces of Liberia to begin to move reinforcement  
26 out of the city to the border. Those Special Forces in town and  
27 their collaborators would then seize Schefflein and BTC, which  
28 meant a very quick operation. This is how it was planned.

29 Unluckily for us we had - and I don't want to be held to

1 specific numbers. It has been a long time. But we sent into  
2 Monrovia about a command or platoon of about 44 men. They were  
3 divided into those two areas. Unsuccessfully for us, as the men  
4 were infiltrating into Monrovia some of them had reached their  
10:12:04 5 targets. They did not go in a group of a platoon. It would be  
6 silly. It took us several days to infiltrate them by the twos,  
7 by the threes, different - it may have taken us almost a week to  
8 infiltrate the men in there.

9 The last group, as they were going into the city, some way  
10 somehow as information sometimes will leak the security picked it  
11 up and some of these men were arrested immediately, a few of them  
12 killed and the rest of them commenced exposing the plan,  
13 confessing. Even those that had already reached their  
14 destination at both Camp Schefflein and the Barclay Training  
10:12:56 15 Centre were very much in danger and they too began to scatter and  
16 trying to find their way back to the border to join the group  
17 that was supposed to attack Gbutuo.

18 The group that was on their way to Camp Naama --

19 Q. From where?

10:13:19 20 A. From la Cote d'Ivoire through Guinea. They were already in  
21 Guinea, leaving to get to Camp Naama, and they had to travel all  
22 the way near a town in Guinea called Nzerekore.

23 Q. Spell that.

24 A. I am sorry, I am going to need some help from the Court on  
10:13:41 25 this one. That is in Guinea. It's a border town in Guinea.

26 Q. Pronounce it again for us, please.

27 A. Nzerekore.

28 Q. Nzerekore.

29 A. Unlucky for us a trained soldier sometimes is good, but

1 sometimes he can be stupid. The way they moved and behaved there  
2 were other soldiers there that looked at these guys and said,  
3 "But you guys look a little different. I mean, your movements  
4 are movements of military people." And what happened to those  
10:14:25 5 boys that was explained to me later is there is a trick that I  
6 think military people use. At the back of the foot, behind the  
7 heel, a soldier can be picked up almost immediately. It's a  
8 little darkened because of the wearing of the boots. That was  
9 the inspection that was carried out on them and they saw the dark  
10:14:46 10 spot between the heel, coming up to the ankle. They said, "But  
11 you guys should have been in military training", and they ended  
12 up arresting most of them and so that part of the plan had  
13 failed.

14 The only other thing that was left was Gbutuo and these men  
10:15:03 15 successfully went into Gbutuo and successfully are led by Prince  
16 Johnson.

17 Q. How many men?

18 A. By this time the group that went to Gbutuo I would say was  
19 about a platoon and a half, around 60 plus men. Not more than a  
10:15:19 20 platoon and a half, because remember I said we had spread these  
21 men. There were only 168 men and we had spread them out.

22 They successfully captured Gbutuo and it took another full  
23 day to two for those that were fleeing Monrovia. Imagine having  
24 to escape from Monrovia. There is only one road from Monrovia  
10:15:45 25 all the way up country through Gbarnga to the border. Some of  
26 them had to be avoiding security checkpoints. In fact, it took  
27 some of the boys almost up to a week to finally get back to their  
28 units. By this time the units have captured Gbutuo and have  
29 started advancing inward and so those boys reached.

1 The group in Guinea we had to use some of their friends  
2 that they knew, because remember I said they had been sent into  
3 Guinea with the Mahn ethnic individuals that they knew. They all  
4 started putting pressures in, "These are our family people. They  
10:16:27 5 are not soldiers", so eventually I would say within five to seven  
6 days they were released.

7 So what happens is everyone started moving back to La Cote  
8 d'Ivoire and by this time everybody knows that the troops are  
9 moving, so I would say by the second week almost the entire unit  
10:16:49 10 is now together and moving in the country.

11 Q. When you say "entire unit", how many men are we talking  
12 about?

13 A. I am talking about approximately - the unit now I would say  
14 about one hundred and I would say fifty, because the rest of the  
10:17:07 15 men some of them are serving as security to me hiding out in La  
16 Cote d'Ivoire.

17 Q. So you are in La Cote d'Ivoire at that time?

18 A. Oh, definitely. I don't go in with the men. I am not a  
19 soldier, so I don't go in.

10:17:25 20 Q. Where in La Cote d'Ivoire?

21 A. I was in Bin-Houye.

22 Q. So who was actually directing operations at the front line?

23 A. We initially had chosen a gentleman, late now, by the name  
24 of Isaac Musa. He turned out to be not able, or maybe he didn't  
10:17:53 25 have the stomach, to carry out the operation and immediately a  
26 very professional soldier, Prince Johnson, who before joining the  
27 NPFL was a trained member of the Armed Forces of Liberia, Prince  
28 Johnson immediately moved forward and led the operation that  
29 captured Gbutuo. And then once the information got to me I just

1 authorised him to continue to hold over the command of the unit  
2 since Isaac Musa had retreated and was with me now in La Cote  
3 d'Ivoire, so Prince Johnson was ordered by me to hold the command  
4 of the unit.

10:18:40 5 Q. What was Prince Johnson like?

6 A. Well, first of all Prince is now a senator in the Republic  
7 of Liberia. He is there. Prince Johnson is, or was then, a  
8 professional soldier and a disciplinarian. A very, very tough  
9 and professional soldier, I would say, and tough to the point  
10:19:06 10 that maybe sometimes he went a little overboard, but he was very  
11 professional.

12 Q. What do you mean he went a little overboard?

13 A. Before the NPFL launched its revolution in Liberia, there  
14 was what is called in the military an operational order. That  
10:19:30 15 operational order laid down in black and white and spelt out the  
16 behaviour and compartmentation of the men as military people;  
17 what they could do and what they could not do. That operational  
18 order was strict and it was clear to them that who did not follow  
19 that operational order would be court-martialled and would be  
10:19:56 20 dealt with.

21 Now, there arose an incident in Liberia as Prince was  
22 commanding. A couple of the Special Forces misbehaved. I think  
23 they fled in the sight of battle and endangered the troops. Now,  
24 Prince got annoyed and he executed them. Now, he did not have  
10:20:33 25 the authority to do that. He had no right to do that. That  
26 report reached to me and I ordered that he report and be  
27 available for an investigation.

28 Because of your question I will stop there, okay? So I  
29 have just explained that he was a disciplinarian, but that is

1 what I meant by sometimes he went a little overboard. While he  
2 could have taken action by arresting these men and probably  
3 disciplining them, he did not have a right to take that action  
4 against them and that is why I ordered his arrest.

10:21:14 5 Q. Now, was the attack upon Gbutuo successful?

6 A. Extraordinarily successful. We captured the post and all  
7 the arms and ammunition that they had in the armoury, plus some  
8 of the soldiers that just ran and dropped their arms, and so by  
9 the end of the Gbutuo attack I can say almost all of the 60 men  
10 that had gone into Gbutuo had at least a rifle.

10:21:42

11 Q. Were you in contact with the men from where you were in  
12 Bin-Houye?

13 A. Yes, I was.

14 Q. How?

10:21:59

15 A. What they would do - in fact, the first thing that Prince  
16 did very well I remember he sent back - we would have a courier,  
17 someone who would leave Gbutuo and it is just a few hours walk to  
18 the big town of Bin-Houye, and they will go in and report to me.  
19 Every day Prince sent someone to report to me in the progress  
20 every day.

10:22:23

21 Q. And what progress was being made after Gbutuo?

22 A. Oh, the men were moving. They were moving very fast. They  
23 had captured Gbutuo and moved on forward to another town called  
24 Tiaplay. I am sure it's in the record, Tiaplay. They covered  
25 most of the border towns and maybe in some future if I got a map  
26 I can point it out.

10:22:46

27 Q. Well, that is precisely what I am trying to do.

28 A. They moved and by this time don't let's forget - let me  
29 remind the Court we are in friendly territory. Nimba is friendly

1 territory. So thousands of people are coming in immediately,  
2 which any training group would do. Training bases are opened  
3 immediately to volunteers. So there are thousands of people  
4 coming. And as rumours would have it, and this is where we have  
10:23:32 5 now that we are dealing with, that's what's got me here, there  
6 are good rumours and there are bad rumours. Now, there were some  
7 good rumours at the time that the NPFL had entered with thousands  
8 of men, and so the Armed Forces of Liberia was really put off  
9 track, but that was not true. We only had the exact number that  
10:23:56 10 I mentioned to this Court. So this whole bad rumour of thousands  
11 of men, just threw the Armed Forces of Liberia off and they were  
12 just - we went into towns that we didn't have to fight. I mean,  
13 they were just running and leaving the place. Okay.

14 And those that were further away from Nimba, because what  
10:24:20 15 Doe had done successfully, the troops that are placed in Nimba -  
16 remember, Nimba is a hotbed, Doe is already angry, so the  
17 soldiers that are in Nimba are neither members of the Dan nor the  
18 Mahn ethnic groups. So these soldiers are just fleeing. They  
19 know they are in hostile territory so they just virtually desert.  
10:24:53 20 So within a very short time, within the first month, we had  
21 virtually captured all of Nimba County.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: Pause there. I wonder if we could display  
23 this map helpfully provided by the Prosecution on an earlier  
24 occasion.

10:25:11 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: While that is happening I wonder if the  
26 witness could indicate kind of a time line when he says the  
27 Gbutuo attack happened, in terms of a month maybe and a year.

28 THE WITNESS: Yes.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Also the attack on the Nimba County.

1 MR GRIFFITHS:

2 Q. If you could explain that, please, Mr Taylor, which is a  
3 very clear question.

10:25:43

4 A. Yes. Gbutuo occurred on 29 December 1989, exactly on that  
5 particular day, and we progressed. Gbutuo is in Nimba County and  
6 it is from that point that we commenced spreading into Nimba.

7 Q. The map is labelled L1 for the assistance of my learned  
8 friends. Mr Taylor, I wonder if you could change seats for a  
9 moment, please.

10:26:16

10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, does the Bench have that  
11 map?

12 MR GRIFFITHS: You should, your Honour. It should be the  
13 first - you know that bundle is divided into two sections and the  
14 second section is the Liberia section. It should be the first  
15 map in that section, I think. Or it was at least in my bundle.  
16 It's the one that looks like that.

10:26:32

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: These exhibits are given numbers. It  
18 would be helpful --

19 MR GRIFFITHS: It's L1.

10:27:21

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have an L section in this but it  
21 helpfully starts at L2, Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I am sure it has helpfully been put in a  
23 completely inconvenient position.

10:28:06

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have found it now, Mr Griffiths. It  
25 was on the back of another map.

26 MR GRIFFITHS: Do we all have the map, your Honours?

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we do now, yes. I think you can  
28 go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:



1 Q. Mr Taylor, with the assistance of this map, I wonder if we  
2 could now just briefly review some of the information you've  
3 recently given us. Firstly, can you locate Bin-Houye in the Cote  
4 d'Ivoire?

10:30:16 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Could you just indicate - point the pen at it, please. We  
7 see you are indicating just over the border in Cote d'Ivoire  
8 spelt B-I-N H-O-U-Y-E?

9 A. That is correct.

10:30:39 10 Q. So that is where you were based?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Can you also see Gbutuo?

13 A. Yes. Just above Bin-Houye there is Buutuo that's spelt  
14 B-U-U-T-U-O. Just above on the Liberian side there is Buutuo  
15 right there.

10:31:04

16 Q. Now, I want us to be quite clear about this, Mr Taylor,  
17 because if you look just to the left of the word Bin-Houye there  
18 is a B-E-A-T-U-O as well.

19 A. That is a town in Nimba but that is not called Buutou.

10:31:27 20 That's Beatuo.

21 Q. Okay. So it's the one above Buutou?

22 A. Yes. Buutuo is just above the name Bin-Houye. That is  
23 Buutuo on the border. Further down what you talked about is  
24 Beatuo. Those are two different towns.

10:31:44 25 Q. And can you just indicate for us Nimba County.

26 A. I will just use the back of the pen. Nimba runs in this  
27 direction. It includes Tappita, all the way, I see Sagleipie,  
28 come all the way up here. This entire horn coming all the way  
29 down through here is Nimba County.

1 Q. Now, you mentioned that rapid progress was made and that  
2 you captured Tappi ta. Where is Tappi ta?

3 A. Right here. "Tapi tta". I am sure your Honours can see  
4 that, where I am pointing. That's Tappi ta right there.

10:32:56 5 Q. And how long did it take for your troops to capture  
6 Tappi ta?

7 A. I would say by the end of January of 1990 to the beginning  
8 of February we had captured Tappi ta.

9 Q. And what about the rest of Nimba County?

10:33:28 10 A. Let me just explain here. If you look up, your Honours,  
11 going toward the horn of Nimba there is a place here where I am  
12 pointing called Sanniquellie. Now, if you follow that red line  
13 coming on down you are going to come to Ganta. That red line is  
14 the only highway that runs all the way through Liberia, all the  
10:34:01 15 way down to Monrovia. The only highway. So this section of  
16 Nimba was about the last area to be captured. But what we did  
17 do, realising that the strength of the armed forces then had  
18 moved into Ganta using the highway, we moved westward, coming  
19 into the direction of Buchanan, down here, where we had the least  
10:34:38 20 resistance. So while we had not captured all of Nimba County by  
21 the - let's say the beginning to the middle of February, but we  
22 had advanced substantially westward into the areas of less  
23 resistance. Okay. Because this is all bush area, forest area,  
24 so the commandos took the liberty of moving westward.

10:35:09 25 So I just - I am saying this because I don't want the Court  
26 to believe that we are just stuck in Nimba trying to grab Nimba  
27 and if we have not grabbed it we have not moved, no. We are  
28 spreading and capturing those areas. So we were able for example  
29 to actually capture Buchanan before we even captured Gbarnga,

1 which comes further down on that Monrovia Highway. If you follow  
2 my pen coming on down there is Gbarnga, right there. So you will  
3 see that we had moved from Gbutuo, all the way westward, but we  
4 had not moved fast enough going northeastward.

10:36:00 5 If your Honours need any more clarification, I don't want  
6 it to be confusing, because we are not just stationary, the  
7 troops are spreading out. The areas of most resistance, we leave  
8 in a particular direction. The area of less resistance, we move  
9 full force and this is what we were doing.

10:36:16 10 Q. Okay. Can we leave that map there for the moment, please,  
11 Mr Taylor, and could you return to your other seat, please. Now,  
12 you've spoken there about the geographical advance of your men.  
13 In terms of numbers that you can call upon, had there been any  
14 advance in that respect?

10:37:04 15 A. You mean in terms of increase in numbers?

16 Q. Yes, please.

17 A. Oh, tremendous. By about the first month, which we are now  
18 moving into, January, there are, like I mentioned, thousands of  
19 ordinary Liberians coming in, volunteering to fight. So I would  
10:37:24 20 say within that month of January we could have had as many - and  
21 I do not want to exaggerate. I would say as many as 7 to 10,000  
22 volunteers that had come from Nimba County. Others had been  
23 walking from Bong County. We had two training bases that had to  
24 be opened immediately. There was not even any place for them to  
10:37:53 25 sleep in, because this is the rainforest region. They, being  
26 trained as guerrillas, had to sleep in the forest areas where -  
27 so it was just a large, large, large group.

28 Q. Can you assist us with the locations of those two training  
29 bases?

1 A. Yes. The first training base was opened in a town called  
2 Tiaplay. That's on the map. The second was opened in the town  
3 called Gborplay.

4 Q. I apologise for moving you around like this, Mr Taylor, but  
10:38:27 5 before we lose contact with that point I wonder if you could just  
6 briefly change seats again, please, and point out those two  
7 locations for us?

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Griffiths, what was the name of that  
9 last town?

10:38:39 10 MR GRIFFITHS: Gborplay.

11 THE WITNESS: The last town was called Gborplay. That's  
12 G-B-O-R-P-L-A-Y, Gborplay.

13 MR GRIFFITHS:

14 Q. So the first place was called Tiaplay?

10:39:28 15 A. Tiaplay. If you look upward, I would say going up the map  
16 toward the horn above where we just came from Buutuo, there is a  
17 place there where I am pointing T-I-A-P-L-A-Y, that's Tiaplay.

18 Q. And the other location was?

19 A. Gborplay. I am looking now to see that Gborplay is a  
10:39:56 20 little town right on the border. I am not sure if Gborplay is  
21 shown on this map.

22 Q. How do you spell it?

23 A. G-B-O-R-P-L-A-Y. It is a little town right on the border  
24 there and I am not sure if it's mentioned on this map.

10:40:19 25 Q. Do you see where there is B-O-R-G-P-L-A-Y, just to the left  
26 of Buutuo? Just to the left of Buutuo in the blue, do you see a  
27 town beginning B-O-R-G-P-L-A-Y?

28 A. Okay. Well, that is - okay. That's Gborplay, but it's  
29 supposed to be G-B because that phonetic "bor", maybe this was

1 done by an American or English group, they can't do that "bor".

2 Q. Above it do you see a G-B-O-L-O-R --

3 A. I am looking. Are we looking at the same map?

4 Q. Yes.

10:41:12 5 A. Maybe something is wrong with my glasses because I don't -  
6 I see Garplay, but I just --

7 Q. Very well, if it's not there, Mr Taylor, let's not delay  
8 over it. Let's move on.

9 A. Very well.

10:41:42 10 Q. Let's try and do without the map for a while while I ask  
11 about something else. Now, taking things slowly, firstly, at  
12 those two training camps, who was in charge of training?

13 A. The training camps were under the command of one of our  
14 Special Forces called Samuel Sleshee. That's spelt

10:42:34 15 S-L-E-S-H-E-E. It's pronounced Sleshee. It's a Gio name so I may  
16 not even get it right myself, but it's Sam Sleshee, one of our  
17 Special Forces commanders.

18 Q. And what did the training involve?

19 A. The training involved basic military formation, covering  
10:43:05 20 and concealing oneself, learning how to disassemble and assemble  
21 rifles, learning how to carry out military formation, learning  
22 orders. They were taught, again, how to deal with civilians.

23 They were taught not to take food or other items in their  
24 handling of civilians. I mentioned on yesterday they were again

10:43:51 25 taught about what we call cordon and search operational  
26 procedures and I explained to the justice, the President, what I  
27 meant by cordon on yesterday. Basically - and also the rules of  
28 - to the extent about the arrest and treatment of prisoners of  
29 war.

1 Q. How long did that training last, Mr Taylor?

2 A. The training - the initial training lasted for about six  
3 weeks. Subsequent trainings were much longer. Now, let me just  
4 let you know that we should take into consideration here that by  
10:44:40 5 the time this training is going on, members of the Armed Forces  
6 of Liberia that are from the Nimba region are now working their  
7 way backward. Members of the police that were trained - the  
8 police in Liberia were trained as task force personnel. By this  
9 time they have worked their way back.

10:45:03 10 Q. I don't understand you, Mr Taylor.

11 A. The war is going on --

12 Q. Worked their way back? What do you mean?

13 A. The war is going on. These are Nimbadians and other tribal  
14 groups that really want to join the fight. They are not in the  
10:45:18 15 Nimba area, they are away from Nimba. But as the war is going  
16 on, those men that are armed and at locations in counties that  
17 border Nimba begin to come back and join the rebels. So the  
18 amount is swelling while this training is going on.

19 Q. And those former police officers and the like who come  
10:45:52 20 back, as you say, did they also require training?

21 A. No, no. The trained men went straight into combat.

22 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Exactly who was being trained?

23 MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that:

24 Q. So exactly who was being trained then, Mr Taylor?

10:46:08 25 A. The volunteers from Nimba that had joined. The civilian  
26 voluntarily population that had come in their thousands were the  
27 people being trained.

28 Q. And help us. What was the gender of those volunteers,  
29 civilian volunteers?

1 A. Male and female.

2 Q. And their ages?

3 A. No one was accepted for military training or military  
4 combat under the age of 18.

10:46:41 5 Q. Were there any volunteers under the age of 18?

6 A. Yes, there were. There were volunteers under the age of  
7 18, but they came and they provided services to the training  
8 command.

9 Q. Such as?

10:46:56 10 A. They would what we call go for water, cut wood for cooking  
11 and wash clothes, you know, for those that were in the training  
12 command. They would carry out services for the training command.

13 Q. Was there any system of conscription?

14 A. No. No. The NPFL did not have to worry about conscription  
10:47:28 15 because we - there were too many people available. People  
16 volunteered, came forward, and we received them. We did not have  
17 to go out asking people. They came in their thousands.

18 Q. Was anyone forced to join the NPFL?

19 A. To the best of my knowledge, no. This is not to mean that  
10:47:53 20 some people were not influenced because of the connections of  
21 their family, but, for someone to be forced to join the NPFL, no,  
22 not at all. No, not to my knowledge.

23 Q. This Court has heard evidence about the phenomenon of  
24 so-called bush wives. Did that occur?

10:48:15 25 A. To the best of my knowledge, no. Bush wives, as I heard in  
26 the - during the trial testimony, did not occur in Liberia, no.  
27 We did not have - at the time that we started this revolution,  
28 no, that did not happen with my knowledge. It would not have  
29 been accepted, because that would have constituted rape and we

1 executed several soldiers for that. So we were very, very, very,  
2 very stringent.

3 That phenomena in Liberia, I can't see it because you can  
4 have more than one wife. So, you know, and there are tribal  
10:49:06 5 procedures for getting married. We didn't have to go and get a  
6 licence. There were procedures that you could have one, two,  
7 three wives. So I am not claiming before this Court that that  
8 did not happen. I would not make such a claim. I am saying that  
9 to the best of my knowledge, it was not brought to my attention  
10:49:28 10 and if it had happened and it had been brought to my attention,  
11 that soldier would have been dealt with.

12 Q. Now, assist us with this: You've already recounted the  
13 history of the behaviour of the NPFL in Nimba County, and the  
14 majority of your Special Forces, and indeed recruits, you tell  
10:50:03 15 us, were Manos and Gios, yes?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Bearing in mind their experience, did you appreciate that  
18 revenge may be on their minds?

19 A. Oh, definitely.

10:50:19 20 Q. What did you do to curb or forestall any such behaviour; if  
21 anything?

22 A. The first real indication of where we started taking action  
23 was, it was brought to my attention that while it was true the  
24 soldiers that were killed by Prince Johnson had done something  
10:50:48 25 wrong, but it was also brought to my attention that that was also  
26 based on an old family conflict. And immediately, the action was  
27 taken in an attempt to arrest Prince Johnson, we did not, but,  
28 the pursuit of Prince Johnson commenced and we chased Prince  
29 Johnson from the Gborplay area all the way into Monrovia. We did



1 not relent.

2 I said that Prince Johnson had to be arrested at all costs.  
3 He got afraid that we might take some very stringent actions as  
4 maybe court-martialling him and probably killing him and so he  
10:51:35 5 did not yield but, as we continued, every soldier, and I am not  
6 going to sit here and play no angel, every military personnel of  
7 the NPFL that violated that operational order that I explained  
8 before this Court by raping a woman or murdering a civilian or  
9 murdering another soldier, was court-martialled and a decision of  
10:52:01 10 that court martial was carried out to the limit.

11 Q. But hold on a second, Mr Taylor. We are not just talking  
12 about Special Forces now, are we? We are talking about civilians  
13 without that training who might have revenge in their hearts.  
14 What did you do to try and curb that?

10:52:29 15 A. I mentioned to this Court that the Special Forces were also  
16 trained to turn these matters over to civilian courts. We did  
17 not dismantle the NPFL. When I say we, we did not dismantle the  
18 civilian structures that were on the ground. And they were told  
19 and taught that if civilians committed acts against civilians  
10:52:50 20 they went to justices of the peace. They were dealt with by  
21 civilian administration. Maybe this is one of the reasons why I  
22 won such a large percentage during the elections.

23 When we got in, we knew what we wanted. Civilian  
24 activities remained. This is why - it's not to say that  
10:53:10 25 civilians did not do wrong things, but all of those executed were  
26 soldiers and so you wonder, "Well, did only soldiers do bad  
27 things?" No. But civilians that committed crimes were judged in  
28 civilian courts and they were sentenced and put in jail, so there  
29 were jails, there were justices of the peace, there were judges

1 still that were put back into place in NPFL held territory.

2 Q. You mentioned bad things, Mr Taylor. What are you talking  
3 about?

10:53:48

4 A. Well, by bad things I mean let's say if a civilian went and  
5 stole or killed another civilian, or went on their little old  
6 family tribal feud, that is what I am talking about, you would be  
7 dealt with in a civilian environment.

8 Q. But, Mr Taylor, we are not just talking about stealing  
9 other people's property, are we?

10:54:07

10 A. No, we are talking about killing.

11 Q. This Court has heard evidence about roadblocks festooned  
12 with human entrails and human heads. We've heard about  
13 decapitations and the like. Those kinds of things. Now, help  
14 us. Did they occur?

10:54:24

15 A. To the best of my knowledge, let me explain what I heard  
16 here from this boy Marzah. There were at checkpoints in Liberia  
17 skulls, not human heads. Skulls were used as symbols of death.

18 I saw them, yes, not what the Prosecution said he drove by human  
19 heads. I drove by those skulls. They were used as symbols, I  
20 asked specifically, and these were not our people. The combat  
21 had gone on, enemy soldiers had been killed and skulls were used.

10:55:03

22 I knew that and did not bother it, because again I am a member of  
23 western fraternal organisations. Symbols as skulls are used now  
24 today in western circles, at universities and other things.

10:55:39

25 I saw - and I will be honest because this is about my life.  
26 I saw nothing wrong with using skulls. It's a blatant diabolical  
27 lie that I, Charles Ghankay Taylor, or anyone because of the  
28 discipline we had would drive by a human head and intestine.

29 But let's think about it for a minute. How long would an

1 animal intestine last? How long? If you even took an animal,  
2 say a sheep or a goat, intestine and you tied it up in the sun,  
3 within a few hours it would probably be disintegrated. It is  
4 total nonsense just to try to advertise and make this big  
10:56:29 5 publicity as though people are brutes and savages. Well, we are  
6 not. I am not.

7 There were skulls, I knew of them and let me tell me I am a  
8 past noble father of the Grand United Order of Oddfellows. It's  
9 in Britain. It's in the United States. It is western. If any  
10:56:48 10 Oddfellow member is hearing this, we know what symbols are.  
11 Those were only skulls that I saw and would not have tolerated  
12 anyone killing or putting some human head up. It would have  
13 never happened and did not happen.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Taylor, who was using these human  
10:57:07 15 skulls and where did they come from?

16 THE WITNESS: These skulls are enemy soldiers that are  
17 killed. Enemy soldiers were not buried during the war. Some  
18 bodies - some skulls were found. Some soldiers got lost. Some  
19 of them died. They did not bury. We buried our dead. It was  
10:57:33 20 compulsory that we bury our dead. No soldier left - if an NPFL  
21 soldier died he had to bury him. So these were enemy skulls that  
22 after you have fought in an area and people came by and they went  
23 in the bushes, if you found a skull you brought the skull and you  
24 put it at the gate as a symbol of death.

10:57:56 25 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am just curious why was it necessary  
26 for the NPFL to do this - to display skulls?

27 THE WITNESS: As I say, your Honour, it was a symbol. They  
28 use it as a symbol that death had occurred by the enemy.

29 MR GRIFFITHS:

1 Q. Was it to instill fear, Mr Taylor?

2 A. Well one could assume that if someone saw a skull, of  
3 course, normally it would - it could instill fear, but a skull  
4 even in fraternal organisations is used also to say certain  
10:58:39 5 things that, "If you do wrong, this is the result." I am not  
6 going to go over - I don't have permission to expose western  
7 fraternities but, when you use symbols, symbols are designed to  
8 give a lesson that, "Look, here is the situation. If you don't  
9 do this then this happens, okay? This is the result of not  
10:59:07 10 following orders, okay?" That is why these skulls - not at every  
11 gate, but there were certain areas that skulls were there. I saw  
12 them, I investigated and I got to realise that they were enemy  
13 skulls and we did not think that that symbol meant anything  
14 wrong.

10:59:28 15 Q. Let's not deal with investigation yet please, Mr Taylor.  
16 Did you order the setting up of skulls at these checkpoints?

17 A. No, no, no, no. I had the operational order as a way of  
18 instilling fear. I did not - I did not order that, no. I mean,  
19 why would I? No, not at all.

10:59:57 20 Q. Was it part of NPFL policy --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- to make areas fearful by such devices?

23 A. No, not at all. Let me just again deal with that word  
24 "fearful" as was interpreted in Liberia by the NPFL. If you  
11:00:24 25 reached a village, from a guerilla standpoint - now, I know all  
26 the hoopla that has been around about going to murder to make  
27 areas fearful. For the NPFL let me tell this Court what fearful  
28 meant. If you reached a village and the village was abandoned  
29 but you saw food and maybe you saw smoke but there is not one

1 human, a guerilla was taught in the NPFL to be leaving right  
2 away. It was possible that an enemy was there and probably there  
3 was a possible ambush and so that area was a fearful area.

4 That's how our commandos were trained, because ambushes can  
11:01:22 5 be - you get in a village and you see no-one, but you see let's  
6 say raw rice and you see smoke maybe from where there had been  
7 fire, it's possible that other soldiers were there and abandoned  
8 it. And we did fall - some of my soldiers did fall into ambush  
9 in that particular way.

11:01:41 10 So from that particular point there were strict  
11 instructions that, "When you meet a deserted area, but signs of  
12 life, you must know it's a trap." That's what we interpreted a  
13 fearful area as being, not an orgy of murder and rape and  
14 nonsense. I sat here and listened to all of that. That is what  
11:02:04 15 the NPFL - any trained guerilla and any military person here  
16 would know you don't play with those kind. Those are the fearful  
17 areas in the NPFL. Deserted area, but sign of life that you have  
18 to be concerned about. So immediately they were taught, "You  
19 move into this area and you see it, what do you do? You withdraw  
11:02:23 20 immediately and observe the area for some time to see as to  
21 whether it is an ambush in the making."

22 Q. Very well, but I'm still going to press you further on this  
23 topic. You accept, from what you've said, that you saw skulls at  
24 such checkpoints?

11:02:47 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. So why didn't you do something about it?

27 A. Because, as I said, I did not interpret the presence of a  
28 skull - and not a head - at that particular point as it was  
29 interpreted as a symbol, and knowing that I had also seen skulls

1 in fraternal organisations that are western I felt that there was  
2 nothing wrong with a skull.

3 I am not talking about - and I may as well clear this up.  
4 I am not talking about hundreds of skulls scattered all over the  
11:03:35 5 place. We are talking about at certain strategic junctions you  
6 may see a skull. I am not talking about not more than I would  
7 say a handful of strategic points where there would be such, but  
8 I had seen skulls before in university in the United States in  
9 fraternal organisations. I knew I had seen skulls in fraternal  
11:04:02 10 well-known organisations. Quite frankly, it could be considered  
11 a bad judgment. I did not consider it a bad judgment and I did  
12 not order them removed.

13 Q. Mr Taylor, I am still pressing you on this --

14 A. Yes.

11:04:19 15 Q. -- because we are not talking about a campus at an American  
16 university. We are talking about Liberia.

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Did it cross your mind that by not doing something about it  
19 you, the leader of the NPFL, would be seen as condoning that  
11:04:37 20 activity?

21 A. Quite frankly my interpretation of that particular skull  
22 being there did not cross my mind as something that will come up  
23 where the leader of the NPFL would be said to have condoned this  
24 or that, no. I did not see the presence of that symbol as being  
11:05:07 25 at that time, in my own calculation, what it has been interpreted  
26 here otherwise of being.

27 Q. Mr Taylor, were atrocities committed by members of the NPFL  
28 or individuals hiding behind the NPFL banner? Were they?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you know that such activities were taking place?

2 A. We found out that they were taking place and we acted in  
3 bringing those responsible to justice.

11:06:03

4 Q. Mr Taylor, do you accept that such activities were quite  
5 widespread?

6 A. I do not accept that at all, that it was widespread,  
7 because of the action that was taken against those individuals.  
8 Look, when you see the leader of the NPFL court-martial generals  
9 and Special Forces - and don't forget it took me two years.

11:06:45

10 These were the best trained men, I can almost say, in West  
11 Africa. When you see me put them on trial and a court martial  
12 board comes down and says they are guilty and they are executed  
13 based on the ruling of the court martial, a junior commando or  
14 anybody else would have to be a fool to do the same thing. So it

11:07:08

15 was not widespread, because we dealt with people from senior  
16 members of the NPFL that the Prosecution has talked about here.  
17 They've talked about Samuel Larto that the very Moses Blah spoke  
18 about here that was executed. They've talked about Oliver  
19 Varney. These are all Special Forces.

11:07:29

20 Now, when you take those actions against the most senior of  
21 your armed forces, that is a lesson, and no one, no one can, in  
22 his or her rightful mind, say that it was widespread. It was not  
23 widespread. I deny that seriously. It was definitely not  
24 widespread. And if you can remember here, I - just before I  
25 stop - there has not been one case brought before this Court  
26 where there was an amputation in Liberia, not one. Not one case.  
27 So it was just not tolerated.

11:07:57

28 Q. Help us with this, please, Mr Taylor: What systems were in  
29 place to impose discipline within NPFL controlled areas?

1 A. The first very, very principle thing was the operational  
2 order. That order was displayed from training camp. Every  
3 commander in the field had that order. That is the first thing.  
4 The second thing that was in place was a court martial board.

11:08:58 5 The third thing that was put in place was a military police unit,  
6 and designated military jails. Those were in place. And people  
7 did appear before the military tribunals. They did get arrested  
8 by military police. Some of them did get executed. Some of them  
9 did get incarcerated.

11:09:26 10 Q. And help us: Was there someone assigned to supervise  
11 discipline?

12 A. The discipline, yes, there was someone. That someone was,  
13 what we had, what we call our provost, our marshall general at  
14 the time.

11:09:49 15 Q. And can you assist us with a name?

16 A. Yes. The provost marshall general at the time that we used  
17 also sat at the head of the tribunal. It's a gentleman called  
18 McDonald Boam. That's B-O-A-M, Boam. He also chaired the  
19 tribunal.

11:10:09 20 Q. Now, I'm going to --

21 A. And he was a Special Forces commando also.

22 Q. Thank you. I am going to come back to the structure of  
23 command within the NPFL. But before we come to that, there is a  
24 matter that I would like to deal with in the time available

11:10:35 25 before we have the short adjournment. In the narrative  
26 chronology of events so far, we have come to the end of the first  
27 month or so of the revolution. During that time, had you set  
28 foot in Liberia?

29 A. No, no. No.



1 Q. Where had you been based during that time?

2 A. I am still across the border in Bin-Houye. The commandos  
3 would not let me come in. They said that they had to properly  
4 secure a sizeable area and set up a base for me.

11:11:29 5 Q. Right. So let's go forward to come back. When did you  
6 first set foot during the campaign on Liberian soil?

7 A. In April of 1990 I first went into a base that had been  
8 prepared for me on the border in the town of - that I mentioned,  
9 Gborplay. That's where I am based.

11:11:53 10 Q. Where the training camp was situated?

11 A. Just outside of the town, yes, Gborplay, yes.

12 Q. So, between December and April when you arrive on Liberian  
13 soil, how had you maintained contact with your men?

14 A. Every day, there was a courier that came from inside  
11:12:20 15 Liberia, to me in Bin-Houye. There were regular, regular  
16 messages. By this time we don't even have radio communication.  
17 We are just sending people across the border, okay, informing us  
18 of what is going on.

19 Another thing that was being done, at a particular time,  
11:12:42 20 the other gentleman that I mentioned, one of the other  
21 individuals that is a part of putting together the NPFL, Tom  
22 Woveiyu at this particular time, is getting information and  
23 becomes the spokesperson of the NPFL, so the third source, even  
24 sometimes we got some information ourselves, Focus on Africa  
11:13:10 25 became a famous place. They were reporting. So someone would  
26 call Tom and Tom what announce, because there were times I didn't  
27 even know where my front line was. By front line, I mean the  
28 military unit is moving - it's not moving like a conventional  
29 army on a straight line and progressing. You will find some

1 people here, some people are maybe 15, 20 miles ahead because the  
2 advantage that we had, we were not using highways. These  
3 guerrillas would go into the bush, take short paths and  
4 everything, so I didn't even know for the most part where our  
11:13:48 5 front line was, but as they received message, the command  
6 structure would send the message across the border to me.

7 Q. Now, you mentioned that you didn't have radios?

8 A. Not at that time.

9 Q. At what stage did you obtain radio communication  
11:14:07 10 facilities?

11 A. I would say somewhere about the mid of the year. After I  
12 moved into Liberia, and the news has spread about the NPFL  
13 operations in Liberia, I then come back out but by this time the  
14 security problems that had me hiding in La Cote d'Ivoire had  
11:14:46 15 dissipated and so I can now come out. So I came out.

16 I get in in April. I come out and then go back to Burkina  
17 Faso to begin to see if I could plead with the authorities there  
18 for some real assistance in terms of communication, you know, to  
19 be able to reach our men at long distance areas.

11:15:12 20 Q. And did you obtain that?

21 A. Yes. We did get initially some assistance in terms of  
22 radios and these are not military radios. Now, this Court has  
23 been hearing testimony about these so-called radios. What was  
24 not mentioned that these are not military radios, your Honours.  
11:15:37 25 These are your basic SSBs that even in America they use them on  
26 trucks. That anyone who is on that frequency will listen to it  
27 so these were not sophisticated radios. We wouldn't have been  
28 able to move sophisticated radios through La Cote d'Ivoire so it  
29 had to be something that just out of the ordinary that we could

1 go through, so these were ordinary SSBs that we obtained to try  
2 to reach to some of our people.

3 Q. Now, at that stage you tell us that you obtained that  
4 assistance from Burkina Faso. Did you consider requesting such  
11:16:34 5 assistance from say the Sierra Leoneans or Dr Manneh and his  
6 Gambians?

7 A. No. Dr Manneh is in Burkina Faso. His men are in Burkina  
8 Faso. They themselves are struggling, trying to put their act  
9 together and get their own revolution going, so he could not have  
11:17:03 10 helped me at all. He needed help himself.

11 JUDGE DOHERTY: Mr Griffiths, there was two parts to -  
12 there were really two questions in that. You asked about the  
13 Sierra Leoneans or Dr Manneh and his Gambians and I haven't got an  
14 answer to the Sierra Leoneans.

11:17:20 15 MR GRIFFITHS: I was coming to that just now.

16 Q. So what about the Sierra Leoneans, where were they, to your  
17 knowledge?

18 A. Which Sierra Leoneans? Are you talking about President  
19 Momoh?

11:17:30 20 Q. No, no, no, we are talking about the Sierra Leoneans who  
21 had been in Libya?

22 A. No, I have explained to this Court that the Sierra Leoneans  
23 left Liberia before I left. I don't know where they had gone to.  
24 The only people that were in Burkina Faso were the Gambians, and  
11:17:47 25 if you can see, up until this time the Gambians are not even  
26 involved with us; they get involved later. But they are not a  
27 part of the NPFL entry into Liberia. These are trained Special  
28 Forces. They are not a part of the Liberian operation at all.

29 Q. But just to go ahead to come back: Did there come a time

1 when the Gambians became involved?

2 A. Yes, there was a time.

3 Q. Now, you've told us, Mr Taylor, that you had not been in  
4 Liberia until April 1990?

11:18:31 5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Had you, however, made any attempt to address the Liberian  
7 people?

8 A. Oh, yes.

9 Q. How?

11:18:43 10 A. We would call the BBC, Focus on Africa, and speak from I  
11 Cote d'Ivoire.

12 Q. And were any other methods of communication adopted?

13 A. Well, I just mentioned that Tom Womeiyu was also out there  
14 speaking. Ellen was in America speaking to - doing press

11:19:11 15 releases but the one that comes to mind right now is the use of  
16 international radio to do interviews via the telephone.

17 MR GRIFFITHS: Could the witness please be shown exhibits -  
18 documents for week 29, document at tab 2 please.

19 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, we would object to the witness  
11:19:45 20 being shown this document until there is some foundation as to  
21 what the document is, how the witness knows about the document.  
22 Otherwise, the document would be leading the witness. That is  
23 what was ruled during our case.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's correct. Mr Griffiths.

11:20:13 25 MR GRIFFITHS:

26 Q. In January 1990, Mr Taylor, did you issue any statement in  
27 Liberia?

28 A. Yes, I did.

29 Q. In what form was that statement?

1 A. There was a statement setting out the aims of and  
2 objectives of launching this revolution.

3 Q. Who created that statement?

4 A. That statement was ordered by me but created by one of the  
11:20:46 5 founding members of the organisation by the name of Thomas  
6 Woweiyu.

7 Q. Have you seen that statement?

8 A. Yes, I have. I approved it.

9 Q. When did you first see that statement?

11:21:02 10 A. Well, I had known of it and it had disappeared for some  
11 time because it was issued at the time. In recent weeks I've  
12 come across it.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness can now be shown  
14 that document.

11:21:18 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, show the witness that document.

16 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Is this the document, Mr Taylor?

11:22:05 20 A. This is the document.

21 Q. Now, we see at the top that it's dated 1 January 1990. Do  
22 you see that?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Based on what you've told us, so this would have been  
11:22:22 25 shortly after the campaign was launched?

26 A. On the 29th, that's correct.

27 Q. Could we now look at this document please. It's headed  
28 "Statement by Charles Ghankay Taylor Leader of the National  
29 Patriotic Front of Liberia", is that right?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. It reads as follows:

3 "Since the bloody military coup of April 12, 1980, which  
4 brought the regime of Master Sergeant Samuel K Doe to power in  
11:22:54 5 Liberia, the Liberian people have endured ten years of  
6 oppression, summary killings, human rights violations, ethnic  
7 genocide, gross economic mismanagement and blatant widespread  
8 corruption."

9 First of all, whose assessment was that?

11:23:22 10 A. Well, I could almost say it was the assessment of the vast  
11 majority of the Liberian population, in the first instance. I  
12 was just conveying the sentiments before we launched this  
13 revolution as to why we did this.

14 Q. It continues:

11:23:46 15 "In October 1985, despite threats and intimidation, the  
16 Liberian people turned out in massive numbers to express their  
17 will at the polls for a peaceful change of government, only to  
18 see the electoral process subverted by the Doe regime which  
19 unilaterally declared itself the winner despite all independent  
11:24:12 20 evidence to the contrary."

21 To what were you adverting there?

22 A. I explained to this Court, I think on yesterday, the  
23 elections are held in Liberia in 1985. A vast majority of the  
24 citizens believed that the elections was won by I mentioned on  
11:24:38 25 yesterday Jackson Doe, N Doe, but Samuel Doe claimed to have won  
26 with a margin of 50.9 per cent. A vast majority of the family of  
27 nations disagreed that Doe had won the election. This is what I  
28 am alluding to.

29 Q. And then it goes on, paragraph 3:

1 "Following the aborted elections the popular resistance  
2 movement, under the leadership of the late commanding General  
3 Thomas Quiwonkpa sought to overturn the Doe regime with minimal  
4 force and restore democracy to Liberia. The Doe regime brutally  
11:25:25 5 put down this uprising and took harsh retaliation against  
6 innocent civilians in the northern counties taking hundreds of  
7 innocent lives, and forcing thousands of Liberians to flee their  
8 homes as refugees."

9 You've already recounted that history and so we won't  
11:25:47 10 delay:

11 "Having exhausted every possible avenue of reason and  
12 having seen every effort to peacefully effect a change of  
13 governance by constitutional means crushed by the harshest use of  
14 force we, the members of the National Patriotic Front, under the  
11:26:11 15 leadership of Charles Ghankay Taylor, feel it is our right and  
16 bounded duty to rid the people of Liberia of this cancerous  
17 despotism by whatever means at our disposal with the following  
18 objectives."

19 Before we come to the objectives, however, help us with  
11:26:31 20 this please: It says on the first line of that paragraph, having  
21 exhausted every possible avenue of reason. What were they?

22 A. Not just Charles Taylor but the Liberian people had asked  
23 Doe to step aside and turn the presidency over to the individual  
24 that, for the most part, even the international community agreed  
11:27:02 25 had won the election. That was Jackson Doe.

26 These arguments continued for a long time. He did not and  
27 then you had the incoming just barely one month after the  
28 elections in November, General Quiwonkpa launches this attack.  
29 He is crushed brutally. We again call for Doe to step down.

1 Jackson Doe is still here. He does not so for us these were the  
2 reasonable things that we had done.

3 Q. Now, noting the date of this statement, let us now look at  
4 the first stated objective.

11:27:48 5 "The restoration of full constitutional democracy to the  
6 Liberian people through free, fair and open elections, to be  
7 conducted as soon as practically possible following the  
8 conclusion of military actions and the restoration of law and  
9 order to the country."

11:28:14 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Griffiths, I will just caution you  
11 that the tape is almost exhausted.

12 MR GRIFFITHS: Very well.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is this convenient now to leave at this  
14 point?

11:28:22 15 MR GRIFFITHS: It is as convenient as any.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you. We will have a  
17 short adjournment and resume at 12 o'clock.

18 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

19 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

12:00:26 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, continue, Mr Griffiths.

21 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please your Honours:

22 Q. Mr Taylor, before the short adjournment we were looking at  
23 a document. Do you still have that document in front of you?

24 A. Yes. May I take it now? I still have it.

12:00:41 25 Q. It's the second tab and we were looking at the first  
26 numbered paragraph and the relevant passage read as follows:

27 "The following objectives:

28 1. The restoration of full constitutional democracy to the  
29 Liberian people through free, fair and open elections to be



1 conducted as soon as practically possible following the  
2 conclusion of military actions and the restoration of law and  
3 order to the country."

4 Now was that a general sentiment on the part of the NPFL,  
12:01:29 5 Mr Taylor?

6 A. Yes, it was extraordinarily genuine. Yes.

7 Q. And so these elections that you were proposing, how soon  
8 were you intending to embark upon that course?

9 A. We had first of all to defeat Doe. We did not know how  
12:01:59 10 long that would take. We were making rapid progress. But  
11 following the defeat of Doe it meant that you had to put into  
12 place the structures that would probably enable a democratic  
13 process.

14 And what do I mean by structures? First there would have  
12:02:25 15 to be an interim arrangement of a government of a sort and in  
16 even dealing with electoral processes you have to deal with,  
17 what, voters' registration. You had to deal with probably some  
18 Parliamentary source and we had not quite figured that out to get  
19 election laws promulgated. We would have needed the cooperation  
12:02:56 20 of the international community, election advisors. It's a whole  
21 process. So by saying here "practically possible", I'm  
22 describing that process that we had to go through to secure an  
23 enabling environment for free and fair elections.

24 Q. Now, help us with this. It goes on to say at paragraph 2:

12:03:23 25 "The rebuilding of the Liberian economy on the basis of our  
26 traditional free enterprise system and the protection of private  
27 property, without excessive government bureaucracy and government  
28 corruption but with concern for basic health, education, housing,  
29 employment and food for the vast majority of our populace."

1           Why was it thought necessary to mention to a commitment to  
2 a free enterprise system?

3 A.     Quite frankly, we had taken a jab at the Marxist-Leninist  
4 group that we know are lurking some place that, "Hey, we are not  
12:04:07 5 going to have this. Even when we get in there will be none of  
6 that. We are going to subscribe to a free enterprise system."

7 Q.     And what about the mention of the protection of private  
8 property?

9 A.     That's also a part of the democratic process. Under  
12:04:28 10 certain systems, you know, that private property don't exist - it  
11 did not exist under the communist system, so again this whole  
12 paragraph is dedicated towards saying, "Look, we're not going to  
13 be Marxists. We're not going to be Leninists", or whatever you  
14 call it. "We are going after the free enterprise system", and we  
12:04:51 15 wanted to be very clear on that at the outset.

16 Q.     Now, going on it says this:

17           "3. The unification of all Liberian people without regard  
18 to class, social status, ethnic origin, religion or political  
19 philosophy in the common task of nation-building. The National  
12:05:19 20 Patriotic Front is a broad-based, popular, non-sectarian  
21 nationalist movement which believes in the right of every  
22 Liberian to equal protection and opportunity under the law and  
23 which does not subscribe to ethnic and social" - and I think that  
24 word should be factionalism - "or recriminations."

12:05:41 25 A.     That is correct.

26 Q.     Why was that considered necessary?

27 A.     I have explained to the Court the still intrinsic problem  
28 in Liberia of this divide between the so called Americo-Liberian  
29 and the aborigines. That is still a problem and until that

1 problem is even resolved in Liberia today Liberia will not  
2 progress. I come in as the first possible leader of the country  
3 that stands squarely in the centre of this divide. I am half  
4 Americo-Liberian and half aborigine and so I see myself being in  
12:06:20 5 a unique position to begin to spell out I mean right away that,  
6 "Look, we cannot continue this. We are not going to accept it.  
7 We want to make sure that Liberia is going to be for Liberians  
8 and that anyone trying to bring about this sectional or racial  
9 divide would just be denied by the rest of us."

12:06:46 10 Q. Now, the document continues in this way:

11 "The National Patriotic Front is not beholden to any  
12 foreign group or power and believes in the maintenance of  
13 Liberia's traditional relationships with its close friends and  
14 allies, particularly the United States, and intends to work  
12:07:14 15 closely with this foreign partners in the reconstruction of the  
16 country."

17 Pausing there. First of all, where in that paragraph it  
18 says, "The National Patriotic Front is not beholden to any  
19 foreign group or power", was that the truth?

12:07:31 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. But what about Libya?

22 A. That's what we were - that's the very point we were trying  
23 to make here. We are dealing with an era of the Cold War. Libya  
24 has been bombed by the United States. Libya is supposed to be  
12:07:52 25 the pariah in the international community. Surely having trained  
26 in Libya will be an issue.

27 We while training in Libya, and I remember telling this  
28 Court, the Green Book - listen, I led a group into Libya as an  
29 educated man. We were not a bunch of - the three of us, Ellen,

1 Tom and I, are educated people. The Green Book I said we read  
2 and it was not imperative that it be accepted in Libya. Libya  
3 did not insist on that.

4 Now knowing that we had trained in Libya and it would be an  
12:08:40 5 issue during that period, we had made it clear to Libya - and  
6 Libya did not insist otherwise - and we remained very strong in  
7 our views and we wanted to make it very clear here and now that,  
8 "Look, for those of you that might come out and say because these  
9 people are trained in Libya these are supposed to be Gaddafi  
12:09:02 10 personal people, we are setting it straight here and now that we  
11 are not. We owe nothing to Gaddafi. He did not ask for anything  
12 in return for whatever assistance he gave." We wanted to set the  
13 record straight because our traditional friend the United States  
14 would have raised these kinds of issues and we wanted to assure  
12:09:21 15 the United States immediately that if we succeeded that they  
16 would remain our traditional allies, as they are.

17 Q. But what about Burkina Faso? They'd assisted you, hadn't  
18 they?

19 A. Yes, but Burkina Faso like Libya made no demands  
12:09:47 20 whatsoever. Their assistance was from a purely revolutionary  
21 standpoint and again they were dealing with people that knew what  
22 we wanted. We were not like sheep being herded into the field.  
23 They were dealing with sound people. We were one of the groups  
24 that knew ourselves, so to speak. So there were no questions  
12:10:12 25 about us lingering in thoughts, no. We went there, we asked for  
26 assistance and we made it clear - very clear - about our  
27 orientation, which direction we leaned toward and since there  
28 were no specific demands from either of the two countries we had  
29 nothing to worry about. Our main concern was at that time how

1 would our traditional ally interpret our accepting training in  
2 Libya during the Cold War. That was our concern, because those  
3 two countries had posed no particular threat to us.

12:10:59 4 Q. I was coming to that. Why was it felt necessary to  
5 particularly mention the United States of America?

6 A. Look, no President of Liberia yesterday, no President today  
7 and no President tomorrow will be able to lead successfully in  
8 Liberia if there is the slightest view that Liberia is pulling  
9 away from our traditional relationship with the United States.

12:11:43 10 It would be suicidal. It would never happen because Liberia is  
11 still considered to be America's little farm in West Africa.

12 And I do not use that word "farm" in a negative sense.  
13 Liberia little brother. Let's not forget Liberia was established  
14 as a place of asylum for the black man by the American

12:12:17 15 colonisation society and has remained in contact with America  
16 ever since. It was not Ghana, as President Obama went to. I  
17 mean, the blacks that returned from the United States went to  
18 Sierra Leone and Liberia. We are just unlucky Ghana is getting  
19 the glory. But the black population came from the southern  
12:12:37 20 states and all back to Liberia and so that connection with

21 Liberia remains until this very day. America has always felt  
22 that her little brother is Liberia and that's why I mentioned as  
23 former President that America has not been the friend that she is  
24 capable of being.

12:12:57 25 Now if you look in Africa, I mentioned yesterday the  
26 Francophone block and I did mention that these are those that had  
27 colonial masters as France. You had the Anglophone block and  
28 these were the British that were their masters. Liberia was  
29 never colonised by any country. The United States upon sending

1 the freed slaves did not seek to colonise Liberia, so Liberia is  
2 neither Francophone nor Anglophone and so we are just a little  
3 island hanging out there that has traditionally stuck close to  
4 the United States. I hope I have explained it.

12:13:43 5 Q. So at this early stage in the revolution then, Mr Taylor,  
6 were you seeking to send a positive signal to the United States?

7 A. Most definitely. Most definitely. Not only was I seeking,  
8 I was anxiously trying to make sure that it got understood and we  
9 did other things immediately thereafter to pursue that particular  
10 line, yes.

11 Q. Other things such as what?

12 A. Besides just an open statement, I instructed the other  
13 colleague of mine, Mr Womeiyu, to send a direct and even clearer  
14 statement to the United States State Department detailing and  
15 re-emphasising our desires at the time.

12:14:44 16 Q. We'll come to that in a moment, but let us conclude with  
17 this document first please. Paragraph 5:

18 "The National Patriotic Front believes strongly in the  
19 implementation of all fundamental human rights guaranteed to  
12:15:06 20 every citizen of Liberia by the constitution, particularly the  
21 right of life, liberty and security; the right to freedom of the  
22 thought, expression, movement and peaceful assembly; and the  
23 right to equal protection and due process under the rule of law."

24 Were you being sincere when you included that paragraph in  
12:15:34 25 this document?

26 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

27 Q. But, Mr Taylor, the cynic might say, "But your NPFL  
28 soldiers and those under their umbrella were committing  
29 atrocities in Liberia at this time and so this is the height of

1 hypocrisy", so what do you say about that?

2 MS HOLLIS: Excuse me, Mr President. This is not really  
3 rebutting an allegation in the indictment and this is leading.

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well what do you say to that,

12:16:12 5 Mr Griffiths?

6 MR GRIFFITHS: Well, I suggest it's not. This is the  
7 suggestion at the heart of the Prosecution case, that Mr Taylor  
8 was from the outset a bloodthirsty warlord with no belief in the  
9 rule of law or human rights, and it seems to us necessary, as we  
10 stated in our opening, to address that suggestion full on and  
11 that's what I'm seeking to do.

12:16:33

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I'll overrule the objection. Go  
13 ahead.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

12:16:46

15 Q. What do you say to that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Well I'm going to probably need some help, before I help  
17 you, from the Court. There are two parts to that question. When  
18 you say "under your umbrella", what are you referring to?

19 Q. Well you were speaking earlier, were you not, of the desire  
20 for revenge on the part of many people in for example Nimba  
21 County. Do you remember telling us about that?

12:17:09

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. That's what I'm talking about.

24 A. Okay, I asked that question because "under your umbrella"  
25 goes again to the heart of this very indictment that it could be  
26 construed that the RUF was under my umbrella, so if we're not  
27 talking about the RUF I will continue while you have clarified  
28 this.

12:17:25

29 Well I don't know, your Honours, what else I could have

1 done in Liberia. I entered the country. I trained the men in  
2 the rule of law and respect for human rights. I keep into place  
3 civilian courts. I set up a court martial board. I put into  
4 place all the mechanism. There are several individuals at the  
12:18:16 5 highest level of the NPFL, my Special Forces that I took so long  
6 training, and you must understand it was painful for me to  
7 execute some of them. I followed the law and I meant everything  
8 that I said here and it was demonstrated on the ground. I don't  
9 claim for one minute that there may have been some things that  
12:18:43 10 went on that I did not know, or that did not come to the  
11 attention of authority, but I had everything put into place and  
12 even Prosecution witnesses who have come before this Court have  
13 talked about the tribunals and they've talked about the  
14 execution. I meant this. I followed it to the letter.

12:19:04 15 Q. And it concludes:

16 "We therefore call upon every patriotic Liberian,  
17 including the many truly patriotic elements of the Armed Forces  
18 of Liberia, and all freedom-loving peoples everywhere to make  
19 every sacrifice and join with us in this right and historic  
12:19:28 20 struggle to free the Liberian people and nation of the shackles  
21 of tyranny and injustice once and for all."

22 Pausing there, that appeal to "all freedom-loving peoples  
23 everywhere", to whom was that addressed?

24 A. We had several target audiences, I would say. Again,  
12:19:59 25 principal was the response of the international community to what  
26 was going on. That was very principal in our traditional ally.  
27 That was very - this was one of our principal target populations.  
28 We were also looking at Liberians in the diaspora. We were also  
29 looking at other democratic countries around the world, because



1 again - and I hate to keep repeating myself - we are dealing with  
2 the period of the Cold War. Anything, a little group like the  
3 NPFL going into Liberia and removing - and by the time of this  
4 crisis in Liberia, don't let's forget Doe has - while he's not  
12:20:57 5 liked for what happened during the elections, but Doe is  
6 beginning to receive support from the United States in an attempt  
7 to probably encourage him to leave. So Doe is not hanging out  
8 there to dry. So we are beginning almost immediately to appeal  
9 to the United States and the powers that be that this is a worthy  
12:21:24 10 cause and that we cannot be looked at as one of these groups that  
11 were coming to start some communist Marxist-Leninist regime in  
12 the heart of West Africa. So this is very intentional and it's  
13 very targeted in trying to deal with democratic nations across  
14 the world that we knew could come after us with the hammer.

12:21:56 15 Q. Bearing in mind the nation of the allegation you face,  
16 where it says in that paragraph "all freedom-loving peoples  
17 everywhere", was that a reference to your supposed  
18 co-conspirators in the RUF and the Gambians say?

19 A. No, I mean we're talking apples and oranges. Who are these  
12:22:24 20 people that someone will have to appeal to them? I mean, number  
21 one I don't know even - the three letters you use RUF I don't  
22 even know who they are, because I mentioned to you I met Ali  
23 Kabbah in Libya. He had several unions there, but they were not  
24 called RUF. They were the Sierra Leonean Pan-African  
12:22:51 25 Revolutionary Movement, so RUF is something that doesn't even  
26 play. The little Gambian group that is in Burkina Faso are not -  
27 these are not the people to appeal to.

28 What I'm appealing to are the large democratic nations, the  
29 leaders of the free world. When we talk about that, who are we

1 talking about? We're talking about the United States, we're  
2 talking about Britain and we're talking about Europe in total  
3 because that's the free world at that time. So that appeal is  
4 going to nation states.

12:23:26 5 Q. I was coming to that. To whom were you addressing this  
6 document?

7 A. This is a general pronouncement, but targeted at these  
8 nation states.

9 Q. So to whom was it distributed?

12:23:46 10 A. To the press and the international media that was in La  
11 Cote d'Ivoire and it was published - it was distributed in the  
12 United States by our man in the United States, Tom Woveiyu, to  
13 press individuals and individuals that wanted to read about it.  
14 So this was a public document intended for mass distribution, but  
12:24:11 15 I'm in La Cote d'Ivoire and so it's going to the press.

16 Q. Was it distributed, for example, to members of the NPFL?

17 A. Oh, definitely. Everyone knew. Yes, they had copies.  
18 Yes, yes.

19 Q. And again, Mr Taylor, in light of the allegation you face,  
12:24:31 20 bearing in mind it is suggested that from the outset your  
21 intention was to terrorise the civilian population and that  
22 you're no more than a terrorist, what were you seeking to do with  
23 this document?

24 A. This document is - imagine this. The news wires, the radio  
12:24:59 25 stations, are reporting that there is some group that has  
26 attacked, you know, Liberia called the National Patriotic Front  
27 of Liberia. The first question in the minds of everyone, "Who  
28 are these people? Who are these people?" The next question  
29 logically will be, "What do they stand for?" We are setting out

1 immediately to answer these questions that are surely to come and  
2 they did come, but we - you don't start a revolution, you don't  
3 start these kinds of things, without setting out for all  
4 interested parties and what we referred to here as  
12:25:41 5 "freedom-loving people" - setting out your objective: "Why are  
6 you doing this? After you do this, what do you expect to do  
7 thereafter?" If you are a serious minded person that knows what  
8 you are doing, you have to set out these general and specific  
9 objectives. That's what we're trying to do here.

12:26:05 10 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that this was not the only  
11 initiative taken at this time and that there was another  
12 initiative directed specifically to the US State Department. Do  
13 you remember telling us that?

14 A. That is correct.

12:26:22 15 Q. And what was that initiative?

16 A. We constructed under the signature of my other colleague,  
17 Thomas Woveiyu, a document to a senior State Department official  
18 by the name of John Dobrin to also explain instead of in a  
19 general level which I'm sure the United States Government saw  
12:26:50 20 this copy, but we wanted to in a specific way speak to the United  
21 States Government as to our aims and our objectives and what we  
22 wanted to accomplish and we did that.

23 Q. Have you seen the document which was sent to John Dobrin?

24 A. Yes.

12:27:14 25 MR GRIFFITHS: I wonder if the witness could be shown,  
26 please, from the Defence documents for week 30, the item behind  
27 tab 2:

28 Q. Have you seen that document before, Mr Taylor?

29 A. Yes, this is the document.

1 Q. Now it's headed "Memorandum" and we see that it's addressed  
2 to Mr John Dobrin, US Department of State. Pausing there. Did  
3 you send any memorandum like this to any other government around  
4 the world?

12:28:57 5 A. No. To my recollection we did not target any other  
6 government immediately. We targeted our traditional ally, the  
7 United States.

8 Q. Who is John Dobrin?

9 A. Well, I'm not sure where he is now, John could be dead.  
12:29:13 10 John Dobrin was a senior United States State Department official  
11 I think at the level of - and I stand direct on this - I think he  
12 was at least at the level of Assistant Secretary of State or  
13 thereabouts.

14 Q. Why was he selected?

12:29:31 15 A. Because he would have necessarily been in charge of the  
16 African situation and even more specifically the Liberian  
17 situation.

18 Q. Now, we see below that from Jucontee Tom Woveiyu, National  
19 Patriotic Front. Who is he?

12:30:00 20 A. Remember I've mentioned Jucontee Tom Woveiyu is the same as  
21 - that Tom is just short, it's Thomas, the Thomas Woveiyu who is  
22 the other individual along with Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf that I said  
23 put the final touches on the NPFL.

24 Q. At the time that this document was issued, and we see it's  
12:30:30 25 dated 22 January 1990, where was Mr Woveiyu?

26 A. Mr Woveiyu was in the United States.

27 Q. And we see then that it's headed "The current situation in  
28 Liberia" and below that "objective".

29 "1. The military action that commenced on December 24,

1 1990 in Gbutuo Nimba County has as its objective the overthrow of  
2 the Doe dictatorship and its replacement in a two-phase process  
3 by a democratically elected government."

4 Let's pause there. Mr Taylor, this morning you told us  
12:31:20 5 that it commenced on 29 December, so which is right?

6 MS HOLLIS: Mr President, Defence counsel is attempting to  
7 rehabilitate his witness on direct examination.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: What do you say to that?

9 MR GRIFFITHS: Your Honour, I find it amazing that my  
12:31:45 10 learned friend should make this objection. The fact that it  
11 began on 24 December, Christmas Eve, is an historical fact. Now,  
12 for my learned friend in those circumstances to say that in  
13 effect I'm trying to assist Mr Taylor on a date seems to us  
14 completely ridiculous.

12:32:07 15 Obviously he misspoke this morning. Not everyone,  
16 particularly in the pressurised position of sitting in the chair  
17 being cross-examined, can recollect every date and every occasion  
18 and it seems to us perfectly legitimate for us to seek to assist  
19 the witness in this way and in effect correct the record where at  
12:32:32 20 page 50, line 19, I'm helpfully assisted, he evidently made an  
21 error. That's all we're seeking to do.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's all right. I will overrule the  
23 objection and allow the question.

24 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

12:32:47 25 Q. So which is right, Mr Taylor?

26 A. The revolution was launched the day before Christmas. I  
27 apologise; I did misspeak. It was launched the day before  
28 Christmas in Nimba.

29 Q. And where it says in that paragraph "in a two-phase

1 process", what does that mean?

12:33:27 2 A. I tried to explain that earlier. The first phase is the  
3 military phase. The second phase is putting in the structures  
4 that I described before, that whole process of going to election,  
5 the participation of the international community from your  
6 voters' registration, to your voters' education, to the  
7 establishment of political parties, that's that second phase that  
8 I'm referring to. So the first phase is military, the second  
9 phase is this - all of the trappings of the democratic process  
12:33:51 10 before elections are held.

11 Q. Then it goes on:

12 "Political programme. Upon the successful completion of  
13 the military campaign, a provisional administration will be  
14 established, led by the National Patriotic Front. Its mandate  
12:34:13 15 will be to restore order and prepare the country for multi-party  
16 presidential and legislative elections in accordance with the  
17 Liberian constitution. Although the precise composition of the  
18 provisional government has not yet been decided, it is envisaged  
19 that it will comprise elements of the various groupings that are  
12:34:38 20 making a contribution to the struggle for the restoration of  
21 democracy in Liberia."

22 Can we pause there, please.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now help us: Where it says "although the precise  
12:34:55 25 composition of the provisional government has not yet been  
26 decided", was that true?

27 A. That was true.

28 Q. But you had told us earlier, Mr Taylor, that it had already  
29 been agreed that you would be president and a Special Forces

1 would be vice-president?

2 A. That is true.

3 Q. So what does that mean then?

4 A. Well, let me tell you.

12:35:19 5 MS HOLLIS: Your Honour, at the risk of incurring the wrath  
6 of the Court, Defence counsel is once again attempting to  
7 rehabilitate his witness by reconciling possibly different  
8 language in a document and testimony. Contrary to what Defence  
9 counsel has just said, this witness is not under the pressure of  
12:35:38 10 cross-examination, this is direct examination, and we think that  
11 it's improper.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: This witness is not in the ordinary  
13 position of other witnesses. This is the witness the Prosecution  
14 has alleged committed 11 serious - extremely serious counts and  
12:35:59 15 has called 91 witnesses and hundreds of documents in an attempt  
16 to prove those counts against this witness, the accused.

17 Now, in the opinion of this Court, this accused has got the  
18 right to fully reply to those allegations and that evidence and  
19 questions directed to that aim will be allowed by this Court.  
12:36:29 20 Having said that, I'll overrule the objection and you go ahead,  
21 Mr Griffiths.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I'm grateful:

23 Q. So what's the position, Mr Taylor?

24 A. Well, let me just explain this. When we talk about the  
12:36:48 25 composition has not been decided, we have to look at it in this  
26 particular light: The Special Forces agreed that if we succeed  
27 I, if I became the president, one of them would be  
28 vice-president. That's the military revolutionary process that  
29 is going on.

1 This process that I'm talking about, I do not become  
2 President of Liberia until after an election. I am only known as  
3 leader of the NPFL. It was known that I would participate in the  
4 election. This process that I'm describing here, when I say the  
12:37:31 5 composition has not been decided, we have a typical example right  
6 here in court, your Honour.

7 There were groups in Liberia, right in Monrovia, the  
8 gentleman sitting at the rear of the Court, Cllr Lavalie  
9 Supuwood, a member of my legal defence team, was one of the  
12:37:59 10 individuals in Monrovia that was dispatched via La Cote d'Ivoire  
11 to bear message from supporting groups of - remember I talked  
12 about progressives in Monrovia - to bring word to us that they  
13 were with us. So we had support in Monrovia.

14 So by the time we succeeded militarily there would have had  
12:38:26 15 to be a transitional government. It is those progressives that  
16 would have to be brought on board in setting up this transitional  
17 government that would then put into place the mechanism for  
18 elections.

19 Now, Charles Taylor was going to be a candidate, so the  
12:38:48 20 deal was wherever I led one of them would be vice-president and  
21 that is what happened. So, when I talk about not knowing the  
22 composition, we did not know yet in Monrovia who all were going  
23 to join the government, because everybody from the same Amos  
24 Sawyer, Cllr Supuwood in - the whole group in Monrovia said they  
12:39:12 25 paid his way, go, carry out message. That's how he came in the  
26 bush and joined us.

27 Q. Now, what are you talking about in this document when it  
28 says "of the various groupings that are making a contribution to  
29 the struggle"?



1 A. That's what I'm talking about. I'm talking about in  
2 America we still have our major base over there, the Union of  
3 Liberian Associations in America. They are doing press releases,  
4 they are supporting. You've got in the Monrovia area, you've got  
12:39:49 5 - remember I mentioned to the Court that you had the Progressive  
6 Alliance of Liberia that later on became the PPP, the political  
7 party headed by Barcus Matthews. They are down there rooting for  
8 us. And that's why they sent him.

9 So all of these groupings that were outside of Liberia,  
12:40:14 10 Liberians in the Diaspora that wanted to see this change, were  
11 out there supporting it. So if you were in Europe and a  
12 television or radio or a journalist came up to you and asked you  
13 questions, your mere statement of support meant something to us.  
14 That's what I'm talking about.

12:40:33 15 Q. Very well. It goes on at paragraph 3:

16 "One of the most unsettling features of the Doe  
17 dictatorship has been the injection into our body politic of  
18 pernicious tribal cleavages. Although this is a familiar theme  
19 in much of Sub-Saharan Africa it has never been part of our  
12:40:56 20 political culture. One of the urgent tasks of the NPF government  
21 will be to establish the principle that Liberia belongs to all  
22 Liberians, including the vanquished Krahs."

23 What's that about?

24 A. Well, we have to pay attention to the third line where it  
12:41:20 25 talks about tribal cleavages. I have told this Court we have  
26 this divide between Americo-Liberians and aborigines as two  
27 groups. Doe comes in and he brings into place a third dimension  
28 that is now not a group dimension but a tribal dimension of the  
29 Krahn ethnic group where the Krahs then move forward and almost

1 broke this whole thing down into not like Americo-Liberians  
2 versus aborigines, it almost became the Krahn ethnic group versus  
3 the rest of the country.

4 Q. Just the Krahns?

12:42:08 5 A. Well, let me probably give the Court some information.  
6 There are four groupings in Liberia that speak different  
7 languages but practically understand each other. I will name  
8 them. One is called the Kru. The other is called the - that's  
9 K-R-U. The second is called the Sapo, that's S-A-P and some say  
12:42:45 10 P-P-O. The third grouping you have the Grebos, that's  
11 G-R-E-B-O-S, and then you have the Krahn.

12 Now, close to the Krahn are the Sapos that speak the same  
13 language. So, as an extension of the Krahn ethnic group at that  
14 particular time the Sapos stopped calling themselves Sapos and  
12:43:15 15 started calling themselves Krahns. So we are talking about an  
16 extension of the Krahn Sapos. The Grebos did not join the Krahn  
17 in that way, neither did the Kru, but we are mostly talking about  
18 the Sapos and the Krahns.

19 Q. And it goes on at paragraph 4:

12:43:40 20 "The ideological orientation of the principal players in  
21 the current Liberian movement for democracy is pro-west, pro the  
22 free enterprise system. It our hope not nearly to retain ties  
23 with our traditional allies, but to expand them in a way which  
24 will command mutual respect. The undignified spectacle which we  
12:44:10 25 have had to endure these past years of a Liberia with its hands  
26 constantly outstretched in supplication is one we are anxious to  
27 change."

28 Why was it felt necessary to make that statement?

29 A. Well, the first part is similar to the document we just saw

1 before. Right away we want to tell them that: Look, this is no  
2 Marxist-Leninist operation. So we're going to just be, in other  
3 words, pro you. The second part of this is the pan-African wing  
4 of this that: Look, we are part of you, but we are not your  
12:44:53 5 little child. We want to be able to take care - for you to help  
6 us to take care of ourselves. We are tired of having to come to  
7 you respectfully to beg for a little money here, a little food  
8 here. We are looking at a process now where, in the old saying,  
9 you would teach us to grow our food instead of just giving us.  
12:45:17 10 We are tired with your handouts and treating us like your little  
11 children. We want to be looked at with some respect as a  
12 sovereign nation. We want you as our friend, we want you as our  
13 ally but we don't want you treating us as though we are on your  
14 plantations. This is what we are actually getting at here.

12:45:38 15 Q. Now where it says "of the principal players in the current  
16 Liberian movement", why was it necessary to make that reference?

17 A. Well, you have one of our main individuals Ellen Johnson is  
18 very well known and respected in the United States and in the  
19 west. So we are - Tom Woweiyu is also in the United States, he  
12:46:03 20 is known from our days in the union. I am known. So we are  
21 really trying to deal with them knowing that, well, we are the  
22 guys in control. So you don't have to worry about some other  
23 influence, we are the individuals that you have to look at. So  
24 you can depend on us, in other words.

12:46:24 25 Q. Go over the page, please. "Economic programme". Paragraph  
26 5:

27 "Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Doe administration  
28 has been the despoliation of the Liberian economy. Ten years of  
29 negative growth, gargantuan deficits financed through heavy

1 foreign borrowing and raids on the domestic banking system and  
2 abject neglect of the country's physical and human infrastructure  
3 have taken a heavy toll. An urgent priority will be to put into  
4 place the kinds of policies that will begin to address these  
12:47:43 5 problems in a meaningful way."

6 What's all that about?

7 A. I'm going to have to break this down because there are  
8 about three, four different constructs in here. Let's deal with  
9 ten years of negative growth, guaranteeing deficits financed  
12:48:09 10 through heavy borrowing. The military comes to power. Doe is  
11 there; investment begin to dwindle. Most foreign investment in  
12 the country begin to find themselves pulling out because here we  
13 have a situation where the military is there; we've had an  
14 attempt before.

12:48:41 15 We are still going through this terrible problem and there  
16 are open secrets that something - that Liberians are not, you  
17 know, were not prepared to permit this whole process to continue  
18 and that probably there will be trouble in the country, so this  
19 serves as a disincentive to foreign investment. So we had the  
12:49:09 20 decline in investment that led to this negative growth. And so  
21 what Liberia had to do at that particular time was Doe kept  
22 trying to borrow money to fill this gap that had been left as a  
23 result of this negative growth.

24 This part that deals with the abject neglect of the  
12:49:35 25 country's physical and human infrastructure have taken a heavy  
26 toll. The human infrastructure had to deal with that segment of  
27 the up-and-coming students and the educated already population in  
28 Liberia and also in the Diaspora. Liberians that were educated  
29 and trained in various disciplines that might have wanted to come

1 home found themselves not coming.

2 Our universities found themselves losing assistance to the  
3 academic process, and so this whole process of renewal, training  
4 - growing and training to over time replace and keep the civil  
12:50:32 5 service and other parts of the economy going were all hampered  
6 because of this massive loss of revenue because of the negative  
7 growth. And so this is what we were talking about in that  
8 particular part.

9 Q. It continues:

12:50:51 10 "An implementable economic recovery programme is being  
11 drafted with specific prioritised goals which it is hoped will  
12 serve as a basis for discussions with our bilateral and  
13 multilateral partners.

14 As a general principle, the broad thrust of NPF economic  
12:51:17 15 policy will be to diminish the commercial public sector presence,  
16 reorienting government's role away from that of active player and  
17 more towards that of regulator/referee. There will also be  
18 conscious efforts to provide opportunities for the development of  
19 Liberian entrepreneurship while at the same time providing a more  
12:51:48 20 hospitable environment for foreign investment."

21 So what kind of economic route were you proposing there,  
22 Mr Taylor?

23 A. Well, let's deal with the diminishing of the commercial  
24 public sector and then I will work into what I'm talking about  
12:52:09 25 here. It's important for the Court to understand that Liberia is  
26 one of those curious countries where the commercial part of our  
27 economy was - I would almost say 85 per cent held by foreign  
28 nationals; Lebanese, Indians and other nationals that you could  
29 hardly find a Liberian with one little storefront to sell dry

1 goods and other things.

2           Liberians continued to remain dependent on the presence of  
3 foreign - and I don't say this in a negative way because we, I  
4 appreciate the presence of foreigners, they've contributed  
12:52:58 5 significantly - but this was to encourage Liberians to get  
6 involved in the whole economic structure by doing some business,  
7 do something, and not just leave it up to foreigners to do. Now  
8 that's what we meant by this commercial situation.

9           The second part was that we are still hinting to  
12:53:24 10 non-government involvement in the - as far as control as in a  
11 communist type economic environment where there would be a free  
12 enterprise but there would be a type of what is referred here as  
13 a regulator/referee.

14           So instead of owning, the government owning and operating  
12:53:57 15 the systems of distribution in the country, it would do what most  
16 western economies do is to - what you call regulate and referee  
17 and I guess if they had done that we would not have the - if they  
18 had continued doing that in the West we would not have the  
19 present global economic crisis.

12:54:14 20 Q.   Now pausing there for a minute, Mr Taylor. At this stage  
21 we're talking about 1990?

22 A.   That is correct.

23 Q.   Who is President of the United States?

24 A.   1990. I've got to be very careful with this one. It's got  
12:54:32 25 to be - I think it's the old man George Bush, if I'm not  
26 mistaken.

27 Q.   And help us also: Can you recall now who was Prime  
28 Minister in England?

29 A.   Yes, I can. It was the Iron Lady, Margaret Thatcher.

1 Q. And help us: What kind of economic programme had come to  
2 be associated with her?

3 A. Well, to the best of my recollection, at that time Margaret  
4 Thatcher, to the best of my recollection, was a conservative and  
12:55:19 5 so there were some problems in Britain at the time with  
6 demonstrations from - I think on the part of trade unions and  
7 there was some restructuring of the British economy. That's the  
8 extent of my recollection and it was pretty tough. I think  
9 Britain was in dire economic straits during that particular time  
12:55:44 10 and she brought about some very tough, stringent measures that I  
11 think helped to rein in the trade unions and it did cause some  
12 problems.

13 Q. I'm just looking here at the context in which you were  
14 saying this. Now could you put that document to one side,  
12:56:03 15 please. So we've now looked, Mr Taylor, in a little length at  
16 two documents dating from January 1990, so weeks after you had  
17 embarked upon this revolution, yes? And between those two  
18 documents do they set out what your goals were at the time?

19 A. Yes.

12:56:41 20 Q. Can you now please, Mr Taylor, help us with the progress of  
21 the Liberian revolution thereafter in 1990?

22 A. Well I will do my best here, because by January/February of  
23 this particular time while we are moving Doe is really beginning  
24 to go after people in the Monrovia and general area that he  
12:57:32 25 suspects are trying to help. Now, by May of 1990 NPFL forces  
26 take Buchanan. Now it's important, because if I have an  
27 opportunity it's important for this to be seen from a map  
28 because --

29 Q. Well let's go to the map then, please.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can we replace this map please, L1, which we've been  
3 looking at earlier today.

4 A. Yes. We have captured Buchanan and if you look Buchanan  
12:58:16 5 now is to the far west, but we have not reached to Gbarnga. I  
6 want to go to through this even before I get to the map, because  
7 I don't want it to be said that the map is leading me because I  
8 know this. So we have progressed west to Buchanan, we've  
9 captured Buchanan, but going northeastward towards Gbarnga we  
12:58:44 10 deliberately do not capture Gbarnga.

11 By July - and this is very interesting. By July of 1990  
12 the NPFL forces have reached the outskirts of Monrovia, by July,  
13 and so we are talking about a period of about six months we had  
14 moved from the border all the way right on the outskirts of  
12:59:19 15 Monrovia. We had practically encircled Monrovia. We still have  
16 not moved into Gbarnga.

17 What we do, we go into Buchanan and then we move northward  
18 towards the town of Kakata. Now, Kakata - because you asked me  
19 the question about 1990. Kakata is on the road between Monrovia  
12:59:52 20 and Gbarnga. Now, from a military tactical position we have left  
21 Gbarnga in natural terms behind us. What we did was to go and  
22 capture the town of Kakata. There were still Armed Forces of  
23 Liberia troops in Gbarnga and to a great extent all the way back  
24 in the other part of Nimba, so when I told this Court we had not  
13:00:23 25 captured all of Nimba County, that part of Nimba County as I  
26 mentioned that is the northeastern side on the main highway that  
27 I tried to direct, Ganta coming on to Gbarnga, are still being  
28 held by the armed forces. So we bypass them, come to Buchanan,  
29 cut across to Kakata and leave Gbarnga and Ganta behind us.



1           What happens then? The troops from the Armed Forces of  
2 Liberia have been cut off from the rest of the troops in Monrovia  
3 and most of them flee. Then we work our way back from Kakata  
4 towards - and I'll then show what I'm talking about on the map.

13:01:12 5 Q. Please do.

6 A. Now, remember we enter at Gbutuo and begin to expand. We  
7 come, your Honours, all the way, we capture the town of Tappita.  
8 If you look coming right where I'm pointing is the town of  
9 Tappita.

13:01:55 10           Now this is important here, because behind Tappita if you  
11 look going westward is Grand Gedeh. Grand Gedeh is the home  
12 county of Samuel Doe and there was a major military position  
13 here, but there is only one road into Grand Gedeh in and one road  
14 out and that is that road coming through Tappita that goes on -  
13:02:26 15 if you watch it, we don't have good roads in Liberia. From  
16 Tappita the next road you have to go up to Ganta before you go to  
17 Monrovia.

18           Now, we captured Tappita and take this forest route that  
19 you see I'm going through here. I'm not sure if the judges are  
13:02:46 20 seeing this. Are you?

21 JUDGE DOHERTY: [Microphone not activated].

22 THE WITNESS: Okay. We take this bush road here and attack  
23 Buchanan. We capture Buchanan. We do not advance behind to  
24 Grand Gedeh. From Buchanan we work our way all the way up to the  
13:03:07 25 town of Kakata. So we move from Buchanan. We begin to fight.  
26 This is - right here is Roberts international airport and we move  
27 and we capture the town of Kakata, putting Harbel, which is the  
28 Firestone rubber plantation, in our control area.

29           If you look, your Honours, further to your left there is

1 that town - the military barracks - of Camp Schefflein right  
2 here. We do not go in that direction. We do not attack  
3 Schefflein. It's too strong. But we go up to Kakata, capture  
4 Kakata, station a major force there and begin to work our way  
13:03:52 5 backward to Gbarnga and backward to Ganta, joining now the full  
6 control of Nimba County and this entire area that involves Nimba,  
7 Bong, here is Margibi, this entire area. So we in effect have  
8 captured the very centre of the country.

9 Doe forces that are in Grand Gedeh are cut off from  
13:04:20 10 Monrovia so we can fight them. Monrovia is still on that side,  
11 but we are dead centre and there can be no connection between the  
12 troops of the Armed Forces of Liberia. This is what happened.

13 By this time, that's in May, we move to Kakata and push  
14 further toward Monrovia. We go on down to the town of - where is  
13:04:49 15 Careysburg? We come all the way here to Careysburg and then come  
16 near Monrovia and then we stop. We do not attack Camp  
17 Schefflein. It's a major military post and we don't touch it,  
18 but we just spread out.

19 By this time in 1990 we get to Gbarnga. From Gbarnga we  
13:05:12 20 then started moving our troops toward the Lofa angle, but we  
21 crossed the St Paul River, we come into this Belle Yella area and  
22 attack this Bomi/Cape Mount area. So by July we have encircled  
23 Monrovia, but we have already now penetrated and we have captured  
24 most of Lofa and Cape Mount. So what has happened in effect by  
13:05:49 25 July, Monrovia is totally encircled from the Bomi/Cape Mount side  
26 all the way back up to the town of Tappita. That's the situation  
27 as of July.

28 In August of 1990, this is when ECOMOG, the West African  
29 peacekeeping forces, come into Liberia and meet us and we begin

1 fighting the ECOMOG and there is a reason for that.

2 By September of 1990 Samuel Doe is killed. He is killed a  
3 month after the ECOMOG forces get into the country in September.  
4 By that time he had done some terrible things in Monrovia. The  
13:06:48 5 UN compound had been raided, somewhat earlier than July.

6 Q. Can I ask you to pause at this stage please, Mr Taylor,  
7 because you've helpfully provided us with an outline of events  
8 for the first nine months of 1990.

9 A. That's correct.

13:07:09 10 Q. I'd like us now to pause, please, and deal in a little bit  
11 more detail to assist these judges with some of the events you've  
12 mentioned. First of all, can you help us with the month in which  
13 Kakata was captured?

14 A. Kakata was captured - May is Buchanan, so by late May/early  
13:07:34 15 June we are moving up there. We moved straight across to Kakata.

16 Q. Now, did Buchanan have any significance as a town?

17 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

18 Q. What's that?

19 A. Buchanan is - has a seaport. It was an iron ore staging  
13:07:57 20 post. Buchanan is about I would think the second city I would  
21 say to Monrovia. A very, very, very well planned and well  
22 organised city of industrial activities. This was important  
23 because it had a seaport. It was important because it meant a  
24 major blow to the government to lose such a commercially  
13:08:26 25 important part of the country.

26 Q. Now, Harbel is the location for what economic activity?

27 A. Harbel is the location of the Firestone rubber plantation.  
28 The largest - at that time I would say one of the largest rubber  
29 plantations in the world.

1 Q. And what was the significance of capturing that?

2 A. You had immediately a means that would provide the needed  
3 financial assistance that we needed for the revolution.

4 Q. How?

13:09:14 5 A. Well, once Harbel fell in our control - this was a major,  
6 major industrial area. Rubber was being sent out, rubber was  
7 being exported to the United States. So once we captured Harbel  
8 we then made it very clear to the Firestone plantation company  
9 that they could no longer be permitted to exercise allegiance to  
10 the government in Monrovia; that that which in terms of revenue  
11 were being generated from the sale of rubber that we did not ban  
12 had to be paid to the National Patriotic Front. So it became at  
13 that particular time our most significant principal source of  
14 foreign exchange.

13:10:07 15 Q. And what kind of sums are we talking about?

16 A. Well, depending on the sale of rubber, we could do an  
17 average of one, two million dollars probably every two quarters.

18 Q. And who received that money?

19 A. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia received that  
13:10:32 20 money.

21 Q. And who controlled it?

22 A. I controlled the National Patriotic Front.

23 Q. No, who controlled the money?

24 A. The organisation. We had a whole system set up that we  
13:10:45 25 could buy food and medicine and different things. There was a  
26 whole structure put into place that would be a financial  
27 structure to deal with the collection and distribution of the  
28 money. I want to clarify one thing. I am not eluding here.  
29 What Firestone did at that particular time was that, because of

1 United States laws, Firestone, and I want to be very clear about  
2 this, did not pay money to the NPFL. I'm going to be very clear  
3 about this.

4 What happened is that we took rubber in return for what and  
13:11:34 5 we sold the rubber mostly to La Cote d'Ivoire and then got the  
6 money from there. We had a mechanism set up where the rubber  
7 would be turned over to us and we would then send the rubber to  
8 La Cote d'Ivoire that was buying and exporting rubber and it was  
9 being bought by local merchants and we used the money that way.  
13:11:54 10 Firestone did not pay to us.

11 Q. And I am dwelling on this topic for a reason, Mr Taylor.  
12 The money you received, was that in cash or was it kept in a  
13 bank?

14 A. No, we sold on the market in La Cote d'Ivoire in cash.

13:12:17 15 Q. Yes, and where was the money kept?

16 A. And then the money was brought back - by now we are in  
17 Harbel, we moved to Gbarnga, by now we begin to set up our  
18 headquarters in Gbarnga. So it is being now used by what we call  
19 our ministry of finance.

13:12:34 20 Q. But how is it kept?

21 A. Not in a bank. It was kept by the ministry officials I'm  
22 sure in the building there. There was no operating bank in  
23 Greater Liberia at the time.

24 Q. And who was the minister of finance?

13:12:50 25 A. The minister of finance at that particular time started off  
26 to be a gentleman we called Togar McIntosh.

27 Q. Can you spell the first time?

28 A. Togar, T-O-G-A-R and the last name is spelt  
29 M-C-I-N-T-O-S-H, I think, McIntosh.

1 Q. Thank you. Now moving on, your assistance, please.

2 Roughly when was Gbarnga captured? Just a month will do.

3 A. I would put Gbarnga to about - roughly about the same time  
4 that we are progressing toward Monrovia, so we are talking about  
13:13:49 5 roughly between June/July. We are moving in two directions. A  
6 group is going towards Monrovia, and a group is going backward to  
7 Gbarnga. Gbarnga may have been captured a little earlier than  
8 our encirclement of Monrovia because, as I mentioned to the  
9 Court, there is virtually no resistance behind us.

13:14:10 10 Once we cut these people off most of the soldiers flee and  
11 so the first scout unit that we sent to the area didn't really  
12 find anything, so it was a very short time. So I would really  
13 put this to - if I really wanted to be pushed on this - to not  
14 later than maybe June because it was captured a little earlier  
13:14:30 15 than getting the circle around Monrovia.

16 Q. Good enough for my purposes, Mr Taylor, but can I just  
17 return briefly, and I apologise for this, to the issue of money.  
18 The money that you were receiving from the sale of rubber, was  
19 any of that being sent to any groups outside Liberia?

13:14:54 20 A. No, no, no, no, no, no. We are not supporting any group or  
21 sending money to any groups outside Liberia at this particular  
22 time.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. No.

13:15:07 25 Q. Another little detail. Given that you had come as far as  
26 Harbel, which we can see on the map is not that far from  
27 Monrovia, why did you not make a strike for Monrovia at that  
28 time?

29 A. We encircled Monrovia. As I said --

1 Q. By when?

2 A. By July of 1990. By this particular time there are all  
3 kinds of efforts underway for a peacekeeping unit or the  
4 involvement of ECOWAS in this whole process.

13:15:59 5 Q. Just ECOWAS?

6 A. Well, I'm coming to that. We are refusing to permit ECOWAS  
7 to come in at a time that we are about to capture Monrovia, but  
8 no one is listening to us. At this particular time our good  
9 friends the United States - now we're going - I want to make this  
10 clear now: We encircled Monrovia around July. We are moving on  
11 where there are discussions going on for these troops. The  
12 troops finally, I mentioned to the Court, entered in August.

13 Q. Which troops?

14 A. The troops from ECOWAS finally entered. But there are  
13:16:50 15 these discussions going on.

16 Q. Between whom?

17 A. The NPFL, the ECOWAS leadership about should it happen,  
18 should it not happen. All of that is going on. We are still  
19 insisting even after they get into Monrovia that: Hey, you're  
13:17:06 20 here, you do not meddle and this is unlike the meddling that the  
21 Prosecution mentions of me in Sierra Leone. You have nothing to  
22 do with what we are doing here, we are going to take Monrovia.  
23 We are now going forward.

24 In September Doe is killed while ECOWAS is - the ECOMOG  
13:17:32 25 forces are in town. By or around October comes in the Assistant  
26 Secretary of State for African affairs.

27 Q. Who?

28 A. Herman Cohen.

29 Q. Herman Cohen comes into the bush on the border at a

1 different area now. He comes into an area called Loguato, that's  
2 on the map, in a little town just outside of Loguato called  
3 Duanplay to ask me and in fact to deliver a message to me,  
4 secretary Cohen came in the bush to deliver a message to me that  
13:18:24 5 it was the desire of the United States government that I not  
6 attack the city of Monrovia because there were close to a million  
7 citizens in the city and to attack the city would result to  
8 massive loss of life.

9 And because we had captured Grand Cape Mount County, I  
13:18:46 10 explained to the Court not only had we - the encirclement of  
11 Monrovia means that we had come across and captured - I mentioned  
12 Lofa, Grand Cape Mount and Bomi.

13 He secondly asked that we open a humanitarian corridor  
14 between Monrovia through Cape Mount to the Sierra Leonean border  
13:19:09 15 that citizens that wanted to leave could leave. We accepted.  
16 That's why we did not take Monrovia. We felt that it was a  
17 reasonable request and we accepted not to storm Monrovia.

18 Q. Do you think you made a right decision?

19 A. On second thought one would look at it in a little  
13:19:38 20 different light, but I'll put it this way, counsel: I have no  
21 regrets that we took that decision because I believe that the  
22 United States was right, we did save lives. But on the other  
23 hand it did prolong the military operations in Liberia beyond a  
24 particular point, because what happened is that ECOMOG launched a  
13:20:05 25 counter-offensive against us. So how do I answer you?

26 I am very glad that we saved lives because it was true that  
27 there would have been massive loss of lives, but regrettably  
28 there was almost on the other hand exactly what we were trying to  
29 prevent, unfortunately. So in direct answer I can't say now that



1 I regret that decision because, on a whole, I think even more  
2 lives would have been more lost, the city would have been  
3 practically wiped out, and so I just have to - you know, to leave  
4 it at that.

13:20:46 5 Q. Now, you mentioned that in September, a month after ECOMOG  
6 arrived, Samuel Doe was killed.

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. Who by?

9 A. Now just to remind the Court, I had mentioned that my  
13:21:15 10 commander Prince Johnson had executed two individuals without due  
11 process.

12 Q. Pause there. When?

13 A. We are talking all the way back now in about February of  
14 1990.

13:21:33 15 Q. Thank you.

16 A. He is now being still pursued by my forces to have him  
17 arrested. He manages to evade us all the way and he's ahead of  
18 us and so he gets within the Monrovia area.

19 Q. And by this stage that he's in Monrovia, is he by himself?

13:22:04 20 A. Well, Prince Johnson pulled a little trick. He gets into  
21 the Monrovia area with a group that he calls the INPFL, that is  
22 the Independent National Patriotic Front. Along the way Prince  
23 Johnson is telling everywhere he reaches "I am working for my  
24 leader Charles Taylor and I'm just moving along." And so he got  
13:22:36 25 along with a whole lot.

26 He gets into Monrovia and he strikes a deal with Samuel Doe  
27 and he actually enters the city. Prince Johnson comes and he  
28 captures and sits into an area of Monrovia called the Freeport of  
29 Monrovia. Unfortunately, this is where Doe is killed. Prince

1 Johnson works out a deal with Samuel Doe by telling Doe that he  
2 wants peace and he wants to join Doe to help to fight against me  
3 because in fact I am chasing him. Doe begins to supply Prince  
4 with material.

13:23:20 5 Q. What kind of material?

6 A. Arms and ammunition. But by this time Doe is under a  
7 little pressure to leave, but Prince is now in the city with the  
8 INPFL, in direct answer to your question.

9 Q. And so how does the death of Doe come about?

13:23:50 10 A. One of the things that was said to me by secretary Cohen,  
11 and secretary Cohen has written extensively, he has a book  
12 published and these facts can be verified in his book. Secretary  
13 Cohen has said to me that: Look, this has to end. If and when  
14 you capture Roberts International Airport - now Roberts

13:24:27 15 International Airport is in Harbel and there is the Firestone  
16 plantation in Harbel, the airport is in Harbel but the airport  
17 remained a strategic position for the Government of Liberia still  
18 under Samuel Doe and not far from the airport is this military  
19 barracks right down the road called Camp Schefflein. So Camp  
13:24:49 20 Schefflein is the barracks that is used to protect Roberts  
21 International Airport. So it is heavily defended by the  
22 government. Heavily defended. This is the only place that the  
23 government has to bring in its arms and ammunition to continue  
24 the war.

13:25:10 25 Secretary Cohen says to me: If and when the NPFL captures  
26 Roberts International Airport we will know the war is over and  
27 the United States will convince Doe to step down and leave the  
28 country. This is what he said; it's in his book. He told me  
29 that. And when we captured Roberts International Airport shortly

1 thereafter what happened was that Doe then was pressured and he  
2 was trying to leave the country.

3 Q. Pause there, help us: When was Roberts international  
4 airfield captured, just roughly, just the month?

13:25:56 5 A. Yes. Well, Roberts International Airport was captured  
6 around August of 1990.

7 Q. Continue.

8 A. Around that time. Doe now, depending on this Prince  
9 Johnson boy, is leaving the country at the Freeport of Monrovia  
10 under the protection of the peacekeepers.

11 Q. Which peacekeepers?

12 A. The ECOMOG. The Economic Community of West African States,  
13 the peacekeeping force that had been sent is called the Economic  
14 Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. He is captured at the Freeport. Now,  
13:26:39 15 don't let's forget the Freeport of Monrovia and that area is  
16 under Prince Johnson's command. But Doe relaxes because he  
17 believes that Prince is his ally now. He goes at the port with  
18 his team to leave, Prince Johnson attacks Doe, peacekeepers  
19 whoever, and captures Doe alive and subsequently kills him.

13:27:00 20 Q. Now you speak of peacekeepers arriving in Liberia in August  
21 of 1990?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Were there any other troops unassociated with the  
24 peacekeepers who arrived at any time?

13:27:19 25 A. Well, at around this time, for the protection of American  
26 citizens, some 2,000 United States marines had been dispatched to  
27 Liberia. We were consulted also.

28 Q. Who by?

29 A. By our contacts in La Cote d'Ivoire, at the United States

1 embassy in La Cote d'Ivoire, and they even came to Buchanan and  
2 other places to help evacuate American citizens. But the only  
3 other military force that came in and entered the territory of  
4 Liberia with the knowledge of Doe and myself was 2,000 United  
13:28:05 5 States marines.

6 MR GRIFFITHS: I note the time, Mr President. Would that  
7 be a convenient point?

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we'll adjourn now. We'll reconvene  
9 at 2.30.

10 [Lunch break taken at 1.29 p.m.]

11 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, go ahead, Mr Griffiths.

13 MR GRIFFITHS: May it please you, your Honours:

14 Q. Mr Taylor, before we adjourned for lunch you were - oh, I  
14:30:54 15 am sorry, there is a change of appearance on our side. We are  
16 joined this afternoon by my learned friend, Mr Terry Munyard.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Right, thank you. That is noted.

18 MR GRIFFITHS:

19 Q. Before we adjourned for lunch, Mr Taylor, you were dealing  
14:31:07 20 with the arrival of some 2,000 United States marines in Liberia  
21 in 1990. Do you recall that?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Now, who had arrived first? The ECOWAS led force or the US  
24 marines?

14:31:32 25 A. The ECOWAS forces arrived in August. I think that is a  
26 little ahead of the marines.

27 Q. Now you had told us before the luncheon adjournment,  
28 Mr Taylor, that you had been - the NPFL had been involved in  
29 discussions with the ECOWAS countries prior to the deployment of

1 that force. Is that right?

2 A. Well, there were discussions going on. We had spoken to a  
3 few, yes.

4 Q. Who had you spoken to?

14:32:11 5 A. Well, we had our representatives, our principal  
6 spokesperson, Mr Woveiyu, who had on different radios been  
7 talking about it. Let me be clear: There was no formal meeting  
8 or discussion with ECOWAS at this particular time. Okay, ECOWAS  
9 is looking at the problems in Liberia. The theory is advanced  
14:32:47 10 and we got to set the stage for where you are. At this  
11 particular time the chairmanship of ECOWAS is headed by Sir Dawda  
12 Jawara, then President --

13 Q. Spelling?

14 A. Oh --

14:33:12 15 Q. Fine, no problem. Continue?

16 A. Please find out. Sir, Dawda Jawara the President of The  
17 Gambia is then the sitting chairman of ECOWAS. This is still  
18 during the administration of the elder Bush. So Dawda Jawara,  
19 hearing of this problem, and this I must attribute to him, a  
14:33:44 20 theory was developed that the revolution in Liberia is about to  
21 destabilise West Africa. I guess he could have drawn this  
22 experience from his own encounter with the gentleman I have  
23 mentioned here before, Kukoi Samba Sanyang as leading the  
24 problems in The Gambia. And so discussions are going on. There  
14:34:16 25 is no real consultation but discussions between and amongst  
26 states are going on. Nigeria is involved, but more than Nigeria  
27 Ghana, and a decision is taken to try to intervene but all along  
28 we object. The NPFL is objecting to their intervention at that  
29 time.

1 Now, crucial to this objection is this: At this time the  
2 President of Nigeria is Ibrahim Babangida. Now, again the Court  
3 will have to help me with Babangida. He was President of  
4 Nigeria. I am sorry, your Honours, I am not as good as some of  
14:35:06 5 the other spellers, but I know the details.

6 Babangida has developed a very, very close relationship  
7 with Samuel Doe. He is supplying arms and ammunition to Doe.  
8 They are good friends. Babangida is contacted by Jawara,  
9 Rawlings is still the President of Ghana. I at this time have no  
14:35:40 10 dealings with Ghana. As you know, I am arrested. I am out of  
11 Ghana.

12 This revolution now is being led by us, but I can almost  
13 say with certainty that Rawlings is concerned because this  
14 Marxist group with the Sawyers and the Tiptehs of this word and  
14:36:09 15 the Commany Wisseh are based in Ghana, and remember I have been  
16 arrested because I was in a way disrupting what they were about  
17 to do.

18 So, Ghana has interests in the intervention of ECOMOG, but  
19 Nigeria is drawn in because of their relationship with Doe. We  
14:36:31 20 then object. We see Nigeria's involvement because Nigeria is  
21 known as the powerhouse of West Africa. We see Nigeria's  
22 involvement as a way of holding and keeping Doe in power, so we  
23 object and we say: If ECOMOG troops arrive we will attack them  
24 because this is a backdoor way of keeping Doe in power. You  
14:36:59 25 understand me?

26 Q. Yes. Now that ECOMOG force, Mr Taylor, how was it  
27 composed?

28 A. At that time the largest contingent was from Nigeria.

29 Q. Yes.

1 A. Followed by Ghana.

2 Q. Mm-hm.

3 A. And guess who? The Gambia sent a force.

4 Q. Anybody else?

14:37:24 5 A. Along with Sierra Leone and Guinea.

6 Q. Now, dealing with each of those contributing countries in  
7 turn, Nigeria, you have already told us, led by Ibrahim  
8 Babangida, What was his background?

9 A. Oh, General Babangida is a military. He is from the  
14:37:49 10 military background.

11 Q. How had he come to power?

12 A. He had seized power militarily.

13 Q. A military coup?

14 A. Oh, that is correct.

14:37:58 15 Q. Now, help us: Ghana, who was in charge of Ghana at the  
16 time?

17 A. Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. He had also seized power  
18 in a military coup.

19 Q. Sierra Leone, who was in charge there?

14:38:16 20 A. It was also a military man who had not seized power by  
21 force of arms. He had had power handed over to him as a result  
22 of Siaka Stevens's removal, but he was a general in the armed  
23 forces, General Joseph Momoh.

24 Q. What about Guinea?

14:38:36 25 A. We had there a military general who had seized power by  
26 force of arms following the death of Ahmed Sekou Toure.

27 Q. So of the five countries, no, no, no, let's complete the  
28 picture. Gambia, who was in power?

29 A. Gambia at this particular time Sir Dawda is still there,

1 but he is frightened by this new phenomena because of his  
2 experience, and I must say this is not what Sir Dawda Jawara  
3 said, I am just trying to, based on what I believe, because of  
4 his whole reaction in helping to develop this theory that the  
14:39:21 5 NPFL had set out to destabilise the entire West African --

6 Q. I am coming to that, but just pause. But what was his  
7 background, Sir Dawda?

8 A. Oh, I really don't know, but he had come - Sir Dawda, well,  
9 you know, that sir comes from the British situation. He had come  
14:39:46 10 into The Gambia almost from the very beginning of independence,  
11 so I am not sure that I know his - I can almost say he was not  
12 military, but I am not sure of the rest.

13 Q. But in any event, of the five contributing countries four  
14 were led by military dictatorships?

14:40:05 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. And the fifth, The Gambia, yes, you have told us that its  
17 leader was afraid of destabilisation in West Africa?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Now, you recall telling us of some Gambians you had met in  
14:40:28 20 the training camp in Libya?

21 A. That is correct. To be correct - not I had met in Libya,  
22 not at the training camp, but they were in Libya. They were not  
23 --

24 Q. They were in Libya?

14:40:40 25 A. That is correct.

26 Q. And was there a basis for this fear that Sir Dawda had  
27 about destabilisation?

28 A. Oh, I want to believe so. I want to believe so. Yes, I  
29 want to believe so. The gentleman that staged the attempted



1 takeover from Sir Dawda Jawara, Kukoi Samba Sanyang that is also  
2 known as Dr Manneh, is in Libya. I meet him there with his men.  
3 They are not in the camp, but they serve as security guards at  
4 the area I keep referring to as the Mataba. So Sir Dawda's own  
14:41:26 5 experience I want to believe just led him to believing that  
6 knowing that again it had been said that the NPFL had trained in  
7 Libya and I know he knew that Kukoi and his boys had gone to  
8 Libya, just probably connected the whole thing and said, "No,  
9 this is going to destabilise West Africa. We cannot let the NPFL  
14:41:53 10 take over".

11 Q. So let us just clarify the situation then, shall we? First  
12 of all, help me with this. The attempted coup in The Gambia,  
13 that you mentioned, when had that occurred?

14 A. I apologise for this. I really cannot recall the year. I  
14:42:11 15 am not up to snuff on that, but I do know that it could have  
16 occurred --

17 Q. Just give us a rough time frame in terms of years before,  
18 months before, or whatever.

19 A. Okay, I begin going to Libya around '87 and so I would  
14:42:35 20 really put it to somewhere before 1987. That's as good as I can  
21 get.

22 Q. Very well. So we have this situation then: The leader of  
23 The Gambia has had that experience, he knows that you have been  
24 training in Libya with those who attempted to overthrow him.

14:43:05 25 Have I got that right so far?

26 A. Well, not quite because I am sure it's going to be  
27 reflected in the record. I am not sure if he - well, okay,  
28 training in Libya, but I really want it to be clear that they  
29 were not a part of any training that we were a part of because

1 they had already been trained. So I do not want training to be  
2 construed in the future under cross-examination, "You said that  
3 you trained with the Gambians". I did not train with the  
4 Gambians.

14:43:39 5 Q. However, there is this link with Libya?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And so he perceived what you were doing in Liberia as a  
8 threat to the peace of the sub-region, you tell us?

9 A. That is correct.

14:44:05 10 Q. So help us, Mr Taylor. Did you have ambitions to become a  
11 Napoleon-type figure in West Africa?

12 A. No and there is a reason for that. A little, little,  
13 little Liberia. You have got huge armed forces like Nigeria.  
14 You have Ghana. A powerful military in Guinea. I think one  
14:44:38 15 would have to be a cuckoo to believe that he could become, even  
16 if he ever thought so, a Napoleon. What would happen to Nigeria?  
17 You have to, what, conquer, you know, Nigeria to become a  
18 Napoleon. That's pure nonsense. It could have never been a  
19 thought even remotely in my mind.

14:45:02 20 All I was interested in and all the guys that I led were  
21 interested in was trying to solve our little internal problem in  
22 Liberia, build an environment where our people would have some  
23 peace, democracy and the rule of law. There was no act of  
24 adventure, no place at all.

14:45:30 25 Q. Now, can I pause for a moment to assist with some  
26 spellings. Sir Dawda Jawara, D-A-W-D-A J-A-W-A-R-A. Ibrahim  
27 Babangida, I-B-R-A-H-I-M B-A-B-A-N-G-I-D-A. So you told us  
28 earlier then, Mr Taylor, you decided to attack ECOMOG. Is that  
29 right?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. When did you make that decision?

3 A. Even before they came they were warned that we construe  
4 your intention to be one of preventing us from completing our  
14:46:30 5 objective. We construe your intentions of being one to  
6 perpetuate Doe in power. This we consider as being interference  
7 and if you put foot on Liberian soil we will attack you. We  
8 warned them before and when they landed we did attack them.

9 Q. Well, help us then with this, Mr Taylor. How many troops  
14:47:00 10 did ECOWAS send to Liberia?

11 A. Well, in military terms they may say one thing, it could be  
12 differently. We understood at the time that they were 3,000, but  
13 they could have been as many as 5,000. You never believe these  
14 military stories.

14:47:21 15 Q. To the best of your knowledge, were they well armed?

16 A. Yes. ECOMOG came in with a full Nigerian backed armoured  
17 unit. By armoured I am talking about tanks and armoured carrier.  
18 Here you can remember I said the city of Monrovia is not  
19 captured, it is surrounded. But there is an airport in Monrovia  
14:47:57 20 other than Robertsport. It is called Spriggs Payne airport.

21 ECOMOG comes in with an air force, a Nigerian with Alpha Jet  
22 bombers, stationed at the airport and a large mechanised unit of  
23 tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Very well.

24 Q. Spriggs Payne spelling?

14:48:27 25 A. S-P-R-I-G-G-S, Spriggs, and P-A-Y-N-E. Spriggs Payne  
26 airport. That is in the Sinkor section of the city of Monrovia.  
27 In fact the Special Court has offices there at Spriggs.

28 Q. Now in comparison with the armaments available to that  
29 ECOMOG force, how well were the NPFL fighters armed at that time?

1 A. By this time the NPFL was not just well armed, but we had  
2 grown very intensively in numbers. We are talking now in or  
3 around July/August of 1990. Because ECOMOG comes in in August.  
4 We have captured all or most of the arms, ammunition and armament  
14:49:40 5 of the Armed Forces of Liberia from Naama. Remember I told this  
6 Court that Camp Naama was the main artillery base.

7 We had captured Camp Naama. We had backtracked. The  
8 soldiers ran away from Gbarnga, I mentioned to the Court, and  
9 Ganta and left their principal equipment - I mean equipment. In  
14:50:07 10 Ganta they had left what you call a BM-40. Now what a BM-40 is,  
11 this is a 40 tube multi-launcher rocket vehicle. It is called a  
12 BM-40. With most of the armament. At Camp Naama we had captured  
13 close to two dozen American-made 105 Howitzer guns. Howitzer, I  
14 think it's H-O-W-I-T-Z-E-R. Howitzer gun. With all of the  
14:50:48 15 armaments. These artillery pieces can fire I think a distance of  
16 about 20 kilometres or more depending on I think some other  
17 military factors. We had those plus all of the armaments.

18 We had another American-made recoilless rifle gun, it is a  
19 106 millimetre cannon. It is a recoilless rifle. What I mean by  
14:51:27 20 recoilless, it fires I think I would say - I would put it to  
21 about three kilometres or more, but it is a gun that would sit  
22 practically on this table, lock it a little bit and it could fire  
23 without a massive push back. It was a very mobile type gun that  
24 you could mount on a jeep or whatnot. In fact it is used  
14:51:54 25 extensively, at least before, by the United States military  
26 because they - and let me clear this up before I misquote it. I  
27 am not saying that the United States gave us these weapons. The  
28 United States always trained and armed the Armed Forces of  
29 Liberia. That is how these weapons got there. We captured

1 tonnes of that.

2 The Armed Forces of Liberia at the time use the US M16  
3 rifles. We captured thousands of M16 rifles, plus their  
4 ammunition. We also captured large amounts of United States 81  
14:52:41 5 milli mortar guns. We also captured a very large mortar,  
6 military people will know, it is called the 4.2 deuce mortar.

7 Q. Spell that.

8 A. I think it is D-U-C-E. 4.2 deuce mortar. It has a range  
9 of about I would say 12-15 kilometres, I would say. And we also  
14:53:12 10 captured a lot of 60 mortar guns.

11 So, in answer to your question, we were well equipped and  
12 really didn't care about whatever forces ECOMOG came with. And  
13 in terms of number of troops, by this time the NPFL forces - and  
14 I am saying I can't give you a correct number, but I will give  
14:53:40 15 you very close and the reason being we are talking about a  
16 guerrilla force; there are no large rosters of I've got 1,000.  
17 We trained - and so we could have been in the neighbourhood of 15  
18 to 18,000 fighting men at the time.

19 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I note that in that last answer, page 104,  
14:54:04 20 line 3 on my font, you say that you were well equipped and really  
21 didn't care about whatever forces ECOMOG came with. Well, you  
22 may not have cared about them. Did you care about the increased  
23 civilian casualties in Liberia which might occur if you decided  
24 to take on ECOMOG?

14:54:26 25 A. Yes, we thought about it and that is very clear because  
26 remember we had agreed with the reasonable request made to us by  
27 the United States government not to take Monrovia in the first  
28 place. But we have also done one thing why I am saying we did  
29 not care. Remember I also told this Court that one of the

1 requests of Secretary Cohen was that we open a humanitarian  
2 corridor along the Liberian-Sierra Leonean road.

3 So the population in Monrovia started reducing  
4 significantly because they were all - I mean, we didn't hide it.

14:55:10 5 We made it very clear, we did threaten and say that we would  
6 attack ECOMOG if they came into the city and we were very, very  
7 clear about ECOMOG and we were not just thinking about  
8 overrunning the city, but we were trying to target ECOMOG and  
9 they had announced that they were coming into the Freeport of  
14:55:30 10 Monrovia.

11 Q. Now moving on somewhat, and we are still dealing with the  
12 summer of 1990, you mentioned this morning that there had been a  
13 number of little incidents involving Doe during that period.  
14 What incidents are we talking about?

14:56:10 15 A. I will have to - that is very general. When I talk about  
16 with Doe as far as dealing I am a little off on this one.

17 Q. Well, let's address it in this way: At the beginning of  
18 1990, Mr Taylor, was your father still alive?

19 A. Oh, yes, my father was alive.

14:56:39 20 Q. Was he still alive by the end of the year?

21 A. No, he was not alive by the end of the year.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Okay. What - when I speak about incidents I am talking  
24 about the - and I think I did mention it at the beginning of the  
14:56:57 25 morning - Samuel Doe commenced a few terrible things. The United  
26 Nations, as the war progressed and we are talking about - this is  
27 the early part now of 1990 - people from the Nimba area that felt  
28 that they were not safe took refuge at the compound of the United  
29 Nations.

1 Q. Where is that?

2 A. In Monrovia. The first thing that Doe did was he stormed  
3 the UN compound and took these citizens out and really killed  
4 them. He stormed the compound.

14:57:40 5 Q. How many people?

6 A. There could have been as many as a couple of hundred  
7 individuals. The second incident involved me personally. During  
8 this particular time my father took refuge in the Lutheran  
9 church.

14:58:03 10 Q. Where?

11 A. In the city of Monrovia because we had all thought and  
12 always believed that churches, mosques and whatever were off  
13 limits. Doe ordered the soldiers into the church and everyone in  
14 that church were killed, including my father.

14:58:29 15 Q. How did you feel about that, Mr Taylor?

16 A. Well, I was very, very, very angry. I was very, very sad,  
17 because my father and I were very close and Doe knew him well,  
18 very well.

19 Q. How?

14:59:03 20 A. Doe had explained to me that as a young man in the Armed  
21 Forces of Liberia, during those years I was in exile and had not  
22 started this situation, he had some problems with a Lebanese  
23 merchant in Monrovia and was taken to court. There was a system  
24 in Liberia called the LPA, the Legal Power of Attorney. What  
14:59:36 25 that was, during the course of the month you could go to a  
26 Lebanese store and pick up little provisions for your family and  
27 you will sign an IOU note. He would take your money at the end  
28 of the month, but that had to be in line with the dispersing  
29 officer of the Armed Forces of Liberia.

1           So young Doe had a problem where the Lebanese man has  
2 seized his cheque on a couple of occasions. This time he  
3 manoeuvred and got the cheque before the Lebanese man and he took  
4 him to court. And my father was the presiding judge in this case  
15:00:22 5 and so my father just told the Lebanese man, "Listen, I am not  
6 going to send this young soldier to jail because he managed to  
7 get some money." He said, "He will pay you the next time so we  
8 are going to accept that" and gave him time to pay and Doe  
9 remembered it, but he didn't really know that that was my father  
15:00:40 10 until some time later - I can remember I we are sitting in his  
11 office talking about - he said "But Taylor is your father in  
12 Monrovia?" I said, "Yes." He said "Where is he?" I say, "He is  
13 across the street" and by across the street I mean the mansion,  
14 the Temple of Justice the courthouse in Monrovia is not too far  
15:01:04 15 from the mansion. I said, "He is the judge over there." I said  
16 "Judge Taylor." He said, "No, Judge Taylor?" I said, "Yes." He  
17 said, "Judge Taylor is your father?" I said, "Yes." He said,  
18 "No, no, no, is it Judge Taylor?" I said, "That is my father."  
19 He said "What?" Then he, Doe, explained the story to me, and  
15:01:20 20 Said, "Your father saved me before. Is he doing fine?" He said,  
21 "Go and bring him to me." And I went across and brought my  
22 father to his office. So he knew him very well.  
23 Q.       And when did this occur, Mr Taylor, the killing of your  
24 father?  
15:01:35 25 A.       Oh, boy, I have tried to really wipe that out of my mind.  
26 This was in or around June/July I want to believe in 1990. I  
27 have really tried to not remember that date. I always get  
28 sensitive.  
29 Q.       Now, just so that we can place this all what is happening



1 in little Liberia in some kind of global context, what other  
2 major international event or was there a major international  
3 event taking place in the summer of 1990, Mr Taylor, that you  
4 recall?

15:02:20 5 A. Oh, event. Well, if we want to call it that. Well,  
6 remember I think in August of 1990 was the first Gulf War at that  
7 particular time. That is about the time that all these military  
8 forces are moving. ECOWAS is moving. It is the first Gulf War.

9 Q. Now, I just want to tidy up this period before moving on.  
15:02:53 10 You mentioned earlier the capture of President Doe by Prince  
11 Johnson's men and his killing, yes?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. What happens to Prince Johnson and the INPFL thereafter?

14 A. Well, Prince Johnson and the INPFL remain in Monrovia, but  
15:03:21 15 they get involved in a squabble with ECOMOG because when ECOMOG  
16 arrives in Liberia they are now dealing with the president still  
17 of Liberia who is Samuel Doe, and ECOMOG is in charge of Doe's  
18 security as they go into the port. So it created a very major  
19 embarrassment for ECOMOG, but after Prince Johnson carried out  
15:03:49 20 that act he then tried to - and the Court needs to understand  
21 this. The port of Monrovia, I am sorry we don't have a map, but  
22 I will explain it the best way I can. The port of Monrovia is  
23 located in a section of the city called Bushrod Island.

24 Q. Spell it please.

15:04:12 25 A. That is B-U-S-H-R-O-D Island. Now Bushrod Island is  
26 connected to the city of Monrovia by two major bridges. One is  
27 the - known as the Gabriel, that is G-A-B-R-I-E-L, the Gabriel  
28 Tucker Bridge and the second bridge is known as the  
29 M-E-S-U-R-A-D-O Mesurado River Bridge. So Doe then kills -

1 excuse me, Prince Johnson kills Doe and then tries to cross into  
2 the city of Monrovia to where the Executive Mansion is located to  
3 seize power and ECOMOG engages him in a major battle.

4 Q. And what was the outcome of that battle?

15:05:17 5 A. Oh, he was just - he just did not manage to take the city,  
6 but he also very craftily agreed to a process of helping to set  
7 up an interim administration in Liberia as a way of bringing an  
8 end to the fighting.

9 Q. Now, at this time, geographically where was ECOMOG  
15:05:53 10 deployed?

11 A. For the most part on Bushrod Island and in the city of  
12 Monrovia around the presidency, to the best of my knowledge.

13 Q. Now, you have told us that the death of Doe occurs in  
14 September?

15:06:09 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Can we just conclude this chapter by you outlining for our  
17 assistance the events for the rest of that year of 1990?

18 A. Well, attempts are now made by ECOWAS to quote/unquote set  
19 up an interim government and to hold elections. This is again  
15:06:43 20 being driven by Nigeria, The Gambia.

21 Q. Pause there. Help us with a date for that event in 1990.  
22 A month?

23 A. Well, I think we want to be careful here and I am saying  
24 attempts because there are several meetings.

15:07:02 25 Q. Very well.

26 A. So let me deal with it. We have at the beginning - we are  
27 now operating in the last quarter of 1990. There is the Bamako  
28 meeting where we try for peace. We don't get anywhere.

29 Q. I don't know if we have had a spelling for Bamako before?

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think we have.

2 THE WITNESS: Bamako is B-A-M-A-K-O and Bamako is the  
3 capital of the West African country of Mali, that is M-A-L-I. At  
4 that time the President of Mali General Moussa Traore was the  
15:07:49 5 president.

6 MR GRIFFITHS:

7 Q. Carry on, Mr Taylor.

8 A. You have all these - you have the Bamako meeting with all  
9 success. It ends up now, but we agree that we would set up an  
15:08:12 10 interim government but we still felt that such a government  
11 should be hated by the NPFL because we, by this time, have  
12 captured some 90 per cent of the country.

13 As I explained to the Court, and we stopped at the point  
14 where our forces I did mention had come to Tappita, the strategic  
15:08:40 15 highway into Grand Gedeh, but this is, we don't stay there, we  
16 push into Grand Gedeh, so by this time the entire Republic of  
17 Liberia is in the hands of the NPFL save for the city of  
18 Monrovia.

19 Q. Very well.

15:08:55 20 A. So we demand that we lead that government and that we would  
21 permit others - we would bring everybody on board, but we had to  
22 lead that government. And what is that predicated on?

23 We are aware in the back of our minds that the whole  
24 attempt of bringing ECOMOG in Liberia at that time is to stop us  
15:09:21 25 because of this theory that permitting us would cause the  
26 destabilisation of the entire West Africa.

27 We now agree that a meeting will be further held in The  
28 Gambia, in the capital. We agree that we would attend the  
29 meeting in The Gambia. We - a date is set. We send our

1 delegates to this meeting. We are represented at that meeting by  
2 two individuals. We are represented by Mr Tom Woveiyu that I  
3 mentioned, and the gentleman that is not in court this afternoon  
4 Lavalie Supuwood. To our surprise they get to the airport and  
15:10:22 5 they are arrested. They are stopped.

6 Q. Which airport?

7 A. At Banjul. Banjul, the capital of The Gambia. Banjul  
8 airport. They are not put in prison. They are just detained at  
9 the airport and not given an opportunity to go to the meeting.

15:10:49 10 The meeting is held. There are 24 delegates at the meeting from  
11 different groupings and I understand - and this is only an  
12 understanding because we were not present - that Amos Sawyer was  
13 I will call it selected as the interim President of Liberia.

14 At the close of that meeting our people then were released  
15:11:17 15 and put on a plane and sent back out and the NPFL decided that it  
16 would have none of that, that we would continue to fight until  
17 there was justice and we continued the fight. Amos Sawyer was  
18 brought into the city of Monrovia as the so-called interim  
19 President and we continued to fight.

15:11:41 20 Now, I had mentioned before based on the question that you  
21 asked as to whether I had any regrets, and this is what I meant  
22 when I said that on the one hand I am glad that we accepted the  
23 reasonable statement from Secretary Cohen, and by Cohen I mean  
24 the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States for African  
15:12:05 25 Affairs Herman Cohen. But following our acceptance all of these  
26 machinations followed and so in some way it is regrettable.  
27 That's what I was alluding to.

28 Q. Let's see if we can sum-up the situation then by the end of  
29 1990. If I understand what you are telling us you - the NPFL

1 control all of the country except Monrovia?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And what is preventing you from seizing Monrovia and thus  
4 controlling the whole country?

15:12:48 5 A. What?

6 Q. Yes, what is preventing you from doing that?

7 A. Well, I would say - now what I will say would be ECOMOG,  
8 but behind that it would be specifically Nigeria and The Gambia.  
9 At most I would lay on their doorstep.

15:13:15 10 Q. Now, we have already examined this morning two documents  
11 setting out the programme which would have been implemented by  
12 the NPFL had they seized complete power. Do you recall telling  
13 us about that?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15:13:34 15 Q. Now, following the ECOMOG intervention, which you say  
16 prevented you from gaining control of Monrovia, how many more  
17 years did the civil war in Liberia last, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Many more years. This is the main problem. The civil war  
19 lasted up until actually 1995.

15:14:06 20 Q. So another five years?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Had you secured control of Monrovia by the end of 1990, so  
23 just, what, over 12 months after it had begun, what would you  
24 have done?

15:14:32 25 A. As I mentioned to the Court, our objective was to set up a  
26 national unity government involving the what I keep referring to  
27 as progressives, bring on some individuals, stabilise the country  
28 and hold free and fair elections. Our calculations, if we look  
29 at 1990 in the end as the base year, I would say that another at

1 most two years could have accomplished our objective as we saw  
2 it. That is the years 1991 and 1992 would have brought an end to  
3 the military situation and we could have had elections by the end  
4 of 1992.

15:15:21 5 Q. Now by this stage, Mr Taylor, the end of 1990, where are  
6 you based - you personally?

7 A. Well, I don't want to lose the Court. I begin in Gborplay.  
8 As we move forward I move my headquarters - I moved from Gborplay  
9 to Tappita. After Tappita, after - in May when Buchanan is  
10 captured, secured, people move forward, I then move on to  
11 Buchanan. By the time in July we have surrounded Monrovia and  
12 all this stuff is going on, Harbel is under full control, I move  
13 into Harbel.

14 Now, we are now coming toward the end of 1990, but because  
15 of this situation that occurred in The Gambia where they have put  
16 this Sawyer man over Monrovia and we used to call him the  
17 President of Monrovia, the NPFL at that particular time sat with  
18 our senior military and civilian personnel and decided that they  
19 were not ready, they were not serious, that we would put into  
20 place a government. And we decided on that government. The name

15:16:56 21 was supposed to be the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly  
22 Government, NPRAG. And it was decided then that we would  
23 establish a headquarters. And because the war was still going on  
24 there were arguments about making Buchanan the headquarters,  
15:17:29 25 about making Harbel the headquarters. But it was decided that  
26 Gbarnga would be used as the headquarters and that all regions  
27 that were under our control would use a typical system of - I  
28 really wouldn't call that election. I would call it of selecting  
29 an assembly that will convene in Gbarnga, establish ministries

1 and agencies of government, the NPRAG government that will seek  
2 and secure the welfare of those that were then called by the name  
3 of Greater Liberia.

4 Q. Who did the selecting?

15:18:15 5 A. The individuals in the different regions. Our military had  
6 nothing to do with it. Remember I said to the Court that we did  
7 not dismantle the civilian mat that - I mean mat, M-A-T, that we  
8 met on the ground. We left that to them. So all we asked the  
9 regions to do was to use their own methods and some of those were  
15:18:42 10 local methods where the chiefs, the elders, would get together,  
11 call the senior people and they knew who they wanted and they  
12 would do an assembly and send it down to Gbarnga.

13 Q. And so when did you then move to that new centre of  
14 authority for Greater Liberia?

15:18:59 15 A. Now this process - after agreeing upon this process we then  
16 set out to go - to send up to Gbarnga, review the area, select  
17 buildings and everything. So I as the leader moved to Gbarnga  
18 around the middle of 1991.

19 Q. '91?

15:19:26 20 A. '91.

21 Q. Now, there is another matter I want to clarify. At this  
22 stage, late 1990, with your forces controlling the majority of  
23 the country apart from Monrovia, how were your forces deployed  
24 around the country?

15:20:01 25 A. We had our forces deployed in every major city and every  
26 strategic highway around almost like a U-form from Bomi coming  
27 all the way down and going all the way through Kakata, Gbarnga,  
28 but were deployed in the cities.

29 Q. And what was the command structure?

1 A. We then had established a ministry of defence. After that  
2 decision was taken a ministry of defence was established and  
3 Mr Womeiyu became the minister of defence. Under the ministry of  
4 defence we had the Special Forces and then under the Special  
15:20:55 5 Forces we had all of the battalions and the different - first the  
6 divisions and then the battalions and coming on down.

7 Q. So you have the ministry of defence and then below them the  
8 Special Forces. Now, taking things slowly, by this stage how  
9 many Special Forces remain, roughly?

15:21:18 10 A. By this time we have lost a few in combat. I would say we  
11 could have lost in combat as many as 15, at most 20, in general  
12 combat.

13 Q. And when you say they became the second tier of command,  
14 were they all in Gbarnga, or what?

15:21:52 15 A. No, no, no, no, no. And the reason why they are second in  
16 command - no, I am sorry if I am taking too long, but the Court  
17 has to understand this. The Special Forces I said were the eyes  
18 and ears of the revolution, so they were put in a special  
19 category. And so they had at that particular time command  
15:22:21 20 responsibilities across the country. There was no human other

21 than the Special Force in Liberia that had senior command  
22 position. That is why we had defence, we had the Special Forces  
23 that were regarded as the leaders of the revolution, then before  
24 we had divisions. So whether it was a division or whether it was  
15:22:45 25 a battalion, all positions were held by Special Forces wherever  
26 they were deployed in the country.

27 Q. So how were they deployed?

28 A. Well, we had the navy division, we had the marine division,  
29 we had the army division, we had the strike force division.



1 These were all headed by Special Forces. Then under those  
2 divisions you had different battalions under those divisions.  
3 And again each battalion was commanded by a Special Forces and in  
4 most cases his immediate executive officer, that is the number  
15:23:31 5 two man, was a Special Forces. But as the other people that we  
6 call our junior commandos, the very bright ones had command  
7 responsibilities for companies and for platoons. But at that  
8 high level, only Special Forces could do it.

9 Q. And help me, how much power did these Special Forces, the  
15:24:01 10 eyes and ears of the revolution - how much power did they  
11 exercise?

12 A. The only individuals who were superior to the Special  
13 Forces were God and Charles Taylor. The Special Forces had  
14 tremendous power. They could take a lot of decisions wherever  
15:24:18 15 they were. It is assumed that they knew what they had to do.  
16 They had real power, yes. Real, real power.

17 Q. And, Mr Taylor, effectively how much control did you have  
18 over them?

19 A. Well, there were times - I had very good control, but in  
15:24:44 20 that bunch there are little things that are still afloat and let  
21 me explain to the Court what I mean by little things. Remember I  
22 spoke about while in training men conspired to kill me upon  
23 getting back to Liberia and them taking over the rest of the  
24 operation.

15:25:20 25 Now, these men are back in Liberia and are really, really  
26 doing some things that are - you know, we are getting a lot of  
27 reports that they are beginning to really get a little  
28 mischievous. I forgot to mention when Prince Johnson fled he did  
29 flee with some of these - a few of the Special Forces followed

1 him, but they are beginning to do some things, because of the  
2 authority given them, that did not reach to me.

3 Q. Such as?

15:26:04

4 A. Well, they would mete out punishment to soldiers without  
5 having to follow the regular chain. No commander has a right to,  
6 on his own, take harsh measures against a soldier. If a soldier  
7 has done something they knew wrong, he could remove him from that  
8 unit and send him to face a court martial board, but he could not  
9 - what some of them were doing, some of the junior commandos did  
10 something wrong, they would flog them as they - I mean, that was  
11 unacceptable.

15:26:32

12 So they were really beginning to really what we say in the  
13 African way, they were beginning to grow wings and this is  
14 evident by certain things that had happened where they were  
15 beginning to get rotten by getting involved in some minor  
16 looting. We had to weed those Special Forces out.

15:26:56

17 There is a famous, a very terrible incident that happened  
18 where this gentleman, one of the individuals from Libya that had  
19 caused the trouble, Anthony Mekuagbe, was really, really, really  
20 - he was becoming outrageous and had actually carried on some  
21 looting and firing at the Sierra Leonean border in January.

15:27:19

22 Q. January of which year?

23 A. Of 1991. He had - he was the commander in Lofa and very,  
24 very, very terrible boy that we were beginning to put the squeeze  
25 on him. In fact, we did put the squeeze on him.

15:27:44

26 Q. Now, January 1991, that is a couple of months before, as  
27 this Court has been told, an invasion took place of Sierra Leone?

28 A. Sierra Leone, that is correct.

29 Q. So are you telling us, Mr Taylor, that in the January of

1 that year you were aware of misbehaviour by one of your  
2 commanders along the Liberian-Sierra Leone border?

3 A. That is correct. Anthony Mekuagbe, after he was arrested  
4 for our investigation had, along with some Sierra Leonean  
15:28:25 5 soldiers, gotten involved in a looted property deal where they  
6 had sold some properties to the Sierra Leonean side and payment  
7 was not forthcoming, and Anthony Mekuagbe attacked the Sierra  
8 Leonean soldiers on the border for the property.

9 That came to my attention and my good friend President  
15:28:51 10 Momoh. We exchanged information on this. Momoh got upset,  
11 ordered the Sierra Leonean forces to come inside Liberia. In  
12 fact the Sierra Leonean armed forces came near Foya. We drove  
13 them back and Momoh and I, using our intermediary Prince Barclay,  
14 were able to bring that situation under control and I arrested  
15:29:17 15 Anthony Mekuagbe. I punished him. In fact he was in  
16 confinement for a short while, released and sent back to his  
17 assignment. This is in January of 1991.

18 Q. Now, I don't want us to get ahead of ourselves, Mr Taylor.  
19 Now, we are just talking about the structure - the hierarchy - of  
15:29:45 20 command at this stage?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So are you telling us that you were experiencing  
23 difficulties in controlling these Special Forces?

24 A. Without a doubt. Without a doubt. And I acted, and  
15:29:59 25 because we were experiencing problems we had to act almost  
26 immediately in a particular way. And what we did, after we  
27 realised that these Special Forces were behaving in this way, and  
28 we were getting reports that some of the other troublemakers from  
29 Libya, that is, the Oliver Varneys and Degbon, without my

1 knowledge or consent, were putting together some group. On the  
2 other side, intelligence were coming called Black Kadaffa. I  
3 then knew that we were about - that is K-A-D-A-F-F-A they call,  
4 or F-F-Y, and when we got to know that Oliver Varney, Degbon,  
15:31:01 5 these are all in the transcripts, your Honour, were involved in  
6 some activities on that side I then knew that I was headed for  
7 trouble. So there was trouble beginning to mount at that  
8 particular time.

9 Q. On which side?

15:31:18 10 A. On the Liberian side.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. They had - these guys were now going about organising their  
13 own units and hardly waiting for instructions from headquarters.

14 In fact, one of the reports that came to me that really caused me  
15:31:38 15 to move in a direction that I will soon explain, Degbon --

16 Q. Who?

17 A. Yegbeh Degbon, that is in the records, Yegbeh Degbon was an  
18 educated person like myself. He had a Masters Degree in Geology,  
19 he had studied in Europe, so he was not on the front line  
15:32:01 20 fighting. We used to use Degbon to service, to take - to come to  
21 headquarters, get arms and ammunition, food and medicine -  
22 medical supply for the troops - and he also was responsible for  
23 picking up arms and ammunition in the field that was captured and  
24 bring it to headquarters. And what do I mean by that?

15:32:27 25 All arms and ammunition that were captured in the field by  
26 the forces, if your battalion captured material you couldn't keep  
27 them. You had to list these material, report it to headquarters,  
28 because the same material could be used and distributed into  
29 areas that did not have it.

1 We realised that Degbon was not bringing all of the  
2 material that was being turned over to him to headquarters.  
3 Sometimes he will come and report that, oh, he was bringing  
4 material but another unit needed some and he gave it to them not  
15:33:09 5 knowing they were putting together this group called Black  
6 Kadaffa.

7 So what we had to begin to put into place at this  
8 particular time was to dilute the powers of the Special Forces.  
9 This was a plan thought about and it really came into being just  
15:33:32 10 around the time that I moved into Gbarnga by the middle of 1991  
11 where those junior commandos that had shown good judgment, we  
12 began moving them up into command positions for battalions and  
13 others, but we did - we were experiencing problems at this time  
14 with not all but some of these same troublemakers, that is the  
15:34:00 15 Mekunagbe, Yegbeh Degbon, that is the Oliver Varney, there was a  
16 Timothy Mulibah. Also involved in that to a certain level was  
17 the very Sam Larto, they were all a part of a network that really  
18 frightened us.

19 Q. I am going to come to that in a bit more detail in a  
15:34:22 20 moment, but I want to pause to ask you about one or two specific  
21 matters. We are at a stage now where you are controlling all of  
22 the country apart from Monrovia?

23 A. Mm-hm.

24 Q. In the vast majority of the country that you controlled,  
15:34:40 25 were there abuses of civilians?

26 A. Yes, there were some abuses. One or two notable cases that  
27 I can refer to that finally reached us a little later, these,  
28 some of these Special Forces, like I say, were actually out of  
29 hand. They were taking matters in their own hands. They were

1 beating civilians and in fact one of the Special Forces that got  
2 executed was, he executed one or two civilians. We arrested him,  
3 court-martialled him. He was found guilty and he was executed  
4 for killing those civilians. So I will admit there were some  
15:35:29 5 abuses creeping up, but as they came we dealt with it.

6 Q. Now, the abuses you speak of, did that include rape?

7 A. Oh, yes, there were a couple of cases that I know of of  
8 rape and those that were involved, the soldiers that were  
9 involved, were executed. And they were not just Special Forces.

15:35:57 10 These are now some junior commandos but they were held to the  
11 same standard and they were executed, but there were a couple of  
12 cases.

13 Q. Just a point of clarification, in parentheses: Junior  
14 commandos means what?

15:36:11 15 A. Well, all of the individuals that were trained by our  
16 Special Forces were called junior commandos.

17 Q. Very well. To distinguish them from?

18 A. Special Forces commandos.

19 Q. Thank you. So you accept rapes occurred. What about the  
15:36:26 20 use of child soldiers?

21 A. No. This is one thing I have to explain very well. There  
22 were young people under the age of 18 that performed tasks for  
23 the military. I have explained this. Now, there is another  
24 phenomenon that developed that, quite frankly, there was very  
15:36:57 25 little we could do about it. Look, we have got about 15, 20,000  
26 soldiers. Some of them are leaving home. They take along with  
27 them younger members of the family. You have a young cousin,  
28 10/12, you take him along. He would carry your food. He would  
29 carry maybe even your rifle. He will hold it while they are

1 going into areas where they are about to go into combat, And this  
2 I observed. The reports came, but why we did not really do  
3 anything serious because those young men were not involved in  
4 combat. They live at home with their relatives in the army and  
15:37:48 5 when they are going around to places they go along with them, but  
6 they were not trained for combat, and did not engage in combat.  
7 They were used to cook food; they were used to wash clothes; they  
8 were used to man gates and search vehicles because why was it  
9 necessary to search?

15:38:12 10 We got scared at a particular point where weapons now could  
11 not be accounted for, so all vehicles going into the combat area,  
12 we would have a senior commander at the gate. So at that gate  
13 the commander - there would be soldiers and if those soldiers  
14 that are at that gate had any of their relatives with them,  
15:38:38 15 whether it was their girlfriends or their wives, they all would  
16 sit around the gate.

17 So when you hear of reports that there were some young men  
18 seen in Liberia carrying rifles, those reports are true, but what  
19 the reports don't say is this: That the men that they see  
15:38:58 20 carrying those rifles are young men walking with their family,  
21 but do not enter combat. Never entered combat.

22 Q. Another detail, please: Were soldiers within the NPFL  
23 paid?

24 A. No, soldiers in the NPFL were not paid. They were all  
15:39:32 25 volunteers, but - okay, well, let me put it this way: When we  
26 look at pay in terms of a salary cheque at the end of the month,  
27 no. They were volunteers. But what was provided for the  
28 fighting men in Liberia, we provided food, we provided medical  
29 care and we provided clothing for our soldiers. So, on the one

1 hand if you want to look at that as pay, yes. On the other hand  
2 if you are looking at it in terms of a salary cheque, no.

3 And we were lucky - and I did not mention - when we  
4 captured Buchanan in or around May of 1991 it was reported to us  
15:40:25 5 that the Government of Liberia had just ordered 300,000 bags of  
6 rice for their military purposes. That ship was docked off the  
7 coast of Buchanan and the friendly people of Buchanan at the port  
8 told us about the ship. So we went and we brought the ship into  
9 harbour and off-loaded the 300,000 bags of rice, so Doe lost and  
15:41:00 10 we won. And it is that food. We never sold one grain of that  
11 rice. It is that rice that we provided to displaced centres free  
12 of charge and we fed the armed forces.

13 So in a way while it was not that kind of pay, but they did  
14 get something. They were not just out there struggling on their  
15:41:24 15 own, having to fend for themselves. They received food, rice.  
16 The government bought - by then I am talking about the NPRAG  
17 bought oils and salt. All of the provisions to feed the armed  
18 forces, they were fed by us.

19 Q. But, Mr Taylor, you have heard evidence during the course  
15:41:45 20 of these proceedings of a phenomena called food finding missions?

21 A. Nonsense. Total nonsense. Maybe in their environment, but  
22 even they forgot to ask their most famous witness, Moses Blah.  
23 He knows that the armed forces, the NPFL men were fed.

24 Q. Are you saying that there was no such thing as food finding  
15:42:07 25 missions in the Greater Liberia which you ruled?

26 A. Well, I tell you. I will put it this way. You know, there  
27 are bad apples in every sack and I think I will be misleading  
28 this Court if I were to say that there were never any occasions  
29 where there was food finding, but I can say this much: We fed



1 the army and if anybody engaged in that particular action that  
2 came to the knowledge of the authorities you will be sorry that  
3 you did it.

4 MR GRIFFITHS: A name was mentioned earlier, Mr President.

15:42:50 5 Could I assist with a spelling now, Moussa Traore.

6 THE WITNESS: Yes, the former President of Mali.

7 MR GRIFFITHS: M-O-U-S-S-A T-R-A-O-R-E acute:

8 Q. Now, having dealt with those matters, Mr Taylor, I  
9 mentioned that I would be returning to the topic of the Special

15:43:22 10 Forces. I wonder if the witness could be shown Prosecution  
11 exhibit 116, please. Prosecution exhibit 116, for the assistance  
12 of the Court, is the original roster of the Special Forces  
13 commandos of the NPFL and this was a document introduced on 21  
14 May 2008 during the testimony of Moses Blah. During the course

15:44:33 15 of his testimony, just to remind ourselves, former President Blah  
16 was asked to place an X against the names of those Special Forces  
17 who had been executed. Do you recall that evidence, Mr Taylor?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. Now we see at number 1 on this list the name Charles  
15:45:03 20 Ghankay Taylor, is that right?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. The next name is Cooper G Miller and you will note that  
23 former President Blah has put an X by that name to indicate that  
24 Cooper G Miller was executed. Mr Taylor, was he?

15:45:35 25 A. No, Cooper Miller was not executed. As a matter of fact,  
26 Cooper Miller was not with us. After some time the INPFL  
27 somewhere in - if I am right, somewhere in 1991 Cooper Miller had  
28 joined the INPFL and in combat at the INPFL base in Caldwell,  
29 that is C-A-L-D-W-E-L-L, Cooper Miller was killed in combat.

1           So I guess what Moses was referring to here is that he is  
2 dead, but he is not one of those that had any trouble with me  
3 after we left this place. He was not with the NPFL as we came  
4 in. Cooper Miller was one of those troublemakers that we had  
15:46:53 5 incarcerated during the early part of the revolution that went  
6 into Monrovia via Lagos, Nigeria, and flew in and was a part of  
7 Prince Johnson but he was never executed by Prince or me. He  
8 died in combat at the base.

9           Q.     Now we see an X against a name Augustus Wright. Was he  
15:47:18 10 executed on your orders?

11          A.     Yes, he was.

12          Q.     What for?

13          A.     You are going to have to look at this boy. This Augustine  
14 Wright, Peter Kerseh, these were the people that were involved in  
15:47:38 15 this second tier issue involving Black Kaddafi and the objective  
16 of Black Kaddafi in what we found out eventually that they had  
17 given assistance to certain individuals and were seeking  
18 assistance in return. Now I can get into these details about  
19 that. Black Kaddafi was a group that involved Liberians and  
15:48:05 20 Sierra Leoneans that had been brought into Liberia just off  
21 Kakata as a possible standby unit to stage an attack against us,  
22 the rest of the NPFL. That was the objective of Black Kaddafi  
23 with the Oliver Varney on the one side and the Anthony Mekunagbe  
24 and all of them on the other side. So these were the people that  
15:48:30 25 were involved in that conspiracy.

26          Q.     Now, help us, because Black Gaddafi has featured in the  
27 evidence placed before this Court by the Prosecution, so I want  
28 your assistance with it.

29          A.     Yes.

1 Q. When did this phenomena of Black Kadaffa occur?

2 A. Black Kadaffa started around the early part of - the late  
3 to early part of 1990 and 1991. That is when this whole thing  
4 started developing of Black Kadaffa under the real command of two  
15:49:12 5 - three principal people.

6 Q. Who were they?

7 A. Anthony Mekunagbe, Yegbeh Degbon and Varney - Oliver  
8 Varney.

9 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, I want - so there is three names you have  
15:49:27 10 given us, Mekunagbe, Degbon and Varney?

11 A. Oliver Varney. Oliver Varney.

12 Q. Right. Let's just take this in stages, please, and slowly  
13 so we can follow. The page which is on the screen which is the  
14 first page of this, take a look at entries number 10 and 11,  
15:49:48 15 please. Can you see them?

16 A. Yes, I do.

17 Q. Now we see the name there Samuel J Varney?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Is that a different individual from the one you are talking  
15:50:01 20 about?

21 A. That is a different individual from the one I am talking  
22 about.

23 Q. We see below that at number 11 Yegbeh Degbon. Is that one  
24 of the individuals you are talking about?

15:50:14 25 A. That is one of the individuals that I am talking about.  
26 That's one of the main individuals that put together Black  
27 Kadaffa.

28 Q. Right, so that's number 11. Can you find Oliver Varney and  
29 the other gentleman you mentioned on the list, please, and give

1 us the numbers?

2 A. Yes, Oliver Varney is number 75. That's on page 3.

3 Q. I wonder - let's take this slowly so that we can follow.

4 Page 73.

15:50:45 5 A. No, not page 73.

6 Q. Number 73?

7 A. No, Oliver Varney is number 75.

8 Q. I'm sorry. Oliver Varney. Okay, number 75?

9 A. That is correct.

15:50:57 10 Q. And before we proceed we note there is not an X placed  
11 against that number. Now the third person you mentioned was  
12 Anthony Mekunagbe. What number is he?

13 A. He is number 88. I do not know why Moses didn't put an X  
14 here, but he was executed.

15:51:18 15 Q. Right, so Anthony Mekunagbe, again we see no X?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Mr Taylor, it has been brought to my notice, please do not  
18 mark that document.

19 A. But I just did. Then I will not mark it again.

15:51:42 20 MS IRURA: Your Honours, the document he has is a copy.  
21 The original is on the screen.

22 MR GRIFFITHS: I am grateful for that.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: I will leave it to you, Mr Griffiths, but  
24 the original is a Prosecution exhibit and of course can't be  
15:51:57 25 marked, but whatever you do with that copy is a matter for you.

26 MR GRIFFITHS:

27 Q. Well, I suggest then, Mr Taylor, given that it is a copy,  
28 thankfully, that you mark those three, please. So that is  
29 numbers 11, 75 and 88.

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Okay.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I am assuming, Court Manager, that that  
4 copy is available for the witness to mark. Is that correct?

15:52:31 5 MS IRURA: Your Honour, the copy is before the witness  
6 presently.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. No, what I am asking you is it  
8 wasn't a copy that you were using for some other purpose?

9 MS IRURA: Your Honour, no.

15:52:42 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: All right, thank you.

11 MR GRIFFITHS:

12 Q. So if you mark those three, please, Mr Taylor; 11, 75 and  
13 88. Now that we have identified them, noting in passing that  
14 there is no X next to 75 and 88, you say these three were the  
15 chief conspirators in Black Gadaffa, is that right?

15:53:06

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. And you tell us that Black Gadaffa was a grouping composed  
18 of both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians intent on deposing you?

19 A. That is correct.

15:53:27 20 Q. And that they commenced or embarked upon this course of  
21 action some time in late 1990?

22 A. Yes, with Black Kadaffa, but the whole action of trying to  
23 remove me started from Libya, yes.

24 Q. Yes, but in any event, going forward to come back, what was  
15:53:49 25 the fate of these three men?

26 A. Anthony Mekunagbe while awaiting trial by court martial  
27 died in prison. Well, we will call that - it was our  
28 responsibility. The other two men plus a few others - and I am  
29 saying that these were the gang leaders, it did not mean that

1 there were not others involved, but they were all tried,  
2 convicted and they were executed.

3 Q. So numbers 11 and 75, yes?

4 A. Executed, yes.

15:54:31 5 Q. Both executed?

6 A. Yes. 38 was also executed.

7 Q. In relation to this same thing?

8 A. That same thing.

9 Q. And who is number 38?

15:54:44 10 A. Timothy Mulibah. I have mentioned that before.

11 Q. And we note an X against that name. Now I want to examine  
12 one of the details you just gave us, Mr Taylor. You said that  
13 some of those involved in Black Gadaffa were Sierra Leoneans, is  
14 that right?

15:55:21 15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Were those Sierra Leoneans members of the NPFL?

17 A. No, they were not.

18 Q. So can you help us as to how they came to be associated  
19 with some of your Special Forces?

15:55:45 20 A. Excuse me. Well, let me take my time and go through this.  
21 In January - remember I explained to the Court Mekunagbe had  
22 misbehaved on the border over looted property, exchanged fire.  
23 My friend Joseph Momoh and I have to settle it in a rather  
24 unusual way. He is punished and released and sent back.

15:56:18 25 Q. Sent back from where?

26 A. Sent back to his post as commander in Lofa. Now,  
27 subsequent to that, as we develop at around - I would put it to  
28 about April/May or thereabouts of 1991 as I - and this is almost  
29 the middle of 1991 - as I move into Gbarnga, don't let's forget

1 in March there is an attack on Sierra Leone. This attack is this  
2 famous attack that goes across the border.

3 Now, there is one thing I am not sure if this is the time  
4 that we have not talked about, this rise in - at least we haven't  
15:57:15 5 talked about the composition of the NPFL forces, and I am sure  
6 you will get to that, but this attack occurs in Sierra Leone in  
7 March. There are allegations on the air that most of the people  
8 are quote/unquote NPFL forces. We are denying these allegations  
9 because in fact we know nothing about it, but the news finally  
15:57:46 10 breaks as we arrest these people around about May, I will call  
11 it, of 1991 on the Black Kadaffa situation. We get to know that  
12 Anthony Mekunagbe had been working with a Sierra Leonean called  
13 Foday Sankoh that were friends with them on the base and --

14 Q. Which base?

15:58:20 15 A. In Tripoli, Libya, and what they were trying to do at this  
16 particular time, I understand they assisted him in training  
17 Liberians to go to Sierra Leone to invade, and in return what  
18 they were using was Black Kadaffa. Now that Sankoh had gone in  
19 they had some Sierra Leoneans that they were using on our side of  
15:58:47 20 the border in the Bong Mines area as Black Kadaffa to  
21 counter-attack me.

22 This is when we arrested all of them. So Anthony Mekunagbe  
23 was tried. He was in jail, he died. Degbon behind Black Kadaffa  
24 was also tried, convicted and executed but it was at this  
15:59:13 25 particular time that we as the authority got the information that  
26 in fact Anthony Mekunagbe, Oliver Varney, Timothy Mulibah and the  
27 rest of them, Degbon had assisted a gentleman called Foday Sankoh  
28 in going across into Sierra Leone.

29 Q. Now pausing there, because we are going to come back and

1 deal with that in more detail, but help me with a detail. Was  
2 there any family link between you and Anthony Mekunagbe?

3 A. Not blood family. Anthony at that particular time was  
4 going out with a sister of mine, a half sister of mine.

16:00:06 5 Q. What is her name?

6 A. Her name is Thelma. T-H-E-L-M-A.

7 Q. And how did Anthony's death in custody, did Anthony's death  
8 in custody affect your relationship with Thelma?

9 A. Yes, a little bit at the time but the wounds were healed.

16:00:37 10 Q. And what was the effect?

11 A. Oh, she was, you know, issues of heart are very difficult  
12 to deal with. She was hurt because, you know, her loved one had  
13 been what she called killed by her brother.

14 MR GRIFFITHS: Now, can we put up, please, the first page  
16:01:08 15 of the list:

16 Q. And can I invite your attention back to that first page,  
17 please, Mr Taylor, because I want us to be systematic about our  
18 examination of this list. Now, we have dealt with Cooper Miller  
19 and Augustus Wright, haven't we?

16:01:38 20 A. That is correct.

21 Q. We then see at number 8 the name Moses Z Blah?

22 A. Mm-hm.

23 Q. And below that Peter Kerseh. Now, there is an X beside  
24 that name signifying, according to former President Blah, that  
16:02:07 25 that individual was executed; is that true?

26 A. That is true.

27 Q. Again number 11 again another X. Was he executed?

28 A. He was executed.

29 Q. Can we see the remainder of the list - of that page,



1 please. There are no further Xs on that page?

2 A. No.

3 Q. But we note at number 12 Prince Y Johnson?

4 A. That is correct.

16:02:52 5 Q. And that is the Prince Johnson of whom you have spoken,  
6 yes?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Can we see the second page, please, starting at the top  
9 hopefully. We see an X against the name Timothy Mulibah, yes?

16:03:19 10 A. That is the Black Kadaffa Sankoh group, yes.

11 Q. Was he executed?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can we see the remainder of the page. In passing,  
14 penultimate entry on that page Enoch Dogolea, did he serve in any  
16:03:56 15 position in the Liberian government?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What was that?

18 A. Enoch Dogolea both during the revolution at the  
19 establishment of the NPRAG, and again that is the National

16:04:15 20 Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government, became  
21 vice-president even after the elections in 1997 because of - I

22 have informed this court of my original promise to the Special

23 Forces. He was carried on as the first vice-president during the  
24 election - after the elections in 1997.

16:04:36 25 MR GRIFFITHS: Right. Can we see the next page, please:

26 Q. Now, we can't see any Xs. Can we see the bottom?

27 A. Counsel, remember we just talked about number 75.

28 Q. So there should be an X against number 75?

29 A. Yes, Oliver Varney. That is correct.

- 1 Q. Thank you. I am grateful.
- 2 A. And also --
- 3 Q. And there should be an X, based on your testimony, against  
4 number 88?
- 16:05:23 5 A. That is correct.
- 6 Q. I wonder if it might be sensible to assist us later if you  
7 could add an X against those two names?
- 8 A. Yes, I have already X'd them here.
- 9 Q. And have you marked the other X on the first page which  
16:05:44 10 should have been there? I may be wrong.
- 11 A. Well, number 11 had already been X'd by Moses and so I have  
12 X'd it too, but it was X'd I think by Moses.
- 13 Q. Very well. Can we then move on to the page which  
14 immediately follows entry number 92 and we see an X against a  
16:06:30 15 name Joe Doe?
- 16 A. Are we on page --
- 17 Q. Page 4, Mr Taylor.
- 18 A. Okay, I will find it. My page is a little different. You  
19 are talking about number 10 --
- 16:06:55 20 Q. Page 4, entry number 103?
- 21 A. Yes, Joe Doe. Yes.
- 22 Q. Was he executed?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. What for?
- 16:07:04 25 A. Ah, he was a part of that Black Kadaffa movement.
- 26 Q. Can we see the bottom of the page, please. At number 121  
27 Benjamin Yeaten, yes?
- 28 A. Yes.
- 29 Q. He was a Special Forces, was he?

- 1 A. That is correct.
- 2 Q. And what role did he play after you became president?
- 3 A. He became the director of the Special Security Services.
- 4 Q. Now, at 123 we see Dopoe Menkarzon, yes?
- 16:07:55 5 A. That is correct.
- 6 Q. Was he executed?
- 7 A. No, he was not.
- 8 Q. Did he have any particular role in your Greater Liberian  
9 government?
- 16:08:06 10 A. No - oh, Greater Liberian government. Dopoe Menkarzon rose  
11 to the rank of general and commander of one of the major  
12 divisions of the NPFL.
- 13 Q. Which division?
- 14 A. He was in charge of the Strike Force Division.
- 16:08:35 15 Q. Did he have any nickname, Dopoe Menkarzon?
- 16 A. By nickname, I just know him to be --
- 17 Q. Any alias?
- 18 A. His military - his military name was applied to him was  
19 Ground, G-R-O-U-N-D, Ground.
- 16:09:00 20 Q. Can we have a look at - before we leave that page, there is  
21 a matter of detail. Prince Quiwonkpa, any relation to Thomas?
- 22 A. A brother of General Quiwonkpa.
- 23 Q. The next page, please. We see an X against a name of Sam  
24 Larto. Was he executed?
- 16:09:35 25 A. Yes.
- 26 Q. What for?
- 27 A. Sam Larto was executed for two principal reasons, two  
28 different issues as we were trying to get him. We had the deaths  
29 of some civilians in the southeastern part of Liberia. While

1 that was under investigation Sam Larto, in or around the - I  
2 think the Monrovia area - had shot and killed a civilian. In  
3 fact shot him in the head - someone that - it was claimed he was  
4 a thief and he was I think stealing a television and he shot and  
16:10:40 5 killed him. He was arrested for that wanton - for those two  
6 crimes and he was court-martialled, tried, found guilty and he  
7 was executed for those civilians.

8 Q. Now, on a number of occasions, Mr Taylor, you have told us  
9 that he was court-martialled, tried and executed. Help us. The  
16:11:04 10 trial process you are talking about, what did that involve?

11 A. It was a full - a five member court martial board headed by  
12 McDonald Boam.

13 Q. By who?

14 A. McDonald Boam. That's already in the records. But they  
16:11:31 15 were assisted by trained lawyers.

16 Q. Who was assisted by trained lawyers?

17 A. We are talking about the board. The court martial board  
18 was assisted by trained lawyers as prosecutors and the military  
19 men that came before them were also defended by trained lawyers.  
16:11:47 20 I am talking about actual members of the bar of the Republic of  
21 Liberia. In the case of Sam Larto, I can remember very, very  
22 well Sam Larto was represented by a very famous counsellor in law  
23 in Liberia right now, Francis Galawolo.

24 Q. Francis who?

16:12:07 25 A. Galawolo, G-A-L-A-W-O-L-O. So they were represented. This  
26 was not a kangaroo court with military men not knowing what they  
27 were doing. They were prosecuted by lawyers assisting the court  
28 martial board and they were defended by lawyers, yes.

29 Q. You say that the chair of the board was McDonald Boam?

1 A. Boam, yes.

2 Q. The other four individuals who sat on that board, first of  
3 all, where were they selected from?

4 A. To the best of my knowledge they were all - in fact  
16:12:50 5 McDonald Boam is a Special Forces. He is on this list, so he was  
6 not a stranger. And the other members - the other four, my  
7 recollection is very bad on this. I do not know - I do not  
8 remember quite frankly the name of the - I do not know who were  
9 the others that sat on it, but Boam --

16:13:09 10 Q. Very well.

11 A. Boam was the chairperson of that.

12 Q. Maybe for completeness you should try and find the name,  
13 just so that we can have it well in mind.

14 A. Yes, McDonald Boam. Yes, McDonald Boam is number 78 found  
16:13:26 15 on page 3.

16 Q. Thank you. And this military court, at what location did  
17 it sit?

18 A. In Gbarnga, the capital.

19 Q. And was there a dedicated building or facility for these  
16:14:02 20 hearings?

21 A. Yes, I was not just - it was not just a board that came up  
22 and went down after a case. It was a permanent setting.

23 Q. And help us, how regularly did that board try cases?

24 A. Not - I can say there were - that board may have looked  
16:14:30 25 into as many as three major cases while - what I can remember.  
26 The first set of cases had to do with these Black Kadaffa people.  
27 The second had to do with the Sam Lartos [indiscernible] for  
28 wanton killing of civilians or other soldiers. The third had to  
29 do with an incident in 1994 after the fall of Gbarnga with the

1 Cassius Jacobs group situation.

2 Q. We will come to that. Now, for how long was that  
3 particular board a part of the disciplinary structure of the  
4 NPFL?

16:15:26 5 A. Up until 1995.

6 Q. Okay. And you have spoken of the board sitting in a  
7 dedicated building, but did they, for example, have detention  
8 facilities attached?

9 A. Not detention facilities attached to the board as it is,  
16:15:52 10 but there were detention facilities in Gbarnga that were used by  
11 the board.

12 Q. And help us, what were those detention facilities?

13 A. There's a jail. There's a jail located in Gbarnga.  
14 There's a jail.

16:16:13 15 Q. Were detainees held in metal containers?

16 A. Metal containers? Never. No, no, no, no.

17 Q. To your knowledge were they kept in holes in the ground?

18 A. No, there were jails. I mean Gbarnga is a major city. By  
19 the time we get there there are two prison facilities in Gbarnga;  
16:16:35 20 one held by the police for regular civilian matters and there is  
21 a national prison in Gbarnga. This is where - no, no, no, no.

22 On container matters, before I got into Liberia I understand that  
23 at Gborplay without prison facilities some people were being kept  
24 in containers down there and when I got there I was so upset

16:17:07 25 those that were responsible were very lucky and I had everybody -  
26 in fact it was a terrible situation. I had every one of them  
27 released. But we are talking about now the very early part of  
28 the situation. But no, no, no, these other cities had civilian  
29 facilities that were used.

1 Q. Now lest I forget, did I complete all the names on the  
2 list?

3 A. No, you didn't.

16:17:34

4 Q. I think there was one remaining sheet that we needed to  
5 examine, wasn't there?

6 A. Yes, but there is another X placed at number 155, Elmer  
7 Glee Johnson.

8 Q. Yes?

16:17:50

9 A. He was not executed. This is a very good friend of mine  
10 that was killed in combat and I think what Moses was trying to  
11 mark off here was the death of him, but he was not executed. He  
12 was a very good friend of mine.

13 Q. Can we look at the final page, please, and we see at number  
14 160 Tom Wowei yu?

16:18:21

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Was he in fact a Special Forces? Did he train in Libya?

17 A. No, Tom has never had any military training. If you look  
18 at it, I am number 1, I have never had military training in my  
19 life but I am number 1 and they just put - I do not know who made  
20 this list and those to put him at number 160. If they really  
21 wanted to do justice they should have probably put him as number  
22 2. But no, no, no, Tom has never had any sort of military  
23 training.

16:18:38

24 Q. Right. Can we have the first page back up, please, and a  
25 couple of questions before we finally leave this document.

16:18:53

26 Firstly we note two dates, 1990 to 2001. Help us. Is that date  
27 2001 of any significance, or are either of those two dates 1990  
28 to '91 [sic] of any significance?

29 A. I don't see why 2001 would be of any real significance. I

1 really can't put my hand on this one. 1991, I don't see why you  
2 are referring to '91.

3 MR GRIFFITHS: Could I have a moment, please. Okay, can we  
4 put that exhibit away now, please, and, lest I forget, can I ask  
16:20:21 5 that the document marked by the witness be marked for  
6 identification. So I think we would be on MFI-2.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's correct. That document can be  
8 marked as MFI-2.

9 MR GRIFFITHS:

16:21:04 10 Q. One final matter before we move on, Mr Taylor. This board  
11 - returning to that topic briefly - what punishments were they  
12 entitled to hand out?

13 A. Well, let's not forget, even though they have lawyers this  
14 board is operating under the uniform code of military justice  
16:21:34 15 which is separate from civilian law, so they can hand out death  
16 by firing squad, they can hand out - these are military legal  
17 decisions that are handed down. It could be life imprisonment.  
18 It could be anything. Based on, what I described before, the  
19 operational order. The order was there which was the blueprint  
16:22:02 20 that was respected of military people, but they were tried under  
21 the uniform code of military justice. They knew their general  
22 orders, they knew everything, and so they were tried not under  
23 civilian law.

24 Q. Was flogging, by way of an example, a punishment which they  
16:22:23 25 could impose?

26 A. No, flogging I am not sure. Flogging is not a part of the  
27 punishment under the uniform code of military justice. I do not  
28 claim to be an expert, but I do not think that corporal  
29 punishment is one of those - maybe some of the military people



1 may be able to help the Court with that, but I doubt very much if  
2 corporal punishment is a part of a discipline. I mean soldiers  
3 are incarcerated, they are - under extreme conditions are  
4 executed, but I do not believe so and I stand corrected on that.

16:23:07 5 Q. Now, Mr Taylor, we have got five minutes left and I would  
6 like to embark on another topic with you, please. We have  
7 mentioned it in passing, but I would like us at this stage to  
8 begin our examination of it. Bearing in mind we are now at the  
9 end of 1990, beginning of 1991. We know of the situation on the  
16:23:38 10 ground; 90 per cent of the country under your control apart from  
11 Monrovia. At that stage of events what was the composition of  
12 the NPFL?

13 A. The NPFL at this particular time is a combination of  
14 Liberians, Gambians, Ivoirians, Ghanaians, even a few Nigerians,  
16:24:26 15 because there was no volunteer situation. This is the  
16 composition. And a few Mahn Guineans whose relatives on the  
17 Liberian side could encourage them to join. In fact, I remember  
18 specifically a number of around 200 Ivoirians from the Dan ethnic  
19 group that joined the NPFL. I remember this so well because  
16:24:58 20 following my - the disarmament in 1995 I then collected those men  
21 and took them and delivered them to late President  
22 Houphouet-Boigny who used them in the gendarmerie because they  
23 were very highly trained.

24 Q. Now, correct me if I am wrong but I am looking at the  
16:25:29 25 LiveNote. You said Liberians, Gambians, Ivoirians, Ghanaians,  
26 even a few Nigerians. Were there any Sierra Leoneans?

27 A. At this particular time, no. The Sierra Leoneans that were  
28 in Liberia we understand had - with this Mekunagbe situation, had  
29 gone into Sierra Leone. At the beginning of the training around

1 and the fighting in the early 90s there were a few Sierra  
2 Leoneans that fought alongside the NPFL, in 1990.

3 Q. In 1990?

4 A. That is correct.

16:26:11 5 Q. So, all right. So in 1990 there were some Sierra Leoneans?

6 A. Let's not - there are hundreds of Sierra Leoneans in  
7 Liberia that go there looking for work. They, some of them are  
8 teaching. Some of them are - Sierra Leoneans are in Liberia I  
9 mean by the hundreds. There are some of them that do join the

16:26:39 10 NPFL as they get into - as you get into the Buchanan-Harbel area  
11 that is the corridor that Sierra Leoneans who are living in and  
12 working. Sierra Leoneans used to come to Liberia to look for a  
13 job so some of them had joined by 1990.

14 Q. Now, I want us to deal with this topic with care and let's  
16:27:09 15 start with the Sierra Leoneans. When did you first become aware  
16 that there were Sierra Leoneans within the ranks of the NPFL?

17 A. I would say around May - around May of 1990 when they first  
18 got into Buchanan, they did report, because a training base was  
19 created in Buchanan. Sierra Leoneans and Nigerians working in  
16:27:49 20 that general area, a few Nigerians looking for adventure, did  
21 join.

22 Q. Pause there. Now, from what you have - the totality of  
23 what you have told us, Mr Taylor, there is a distinction between  
24 Special Forces and volunteers?

16:28:12 25 A. Oh, definitely.

26 Q. At the stage we are talking about, May 1990, were you aware  
27 of any Sierra Leonean Special Forces within the ranks of the  
28 NPFL?

29 A. Never, no, no, no, no. As a matter of fact let me - I

1 think we better clarify this.

2 MR GRIFFITHS: I think - Mr President, I am not sure, I am  
3 not sure we will have time to embark on this now and it may be  
4 more convenient if we hold that thought until our next session.

16:28:50 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. The Court Manager has advised us  
6 that we have less than two minutes left at the moment, so if that  
7 is a convenient place we will adjourn.

8 Mr Taylor, I will remind you again: You are directed not  
9 to speak to any other persons about the evidence you have given  
16:29:15 10 and the Court will rise. We will resume on Monday morning at  
11 9.30.

12 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
13 to be reconvened on Monday, 20 July 2009 at  
14 9.30 a.m.]

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## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENCE:

DANKPANNAH DR CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR	24591
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR GRIFFITHS	24591