



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE SPECIAL COURT
V.
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

TUESDAY, 8 APRIL 2008
9.30 A.M.
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

Before the Judges:

Justice Teresa Doherty, Presiding
Justice Richard Lussick
Justice Julia Sebutinde
Justice Al Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr William Romans
Ms Carolyn Buff

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura

For the Prosecution:

Ms Brenda J Hollis
Mr Mohamed A Bangura
Mr Alain Werner
Ms Maja Dimitrova

For the accused Charles Ghankay
Taylor:

Mr Terry Munyard
Mr Morris Anyah

1 Tuesday, 8 April 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.].

09:30:57 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. I notice some change of
6 appearances. Mr Bangura?

7 MR BANGURA: Good morning your Honours. Your Honours, for
8 the Prosecution this morning, Brenda J Hollis, Mohamed A Bangura,
9 that's myself, Alain Werner and Maja Dimitrova. Thank you.

09:31:18 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura. Good morning
11 Mr Anyah.

12 MR ANYAH: Good morning Madam President, your Honours. For
13 the Defence we have Mr Terry Munyard, myself Morris Anyah and we
14 are joined today again together by Mr Ibrahim Warne.

09:31:34 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Anyah. If there are no
16 other matters - Mr Bangura, you are on your feet.

17 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour. Good morning
18 Mr Witness.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: I haven't reminded the witness of his
09:31:46 20 oath. I was just checking if there were no preliminary issues.
21 No. Mr Witness, you recall that yesterday you swore to tell the
22 truth. That oath is still binding on you. You must answer
23 questions truthfully.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

09:32:00 25 WITNESS: TF1-516 [On former oath]

26 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very good. Please proceed, Mr Bangura.

27 MR BANGURA: Thank you.

28 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR BANGURA: [Continued]

29 Q. Good morning again, Mr Witness.

1 A. Good morning, sir.

2 Q. We shall continue with your evidence this morning.

3 Yesterday before we broke off you were telling the Court about
4 the training - one of the training bases where you were taken to.

09:32:27 5 In fact you had given a description of that training base which
6 is the secondary school. Do you recall?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. What's the name of that secondary school again?

9 A. Ahmadiyya secondary school, Kailahun.

09:32:45 10 Q. How long were you at the Ahmadiyya secondary school?

11 A. About three months.

12 Q. Now you have also told the Court that during the period you
13 were there one of the exercises to which you were put was to run
14 every morning for quite a distance, is that correct?

09:33:11 15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Do you recall any other form of treatment to which you were
17 subjected?

18 A. Every morning we were asked to the gather and that was
19 referred to as a muster parade and at muster parade we were given
09:33:27 20 necessary information, commands as how to move about doing
21 things.

22 Q. Now what sort of people were brought to this base,
23 including yourself?

24 A. I was a student and on the training base I got in touch
09:33:47 25 with so many other colleagues who were all students.

26 Q. Were they before they were brought there part of any of
27 these forces that were fighting?

28 A. I did not understand the question, please.

29 Q. Were they part of any of the factions that were fighting at

1 that time before they brought them to the base?

2 A. No, sir. We were all civilians.

3 Q. Thank you. Now were you free to leave when you were
4 brought to this base?

09:34:21 5 A. No. We only moved by the command of the training
6 instructors. Nobody was authorised to move, otherwise you would
7 be killed.

8 Q. Did you see this happen at all during your stay on the
9 base?

09:34:41 10 A. Yes, it happened at the time we were transferred to the
11 national secondary school campus training base. It happened as a
12 result of our colleagues, a recruit who took to escaping from the
13 training base, and at one time the instructor said, "We have
14 learnt that a good number of you people are escaping and you have
09:35:06 15 been initiated into our society, so if any one of you is caught
16 we will deal with you accordingly."

17 And a colleague called Jusu, I can still remember, was
18 caught on the bypass trying to escape and he was arrested and
19 taken to the field and one of the instructors called Rambo told
09:35:29 20 us in a muster parade that, "See what we are going to do to your
21 colleague because we made this announcement but it appears you do
22 not want to heed to it." He was shot in the leg and lay down,
23 his head was cut off. He said, "This will serve to you as an
24 incentive not to escape."

09:35:48 25 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Your Honours, I see on the screen
26 the name which the witness mentioned is spelt differently. The
27 name that came up that the witness mentioned is Jusu and that
28 name is J-U-S-U.

29 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Also, Mr Bangura, he named a something

1 society. I didn't get it and nor did the transcriber. "You have
2 initiated a" something "society" in line 21.

3 MR BANGURA: Yes, I am trying to get that.

09:36:28

4 THE WITNESS: That we have been initiated on their society
5 and we should not move without their consent.

6 MR BANGURA: Okay, I hope that makes sense. Thank you,
7 Mr Witness.

09:36:50

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just to make sure we understand, is the
9 witness saying these recruits were initiated into their society
10 and therefore should not escape?

11 THE WITNESS: Fine, that is it.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Witness.

13 MR BANGURA:

09:37:01

14 Q. Mr Witness, you mentioned that you moved over to the
15 national secondary school. Where was the national secondary
16 school?

17 A. National secondary school is situated in between a village
18 called Nyahun and Kailahun, the township of Kailahun.

19 Q. Are you able to spell the name of that village Nyahun?

09:37:21

20 A. It's N-Y-A-H-U-N.

21 Q. Now apart from the national secondary school was there any
22 other base in Kailahun, training base?

23 A. Yes, sir. Another training base was situated at the
24 Methodist secondary school, Kailahun campus.

09:37:47

25 Q. Now yesterday you said that there were up to 5,000 people
26 being trained at the national secondary school. Did that include
27 the number also at the Methodist secondary school?

28 A. National secondary school campus, the number was
29 overwhelming so they had to divide the group into two, one taken

1 to the Methodist secondary school Kailahun and the other reminded
2 in the national secondary school Kailahun.

3 Q. So when you say 5,000 was that inclusive of the two
4 training bases?

09:38:28 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Now were you during the course of your training put into
7 any group?

8 A. Yes, sir. On the training base we had different groups.
9 One, we had the SBU, that is ranging from one to 20 years. That
09:38:49 10 is boys. And we had the adult group. We had SGU, girls ranging
11 from one to 20 years. And we had WAC's, that is women army
12 commando soldiers.

13 Q. And who were in this WAC's group?

14 A. Those were women above 20 years, because before your name
09:39:18 15 is written you will first be asked to state your date of birth.
16 Based upon that you will be put into these groups.

17 Q. So which of these groups did you fall into?

18 A. I fell in the SBU, the Small Boys Unit.

19 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I am just - perhaps counsel
09:39:43 20 could assist us with a little foundation. I am not sure if the
21 witness is still at national secondary or at Methodist at this
22 point and whether in respect of these groups he is referring to
23 groups that pertain to national secondary or Methodist. I am not
24 sure which base we are talking about at this point.

09:40:01 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understood it to be just a general
26 background information but, Mr Bangura, you have heard Mr Anyah.

27 MR BANGURA: I will get the witness to clarify:

28 Q. Mr Witness, you said you were moved from the Ahmadiyya base
29 after two to three months and you went to another base. Which

1 one of these two bases did you go to?

2 A. National secondary school.

3 Q. And the description which you have given about composition
4 of the different groups, this was your experience with which
09:40:33 5 base?

6 A. Initially at the Ahmadiyya secondary school.

7 Q. When you went to the national secondary school was the
8 situation the same?

9 A. Yes, it remained the same in that vein.

09:40:48 10 Q. Do you recall who your training instructors were at the
11 national secondary school?

12 A. One was John B Vincent. Two, Ibrahim Dugba. Isaac T
13 Mongor and one Rambo. There were many other instructors, but
14 those were the prominent ones I can remember.

09:41:14 15 Q. Thank you. Your Honours, just for some spellings here.
16 Vincent is - I see it is spelt differently here. It's
17 V-I-N-C-E-N-T. Dugba is D-U-G-B-A. Isaac is normal spelling but
18 I see it come up differently here as well. Now these people who
19 you've mentioned --

09:41:48 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: There was also an Ibrahim.

21 MR BANGURA: Ibrahim Dugba:

22 Q. These people who you've mentioned who were your
23 instructors, do you know which nationalities they were?

24 A. Yes, sir. They told me they were Liberians. And like for
09:42:08 25 Dugba, he told us he was once a SATU in the Liberian army under
26 the control of late President Samuel Kanyon Doe and that he was
27 captured during the war in Liberia and trained by the NPFL.

28 Q. Thank you. You say he was once a?

29 A. A SATU.

1 Q. What is that?

2 A. There was a certain group of soldiers in Liberia referred
3 to as SATU.

4 Q. Can you spell that for us, please?

09:42:39 5 A. Really I cannot come up with any clear spelling of that,
6 but that is the story he told us at the training base.

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is it some kind of acronym for something?

8 THE WITNESS: Okay, yes, something of the sort.

9 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I can only spell that as
09:43:04 10 pronounced, S-A-T-U:

11 Q. How long was your training, the rest of your training at
12 the national secondary school?

13 A. Two to three months. About that.

14 Q. Apart from the physical exercise which you have described
09:43:27 15 did you also get to learn anything, or were you taught anything
16 else at the training base?

17 A. Yes, sir. One, we were taught how to manoeuvre on the
18 training base. Two, the ideology of the RUF and the background
19 information of the RUF itself.

09:43:47 20 Q. When you say you were taught how to manoeuvre what do you
21 mean?

22 A. That is the physical exercise that if we are taken on the
23 front line, say for example our position is attacked, we have to
24 get down and crawl instead of running otherwise the bullet will
09:44:07 25 catch us. That was also part of our training. And again they
26 told us how to treat the civilians when we go on the front line
27 and happened to lay hands on civilians.

28 Q. What were you taught to do when you captured civilians?

29 A. They told us the movement, the RUF, needs manpower and

1 whenever civilians are captured they must be sent to the rear for
2 training.

3 Q. Okay. Now were you able to learn at all about the
4 leadership of the RUF at that time?

09:44:47 5 A. Yes, sir. On the training base they told us that the group
6 fighting in the RUF had divided into two at that time. They told
7 us about Special Forces and they said those were NPFL.

8 Charles Taylor's rebels. And they had the vanguards who were
9 mainly trained to fight the RUF war in Sierra Leone and that the
09:45:20 10 NPFL fighters, the Special Forces, were to help the RUF, the
11 vanguards, to open the road and that in fact the leader was on
12 the way coming, he was Foday Sankoh, but that Foday Sankoh hadn't
13 much money but they had their leader who was Ghankay Taylor that
14 they were using in fact his materials, his arms and ammunitions.

09:45:47 15 He's supporting them, that Sankoh hasn't anything. In fact they
16 are only answerable to questions to their leader Ghankay Taylor.

17 Q. You mentioned Special Forces and you mentioned vanguards.
18 Were you told who the Special Forces were?

19 A. Yes, sir. They told me on the training base that the
09:46:13 20 Special Forces were NPFL fighters and the vanguards were those
21 who were trained in Liberia under the auspices of Corporal Sankoh
22 to come and liberate Sierra Leone.

23 Q. Did you later come to learn whether there were Special
24 Forces who were not even Liberians?

09:46:34 25 A. Later on I was told by one Mohamed Zino that he was not
26 trained in Liberia but in Libya. And one other Rashid Sandi was
27 later on killed. He told us that he was also trained in Libya
28 and that whilst training in Libya Corporal Sankoh met them and
29 joined them to come and liberate Sierra Leone.

1 Q. Okay. Now after your training --

2 MR ANYAH: Madam President, may we get some foundation.
3 When was he told these things? He is referring to Zino and for
4 all we know he spoke to Zino three years after he was at the
09:47:19 5 base.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we will let Mr Bangura proceed
7 with his evidence-in-chief and if these matters are still not
8 clear that can be raised again.

9 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour. In any event there's
09:47:36 10 not been evidence before this Court already that the witness only
11 met Zino three years later.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: No, that's a suggestion rather than a
13 fact being put forward; an example.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Also the witness's testimony is, "Later
09:47:56 15 on I was told." It's as vague as that, later on.

16 MR BANGURA:

17 Q. Which nationality was Zino?

18 A. Zino was a Sierra Leonean.

19 Q. Mr Witness, after your training you said you trained - you
09:48:14 20 continued training at the national secondary school for two to
21 three months, after that period did you go anywhere?

22 A. Yes, sir. It was one morning that we were commanded to
23 gather in the muster parade and we were taken to the front line,
24 a town called Gbaiama in the Mandu Chiefdom, Kailahun District.

09:48:41 25 Whilst in Gbaiama our position came under attack by the
26 government forces and during that confrontation I got wounded and
27 I was taken on the hammock to Pendembu.

28 Q. Okay, just hold on, Mr Witness. Your Honours, I see
29 Gbaiama spelt differently from what we would have it spelt. It

1 is B-A-I-M-A [sic].

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: And the chiefdom?

3 THE WITNESS: Mandu, that is M-A-N-D-U.

4 MR BANGURA:

09:49:22 5 Q. You said you were taken to Gbaima and you got shot?

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pendembu. Oh, sorry.

7 MR BANGURA: Gbaima.

8 THE WITNESS: To Gbaima.

9 MR BANGURA:

09:49:36 10 Q. And then you got shot. When you were - how long were you
11 at Gbaima before you got shot?

12 A. A very short period of time. Very short.

13 Q. Okay, and then you were taken to Pendembu. How long were
14 you - where at Pendembu were you taken to?

09:49:57 15 A. To the hospital. To the hospital in Pendembu. I spent
16 about three months in Pendembu, but still my condition was not
17 improving. So the leader, Corporal Sankoh, met us and we were in
18 good number admitted to the hospital and he suggested that all
19 serious cases be transferred to Foya, Liberia, and I was taken
09:50:23 20 across Liberia to the hospital there.

21 Q. What sort of injury did you suffer?

22 A. My tendon was cut.

23 Q. In which of your legs?

24 A. You can see here.

09:50:41 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: The witness is showing his ankle - the
26 right angle, is it?

27 MR BANGURA: The right ankle, yes, your Honour.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Can counsel for the Defence see what the
29 witness is showing?

1 MR ANYAH: Yes, I can, Madam President.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Okay. Well, the record then can show
3 that the witness has shown his right ankle and indicated where he
4 was injured.

09:51:05 5 MR BANGURA: Okay, thank you.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, you suggested the witness was
7 shot, but the witness didn't say that. He said he was wounded,
8 but we don't know how.

9 THE WITNESS: No, no, I was wounded by bullet. I was shot
09:51:22 10 and my tendon was cut.

11 MR BANGURA:

12 Q. How long were you at Foya?

13 A. About six months in Foya.

14 Q. And at the end of that period did you go anywhere?

09:51:46 15 A. Yes, there was much improvement and I was given document by
16 the combat medic in Foya to travel back to Sierra Leone and that
17 I was to report to the immediate commander in the RUF that was
18 Captain Kennedy. He was assigned in Koindu. So I got to Koindu,
19 spent some time there and he transferred me to Buedu.

09:52:11 20 Q. You were at Buedu for how long?

21 A. I was in Buedu about nine months charging batteries in the
22 radio station, since I was not able to walk, or take part in any
23 other physical activity on the front line.

24 Q. About what time was this, Mr Witness?

09:52:30 25 A. This was in the year 1992.

26 Q. Okay.

27 A. 1992 to 1993, I think that.

28 Q. And did you - you said you were at Buedu for nine months
29 and after that period did you go anywhere?

1 A. I obtained permission to go to my village to seek a native
2 treatment, because I needed a treatment for my vein and so I was
3 given a pass. There was a document referred to as pass which was
4 given to me by the commander and I went to my village; the same
09:53:11 5 village I stated yesterday in my statement. I spent some time in
6 my village and whilst in my village I was arrested by a certain
7 group who said they were in search of AWOL soldiers and that
8 I was on AWOL. I was taken to Giema.

9 Q. How long were you in your village before you got arrested
09:53:33 10 by this group of soldiers?

11 A. About three months, about that, and any time I am stating
12 here it is not really something I had counted. It is just
13 estimate and see the number of weeks or months I lived in a
14 particular area, because this thing happened quite so long and so
09:53:55 15 really one cannot come up with any precise date.

16 Q. So, you were taken to Giema. (I am just checking the
17 spelling, your Honour.)

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, what is AWOL?

19 MR BANGURA: I will get the witness to say.

09:54:17 20 THE WITNESS: That is absent without leave. It is a sort
21 of acronym military term. Let us take, for example, you have
22 been posted to this particular location. Until you are released
23 by your commander you have no single right to dissolve or desert
24 that position. If you do it means you are on AWOL. It is a
09:54:43 25 chargeable offence.

26 MR BANGURA:

27 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Now, you were taken to Giema and
28 what did you do at Giema?

29 A. Still charging batteries together with - or under one

1 operator, Sergeant Murphy. Eddie Murphy.

2 Q. And how long were you with Sergeant Eddie Murphy at Giema?

3 A. Two-and-a-half months, about that.

4 Q. And did you go anywhere from there?

09:55:12 5 A. Yes, sir. From there we crossed - we started manoeuvring
6 to go to Paema.

7 Q. Now when you say you started manoeuvring, can you be more
8 specific as to what your activities were?

9 A. Well, we were called on a muster parade and we were told
09:55:32 10 that we were heading for another target. We were setting for the
11 target.

12 Q. Now Sergeant Eddie Murphy that you mentioned that you were
13 working with, to which unit did he belong?

14 A. To the signal unit; that is the communication department.

09:55:50 15 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I am sorry to interrupt again.
16 My reading of the transcript the witness said when he was in his
17 village he was arrested by "a certain group" and we have Sergeant
18 Eddie Murphy in the signal unit and I am not sure if he is RUF at
19 this point. I understand it is counsel's examination, but there
09:56:21 20 is no indication of which group the witness was reinstated into
21 after he was arrested in his village.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, thank you, Mr Anyah. I think that
23 is a valid observation, Mr Bangura. Please clarify that.

24 MR BANGURA:

09:56:40 25 Q. Mr Witness, let me take you back briefly. When you were at
26 your village you said you got captured by a group of soldiers
27 because you were AWOL; you were away from your station without
28 leave. Now these soldiers, which group did they belong to?

29 A. The RUF. To the RUF. And when I was taken to Giema with

1 all the presentation of my document they told me, no, I was to be
2 reassigned.

3 Q. And the description of your activities and your movement
4 that you have given thus far, within what group were you as you
09:57:30 5 went through these activities? These movements?

6 A. Still under the RUF. The command of the RUF.

7 Q. Thank you. Now Sergeant Eddie Murphy, what nationality was
8 he?

9 A. A Sierra Leonean. He was also captured and trained. He
09:57:53 10 was now referred to as a junior commando, because they told us on
11 the training base that on the base we are recruits and after
12 graduation we are no longer recruits but junior commandos. So,
13 we had three sets: (1) Special Forces; (2) Vanguard; and the
14 junior commandos.

09:58:15 15 Q. Thank you. Now you were explaining about your movement, or
16 you said you manoeuvred - from Giema you manoeuvred to go
17 somewhere else. Can you explain exactly what you meant by
18 manoeuvring?

19 A. There was no free road leading to the point we were heading
09:58:42 20 for, meaning we were given the responsibility to bypass certain
21 targets and some other targets to attack and conceal ourselves
22 when there is heavy target on the road. So, that I meant by
23 manoeuvring.

24 Q. So, where were you assigned to go to?

09:59:04 25 A. We were commanded to go to Tongo and there was a ground
26 referred to as the combat camp and that was Paema. There we
27 headed for.

28 Q. Who gave this command?

29 A. It was Mosquito.

1 Q. And where did he give you this command?

2 A. In Giema.

3 Q. About what time are we talking about, Mr Witness? What
4 year was this?

09:59:38 5 A. This was in 1993, some time in 1993.

6 Q. Now Mosquito, did he have another name?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. What other name did he have?

9 A. Sam Bockarie.

09:59:53 10 Q. Thank you. Did you get to Paema?

11 A. Yes, sir, we got there. We spent some time in Paema and
12 from there we were authorised to move to Boajibu to Kangari
13 Hills.

14 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Boajibu --

10:00:16 15 THE WITNESS: We travelled through Boajibu, heading for
16 Kangari Hills.

17 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Boajibu is B-O-A-J-I-B-U:

18 Q. At this time, what was Mosquito's position?

19 A. He was just a strong fighter. He was just a strong

10:00:38 20 fighter. In fact at that time there was no proper structure.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I mean giving promotions of ranks, no.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, did you get to Kangari Hills eventually?

24 A. Yes, sir. We spent some time on the way manoeuvring to get
10:00:57 25 to Kangari Hills, yes, sir.

26 Q. Do you recall when you got to Kangari Hills?

27 A. This was in 1994.

28 Q. Can you say about what time in 1994? Early, middle, late?

29 A. Early. Early.

1 Q. Now, do you recall who was the commander that led your
2 group to Kangari Hills?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Who?

10:01:28 5 A. CO Mohammed. Mohammed Tarawalli, alias Zino.

6 Q. Now, when you got to Kangari Hills what was your - what was
7 the focus of your mission to Kangari Hills?

8 A. This Kangari Hills I am talking about is situated between
9 Makali and Masingbi - Matotoka and Masingbi. So whilst in

10:02:00 10 Kangari Hills we were getting instructions from Corporal Sankoh
11 to set ambushes on the highway and to stop all vehicles
12 travelling either from Freetown, or Makeni Way to Kono, or from
13 Kono way to Makeni, but in Kangari Hills at first I was assigned
14 to a unit called G4 since I was unable to travel far distance.

10:02:33 15 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, let me deal with some spellings
16 briefly. Matotoka is M-A-T-O-T-O-K-A and Makali is M-A-K-A-L-I-E
17 [sic]:

18 Q. Now Kangari Hills, do you know what district of Sierra
19 Leone that is?

10:02:54 20 A. Yes, sir, that is found in the Tonkolili District.

21 Q. And you said you were assigned to the G4 unit?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. What did the G4 unit do? What was its responsibility?

24 A. The G4 unit was responsible to take care of ammunitions.

10:03:17 25 Q. How long did you work with this unit?

26 A. Briefly and I was appointed by a friend. In fact this
27 appointment was in my absence. Somebody recommended me that
28 since I can read and write with regards announcement made by the
29 signal unit Captain Nya I was recommended to undertake that

1 training, the signal training.

2 Q. Mr Witness, it is not entirely clear what you have said.

3 You said you were recommended. You also talked about

4 announcement made by the signal unit?

10:04:01 5 A. Okay. Captain Nya made an announcement at the muster
6 parade that they needed manpower to be trained so as to increase
7 the number of operators in the jungle because they would like
8 base operators and operators to be sent on mobile operations, so
9 based on that a friend, or a comrade recommended me to be one of
10:04:29 10 those people to be trained as signal radio operators.

11 Q. Okay. Mr Witness, you have mentioned the name Captain Nya.
12 Did he go by any - was that his full name?

13 A. Nya Nissar. N-Y-A, Nya, N-I-S-S-A-R, Nissar.

14 Q. Okay. Do you know what nationality Nya was?

10:04:59 15 A. Nya told us he was a Liberian, in fact a Mano by tribe.

16 Q. What role or what responsibility did Nya have at that time?

17 A. At that time he was the overall signal commander of the
18 RUF.

19 Q. You say that he made an announcement requiring the training
10:05:28 20 of more operators. What operators?

21 A. Radio operators.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Signal.

24 Q. Did you get into training as a radio operator?

10:05:42 25 A. Yes, I did. I was commanded by the unit commander of G4
26 upon the recommendation made by Gebeh.

27 Q. Who was the unit commander of the G4?

28 A. G4 unit commander was Saddam. Saddam was the G4 unit
29 commander at that time.

1 Q. Did Saddam have another name?

2 A. Saddam is the only name I know or I knew him by.

3 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, the witness mentioned the name
4 Gebeh. That is G-E-B-E-H. It should be spelt G-E-B-E-H. Saddam
10:06:32 5 should be spelt as one word.

6 Q. Was that his proper name or was that an alias?

7 A. An alias. In fact when we were in the jungle we had just
8 nicknames. The actual names came up after we had left the
9 jungle.

10:06:56 10 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I will spell that S-A-D-D-A-M:

11 Q. Where was the training taking place?

12 A. Within Kangari Hills, because up the hill of course at some
13 point in time we went under attack by the jet bomber so we had to
14 dissolve that particular hill and to another location but still
10:07:22 15 within that jungle.

16 Q. Were there other persons with you who were training?

17 A. Yes, sir. Myself, Moses Sama Samba, Sebatu alias
18 Competent, Sahr alias Oxygen, Banko and Versatile.

19 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Can you help us spell some of these
10:07:57 20 names that you have called?

21 A. For Moses, M-O-S-E-S, Sama, S-A-M-A, Samba, S-A-M-B-A.

22 Moses Sama Samba, that is one name. And Banko, B-A-N-Q-U-O or
23 B-A-N-K-O, whichever way.

24 Q. And Sebatu?

10:08:29 25 A. S-E-B-A-T-U alias Competent.

26 Q. Thank you. Now you mentioned a jet bomber bombing your
27 position?

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, is it Combatant or Competent?

29 THE WITNESS: Competent. Alias Competent. But before that

1 time there were other operators. One Waco-Waco. Cristo [phon]
2 the Eddie Murphy I spoke about earlier, and Alice Pyne and one Pa
3 Sombi alias Trouble Fall Down.

4 MR BANGURA:

10:09:03 5 Q. Can you spell Sombi?

6 A. S-O-M-B-I.

7 Q. You also mentioned Waco-Waco can you spell that?

8 A. W-A-C-O - W-A-C-O.

9 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: There was a Versatile or something like
10:09:21 10 that?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, Versatile.

12 MR BANGURA:

13 Q. Whose alias was Versatile?

14 A. Something Si aka.

10:09:38 15 MR BANGURA: Alice, your Honours, is A-L-I-C-E:

16 Q. You mentioned something about a jet bomber bombing your
17 position. Do you recall that?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Which jet bomber was this?

10:09:58 20 A. I really cannot tell anything much about the jet bomber.
21 All that happened was that the particular position we were came
22 under attack and the bombing took place. So we had to dissolve
23 and really I could not really see any kind of writing to say
24 I can really recognise and say this is the particular jet bomber
10:10:30 25 that bombarded our position.

26 Q. How long was your training at Kangari Hills?

27 A. I think about three months.

28 Q. And did you go anywhere after that?

29 A. Yes, sir. After training for three months Captain Nya

1 informed the leader that he had started training some operators
2 and the leader, Corporal Sankoh, requested that all of us should
3 be transferred to his location at Zogoda. So Captain Nya ordered
4 us to manoeuvre to Zogoda.

10:11:11 5 Q. Where was Zogoda?

6 A. Zogoda was located in Kenema District. That is in the
7 Kambui Hills. That was along the Moa riverbank. That was
8 somewhere around Jui Koya.

9 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Jui Koya is J-U-I K-O-Y-A, two
10:11:38 10 separate words:

11 Q. Now did you go to Zogoda?

12 A. Yes, sir. We went. We manoeuvred to Zogoda.

13 Q. When you got to Zogoda what activities did you get into?

14 A. We were still to continue the training, but besides we were
10:12:04 15 commanded to move around in search of food.

16 Q. Who was conducting your training at Zogoda?

17 A. Corporal Sankoh, the leader himself and one Tucker, Pa
18 Tucker, a retired lieutenant.

19 Q. A retired lieutenant from which --

10:12:26 20 A. The Sierra Leone Army.

21 Q. Thank you. How long further did you train - did you
22 continue to train as a radio operator?

23 A. I think about six months, six months, and the six added to
24 the three previously undertaken in Kangari Hills went up to nine
10:12:47 25 months.

26 Q. Do you recall when you completed your training, about what
27 time?

28 A. I think this was late 1995 to early 1996.

29 Q. After your training were you deployed anywhere?

1 A. Yes, sir. I was assigned at Zogoda itself which was the
2 headquarters station for the RUF.

3 Q. What about your colleagues with whom you were training?
4 Were they assigned to other locations as well?

10:13:22 5 A. Yes, sir. Like Versatile, he was sent to Paema. Banko of
6 course was still assigned to the headquarters. After some time
7 he was posted to Kori bundu jungle. Elevation was posted to
8 Gandorhun. The one other Jestina was also posted to Kenema
9 bypass and others I cannot recall.

10:13:55 10 Q. Thank you. Your Honours, I see the name Jestina did not
11 come up at all --

12 A. These friends I am talking about, we met on training in
13 Zogoda. We came and joined them in Zogoda and we were all
14 trained together by Corporal Sankoh and Pa Tucker.

10:14:18 15 Q. So you are saying, Mr Witness, that your group that came
16 from Kangari Hills met up with another group at Zogoda?

17 A. Correct, exactly so.

18 Q. In total how many of you were trained at Zogoda, do you
19 recall? You don't have to name all the names, just the number if
10:14:38 20 you can recall?

21 A. Allow me to think. There were nine, about that.

22 Q. Thank you. Your Honours, the name Jestina did not come up.

23 It is J-E-S-T-I-N-A.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is this the person posted to Kenema
10:15:08 25 bypass?

26 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

27 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Justina?

28 THE WITNESS: Jestina.

29 MR BANGURA:

1 Q. Now at the Zogoda base where you were posted who did you
2 work with?

3 A. The station sergeant was Zedman, but operating directly
4 under Corporal Sankoh.

10:15:37 5 Q. Did Zedman have another name?

6 A. Sahr James.

7 Q. How long did you stay at Zogoda working at that base?

8 A. From the time I arrived in Zogoda I remained in Zogoda
9 until the last day our position was overrun by the Kamajors and
10:16:05 10 we were beaten in Zogoda in the year 1996.

11 Q. Do you recall the month?

12 A. Late, November to December, somewhere around that.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And we were forced to pull out of - pull out from Zogoda
10:16:27 15 and the commander we had there was alias Zino, so he commanded
16 everybody to manoeuvre to Burkina and that was Giema.

17 Q. Burkina you say is Giema and that is in what district?

18 A. Kailahun District. Corporal Sankoh left us in Zogoda for
19 peace talks in Yamoussoukro. So after his departure Mohamed
10:17:03 20 alias Zino came to take care of his post, so Corporal Sankoh left
21 us under the command of Mohamed Zino, so we operated under the
22 command of Mohamed Zino.

23 Q. Do you recall when Corporal Sankoh left the base to go for
24 peace talks?

10:17:17 25 A. I think that was in 1996. I can recall 1996.

26 Q. You don't recall the month? Are you able to recall the
27 month?

28 A. I cannot recall really.

29 Q. Okay. Do you know where he went?

1 A. We communicated with ICRC who were to provide a flight for
2 his movement to Yamoussoukro and that is Cote D'Ivoire.

3 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Yamoussoukro is
4 Y-A-M-A-S-S-O-U-K-R-O:

10:18:11 5 Q. Now, you said you were pushed out of Zogoda and you went -
6 and you went to what is the --

7 A. To Giema. We manoeuvred to Giema.

8 Q. To Giema.

9 A. Yes, sir. We were moving in a large group, but whilst
10 manoeuvring that group was destabilised by the Kamajors and so we
11 had to move in smaller numbers, but I manoeuvred to get to Giema.

12 Q. Now, you said your commander at this time was Mohamed Zino
13 Tarawalli?

14 A. Yes, sir.

10:18:50 15 Q. Now, did anything happen to him in the course of the period
16 that you were retreating from Zogoda?

17 A. He went at large and from that time nobody knows his
18 whereabouts.

19 Q. Now, when you got to Giema what did you do there?

10:19:14 20 A. In Giema I arrived, I was briefly arrested and questioned
21 by the MPs to give account of the communication materials like
22 the radio set, the satellite and the fax machine, because we had
23 satellite phone and fax machine which were brought by Zedman Sahr
24 James from Yamoussoukro. He brought those materials to enhance
10:19:45 25 smooth communication. When we manoeuvred we were unable to cross
26 with all those devices, so when I got to Giema I was arrested and
27 questioned to give account of those materials and I explained the
28 impossibilities of carrying those materials to that location.

29 Q. Thank you. Now, you just mentioned that Zedman had brought

1 these materials - had brought a satellite phone and a fax machine
2 from Yamoussoukro. Can you explain how this came about?

3 A. Before their movement to Yamoussoukro a new code was
4 prepared, which meant the old testament was to be discarded.

10:20:31 5 Q. Can you be clear about what you mean by new code and an old
6 testament?

7 A. Let us say, for example, this particular code is created
8 and it is to be used for a specified number of times. When that
9 time expires, we now refer to that code as the old testament and
10:20:50 10 the new one will now be referred to as the new testament.

11 Q. Now when you say code, what did you use the code for?

12 A. The code was used as a means to communicate, and really
13 since no frequency is invulnerable they strategised the use of
14 the code that what we put on the air will not be monitored by any
10:21:19 15 other forces.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, you were talking of a new code being
17 developed at the time that the group was leaving for
18 Yamoussoukro. What happened at this time?

19 A. Sahr James was supposed to take the code along with him,
10:21:40 20 but he was not that much au fait with the code and so he left it.
21 He was still using the old code and so whilst in Abidjan, talking
22 about secret matters, he was exposing security. So Corporal
23 Sankoh thought it wise that instead of using the old code, and
24 that was creating insecurity, he decided to purchase another
10:22:06 25 device which he thought was safer for communications, and he was
26 given a satellite phone and a fax machine. That was handed over
27 to alias Zino in Zogoda, so communication went between Zino and
28 Corporal Sankoh through the satellite phone and the fax machine.

29 Q. Now, you tried to explain that the Sahr James - I am

1 Looking at what you have just said. You said that "Sahr James
2 was supposed to take the code along with him, but he was not much
3 ..." and I heard you say "... au fait ...", but that does not
4 come up here, "... with the code". What do you mean he was not
10:22:50 5 au fait?

6 A. He was not really trained to use the code, because the code
7 was prepared in Kangari Hills. So whilst coming Captain Nya, our
8 overall commander, gave us the code to be handed over to the
9 station sergeant in Zogoda. We knew the code, but when we got to
10:23:11 10 Zogoda he did not listen to us to teach him the code with the
11 notion that he was superior to us. He was supposed to have taken
12 that code, but whilst going he left the code. He was still using
13 the old code creating insecurity.

14 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Your Honours, I see on the record
10:23:31 15 au fait comes up consistently spelt in a different way. It is a
16 French - I think a French word. Fait is F-A-I-T, not F-A-T-E:

17 Q. Now after your arrest at Giema, did anything happen next?

18 A. I made them to understand that my health was not too good
19 and I should be given a chance to cure myself, so I went to the
10:24:04 20 combat medic and I was given treatment and from there I was
21 posted back to Buedu. Whilst in Buedu, at some point in time
22 I received the message and took the message to Sam Bockarie and
23 the matter came up again.

24 Q. You said that you received the message. Which message did
10:24:26 25 you receive?

26 A. Mining was going on somewhere around Koidu and the Guinean
27 forces went there and opened fire on the miners, so the message
28 came explaining that situation and so I had to rush up to Sam
29 Bockarie to give him the message. So he read the message on my

1 way coming back and he said, "Come, come, come. There is
2 something we have to discuss about you". He said, "We have still
3 not forgotten you need to give account of those devices that you
4 left behind in Zogoda".

10:24:58 5 Q. And this was who was talking to you?

6 A. Sam Bockarie.

7 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, at the beginning of that answer
8 from the witness he said "mining", but what comes up is "many".

9 THE WITNESS: No, the message I received --

10:25:15 10 MR BANGURA: Hold on. Hold on.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause, Mr Witness. I heard "mining".

12 THE WITNESS: Mining. He asked me about the sort of
13 message that I took to Sam Bockarie.

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Also the witness I think mentioned his
10:25:28 15 health was not good, but the record shows his head was not good.

16 THE WITNESS: My health.

17 MR BANGURA:

18 Q. Now, did you get assigned - you said you were at Buedu.

19 Did you get assigned elsewhere apart from Buedu?

10:25:51 20 A. From 1996 I remained in Buedu until some time in 1997, when
21 the AFRC took over power in Freetown.

22 Q. And at the time that you were in Buedu, who did you work
23 with?

24 A. I worked with Sam Bockarie. He was the immediate
10:26:13 25 commander. Of course we had General Issa Sesay there as well,
26 but at that time he was not a general.

27 Q. You worked with Sam Bockarie as in what capacity?

28 A. I was a radio operator under the command of one station
29 commander called Fidel. Fidel Castro.

1 Q. Now Fidel Castro, was that his actual name?

2 A. That was the name I knew him by.

3 Q. Now, you mentioned just a short while ago about mining that
4 was going on in Koindu. Am I correct?

10:26:52 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. What sort of mining was going on in Koindu at this time?

7 A. Diamond mining.

8 Q. And you mentioned something about Guineans?

9 A. Yes, the Guineans opened fire on the miners. So the
10:27:07 10 message came and that was the message I took to Sam Bockarie, and
11 the problem of leaving satellite phone and fax machine behind
12 came up.

13 Q. Who was doing this mining at Koindu?

14 A. There was a particular group set referred to as mining unit
10:27:28 15 and that comprises civilians and some other armed men. The armed
16 men were there to provide security for them.

17 Q. These armed men belonged to which group?

18 A. To the RUF.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, you said that you served in this capacity
10:27:49 20 as operator working with Sam Bockarie until the coup in - when
21 was the coup?

22 A. That was in 1997.

23 Q. And did your assignment change after the coup?

24 A. I was only sent to go down to Kono to receive acid.

10:28:13 25 Q. Now just before we talk about you moving down to Kono, as a
26 result of the coup were there any changes in the deployment
27 arrangements of the RUF, do you recall?

28 A. Yes, sir. We had a - or there was another group of RUF
29 fighters in Malal Hill, that is the western jungle, and the

1 commander was Superman. He was ordered by Sam Bockarie, alias
2 Mosquito, to move to Freetown.

3 Q. Now just before you continue which district, if you can
4 tell, was this location Malal Hill?

10:28:55 5 A. I was only told there was a group of RUF fighters in Malal
6 Hill and that was referred to as the western jungle.

7 Q. Okay. And you said they were ordered to move down to
8 Freetown?

9 A. To Freetown. And another group in the Kangari Hills around
10:29:13 10 there, commanded by Morris Kallon, was also ordered to move down
11 to Makeni, and Sam Bockarie together with Issa Sesay themselves
12 moved to Daru onwards to Kenema via Freetown.

13 Q. At this time, where was Issa Sesay before the - just before
14 the coup?

10:29:36 15 A. He was in Buedu, together with Sam Bockarie.

16 Q. Thank you. Were there any other movements that you recall?

17 A. They all moved to - Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie moved to
18 Kenema, then Issa Sesay travelled down to Freetown to join forces
19 with Superman while Sam Bockarie stayed in Kenema.

10:29:58 20 Q. Thank you. Now you said that yourself, where did you -
21 where were you during the course of the junta period?

22 A. I was communicating up to --

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: We have not had that word yet,
24 Mr Bangura.

10:30:15 25 MR BANGURA: I am sorry, your Honour.

26 THE WITNESS: I was commanded to go to Kono to receive
27 acid.

28 MR BANGURA:

29 Q. Can I rephrase this question, Mr Witness.

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Now during this period after the coup by the AFRC, where
3 were you?

10:30:40

4 A. Before the coup I was in Buedu and, after the coup took
5 place, not up to a month I was commanded to move down to Kono to
6 collect acid.

10:31:07

7 Q. Now, as a result of the coup you said that there was
8 movement of RUF personnel and you have mentioned Bockarie moving
9 down to Kenema and Issa Sesay to Freetown. Now that period that
10 the military government was in office, do you recall what you
11 called that period?

12 A. That was the junta period.

10:31:27

13 Q. The junta period, thank you. And you said that you were at
14 Buedu and you at one point moved from Buedu. Where did you go
15 to?

16 A. I moved down to Daru, some time in Daru, and then proceeded
17 to Kenema. Anyway I was travelling to Kono, but through
18 Kenema --

19 MR ANYAH: Madam President --

10:31:41

20 THE WITNESS: -- since the road was blocked.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Pause, Mr Witness.

22 Mr Anyah.

10:31:53

23 MR ANYAH: Yes, I just make an observation and leave it to
24 the Chamber if it wishes to intervene. On several occasions this
25 morning the witness has on his own initiated evidence while
26 counsel has discontinued questioning and I just point it out to
27 the Chamber. I have noticed it on several occasions where he
28 just continues in a narrative form without a question pending.

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Well I have observed before it is for the

1 Prosecution to run their case, Mr Anyah.

2 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, besides I believe --

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think there is anything erroneous
4 in that.

10:32:18 5 MR BANGURA: I believe also there is a principle of orality
6 by which other than what the witness may have disclosed in
7 previous statements he is free to by recall to --

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: I have not challenged you, Mr Bangura.

9 MR BANGURA: Thank you. I take the point, your Honour.

10:32:33 10 Thank you:

11 Q. Yes, you were about explaining your movement from Buedu at
12 one point during the period of junta rule. Why did you - first
13 of all, why did you leave Buedu?

14 A. I was commanded to go to Kono to receive acid.

10:32:59 15 Q. Who commanded you?

16 A. The overall commander, Mohamed Kabbah Tourist, alias
17 Tourist.

18 Q. Yes. And what was this acid for?

19 A. The acid was to be used to energise the car batteries which
10:33:16 20 we were using and the car batteries were providing us current for
21 the operation of the radio sets.

22 Q. And how did you travel to Kono from Buedu?

23 A. To Daru and through Kenema. I spent some time in Kenema.
24 I think about 10 days in Kenema where I met Sam Bockarie.

10:33:42 25 Q. You eventually got to Kono?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. About what time was this?

28 A. That was in the rainy season, the rainy season of 1997.

29 Q. Who were you to collect the acid from in Kono?

1 A. From the station commander in Kono, Ngaiya, that was
2 Captain Nya.

3 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I am looking for the spelling of
4 Ngaiya.

10:34:18 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we had it before. It should be
6 on record.

7 MR BANGURA:

8 Q. Where was Ngaiya?

9 A. Ngaiya is located in Kono District.

10:34:28 10 Q. Which part of Kono District?

11 A. If you are moving from Makeni and just after Bumpe, the
12 other section is Ngaiya. Ngaiya is situated somewhere by Yengema
13 where you have the airfield.

14 Q. You were to collect this acid from who was it?

10:34:56 15 A. From CO Nya.

16 Q. Did anything happen when you got to Kono, to Ngaiya?

17 A. When I got to Ngaiya I reported to CO Nya and there was
18 another sergeant called King Perry so he told me - he commanded
19 me to move down to Koidu, the township of Koidu, and whilst in
10:35:20 20 Koidu he told me that he had a certain group of men who were
21 staying with him and he had established some kind of mining, so
22 he took me to the site and I was there to oversee what was taking
23 place there.

24 Q. This sergeant who you mentioned King Perry, what was his
10:35:40 25 role in Kono? What duties did he perform there?

26 A. He was also a signal personnel, but he left Makeni and came
27 down to Kono. There I met him. So when I arrived at Kono he
28 told me that we should move down to the mining site.

29 Q. Now when you moved down to the mining site in Koidu did

1 anything happen there?

2 A. Yes, I was with him. In the morning we used to go to the
3 station. After transmitting message then we moved down to the
4 site.

10:36:21 5 Q. Did you go back to Buedu from this mission that you were
6 sent on?

7 A. I remained in Kono until 1998 after the ECOMOG
8 intervention, so I travelled back to Buedu.

9 Q. So during this period that you were in Kono what were you
10:36:42 10 engaged in?

11 A. I was communicating and at the same time overseeing mining.

12 Q. In the mining activity you were engaged in who was it for,
13 for whose benefit was it?

14 A. There was another - there was one pit meant for the RUF and
10:37:02 15 the other pit meant for the sergeant I was working with.

16 Q. So in your case specifically who was taking the benefit of
17 the diamonds that you were mining?

18 A. For the sergeant's pit it was private, but for the other
19 government pit it was for the RUF and that was commanded by one
10:37:27 20 Captain Moriba.

21 Q. Now you said you went back to Buedu in 1998?

22 A. 1998, yes, sir.

23 Q. When in 1998?

24 A. I think some time in February.

10:37:42 25 Q. Do you recall under what circumstances you moved from Kono
26 and go back to Buedu?

27 A. After the intervention - ECOMOG intervention in Freetown we
28 had a commander - there was the overall commander in Kono called
29 Gullit, he was the PLO-2. So he commanded everybody to move down

1 to Buedu. But before that time he called a muster parade at
2 Lebanon, there is a section in Kono called Lebanon, and ordered
3 one Operation Pay Yourself and the Captain Moriba who was in
4 charge of mining operations kicked against the idea saying that
10:38:28 5 we had spent so many time - in fact much time with the people in
6 Kono, there was no need vandalising or looting their property.
7 But Gullit insisted that that operation be carried out and that
8 operation was carried out and he ordered everybody to pull out.

9 So whilst communicating with the station in Buedu that we
10:38:55 10 were about to pull out I received a call from across the other
11 side that was Base 1 enquiring why we are pulling out from Kono
12 whilst others are still in Makeni and some other areas towards
13 Freetown. Then Gullit responded that I should tell the station
14 that he had something very much important to discuss with Sam
10:39:23 15 Bockarie, so he insisted that everybody should pull out. So we
16 set in for Buedu.

17 MR BANGURA: Now, your Honours, I will deal with some
18 spellings first. Moriba is M-0-R-I-B-A. Lebanon is the name of
19 the country Lebanon. That's a section in Koidu. The other word
10:39:50 20 is the position of Gullit:

21 Q. Mr Witness, I will get you to say again, what was the
22 position of Gullit?

23 A. PLO-2.

24 Q. I see that come up as P level 2. That should be the
10:40:05 25 letters PLO-2. Now you mentioned that Gullit ordered an
26 operation which he called?

27 A. Pay yourself.

28 Q. What was the intent and purpose of that operation? What
29 exactly --

1 A. That Kono was to be looted. He hadn't anything to pay the
2 soldiers but there were to move around around to pay themselves by
3 taking or looting whatever they were able to.

4 Q. You also mentioned something about communications just
10:40:42 5 before you left, or as you were leaving you received
6 communication from the other side. What do you mean?

7 A. Yes, sir, from Base 1 because they were monitoring our
8 radio net and of course we are almost on the same net.

9 Q. Hold on. What do you mean when you say Base 1?

10:41:02 10 A. Base 1 is a radio set assigned to Benjamin D Yeaten, that
11 is the SSS director of Liberia, and that station is situated in
12 Congo Town just by White Flower and that is the special residence
13 of the President Charles Taylor of Liberia.

14 Q. How do you know that these - I will get back to this, but
10:41:31 15 how do you know that this radio was based in Liberia?

16 A. I went to Liberia myself. I crossed into Liberia myself
17 and stayed there until some time 2001.

18 Q. This was not immediately at that time, correct?

19 A. No.

10:41:51 20 Q. Now, you said "the other side", you used the words "the
21 other side", what do you mean?

22 A. When we said the other side - when we were in Sierra Leone
23 if we say the other side we were talking about Liberia and in
24 Liberia again when we talk about the other side we are talking
10:42:08 25 about Sierra Leone.

26 Q. Thank you. I will come back to the radio communication
27 system that you have already mentioned. Now did you move
28 eventually to Buedu?

29 A. Yes, sir. I moved to Kailahun at first in 72 hours. From

1 Koidu, that is Kono, got to Kailahun. Then Gullit left us in
2 Kailahun and moved up to Buedu. Then the following day we saw
3 him on board a vehicle together with Sam Bockarie and they told
4 us they were moving down to Daru. From that time I never set
10:42:52 5 eyes on him again.

6 Q. Now you mentioned that the next day you saw him in a
7 vehicle with Sam Bockarie. Where was Sam Bockarie at this time?

8 A. Sam Bockarie came from Buedu. Just after the intervention
9 Sam Bockarie retreated immediately to Buedu. There he was a
10:43:15 10 resident. There he was based.

11 Q. So by the time you got back to Buedu Sam Bockarie was in
12 Buedu, is that right?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Now when you got to Buedu did anything happen?

10:43:34 15 A. Yes, sir. In Buedu as we arrived Sam Bockarie called a
16 muster parade right to the MP and told us that he was promoted to
17 the rank of a general. He said, and I quote, "I am now a
18 general. Everybody should take instructions from me." And he
19 said that he had been promoted by the chief, Charles Taylor, to
10:44:03 20 the rank of a general. We saw him with the new combat fatigue
21 and with insignia of a general with the military vehicle. So he
22 addressed us and told us we should work together. But just after
23 that the station commander who ordered me to go in search of acid
24 but failed to report on time ordered my arrest and I was arrested
10:44:31 25 by the MPs and locked up.

26 Q. Now just back to the parade that you said Sam Bockarie
27 addressed, did he tell you how he had come to be promoted?

28 A. He explained to us in the muster parade. He told us that
29 he was not any other lieutenant colonel again or any colonel but

1 a full general. "I have been promoted by the chief so I am now a
2 general."

3 Q. When you say the chief who was he referring to?

10:45:15

4 A. To Charles Taylor. He said the chief Taylor. He said,
5 "I am just here from the other side." He said, "Now I am a
6 general."

7 Q. When he said "the other side" where was he referring to?

8 A. Liberia.

9 Q. You mentioned a jeep - a vehicle, a military vehicle?

10:45:28

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. What kind of vehicle was it?

12 A. A jeep, a military jeep. He said that was what the chief
13 gave him.

14 Q. You also mentioned that he was wearing --

10:45:43

15 A. A military fatigue.

16 Q. Military fatigue. Did you recognise that? Was this part
17 of the normal uniform that the RUF wore at the time?

18 A. At that time RUF hadn't any uniform. Of course the
19 combatant used to wear whatever military fatigue they were able

10:46:04

20 to capture and that type of military fatigue I saw with Sam
21 Bockarie was the one later on I saw with the ATUs when I crossed
22 into Liberia.

23 Q. When you say the ATUs, who were the ATUs?

10:46:24

24 A. There was a unit in Liberia referred to as ATU. That was
25 the Anti-Terrorist Unit. Those were bodyguards to the President
26 Charles Taylor at that time I went there.

27 Q. And the rank which you say Bockarie was wearing, was this
28 the same rank - had he been wearing that rank before?

29 A. No, no, sir.

1 Q. Now at Buedu what duties did you perform?

2 A. I did not spend much time in Buedu. After my release I was
3 posted to another target called Sengema. Sengema was a crossing
4 point.

10:47:01 5 Q. Can you spell Sengema?

6 A. S-E-N-G-E-M-A.

7 Q. Continue, please.

8 A. Sengema was a crossing point situated between the Moa River
9 and Sandaru. There I was posted.

10:47:22 10 Q. Now do you remember in which district this location was?

11 A. Sengema is located in Kailahun District, but I suppose
12 Penguia chiefdom.

13 Q. Now what was the importance of Sengema?

14 A. Sengema was a base meant for provision of escort facility.

10:47:43 15 When commanders were moving from Kono to cross into Kailahun
16 Sengema provided manpower, armed men, to provide security escort
17 for the commander until he crossed into Kailahun. And so also
18 coming from Kailahun to Kono District. Sengema provided manpower
19 to come to the riverbank, the Moa River, to provide security.

10:48:16 20 Q. Do you recall in what chiefdom Sengema is?

21 A. In Penguia Chiefdom, I suppose.

22 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Penguia:

23 Q. Are you able to spell Penguia?

24 A. P-E-N-G-U-A [sic].

10:48:35 25 Q. Thank you. How long were you at Sengema?

26 A. I spent a short time in Sengema, I think about two to three
27 months.

28 Q. Did you get posted somewhere else?

29 A. Yes, sir, I was again called upon to report to Buedu for

1 operations.

2 Q. And back to Buedu, what role did you perform there?

3 A. I was still a radio operator. I was communicating still.

4 Q. Were you working alone as a radio operator?

10:49:04 5 A. No, I had some other senior radio operators like Ebony,
6 Mohamed Kabbah, Tolo - Osman Tolo - and Zedman Sahr James.

7 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Tolo is T-O-L-O:

8 Q. Ebony, did he have another name?

9 A. Sam Lamboi. Samuel Lamboi.

10:49:33 10 Q. Thank you. Now, were you assigned to any particular
11 commander at Buedu at this time?

12 A. To Sam Bockarie. I was appointed to Sam Bockarie.
13 Appointed - assigned to Sam Bockarie.

14 Q. Now, do you recall which particular radio you were
10:49:55 15 operating in Buedu at this time?

16 A. Sam Bockarie's radio, but the call sign was changing. For
17 example today it is Bravo Zulu 4, tomorrow it is Marvel and the
18 next day it is Planet 1. Just like that.

19 Q. At the particular time that you got - that you were sent
10:50:17 20 back from Sengema to Buedu, what was the call sign for Sam
21 Bockarie's radio?

22 A. Okay, it was Bravo Zulu 4.

23 Q. Bravo Zulu 4, is represented - is it represented by
24 letters?

10:50:38 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. So, what letters would it be?

27 A. BZ4.

28 Q. Thank you.

29 A. So, in communication at times we will refer to that as

1 Bravo Zulu 4.

2 Q. Thank you. Now, how long did you work with Sam Bockarie at
3 Buedu?

4 A. From that time I remained there operating or serving him
10:51:06 5 until some time in 1999, and I was appointed, or commanded, to
6 cross into Liberia.

7 Q. You say some time in 1999. Can you be more specific with
8 what period in 1999?

9 A. That was in the rainy season. The rainy season ranging
10:51:26 10 from June to July, somewhere within that.

11 Q. Around June/July of 1999?

12 A. 9.

13 Q. You said you were commanded to go to Liberia?

14 A. Yes, sir.

10:51:37 15 Q. Who commanded you to go to Liberia?

16 A. General Issa Sesay. Well, at that time he was not a
17 general anyway.

18 Q. Right. And where was Issa Sesay at this time?

19 A. He was in Buedu.

10:51:47 20 Q. What rank was he then?

21 A. He was a colonel, or a brigadier, or so. I can't recall
22 exactly the rank he was carrying at that time.

23 Q. And what was the purpose of your being assigned to Liberia?

24 A. I was to meet one Zigzag Marzah for smooth communications.
10:52:16 25 Zigzag was just to provide accommodations for us until 50 - there
26 was a man I was supposed to meet called 50. Zigzag was to
27 provide accommodation for us until 50 comes to collect us from
28 Foya.

29 Q. Now, first of all can you help us with Zigzag? Your

1 Honours, the name is Zigzag Marzah I believe.

2 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I think you should let the witness give
3 evidence.

4 MR BANGURA:

10:52:48 5 Q. Can you spell the name for us, please?

6 A. Marzah, Zigzag, something like that. You know, Liberians
7 have a very weak pronunciation. Zigzag Marzah.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Try to spell it, Mr Witness.

9 THE WITNESS: Z-I-G hyphen Z-I-G [sic] M-A-Z-D-A.

10:53:21 10 MR BANGURA:

11 Q. Thank you. Now, just before you tell us about - you also
12 mentioned 50. You said you were supposed to go and meet somebody
13 called 50?

14 A. Unit 50.

10:53:32 15 Q. Do you know who was this person called 50? Did the person
16 have another name?

17 A. In Buedu I was only told to meet Unit 50, but when
18 I crossed into Liberia a man came and told me he was called
19 Benjamin D Yeaten and that he was the SSS director of Liberia.

10:53:53 20 Q. And did he match the name, 50 is Benjamin Yeaten? Was it
21 the person you referred to as 50?

22 A. Yes, sir. That was his code name, Unit 50.

23 Q. When you say code name, in what circumstances or what
24 situation was this code name used for him?

10:54:12 25 A. When we were communicating and for security purposes,
26 instead of calling "SSS Director" we only called "Unit 50".

27 Q. Now before you moved over to Liberia, before you went on
28 this assignment, did you have --

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: We don't have a definition of what "SSS"

1 stands for, Mr Bangura.

2 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour:

3 Q. Can you tell the Court, Mr Witness, what those letters
4 stand for, "SSS"?

10:54:43 5 A. I suppose it should be Special Security Service.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. Triple S.

8 Q. And this was - this service, what was it?

9 A. Special Security Service to the President of Liberia,
10:55:01 10 Charles Taylor.

11 Q. Now before you moved to Liberia on this assignment, what
12 was the - was there any communication with Liberia at all from
13 Buedu while you were an operator there?

14 A. There was communication before us getting to the unit, or
10:55:26 15 let us say training as radio operators. There had been that
16 communication. In fact, when initially I was trained I was told
17 never to communicate with stations from Liberia and that it was
18 only the station sergeant who were mandated who had the authority
19 to communicate with stations from Liberia.

10:55:51 20 Q. And when you talk about when you were trained, you are
21 referring to your early days. Where was this?

22 A. That was from Zogoda. From Zogoda I was trained and
23 I started communicating, but I was told I am not to receive call
24 from Liberia, the other side, and of course there was a number of
10:56:15 25 calls from the Liberian stations, but I was mandated not to
26 receive those calls. So, whenever there was a call I had to rush
27 to call the station sergeant to talk with them.

28 Q. Okay. And when - up until the time you started working
29 with Sam Bockarie at Buedu, did you have the authority to

1 communicate with the other side?

2 A. When I got to Buedu it was at that time I was given the
3 authority to communicate.

10:56:52

4 Q. Now, which radios did you communicate with in Liberia on
5 the other side?

6 A. On the other side - before crossing there I was given a
7 radio set. I crossed into Liberia with a radio set. Of course,
8 when I arrived and 50 received me from Foya --

10:57:11

9 Q. Can I pause you. I think you are not actually answering
10 the question. Before you left to go to Liberia when you said at
11 some point at Buedu you had authority to communicate, you could
12 also communicate with the radios in Liberia. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, sir.

10:57:27

14 Q. Now which radios in Liberia, or which stations in Liberia,
15 would you communicate with at that time?

16 A. Call sign 020, 020, that was located at the Executive
17 Mansion Ground in Monrovia, and one call sign, Base 1, like
18 I said earlier, was located in Congo town at Benjamin D Yeaten's
19 residence. That is by White Flower and White Flower is the
20 personal residence of President Charles Taylor of Liberia.

10:57:56

21 Q. Thank you. Before these - before this time when you could
22 communicate to 020 and Base 1, was there any radio - any other
23 radio - that you communicated with in Liberia?

10:58:29

24 A. Yes, there was also another radio station located in Foya.
25 That is Foxtrot Yankee as we referred to.

26 Q. So, at the point of your assignment to Liberia there were -
27 (your Honours, my attention has just been called to the spelling
28 for Foxtrot. Foxtrot Yankee.)

29 THE WITNESS: We just say "FY" and we were referring to

1 Foya, F-0-Y-A-H [sic], but in communication parlance we referred
2 to that as "Foxtrot Yankee". That is "FY".

3 MR BANGURA: It should be F-0-X-T-R-0-T, one word, and then
4 Yankee:

10:59:09 5 Q. So, when you got to Liberia and you said somebody who
6 answered to the name Unit 50 met you. Is that correct?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. And this person was Benjamin Yeaten?

9 A. Benjamin Yeaten.

10:59:29 10 Q. Right. Now, what was your role in Liberia briefly?

11 A. It was to receive and transmit messages, receive messages
12 from Sierra Leone and from Issa Sesay and Mosquito and relay it
13 to Benjamin D Yeaten in Liberia and to receive messages again
14 from Benjamin D Yeaten and transmit it to Issa Sesay and General
10:59:57 15 Sam Bockarie in Sierra Leone.

16 Q. Now, how long were you in Liberia on this assignment?

17 A. From that time I remained in Liberia until the year 2001,
18 late. We were hunted for. There was an allegation made against
19 me that they heard a Sierra Leonean voice communicating with the
11:00:22 20 Kamajors in Sierra Leone, so I was accused. I was the only
21 person at that time on the front line, a Sierra Leonean,
22 communicating on the radio, so I knew it was dangerous for my
23 life and the only way to save my health was to retreat and that
24 was what I did.

11:00:41 25 Q. And so you returned from Liberia finally when?

26 A. Some time 2001, late.

27 Q. Late 2001?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 Q. And following that did you do anything else within the RUF?

1 A. From that time I went briefly to Tongo, where I was beaten
2 and I had to retreat hastily to join the DDR.

3 Q. DDR is the?

4 A. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

11:01:19 5 Q. And when was this?

6 A. 2001.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, let me take you back again on some of the
8 locations that you were during the course of your career with the
9 RUF. You mentioned that you had training at Kangari Hills

11:01:43 10 briefly and then later at Zogoda as a radio operator. Can you
11 describe the nature of the training as a radio operator at
12 Zogoda?

13 A. In Zogoda I was trained in: (1) procedure, (2) prosigns,
14 (3) codifications and (4) the operation of the device, the radio

11:02:10 15 I mean. The operation of the radio itself, how to tune the
16 radio.

17 Q. During the course --

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, some of the words were
19 indiscernible. What was the second one? After procedure he said
20 something.

11:02:27 21 THE WITNESS: Prosigns. Pro, P-R-0, S-I-G-N-S. Prosigns.

22 MR BANGURA:

23 Q. Now, what do you mean by prosigns?

24 A. For example, there was what we call NIS, that was the net
11:02:45 25 identification sign. While communicating if I say "over" the
26 interpretation of "over" is that that is the end of my
27 transmission and I need your response. When I said "out" that is
28 the end of my transmission and I need no response from you.

29 Whilst communicating - transmitting a message, when I said "Roger

1 so far" it means I have communicated or transmitted so far and
2 I have given you a chance to receive and maybe respond, but there
3 are still more pieces of information to follow.

11:03:24 4 Q. During the course of your training, both at Kangari Hills
5 and Zogoda, did you keep notes of the instructions that were
6 given to you?

7 A. Yes, sir. I had my notebook until the last day of
8 disarmament, the note that I was given during the training
9 exercise. I kept it with me until the last day. At some point
11:03:50 10 in time my former sergeant requested those materials and they
11 were handed over to him.

12 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, can the witness be assisted with
13 the document in tab number 3.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please assist the witness. Whilst
11:04:10 15 that is happening, Mr Bangura, I note the words "Royal Courts of
16 Justice" have been put in at line 10 of page 50 and I thought
17 I heard the witness say something about "Roger".

18 THE WITNESS: I said "Roger so far", I stopped there so
19 far, but more to come.

11:04:29 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think that needs adjustment.

21 THE WITNESS: You asked about prosigns. That is what I am
22 trying to elaborate.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we fully appreciate. Thank you for
24 that assistance, Mr Witness.

11:05:28 25 MR BANGURA:

26 Q. Mr Witness, you have looked through the notebook which was
27 shown to you. Do you recognise that book?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 Q. What do you recognise it as?

1 A. It is my notebook in which I had the signal message
2 training that I undertook, the training that I undertook is what
3 I had in here.

4 Q. Does it contain notes?

11:05:58 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Which you took down during your training?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Now, does that book bear your handwriting?

9 A. No, that handwriting is the handwriting of one girl who had
11:06:23 10 wanted to be trained in signal operation. The initial book had
11 worn out and that was replaced while in station in Buedu.

12 Q. What do you mean the initial book had worn out?

13 A. The one I had from the jungle, manoeuvring back to Buedu,
14 had wear and tear, so we had to transfer it into this book.

11:06:44 15 Q. Who did the transfer? Who transferred the notes into this
16 book?

17 A. Another girl recruit who had wanted to be trained in
18 signal.

19 Q. Now, you want this Court to see that book, is that not so?

11:07:03 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I ask that this document be
22 marked for identification at this stage.

23 MR ANYAH: Madam President, would it be possible for me to
24 see the actual book itself, the original? What I have is a copy
11:07:20 25 and some comments have been made by the witness which prompts me
26 to want to see the original.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Have you any objection to that
28 application, Mr Bangura?

29 MR BANGURA: Not at all, your Honour.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please show it to counsel then.

2 MR BANGURA: As long as it doesn't impede the flow of the
3 evidence of the witness.

11:07:46

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: In any event, we have an application to
5 mark it for identification so that will be MFI-17. It is a
6 document of - I have not counted the number of pages, but the
7 front page says "Composition Book" and "Monitoring,"
8 M-O-N-I-T-I-N-G, "Book, Signal Unit."

9 THE WITNESS: That is not the one I have now.

11:08:11

10 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see.

11 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I believe the original of the
12 book in question was shown to the witness. I am not so sure --

13 THE WITNESS: The monitoring book you are talking about is
14 not that one. There is another notebook written the monitoring
15 book and that is supposed to be the code book.

11:08:34

16 MR BANGURA: Just hold on, Mr Witness.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understood you referred us to tab 1,
18 Mr Bangura.

19 MR BANGURA: Tab 3, your Honour.

11:08:44

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Then I am in error, I apologise. I am
21 looking at the wrong document. In which case then the document
22 under tab 3 is headed "Composition Book". Is that the correct
23 document?

24 MR BANGURA: That is it, your Honour.

11:08:58

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Then there is some writing which I am
26 having great trouble deciphering: "R", a word I can't read, and
27 I-N-F-O E-A-E-M-M-M.

28 MR BANGURA: Your Honour was not sure about the number of
29 pages. I am just trying to give a rough check. I am reliably

1 informed it is 46 pages.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

3 MR BANGURA:

4 Q. Mr Witness, we shall come back to some of the content of
11:09:49 5 this book, but after your training you have already indicated -
6 you have already told this Court that you got assigned to - your
7 first assignment was at Zogoda at the radio there. You say that
8 at this time there was communication going on with the other
9 side, is that correct?

11:10:12 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Now, were you at this stage able to communicate directly
12 with the other side?

13 A. From Buedu?

14 Q. No, we are talking of Zogoda. We have gone back to Zogoda
11:10:29 15 and just after your training.

16 A. There was a possibility to communicate with the other side,
17 but the point was it was only the senior operators who had the
18 authority to communicate with the stations from Liberia.

19 Q. What about communications within Sierra Leone, within RUF
11:10:54 20 units, within RUF positions?

21 A. There was no station that I was mandated not to communicate
22 with, only stations from Liberia, and that was the initial stage.
23 When I was posted to Buedu I had every right to communicate with
24 stations from Liberia and that I did until the time I was
11:11:22 25 appointed, or commanded by General Issa Sesay to cross into
26 Liberia for smooth operations.

27 Q. Who was it that restricted your authority to communicate
28 with Liberia at this time? Who had the --

29 A. The station sergeant, like Daf was authorised to

1 communicate with the other side. King Perry was authorised.
2 Mohamed Kabbah was authorised. Osman Tollo, Zedman and Ebony,
3 Ebony Prince, were authorised to communicate with stations on the
4 other side.

11:12:06 5 Q. Now, Daf, did he have another name?

6 A. Dauda Alfred Fonnine.

7 Q. Can you spell Fonnine?

8 A. F-O-N-N-I-E.

9 Q. Now, do you recall any communications at this time while
11:12:33 10 you were at Zogoda with the other side, any specific
11 communication?

12 A. Yes, at that time they used to just come on the net and
13 identify themselves as 35B. They said "35B, 35B" and the station
14 commanders could be called to come and talk to them. I can

11:12:57 15 remember during the time we were communicating, or facilitating
16 the movement of Corporal Sankoh from Zogoda to Yamoussoukro there
17 was a call from that station, 35 Bravo. At that time the station
18 sergeant told me that that station was located in Gbarnga and
19 that was the station of Charles Taylor. He had not yet been
11:13:19 20 elected as president. There was a call from the radio operator

21 requesting the radio operator on our side to make available
22 Toyota, that Ebony was on the radio to talk to Toyota. In the
23 code I went through Ebony was referring to Charles Taylor and
24 Toyota was referring to Corporal Sankoh and they had that radio
11:13:47 25 conversation, and in their conversation Ebony told Toyota to make
26 use of, or take advantage over that peace accord which he was
27 supposed to attend in Yamoussoukro, to move outside to get more
28 dancing materials. Dancing materials they were referring to
29 ammunition and some other materials relating to combat.

1 Q. You said dancing materials related to - can you go over
2 that again, please?

3 A. Ammunition, they referred to ammunition as dancing
4 materials.

11:14:24 5 Q. You said this call came and 35B was calling and who took
6 the call initially?

7 A. I received the call. I had to rush to call the station
8 sergeant and Zedman came and spoke to them and they made that
9 request: That Ebony was on set and was requesting to talk to

11:14:48 10 Toyota. So the station sergeant, Zedman, rushed down to call
11 Corporal Sankoh and he came and talked to Ebony.

12 Q. Were you present when this conversation went on between
13 Ebony and Toyota?

14 A. Yes, I was in the station.

11:15:11 15 Q. And you overheard the conversation?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Was Zedman present?

18 A. Yes, sir. Zedman was on set. He was called to command
19 operate the set.

11:15:24 20 Q. Apart from communications which went on between the RUF at
21 that time and the other side, you said you also were engaged in
22 communications within RUF positions in Sierra Leone, is that
23 correct?

24 A. Yes, sir. I was commanded to do so.

11:15:46 25 Q. What sort of issues, or subjects would come up in your
26 communications?

27 A. There were radio stations posted in many different
28 locations in Sierra Leone. Those radio stations were operating
29 on behalf of the RUF and of course under the control of the

1 commanders of the RUF, so whatever went on in those areas, the
2 operators prepared what they called "sit rep", that is the
3 situation report, and transmitted those pieces of information to
4 the headquarters station.

11:16:32 5 Q. At that time which station was the headquarters station?

6 A. Corporal Sankoh's radio station was the senior most of all
7 the other stations and of course the other stations were referred
8 to as sub-stations.

9 Q. These sit reps you referred to were then sent to the main
11:16:55 10 station, is that correct?

11 A. Sit reps were received from the various stations then
12 instructions - let us say messages coming from Corporal Sankoh's
13 stations should either be directive instructions, or orders, that
14 is giving out instructions to the commanders to either attack, or
11:17:16 15 move on ambush missions, something of this sort.

16 Q. How frequently was this flow of communication? How
17 frequent was it?

18 A. One cannot really estimate because once the radio is open
19 you have many calls coming in with new pieces of information and
11:17:37 20 that was just the kind of situation.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, after you were moved from Zogoda and you -
22 even before you moved from Zogoda, you mentioned that Sankoh went
23 for a peace meeting, peace talks in Yamoussoukro, is that
24 correct?

11:18:03 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. You said Zedman went along with him, is that correct?

27 A. Yes, sir.

28 Q. And at some point Zedman came back with some communication
29 material?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Can you --

3 A. One satellite phone and a fax machine.

4 Q. During the period just before you were moved out of Zogoda

11:18:30 5 were these equipment used for communication?

6 A. Yes, sir, but they were later on captured from us by the

7 Kamajors. We were unable to manoeuvre with them.

8 Q. Who did you communicate with using those equipment?

9 A. I was not operating those equipment, those devices myself.

11:18:54 10 In fact, when they brought those materials there was a radio

11 operator assigned in Paema. That radio operator was called upon

12 by Mohamed Zino. That operator was a Temne by tribe, a Fatmata.

13 They were communicating in Temne and Corporal Sankoh was also a

14 Temne by tribe, so communication went between them in Temne. So

11:19:23 15 they were using the satellite phone to communicate in Temne. All

16 we could get from Foday Sankoh at that time was to instruct

17 Fatmata to go on the towan [phon], meaning the telephone, to put

18 the telephone on that Corporal Sankoh was on the telephone in

19 Yamoussoukro to talk to Mohamed Zino.

11:19:45 20 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Would you please spell some things.

21 Temne I think needs to be spelt.

22 MR BANGURA: T-E-M-N-E. Fatmata is F-A-T-M-A-T-A. I think

23 Yamoussoukro has been spelt before. I see Temne come up again

24 differently. T-E-M-N-E.

11:20:29 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: For the purposes of record Temne is a

26 language.

27 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour:

28 Q. Now, you mentioned that you after you moved, after you were

29 pushed out of Zogoda you went to Buedu. Focussing on Buedu at

1 the period you were there, what was the - you said you worked
2 with Sam Bockarie, is that correct?

3 A. Yes, sir. I received a message and handed it over to the
4 station sergeant and the station sergeant in turn took it to Sam
11:21:09 5 Bockarie.

6 Q. Okay. Who was the station sergeant that you worked with at
7 this time?

8 A. Ebony. Ebony was my duty commander because we were serving
9 duty in threes for 72 hours, then you have another set of
11:21:25 10 operators commanded by a particular station sergeant. So I was
11 working under the auspices of Ebony during the time I was in
12 Buedu.

13 Q. You said that you worked in teams, so were there other
14 operators apart from yourself and Ebony?

11:21:45 15 A. Yes, there were other operators.

16 Q. And who were these?

17 A. Osman Tollo, Zedman and one Elevation because Elevation was
18 later on permanently assigned to Issa Sesay, but at that time
19 I was there in my own team: Myself, Ebony and Zedman. Then in
11:22:12 20 the other team you had Osman Tollo, Elevation and the other
21 operator.

22 Q. You said that just after you took up your duties at Buedu
23 the radio call sign for Sam Bockarie's station was BZ4, Bravo
24 Zulu 4.

11:22:39 25 A. Bravo Zulu 4. That station later changed to Planet 1.
26 There was a mission run in Liberia. A particular man identified
27 himself as Mosquito Spray. That man captured Voinjama in Liberia
28 and Sam Bockarie was mandated, according to him, by his chief and
29 he organised armed men within the RUF and instructed them to

1 cross into Liberia to capture Voinjama and they succeeded in
2 capturing Voinjama. That operation was code named Operation
3 Vulture. That operation was code named Operation Vulture. So it
4 was from that operation that the RUF combatants who were mandated
11:23:28 5 to cross into Liberia captured two vehicles and in those vehicles
6 they had radios mounted in them, so when they brought those
7 vehicles to Buedu the station then changed from Bravo Zulu 4 to
8 Marvel and Planet 1 respectively.

9 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Marvel is M-A-R-V-E-L:

11:24:02 10 Q. Now, these two names that you mentioned, Marvel and
11 Planet 1, became - what names are those?

12 A. Those were call signs.

13 Q. Call signs?

14 A. Call signs.

11:24:16 15 Q. For two different radios, is that correct?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. You mentioned earlier that --

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Sorry, Mr Bangura, the name of the
19 operation, this is Vulture as in the bird?

11:24:27 20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

21 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour:

22 Q. You mentioned earlier that Bockarie said he was instructed
23 by his chief --

24 A. Yes, sir.

11:24:42 25 Q. -- to go across to Liberia and address the situation which
26 had arisen there created by Mosquito Spray, is that correct?

27 A. Yes, sir.

28 Q. Who was his chief?

29 A. I was referring to Charles Taylor, his chief. That was

1 what he told us. He could address us on whatever communication
2 he had with his chief. It was nothing hidden.

3 Q. Do you recall about what time this Operation Vulture took
4 place?

11:25:16 5 A. It was just short after I left for Liberia.

6 Q. You said shortly after you left for Liberia. Do you mean
7 to say something else?

8 A. Yes, sir, just after that operation. Of course the
9 operation was successful. It was commanded by one Oiso. That

11:25:40 10 was the commander. He was taken from Kono to move into Liberia
11 and take care of Voinjama and he succeeded in capturing Voinjama,
12 so they brought those vehicles.

13 Q. Can you spell Oiso?

14 A. O-L-S-O.

11:26:02 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, the timeframe of when this
16 operation happened is very vague.

17 MR BANGURA: I am coming back to it.

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: If you look at the answer the witness has
19 given.

11:26:12 20 MR BANGURA:

21 Q. Mr Witness, you have said that this operation took place
22 just after you left to go to Liberia.

23 A. After Operation Vulture then I left for Liberia.

24 Q. So the operation was before you left for Liberia?

11:26:26 25 A. Fine, fine.

26 Q. Is that what you meant to say?

27 A. Just after the operation, a short while then I left for
28 Liberia.

29 Q. You said that you left for Liberia in June/July of 1999, is

1 that correct?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Thank you. Now, these vehicles, do you know whose vehicles
4 they were?

11:26:55 5 A. Those vehicles were alleged to be vehicles belonging to
6 certain NGO.

7 Q. Now, how were these two vehicles now used after they
8 became - the radios were put into them? How were they used by
9 Sam Bockarie?

11:27:20 10 A. Like the Planet one was used as a mobile radio because we
11 had the radio planted in the vehicle, so wherever he went, he
12 went along with the radio. We had the Marvel. Marvel could stay
13 on the ground while Planet 1 was away.

14 Q. Both these stations were operated - were they operated
11:27:51 15 differently?

16 A. They were operated differently, but receiving messages for
17 the same commander.

18 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Your Honours, I am not so well
19 positioned to see the clock.

11:28:09 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we have about two minutes left.

21 MR BANGURA: I want to get into a new area which --

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well then, I think it might be
23 appropriate to take the mid-morning adjournment at this point.

24 Mr Witness, we are going to take a half hour break. We will
11:28:26 25 start court again at 12 o'clock and please adjourn court until
26 12.

27 [Break taken at 11.28 a.m.]

28 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

29 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Bangura, please proceed.

1 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour:

2 Q. Mr Witness, before we continue I just wish to take you back
3 briefly on a few areas we have already covered for some
4 clarification, okay?

12:01:43 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Now earlier you mentioned that during your training at
7 Kailahun, at the national secondary school, there were SBU groups
8 and SGU groups. Is that correct?

9 A. Yes, sir.

12:02:05 10 Q. And you gave an age range for each of these groups. Is
11 that right?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. You did say one year to 20 years for each of the groups,
14 SBUs and SGUs. Is that correct?

12:02:26 15 A. Okay, let me just say below 20 years boys were put in a
16 unit called SBU and the same thing with the girls below 20 years
17 were put in a unit called SGU.

18 Q. Now, could you remember what were the youngest ages of boys
19 and of girls that you had? First of all boys and then girls?

12:02:51 20 A. 12 years, sometimes ten. There were boys younger than I
21 was.

22 Q. At the time your age was?

23 A. 17.

24 Q. And you said that there were boys as young as ten or 12?

12:03:08 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. What about girls? How young? What were the youngest ages
27 that you had?

28 A. 15, 16, like that.

29 Q. Thank you. Now, I asked you about - you mentioned in your

1 earlier testimony that you were told about Special Forces by
2 Mohamed Zino Tarawalli. Is that correct?

3 A. Yes, sir. He identified himself to us as a Special Force,
4 but he was not trained in Liberia but Libya.

12:03:43 5 Q. At what point did he identify himself as a Special Forces
6 person to you?

7 A. When we were travelling to the front line we met him in
8 Pendembu.

9 Q. When you say travelling to the front line, on which
12:04:01 10 assignment?

11 A. When we were taken from the training base, having completed
12 the training according to them that we are fit to be sent to the
13 front line. So, whilst in Pendembu he addressed us on a muster
14 parade.

12:04:14 15 Q. And this was just before you were sent to which particular
16 assignment? Which particular front line?

17 A. We were going to Gbaima, where I was shot.

18 Q. Thank you. Now this Mohamed Tarawalli, you also mentioned
19 in your later testimony that Sankoh when he left Zogoda to go to
12:04:40 20 Yamoussoukro for peace talks left Mohamed Tarawalli in charge.
21 Are they one and the same person?

22 A. The same Mohamed Tarawalli.

23 Q. Thank you. Now talking about your notebook which we have
24 already tendered for identification in court, you said that this
12:05:04 25 notebook was not the initial original that you had and that what
26 you have just tendered in court was one which was reproduced from
27 the original by a girl. Is that correct?

28 A. Yes, sir, it's just a replica of what I copied myself. The
29 book is worn out, some of the papers in the book worn out, so I

1 had to change it.

2 Q. And you say the person who copied this, who helped you to
3 reproduce it, was?

4 A. A girl.

12:05:36 5 Q. And this girl was called?

6 A. Rebecca. She had wanted to be trained in signal
7 communication.

8 Q. You also mentioned that at some point this notebook was
9 taken from you by a sergeant?

12:05:57 10 A. Yes, he had wanted to copy some of the parts of the
11 message, or let's say the communication we had in there. That
12 book was as well used as a rough workbook sort of, because I had
13 some papers in there. When I was travelling I had everything in
14 my bag and sometimes we went out of stationery and so that book
12:06:25 15 was then used to do some rough works. In receiving message, you
16 are not just going to write the message in the actual message
17 book. You first receive the message either on a piece of paper,
18 or in an exercise book, where the message will then be
19 transcribed and recorded.

12:06:48 20 Q. Now, who was this sergeant that took this book from you at
21 some point?

22 A. Zedman.

23 Q. Why did he take it from you?

24 A. He met me and said if there is any notebook with me that I
12:07:03 25 was using, I told him, "Yes", and he asked for them, that I
26 presented the materials to him.

27 Q. And when was this?

28 A. 2005, or 6.

29 Q. Thank you. Now, your training at - you mentioned that you

1 were trained as a radio operator for the first part of it at
2 Kangari Hills and then later at Zogoda. Who was your instructor
3 at Kangari Hills?

12:07:57 4 A. Captain Nya Nissar was my instructor and in Zogoda my
5 instructors were (1) Corporal Sankoh, the leader himself, and (2)
6 Pa Tucker, a retired lieutenant of the Sierra Leone Army.

7 Q. Now, I asked you earlier about who placed a restriction on
8 your ability to communicate with the other side. You said that
9 at some earlier stage, after you had finished your training as an
12:08:26 10 operator, you could not communicate or you were not allowed to
11 communicate with the other side, and the question I had asked was
12 who put that restriction on you and the answer was not quite
13 clear. Who was it that placed the restriction on your ability to
14 communicate?

12:08:43 15 A. Corporal Sankoh himself and that was enforced by the
16 station sergeant.

17 Q. Were you the only one who had a restriction placed on your
18 ability to communicate with the other side?

19 A. No. Myself, Banko and the other junior operators.

12:09:11 20 Q. So in terms of communicating with the other side, who was -
21 was there a restriction on a particular set of persons only?

22 A. Only we, the junior operators, were not allowed to
23 communicate with stations on the other side.

24 Q. Okay, thank you. Now, just before we went out for the
12:09:43 25 break I was asking you questions about the radios that - the
26 radio call signs that Sam Bockarie had at Buedu and you mentioned
27 that it changed from BZ4 to Marvel and Planet 1 and that these
28 two new call signs were based on two vehicles that were brought
29 from Liberia. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Do you know how these vehicles were obtained from Liberia?

3 A. Those vehicles were looted from Voinjama and brought into
4 Sierra Leone, Liberia.

12:10:21 5 Q. Thank you.

6 A. They were looted by the commandos who were sent to capture
7 Voinjama; the RUF fighters who crossed into Liberia to capture
8 Voinjama from the insurgents.

9 Q. Thank you.

12:10:39 10 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, just for correction purposes I
11 refer back to the transcript. The name "Isaac Mongor" was
12 mentioned earlier by this witness and initially "Mongor" came up
13 but not "Isaac" and I did indicate that it was a name which was
14 already known to the Court. It didn't come up the second time at
12:11:03 15 all still. It's just to --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you referring to the transcript,
17 Mr Bangura?

18 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Attendant, if you could note
12:11:14 20 that, please, and we'll ensure it's corrected.

21 MR BANGURA: I think the page reference and line is page 7,
22 line 10.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, I'm just wondering, the
24 evidence that the witness has just given relating to the looting
12:11:28 25 of vehicles in Voinjama, do you think you could find out how he
26 knows this information?

27 MR BANGURA: I will, your Honour:

28 Q. Mr Witness, you have just mentioned that the vehicles that
29 were brought from Voinjama were looted - in fact, were looted in

1 Voi nj ama. How di d you know thi s?

2 A. The mi ssi on that went on in Voi nj ama, I mean the group that
3 entered into Voi nj ama took along a radi o set and we were
4 contacted. We were kept in touch wi th whatever devel opment they
12:12:11 5 had on that parti cular mi ssi on. They kept us posted on all
6 activi ti es they undertook.

7 Q. And what speci fi cally di d you l earn from them?

8 A. In gi vi ng what we called a compre hensive report from the
9 mi ssi on they went on, they made an inclu si on of those vehi cles
12:12:30 10 and some other materi als; weapons they captured from the enemy
11 forces.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 A. In fact I went on a short mi ssi on somewhere around
14 Pendembu, so comi ng back I met the vehi cles on the ground.

12:12:47 15 Q. Where? When you say on the ground, where?

16 A. At Sam Bockarie's place where he was resident. We used to
17 call that parti cular area as the base. The ground.

18 Q. Thank you. Now, you said earli er that the leader of the
19 RUF when you joined you were told it was Foday Sankoh?

12:13:12 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. And at the time he was in Liberia and you were told he was
22 going to join you? He was comi ng to join you later?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. And he di d join you. Is that correct?

12:13:23 25 A. Yes, he came to the training base and addressed us in the
26 muster parade. I mean, the recrui ts.

27 Q. Thank you. Now Sankoh was leader, you said, and he left
28 some time in - what time di d you say he left, Sankoh, for peace
29 conference in --

1 A. 1996.

2 Q. In '96?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And after he left he had somebody else to replace him?

12:13:54 5 A. Yes, sir. That was Mohamed Tarawalli, alias Zino.

6 Q. And you have mentioned that Zino got missing at some point
7 during the - when Zogoda was attacked. Is that correct?

8 A. No, when we were retreating Zogoda was captured. We were
9 dislodged from Zogoda. Then whilst manoeuvring to Giema we were

12:14:21 10 again destabilised, so in that process Zino went at large and

11 from that time nobody - I don't know his whereabouts.

12 Q. Now after Zino went at large, did anybody take over control
13 of the RUF --

14 A. Yes, sir.

12:14:42 15 Q. -- in the absence of Sankoh?

16 A. Yes, sir, that was Sam Bockarie.

17 Q. Do you know when he took over control?

18 A. I was in the jungle manoeuvring from Zogoda, so by the time
19 I got to Giema I met him in control of the RUF.

12:15:07 20 Q. And do you know up until what time he remained in control
21 of the RUF?

22 A. Until 1999, I think, in December, when he fell off with the
23 leadership of the RUF. At that time Corporal Sankoh was in
24 Freetown, so Sam Bockarie became recalcitrant. He was not taking
12:15:32 25 instructions from him any longer.

26 Q. And at that point what happened?

27 A. He crossed into Liberia.

28 Q. And did anyone take his position after he left?

29 A. Yes, sir, that was a General Issa Sesay.

1 Q. And how long did Issa serve in that position?

2 A. From that time he remained in power until disarmament took
3 place in Sierra Leone and that was some time in 2000/2001.

12:16:13

4 Q. Thank you. Now you mentioned in your earlier testimony
5 that, when you retreated from Kono after the intervention along
6 with Gullit and his group, you got to Buedu and Bockarie was
7 there and he had just been promoted by his chief. Is that
8 correct?

9 A. Yes, sir.

12:16:35

10 Q. Now apart from Bockarie, do you recall any other person who
11 received a similar promotion from anybody else?

12 A. Yes, sir, General Issa Sesay also was promoted.

13 Q. By who?

14 A. By his chief also according to him. He met us in Kolahun.

12:16:58

15 Q. And who was his chief?

16 A. He was referring to Charles Taylor and he was the chief,
17 everybody knew, in the RUF in the absence of Corporal Sankoh.

18 Q. Now apart from Bockarie and now Issa Sesay who you say
19 referred to Charles Taylor as the chief, did anybody else use
12:17:20 20 this word or this title for Charles Taylor?

21 A. That was common with the senior officers of the RUF
22 referring to Charles Taylor as the chief.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, you said you got to know that Issa Sesay
24 had also received promotion from his chief at Kolahun. Where is
12:17:49 25 Kolahun?

26 A. Kolahun is in Lofa County.

27 Q. Where?

28 A. Liberia.

29 Q. And when was this that you learnt about Issa Sesay's

1 promotion?

2 A. That was some time in 2000, the year 2000.

3 Q. And what were you doing at Kolahun at this time?

4 A. I was operating the radio for Benjamin D Yeaten.

12:18:18 5 Q. And what was Issa Sesay doing at Kolahun at this time?

6 A. He came from Monrovia. He met us in the estate there in
7 Kolahun and called a muster parade and he addressed us. During
8 his address he stated this to us and he was dressed in the same
9 military fatigue just as that of the ATU.

12:18:42 10 Q. And was he wearing a rank? Was he carrying a rank?

11 A. The same insignia as that of Sam Bockarie's.

12 Q. Now when you say the same insignia, what do you mean?

13 A. A general. We see the star. He said he was promoted to a
14 three star general.

12:19:01 15 Q. Now you said he addressed a muster parade at the estate, or
16 you were at the estate. What do you mean?

17 A. There was a particular section in Kolahun referred to as
18 estate. We had some buildings. There we were told to base.

19 Q. Now you said he addressed you, not just you alone, meaning
12:19:25 20 a number of you?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Now, who were the others that were with you?

23 A. There were a good number of RUF fighters assigned in
24 Kolahun.

12:19:37 25 Q. At this time?

26 A. Yes, sir, to Benjamin D Yeaten, unit 50, the SSS Director
27 of Liberia.

28 Q. And roughly what number are we talking of?

29 A. I cannot be precise in any way.

1 Q. At the particular parade that you refer to, would the
2 number have been up to 50?

3 A. Maybe more than that, because the number was big in
4 Kolahun. At that time, the LURD forces were fighting in
12:20:19 5 Voinjama.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. They were occupying Voinjama.

8 Q. Thank you. Now after the retreat of the RUF - sorry, after
9 the intervention in Freetown you said that Mosquito moved from
12:20:36 10 Kenema and came to Buedu. Apart from him, did any other persons
11 move on to Buedu at some point?

12 A. From Kenema?

13 Q. Not just from Kenema, but from other parts of --

14 A. After intervention, yes, Gullit came together with Captain
12:20:57 15 Kaloga, Thomas and Eddie Kanneh of course came together with Sam
16 Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma.

17 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Kaloga is K-A-L-O-G-A:

18 Q. Now, can you give us the - you have mentioned quite a few
19 names here. Can you tell us which group or units they belonged
12:21:25 20 to?

21 A. The Sierra Leone Army.

22 Q. Now, Kaloga --

23 A. But those were the junta forces.

24 Q. If you'd like to go over these names again, please, and
12:21:38 25 just say who was --

26 A. Captain Thomas, Kaloga and Gullit travelled together to
27 Buedu.

28 Q. From where?

29 A. From Kono.

1 Q. Okay, and these belonged to which group?

2 A. Those were the junta forces. They belonged to the Sierra
3 Leone Army.

4 Q. And who else came to Buedu?

12:21:59 5 A. Eddie Kanneh of course came together with Sam Bockarie.

6 Q. And they came from where?

7 A. From Kenema. They came from Kenema.

8 Q. Right. And then?

9 A. Johnny Paul Koroma together with General Issa Sesay, but at
12:22:15 10 that time he was not a general anyway.

11 Q. Okay, and they came from?

12 A. From Freetown through Makeni, Kono to Kailahun.

13 Q. Now Johnny Paul Koroma when he came to Buedu, did he stay
14 there?

12:22:36 15 A. He stayed there for some time. Of course, he had some
16 misunderstandings with Sam Bockarie. All the items he brought
17 were taken from him. In fact his property were vandalised and it
18 was alleged that his wife was even raped, but I did not see it
19 myself, but that news was going around.

12:23:00 20 Q. Now, you said all the items he brought were taken from him.
21 What sort of items were taken from him?

22 A. The rumour was around that diamond and foreign currency
23 were arrested from him.

24 Q. Arrested, what do you mean?

12:23:18 25 A. They took his bag which contained diamonds, according to
26 rumour. I did not myself look into the bag that was taken from
27 him, but that was the rumour that was going around. In fact
28 there was an exchange of gunfire in that process, because he came
29 along with some armed men who had not wanted to see that happen.

1 They put up some amount of resistance.

2 Q. Now who took the bag, the bag that you're referring to,
3 from Johnny Paul Koroma?

12:24:11

4 A. According to rumour, it was Sam Bockarie jointly with Issa
5 Sesay.

6 Q. Now, do you recall whether Johnny Paul Koroma addressed any
7 meeting at Buedu while he was there?

12:24:28

8 A. Meeting, a forum at some point in time, but that was not in
9 the same situation when his items were taken away from him. As
10 time went on, he was posted to Kangama and it was from Kangama he
11 was called upon to come and address a sort of forum.

12 Q. Now when you say "forum", what do you mean?

12:24:54

13 A. We had some other senior officers of the AFRC/RUF in the
14 distance. They were called on the radio set, and Sam Bockarie
15 and some other officers in Buedu, and Johnny Paul Koroma was
16 called to address that particular forum.

17 Q. You say that Johnny Paul Koroma was addressing this forum
18 from where?

12:25:15

19 A. From Buedu. He was on set in Buedu, with some other
20 RUF/AFRC senior officers, and some other officers like Gullit,
21 late SAJ Musa, Superman, Rambo in the distance. They were in the
22 distance.

23 Q. Okay.

12:25:32

24 A. Then Johnny Paul Koroma, Sam Bockarie and some other senior
25 officers were in Buedu. So, he addressed this forum by saying
26 that they should all work as a team and only by that they would
27 be able to retake Freetown. Then the response came from SAJ Musa
28 saying that he would never take instructions from a rebel; that
29 is he was referring to Sam Bockarie. Johnny Paul stated that

1 they should all take command from Sam Bockarie and then SAJ Musa
2 stated that he will never take command from a rebel.

3 Q. Do you know where SAJ Musa was at this time as the forum
4 was going on?

12:26:10 5 A. They were in the jungle in the northern part of Sierra
6 Leone.

7 Q. Are you able to tell exactly where?

8 A. Around Kabala area.

9 Q. Who else was on the radio apart from SAJ Musa?

12:26:24 10 A. Gullit.

11 Q. Where was he?

12 A. Somewhere around Makeni end.

13 Q. Anybody else that you recall?

14 A. Superman.

12:26:34 15 Q. Where was he?

16 A. Around Kabala area.

17 Q. Okay. Now following this forum, was there compliance with
18 the orders of Johnny Paul Koroma from the rank and file of the
19 AFRC?

12:27:13 20 A. There was a maintenance of communication, a free flow of
21 communication between Gullit and Sam Bockarie, and that really
22 improved after the death of SAJ Musa.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, you have talked about the communication
24 system. As a radio operator you were part of the communication
12:27:40 25 network of the RUF, is that correct?

26 A. Yes, sir. I was commanded to do so.

27 Q. Now, how did the RUF radio network operate?

28 A. We operated on a 7 megahertz and on LSB. That is the lower
29 side band, but that was always changing.

1 Q. When you say you operated on a 7 megahertz, 7 megahertz
2 what, what is it?

3 A. First let me explain the meaning of frequency. When we
4 talk about the frequency in communication here we mean the number
12:28:19 5 of selected let's say figures is what we call a frequency and if
6 it begins with 7 then we say we are operating on 7 megahertz, if
7 it begins with 6, say, then we can say we are operating on 6
8 megahertz.

9 Q. In the RUF you were operating on 7 megahertz?

12:28:47 10 A. Yes, sir. We operated on 7 megahertz.

11 Q. I heard you mention lower side.

12 A. We have the frequency and, of course, the mode. You bring
13 it down, it's the LSB; you bring it this way it's the USB, on the
14 same frequency, but different band. There is no flow of
12:29:00 15 communication. We can be on the same frequency, but if we are
16 not on the same band - take, for example, if I'm on 70110 but on
17 LSB, that person - or let's say the other operator, on the same
18 frequency, 70110, but on USB, will never understand what we are
19 saying. We will not even get what we are saying on the radio.

12:29:24 20 Q. What do the letters USB and LSB stand for?

21 A. USB is the upper side band and LSB is the lower side band.

22 Q. So these two were the different bands on which the
23 frequencies operate, is that correct?

24 A. Yes, sir, and we were on the 7 megahertz and the Liberians
12:29:43 25 were on the 6 megahertz, but there were certain stations who had
26 access to our net, they knew all our frequencies and they had the
27 authority to call and besides they had our code.

28 Q. Now, when you say there were certain stations, which
29 stations were these?

1 A. One Base 1 had our code. Base 1 was operated by an
2 operator called Sunlight.

3 Q. Where was Base 1?

12:30:18

4 A. Base 1 was located in Congo Town, that is to Benjamin
5 Yeaten's personal residence.

6 Q. And you say it was operated by?

7 A. Operator Sunlight, one, and, two, operator Dew.

8 Q. Can you spell Dew?

9 A. D-E-W.

12:30:34

10 Q. Now, these names that you've just mentioned, the names of
11 the operators, how do you refer to them in communication
12 parlance?

13 A. Those were code names and I knew them only by those code
14 names.

12:30:48

15 Q. So the operators for the radio called Base 1 were?

16 A. The name Base 1 was the call sign of the radio. Dew,
17 Sunlight were the code names of the operators who operated that
18 radio.

19 Q. And you say that radio had access to the RUF code?

12:31:10

20 A. Yes, sir. They had a copy of our code and the other
21 station Zero 20 at the Executive Mansion Ground, that was
22 operated by Sky 1.

23 Q. When you say operated by Sky 1, what do you mean?

24 A. Sky 1 is the name of the operator who operated that radio
25 with the call sign 020, 020.

12:31:32

26 Q. To your knowledge who did the operators Sunlight and Dew
27 for the radio Base 1 report to?

28 A. They reported to Benjamin D Yeaten, Unit 50.

29 Q. And when you say Unit 50 and you call Benjamin Yeaten's

1 name, what was Unit 50? Why was it called Unit 50?

2 A. That was his code name. He was called by that name,
3 Unit 50.

4 Q. Now, you also mentioned radio call sign 020 which you say
12:32:25 5 was at the Executive Mansion, is that correct?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. It had a radio operator whose code name was --

8 A. Sky 1.

9 Q. Sky 1. Now, who do you recall that - the radio at the
12:32:45 10 Executive Mansion reported to who?

11 A. To the president.

12 Q. Who was the president then?

13 A. President Charles Taylor was in power at that time.

14 Q. Now, let us focus briefly. You say that these two radios
12:32:56 15 had the code for the Sierra Leone - for the RUF radio network, is
16 that correct?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. How do you know this?

19 A. I was an operator and when I was taken to Liberia the
12:33:11 20 number of times I received a message from them in our code and
21 besides when I was to cross into Liberia I was given a special
22 code which was distributed to operators Sunlight, Sky 1 and the
23 other radio that was in Foya and that was the code we used.

24 Q. Now, let's for a brief moment focus on communication within
12:33:42 25 Sierra Leone, the RUF within Sierra Leone. Now, you have
26 mentioned that the RUF operated on a 7 megahertz and that means
27 that the frequency numbers on this network started with the
28 number 7, is that correct?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. How many radios at any given time did the RUF have? In
2 your recollection what was the largest number of radios that the
3 RUF had at any particular point in time?

4 A. When the AFRC took power and called upon the RUF then the
12:34:27 5 number of radio stations multiplied and it was about 45 or some
6 more stations.

7 Q. And how was this radio network controlled? How was the
8 system controlled?

9 A. By the senior most station and that is the station for the
12:34:50 10 senior most commander.

11 Q. So what name would you give to the radio of the commander?

12 A. That is the control station.

13 Q. And what name did you give to the other stations which that
14 station controlled?

12:35:07 15 A. Substations, substations.

16 Q. Now, in a typical situation what would the control station
17 do in relation to the substations? How would the control station
18 exercise authority over the substations?

19 A. We had a particular frequency referred to as the national
12:35:30 20 frequency, which was meant for all stations to establish
21 communication with another station from a distance. You make a
22 call, or you establish a call on this national frequency. If the
23 station needed is available on air then you select another
24 frequency. Of course we had different types of frequencies. We
12:35:55 25 had what we called a predesignated frequency. That frequency had
26 already been stated in the code with a special code name assigned
27 to it. That was one and in the code chart we had numerals and we
28 had representations for all those numbers and that could be
29 manipulated to figure out whatever frequency you want to.

1 Q. Now, let us keep it a little simple. You said that to
2 start a communication if there is a call on the national
3 frequency then two persons who are in communication can agree to
4 go to another frequency and have their communication there, is
12:36:45 5 that right?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Now, what was the national frequency?

8 A. At some point in time it was 70110 on LSB.

9 Q. Why would two persons on the network have to move on to
12:37:04 10 another frequency from the national frequency?

11 A. That was to give chance to the other stations. Since the
12 stations were many, that was to enhance smooth communications
13 between the other stations.

14 Q. Now, you just mentioned - you said there are predesignated
12:37:22 15 frequencies, is that right?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. And you mentioned a code chart.

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Now can you explain predesignated frequency in relation to
12:37:32 20 the code chart that you mentioned?

21 A. When we talk about a predesignated frequency, these are
22 frequencies that had been agreed upon and given code names. They
23 are already in the code chart. They are predesignated
24 frequencies. Let's take, for example, we were using 70110 at
12:37:54 25 some point in time as the national frequency. When that
26 frequency was changed that 70110 was then code named "Old Farm"
27 70110 was referred to as Old Farm. So if a station wants to go
28 to the other frequency from the national frequency, let's say
29 they have selected 70110 to join to, the other operator in the

1 distance could say "Let us go to the Old Farm" and you would just
2 easily tune to 70110, leaving the national frequency quiet,
3 allowing other stations to establish a call.

12:38:47

4 Q. Now, how were the predesignated stations or frequencies
5 then selected?

6 A. They were selected by the commanders who were in charge of
7 printing of the code.

8 Q. Then would these frequencies change?

12:39:07

9 A. The frequencies were changing, yes, and they of course -
10 the names were also changing.

11 Q. Now, in the course of your meetings with lawyers for the
12 Prosecution did you have cause to explain, or demonstrate what
13 you have just explained in court?

14 A. Yes, sir.

12:39:22

15 Q. The way the system operated?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Did you produce any material for that purpose?

18 A. Yes, sir. I was given a plain sheet to explain what
19 exactly I meant.

12:39:39

20 Q. Now, just before I show you that material again, you talked
21 about the code chart. How was the code chart created?

22 A. We had certain phrases with representations, what they mean
23 in the code, and we had certain military terminologies and those
24 were also given representations, and we had double letters, those
25 were also given representations.

12:40:10

26 Q. Who created the code chart?

27 A. The signal unit commander and it was based upon that other
28 and new codes were produced.

29 Q. How did the other stations - substations get the code

1 chart?

2 A. Whenever there was a change in the code the station
3 commanders were called upon to report to the control station and
4 the code was handed over to them and they returned to their
12:40:51 5 respective stations. The last person had to return - I mean to
6 acknowledge that he had arrived at the station and thereafter
7 instructions could be passed by the overall commander for that
8 particular code to be put into use.

9 Q. Now, when you say that the commanders would be called to
12:41:14 10 report to the control station, would they be required to be there
11 in person?

12 A. You must be there in person. Code was something very much
13 secretive. There was no need putting it on the air. You come to
14 the control station, they tell you how to manipulate on that
12:41:38 15 code, you make sure there is nothing obscure, nothing is left
16 that is not understood, then you would be authorised by the
17 overall commander to get to your station.

18 Q. Was the code ever transmitted by any other means --

19 A. That was the only means through which codes were
12:41:59 20 distributed to the various stations. Even if you are staying
21 let's say in a hundred miles distance, you have to walk to get to
22 the control station to collect your own code.

23 Q. Now, you have said that if there is a change of code this
24 is what will happen: The commanders would be invited to the
12:42:19 25 control station and be given the new code. What would be the
26 reasons for a change of code?

27 A. For example, if there is an attack, let's say in a
28 particular area, in that case the operator becomes let's say
29 unable to manoeuvre with his materials, that leads to insecurity

1 and that leads to the swift changing of the code, or if the
2 operator is captured or killed on the front line, that would be
3 the time the code would be changed.

12:43:01 4 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, can the witness be assisted with
5 a document which is not included in the tab. It's a handwritten
6 note.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Has it been disclosed to the Defence?

8 MR BANGURA: Yes, it has, your Honour. It has got figures.
9 This is material which was, as has been established already,
12:43:35 10 produced by the witness in the course of prepping.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's been established, what does that
12 mean?

13 MR BANGURA: The witness has indicated in his evidence that
14 he produced - he demonstrated in writing the way the radio
12:43:52 15 frequency operated.

16 MR ANYAH: Madam President, I can see from the distance the
17 nature of the document counsel has. The Chamber certainly is not
18 privy to what has been disclosed, but several sheets of
19 handwritten material, or documents, have been disclosed and I
12:44:14 20 would be grateful if counsel opposite could direct me to the
21 specific one in question. We've received disclosures on
22 different dates with handwritten materials that could be from
23 this witness.

24 MR BANGURA: May I briefly seek clarification with the case
12:44:33 25 manager? Thank you.

26 MR ANYAH: If you could just tell me the ERN number I
27 should be able to find it.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think he's sorting it out, Mr Anyah.

29 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, it was disclosed as part of the

1 statement dated 9 to 11 October 2007. My learned friend agrees
2 with me.

3 MR ANYAH: I have it. Do you have five pages, if I might
4 ask?

12:45:57 5 MR BANGURA: I only have three on this one, four actually.

6 MR ANYAH: I have five.

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, isn't it easier if you just
8 passed that document over to the other side so they could see
9 what it is before you pass it on to the witness?

12:46:24 10 MR BANGURA: I will, your Honour.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Will the Bench get a copy of this?

12 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, may I again seek clarification
13 on this issue. Your Honours, may I respectfully ask that I move
14 on with the evidence, on to something else? I will get back to

12:47:09 15 this once we're clear on which material - how many copies are
16 available for the Bench as well as for my colleague on the other
17 side.

18 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. We will note that you are
19 arranging copies and you'll revert to this evidence.

12:47:29 20 MR BANGURA: May I ask that the witness be referred then to
21 a document in tab 1.

22 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, have we had evidence relating
23 to this document on record?

24 MR BANGURA: That document that is being shown to the
12:48:14 25 witness?

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: In tab 1, yes.

27 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour.

28 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: We have?

29 MR BANGURA: Yes, I believe so, your Honour. This document

1 is entitled "Code Book for RUF Radio Network".

12:48:42 2 MR ANYAH: I do not believe, following up on what Justice
3 Sebutinde has pointed out, that any information about this
4 particular document is on record. I recall the evidence
5 pertaining to what was in tab 3, a different composition book,
6 and they clearly are different in appearance and substance.

12:49:04 7 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I was going to treat all the
8 documents that I intend to introduce through the witness now in
9 one breath and the witness's testimony prior to this has been
10 focused largely on how charts are created and how code
11 frequencies were created and used, and the document that is about
12 to be shown to the witness is one which is a code book that the
13 RUF used and it relates to the evidence that the witness has just
14 been giving to the Court.

12:49:28 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Is there evidence actually that the RUF
16 did encode this in a book? This is what I'm saying.

17 MR BANGURA: I shall lead evidence, lay proper foundation.

12:49:44 18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Because if there isn't what you in fact
19 are doing is leading the witness by showing him this document up
20 front.

21 MR BANGURA: I take the point, your Honour. I shall lay
22 some foundation for this:

23 Q. Mr Witness, you have indicated that there was a code chart
24 that was used by the RUF, is that correct?

12:50:08 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. You have said also that this chart was created by a
27 commander of the unit, the communications unit, is that right?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 Q. Now, where were these charts - when they were changed, what

1 happened to them, the old ones?

2 A. They were taken to the commander in charge and they
3 sometimes remained in the station, only that it was never to be
4 used. The old ones were kept, they were never to be used.

12:50:47 5 Q. Now, in fact if an operator attempted to use an old chart
6 was there any consequences that he could suffer as a result?

7 A. That is breach of security. You would be charged with FFI
8 and DI. FFI, that is failure to follow instructions. DI, that
9 is different intention.

12:51:13 10 Q. Now, was it the commander of the unit who alone compiled
11 this chart?

12 A. We had the senior operators. That could be to the
13 knowledge of the overall commander and the regional commander and
14 sometimes the area commander.

12:51:31 15 Q. And typically what would the code charts contain? What
16 information would be in the charts?

17 A. Phrases of military terminologies and sometimes military
18 terminologies themselves. For example, attack, talk about
19 ammunition, ambush, talk about weapon, AK, GMG, et cetera, et
20 cetera.

12:52:03 21 Q. Now, once these charts were handed back to the commander,
22 the unit commander, do you know what happened to them?

23 A. The code charts were handed over to the senior commanders.
24 If a particular code has been disbanded, or let's say it has been
12:52:29 25 taken out of use, you just have to keep it and another code will
26 be distributed to you.

27 Q. Now, have you seen any of those charts yourself lately?

28 A. I was given one when I came to the Court I was asked to
29 identify. I was asked if I have any idea on that particular

1 exercise book. I said, "Yes, this was the kind of code we had",
2 because the set up and the code, I saw some names of some senior
3 officers in the RUF.

4 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, could the witness be assisted
12:53:17 5 with the document in tab 1 again, please.

6 THE WITNESS: Yes.

7 MR BANGURA:

8 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. Do you recognise the book which is
9 shown to you right now?

12:55:08 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. What do you recognise it as?

12 A. A code book produced during the time of General Issa's
13 regime.

14 Q. How do you know that this code book was produced in the
12:55:23 15 regime of General Issa?

16 A. It was during the time he was given the responsibility to
17 act as the leader of the RUF, he was promoted as general, so in
18 the code his name is General I Sesay.

19 Q. And where do you find that?

12:55:42 20 A. 00010008.

21 Q. Now, his name is there, General Sesay. What line is that?

22 A. Line - just go to part --

23 MR ANYAH: It's four from the bottom.

24 THE WITNESS: 6A --

12:56:26 25 MR BANGURA:

26 Q. Part 6A. The second line, the second name, or that was the
27 first name?

28 A. The first name is the leader [indiscernible] and that is
29 Yankee Romeo Zulu for the leader and for General I Sesay it's

1 Yankee Romeo Kilo.

2 Q. Now, on the page that you have just directed the Court's
3 attention to we have names on one side, is that correct?

4 A. Yes, sir.

12:57:00 5 Q. On the page and then against each name there are letters,
6 is that correct?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. What are those letters?

9 A. Those are representations for this name, so when
12:57:11 10 transmitting the message you are using the code. Instead of
11 writing these names that you see, calling these names, it is
12 these letters that you have to call, then the operator in the
13 distance will receive this message and transcribe it by using
14 this particular word. For example, now I want to refer to
12:57:31 15 General Sam Bockarie in this particular code. Instead of calling
16 his name, General Sam Bockarie, I will just say "Yankee Romeo
17 Whiskey" instead of calling his actual name, so I'm writing
18 "Yankee Romeo Whiskey" on a piece of paper. Using this code
19 chart the actual name will be written and then this is what I
12:57:57 20 will have to copy in the actual book and present it to the
21 commander.

22 Q. Mr Witness, can I ask you to try and speak into the
23 microphone.

24 A. Yes, sir.

12:58:05 25 Q. When you move aside from the microphone we will lose your
26 answers.

27 Now, the book itself is divided into parts, is that
28 correct?

29 A. Yes, sir. This is to help the recipient to process this

1 information faster. If I have used this particular code to
2 codify any message, in using this code I will have to take note
3 of the part from which I'm taking the code words from. For
4 example, if I'm using, say, the alphabet and that is in part 1, I
12:58:46 5 will state having transmitted this message and for the alphabet
6 you go to part 1, you will find this one there. For any other
7 phrase used in my message I will refer to, say, "Go to part 2,
8 there you will find the code word", "Go to part 3, the code word
9 for what you have received is found there."

12:59:12 10 In addition to that, let's say for example I have received
11 a message today, using this code that message would be
12 transcribed and left like that and it will be replicated any
13 other time I want to because I have used the actual writings in
14 English and then the code. You have to write the code word on
12:59:38 15 top of the actual words, then transmitting that message you are
16 now using the code words. Okay?

17 Q. Mr Witness, can I take you back to the page that is the
18 page where you identified the name of General Sesay that is
19 00010008. Now, there is in fact a list of names starting from
13:00:11 20 that page running through a number of - almost to the end of the
21 book, is that correct?

22 A. Let me check, please. Yes, sir.

23 Q. These names that you see there, do you recognise them
24 generally?

13:00:33 25 A. These were top RUF commanders at some point in time, under
26 General Issa Sesay's command.

27 Q. And was it the practice to also have their names encoded in
28 the chart?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Now, the first name there under part 6A is the leader. It
2 says C/man?

3 A. That is the chairman.

4 Q. Who was the leader?

13:00:59 5 A. Referring to Corporal Sankoh.

6 Q. Then next to him you have Issa Sesay whom you have
7 identified.

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. And then you have the next name there is?

13:01:10 10 A. Brigadier Morris Kallon.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. So in the code instead of saying Brigadier Morris Kallon
13 you just say "Yankee Romeo Victor". So when you write "Yankee
14 Romeo Victor" in the code, let's say receiving your message, then
15 you are using this one. The sender will then direct you to go to
16 part 4. Then you go to part 4, then you see Yankee Romeo Victor.
17 What is written against Yankee Romeo Victor is Brigadier Morris
18 Kallon, so that is what you have to copy.

19 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Your Honours, I would at this
13:01:46 20 stage respectfully ask that this document be tendered for
21 identification.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think we're up to MFI-17.

23 JUDGE LUSSICK: 18.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: MFI-18. I haven't got the original in
13:02:13 25 front of me. If we could just have a look at it, please, so that
26 I note it correctly. Thank you. It's a blue covered book named
27 as an exercise book with the words "Monitoring," M-O-N-I-T-I-N-G,
28 "Book" at the front. I'm not sure how many pages, but perhaps
29 Mr Bangura you might know how many pages are in it.

1 MR BANGURA: 26 I guess, your Honour.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: 26 pages. Yes, MFI-18.

3 MR BANGURA:

4 Q. Mr Witness, in the normal flow of communications within the
13:03:28 5 RUF at the time while you were at Buedu, before you moved over to
6 Liberia, when you communicated there would be - what would be the
7 normal procedure every day, on a day to day basis, from the
8 control station?

9 A. In the morning you establish communication and keep record
13:03:59 10 of all information, pieces of information received from other
11 stations in the distance.

12 Q. And how would you establish communication with the other
13 stations?

14 A. We had a stated - a stipulated time for establishment of
13:04:17 15 communication, which was 7.30. At 7.30 all stations were obliged
16 to be on the air.

17 Q. How did they report then that they were on the air? Was
18 there any particular mode of reporting?

19 A. The control station will establish what we call a net call
13:04:42 20 and all stations in the distance could respond with regards their
21 seniority.

22 Q. Now, when you said at 7.30, 7.30 at what time of the day?

23 A. 7.30 a.m.

24 Q. In the morning. Now, what would be the subjects of
13:05:19 25 communication generally that flowed within the network, between
26 the control station and the substations, to your recollection?

27 A. We had what we called a sit rep, that is messages coming
28 from the substation reporting on the situation to the control
29 station, and we had instructions, orders and directives coming

1 from the control station to the substations.

2 Q. Okay. What would be the substance of some of these
3 directives and orders coming from the control station?

4 A. One --

13:06:04 5 Q. At the time you were there.

6 A. Commanders to report for briefing and to give them strategy
7 and that would be thoroughly coded.

8 Q. Strategy to do with what?

9 A. As how to manoeuvre.

13:06:26 10 Q. Mr Witness, when you say "manoeuvre" you need to go a
11 little further and clarify. Manoeuvre in what situation?

12 A. How to move from one point to the other to capture other
13 areas.

14 Q. Now, what was the system in place for the substations,
13:06:49 15 radios in these stations? Who was the commander in each of these
16 stations? What was your system?

17 A. The signal unit. In the signal unit we had the overall
18 commander. After the overall commander we had - or I should say
19 next to the overall commander was the regional commander. Next
13:07:15 20 to him was the area commander and next to the area commander was
21 the station commander.

22 Q. Now, at each station who was the operator answerable to?

23 A. The operator was answerable to - the ordinary operators
24 were answerable to the station commanders. Station commanders
13:07:39 25 answerable to the area commanders. Area commanders were
26 answerable to the regional commanders and regional commanders
27 were answerable to the overall commander.

28 Q. Now, the radio operators worked together with - were they
29 combatants?

1 A. The radio operators?

2 Q. Yes, did they engage in combat?

3 A. No, no. The station - each station was supposed to have
4 about 15 armed men to provide security for the radio station and,
13:08:15 5 of course, the radio operator. No operator had authority to
6 leave the radio to other area. In fact, signing for the radio
7 they would tell you, "If this radio is captured from you it would
8 be better for you to follow the enemies than to return to this
9 place." They said, "Just follow them. Don't come here,

13:08:36 10 otherwise you will be killed."

11 Q. Who did the operator report messages to, messages that were
12 received at his station?

13 A. You receive message - let's say the junior operator in a
14 particular station, when I received a message I had every right
13:08:51 15 to hand it over to the sergeant. The sergeant will then take the
16 message to the commander.

17 Q. Which commander is this? Is it a communications --

18 A. Not the overall commander. The combatant commander under
19 whom you are operating. Then when the commander receives the
13:09:12 20 message you either sign for him, because some commanders were not
21 literate, so the operators were mandated to sign on their behalf
22 and signing on behalf of the commander really was just to really
23 prove that indeed such message has been either received by that
24 commander, or transmitted by that commander.

13:09:38 25 Q. And to transmit messages as well, who would the message
26 come from for the operator to transmit to another station?

27 A. Sometimes certain commanders had what we call adjutants and
28 some other commanders hadn't adjutants, so the operator was used
29 to - the operator was used as an adjutant to draft messages.

1 Q. Now, when a message was received how was it recorded?

2 A. In the control station. In the control station where I
3 operated we had two different types of books. We had what we
4 call outgoing, that is messages originated from the commander to
13:10:25 5 be transmitted to substations in the distance. That was referred
6 to as the outgoing message book, and we had another incoming, or
7 we say a sit rep message book. That is all messages received
8 from other stations were to be recorded in that book. But one
9 thing, you don't just receive message and have it recorded. You

13:10:51 10 are receiving this message in code. That has to be written
11 either in an exercise book, or on a piece of paper. Then having
12 received that message it is first going to be transcribed and
13 recorded and sometimes you receive message, you transcribe it and
14 it is left in the exercise book, the reason being that certain
13:11:13 15 operators were not efficient. You receive message, you don't
16 just have to destroy the transcribed message otherwise areas in
17 that message may not be clear and you'll be asked for
18 clarification. So if the message which you had transcribed and
19 destroyed, you have it difficult to make that clarification. So
13:11:38 20 we had some of these transcribed messages left in the exercise
21 books.

22 Q. Now, in what form would the message be when you take it to
23 the commander to read and sign for?

24 A. It would be in the normal handwriting form, in the normal.
13:11:51 25 That makes you the operator manipulating on the code and getting
26 the message in black and white. For example, we refer to map,
27 M-A-P. In actual terms M-A-P is map, but we used the code to say
28 "XYH" instead of M-A-P, so that is left with the operator to
29 transcribe that particular letter which has been supplied for

1 M-A-P, which is not just routine clear form.

2 Q. Now, when the combatant commander of a station has a
3 message to transmit, in what form does he pass it to the
4 operator, or to his adjutant?

13:12:35 5 A. He explains to the adjutant, the adjutant writes it on a
6 piece of paper, he brings it to the station and the operator in
7 turn transcribes that message in code and that is going to be
8 transmitted to the other station. The recipient gets that
9 message, or receives that message, and makes use of the code to
13:12:55 10 put it in actual writing.

11 Q. Thank you. Now apart from two persons who were
12 communicating to each other on the net - on the radio network -
13 would other persons who were not involved in the communication
14 also be privy to that communication?

13:13:18 15 A. Yes, provided you are on the same frequency you can get
16 whatever they are saying. That was in fact the reason of us
17 using code, because no frequency is invulnerable. All
18 frequencies are set to be vulnerable. You are talking on this
19 frequency, who knows, maybe somebody else is in the distance who
13:13:41 20 is having that same frequency on his radio. You don't know.

21 Q. And so what do you - would happen in a situation where two
22 persons are communicating and you were not the person to whom a
23 message was being sent, or you were not the person sending the
24 message? What do you do?

13:14:04 25 A. It was to listen. You monitor that message and it was
26 really important for all operators to take whatever message that
27 was transmitted on the air. That keeps you in line with the
28 recent development. Maybe there is an attack going on around
29 your area and there is a station reporting on that particular

1 event, so if you don't receive that message you may not know what
2 is happening.

13:14:39 3 Q. Now earlier you mentioned that when one caller gets to
4 another caller on the network, usually on the national frequency,
5 they then agree to move on to another frequency?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And then they can have a conversation there?

8 A. Yes, sir.

13:14:51 9 Q. And you also mention that there were predesignated
10 frequencies, which you have already explained. If they were not
11 going on to a predesignated frequency, could they go to any other
12 frequency?

13 A. Yes, they would select by using the code.

14 Q. When you say "they would select", what do you mean?

13:15:09 15 A. For example, I have a - I want us to tune to 60220 and
16 using this code I will put this 60220 in code and transmit this
17 code to the other operator. He decodes that code I'm going to
18 give him and we tune to this frequency.

13:15:43 19 Q. Right, thank you. Now, you mentioned earlier that the
20 frequencies which you operated on within the RUF in Sierra Leone
21 were also available to certain radio stations in Liberia. Is
22 that correct?

23 A. Yes, sir. In fact, we were on the same net. Those
24 stations I have named, we were on the same net. We were almost
13:16:03 25 on the same net.

26 Q. Now was it the same with your stations in Sierra Leone, the
27 RUF stations? Could you also monitor what was going on from the
28 other side?

29 A. Yes, sir. We were on the same radio net and, when I say

1 radio net in communication, that is a group of radio stations
2 working on selected frequencies.

13:16:38 3 Q. And the radios that were within this net, could you just
4 name them again that were operating within this very restricted
5 net?

6 A. The stations I communicated with were Base 1, 020 and that
7 Foxtrot Yankee, and of course I had - the radio I was operating
8 in the jungle with General Yeaten was call sign 72 - 72 - and the
9 one left on the base was 72 Victor. So, wherever we went on
13:17:02 10 jungle operations I used the mobile radio set 72. 072.

11 Q. Thank you. Before we talk about the period that you were
12 over in Liberia and were operating the radios that you have just
13 mentioned, let us for this moment focus on the time before you
14 left to go to Liberia.

13:17:25 15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Okay?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. And within this period which radios were within the network
19 that could --

13:17:36 20 A. The same radios, Base 1, 20 and Foxtrot Yankee, if I knew
21 Base 1 was at that location that I have mentioned when I cross
22 into Liberia.

23 Q. Okay. And on the Sierra Leone side which radios could
24 communicate to those radios?

13:17:53 25 A. Stations mandated to communicate with those stations I have
26 just named were Marvel and Planet 1.

27 Q. And who mandated, who gave the authority, for these
28 stations to communicate with --

29 A. Sam Bockarie.

1 Q. Could anybody else give that authority?

2 A. Sometimes General Issa, but really it was Sam Bockarie most
3 often giving mandate to call those stations. And those stations
4 as well could call us. Those stations could call us. We were
13:18:45 5 called sometimes to tell Log, that is Sam Bockarie, to put on the
6 21, that is to put on the telephone. Those calls came from 020,
7 call sign Base 1. They --

8 Q. So - continue, please.

9 A. They could call us and say, "The principal on this side
13:19:04 10 wants the principal to get on the 21", so we would rush to inform
11 Sam Bockarie to go on the telephone.

12 Q. Now, you have mentioned the word "telephone" here. We are
13 at this moment talking about radios. Was there any other form of
14 communication which the RUF used to communicate apart from

13:19:27 15 radios?

16 A. No, telephone satellite. Mobile satellite phone.

17 Q. A mobile satellite phone?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Now, who used the mobile satellite phone?

13:19:39 20 A. Sam Bockarie brought those satellite phones. He brought
21 the mobile satellite phone and told us he had been given that
22 phone by his chief.

23 Q. Do you recall when you first saw Bockarie with the mobile
24 satellite phone?

13:19:51 25 A. I saw him with that phone in Kenema, when I was travelling.

26 Q. When you say he reported that he had been given the phone
27 by his chief, who do we refer to?

28 A. The President Charles Taylor. He was the one he used to
29 refer to as his chief.

1 Q. Now, you say you saw Bockarie with a mobile satellite phone
2 in Kenema. When was this, can you remind us?

3 A. That was 1997.

4 Q. About what period in '97?

13:20:27 5 A. During the AFRC.

6 Q. Okay. And --

7 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, before you leave the radio
8 net, the witness testified that both Sierra Leone and Liberia
9 were on the same net. I'm just wondering did they also share the
10 same code?

13:20:48

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, at some point in time we had the same
12 code. The stations in Liberia I'm referring to were Base 1, call
13 sign 020 and Foxtrot Yankee. That's Foya. There the helicopter
14 used to land. There was a radio station there which had our
15 code.

13:21:13

16 MR BANGURA:

17 Q. How were these codes shared? How did they get your code?

18 A. I can remember giving code to Sunlight myself and one to
19 Sky 1 when I was to get to Liberia.

13:21:30

20 Q. But before this time that you took codes to Sunlight and to
21 Base 1 there had been communications with Liberia. Is that
22 correct?

23 A. Yes, sir. Daff knew their code. Daff. And again --

24 Q. Just pause. When you say "Daff knew their code", what
25 period are we talking of?

13:21:52

26 A. Long before, before I went to Liberia, okay? And besides
27 there was a man sent to work with Sam Bockarie, he was a radio
28 operator. In fact, at some point in time he led the signal unit.
29 He was called Sallay. So most times it was Sallay who was called

1 to talk to his brothers in a very [indiscernible] dialect that we
2 did not understand, but this man, Sallay, got killed at some
3 point in time in Foya and of course nobody knew what killed him.

4 Q. Now, can you give the full name of --

13:22:31 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: I'm not sure what is Daff? Is that
6 initials, or?

7 MR BANGURA: I am just getting on to that:

8 Q. Now, you've mentioned Daff as a person who knew the code
9 before.

13:22:43 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. What is Daff's - your Honours, we actually have evidence,
12 but who was Daff?

13 A. Daff was a senior operator.

14 Q. And what was his actual name?

13:22:57 15 A. Dauda Fonni.

16 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, there is evidence already
17 regarding the name:

18 Q. You also mentioned the name --

19 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Do we have the spelling of these names?

13:23:07 20 MR BANGURA: I believe he did:

21 Q. Can you spell Fonni?

22 A. F-O-N-N-I.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Okay.

24 MR BANGURA:

13:23:13 25 Q. You mentioned also the name of somebody Sallay?

26 A. Sallay Duwor.

27 Q. Can you - your Honours, the --

28 A. S-A-L-L-A-Y, Sallay, D-U-W-O-R.

29 Q. Now, who sent Sallay Duwor to Sam Bockarie? You said he

1 was sent to Sam Bockarie at one point?

2 A. He came from Liberia. He was just a Liberian.

3 Q. Yes, but, you know, how did he come to Sam Bockarie?

4 A. During the time the ULIMO-K had cut off, they cut off the
13:23:50 5 link between the RUF and the NPFL, Sallay Duwor together with
6 Jungle were left in a cut off in the jungle around Foya, so when
7 ECOMOG came to disarm the NPFL and the ULIMO-K fighters they
8 crossed into Sierra Leone and stayed with Sam Bockarie.

9 Q. You mentioned something about Duwor coming to help with
13:24:20 10 communications because of the problem with dialect?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Was it Duwor's intention to come and help only, or was he
13:24:32 15 assigned?

16 A. He was assigned.

17 Q. Who assigned him?

18 A. They came to Buedu. You know, the NPFL and the RUF had the
19 same command chain. They had that chain of command.

13:24:49 20 Q. So, are you able to say then who assigned him specifically?

21 A. This man Jungle was superior to Duwor. He was once the
22 radio operator with them in the jungle, so when they came to
23 Buedu to Sam Bockarie he was assigned to stay with Sam Bockarie
24 to enhance smooth communication with the other side.

13:25:19 25 Q. Now, you have mentioned the name of a man called Jungle.
26 Is that his real name?

27 A. Jungle was a man called Daniel Tamba, alias Jungle.

28 Q. And your evidence is that Sallay Duwor used to serve Jungle
29 in the jungle --

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. -- as an operator?

3 A. Yes, sir, and so when there was that difficulty in flow of
4 communication he was sent to take care of that particular area.

13:25:55 5 At that time Nya and others were somewhere around Makeni, Kono,
6 within that axis.

7 Q. Which group did Jungle belong to?

8 A. To NPFL.

9 Q. And do you recall what time he moved over to Sierra Leone
13:26:17 10 along with Sallay?

11 A. When disarmament started in Liberia. In fact, at that time
12 we had the ULIMO-K fighters crossing to Liberia with arms and
13 ammunitions. They were selling weapons and ammunitions to Sam

14 Bockarie and the message was transmitted to One One X-ray, that
13:26:42 15 was in Abidjan to Corporal Sankoh at the time he was then. Then
16 he sent money with one radio operator called Cat, Martin Moinama.

17 Martin Moinama came with that money and handed it over to Sam
18 Bockarie. So, they went on that transaction until we had
19 information from the SLAs. They tuned on our frequency and

13:27:08 20 called us to have Sam Bockarie available on the set for them to
21 talk.

22 Q. Now, let's just go back briefly. You mentioned something
23 about ULIMO-K fighters crossing to Liberia?

24 A. Into Sierra Leone.

13:27:24 25 Q. You meant to say Sierra Leone?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. Then you also mentioned the word One One X-ray?

28 A. That was the call sign of Corporal Sankoh at that time in
29 Abidjan.

1 Q. And then you also mentioned somebody called --

2 A. Martin Moinama, the Cat.

3 Q. You say the Cat. When you say Cat, how do you spell that?

4 A. That was his code name, C-A-T, Cat.

13:27:54 5 Q. Now, Sallay Duwor, do you know what group he belonged to?

6 A. Yes, to the NPFL of Liberia.

7 Q. Do you know how long Sallay Duwor stayed with Sam Bockarie?

8 A. From the time of intervention - or during the time of the
9 coup he travelled with Sam Bockarie on to that mission in

13:28:34 10 Voi njama, Vulture Operation. He killed himself in Foya.

11 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I just note that Vulture does
12 not come up.

13 THE WITNESS: That was the code name given to that
14 operation which was led by Colonel Olso on one Mosquito Spray.

13:29:04 15 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I see that --

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I note it's almost 1.30. We will
17 adjourn now, Mr Witness, for the lunchtime adjournment. We will
18 take a one hour adjournment and we will resume at 2.30. Please
19 adjourn court.

13:29:23 20 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

21 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Bangura, please proceed.

23 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour. Good afternoon,
24 Mr Witness. Your Honours, just before I move on, I just wish to
14:30:01 25 indicate to the Court that the document I was going to deal with
26 earlier on has now been made available for the Bench as well as
27 for my colleague on the other side.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. When you consider it
29 appropriate to deal with it, Mr Bangura, we will hear you.

1 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour:

2 Q. Mr Witness, we shall continue with your evidence. Just
3 before the break you did mention that communication with Liberia
4 was not only now limited to radio, but also included satellite
14:30:49 5 phone communication. Do you recall that?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And I think I asked you when was the first time you had a
8 satellite phone, or Sam Bockarie had a satellite phone with which
9 he communicated. Do you recall?

14:31:06 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. When did you say he first had a satellite phone?

12 A. In Kenema I saw him with a satellite phone.

13 Q. Do you know how he got that satellite phone?

14 A. The one I saw him in Kenema I cannot confirm, but at some
14:31:19 15 point in time, in Buedu, he told us that he got the satellite
16 phone from Liberia, his chief gave him one. The one he had
17 previously was blocked because of not paying his bills. That is
18 what he told us.

19 Q. So, at the same time as communications flowed - or rather
14:31:41 20 communications at this time then flowed two ways, is that
21 correct?

22 A. Yes, sir. At that time we only used to get a call from
23 either Base 1 or 020 to tell Log, that is Sam Bockarie, to put
24 the on his 21, that is to go on the telephone, that his chief
14:32:12 25 wants to talk to him. And we could move to have him informed and
26 he could then go on the telephone. And sometimes after the
27 telephone conversation he could come on the radio to issue
28 instructions that he has spoken to his chief and that is what he
29 said to implement.

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, what was that code for
2 Sam Bockarie?

3 THE WITNESS: Log, L-0-G.

4 MR BANGURA:

14:32:38 5 Q. Now you were coming back to radio communication and you
6 said that the code, the RUF code, was available to just a certain
7 number of radio stations in Liberia and they could freely monitor
8 and communicate with your stations in Buedu. Is that correct?

9 A. The time I am talking about they had the RUF code. When
14:33:09 10 the operation was going on in Voijnama, Lofa, we had a special
11 code that was with Base 1, 020, and call signs 072 and the
12 Foxtrot Yankee and we with operator Elevation who was General
13 Issa's personal radio operator.

14 Q. Yes. Now when you say when the operation was going on at
14:33:36 15 Voijnama, which operation are you talking about?

16 A. After Operation Vulture, there was another operation,
17 because after Operation Vulture the RUF men retreated then after
18 some time there was another attack on Voijnama.

19 Q. I shall come to that, Mr Witness. At this stage I just
14:33:56 20 want you to focus on communications with Liberia before these
21 operations came up, okay?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. And you said that even from before this time there had been
24 - there had always been a code which was common to radios on both
14:34:14 25 sides and you mentioned that Daf knew the code before. Is that
26 correct?

27 A. Yes, sir, that was the code the Liberians were using that
28 was known to Daf, Ebony Prince, Osman Tolo, Zedman and other
29 senior radio operators, King Perry.

1 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, a few points to correct on the
2 transcript. Page 113 line 21, I think Elevation.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes and it should be Operation Vulture.

4 MR BANGURA: And in fact going back to - this was before
14:35:08 5 the lunch break, page 105 line 9 there was the word "communicate"
6 or "communication", it should read - well, it read something
7 different. It read "indicate" or something of that sense. I
8 will just go back.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand these things are recorded
14:35:40 10 and are checked in the course of the evening, but Madam Court
11 Attendant is listening and will note those lines, Mr Bangura.

12 MR BANGURA: All right. Well, just for the present
13 position Elevation came up at just the point I was calling
14 attention to. Elevation came up differently as well.

14:36:04 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: That has been noted.

16 MR BANGURA:

17 Q. Yes, you recall that you mention that there was a point
18 when there had been communication in fact long before you moved
19 over to Liberia, correct?

14:36:19 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. And you said that the code was known, Daf knew the code and
22 the number of operators also knew the code?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Now you had said that at some stage you were restricted
14:36:30 25 from communicating with the other side. Is that right?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. Did you know the code at that time?

28 A. No, sir.

29 Q. How did you know then that this code was known by or was

1 common to radios on both sides? How were you able to tell?

2 A. Daf at some point in time whilst in Zogoda used to
3 communicate with other side in their code and that was quite
4 different from the one we were using.

14:37:00 5 Q. Was this in your presence?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And also later in Buedu before you moved over to Liberia
8 you were yourself able to communicate directly with the other
9 side. Is that correct?

14:37:15 10 A. Yes, sir. I was receiving call - I used to receive call and
11 pass on information to them.

12 Q. And did you yourself receive calls from these radio
13 stations that you have mentioned on the other side?

14 A. Messages in code were left with the station sergeants to
14:37:33 15 receive, while I had the mandate to establish the communication
16 with them.

17 Q. Who did you communicate with on the other side?

18 A. Sunlight, Dew and Sky 1.

19 Q. And did you receive calls from these operators that you
14:37:54 20 have just mentioned?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Now, talking about satellite phone, the use of a satellite
23 phone, normally how would communication be initiated when the
24 satellite phone is to be used?

14:38:16 25 A. We could call from either Base 1 or 020 to tell Log to put
26 on his 21, or sometimes from 020 Sky 1 could tell us, "Tell the
27 principal my principal on this side wants to talk to him. Tell
28 him to put on the 21."

29 Q. Now if you just remind us in more simple terms, in clearer

1 terms, when you say sometimes call from Base 0, whose radio would
2 be would that be?

3 A. That's Charles Taylor's radio at the Executive Mansion
4 Ground in Monrovia.

14:38:54 5 Q. Sorry, did you say Base 0?

6 A. 020.

7 Q. Sorry, I said Base 0.

8 A. Base 1 was the radio situated in Congo Town at Benjamin
9 Yeaten's house and that was operated by operators Sunlight and
14:39:10 10 Dew.

11 Q. Let us deal with one at a time. Now sometimes you said you
12 would get a call from Base 1 stating what? And this call would
13 be on where?

14 A. From Base 1 they could tell us to tell Log to go on the 21.

14:39:27 15 Q. And he when they say tell Log, who are they are referring
16 to?

17 A. Same Bockarie. They were referring to General
18 Sam Bockarie.

19 Q. When they say go on the 21 what do they mean?

14:39:41 20 A. That is to put the telephone on, go to the telephone.

21 Q. Which telephone?

22 A. The satellite telephone which Sam Bockarie had.

23 Q. And when he switched on the satellite phone who would he be
24 communicating with?

14:39:55 25 A. Sometimes from Base 1 the principal of Base 1 was Benjamin
26 Yeaten and the principal of 020 was the president.

27 Q. Now let's leave 020 out for the time being. Let's deal
28 with Base 1 and then we can come to 020. So from Base 1 again
29 who would be communicating with Bockarie on the other side?

1 A. Benjamin D Yeaten.

2 Q. Right. Now you mentioned earlier that the operators would
3 - to initiate the satellite communication calls they would
4 mention that one person wanted to talk to the other person using
14:40:34 5 certain code names. What code names did they use?

6 A. 50. Sometimes principal on this side wants to talk to Log,
7 or principal on this side want to be on to your principal.

8 Q. Now how do you know all of this?

9 A. When I crossed into Liberia I knew that Unit 50 was
14:40:53 10 Benjamin D Yeaten and at call sign 020 referring to the principal
11 was no other person but the President.

12 Q. Now before you even crossed over to Liberia did you
13 yourself field or receive any these calls?

14 A. I received the call and the station sergeant was
14:41:15 15 immediately informed and I went to have the principal informed.
16 That was Log, Sam Bockarie, and they went on the telephone, they
17 had conversations and whilst they were conversing he could
18 respond, say "Yes, sir. Yes, sir." And thereafter he could come
19 on the radio to prepare messages to be transmitted to the front
14:41:36 20 lines.

21 Q. Now when you say you received the call are you referring to
22 only one call?

23 A. It was not one call. Sometimes twice a day, sometimes one.
24 In fact we used to receive a call and when there was an operation
14:41:50 25 going on on the front lines.

26 Q. Now I am talking about you yourself as an operator at the
27 time. Did you receive these calls?

28 A. Yes, sir.

29 Q. You did. Now talking about the calls from 020, how would

1 they be initiated?

2 A. They could call us. Sometimes if our call sign - when it
3 was Bravo Zulu 4 they could call, "020 calling for Bravo Zulu 4"
4 and we could respond. And in response they could tell us, "Have
14:42:32 5 your principal informed to get on the 21, that the chief is on
6 the 21 the talk to him" and the message would be relayed to
7 Sam Bockarie.

8 Q. Now here you have just given an example using Bravo Zulu 4.
9 In your earlier testimony you said this was the previous call
14:42:52 10 sign for Bockarie's radio. Is that correct?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. So if you got a call on Bravo Zulu 4 it means that call
13 came before a certain time, a certain period in time. Is that
14 right?

14:43:03 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. It would be before what time?

17 A. Before the operation in Voinjama, because the call sign
18 changed to Planet 1 when the operation in Voinjama was carried
19 out and those recruits brought to Buedu. That was the time the
14:43:20 20 call sign changed.

21 Q. Now when there was a call from 020 and indicating that they
22 wanted Log to go on the 21, who would come on the 21 to speak to
23 Log?

24 A. They made reference to the chief. The operator could make
14:43:44 25 reference to the chief by telling us on the radio to have Log
26 informed to go on the telephone and Log was Sam Bockarie in the
27 code and the chief they were referring to was Charles Taylor.

28 Q. Now how did you know that he would be speaking to Charles
29 Taylor?

1 A. After their conversation himself could come on the radio to
2 draft message to be transmitted to the front line and he could
3 tell us. He never used to hide anything from us.

14:44:20 4 Q. Now apart from telling you, would you tell from the nature
5 of the conversation who he was talking to?

6 A. He could say, "Yes, sir", the thing would be implemented,
7 "Yes, sir", and thereafter he would go. We had the radio room
8 like this. In fact when the radio was transferred to the vehicle
9 and when the station was now in the vehicle the vehicle was
14:44:39 10 parked just by or let's say outside of the radio room where he
11 had the computer and the satellite phone.

12 Q. And did Bockarie in your experience and the time you were
13 with the RUF, who would he defer to by answering "Yes, sir" in
14 your recollection?

14:45:05 15 A. He could refer to Benjamin D Yeaten as sir and his chief.

16 Q. Apart from those two do you recall anyone else who would
17 call him on the radio and to whom he would answer "Yes, sir"?

18 A. No, I cannot confirm that.

19 MR BANGURA: Now, your Honours, at this stage I want to
14:45:34 20 deal with the document which I had referred to earlier.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.

22 MR BANGURA: Can the witness be shown - the document is
23 marked ERN 00047121:

24 Q. Mr Witness, do you recognise that piece of paper that has
14:46:11 25 been shown to you?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. What do you recognise it as?

28 A. It is an example of how the messages were processed. As
29 you can see the preamble, let's say for example there is a

1 message --

2 Q. Just before you get on to that, who prepared this document?

3 Do you know?

14:46:40

4 A. This was prepared in a form just to give clear explanation
5 about how messages were processed.

6 Q. Who prepared it?

7 A. I prepared this one.

8 Q. Okay, thank you. Now are you able to discuss this document
9 showing us how you - what you indicated in it?

14:47:02

10 A. Yes, sir. Like the one you have, let us say the message
11 you have up there, let us take for example --

12 Q. Now let me lead you.

13 A. Okay.

14:47:20

14 Q. At the top there we have got some reference - I mean
15 messages coming from a certain name, or code, and it is going to
16 a certain name and a code, is that correct?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. And then the subject and then the date, is that correct?

19 A. Yes, sir.

14:47:34

20 Q. Now, do you wish to comment on those at all?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Yes, please do.

14:47:58

23 A. This was an example like I was asked to explain how was the
24 code used in terms of transmitting and receiving of messages. So
25 this was drafted as a sort of example that you have words, for
26 example "enemy", and instead of calling the word "enemy" open on
27 the air like that, you use "535" as an example. Then you have
28 "attack", which is "Kilo 59 Alpha". So the operator in the
29 distance will have these code words and then having received this

1 message and looking into the code chart will be able to put those
2 code words into proper English and be written and transmitted, or
3 let us say presented to the commander. That was how we used the
4 code.

14:48:43 5 Q. So in the example in the first sentence there we see the
6 word "535" and you say that is just an example of a
7 representation of the word "enemy", is that correct?

8 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

9 Q. And "attack" is represented by the letters there and
14:49:02 10 numbers?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Next following that we see the numbers "60220" and the word
13 "state" underneath and it is circled. Can you comment on that?

14 A. Yes, sir. This is another method of preparing frequencies
14:49:23 15 apart from the one I spoke about being the predesignated code,
16 okay? This other method is - as you can see, you have
17 representations of 0, 00, 000, of course 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 on to
18 8, okay? Let us take, for example, you have a frequency like
19 this which is 70000 and you look out for the number 7. 7 is
14:50:00 20 represented by "U square".

21 MR ANYAH: Madam President, it is difficult to follow the
22 witness because I suspect he is pointing at the screen and going
23 from numbers to numbers, and obviously we cannot use the
24 projector, I suspect, because it might compromise the measures.
14:50:22 25 I don't know what middle ground can be struck under these
26 circumstances.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps if the witness held it up and
28 indicated, would that solve the problem, or perhaps even -
29 Mr Bangura, have you any suggestion?

1 MR BANGURA: [Microphone not activated].

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Your microphone, Mr Bangura. Your
3 microphone.

4 MR BANGURA: I am sorry.

14:50:56 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: You are going to refer him to the
6 numerical numbers listed?

7 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Would that resolve your problem,
9 Mr Anyah?

14:51:05 10 MR ANYAH: It appears that he apparently can come to the
11 overhead and point without it disclosing his - if that is the
12 case then that would be the preferred mode of --

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes [microphone not activated]. Please
14 proceed, Mr Bangura.

14:51:17 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Also, Mr Bangura, is this in any way
16 related to MFI-18? Are these the codes that he is picking out of
17 MFI-18, or are these made up codes that he has made up?

18 MR BANGURA: Well, they are not the same as the codes in
19 MFI-18. They are not.

14:51:36 20 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Okay.

21 THE WITNESS: This "535" and the "K59A", they are from that
22 code. That was demonstrated from that code, only for these
23 numbers, the example below.

24 MR BANGURA:

14:51:56 25 Q. Only for the sentence which has those codes?

26 A. Yes, sir. That was taken from there as an example and this
27 one was just formulated to be able to explain exactly how
28 frequencies were put in place.

29 Okay, now, you have "60220", The predesignated code with

1 the frequencies we spoke about. Now, this number could be
2 referred to as "state". So whilst they are communicating, if you
3 are told to go to "state" you only to introduce a frequency,
4 60220, but in the case you are to create another frequency which
14:52:40 5 has not been predesigned, this method could be used. For
6 example, you have 0 represented by this sign, 00 represented by
7 this sign, 000 represented by this sign, 1 represented by this
8 sign, 2 represented by this, 3 by this, okay?

9 Now, let us say you have a frequency which is 70000 and you
14:53:05 10 want to transmit this one to another operator, now you have for 7
11 - the representation for 7 is "U square" and 000 is "Y to the
12 third power" and one single zero is "question mark". So in
13 transmitting this particular frequency you just tell the operator
14 to take down and he responds and you go on. You say, "U square,
14:53:35 15 Y to the third power, question mark." He receives this and
16 looking into his code chart will be able to decode and know that
17 the frequency he is expected to tune to is 70000.

18 Q. Okay. Now, where there are - as you have in the code which
19 you have demonstrated, 70000, there are four zeros there, where
14:54:01 20 there are a series of numbers of the same digit, how do you treat
21 them?

22 A. Well, we first treat them multiple. The multiple digits
23 and next the double and then the single.

24 Q. So when you say the multiple, how many digits do you go to
14:54:17 25 first?

26 A. First the three digits, the three digit number is first
27 treated.

28 Q. And then the double?

29 A. The double and then the single.

1 Q. Okay. Now, this code, as you have demonstrated, was it the
2 sort of practice when you did not use the predesignated code?

3 A. Yes, sir.

14:54:50

4 Q. And this is not exactly what you used. What would you use,
5 which code would you use?

6 A. You use - for example, this is 70000. That is the
7 frequency you want to tune on your radio. Instead of calling
8 this one you call, "U square and Y to the third power, question
9 mark", and using this one, because you have representations, you
10 can now look at "U square" and "U square" is what? It is 7.

14:55:12

11 Then "Y to the third power" is 000 and you write that. Then
12 "question mark" is 0. Then you have your frequency set.

13 Q. Normally would you find all of these codes in the chart,
14 the code chart which is available to operators?

14:55:38

15 A. We had certain frequencies which were selected and given
16 code names and this was another method used to formulate
17 frequencies.

18 Q. Yes, understood, but when you decide not to go on the
19 predesignated frequencies and you decide to create your own
20 frequency as you have demonstrated --

14:56:01

21 A. This is the method used.

22 Q. And where would you find all these codes?

23 A. In the code chart.

24 Q. Thank you. This code chart, as you said, was created by
25 the commander, is that correct?

14:56:15

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. What about the operators? Would they have the code chart?

28 A. Yes, sir, otherwise there was not going to be any
29 communication.

1 Q. Thank you. Can you take your seat.

2 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, may I respectfully ask that this
3 document be tendered for identification?

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: A one page handwritten document. Madam
14:56:45 5 Court Attendant, do we have a written - an original for this? In
6 any event, it is a handwritten document. There is a date,
7 12/03/08, and it is MFI-19.

8 MR BANGURA: Thank you:

9 Q. Mr Witness, going back to communications within Sierra
14:57:16 10 Leone, the RUF within Sierra Leone, you recall in your earlier
11 testimony this morning that you said after the intervention
12 Johnny Paul Koroma moved to Buedu and at one point had a forum
13 radio conference with other commanders, is that correct?

14 A. Yes, sir.

14:57:39 15 Q. He gave orders, you said, that AFRC commanders should now
16 take command from Sam Bockarie, is that correct?

17 A. Yes, sir, and work as a team.

18 Q. Now, you did say that one of the commanders refused to
19 follow this order.

14:58:06 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. And who was this?

22 A. SAJ Musa.

23 Q. What became the state of communication between himself, SAJ
24 Musa, and the RUF generally over time?

14:58:28 25 A. There was not that much cordiality between the two
26 commanders.

27 Q. You said that the communication improved after his death,
28 after SAJ Musa's death, is that right?

29 A. The relationship with the SLAs and with Sam Bockarie, and

1 communicating with Gullit, really improved after the death of SAJ
2 Musa.

3 Q. When did SAJ Musa die?

14:59:11

4 A. I cannot come up with the actual date, but it was during
5 the venture to retake Freetown.

6 Q. Now, do you recall when this venture was to retake
7 Freetown?

8 A. It was 1999, early.

14:59:41

9 Q. Now, do you recall before the actual effort to take
10 Freetown - the actual attempt to take Freetown, what was the

11 state of communication between the RUF and SAJ Musa?

12 A. There was not that much flow of communication between them.

13 Q. Do you recall which group entered Freetown?

15:00:24

14 A. I only used to receive a call when I was on duty. In fact,
15 when you are on duty you have a right to stay in the station. I
16 was not all the time assigned on the radio set.

17 Q. And so what communication did you receive about the move to
18 Freetown?

15:00:57

19 A. In fact, the time I was on duty communicating with those
20 forces, that was the time they were already about to pull out
21 from Freetown and Gullit sent a message to Sam Bockarie that the
22 situation was tense and that they were without ammunitions. So

15:01:32

23 he told SAJ - I mean Gullit to stay at the particular location
24 and move to Rambo at a particular point, and communication was
25 going on between Rambo and Superman and the other commanders to
26 move in to reinforce Gullit at a particular point. But again he
27 told him, "If they mount - if the pressure is too much, if
28 pressure is mounted on you too much, take your time to retreat by
29 the peninsula, but before retreating you have to make the area

1 fearful to call the minds of the international community", and he
2 was doing that to maintain --

3 Q. Can I pause you, Mr Witness. Can you say who was saying
4 all of this to who?

15:02:21 5 A. Sam Bockarie was talking directly to Gullit.

6 Q. Can we go back and establish how the communications came
7 about between Sam Bockarie and Gullit. To your recollection,
8 when did you first get to know that there was communication going
9 on between Sam Bockarie and Gullit?

15:02:45 10 A. His operator was communicating to us.

11 Q. Whose operator?

12 A. Elongi ma.

13 Q. Whose operator is Elongi ma?

14 A. Gullit's operator.

15:02:57 15 Q. Can you spell that name, please?

16 A. E-L-O-N-G-I-M-A.

17 Q. Yes. What was the substance of that communication?

18 A. He used to give a report to Sam Bockarie, the position they
19 were and the situation in which they were. And entering Freetown
20 they were communicating still. So when they entered Freetown

15:03:26 21 they contacted Sam Bockarie that they were at the State House.

22 Q. Can you just pause. Your Honours, I see the name which the
23 witness gave is not --

24 THE WITNESS: Elongi ma who was the radio operator.

15:03:46 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: But it's been noted that there was a
26 spelling, Mr Bangura, so I think it will be picked up on record.

27 MR BANGURA:

28 Q. Yes, you said you - continue, please?

29 A. When they entered Freetown he contacted that they were at

1 the State House and then they reported that they had released
2 some prisoners from --

3 Q. Who reported that they were at State House?

15:04:21

4 A. Gullit reported to Sam Bockarie that he was at the State
5 House.

6 Q. Yes. Continue, please?

7 A. After some time, I think two or three days later, another
8 call was received from him stating that the pressure on them was
9 serious, but they had released some prisoners from Pademba Road.

15:04:42

10 I sent the names of those prisoners and then Sam Bockarie ordered
11 that all those prisoners be sent to his location there in Buedu.

12 Q. Now, just to pause there, Mr Witness. How did you know
13 this?

15:05:02

14 A. We were on set. When I was on set I used to collect
15 information and even when I was not on set operators used to give
16 us information and we read into the message book and collected
17 information.

18 Q. Did Gullit himself communicate directly with Sam Bockarie?

19 A. Yes, sir. In fact that was frequently occurring.

15:05:26

20 Q. And this was by what means?

21 A. On the radio.

22 Q. Now apart from Gullit calling Sam Bockarie did you get
23 information from Freetown from any other source?

15:05:45

24 A. The operator. The operator used to give us information and
25 in fact before taking over from any operator on duty you are
26 going to be supplied with necessary information. This is where I
27 have stopped with the communication. And again you will be
28 provided with what we call a logbook. You look into the logbook
29 and there follow with what is currently occurring. And based on

1 that we used to collect information from the front lines.

2 Q. Now you said that at some point there was this message
3 about the prisoners. Was there some other substance in the
4 communication with Bockarie with Gullit that you came to know
15:06:32 5 about?

6 A. At one time he told them - he told Gullit, he said, "Listen
7 to the radio." He said, "I have just had some interview with the
8 correspondent, BBC West African correspondent Mark Doyle, saying
9 if pressure is mounted on your position you have to burn some
15:06:58 10 government buildings, the oil refinery and try to pull out by the
11 peninsular and then find yourself to a particular location." He
12 said, "But you have to maintain communication with Rambo,
13 Superman and the other officers for smooth operations."

14 Q. Now you said that he informed - he told Gullit on the radio
15:07:23 15 to burn down public buildings. How did you know this?

16 A. It was openly stated on the radio and again he had an
17 interview with the BBC correspondent following that instruction.
18 He informed the combatant on the front line to listen to the
19 radio, that he had had interview with the BBC correspondent and
15:07:57 20 they would get the instructions.

21 Q. Did you yourself listen to that radio broadcast, BBC radio
22 broadcast?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Now in Sam Bockarie's radio communication with Gullit where
15:08:13 25 he ordered him to burn down public structures, do you recall the
26 exact words that he said --

27 A. He said --

28 Q. -- when he gave that order?

29 A. He said it in Krio.

1 Q. What exactly did he say in Krio?

2 A. He said, "If they mount pressure on us", he said, "I will
3 burn the fucking place."

4 Q. And translated what would that mean in English?

15:08:39 5 A. He said if pressure is mounted on them they should burn
6 down the buildings, the government buildings, and that will now
7 raise alarm.

8 Q. Now you used a word that came in Krio "fucking". Did that
9 feature in your translation that you gave in English? What did
10 he say? He said it in Krio. Can you give us that in English?

11 A. He said let them burn the entire place, more government
12 buildings and then mount pressure on them, that on Gullit -
13 Sam Bockarie then passed this instruction to Gullit.

14 Q. Yes, we get that in Krio, but when you put it in English it
15:09:31 15 sounds a little different because I understand Krio.

16 A. He said, "If the pressure is mounted on you", he said,
17 "Burn down the fucking place and try retreating by the
18 peninsular."

19 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that Superman and a number of
15:09:59 20 other commanders were also to be involved in coordinating
21 Gullit's retreat if he was to pull out of Freetown. Is that
22 correct?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Where was Superman at this time?

15:10:17 25 A. They are all within the same axis.

26 Q. Which axis?

27 A. The Freetown axis, the western, they were all within that
28 same axis.

29 Q. Do you know whether Superman himself was in Freetown?

1 A. I did not speak with Superman from Freetown.

2 Q. Who else was within the axis that you are talking about?

3 A. Colonel Rambo, Late Colonel Rambo.

4 Q. Any other commander that you recall? Okay. Do you know
15:11:03 5 whether these commanders Rambo and Superman were also in
6 communication with Gullit?

7 A. Yes, Bockarie told - ordered them to maintain flow of
8 communications.

9 Q. How did you know this?

15:11:27 10 A. Bockarie communicated with those people in open terms and
11 we were by the radio and when there was dialogue between them we
12 could hear.

13 Q. Now following Bockarie's order to Gullit to burn the place,
14 the fucking place down, did you learn of anything that happened
15:11:45 15 in Freetown during the course of that operation?

16 A. Elongima gave us information. He said with reference to
17 conversation between his Sunray, that is his commander he was
18 serving under, he said, "The men have gone on the rampage." He
19 said, "They are just killing people, they are wounding the
15:12:12 20 civilians." He said, "The area has become fearful."

21 Q. Now you mention a name just now, Sunray. Was that a normal
22 name?

23 A. For example, if I am operating under Mr X and that Mr X is
24 referred to as my Sunray. That was the code given to commanders,
15:12:34 25 sunray. That is the general.

26 Q. Meaning the commander who you operate would be your Sunray?

27 A. Yes, Sunray.

28 Q. That is the code name for your --

29 A. For the general commanders.

1 Q. Okay. And Elongima's message was to the effect that - can
2 you go over that again? His message was to what effect? What
3 did he say?

4 A. That the men have gone on the rampage. He said they are
15:12:59 5 just killing - wounding civilians.

6 Q. But what did he say in relation to his Sunray, meaning his
7 commander?

8 A. His commander?

9 Q. Yes, what did he say in relation to his commander?

15:13:10 10 A. He said his commander had gone somewhere around - because
11 he left them at certain point and told them he was going to
12 collect ammunition.

13 Q. Now apart from this --

14 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Sorry, what is the name of this person
15:13:28 15 you just called, Mr Bangura?

16 MR BANGURA: Elongi ma.

17 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Did you spell that before?

18 MR BANGURA: He spelt that before, E-L-U-G-E-M-A:

19 Q. Mr Witness, would you like to spell it again, please

15:13:45 20 A. E-L-O-N-G-I-M-A

21 Q. Now did you follow the activities of the group in Freetown
22 until the end of that operation?

23 A. We were serving duty and sometimes I was not on duty, at
24 times I was on duty, but I could read the details from the
15:14:30 25 message book.

26 Q. Now during the course of this operation in Freetown and you
27 were at Buedu do you recall any communication by Bockarie with
28 any other persons outside Sierra Leone?

29 A. He was in persistent communication with 020 and Base 1.

1 Q. Do you recall what was the subject of the communications he
2 had with those two stations?

3 A. Okay. Having heard the message about the release of the
4 prisoners from Pademba Road Prison and those that were released
15:15:21 5 were the former President of Sierra Leone, Joseph Saidu Momoh,
6 one Walter Nicholls, Dr Lee, a man who established a network
7 African BBC, Hilton Fyle, Victor Foh and some others. This
8 message was transmitted. In fact it was not transmitted. Base 1
9 intercepted that communication and later on called and 50 was
15:15:57 10 called to come on the radio and to talk to our principal. Our
11 principal requested to talk to 50 and the message was transmitted
12 to Sunlight. Sunlight made available his principal and 50 came
13 on the radio and then Sam Bockarie was congratulated. He said,
14 "I have heard - I have got the information." He said,
15:16:22 15 "Congratulations, job well done."

16 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness, but would you like to explain this
17 again using more the names of the persons who communicated rather
18 than their code names?

19 A. Sunlight.

15:16:36 20 Q. Sunlight meaning the operator for --

21 A. The operator for call sign Base 1.

22 Q. That is whose radio?

23 A. Benjamin D Yeaten's radio, the SSS director.

24 Q. Okay. So what happened? What did Sunlight do?

15:16:54 25 A. It was a conversation that was conducted between 50 and
26 Sam Bockarie.

27 Q. 50 meaning?

28 A. SSS director, Benjamin D Yeaten, general.

29 Q. Thank you. And what was the conversation about?

1 A. Sunlight monitored that conversation and reported to his
2 commander and then a request was made for 50 to get on the radio,
3 because we told him that, oh, this message had already been
4 received by Base 1.

15:17:35 5 Q. Which message did Sunlight monitor?

6 A. The release of the prisoners from Pademba Road Prison. And
7 whilst communicating with - that was Gullit's station
8 communicating with Sam Bockarie's radio station. Whilst
9 communicating and Sunlight intercepted that communication --

15:17:57 10 Q. From Liberia?

11 A. -- from Liberia and said he had got all necessary details,
12 okay. Sam Bockarie was then informed about this message and then
13 he came on set requesting to talk to 50 on the other side and 50
14 came on the radio. They had that radio conversation and in that
15:18:17 15 conversation 50 congratulated Sam Bockarie that indeed he had got
16 all the details, his operator had briefed him about all that was
17 communicated on that radio.

18 Q. What details? What did he specifically say about?

19 A. 50 stated that he had had the message of the release of the
15:18:38 20 prisoners from Pademba Road Prison, including ex-President Joseph
21 Saidu Momoh.

22 Q. Now, how did Sunlight - or how was Sunlight able to monitor
23 this message that was being communicated by Gullit to
24 Sam Bockarie, the initial message? How was Sunlight able to
15:18:59 25 monitor that?

26 A. Sunlight, like I said earlier, had access to our radio net.
27 They knew almost all our frequencies. There was nothing hidden
28 from them on our radio network.

29 Q. Now, in your experience was this the first time that a

1 Liberian radio was monitoring communications within the RUF
2 locally?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Do you recall any other situation?

15:19:31 5 A. Yes, I can recall at some point in time, in Kono, when we
6 were about to pull out.

7 Q. When was this?

8 A. That was in 1998.

9 Q. About when in 1998?

15:19:44 10 A. Some time in February 1998 after the intervention in
11 Freetown.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. Okay, Gullit commanded all the soldiers in Kono to retreat
14 to Kailahun. Then whilst they were communicating this message
15:20:00 15 Sunlight intercepted that communication and asked why we were
16 pulling out from Kono when the other forces were still around
17 Freetown, Makeni and some other areas. Then Gullit responded by
18 saying that he had something very important to be discussed with
19 Sam Bockarie and he insisted that we must set him for Kailahun
15:20:25 20 and that was what exactly we did.

21 Q. So this was the situation where Sunlight from Liberia
22 monitored directly what was going on internally within the RUF?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Now, apart from the present situation that we are
15:20:37 25 discussing, that the Freetown situation, apart from
26 congratulating Sam Bockarie did Benjamin Yeaten say anything else
27 in their conversation?

28 A. He sent a message of congratulations, that he has done so
29 well and he had had the message.

1 Q. Was this a one time communication only during the period
2 that the operation was in Freetown was going on?

3 A. There were calls, a number of calls, that I cannot recall.

15:21:18

4 Q. And what would be the subject of that communication in
5 these calls?

6 A. Calls sometimes from Sam Bockarie was situation report from
7 the front line and sometimes making requisition for materials,
8 that is ammunitions. In transmitting this message he could come
9 on the radio set and ask us to call Base 1 and we could call

15:21:42

10 Base 1, the operator could respond and then 50 could come on the
11 radio and then Sam Bockarie could tell 50 that he was hungry,
12 meaning --

13 Q. Mr Witness, before you go on even further, I am at this
14 moment restricting the question to the period of the Freetown

15:22:06

15 invasion. Is that clear?

16 A. Okay, sir.

17 Q. I am restricting the question to that period only and the
18 question is: Were there further, other communications apart from
19 the one in which Gullit's message was intercepted? Were there
20 other communications between Bockarie and Yeaten?

15:22:27

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What was the substance? What was the subject of those
23 communications?

24 A. When the AFRC/RUF retreated there was a free flow of
25 combatant, AFRC/RUF, crossing into Liberia. So Bockarie
26 travelled down to Liberia and had a discussion with Benjamin D
27 Yeaten that no armed AFRC/RUF must be allowed to cross into
28 Liberia, that they must tighten up their borders, okay, and that
29 there was a shortage of manpower because a good number of them

1 have crossed into Liberia. So 50 again commanded Sam Bockarie to
2 open a training base to recruit civilians and that was
3 implemented. The place was opened right there in Bunumbu Mababo
4 [phon].

15:23:33 5 Q. Now, apart from communications with Benjamin Yeaten's
6 radio, Base 1, during the Freetown invasion period was there
7 communication with any other station by Bockarie?

8 A. Yes, sir, 020.

9 Q. And how was this communication initiated?

15:23:56 10 A. 020 called on our radio frequency requesting Bockarie to go
11 on the 21.

12 Q. That is over the period of the Freetown invasion?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. And what happened after that?

15:24:12 15 A. After their telephone conversation Bockarie could then come
16 on the radio and draft message instructing commanders as how best
17 to manoeuvre to capture areas and Bockarie could tell us that he
18 had had contact with his chief.

19 Q. Now, in the particular Freetown situation, and not other
15:24:34 20 situations where there had been communications, what specifically
21 did Bockarie order his troops, meaning Gullit in Freetown, after
22 the conversation on the 21?

23 A. He could instruct Gullit to set ambushes to go on attacks
24 like that.

15:24:55 25 Q. Was this a one-off communication on the 21? Was it a
26 one-off communication?

27 A. No. No, sir.

28 Q. How do you know this?

29 A. I was there myself.

1 Q. Were you present when the satellite communication was going
2 on, or -

3 A. We were in the vehicle and sometimes by the vehicle, if I
4 was not on duty and we heard the satellite phone just in the room
15:25:28 5 and we had the vehicle parked, let us say, by the window.

6 Q. Now, during the period of the Freetown invasion was there
7 any form of support which was given to the fighters in Freetown
8 from Buedu?

9 A. Freetown is a long distance away from Buedu.

15:25:59 10 Q. Did the commanders in Freetown get any assistance, or any
11 support from Bockarie in Buedu at the time during the course of
12 the invasion?

13 A. All they were discussing really was strategy, giving them
14 instructions as how to manoeuvre to capture so and so area and
15:26:24 15 when the fighting was tough with them he could issue instructions
16 to pull out to a particular point. After 72 hours another
17 instruction could be transmitted.

18 Q. Did you hear anything about jets during the Freetown
19 invasion?

15:26:38 20 A. We had a monitoring team that was another group of radio
21 operators. Those were the SLAs: One Gbamayagi, Atati and the
22 other SLA I cannot just recall his name. They were tasked with
23 the responsibility of receiving messages from ECOMOG and decoding
24 that message. So that was then used to be transmitted to the
15:27:17 25 fighters on the front line, more especially the flying of the
26 jet, so they could just say on the air "448" meaning the ECOMOG
27 jet, or let us say jet bomber was up and everybody could take
28 concealment.

29 Q. Now, when you say 'take concealment', what do you mean?

1 A. To conceal, you know, to seek safety as the jet bomber was
2 on the air.

3 Q. You mentioned the numbers "448". What did they stand for?

4 A. "448" means "jet bomber is coming".

15:27:53 5 Q. Was this a coded message?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And this message would be coming from where?

8 A. From Buedu.

9 Q. Now, you mentioned the name of certain operators, SLA
15:28:04 10 operators. One of them you say is Gbamayagi and, your Honours, I
11 will spell that. What is the name of the other person you
12 mentioned?

13 A. Atati.

14 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I will spell Gbamayagi and I
15:28:16 15 will perhaps try and get the witness to try and spell that other
16 name.

17 A. G-B-A-M-A-Y-A-G-I.

18 Q. Okay, that has spelt Gbamayagi. What about the other name?

19 A. A-T-A-T-I, Atati.

15:28:31 20 Q. Okay.

21 A. The other one was called Sheku.

22 MR BANGURA: Sheku, your Honours, S-H-E-K-U:

23 Q. How were these operators able to break into the ECOMOG
24 code?

15:28:49 25 A. Those were SLAs, the Sierra Leone Army. Before joining the
26 RUF they had already been trained in Morse code and most of the
27 messages from ECOMOG were transmitted through by the Morse.

28 Q. Can you try and speak into the microphone, Mr Witness,
29 please.

1 A. Most of the messages transmitted by ECOMOG were transmitted
2 through the Morse code and those SLAs I am talking about had
3 already been trained in Morse key code communication before
4 joining the RUF.

15:29:30 5 Q. Thank you. Now, do you recall whether any other form of
6 support was coming from outside Sierra Leone for the RUF?

7 A. Yes, added to the three men I have named, one other one is
8 Ache. Ache was also part of the monitoring team.

9 Q. The SLA operators?

15:29:54 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Can you spell that?

12 A. Ache Pon [phon], Ache. We only used to call it in short,
13 Ache.

14 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, A-R-C-H-I-E?

15:30:11 15 A. Or A-C-H-E, take it like that, Ache.

16 Q. A-C-H-E?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 MR BANGURA: We will go by the witness's spelling, your
19 Honour:

15:30:20 20 Q. Now, was there any other support coming from outside Sierra
21 Leone for the Freetown operation as far as you recall?

22 A. For Freetown operation Sam Bockarie could cross into
23 Liberia to get materials, but really these things happened for
24 quite so long really to have to think to recollect.

15:30:49 25 Q. Now, when you say Sam Bockarie could --

26 A. Cross into Liberia to get ammunition.

27 Q. Are you saying that he did cross into Liberia during that
28 period? Is that what you are saying?

29 A. Yes, sir. In fact, at one time he had a call from Base 1

1 to report to Monrovia for briefing. He went and within 72 hours
2 time he came back.

3 Q. To your recollection the Freetown invasion lasted for a
4 certain period. Is that right?

15:31:20 5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. How long was it to your recollection?

7 A. Manoeuvring to go to Freetown, fighting in Freetown and the
8 time of withdrawal, I think happened in three weeks time,
9 approximately or estimatedly.

15:31:38 10 Q. And within that period you said Bockarie travelled to
11 Liberia?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. On a call from who?

14 A. From Base 1. Base 1, 020.

15:31:50 15 Q. Now, you have called two different radios here and meaning
16 from two different persons. Who particularly was Bockarie
17 answering a call to?

18 A. Messages were transmitted from Base 1 and reinforced by
19 020. Messages transmitted by 020 and reinforced by Base 1. That
15:32:16 20 was the kind of situation.

21 Q. Do you know why Bockarie was called to Liberia during that
22 period?

23 A. He went, according to him, that he was called by his chief
24 for briefing.

15:32:32 25 Q. And did anything happen? When he came back did you learn
26 what had happened in Liberia?

27 A. He came with some materials.

28 Q. What happened to those materials? What materials?

29 A. Ammunition and commanders were called to come from Kono to

1 receive those materials.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am sorry, Mr Bangura. What command?
4 RUF or what?

15:33:07 5 MR BANGURA: I will get the witness to clarify, your
6 Honour:

7 Q. When you say commanders were called from Kono to get the
8 materials, which commanders were called from Kono?

9 A. During that time the AFRC/RUF - the RUF was mixed up with
10 the SLAs and at that time the government soldiers were referred
11 to as the junta forces and the RUF were called the People's Army.

12 Q. Now at the time of the Freetown invasion what was the state
13 of RUF operations generally around the country, apart from the
14 troops in Freetown? Do you recall where RUF had operations at
15:33:53 15 that time, or about that period?

16 A. Around Segbwema. Somewhere around Segbwema.

17 Q. And do you recall who was there, I mean which commander was
18 there?

19 A. I can't recall now.

15:34:35 20 Q. Thank you. Now coming back to communications generally
21 between the RUF and Liberia, the other side, generally what was
22 the subject of these communications as far as you know? This is
23 not limiting you now to the period of the Freetown invasion, but
24 generally when you were at Buedu before you left to go across to
15:34:58 25 Liberia what would be the substance of these communications
26 between your radio in Buedu and the radios with which you
27 communicated in Liberia?

28 A. Sometimes it was Sam Bockarie requesting for ammunition.

29 Q. And to who would this request be made?

1 A. To Base 1. Base 1. And he could come on the set,
2 sometimes communicating with 50, and he could say he is hungry
3 and response could be, "The iron bird will come with your food."

4 Q. Now --

15:35:42 5 A. Meaning, when we talk about the iron bird we are referring
6 to a helicopter. And food, when he says he was hungry, that is
7 he needed a replenishment of ammunition.

8 MR BANGURA: Now, your Honours, I just notice that "iron
9 bird" has come up "board":

15:35:58 10 THE WITNESS: Iron bird. That was the helicopter.

11 MR BANGURA:

12 Q. Right. I believe bird is intended to be the bird?

13 A. And sometimes this information could be transmitted by 020.

14 Q. 020 is the radio station at the Executive Mansion?

15:36:18 15 A. Executive Mansion Ground.

16 Q. Now Sam Bockarie, if he wanted supply of ammunition would
17 come on the radio and would say he was hungry. Is that what you
18 said?

19 A. Yes, sir.

15:36:28 20 Q. And Yeaten would respond saying that the iron bird was
21 coming. How did 020, the Executive Mansion radio, get into this?
22 How would they get into this?

23 A. Sometimes the message was transmitted to Base 1 and the
24 movement of the iron bird to Foxtrot Yankee, which is Foya, could
15:36:48 25 be transmitted by 020.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Excuse me, Mr Bangura, I thought Base 1
27 was Benjamin Yeaten?

28 MR BANGURA: That is so, your Honour.

29 THE WITNESS: That is correct.

1 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: So Base 1, he would sometimes be
2 communicating with 50? I thought 50 was Benjamin Yeaten.

3 MR BANGURA: It doesn't sound right.

4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: You see.

15:37:14 5 THE WITNESS: That might be a slip of tongue.

6 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: I am looking at page 147, the last three
7 lines, 22, 23 and 24, you see? He is talking of Base 1
8 communicating with 50. What is that?

9 MR BANGURA:

15:37:30 10 Q. Can you clarify, Mr Witness, when these communications take
11 place - the question was specifically about communications
12 between Bockarie and Bockarie's radio stations referring - we are
13 referring here to Planet 1 and Marvel?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15:37:48 15 Q. Communications between Bockarie's station and the other
16 side. The question was the other side?

17 A. Base 1. Base 1.

18 Q. So when if Bockarie was in need he would normally
19 communicate with Base 1. Is that what you're saying?

15:38:05 20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. And how did 020, which is the other radio, how would they
22 come into this?

23 A. There was communication between 020 and Base 1.

24 Q. Yes.

15:38:18 25 A. Requests were sometimes made to Base 1 and the
26 acknowledgement of the movement of the iron bird, meaning the
27 helicopter, sometimes came from 020.

28 Q. Now, the request, how was it made? Was it made by radio or
29 was it made by another form of communication?

1 A. Sometimes by form of communication and sometimes verbally
2 between Sam Bockarie and 50.

3 Q. Now when you say verbally, would they communicate on the
4 radio?

15:38:52 5 A. That is when we talk about verbal communication you are
6 having the commander himself on set and the commander in the
7 distance on set and communication going on between them.

8 Q. Without the use of operators on either side? Is that what
9 you're suggesting?

15:39:06 10 A. The operator trains the radio to a particular frequency and
11 calls the commander to come on the radio. So also the other
12 commander in the other station calls - I mean the other operator
13 in the distance calls the commander on set - I mean the two
14 commanders on set and they communicate directly.

15:39:26 15 Q. Now in these communications would there be people present
16 in the radio room when Bockarie communicated?

17 A. The radio operator is obliged to be by the radio.

18 Q. Have you been present in any of these communications when
19 Bockarie spoke to Benjamin Yeaten on the other side?

15:39:49 20 A. Yes, sir. Otherwise I would not have explained what I am
21 explaining here today.

22 Q. Now you mentioned that when a request is made for weapons
23 and to Base 1, Yeaten, that request would be transmitted to 020
24 which is the other radio, the radio at the Executive Mansion.

15:40:15 25 What would they then do when they got this request?

26 A. The communication we are talking about is purely about
27 ammunition. Ammunition.

28 Q. Yes?

29 A. Okay.

1 Q. And what would be the situation when 020 got this message?

2 A. They are could respond by telling Bockarie to go to Foxtrot
3 Yankee that the iron bird will be there with his food. That is
4 to go to Foya, the helicopter would be coming with the

15:40:49 5 ammunition. But sometimes they could call us to tell us to

6 expect either Zigzag and Colonel Jungle, or General Dopoe that
7 they were en route with materials to his location in Buedu.

8 Q. Now you have mentioned a few names. You mentioned Colonel
9 Jungle?

15:41:14 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Earlier in your evidence you mentioned Jungle. Are they
12 one and the same person?

13 A. Jungle, yes, sir. Jungle is the same Daniel Tamba.

14 Q. Right. And you also have now mentioned Dopoe. Who is that
15:41:28 15 person?

16 A. Dopoe Menkarzon was said to be a special force in the NPFL,
17 but at one point in time crossed into Sierra Leone. He was asked
18 to return because they carried out certain operation which led to
19 the killing of civilians in Sierra Leone. That was early 1992.

15:41:51 20 The operation was code named Top 20. They killed our people and

21 the people grew annoyed. They had to in turn go on the rampage

22 to fight against them. In fact they were saying that Corporal

23 Sankoh was nobody, that they were only answerable to Charles

24 Taylor. And a particular group came. After Top 20 that was

15:42:14 25 resisted. They again carried out another operation called Top

26 40. They killed our people. We could not bear it up, you know.

27 There was that confrontation between the Liberians and the junior

28 commandos. So they told us that their chief was working out

29 modalities to send or dispatch a particular group that was to

1 calm down that situation. So we received a group. They referred
2 to them as Special Forces, SBUs. They came into Sierra Leone and
3 they had Dopoe and others disarmed. They were sent back to
4 Gbarnga.

15:42:52 5 Q. So Dopoe Menkarzon had been in Sierra Leone long before
6 this time?

7 A. Yes, they were the ones that entered into Sierra Leone in
8 1991, but because of their mischievous attitude --

9 Q. Okay, thank you, Mr Witness.

15:43:04 10 A. He was deported. He started coming in again with arms and
11 ammunitions at the time Sam Bockarie was in Buedu.

12 Q. About what time was this? When did they start coming -
13 when did they restart coming into Buedu with arms and ammunition?

14 A. They started coming back to Buedu in the year 1998 and he
15:43:25 15 remained coming until a UN patrol team started coming into Buedu.

16 Q. Now you also mentioned Jungle. You had mentioned a name
17 earlier. At what stage did Jungle get involved in the transport
18 of material from Liberia?

19 A. At first he was placed in a sort of cut off like I said.
15:43:54 20 At some point in time in 1993 the ULIMO-K cut off the supply line
21 between the RUF and the NPFL, but there was still a pocket of
22 NPFL fighters along the Sierra Leone-Liberian border. So when
23 ECOMOG came to disarm those combatants including Colonel Jungle
24 came on the side of the RUF and he was in Buedu with

15:44:26 25 Sam Bockarie.

26 Q. About what time did he actually join Sam Bockarie in Buedu?

27 A. This started - 1996 he started coming. But at that time
28 the road was still blocked.

29 Q. So when did he actually get involved in transporting --

1 A. 1998.

2 Q. '98?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. When in 1998?

15:44:49 5 A. In 1998 after the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown.

6 Q. And you mentioned also that Dopee Menkarzon started coming
7 back into Sierra Leone with materials from Liberia in '98. About
8 what time in '98?

9 A. After ECOMOG intervention.

15:45:10 10 Q. Now ECOMOG intervention we know was in what --

11 A. After ECOMOG intervention and Sam Bockarie retreated from
12 Kenema back to Buedu.

13 Q. Was it very long after the intervention that we are talking
14 about?

15:45:25 15 A. No, not. Not too long.

16 Q. Now what about Zigzag Marzah, do you know when he started
17 coming into Sierra Leone with materials?

18 A. The same time. The same time. And of course that Zigzag
19 was SOD, Special Operational Division.

15:45:42 20 Q. And which unit is that?

21 A. There was a unit in Liberia called SOD. Those were Charles
22 Taylor's security forces.

23 Q. Now these three men that you have just mentioned, now on
24 whose instructions did they come to Sierra Leone with material?

15:46:02 25 A. They could - in fact it was Sam Bockarie who told us that
26 his chief had told him that certain people were coming and the
27 operators could tell us. If it was Zigzag that was coming they
28 could tell us that Zigzag would be at your location, he has
29 moved. And if it were Jungle we were informed before that Jungle

1 was on the way coming.

2 Q. How would you be informed?

3 A. By the radio. The radio was meant for free flow of
4 communication. There was nothing hidden.

15:46:36 5 Q. With these messages that came about material, were they
6 messages that were written down or were they just -

7 A. Some of the messages. In fact transmitting messages about
8 the movement of materials were put into code.

9 Q. When you say they were put into code, would they not be
15:47:00 10 decoded using the normal code charts --

11 A. They were --

12 Q. -- that the operators had?

13 A. They were put into code. When our messages are put into
14 code they are then sent to be transcribed and recorded into the
15:47:14 15 operational books.

16 Q. Okay. Now, how frequently did these men bring materials
17 from Liberia to your recollection?

18 A. One cannot really state that they brought materials that
19 has taken five days and other materials is going to be sent, no,
15:47:40 20 but it was happening regularly.

21 Q. How regular? Weekly, monthly?

22 A. One cannot be precise on that, really, but this is the kind
23 of situation that I witnessed myself.

24 Q. How were the materials - how was the transaction initiated?

15:48:12 25 You have said that Bockarie, when he needed, he would indicate
26 that he was hungry and then how would the request be processed
27 from the other side?

28 A. We could at times send message requesting for materials,
29 ammunitions, in code, and they could in turn receive the message,

1 process it and the response would be transmitted to us, either
2 telling Bockarie to go to Foya, or telling us about the movement
3 of those men - any of those men I have mentioned into Buedu, or
4 sometimes to Foya. It was not certain: Today it is going to be
15:48:56 5 a helicopter flying from Monrovia to Foya with ammunition and
6 tomorrow it is going to be materials brought by Colonel Jungle,
7 either from Monrovia with the helicopter, or by the helicopter,
8 and moving from Foya on land. We had vehicles there in Foya.
9 When the helicopter came to Foya the materials were then loaded
15:49:19 10 into the vehicle and taken to Buedu.

11 Q. Now, was it --

12 A. Let me make that point clear. The flying of ammunitions
13 from Monrovia to Foya really came into being when the insurgents,
14 as the Liberians referred to them, the insurgents started
15:49:46 15 attacking Lofa, Voinjama and its environs.

16 Q. When was this?

17 A. That was some time in 1999 and onwards to the last date we
18 closed down our communication.

19 Q. Before this time how were materials transported from
15:50:03 20 Liberia to Sierra Leone?

21 A. On land. On land. Sam Bockarie could go to Monrovia and
22 come with ammunitions in a vehicle. He had a ten tyre truck that
23 he was travelling by quite often into Liberia and back, but the
24 flying started when there was a threat in Lofa County. Fighting
15:50:25 25 was taking place in Lofa County. That was the time they
26 strategised the flying of ammunitions by air to Foya. we had a
27 special group of armed men assigned in Foya and that group
28 included one FOC and one other Takpo. They were in Foya. They
29 were there to take care of - to keep security at the airfield.

1 Q. Now, FOC, did he have another name?

2 A. I only knew him to be FOC. He was a bodyguard to Corporal
3 Sankoh and when Sankoh left for Yamoussoukro he was ordered to
4 work with Sam Bockarie.

15:51:08 5 Q. Now, you mentioned another name, Takpo. Can you spell that
6 name, please?

7 A. T-A-K-P-O, Takpo.

8 Q. Who was Takpo?

9 A. Takpo was an RUF soldier sent to Foya.

15:51:31 10 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Takpo was spelt T-A-K-P-O. I
11 see "B" comes up:

12 Q. Sorry, you said he was an RUF soldier sent to Foya?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. What was the purpose of him being sent to Foya?

15:51:50 15 A. He was there to provide security at the airfield where the
16 helicopter used to land.

17 Q. How important was Foya?

18 A. Foya was a strategic point wherein we used to coordinate to
19 meet with those who were sent from Monrovia and those to be, let
20 us say, taken to Monrovia from Sierra Leone. In fact, Eddie

15:52:13 21 Kanneh, who was given the responsibility to take diamonds across,
22 used to get to Foya to await the helicopter to fly into Monrovia.

23 Q. Now, you said that Takpo was stationed at - or posted to
24 Foya to provide security. Did the RUF maintain security around
15:52:43 25 Foya, or in Foya regularly?

26 A. Men were assigned along with Takpo, men were assigned, and
27 their responsibility was purely to keep security on the airfield.

28 Q. What was the movement/flow of people? I am talking about
29 the RUF, like between Buedu and Foya normally. Between Buedu and

1 Foya what was the frequency of movement of RUF personnel between
2 those two points?

3 A. There was no hindrance at all.

15:53:39

4 Q. And this Foya was - Foya was on the Liberian side, is that
5 correct?

6 A. Foya was on the Liberian side, yes.

7 Q. And Buedu on the Sierra Leone side?

8 A. Yes, sir.

15:53:49

9 Q. And the question was how was the flow of people, the RUF
10 personnel, across the border to Liberia?

11 A. It was frequently. The flow was frequent.

12 Q. Thank you. Now, you said that before the route became
13 unsafe to travel by road supplies from Liberia would come always
14 by road, by vehicle, is that correct?

15:54:16

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Now, who would go for these supplies to Liberia?

15:54:41

17 A. Sometimes Sam Bockarie himself and sometimes Zigzag could
18 come with these materials, Colonel Jungle could come with these
19 materials, Dopoe and late during General Issa's regime, and at
20 that time Superman and others were fighting in Lofa, there was a
21 man called Amphibian Father, Roland Duoh, was also coming with
22 materials and Mosquito, one black Liberian Mosquito, also used to
23 come with the ammunitions to Buedu.

24 Q. And this was around what period?

15:55:03

25 A. That was in the year 2000.

26 Q. Okay. Now, when supplies came from Liberia by road, how
27 were they conveyed?

28 A. From Foya in a vehicle to Buedu and in Buedu there was a
29 unit called G4 and one Captain Felix was the commander of that

1 unit. So the materials could be handed over to Felix for
2 safekeeping.

3 Q. What about the situation where they were flown to Foya?
4 How were they then conveyed to Buedu?

15:55:47 5 A. By vehicles.

6 Q. Who provided the vehicles?

7 A. Mosquito had vehicles on the ground there in Buedu. There
8 were vehicles in Liberia with the Liberian soldiers. They used
9 to sometimes make use of their own vehicles, or sometimes they
10 asked Mosquito to send vehicles to take the materials to his
11 location.

12 Q. Now, these men who you have mentioned, particularly Zigzag
13 Marzah, Dopoe Menkarzon and Jungle, did they ever stay in Sierra
14 Leone after 1998?

15:56:27 15 A. They only came with materials and returned and even when
16 they came, their movement was restricted.

17 Q. Was there any kind of documentation kept for material which
18 was brought across from Liberia?

19 A. Materials - the G4 used to take account of those materials.
15:56:51 20 That was what - and sometimes they came with document and
21 Sam Bockarie could sign that document which was taken back.

22 Q. Who would come with documents?

23 A. If it were Jungle that came with the materials he could
24 come with the document and that document had to be signed, so
15:57:10 25 also with the other men.

26 Q. Now, apart from ammunitions what else came from Liberia?

27 A. Petrol, medicine and sometimes food and in General Issa's
28 regime I was there when some cartons of military fatigue, and
29 that was referred to in Liberia as the immigration combat

1 fatigue. It was in cartons brought by the helicopter. Written
2 at the side of the cartons "Libya, workers' hardware" and those
3 were brought into Sierra Leone to General Issa Sesay.

4 Whilst in Monrovia at one point in time, that was the time
15:58:11 5 the operation in Guinea was about to take effect. There was a
6 man called Bulldog, Momoh Gibba, who at one time told me that he
7 was a Sierra Leonean from a village called Baoma Kukuma, very
8 short from my village. I spoke with him even in Mende. He
9 brought to Benjamin Yeaten's place AK rifles, automatic rifles,
15:58:38 10 and those rifles were referred to as multi-party assister. That
11 was the name given to those rifles. Those rifles were kept in
12 50's house. After some time the weapons were taken to James
13 Springs international airfield and flown into Foya and some of
14 those weapons were sent to General Issa's location in Kono and
15:59:02 15 the others remained with 50 in Foya, and those weapons were
16 supplied to the unarmed RUF combatant who were commanded to cross
17 into Liberia to take part in the Guinea operation. They were
18 supplied those weapons to cross into Guinea.

19 Q. About what time was this?

15:59:22 20 A. This was some time in 2001.

21 Q. Early or late?

22 A. Yes, early.

23 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I see that some words have come
24 up quite differently:

15:59:38 25 Q. Now, you mentioned Momoh Gibba. What is the alias that you
26 said?

27 A. Bulldog.

28 Q. Bulldog. Yes, I see it as "bull doing".

29 A. He was the aide-de-camp of the President Charles Taylor.

1 Q. And the rifles which you said were taken to Benjamin Yeaten
2 by Bulldog, what did you call them? What was the name given to
3 that kind of?

4 A. Multi-party.

16:00:09 5 Q. Okay. The airfield from which they were flown to Foya,
6 what is the name of it?

7 A. From James Springs. I don't know. Spriggs? James
8 Spriggs.

9 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, that would be S-P-R-I-G-G-S.

16:00:27 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, was the word "multi-party",
11 or "mortar party".

12 THE WITNESS: Multi.

13 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Multi as in many.

14 MR BANGURA: Multi, as I understand. Thank you.

16:00:47 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: There was also a village from which
16 Bulldog hailed. What was the name of that village?

17 THE WITNESS: Baoma Kukuma.

18 MR BANGURA: Baoma, your Honours, is B-A-O-M-A:

19 Q. What is Kukuma?

16:01:05 20 A. K-U-K-U-M-A.

21 Q. Thank you. Do you know what part of Sierra Leone that is,
22 which district?

23 A. That is in, I think, Kissi Teng. Kissi Teng chiefdom,
24 Kailahun District.

16:01:21 25 MR BANGURA: Kissi Teng is T-E-N-G for Teng:

26 Q. Now, Mr Witness, do you recall particular shipments of
27 weapons that came from Liberia - apart from the multi-party one
28 which you have mentioned, do you recall any particular shipment
29 that came through from Liberia at any point in time?

1 A. Sam Bockarie himself came with materials in a ten tyre
2 truck.

3 Q. When was this?

4 A. That was before the operation set in for Kono.

16:02:04 5 Q. When was this?

6 A. That was some time in 1998.

7 Q. About what month?

8 A. I cannot give you any precise month.

9 Q. When you say that it was before the operation in Kono, when
16:02:22 10 was the operation in Kono?

11 A. Somewhere around getting to December. November to
12 December, within.

13 Q. So was this shipment long before that operation?

14 A. Not too long. No, not too long.

16:02:45 15 Q. Now as far as you remember what was the content of the
16 material brought in that shipment?

17 A. It was ammunition.

18 Q. What kind of ammunition?

19 A. Materials - ammunitions that came in were mostly AK rounds
16:03:12 20 and RPG bombs and GMG, but it came to a time when the RPG bomb
21 was not coming.

22 Q. Now let us first of all just focus on this one. How did
23 the shipment come?

24 A. Mosquito himself went across Liberia and brought those
16:03:38 25 materials in a truck.

26 Q. Now when Mosquito travelled to Liberia did he travel alone?

27 A. He could go along with radio operators, combat medics and
28 his bodyguards.

29 Q. Now have you yourself travelled with Mosquito to Liberia

1 before?

2 A. Yes, I can remember travelling to Foya. What I told the
3 investigator last, I was not sure really whether it was during
4 the time of the Freetown operation, that was yet to be confirmed.

16:04:21 5 But I could remember travelling to Foya, myself, Zedman and one
6 operator, Tolo, were on board one of those communication
7 vehicles.

8 Q. Which one of the communication vehicles?

9 A. The one we had Marvel planted in. We went to Foya. In
16:04:40 10 fact at first he travelled to Foya and then he was flown into
11 Monrovia. He told us he was called by the chief. So he went to
12 Monrovia. After 72 hours he came back and we were called to
13 receive him at Foya. So those materials - in fact what we saw
14 coming from the helicopter were bales of jeans, were bales of
16:05:08 15 jeans, but when we got to Buedu on the contrary we saw the
16 content of those bales were ammunitions and the ammunitions were
17 handed over to the G4 in Buedu called Captain Felix.

18 Q. Now, Mr Witness, you started by saying that you told the
19 investigator, and you're not sure whether this was in the -
16:05:31 20 around the Freetown invasion. Are you referring to the time that
21 you went on this trip to Foya? Is that what you were trying to
22 say?

23 A. Yes, sir, together with about 18 of his bodyguards.

24 Q. Now this trip to Foya, was it before you left Buedu for
16:05:51 25 your assignment in Liberia?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. Right. And you say Bockarie had left before you went to
28 Buedu on a call to Monrovia. Is that right?

29 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. And you say he was called by who?

2 A. By his chief. That was what he told us. That after the
3 satellite conversation he was called by his chief and he was
4 travelling to Monrovia.

16:06:18 5 Q. And your understanding of his chief was?

6 A. Charles Taylor. That was what he told us.

7 Q. And he came back, you said, 72 hours later?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Where did he come?

16:06:34 10 A. To Foya and that very day back to Buedu.

11 Q. And you were informed that he was back at Foya. Did you
12 get informed before he arrived at Foya?

13 A. We were informed by the radio station 020 and also Base 1.

14 Q. Those are the radio stations in Liberia?

16:06:56 15 A. In Liberia.

16 Q. What were you specifically informed about?

17 A. That Log was on his way back to Foya.

18 Q. And so you went to Foya?

19 A. Yes, sir.

16:07:12 20 Q. Yourself and who?

21 A. We were on board the other vehicle and that vehicle was to
22 be used to transport those materials to Foya.

23 Q. Now when you say the other vehicle, which vehicle are you
24 talking about?

16:07:23 25 A. Marvel. There was another Land Cruiser which we had the
26 radio Marvel planted in.

27 Q. Right. And so you got to Foya. What happened when you got
28 there?

29 A. Sam Bockarie came on the helicopter.

1 Q. Who arrived there first, yourselves or the helicopter that
2 brought him?

3 A. We were there. We were there before his arrival. We had
4 already received information about his movement and we set in for
16:07:51 5 Foya.

6 Q. So you were there when the helicopter arrived?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. And what happened when it arrived?

9 A. The drivers were commanded to load those vehicles with
16:08:00 10 those bales of jeans.

11 Q. Now you said that those bales of jeans contained
12 ammunition. How did you know this?

13 A. When we got to the base, to Mosquito's ground --

14 Q. Where?

16:08:17 15 A. In Buedu. It was in Buedu those bales were dismantled and
16 he said that he is doing that not for any other purpose but
17 really to keep security, because journalists, according to him,
18 were going to Foya to really see the relationship that was going
19 on between the RUF and the Liberian side. So those materials
16:08:41 20 were concealed. Myself, I knew the content of those bales were
21 ammunitions when we arrived at Buedu.

22 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, the last answer started with in
23 and I don't quite make out what --

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: The word is Buedu.

16:09:19 25 MR BANGURA: Buedu comes up later in the sentence.

26 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: No, the sentence reads, "In Buedu" full
27 stop. "It was mainly in Buedu that those bales were dismantled."

28 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour:

29 Q. Now you said the reason for them being concealed in jeans

1 was to?

2 A. To maintain security.

3 Q. How did you know this?

4 A. Sam Bockarie told us everything when he arrived.

16:09:44 5 Q. Now do you recall any other shipment of arms and ammunition
6 or other material, very specific ones, not the general?

7 A. I have said materials were - ammunitions were coming in.

8 Q. Now how frequently would you recall that these materials
9 came in?

16:10:31 10 A. Materials were requested for when operations were going on
11 on the front lines.

12 Q. And were these requests ever denied?

13 A. No, no, only sometimes when requisition was made he was
14 told to wait a little while.

16:10:55 15 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, the witness's testimony has
16 been that materials means ammunition, but you then go on to ask
17 him a question can he tell us of any other shipment where arms
18 and ammunition were shipped, so I don't know.

19 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I believe I had in the
16:11:15 20 previous --

21 THE WITNESS: I have explained in the particular --

22 MR BANGURA: Mr Witness, just hold on, please. I believe I
23 had in a previous question asked him what the material consisted
24 of apart from ammunition, but I will get the witness to say
16:11:28 25 again:

26 Q. Mr Witness, apart from ammunition, the materials that were
27 brought from Liberia, what did they include apart from
28 ammunition?

29 A. Medicine, petrol and food. And I said during General

1 Issa's regime I saw those materials - the weapons in Monrovia,
2 Liberia, and we all flew to Foya and General Issa was in Foya.
3 He received those materials himself, those weapons, and the
4 combat I spoke of. He took those material to Sierra Leone. And
16:12:16 5 the others, I mean the few that remained were issued to the RUF
6 combatants who were to join forces with Benjamin D Yeaten to
7 cross into Guinea.

8 Q. Thank you. Now you have mentioned that Benjamin Yeaten was
9 the SSS director in Liberia. Is that correct?

16:12:41 10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Now, how did you get to know this?

12 A. When I arrived in Liberia, Foya, he came on board the
13 helicopter and he identified himself. But there was a
14 communication in fact about our movement in Foya that we were
16:13:00 15 there already awaiting his arrival. So when he came Zigzag
16 Marzah took me to him and I saluted him, then he explained to me
17 then he said we should - I should get on board the helicopter and
18 we flew to Gbarnga, from Gbarnga to Tenembu.

19 Q. Can I pause you there. You had said earlier in your
16:13:28 20 evidence that you were posted to Liberia some time in 1999. Is
21 that correct?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. When in 1999, can you recall again?

24 A. It was in the rainy season, between June/July, within that
16:13:47 25 really.

26 Q. And who made this assignment? Who assigned you to go to
27 Liberia?

28 A. It was General Issa Sesay who assigned - who told me to
29 take the set and move to Foya.

1 Q. At this time who was the leader? Who was in control or in
2 command of the RUF in Sierra Leone?

3 A. Sam Bockarie.

16:14:20

4 Q. Now was this assignment to the knowledge of Sam Bockarie as
5 far as you remember?

6 A. There was nothing went on in the command structure without
7 the knowledge of Sam Bockarie.

8 Q. Now what was the reason for your being assigned to Liberia
9 at this time?

16:14:36

10 A. He told me to go there to maintain smooth operations.

11 Q. What was happening at this time that required smooth
12 operations between the RUF and Liberia?

16:15:03

13 A. It was fighting that was taking place around Voinjama and
14 Voinjama was a strategic point, a supply route for the RUF. It
15 happened in 1993 when that supply route was cut off and the RUF
16 went under serious threat. So that route went across into
17 Liberia. 50 told me to transmit a message stating that if they
18 don't take that Voinjama issue seriously it will appear or it
19 will look like the situation which the RUF experienced or
20 suffered years back in 1993. So that particular Voinjama issue
21 was not treated lightly.

16:15:35

22 Q. Now when you say 50 ordered you to send a message, who
23 first of all were you to send this message to?

24 A. To General Issa Sesay.

16:15:55

25 Q. And when you say if they do not take the Voinjama issue
26 seriously, who were they? They?

27 A. They, General Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie and the other
28 commanders, the RUF.

29 Q. If they did not take the Voinjama situation seriously it

1 would be?

2 A. Like the situation in 1993.

3 Q. Now what did this mean in effect as far as you know?

4 A. That if Voinjama is not properly protected there was every
16:16:24 5 likelihood that it would fall in the hands of the insurgents.

6 Q. Now did you send this message across?

7 A. I was commanded to transmit messages and receive messages.

8 Q. Did you send this message across?

9 A. Yes, sir.

16:16:43 10 Q. Thank you. Now you said the day you - when you were
11 assigned to Liberia, the day you got to Foya you met with Zigzag
12 Marzah. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. And after a while - was it in the same day that Benjamin
16:16:57 15 Yeaten came?

16 A. Not the same day.

17 Q. When did he come?

18 A. The day after, 72 hours.

19 Q. How did he get there?

16:17:07 20 A. He flew to Foya.

21 Q. On what?

22 A. On a helicopter.

23 Q. Do you recall what kind of helicopter he was flying on?

24 A. In Liberia we had ATU helicopters. One was "ATU" written
16:17:29 25 on the side, "ATU001", "ATU002" and "ATU003", and we had one
26 small size helicopter written on it "SSS", another one "SSS2",
27 "SSS1", "SSS2" and there was another helicopter referred to as
28 "Weasua" used to also come there.

29 Q. Which one of these helicopters did Benjamin Yeaten arrive

1 on when he came to Foya to meet you, do you recall?

2 A. I think it was the ATU, because we had these three types of
3 helicopters flying to Foya.

16:18:19 4 Q. Okay, thank you. Can I ask you, Mr Witness, to try and
5 avoid using the pen and making any form of notes as you speak.

6 A. Okay, sir.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, Weasua, can you spell Weasua?

8 A. That was what I heard they were referring to, those other
9 flight thing. It is a sort of acronym.

16:18:42 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just pause, Mr Witness. Mr Anyah?

11 MR ANYAH: Yes, counsel's remark just alerted me to the
12 fact I think the witness has a piece of paper in front of him. I
13 don't know exactly what it is.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Have you some paper, Mr Witness?

16:18:57 15 MR BANGURA: No, it is not a piece of paper, your Honour.

16 MR ANYAH: It is late in the afternoon. I suspect I am
17 getting tired.

18 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I think I need to say that the
19 witness is really fond of using a pen. If I can ask that the pen
16:19:06 20 be removed from that. I think it is just something in him.

21 PRESIDING JUDGE: Maybe it is something he plays with.

22 MR BANGURA: Just the pen. Thank you:

23 Q. Now, these helicopters that you have described, did you
24 commonly see them in Monrovia, in Liberia, later?

16:19:34 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. Now, do you know which uses they were put to if you recall?

27 A. Like for the ATU helicopter, when sometimes in 2000 we were
28 in Kolahun, I was in Kolahun, and at that time declaration had
29 been made that it was LURD, Liberians United For Reconciliation

1 and Democracy, that were fighting Charles Taylor's government.
2 They were occupying Voinjama. They captured Voinjama and held it
3 for almost two to three months --

4 Q. Yes.

16:20:21 5 A. -- under their control.

6 Q. Now, what were the helicopters --

7 A. The ATU helicopter flew to Kolahun, took off from Kolahun
8 and went to Voinjama, bombarded and came back to Kolahun. There
9 again it was refilled with bombs and went back to Voinjama.

16:20:42 10 Q. Now, were the --

11 A. They were used as well as a sort of gun ship.

12 Q. The ATUs were used as gun ships? Is that what you are
13 saying?

14 A. The ATU helicopters were used as well to bombard enemy
16:20:59 15 locations.

16 Q. What about the SSS helicopters? Do you recall what uses
17 they were put to?

18 A. The SSS helicopters really were to transport I would say
19 two or three, four, five persons, very small size helicopter. I
16:21:15 20 flew on board this helicopter from Schefflein myself and General
21 Yeaten, from Schefflein, to Kolahun.

22 Q. Where did you fly from?

23 A. From Schefflein.

24 Q. Can you spell that name?

16:21:28 25 A. I heard it. That was the point we took off. I heard it
26 Camp Schefflein.

27 Q. Can you spell Schefflein? Are you able to spell
28 Schefflein?

29 MR BANGURA: I am informed, your Honours, that the name has

1 been spel t before.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I do recall it being spel t before,
3 but it would be handy to have it again.

16:22:13

4 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Perhaps the way it has been pronounced is
5 a bit misleading to the transcribers.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Proceed on, Mr Bangura. We can come back
7 to it.

8 MR BANGURA:

16:22:37

9 Q. Now, you said you had flown on one of these helicopters.
10 Which one were you referring to that you flew on?

11 A. The SSS that is from Camp Schefflein.

12 Q. You mentioned also the Weasua, or Weasua. What type of
13 helicopter was that?

16:22:57

14 A. When Sam Bockarie was in Buedu the Weasua was the one that
15 was really coming frequently to Foya. It was later on that the
16 ATU helicopter started flying.

17 Q. And when you say coming to Foya --

18 A. Flying to Foya.

19 Q. When you say coming to Foya, to do what?

16:23:13

20 A. Flying to Foya with materials.

21 Q. Okay. So the Weasua and then later the ATU, is that
22 correct?

23 A. Yes, sir.

16:23:30

24 Q. Yeaten on this occasion arrived on one of the ATUs. Is
25 that what you said earlier?

26 A. Yes, sir.

27 Q. And did you go anywhere from there with Yeaten?

28 A. We flew to Gbarnga, from Gbarnga to Tenembu. There is a
29 road. There is Voijnama, going towards - from Tenembu you are

1 heading for Zorzor, from Zorzor to Gbarnga. Those were the
2 prominent areas on that road, though there were some other
3 smaller settlements along the road.

4 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Now, your Honours, Tenembu is
16:24:02 5 T-E-N-E-M-B-U.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.

7 MR BANGURA:

8 Q. What did you go to do at Gbarnga?

9 A. He took me to the President's farm. He was there to attend
16:24:14 10 a meeting, but when he first collected me from Foya, we flew to
11 Gbarnga, he had a radio which we mounted his residence, or let us
12 say his house at the President's farm.

13 Q. Where?

14 A. In Gbarnga.

16:24:33 15 Q. Right.

16 A. From there I established communication with his station and
17 where he requested for some materials and the other day we set
18 him for Tenembu.

19 Q. Can you just pause. You went to Gbarnga and you said you
16:24:51 20 set up a radio there, is that correct?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. And after setting up the radio you established
23 communication with where?

24 A. With Base 1. Base 1 and telling Network - there was a man
16:25:08 25 called Network, who was Joe Tuah, he was referred to as Network,
26 Joe Tuah. Then he enquired from Joe Tuah to tell him about the
27 movement of the helicopter with materials to his location and
28 that Bulldog was in charge, he was to effect the movement of the
29 "iron bird" to his location. I remained there and the

1 communication was facilitated. Then the helicopter came with
2 materials. Then we set in for Tenembu.

3 Q. Did you hear this communication by Yeaten? Did you hear
4 this - how was this message communicated?

16:25:48 5 A. He told me to have Sunlight informed that he was in Gbarnga
6 and that Network should facilitate the movement of the iron bird
7 with materials to his location.

8 Q. I get it, but how was it communicated? How did you send
9 this message? Was it by radio?

16:26:07 10 A. By the radio.

11 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Your Honours, I now have the
12 spelling for Camp Schefflein. He said "suffering", but I think
13 it is Schefflein as I have it here, S-C-H-E-F-F-L-I-N [sic],
14 Schefflein:

16:26:29 15 Q. You said he was going to go to a meeting, Yeaten was going
16 to go to a meeting, earlier, is that correct?

17 A. Yes, with his chief.

18 Q. Who was his chief?

19 A. Charles Taylor.

16:26:42 20 Q. Where?

21 A. In Liberia. In fact, Yeaten, whilst we were moving, he
22 told me that in the military there was nobody whom he was not
23 superior to. So it was only the president that was superior to
24 him.

16:27:06 25 Q. Now, on this occasion you then went to Tenembu. What was
26 the purpose of your going to Tenembu?

27 A. We were setting for attack at Voinjama.

28 Q. What was a going on in Voinjama at the time?

29 A. Fighting. Fighting was going on in Voinjama.

1 Q. Who was fighting who?

2 A. At that time there was no declaration made, The time I am
3 talking about when we set in to attack Voinjama, but I was really
4 not on the front line fighting. My responsibility was just to

16:27:43 5 receive and transmit messages under command.

6 Q. Right.

7 A. Okay. I stopped at a particular village along that highway
8 and the armed men went to attack Voinjama, but twice it was
9 unsuccessful.

16:28:10 10 MR BANGURA: All right. Your Honours, I have a big area to
11 start off on if I --

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you going into another line of
13 evidence, Mr Bangura?

14 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour, that is right.

16:28:23 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: There is just one or so minutes left, two
16 minutes left, so it would be appropriate to adjourn at this
17 point.

18 Mr Witness, we are going to adjourn the Court until
19 tomorrow morning. I again remind you, as I did yesterday, that
16:28:37 20 you are under oath and from now until the time all your evidence
21 is finished you should not discuss your evidence with anyone
22 else.

23 THE WITNESS: I will not.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very good. Please adjourn court until
16:28:48 25 tomorrow at 9.30.

26 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.29 p.m.
27 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 9 April 2008 at
28 9.30 a.m.]

29

I N D E X

WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION:

TF1-516	6820
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR BANGURA	6820