



Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T

THE PROSECUTOR OF  
THE SPECIAL COURT  
V.  
CHARLES GHANKAY TAYLOR

WEDNESDAY, 6 FEBRUARY 2008  
9.30 A.M.  
TRIAL

TRIAL CHAMBER II

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Before the Judges:

Justice Teresa Doherty, Presiding  
Justice Richard Lussick  
Justice Julia Sebutinde  
Justice Al Hadji Malick Sow, Alternate

For Chambers:

Mr Simon Meisenberg  
Ms Doreen Kiggundu

For the Registry:

Ms Rachel Irura

For the Prosecution:

Mr Mohamed A Bangura  
Mr Nicholas Koumjian  
Ms Kirsten Keith  
Ms Christopher Santora

For the accused Charles Ghankay  
Taylor:

Mr Terry Munyard  
Mr Andrew Cayley

1 Wednesday, 6 February 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused present]

4 [Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.]

09:29:07 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good morning. I will take appearances.

6 Mr Bangura, I notice a change.

7 MR BANGURA: Good morning, your Honours. Your Honours, for  
8 the prosecution this morning: Nick Koumjian, Mohamed Bangura,  
9 Chris Santora and Kirsten Keith. Thank you.

09:29:29 10 MR CAYLEY: Yes, thank you, Madam President. For the  
11 Defence the same as yesterday: Andrew Cayley and Terry Munyard.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Cayley. Counsel, as you  
13 are aware the Bench thought we might have a more practical and  
14 beneficial use of our morning if we took the longer session first  
09:29:51 15 and the shorter session after the mid-morning break.

16 I understand that the parties and the Court Management have no  
17 objection, or difficulties if that proposed change is  
18 implemented, so we are going to start from this morning having  
19 the two hour session first and the one and a half hour session  
09:30:13 20 after the morning break and let us see how it works out.

21 If there are no other matters, I will remind the witness of  
22 his oath. Mr Witness, you recall that you have taken the oath to  
23 tell the truth. That oath is still binding on you and you must  
24 answer questions truthfully. Do you understand?

09:30:36 25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

26 WITNESS: TF1-360 [On former oath]

27 EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR BANGURA: [Continued]

28 Q. Good morning, Mr Witness.

29 A. Good morning, sir.

1 Q. We will continue with your evidence-in-chief this morning.  
2 Before we pick up from where we left off yesterday I just need  
3 for us to go through a few areas that we had actually gone  
4 through already. In your testimony yesterday, about the meeting  
09:31:25 5 that Superman had in Buedu with Mosquito, you gave a description  
6 of the location of Mosquito's house in Buedu and I believe we  
7 have it not in the manner in which it was actually given. Could  
8 you just go over that again. Where was Mosquito's house located  
9 in Buedu?

09:31:56 10 A. Mosquito, Sam Bockarie --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak up a  
12 little.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the interpreter is having a  
14 problem hearing you. Could you sit a little closer to the  
09:32:13 15 microphone and perhaps speak a little louder. If you can start  
16 again, please.

17 THE WITNESS: Mosquito, Sam Bockarie, was based in Buedu.  
18 He was in Buedu. His house was at Dawah Road. That road leads  
19 straight to Liberia and his house was the last house closer to  
09:32:52 20 the bush.

21 Q. Also yesterday in your testimony, Mr Witness, when  
22 discussing instructions which Sam Bockarie had had about the plan  
23 which was discussed at Buedu, you did mention that he had got  
24 instructions from Taylor. Now, can you be very clear about this:  
09:33:29 25 Did he get instructions regarding the plan which was discussed at  
26 Buedu?

27 A. Please repeat.

28 Q. Did Sam Bockarie get instructions from anyone about the  
29 plan that was discussed in Buedu, the plan which he discussed

1 with Superman in Buedu?

2 A. Yes, what he told us, he said he had instructions from  
3 Taylor. Both of them discussed before he left Liberia, before he  
4 left Liberia for Buedu.

09:34:11 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness is too fast.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, I am sorry I have to  
7 interrupt you again. Can you speak a little slower to allow the  
8 interpreter to interpret as you talk. Maybe we will repeat the  
9 answer.

09:34:30 10 MR BANGURA:

11 Q. Mr Witness, do you need the question to be asked again, or  
12 are you - the question was: Did Sam Bockarie receive any  
13 instructions from anyone about the plan which he discussed with  
14 Superman in Buedu?

09:34:51 15 A. Yes, he had an order from somebody and that person is  
16 Mr Taylor.

17 Q. How did you know this?

18 A. He himself explained to us during the meeting at Buedu.

19 Q. What exactly did he say?

09:35:11 20 A. He said this time round when he went to Taylor, Taylor  
21 called him and gave him instructions how he should begin to run  
22 operations in Sierra Leone. He told him everywhere - he told him  
23 the places where to attack and so when he returned he called all  
24 the prominent commanders and explained to them so that they could

09:35:39 25 take action with regard to the instructions. That is what he  
26 told us. That was one of the agenda items during the meeting  
27 which was discussed in Buedu.

28 Q. Now, regarding the movement of Superman from Superman  
29 Ground to Koinadugu, you did say yesterday that when Superman

1 arrived in Koinadugu he prepared an open message. The question  
2 was did you know what or how he was received in Buedu - in  
3 Koinadugu when he arrived there and your answer was he opened  
4 up - he prepared an open message. What do you mean when you said  
09:36:32 5 he prepared an open message?

6 A. What I mean when I talk about open message from Superman to  
7 all RUF stations, that was the way how SAJ Musa received it. He  
8 received him very well and welcomed him and all the fighters  
9 welcomed Superman and the manpower he took to them, so that  
09:37:01 10 message was open to all combatants to hear from Superman.

11 Q. Now, also yesterday we discussed the Fitti Fatta mission  
12 and you did say that your side took many casualties from that  
13 mission and some of the casualties were sent to Liberia for  
14 medical care, is that correct?

09:37:30 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Where in Liberia were they taken to?

17 A. It was in Monrovia.

18 Q. Do you know who facilitated this arrangement?

19 A. It was Sam Bockarie and Mr Taylor.

09:37:53 20 Q. How did you know this?

21 A. Like, for example, when those people were wounded his  
22 response to Superman was he had made arrangements with Mr Taylor:  
23 Whenever we had serious wounded fighters let them be taken to  
24 Buedu, so that he will send helicopters to take them from Foya.

09:38:19 25 Q. In your experience was this the first time that fighters of  
26 the RUF, or wounded fighters of the RUF, had been evacuated to  
27 Liberia for medical care?

28 A. No, any time we had serious wounded fighters they would  
29 take them to Liberia for treatment. Those who had problems would

1 be taken to Monrovi a, Li beria. The heli copter would take them to  
2 Monrovi a.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the counsel wait for  
4 the interpretation.

09:38:56 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Bangura, did you hear the interpreter?  
6 He asked if you would wait until the interpretation is finished  
7 before proceeding.

8 MR BANGURA: Sorry, your Honour. I am not on the  
9 interpreter's channel this morning. I am sorry about that.

09:39:11 10 THE WITNESS: I am not through.

11 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please finish your answer, Mr Witness.

12 THE WITNESS: I will give you one example: It was a senior  
13 man, Dennis Mingo, he had a serious accident during the time the  
14 RUF attacked UN in Makeni. He was taken to Taylor. Taylor  
09:39:39 15 requested for him. He said he should be taken to Liberia. He  
16 himself was taken for a helicopter, by a helicopter. He was  
17 taken to Liberia for treatment.

18 MR BANGURA:

19 Q. When was this?

09:39:55 20 A. It was in 2000, year 2000, during the time RUF attacked UN  
21 in Makeni.

22 Q. Thank you. Now, yesterday also we discussed a situation  
23 that occurred in Tombodu where Savage was a commander. Do you  
24 recall?

09:40:18 25 A. Yes.

26 Q. Your testimony was that Savage had been killing civilians  
27 who were in his care in Tombodu, is that right?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And that reports - this practice had been going on for over

1 a week and there were reports to the effect, is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, these reports that you talk about, were they widely  
4 circulated?

09:40:58 5 A. Yes, all the fighters, from the commander right down to the  
6 civilians who were under him, who were under the RUF control in  
7 Kono District, everybody knew that Savage's area had become  
8 fearful because the civilians who were in his care, he had  
9 started killing them over a week.

09:41:23 10 Q. Now, how long after these reports came out was any action  
11 taken to stop the killings?

12 A. It was during the second week. It was the second week when  
13 an action was taken to remove Savage.

14 Q. Now, apart from being removed, do you know whether any  
09:41:52 15 disciplinary action was taken against Savage?

16 A. No, I did not see any disciplinary action taken against him  
17 because he was sick, he was mad. He was not normal again, so he  
18 was taken to be treated.

19 Q. Thank you. Let us move on from where we left off yesterday  
09:42:16 20 and you were discussing your move from Superman Ground to  
21 Koinadugu, is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You had orders to move and who did the orders come from?

24 A. This order came from Sam Bockarie, Mosquito, and came to  
09:42:52 25 Morris Kallon and Kallon gave us the order, together with Alfred  
26 Brown, and we moved from Superman Ground.

27 Q. You did say you moved in the company of certain other  
28 people, apart from yourself and Brown, Alfred Brown, who were  
29 they?

1 A. Myself, Alfred Brown, Alfred Brown's security and his wife,  
2 and the people to whom we were going, Gullit, Five Five, Five  
3 Five's wife was amongst us, Gullit's wife was amongst us.

09:43:38 4 Q. Now, you said the people to whom you were going, which  
5 people were you going to?

6 A. We were going to Gullit, Rosos, but before we left for  
7 Rosos we were to go to Koinadugu.

8 Q. Why did you have to go to Rosos?

09:44:07 9 A. Why we had to go to Rosos, it was because of that plan  
10 which we went for a meeting in Buedu. That was why we went to  
11 Rosos and as I am speaking we did not just go there directly. We  
12 left Superman Ground, passed through Bai Bureh and went to  
13 Koinadugu.

09:44:33 14 Q. Now, you yourself were a radio operator. What was Alfred  
15 Brown? Was he a combatant, or a radio operator?

16 A. Alfred Brown was another senior man who was second to Nya  
17 and we always called him radio commander.

18 Q. So was he a combatant, or a radio man?

19 A. He was a radio operator.

09:45:06 20 Q. Now, can you tell this Court why the two of you radio  
21 operators were sent, or were ordered to go and join the forces at  
22 Rosos?

09:45:42 23 A. Yes, the reason is the plan that we had discussed about in  
24 the meeting at Buedu concerned a very serious operation and Rosos  
25 hadn't enough radio operators and even the radio machine and  
26 therefore Mosquito decided to send instruction to Morris Kallon  
27 to dispatch radio operators for them to go and establish  
28 effective communication at Rosos. That was the reason why Alfred  
29 Brown and I were appointed to join SAJ Musa and Superman at



1 Koinadugu, so that he would prepare us with equipment to join  
2 Gullit at Rosos, Colonel Eddie Ground.

3 Q. Now, you said that you had to go through Koinadugu to be  
4 prepared. What sort of preparation was to be made for your move  
09:46:33 5 to Rosos?

6 A. The preparation which they were to do for us to go to  
7 Rosos, they were to provide us arms and ammunition which Superman  
8 had taken to that place and they were also to contribute many  
9 fighters and a commander who was to lead us to Colonel Eddie  
09:47:14 10 Ground.

11 Q. How long were you at Koinadugu?

12 A. I spent some time at Koinadugu, but it didn't take me up to  
13 one week. From there we were prepared to go.

14 Q. Now, can you describe the composition of the group that was  
09:47:41 15 put together in Koinadugu for Rosos?

16 A. Yes, we were in groups. We had RUF in that group, there  
17 was STF in that group, then we had AFRC in that group, but in  
18 each of those groups there were units. For example, RUF had  
19 their communication unit in that group and as we got to Koinadugu  
09:48:24 20 SAJ Musa also provided two radio operators. Then we were then  
21 four in number. We were all there in the communication unit. We  
22 had a medical unit. We also had groups who were taking care of  
23 arms and ammunition and we also had our fighters. Among the  
24 fighters we had groups of Cobra Unit, a small group comprising  
09:48:59 25 Superman, Superman's bodyguards, and also we had the other units  
26 in the RUF. They were much more than the other groups. That was  
27 referred to as the Red Lion. Komba Gbundema's bodyguards were  
28 comprising this unit. We also had the STF, that was ULIMO from  
29 Liberia, but at that time they were being called STF. All these

1 groups were headed by commanders, but the overall commander in  
2 that group was 05, the group which was to come from Koinadugu to  
3 Rosos.

09:49:47 4 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness, just before we delve deeper into the  
5 composition of the group, can you - you said you were in  
6 Koinadugu for less than a week. During the period you were there  
7 --

8 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Excuse me, there was a name the witness  
9 mentioned quickly. Komba Gbundema, or something like that.

09:50:07 10 MR BANGURA: Komba is K-O-M-B-A and Gbundema is  
11 G-B-U-N-D-E-M-A and I see Cobra is spelt differently here. It is  
12 C-O-B-R-A. Thank you, your Honour:

13 Q. You said you were not up to a week in Koinadugu. During  
14 the period you were there what were your observations regarding  
09:50:47 15 cooperation between Superman and SAJ Musa?

16 A. What I observed between SAJ Musa and Superman, they were  
17 working cordially when I was there. They had no problem. I had  
18 never observed any problem between the two because I went to  
19 their training base, also I saw the RUF personnel. They were  
09:51:15 20 training the captured civilians and I also saw AFRC and STF  
21 training those civilians, and, again, they did not tell me about  
22 any problems. I saw them going on missions and they were coming,  
23 they were meeting together, discussing, no problems. That was  
24 what I observed in Koinadugu.

09:51:39 25 Q. Also, Mr Witness, can you tell this Court what was the  
26 state of communication between the base in Koinadugu and Buedu,  
27 as well as Rosos? What was generally the state of communication  
28 amongst the commanders at all of these locations during the  
29 period you were at Koinadugu?

1 A. Let me start from Rosos. Rosos communication did not - was  
2 not effective, but when I was in Koinadugu, when I got there,  
3 while SAJ Musa was there, Superman and other senior officers,  
4 together with Superman Ground where I came from, that is Kono,  
09:52:28 5 Morris Kallon's base, and also Buedu, Mosquito, Sam Bockarie,  
6 there was communication between them day and night. It was  
7 cordial. There was no problem.

8 Q. You have described the various groups that were put  
9 together, or units that were put together to form the group that  
09:52:56 10 was to leave Koinadugu for Rosos. Can you give us numbers? What  
11 was the contribution, in terms of numbers, of each of these units  
12 to the group as far as you are able to remember?

13 A. What I can recall, the official list which we had for the  
14 AFRC was 250 manpower. Then the official list for the RUF was  
09:53:40 15 one platoon, which was 60 manpower. STF, I can't recall theirs,  
16 but while they were called - as we were going some others were  
17 joining us, so the numbers was increasing.

18 Q. When you say the RUF was one platoon and you say it was  
19 about 60 men, did that include the unit which you referred to  
09:54:10 20 earlier, the Red Lion battalion?

21 A. The combatants, the Red Lion battalion, that is what  
22 I mentioned. Cobra Unit, it went up to that number, the  
23 fighters.

24 Q. And who do you say - or who was the leader of the entire  
09:54:40 25 group that left Koinadugu?

26 A. It was 05 who was AFRC commander.

27 Q. Can we just go over again who the Red Lion battalion were  
28 and who the Cobra Unit were?

29 A. The Red Lion battalion comprised Komba Gbundema's

1 bodyguards. They formed the Red Lion battalion. The Cobra Unit  
2 was Superman's bodyguards. They comprised that unit.

3 Q. Together these two units formed the RUF contingent, is that  
4 right?

09:55:36 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And apart from these there was an STF unit as well, is that  
7 correct?

8 A. Yes, we had STF among us.

9 Q. And this 05 who you have mentioned that was appointed the  
09:55:56 10 leader, which unit did he belong to?

11 A. 05 was from the SLA, the AFRC, but they didn't come up with  
12 any name.

13 Q. You mentioned that two other radio operators were appointed  
14 to join the two of you that came from Superman Ground. Who were  
09:56:29 15 those two?

16 A. We had one SLA who was called Elugema. That is the only  
17 name I knew. He was called Elugema and we had Sheku Koroma.  
18 They joined us from Koinadugu.

19 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Elugema E-L-U-G-E-M-A and Sheku  
09:56:56 20 Koroma is S-H-E-K-U for Sheku and Koroma is K-O-R-O-M-A:

21 Q. Do you remember on what date you left Koinadugu for Rosos?

22 A. It was on the first day of September 1998.

23 Q. And how long did your journey last to Rosos?

24 A. The patrol lasted for 21 days.

09:57:42 25 Q. How are you able to remember these dates, especially 1  
26 September that you left Koinadugu?

27 A. During that time when we were taking that long patrol I had  
28 a diary where I wrote my movements and in that particular month  
29 I had a serious wound, so all that happened in that month

1 I cannot forget it because in that month, on the 28th, I had a  
2 serious problem that was a wound on my hand, so everything that  
3 happened during that month I can recall because I used to read  
4 over. I cannot forget it.

09:58:32 5 Q. You said you had an injury in that month on the 28th, that  
6 would have been after your arrival at Rosos, is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, can you describe the route that you took from  
9 Koinadugu to Rosos, the main towns that you went through?

09:58:57 10 A. In the first place we went through many villages and towns,  
11 but I can recall few for now because we were not just moving  
12 directly. We were moving in a zigzag manner. If we noticed  
13 enemies we would attack them from one flank as they want to focus  
14 on us and we move to the other direction. We would cause some  
09:59:32 15 problem there and when they want to focus and go ahead, that was  
16 how we moved. That is why we even spent 21 days. But the towns  
17 that I can recall which were big towns, I can recall three or  
18 four.

19 Q. Just before you mention the names of the towns, you said  
09:59:52 20 that you took a zigzag pattern of movement so as to avoid your  
21 enemies. Who were the enemy at this time in that area?

22 A. The government troops were there, including the Civil  
23 Defence Force. They occupied some of those villages.

24 Q. Could you name the villages, the main towns or villages  
10:00:21 25 that you went through?

26 A. We passed through Karina. Karina is another big town in  
27 that area and we came across Gbendembu, Gbendembu, and we also  
28 came to the other village called Mateboi. There were some other  
29 big towns which names I cannot recall now.

1 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Karina is K-A-R-I-N-A.

2 Gbendembu is G-B-E-N-D-E-M-B-U and Mateboi is M-A-T-E-B-O-I:

3 Q. Can you describe what happened on the way as you you went  
4 through some of these big towns and villages, or towns and  
10:01:33 5 villages?

6 A. Yes. Before we left, during the meeting for us to be  
7 dispatched, the order they gave to 05, Superman and SAJ Musa,  
8 they said the guerillas should destroy and after the war you can  
9 make. That was the order they had from the headquarters.

10:02:09 10 Therefore, whosoever see us, if that person saw us to either go  
11 with him or her, or kill him or her. We should use - they used  
12 the word fearful. We should make the area fearful. Those whose  
13 hands were supposed to cut off, we should amputate. Those who we  
14 were to kill, we should kill them and we were to burn all

10:02:36 15 villages which we passed through. As we would move, we started  
16 killing. Anybody we would see who could not carry loads for us,  
17 we would kill that person and if somebody carried ammunition and  
18 he got tired, commander would just pass an order saying kill the  
19 person and we would kill the person. Any village we entered we

10:02:58 20 put that village on fire. Almost all the villages through which  
21 we passed we set on fire and burnt down, and we got to one area,  
22 they had one priest that he was called Father Mario. When SAJ  
23 Musa was going, he captured him. Where Father Mario was, around  
24 that area, I can't recall the name of the village now, we met -

10:03:33 25 he had assembled civilians. He was giving them food, but he  
26 himself, Father Mario, was not there. When we captured civilians  
27 we asked them why they were gathered there. They said Father  
28 Mario was taking care of them. So those civilians, what they did  
29 to them they just selected few from them then 05 passed an order

1 and they were all executed. I saw one fellow who was SLA, his  
2 name was Kabila. Among this group there were pregnant women. He  
3 split open that woman's stomach, the foetus was cut into pieces  
4 and removed. That was how we were going: Abducting, those who  
10:04:48 5 hadn't wives they were capturing young girls, marrying them  
6 forcefully. That was how we were going: Capturing people to  
7 carry our ammunition. That is how we travelled.

8 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Kabila is K-A-B-I-L-A:

9 Q. Now, you mentioned --

10:05:10 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, the witness started by saying  
11 the orders were given to somebody or other. I am not quite sure  
12 who was giving these orders from what is recorded.

13 MR BANGURA: I will get him to go over, but I believe he  
14 said - I will get him to go over:

10:05:33 15 Q. Mr Witness, you said that before you left Koinadugu you  
16 were addressed by some - you were addressed and then orders were  
17 given to your leader, 05, is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Who addressed you before you left Koinadugu?

10:05:53 20 A. It was Superman and SAJ Musa. They said this order was  
21 from Sam Bockarie headquarters in Buedu, so 05 should go with  
22 that order.

23 Q. Earlier you said something about the order stated that you  
24 should destroy and make. Can you clarify yourself there, destroy  
10:06:21 25 and make?

26 A. Yes, they said that was the work of a guerilla. After the  
27 war they will rebuild, but for now let us destroy, so they were  
28 going and burning villages and they said after the war they will  
29 rebuild the villages, because if we left the villages, if the

1 government troops or ECOMOG came they will settle there.

2 Q. Now, you have described a particular incident in a village  
3 whose name you do not recall, but you earlier mentioned big  
4 towns, like Karina and Gbendembu and Mateboi, were your treatment  
10:07:09 5 to those towns or villages much different from what you had -  
6 what had happened in the town which you said you could not recall  
7 the name of?

8 A. Yes, for Gbendembu I remember what happened there and some  
9 other places. Gbendembu, Mateboi I can recall what happened  
10:07:37 10 there.

11 Q. What exactly happened in those towns that you have  
12 mentioned?

13 A. Gbendembu, after we got there and we attacked, burnt the  
14 town, we had to bring some civilians together. I saw two  
10:07:57 15 combatants and they started creating confusion for women and for  
16 manpower and 05, the commander, saw that and he asked, he said,  
17 "Why are you quarrelling?" They said, "It is for that woman."  
18 This one says he is going to have her and the other one said no,  
19 he is going to have her. He said, "Stop quarrelling for a woman.  
10:08:31 20 You call the woman, let the woman herself come." In Gbendembu

21 there is a court barri that is very close to the main road. In  
22 the presence of other civilians and fighters 05 shot the civilian  
23 and she died and we left. That was then a law in that patrol:  
24 Whosoever quarrelled over a civilian, that civilian will be  
10:08:55 25 killed and all the other civilians whom we met the Gbendembu who  
26 could not carry loads, we killed all of them and we moved.

27 When we got to Mateboi, Mateboi was the last place getting  
28 to the Rosos zone. When we attacked that place too and we  
29 brought together the civilians we met there and 05 called all the



1 fighters and asked, "Who wants to take a civilian along, or a  
2 woman, or Small Boys Unit, or Small Girls Unit for domestic  
3 chores?" Some fighters came and selected among the - some  
4 selected women and some selected children. Some others who were  
10:09:54 5 there over 50, nobody chose them. They were all killed. That  
6 was what happened in those two villages that I can recall.

7 Q. Who killed these people that were not selected?

8 A. 0-Five passed order to the fighters. It was not one person  
9 who did the act. They did not use guns to kill them. They  
10:10:25 10 killed them using machetes and sticks, slitting their throats.

11 Q. Did anything happen at Karina?

12 A. At Karina we went there also. We attacked, killed and  
13 burnt there. We met the father - we missed the father. He had  
14 run away. We took a solar plate from where he was living and  
10:10:57 15 then also we saw a bus that was there. They said it was a  
16 government bus. It came there with civilians. All of those  
17 civilians, none of them went out of the bus. We killed them all  
18 and then we looted the place and then we moved.

19 Q. Now, what was the state of communication during the journey  
10:11:22 20 between Koinadugu and Rosos, do you recall?

21 A. Yes, any site we undertook operations we told Koinadugu  
22 that we are going along making the area fearful. We can't say  
23 directly that we are going along killing. The order was that we  
24 should make the area fearful and when we say making the area  
10:11:50 25 fearful, that means killing and burning. So we told them how we  
26 moved along and also we would inform Rosos that we are on our way  
27 coming. Communications went on, every five and six hours we will  
28 communicate with them.

29 Q. You specifically mentioned Rosos, but who would you also

1 communicate with, or who did you also communicate with? You were  
2 not very specific in the first part of your answer.

3 A. By then Gullit was there as high command. He was the one  
4 we communicated with at Rosos.

10:12:31 5 Q. What about in other locations that you communicated with?

6 A. We were communicating with SAJ Musa and Superman in  
7 Koinadugu and we also informed Mosquito that we are moving along  
8 and there is no problem, and also Kono. These areas I am talking  
9 about were the main areas we coordinated with: Rosos, Koinadugu,  
10:13:02 10 Superman Ground in Kono and then Kailahun District, Buedu.

11 Q. You said that you would not say what exactly you were doing  
12 on the way, but what would you report when you communicated with  
13 these locations?

14 A. We were reporting about our movement and our positions.

10:13:35 15 Q. Now, apart from you communicating with your bases at Rosos,  
16 Koinadugu and in Buedu, did you get any information on the way,  
17 as you travelled between these two locations, about your own  
18 activities? Did you get any information from outside?

19 A. Say again.

10:14:13 20 Q. As you travelled along between these two locations, that is  
21 Koinadugu to Rosos, did you get any information about what was  
22 going on, or were your activities monitored by anybody?

23 A. Yes, in fact anywhere we entered civilians must escape and  
24 then go on the side of the enemy and then go to maybe one of the  
10:14:48 25 big towns like Makeni and everywhere we operated we would kill,  
26 burn and then it will be sent over air. The BBC will report  
27 about that and then even our national radios will report about  
28 that.

29 Q. Did you yourself listen to any of the radio reports about

1 your activities as you travelled on?

2 A. Yes, I had a commercial radio to which I listened the news  
3 and even the radio I used, I always changed over to commercial  
4 stations and then it went through.

10:15:32 5 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Your Honours, may the witness be  
6 shown one of two maps that we provided with the Court, they are  
7 not listed in the order of proposed exhibits, the one with ERN  
8 number last four digits 0182.

9 Q. Do you see the map which has been shown to you, Mr Witness?

10:17:01 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. At the top there what does it say?

12 A. "AFRC/RUF primary radio locations mid-1998, as indicated by  
13 TF1-360."

14 Q. Did you, during your prepping with lawyers for the  
10:17:44 15 Prosecution, indicate to them bases that showed the main  
16 communication points for the AFRC/RUF about mid-1998?

17 A. Say that again.

18 Q. Did you - can you explain what the map says in terms of  
19 radio communication?

10:18:17 20 A. Yes, this map, this is the map of Sierra Leone and then it  
21 is indicating areas where the RUF major radio stations operated.

22 Q. At what time?

23 A. This was in 1998, mid-1998. This is what the map is  
24 talking about.

10:18:41 25 Q. You said that you travelled to Rosos in about September.  
26 Does this indication - do the indications we have on the map  
27 cover that period as well?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Did you make these indications to the lawyers for the

1 Prosecution during your interviews with them?

2 A. Yes, these areas - I told the lawyer that these were the  
3 areas where the major radio communications were on this map.

10:19:32

4 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, the Prosecution moves that this  
5 document be marked for identification.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: A one page map headed "AFRC/RUF primary  
7 radio locations - mid-1998" is marked for identification MFI-45.

8 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour:

10:20:06

9 Q. Now, Mr Witness, regarding the map that we have just looked  
10 at, what was the state of communication between all of these  
11 locations?

12 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, sorry to interrupt. I am not  
13 sure exactly - I am looking at this map. I don't know what is  
14 what on this map and you are trying to lead evidence that these  
15 were the areas for communication. What areas? We are looking at  
16 a map with a lot of things on it.

10:20:27

17 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I can get the witness to locate  
18 - to name specific locations. Can the witness be shown the map  
19 again, please.

10:21:25

20 THE WITNESS: This other area --

21 MR BANGURA:

22 Q. Mr Witness, if you would like me to lead you through the  
23 map, please?

24 A. Thank you.

10:21:28

25 Q. Now, if we look at the map and taking it from eastwards,  
26 sorry, westwards, or, if you like, to your left, and we try and  
27 go clockwise, what is the first location that you have indicated  
28 there?

29 A. Well, I want to start it from the east.

1 Q. If that is more convenient for you, fine. Can you guide us  
2 then?

3 A. This one, that is at the eastern part of Sierra Leone, is  
4 Buedu where Sam Bockarie was, okay? Then this, Koindu, which is  
10:22:25 5 after Buedu, is also in the eastern part of Sierra Leone, which  
6 is Kono District and that was where Superman has left and left  
7 Morris Kallon in charge. The other one you see up there, with  
8 the red line, you see Kabala.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, it would be helpful if you  
10:22:45 10 took a pen and actually indicated the places you are talking  
11 about so we can see.

12 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I start again. I will go a  
13 little slower. Here where you see the red, that is in the east  
14 on the right-hand side of the map, you see Buedu. This was the  
10:23:14 15 control station for the RUF. That was where Sam Bockarie, alias  
16 Mosquito, was based. The other one, on the same right-hand side,  
17 you can see Koidu, which is Kono. There also is the eastern part  
18 of Sierra Leone that is Kono District. That was where Superman  
19 was initially based. He left there and he left Morris Kallon in  
10:23:45 20 charge. You can see at the upper side of the map, the map of  
21 Sierra Leone, you can see in the middle of the map you can see it  
22 is written "northern" and then you can look at the upper side of  
23 the right and then you see Kabala, which is the District called  
24 Koinadugu and the headquarters is Kabala. You can see the red  
10:24:07 25 indication, that was where Superman met SAJ Musa and then SAJ  
26 Musa was there, Superman was there, together with other  
27 authorities. Then if you move just opposite the name "north" on  
28 the left-hand side of the map, you can see another red  
29 indication. You can see Kukuna and Madina with a big writing

1 "Rosos". That was where Gullit was based and then there was a  
2 small village around Rosos, the village which was called Rosos,  
3 but inside the jungle the jungle was called Colonel Eddie Ground.  
4 All of these four areas I have pointed at indicate the areas  
10:24:52 5 where our communications were.

6 MR BANGURA:

7 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. These, as you have said, were the  
8 main communication bases at the time, is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

10:25:06 10 Q. Now, just before you take your seat can you just indicate  
11 on the map the locations that you travelled? Between which two  
12 points did you travel? You were moving from Koinadugu, is that  
13 right?

14 A. Yes.

10:25:32 15 Q. And you were going to Rosos, is that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay, thank you.

18 A. Can I go ahead?

19 Q. Well, if you can further indicate the places.

10:25:47 20 A. Sorry, I didn't get you clearly. I thought you had said  
21 I should explain to you how I travelled through the areas. Is  
22 that what you are saying?

23 Q. I basically wanted you to just indicate where you were  
24 coming from and where you arrived at.

10:26:06 25 A. Okay, fine. At first I left this place, Koidu. From there  
26 I came to Koinadugu. From there I came to Rosos. That was how  
27 my movement went.

28 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. You may take your seat. Now, you  
29 have told this Court that you arrived at Rosos on 21 September

1 1998, is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can you describe what happened when you arrived at Rosos?

10:27:27

4 A. When we got to Rosos we met Gullit, Five Five and other  
5 authorities. They welcomed us and from there Gullit wrote a  
6 radio message and sent it to Superman, Mosquito and SAJ Musa  
7 showing that he had received the manpower and all the things he  
8 sent, which were ammunition, and they are all welcome. Then also  
9 the commander, who was 05, who took us along, he also wrote a  
10:27:57 10 message to SAJ Musa and Superman explaining that we have reached  
11 Rosos. Then we went to the meeting ground where we normally call  
12 the parade ground. 05 brought - presented all the material and  
13 all the civilians who were abducted on the way. He presented  
14 them all to Gullit. After that they gave us a place to take our  
10:28:41 15 rest for the first day.

16 Q. Now, you said that the supplies which you took, including  
17 arms and ammunition, were presented to Gullit. What was the  
18 state of their own arsenal at the time. Did they have as much,  
19 at the time, to keep them going?

10:29:09

20 A. Say again.

21 Q. What was the state of their stock at Rosos before you got  
22 there? You took - you brought along with you arms and  
23 ammunitions which you presented to them, but before you got there  
24 did you know what the situation was with them?

10:29:39

25 A. At Rosos they had arms shortage. They never had much arms.  
26 That was why when we are leaving we went with the arms and  
27 ammunition.

28 Q. Now, earlier you said that before you left Koinadugu your  
29 force was composed of 250 AFRC, about 60 RUF and some STF men.

1 Was it the same number that arrived at Rosos?

2 A. No. Let me just make it clear so that you will understand.

3 During the period of the intervention from Freetown to Makeni not  
4 everybody was able to follow us to go to the jungle. For

10:30:40

5 example, back in Kabala some people left their deployment in

6 other villages and they found it difficult to go to the towns

7 and, therefore, they hid themselves in bushes so they were

8 staying there. Therefore, they divided themselves into groups

9 and then when they heard that we were going along attacking areas

10:31:02

10 from Koinadugu to Rosos a good number of the RUF came back and

11 joined us. In fact, the number that we now reported to Gullit,

12 we were more than 500. The number increased to 500 and most of

13 the men who came, they had guns, and we welcomed them to join us.

14 So that was how the number increased.

10:31:28

15 Q. Thank you. Now, you have said that when you arrived Gullit

16 prepared and sent a message about your arrival. To whom was the

17 message sent?

18 A. Gullit sent the message to SAJ Musa and Superman and they

19 informed Sam Bockarie. That was how the message was addressed.

10:31:56

20 Q. Now, did you yourself engage in radio communication during

21 the period that you were at Rosos?

22 A. Yes, beside Alfred Brown I was the most senior radio

23 officer on the ground. Alfred Brown was just there to supervise

24 the work that we did.

10:32:26

25 Q. Now, what was going on at Rosos about this time?

26 A. Say that again. What time are you referring to?

27 Q. At the time that you arrived there what were the main

28 activities that the troops there were engaged in?

29 A. After we got to Rosos we didn't meet food on the ground, so



1 the immediate task we undertook - because according to the order  
2 it said when we got there, in two or three days we should engage  
3 ourselves in military operations, so that was the order that we  
4 brought from SAJ Musa. Then when we got there, within the next  
10:33:19 5 two days we went on food finding. We were on that food finding  
6 and then we started planning for military operations at the time  
7 we got there. We undertook two major missions before we  
8 experienced that SAJ Musa was coming towards our location.

9 Q. Which missions did you undertake apart from the food  
10:33:50 10 finding missions? You have mentioned two, which missions were  
11 they?

12 A. One was on the 27th day that we took off in the evening.  
13 We went to attack Kukuna and on the 28th, in the morning, we  
14 attacked Kukuna. That was in September. I still recall that  
10:34:24 15 date we attacked Kukuna. We got rid of one lieutenant who was a  
16 Guinean, he was also a communications officer, and one corporal  
17 who was just a fighter and we got so many ammunition also from  
18 the Guineans.

19 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Kukuna is K-U-K-U-N-A:

10:34:48 20 Q. Now, the Guineans who you just mentioned, do you remember  
21 to which force they belonged?

22 A. Well, they were fighting alongside the Sierra Leone  
23 Government troops because Kukuna is located in Sierra Leone, so  
24 they went there and established their base there. They were  
10:35:16 25 assisting the Sierra Leone Government.

26 Q. And what happened during this operation at Kukuna, apart  
27 from the two men, the Guineans that you mentioned, what happened?

28 A. Any civilian we saw in Kukuna we didn't leave them there.  
29 Those who were able to carry our loads, we decided to save them

1 because they decided to carry our loads, but we killed almost all  
2 the civilians we met on our way and we burnt down part of Kukuna.

3 Q. Apart from Kukuna which other operation did you undertake  
4 from Rosos?

10:36:10 5 A. The next major operation - I have spoken about two  
6 operations and I have spoken about one. The next one I will talk  
7 about - there was, of course, another operation but that was not  
8 too important. This other major operation I was not present.

9 I was in the sick bed because at Kukuna I was - I got a serious  
10:36:33 10 injury, so this did not allow me to take part in the other  
11 mission, which was the Gbendembu mission, Gbendembu where we had  
12 passed through when we were on our way coming, at the time we  
13 were coming from Koinadugu. After we had passed, ECOMOG troops  
14 went and based there, many of them, so our troops went on food

10:37:02 15 finding patrol and then they saw them. When they brought this  
16 report to the headquarters we sent a radio message from our  
17 headquarter where the place which was SAJ Musa and Superman  
18 Ground, that was in Koinadugu. They sent an instruction that we  
19 should attack that place and make sure that the place is

10:37:27 20 captured. Then they dispatched a mission. Men went and  
21 attacked. They brought so many weapons. I saw over five to six  
22 SLAs captured who were fighting alongside the ECOMOG to attack  
23 our positions, but when our men went and attacked they surrounded  
24 them.

10:37:57 25 Q. They surrounded who?

26 A. They surrendered to our men. The SLAs who were amongst the  
27 ECOMOG, they surrendered to the juntas, that is the AFRC and the  
28 RUF. They surrendered to them, then they brought them to our  
29 base, that is Rosos.

1 Q. Was anything done to these men who surrendered to your  
2 forces?

3 A. Yes, according to what they told us when they returned at  
4 the base, they said the men were many, but they said those who  
10:38:34 5 were hostile, they killed them, but those they were able to  
6 capture, they brought them, and the six men they brought to the  
7 base, later they joined us and they fought alongside with us to  
8 fight against ECOMOG and the government forces.

9 Q. Can we go back to radio communications while you were at  
10:38:54 10 Rosos. As you engaged in these activities was any report made to  
11 anyone about your progress?

12 A. Yes, any time we went on a mission, whatever material we  
13 captured we will put it into a message and we will put into the  
14 message how many fighters got wounded. We will also put into  
10:39:33 15 message how many fighters were killed and then we will send that  
16 to SAJ Musa and then we will give the information to Sam  
17 Bockarie. That was how we sent and addressed our messages.

18 Q. Can you recall how often your communications were with the  
19 other locations that you occupied, I mean Koinadugu and Buedu?

10:40:07 20 A. During this period there was frequent communication almost  
21 every day, sometimes in the morning, sometimes in the afternoon,  
22 or the evening, with Buedu. That went on almost all the time  
23 with Koinadugu. It depended on the kind of information they had  
24 for us, but we cannot just sit down and start talking. When we  
10:40:32 25 wanted to send an information we will call them and then we send  
26 that information. When they are ready too, they will call us and  
27 then they will tell us. When they are sending information, or  
28 they received information from other areas, we will monitor and  
29 write down the information. That was how we did it. For

1 example, if Buedu wanted to receive or transmit a message to Kono  
2 we will monitor and write down the message and inform our  
3 commanders later and tell them these are the developments Buedu  
4 has been talking about. We did that almost every day.

10:41:12 5 Q. Earlier you mentioned that the state of communication in  
6 Rosos was not well-developed and that was a reason why yourself  
7 and Alfred Brown were ordered to go and join the team in Rosos.  
8 Now, did you do anything to improve that situation when you  
9 arrived in Rosos?

10:41:48 10 A. Yes. When we were leaving Koinadugu we went along with two  
11 radio sets to Rosos and then we almost took along three operators  
12 so those were all progress towards communication. So, when we  
13 went, the radio they had, we condemned it and then the better one  
14 that we went with, we had to reset it and then this was the  
10:42:20 15 communication that we are now using from Rosos to all the other  
16 stations under the RUF.

17 Q. Now, just before we go on, you had said earlier that two of  
18 you, yourself and Alfred Brown, were ordered from Koinadugu -  
19 from Superman Ground and at Koinadugu two other operators were  
10:42:45 20 appointed that joined you, so we had four. Just now you have  
21 said that you went with almost three operators. Can you clarify  
22 yourself?

23 A. Okay, if I had said three operators then I am right because  
24 Alfred Brown was just a supervisor. If he wanted, he will come  
10:43:13 25 on the radio. If he never wanted, he will sit aside because he  
26 was just a senior man, but he knew about the communications.

27 Q. Apart from bringing to Rosos two radio sets and helping to  
28 install them, did you do anything else to improve the system of  
29 communication from Rosos to your other locations?

1 A. Yes, beside the RUF zone our communication only extended  
2 not just to other places, but our communication never extended  
3 this time round, but it was only when we captured this Guinean  
4 officer with a Motorola that we started communicating with the  
10:44:11 5 Guineans. We started communicating with the Guineans because we  
6 used the officer that we captured who was a lieutenant. He  
7 called his nearest commander on that Kukuna axis in Guinea.  
8 Anything 05 told him he will tell him, so sometimes he will tell  
9 him that we are all over this area so they shouldn't come around  
10:44:38 10 that area, so for that reason the Guineans were afraid of coming  
11 around our areas, so that was how we later extended our  
12 communication. But beside that, any activity that went on in  
13 Buedu we will monitor it and write it in our log book, but beside  
14 that we never had contact outside at that moment.

10:45:05 15 Q. Did you do anything about the code that was used from  
16 Rosos?

17 A. I don't understand this question.

18 Q. Was there, before your arrival at Rosos, any difficulty  
19 in - apart from having one radio set, was there any difficulty in  
10:45:33 20 the manner in which they communicated the messages to the rest of  
21 the locations that you had at the time?

22 A. Yes, at Rosos there was a problem with the radio set. In  
23 the first place it was not good and, secondly, they never had the  
24 code. That was one of the major problems that led to poor  
10:46:02 25 communication from Rosos before we got there, but when we went we  
26 took along with us the code that will make the communication  
27 nicer.

28 Q. During your stay at Rosos did anything happen that - did  
29 anything happen - or did you know about what was going on around

1 the rest of the country at the time?

2 A. Yes, through the communication I used to know what went on  
3 with regards RUF operations. What I would want to start with is,  
4 1, just the way I had stated it during my statement, that any  
10:46:53 5 movement Sam Bockarie wanted to take from Sierra Leone, Buedu to  
6 Liberia, he will inform us and then anything he brought he will  
7 inform us. One thing I will want to say is that the last good  
8 information that we got before the arrival of SAJ Musa was that  
9 when Sam Bockarie returned from Liberia he sent a general message  
10:47:18 10 saying that the mission that was planned, he has brought the  
11 materials. Those are arms and ammunition to start the mission  
12 effectively. Then he said he was presently at Buedu and then  
13 also he sent troops for them to come and receive the ammunition  
14 for the mission for Kono that they should take from Buedu to  
10:47:48 15 Kailahun. So from there Koinadugu got theirs, Rosos got their  
16 own arms and ammunition for this mission that we had gone to  
17 Buedu to plan. That was one of the things that went on and  
18 also --

19 Q. Just before you move on to the next point, when did you get  
10:48:11 20 this communication from Sam Bockarie about the arrival of arms  
21 and ammunition?

22 A. It was after we had gone through these missions that I have  
23 spoken about, first after the Kukuna mission. That was the time  
24 we received this message to inform all stations, all commanders  
10:48:35 25 in the various jungles, that the ammunition has arrived at Buedu  
26 from Liberia according to plans.

27 Q. You have mentioned that the communication from Bockarie  
28 indicated that the various groups had been provided, or were  
29 allotted their own share of arms and ammunition. How did you get

1 your own share at the time?

2 A. During this time - it is a long story that if I am given a  
3 chance I will narrate when and how we didn't get. What happened  
4 was that ours arrived in Kono, after which Kono was supposed to  
10:49:33 5 have taken them to Koinadugu, but after the arrival of the  
6 ammunition in Koinadugu, which was designed for Koinadugu and  
7 Rosos, it was at that time serious problem erupted between  
8 Superman and SAJ Musa, but I cannot actually tell now to this  
9 Court because when SAJ Musa was moving I don't know whether he  
10:50:05 10 actually moved with the ammunition because the moment SAJ Musa  
11 reached our base, the RUF personnels on the communication he  
12 removed us from there totally. He said we shouldn't go on the  
13 radio again. So it will be difficult for me a little to explain  
14 that process, whether SAJ Musa had the ammunition from Koinadugu  
10:50:27 15 and whether he brought it.

16 Q. Now, during your stay at Rosos did you get any news about  
17 what was going on in Freetown at the time?

18 A. Yes, before the arrival of SAJ Musa we heard over the  
19 national radio, and even the BBC, that the SLPP government of  
10:50:56 20 Tejan Kabbah has killed 24 soldiers. It was on the international  
21 and national media. That was a news that was announced every day  
22 and night, so after we, the fighters, got the information  
23 everybody went angry. Immediately we got the news we held a  
24 meeting and we said to ourselves that the government who has  
10:51:23 25 killed those soldiers, we will make sure that we handle the  
26 people militarily, so some men started singing. They said - the  
27 music was nice, but I am not a good singer. They said: "Who  
28 killed the soldiers? Who killed the soldiers?", and everybody  
29 was dancing in the camp and everybody started shooting in the

1 air, so that gave people the zeal to take immediate action  
2 against them.

3 Q. Now, you said that the news you got from Freetown was that  
4 the government killed 24 soldiers. Were you able to know exactly  
10:52:11 5 how they killed these soldiers?

6 A. Say again.

7 Q. You said they killed 24 soldiers. Did you know how these  
8 24 soldiers were killed?

9 A. Yes, according to what I heard on the radio and even the  
10:52:41 10 people whom we captured on the way who were civilians, they said  
11 the people faced the firing squad and they were shot with guns  
12 and they said the ECOMOG did the operation, approved by the  
13 Government of Sierra Leone.

14 Q. Now, you have described the reaction of the troops at Rosos  
10:52:59 15 to this news. Did you know how the news was taken by commanders  
16 at the other locations that you had: Buedu, Koinadugu and Koidu?

17 A. In fact, the communication that was between us, the people  
18 in Buedu, Kono, Koinadugu, in fact what they told us was that  
19 they were more disgruntled than us because they were far away  
10:53:37 20 from us. They said if they were in the area where we were, the  
21 week the incident took place they would have entered Freetown  
22 without fail.

23 Q. When you say "they said", who said?

24 A. These are the groups I am talking about. In fact, Mosqui to  
10:53:58 25 was on the air and Morris Kallon also was in the air and Superman  
26 too was on the air, and they were speaking with Gullit. That was  
27 a communication that they were undertaking. It was not just by  
28 ordinary messages. It was a communication between themselves.  
29 They said if they were the people in our position at that moment,



1 when they had enough manpower and strong manpower and they  
2 trusted their men, they would not spend a week, they would enter  
3 Freetown.

10:54:33

4 Q. Now, you have mentioned that SAJ Musa came to Rosos,  
5 correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. When did he come to Rosos?

8 A. It was late, it was around November that SAJ Musa went to  
9 Rosos. It was around November 1998.

10:54:58

10 Q. Why did he come to Rosos?

11 A. After all the problems according to what - when SAJ Musa  
12 left Koinadugu a radio communication came, went to Sam Bockarie,  
13 Mosquito, from Superman. According to Superman the message he  
14 sent to all stations, he said a problem had erupted between SAJ  
15 Musa and himself, Superman, and this was not just to do - this  
16 caused fighting amongst themselves and during that fighting they  
17 reported about people who died. As a result, SAJ Musa flee and  
18 they never knew where he went to. After a few days SAJ Musa was  
19 able to run away with a radio set and then they called directly

10:55:38

20 to Rosos that SAJ Musa said to Gullit that he was on his way  
21 coming. He said the reason why he was coming, he had had a clash  
22 with Superman so he is no longer with them. So he was saying  
23 please that they should send a receiving team to receive him. He  
24 said Gullit should send a receiving team from SAJ Musa to come  
25 and receive them. That was what Gullit did.

10:56:11

26 Q. Can you just clarify, I have it here that "Gullit should  
27 send a receiving team from SAJ Musa", is that what you said?

28 A. Yes, SAJ Musa requested a receiving team to come and  
29 receive him from Gullit's place whilst he was on his way to

10:56:43

1 Rosos.

2 Q. Now, did you yourself receive this message from SAJ Musa?

3 A. Yes, of course at that time I was not operating, but in the  
4 morning I would go and sit around the radio. There were other  
10:57:35 5 operators working and when they received any message I needed to  
6 see it before ever it went to the commander.

7 Q. Can you describe what happened when SAJ Musa arrived?

8 A. What I would want to start with, before SAJ Musa arrived he  
9 was around Mateboi. He transmitted a message saying to Gullit -  
10:58:03 10 he said Gullit and 05 should arrest all the RUF personnel that  
11 were amongst them and also all the RUF radio operators, they  
12 should remove them from the radio, and no commander, no soldier  
13 was to communicate with the RUF that were in Koinadugu, Kono and  
14 Kailahun District no more before his arrival.

10:58:32 15 Q. Was this order carried out?

16 A. I know the arrest of the combatants of the RUF was not  
17 possible. I left - I was there when Gullit and 05 responded that  
18 if they attempted to arrest RUF they will destabilise them all,  
19 RUF will destabilise them all, so they suggested to SAJ Musa that  
10:59:08 20 the arrests shouldn't be carried out and even if they arrested  
21 the RUF, or attempted to arrest the RUF, the mission will fail.  
22 So, they did not agree for that to happen, but they agreed to  
23 remove the RUF personnel who were communicating on the radio  
24 before the arrival of SAJ Musa. SAJ Musa has not yet arrived.

10:59:38 25 Q. What happened when he actually arrived?

26 A. SAJ Musa, we went ahead of him at the edge of the town.  
27 That was where I stood. Before he arrived the soldiers - in  
28 fact, everybody was happy. The SLAs were so happy. SAJ Musa was  
29 not walking on foot. In fact, they carried him high and singing

1 his praises. They said the leader has come. Among SAJ Musa's  
2 group I saw Father Mario who was the reverend father around that  
3 area which they assaulted. Father Mario was brought to the base  
4 and when SAJ Musa arrived he said - immediately he arrived he  
11:00:25 5 went to the meeting ground and said as of today he is no longer  
6 an AFRC, neither an RUF. He had come to Gullit for them to form  
7 their own movement, therefore Gullit should not send a message  
8 anymore to anybody. Gullit should not communicate to anybody.  
9 He said he knew now to whom he would communicate. Then he  
11:00:55 10 ensured that no RUF operator operated the radio.

11 Q. How did he do this? How did he ensure that RUF operators  
12 did not use the radio?

13 A. Well, he was to keep us far away from the radio, all radio  
14 materials were to be reported to him and no radio communication  
11:01:22 15 should be sent anywhere anymore, except at the house where he  
16 was, where SAJ Musa was. He gave us a warning letter to all RUF  
17 personnel. I had mine up to the time we went to Freetown and  
18 even when I returned and joined up with Superman and others,  
19 I presented this letter to them, that this was the situation.

11:01:45 20 Q. Now, did any - was any other matter discussed at Rosos by  
21 SAJ Musa after his arrival?

22 A. Yes, when SAJ Musa arrived he said they should set up a new  
23 administration which would lead them to success and, indeed, that  
24 is what happened. He said he, SAJ Musa, he was a new SLA neither  
11:02:26 25 RUF nor AFRC. He said he was the leader for this group. Gullit  
26 was the second in command. Bazy deputised Gullit, followed by  
27 Five Five and other commanders. From there they set up brigade  
28 commanders, battalion commanders, company commanders and unit  
29 commanders. Then he pointed out that our mission was for

1 Freetown. He said before those men could get there we should be  
2 the first to get there. He said our mission was for Freetown,  
3 but at that time we had ammunition to do that.

11:03:25 4 Q. Can you just give this Court an idea as to what the size of  
5 SAJ Musa's entourage was that came to Rosos from Koinadugu?

6 A. Oh, no, the manpower was too much, but what I saw and what  
7 I can say is that there were more than 1,000.

8 Q. Thank you. Now, following this discussion that SAJ Musa  
9 had with the group at Rosos were any plans made to do anything?

11:04:07 10 A. Yes, after they had appointed commanders and unit  
11 commanders the plan was to move directly to Freetown and while we  
12 were moving we were to attack towns and villages and that was how  
13 we moved.

14 Q. Was there any particular route agreed on?

11:04:46 15 A. Yes, firstly we agreed that we were not going to use a  
16 straight route. We were going to move like guerillas. We were  
17 to attack, while the enemy would be focused on that we would use  
18 another route. That was how we were moving. After we had  
19 crossed Little Scarcies, another big river in Sierra Leone, in  
11:05:08 20 the north, we attacked around Madina. We also attacked around  
21 Kambia, but we did not enter Kambia itself. We came and attacked  
22 the - I am going to call the big towns the main towns, the main  
23 road between Freetown and Makeni, we attacked Lunsar and came  
24 back and attacked Masiaka.

11:05:51 25 MR BANGURA: [Microphone not activated] at this stage.  
26 Your Honours, I will provide some spellings here. Little  
27 Scarcies is Little, as normal word, Scarcies is S-C-A-R-C-I-E-S.  
28 That is the name of a river. Madina is M-A-D-I-N-A. Kambia is  
29 K-A-M-B-I-A. Lunsar is L-U-N-S-A-R and Masiaka is M-A-S-I-A-K-A.

1 Q. Just before we proceed with the route that you took, do you  
2 recall when you left Rosos for Freetown?

3 A. Yes, it was in December when we left Rosos for Freetown.

4 Q. What time in December, early, late?

11:06:48 5 A. It was in early December when we left Rosos. We spent more  
6 time before we arrived at Waterloo.

7 Q. Now, you were at Masiaka. How did you proceed from  
8 Masiaka?

9 A. We moved from Masiaka, found another prominent area which  
11:07:18 10 was the RDF, which was at the main highway to - the  
11 Masiaka-Freetown highway and we covered some villages, Songo  
12 Junction. That was another road to the Moyamba area, but we did  
13 not actually move on the main highway. Sometimes we moved, or we  
14 would jump into the bush and attack, divert their attention until  
11:07:53 15 we got to Four Mile, Six Mile, Lumpa, Waterloo, Benguema.

16 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I will give some spellings here.  
17 Songo is S-O-N-G-O. Moyamba is M-O-Y-A-M-B-A. Four Mile just  
18 Four and Mile, F-O-U-R M-I-L-E and the same for Six Mile. Lumpa  
19 is L-U-M-P-A. Waterloo is as normal. Benguema is  
11:08:37 20 B-E-N-G-U-E-M-A:

21 Q. Can you describe - you said you attacked starting from  
22 Madina right through down to Benguema. You have named all the  
23 towns and villages that you passed through and you have said that  
24 you attacked some of these. What was the result of these attacks  
11:09:03 25 as you came along?

26 A. Say that again.

27 Q. You said that you were attacking these locations as you  
28 travelled towards Freetown. What happened in the attacks, ie not  
29 really specific to one of them, but generally can you describe

1 the pattern that flowed from your attacks on these towns and  
2 villages as you approached Freetown?

3 A. Well, we used to attack government troops and ECOMOG  
4 positions. We had casualties and they too had casualties. We  
11:09:52 5 would capture ammunition from them. We would burn down houses,  
6 abduct civilians and they carried our loads for us and we used to  
7 go around cutting hands during those missions up to that point.

8 Q. Now, the last point you mentioned where you were was  
9 Benguema. Did anything happen when you arrived at Benguema?

11:10:23 10 A. Yes, at Benguema was an SLA barracks, or training barracks  
11 and it was there that all the ECOMOG that came to the provinces  
12 had their headquarters. We arrived there with SAJ Musa. During  
13 this attack we were able to capture Benguema and so many arms and  
14 ammunition because they had just brought their supplies.

11:10:59 15 Q. When did you arrive at Benguema?

16 A. It was in December, late December. It was in late  
17 December. I can't tell lies, I can't tell you the specific date  
18 now.

19 Q. When you say late December, was it before Christmas?

11:11:32 20 A. It was around Christmas time, around the 25th.

21 Q. Just continue, please.

22 A. After we had attacked Benguema we were able to capture  
23 Benguema. Luckily for us we were able to capture a lot of  
24 ammunition, but the ammunition that we were coming with we had  
11:12:02 25 problems with the manpower. We had more than 1,000 civilians who  
26 were carrying our loads for us. In fact, the father who was  
27 among us was full of admiration saying that we were able to  
28 control the civilians who were carrying loads for us. So when we  
29 arrived at Benguema and the other ammunition we captured from

1 ECOMOG, we couldn't carry them to Freetown, so SAJ Musa said,  
2 "These ammunition, if they stayed here these people would use  
3 them to attack us." He said, "The best thing to do is to set  
4 fire to the ammo dump." SAJ Musa and the other authorities went  
11:12:46 5 to the officers' mess. They went there, they ate and drank.  
6 They came and stood by the road and SAJ Musa passed an order to  
7 set fire to the ammo dump so that when ECOMOG, or the government  
8 troops arrive they will not be able to use it anymore. The whole  
9 place was set on fire, but in the ammo dump bombs were there, 180  
11:13:19 10 millimetre bombs were there and some other bombs and their tubes,  
11 so the fire exploded the roof and the bomb blasted. We just  
12 heard that this bomb that had blasted, SAJ Musa had dropped.  
13 When we went there he had fallen down, but it was not far away  
14 from the house where this fire was. There were so many other  
11:13:44 15 soldiers there, so they took SAJ Musa. Everybody was coming to  
16 see. But before that other groups had moved. They had moved  
17 towards the peninsula road. When you reach Waterloo you enter  
18 Benguema, you avoid the Freetown highway to go Freetown directly.  
19 You use another route to come to Freetown that is called  
11:14:10 20 peninsula road. It is the bypass through to Freetown. The other  
21 groups went there and stayed there. They had not known that SAJ  
22 Musa had died, or so and so thing had happened to SAJ Musa, and  
23 we were not expecting that SAJ Musa would die at that time. They  
24 took SAJ Musa and they placed him on a plank. They called the  
11:14:30 25 medical personnel who were among us, they touched him and he was  
26 not moving and they said to leave him for a while. They took him  
27 to some place. They thought he had just fainted away. They did  
28 that, but SAJ Musa died. Some people said we should carry SAJ  
29 Musa along as we went along fighting until we finally bury him.

1 Some people said no. Gullit and others came together and said he  
2 was a dead man and so many people had died among these troops, we  
3 did not carry them, so let us bury SAJ Musa as a guerilla, so  
4 they took some leaves and put them over SAJ Musa. Everybody was  
11:15:12 5 doing that until we finally left. We left that location and went  
6 in the middle of the forest.

7 Q. Can I pause you a little, please. Apart from SAJ Musa was  
8 anybody else affected by this blast, by this blast that occurred?

9 MR CAYLEY: Madam President, it is a small point, but  
11:15:31 10 earlier when the witness was talking about the ammunition that  
11 exploded I thought I heard him say mortar bomb, which would make  
12 sense in terms of the description he gave. I could be wrong  
13 there, but I am sure I heard him say mortar and it wasn't  
14 actually translated. I could be wrong.

11:15:46 15 PRESIDING JUDGE: I thought I heard him say 180 mortar  
16 bombs.

17 MR CAYLEY: So we both heard mortar.

18 MR BANGURA: My recollection was 180 millimetre bomb:

19 Q. Mr Witness, can you again say within the ammunition dump  
11:16:04 20 that you have just talked about in Benguema, did you talk about  
21 bombs in there of any kind?

22 A. Yes, I talked about bombs and the ammunitions were by  
23 category. They had 180 millimetre bombs, which were mortar  
24 bombs.

11:16:27 25 Q. Thank you. Now, after the death of SAJ Musa and his burial  
26 you said you then moved on to - you were going to go on to some  
27 other episode. Where did you go to?

28 A. We moved and joined the other groups which had separated  
29 from us. We stopped them and they waited for us and we explained



1 to them that this was what had happened. In that forest we  
2 rested there for the whole day and the authority that was with  
3 us, after SAJ Musa had gone and now Gullit had taken the place of  
4 SAJ Musa, that was how the other group came up. So Gullit and  
11:17:22 5 other men suggested that the best thing to do was that SAJ Musa  
6 had met us and the RUF working together sending information and  
7 they too were sending information to us, but when SAJ Musa and  
8 Superman had a conflict, which resulted in fighting, SAJ Musa  
9 said we should have nothing to do with these people. Now that  
11:17:50 10 SAJ Musa had died, let us now call Mosquito and inform him that  
11 we have reached Waterloo and we are beyond Benguema and we are  
12 seeking advice. Whatever he said we would tell him to accept, so  
13 that we would work together again. We will not tell him directly  
14 that SAJ Musa has died as of that time. That was what people  
11:18:16 15 suggested. From there Gullit called --

16 Q. Just before you get on to the call, I realise that a  
17 question I asked before the interruption by my learned friend was  
18 not answered. The question was: Was anyone else affected by the  
19 blast? You said there was a blast at the ammunition dump and you  
11:18:44 20 said Musa fell and he died. Was anybody else affected by that  
21 blast?

22 A. No, I did not see anybody injured. I did not see anybody  
23 die.

24 Q. Now, please continue. You have just said that it was  
11:19:06 25 agreed to contact Mosquito and to seek his advice. Was he  
26 contacted at all?

27 A. Yes, Gullit called Alfred Brown who was a supervisor for  
28 communication. He called us all up, those of us who were RUF who  
29 they had told not to communicate anymore. They said we should

1 call Mosquito. Alfred Brown gave me the order and I called  
2 Mosquito. Before that Gullit called Mosquito, but Mosquito did  
3 not respond. They called me. They said they should summon the  
4 RUF operators, that when we called Mosquito he would respond.

11:19:57 5 I called Mosquito and luckily he was not far off. The radio man  
6 said wait, Mosquito would come. When Mosquito came, I called and  
7 he responded. He asked me, "Perry, what happened? I have been  
8 calling you and I have not been getting any information from you?  
9 You were the radio operator who we had sent at that place." And

11:20:20 10 I said, "That is an issue that should be addressed by Gullit",  
11 and I said, "At the moment I can't address that issue." I left -  
12 I handed the mike over to Mr Gullit and Gullit explained that we  
13 had continued attacking up to Waterloo, Benguema, we were at some  
14 place now seeking advice. Sam Bockarie said, "How can I give you

11:20:54 15 advice when, in the first place, when you were getting ready to  
16 take off you did not inform me? Even when you were operating you  
17 had the radio men, you had radios, but nobody informed me." He  
18 said, "But we would like to talk to you just so you can provide  
19 us advice." He said, "Okay, the best thing to do it is simple.

11:21:20 20 Now you have reached that point, that trip" --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness slow down.

22 MR BANGURA:

23 Q. You have to slow down and, secondly, you are talking about  
24 two people in a conversation here. As much as you can, try to  
11:21:37 25 say who was saying what. It doesn't help us much if you just say  
26 "he said", "he said", okay? If it is Mosquito who said something  
27 say "Mosquito said". Is that clear?

28 A. Mosquito said Gullit should wait for Superman and Issa  
29 Sesay and others to join him so that the manpower and the command

1 structure would be strong before Gullit could enter. He said if  
2 that were the case it would be all right. Then Gullit said if it  
3 were for the ammunition we have ammunition to enter. He said,  
4 "No, that is not the reason. It is for the command structure.  
11:22:36 5 It will be strong for you." Then Gullit said, "The best thing  
6 was that I would tell my men and whatever they agreed on I will  
7 come back and tell you." Then we closed the radio. Gullit  
8 called - Gullit summoned a short meeting to inform his men what  
9 they had discussed and after --

11:23:03 10 Q. Thank you, Mr Witness. You mentioned that Mosquito asked  
11 Gullit not to enter, but to wait until he provided support.  
12 Enter where?

13 A. That Gullit should not enter Freetown.

14 Q. Yes, you were going to go to what Gullit did after the  
11:23:27 15 communication with Mosquito. What did he do?

16 A. What Gullit did was that he called all the officers on the  
17 mission and explained to them. The majority of them said they  
18 shouldn't wait, that our group should not wait for those groups  
19 which Mosquito had called, if anything they should meet us ahead.  
11:24:00 20 So, since it was a majority all of us accepted to go to Freetown.  
21 It was from that point that we went and attacked Hastings and,  
22 Luckily for us, we were able to get ammunition. We went to York,  
23 but of course we were not able to capture York, but we were able  
24 to capture some ammunition and we returned.

11:24:28 25 Q. Can I pause you there, Mr Witness. You said that Mosquito  
26 had suggested sending support and you said he mentioned some  
27 names of commanders that he was going to send. I think you  
28 mentioned some names. Can you go back to that and tell us which  
29 names that Mosquito mentioned?

1 A. Yes, according to the plan from Buedu to start with,  
2 Mosquito had to allow people to attack Kono. Morris Kallon, Issa  
3 Sesay, Rambo moved from Kono together with all the battalion and  
4 brigade commanders. Superman too moved from Koinadugu and  
11:25:25 5 attacked Kabala, attacked Makeni, Magburaka, Mile 91, Masiaka.  
6 They were to join us, but in the interim they had passed Lunsar  
7 and they were coming towards Masiaka. Troops were moving from  
8 91. There were troops in 91. They were the RUF according to the  
9 plan. There were troops in 91. They had attacked there and  
11:25:58 10 based there. There were troops in Masiaka and some men were in  
11 Lunsar. They had attacked and were based there. They were  
12 seeking advice. It was those troops whom Superman, or Mosquito  
13 told Gullit to wait for.

14 Q. Thank you. You said that the men, Gullit's men, after the  
11:26:19 15 meeting he held with them, said that you should go ahead with  
16 your entry into Freetown and that those others would meet with  
17 you later, or meet ahead with you. What do you mean?

18 A. Say that again.

19 Q. You said that the others, the team, Gullit's team, when he  
11:26:51 20 had a meeting with them about what Mosquito had said, that they  
21 should wait, that all of you should wait until he sent you  
22 support, they decided no, not to wait but to go ahead and they  
23 said that - you said that they would meet with you ahead once you  
24 had moved on. What do you mean that they would meet with you  
11:27:15 25 ahead?

26 A. What I mean is that the officers who were with Gullit, the  
27 majority decided that we should go ahead and attack Freetown, so  
28 whenever the other groups came they would join us.

29 Q. Now, you have mentioned two locations already within the

1 Western Area that you attacked: Hastings and York. After those  
2 two areas did you go on further to - did you continue with your  
3 move into Freetown?

11:28:03 4 A. Yes, we started to attack Freetown at night. It was at  
5 night that we started attacking Freetown up to daybreak. After  
6 we had attacked all these areas I have spoken about we entered  
7 Freetown at night. We continued attacking up to daybreak.

8 Q. What date did you enter Freetown proper?

9 A. It was 6 January.

11:28:24 10 Q. Of what year?

11 A. 1999.

12 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I note the time. That is the  
13 two hour limit.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: I think, in the circumstances, we will  
11:28:40 15 take the mid-morning break now and we will resume at 12 o'clock.  
16 Please adjourn the Court.

17 [Break taken at 11.30 a.m.]

18 [Upon resuming at 12.00 p.m.]

19 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Bangura?

11:58:32 20 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour:

21 Q. Mr Witness?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Just before the break we were about to discuss your entry  
24 into Freetown, correct?

11:58:52 25 A. Yes, sir.

26 Q. Now, I just want to clear up a small issue that we have  
27 dealt with already and that has to do with the move from  
28 Koinadugu to Rosos. It is just a small point. Now during the  
29 period that you were moving between Koinadugu to Rosos, were

1 there - you have mentioned that there were soldiers, SLAs, who  
2 were occupying towns and villages along the route and they were  
3 government forces. Is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

11:59:46 5 Q. And they were considered the enemy at that time. Is that  
6 correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now apart from these, were there any other threats that you  
9 were exposed to - security threats I mean - during the journey?

12:00:06 10 A. Oh, yes, Civil Defence Forces were around. We called them  
11 Kamajors.

12 Q. Now, did you receive any communication from any of your  
13 bases about threats that you were exposed to on your way?

14 A. Please repeat.

12:00:38 15 Q. During the course of your journey to Rosos, were there any  
16 communications which updated you on the threats that you were  
17 faced with?

18 A. Yes, communication was going on. Besides the troops, which  
19 were the government forces and the Civil Defence Forces, ECOMOG  
12:01:06 20 used to attack us from the air - air raid. The jet was coming  
21 from Lungi and attack our positions. And it was not only us.

22 They were attacking positions like Kailahun, Kono, Koinadugu and  
23 also even as we were moving it used to attack our positions. But  
24 this attack that this jet was doing, in our communication we had  
12:01:37 25 two areas how we could communicate. We had radio operators.

26 They were just there to monitor on the radio the activities of  
27 ECOMOG. They will give us information about how ECOMOG was  
28 moving towards us, or even if the Alpha jet was coming to our  
29 location. That is how we got the information. So, when they

1 were going to attack us we would hide elsewhere until they pass  
2 and we come out again.

3 Q. Now, in what form was this information passed on to you  
4 about ECOMOG air raids?

12:02:17 5 A. Well, all information about the movement of our enemy  
6 troops - and when I say enemy troops that includes the Kamajors,  
7 the Sierra Leone army, ECOMOG - that was all coded. For example,  
8 when the jet was coming from Freetown or Lungi we had a  
9 particular code name for that. We called it 448. So when I  
12:02:54 10 called the other station I said "448", I will call the location  
11 of the station and where it will be heading for, but if that jet  
12 was attacking my position I will just say "448". That was my  
13 location code. The word 448 means jet has moved, or it has  
14 attacked our location.

12:03:18 15 Q. So to be clear, Mr Witness, 448 referred to a possible air  
16 raid by the jet - ECOMOG jet. Is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And did you get these sort of messages on your way from  
19 Koinadugu to Rosos?

12:03:44 20 A. Yes. Yes, many times I received that message myself and  
21 other people who took over after me for a while when I was  
22 resting they will get that message. When that message will come,  
23 everybody would know. In fact, all the AFRC/RUF combatants had  
24 that code. When they heard that code, "448", that meant there  
12:04:12 25 was a jet around and so everybody would run to hide.

26 Q. Where were these messages coming from?

27 A. As I was talking about monitoring communication set, we had  
28 a particular radio set in Buedu monitored by the AFRC that was  
29 the former SLA. That group was monitoring and giving the message

1 to the transmission. That was the control station in Buedu and  
2 they would send it to all stations. That was their  
3 responsibility. That 448 information was coming from Buedu,  
4 Sam Bockarie's station.

12:04:51 5 Q. Now, let us come to Freetown. You have testified already  
6 that you entered Freetown on 6 January 1999, correct?

7 A. Yes, it is correct.

8 Q. Now, can you describe your entry into Freetown. From which  
9 end of Freetown did you get into the city?

12:05:22 10 A. Well, we used the main highway from Waterloo to Freetown,  
11 from Kossoh Town - from Hastings, Kossoh Town to Freetown. We  
12 entered from the eastern part of Freetown and we entered with  
13 heavy firing. We entered Freetown fighting, but before we got to  
14 Freetown we divided ourselves into groups.

12:05:52 15 Q. Hold on, Mr Witness. (Your Honours, Kossoh Town is  
16 K-O-S-S-O-H, Kossoh). Yes, you have said you divided yourselves  
17 into groups. Which groups did you divide yourselves into?

18 A. We divided ourselves into fighting groups. That means -  
19 you know, Freetown is not a small village. It is a very big city  
12:06:23 20 if we didn't divide ourselves into groups. Every group had a  
21 commander, who will lead it. We appointed some areas where the  
22 commanders would go like Ferry Junction, that is one point, Ferry  
23 Junction covered Ugun, and also State House in Freetown, that  
24 was one target, the second target was Pademba Road, which is the  
12:06:53 25 maximum prison in Freetown, and we had the National Stadium and  
26 these are the areas I can recall. We divided our groups  
27 according to these areas and appointed commanders to go to these  
28 areas.

29 As for me personally, I was in a group with my radio with



1 my men and we entered Pademba Road. Some other group went to  
2 State House, some other went to National Stadium and the others  
3 we left at Ferry Junction. That is from the back. That was how  
4 we divided ourselves and, as we entered, everybody would go his  
12:07:32 5 various ways.

6 Q. Now can you describe, you said you were with the group that  
7 went to Pademba Road. Is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And can you describe the activities that you engaged in  
12:07:54 10 when you entered Freetown, your group?

11 A. Please repeat.

12 Q. What did your group do on the day that you entered  
13 Freetown?

14 A. I said we divided ourselves into groups. I was among the  
12:08:09 15 group that went to Pademba Road. What we did at Pademba Road,  
16 our mission was to receive Foday Sankoh and to also release all  
17 the political detainees who were called collaborators of the  
18 juntas. That was our mission.

19 Q. Mr Witness, what was at Pademba Road?

12:08:36 20 A. Pademba Road, that is the maximum prison in Freetown.  
21 Those who were at Pademba Road were the RUF and the AFRC  
22 detainees detained by the government of Sierra Leone, and even  
23 the former leader, that is Foday Sankoh, he was jailed there.  
24 That is why we made it a target to go there and release all - to  
12:09:03 25 release him and all the fighters and members of the AFRC and RUF  
26 who were under detention there.

27 Q. Did you succeed in doing this?

28 A. Perfectly, yes. All the targets that I have been naming,  
29 everybody succeeded. We who were at Pademba Road we attacked and

1 drove away all the securities, we used force on the Prison  
2 Officers to open the gates and some of them - we beat some of  
3 them because they delayed us. We opened the gate and we asked  
4 them where was Foday Sankoh and they said that people they had  
12:09:48 5 taken Foday Sankoh. They didn't know where he had been taken to.  
6 We opened the gate, everybody went outside and we made sure all  
7 the rooms were open and everybody went out.

8 Pademba Road was congested. In fact, some prisoners were  
9 sleeping on cartons. All the rooms were occupied. Civilians,  
12:10:08 10 juntas, RUF rebels, all of those who were there were released,  
11 including former President JS Momoh and one of the journalists,  
12 Hilton Fyle, he was among them with some other important people.  
13 Because of time now I cannot name everybody, but these are the  
14 names I can remember now. And also Gibriil Massaquoi, who was  
12:10:32 15 former spokesman for the RUF. These are the names that I can  
16 recall right now.

17 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Now, your Honours, I need to go  
18 over some spellings. Fyle I see the spelling here is different.  
19 It is F-Y-L-E. Hilton Fyle. Massaquoi, okay, that is correct:  
12:11:02 20 Q. Now apart from Gibriil Massaquoi who was a senior member of  
21 the RUF as you have said, was there any other member, senior  
22 person within the RUF that was released from prison that day?

23 A. The only person I can remember was a friend of RUF who was  
24 Steve Bio. He was a businessman, he was a friend to RUF, but I  
12:11:33 25 was not too sure whether he was a full member of RUF. But there  
26 were other men, because after the release of these people at  
27 Pademba Road our manpower in Freetown nobody could tell, because  
28 even ourselves we didn't know each other any more because those  
29 who came from Pademba Road had one slang. They said they were

1 born naked. Their password was they will strip themselves naked.  
2 They can only tie some cloth around them. When you meet them  
3 they can just wave to you as they are bare naked so you know they  
4 are the fighters from Pademba Road. This was how they acted.

12:12:16 5 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, Bio is B-I-O. Steve is spelt  
6 normally:

7 Q. Now these prisoners that you release from Pademba Road, did  
8 you take them anywhere?

9 A. Yes, not everybody because we had fighters and senior  
12:12:40 10 officers who we should - whom we should respect, and Gibril  
11 Massaquoi was one, former President JS Momoh, Hilton Fyle, whom I  
12 mentioned, Steve Bio and other prominent people that I cannot  
13 name now. When this other group got to State House, which was  
14 another target, that was where the senior officers Gullit

12:13:05 15 Five-Five, Bazzy, Papa, all of them went and based there, and  
16 therefore they requested for these people that they should be  
17 brought to State House for their safety. The idea we had was  
18 that State House was safe for our officers and those people who  
19 had been released from prison and, therefore, they all went there  
12:13:29 20 and they were seated there. And also another group of ours moved

21 to National Stadium. That was packed full as well with former  
22 SLA, who were disarmed and they were imprisoned. So, we released  
23 them as well and they joined us to fight. In fact if I think  
24 about the number that we released from National Stadium and  
12:13:57 25 Pademba Road, they were even more than we the fighters who  
26 entered Freetown. So State House became a safe zone when that  
27 was our concentration from the day we entered Freetown, but as  
28 time went by information came that we should abandon State House.

29 Q. Just pause. Now you have said that from Pademba Road you

1 released members of the AFRC and the RUF, some senior and some of  
2 them fighters, and you took the more senior ones, or more  
3 important ones, to State House. What about the fighters?

12:14:46 4 A. Fine. The fighters were even more angry than us. What we  
5 had started doing they did more even. The killing, the burning,  
6 the amputations, they did it even more because they had been  
7 jailed for life, but since they were helped and they were  
8 released so they said they were not going to spare any soul.

9 Q. Now, on this --

12:15:05 10 A. Then again --

11 Q. Can you allow. On the first day, what was the state of  
12 communication amongst the troops within Freetown?

13 A. In Freetown with whom?

14 Q. Amongst the unit?

12:15:26 15 A. Make it clear.

16 Q. Amongst the unit within Freetown?

17 A. Oh, it was cordial. There was no problem.

18 Q. Did you yourself have a radio at this time?

19 A. Fine. I made it possible for myself. The day I got there

12:15:50 20 I entered one of the NGO offices and I got one Yaesu radio. So  
21 where I was lodged with my security I put on the radio, so I used  
22 the communication set and informed Mosquito about everything from  
23 the time SAJ Musa entered Rosos. I compiled that information and  
24 sent it to him at about 12 o'clock midnight, and from that time

12:16:21 25 every midnight I spoke to Mosquito. He used to monitor the radio  
26 and get all the information about everything that was happening  
27 in Sierra Leone and what was the contacts. From my radio, Alfred  
28 Brown used to come. Mosquito - sorry, Gibril Massaquoi himself  
29 was coming and had to send some more information about what had

1 been happening and the discussion by Gullit, that was going on  
2 through my radio communication set.

3 Q. Now on this first day that you entered Freetown, was there  
4 any communication between the forces - your forces - and  
12:17:10 5 Sam Bockarie?

6 A. Yes, as we entered Freetown we were based and settled, the  
7 authorities got settled at State House, they were able to  
8 communicate with Sam Bockarie about the situation. Gullit told  
9 Sam Bockarie that, "You said we should not enter, but however we  
12:17:38 10 have now entered and thanks to God we were able to get State  
11 House, Pademba Road and the National Stadium. Our men are still  
12 advancing, were still under fighting and we were able to release  
13 JS Momoh, Gibril Massaquoi, Hilton Fyle and some other prominent  
14 authorities. In response, Massaquoi - I am sorry, Mosquito told  
12:18:11 15 Gibril Massaquoi that, "Do as a military man".

16 Q. Can you just pause. Was Mosquito - you said, "Mosquito  
17 told Gibril Massaquoi". Who was Mosquito responding to? Who  
18 called Mosquito and who was he responding to?

19 A. I am sorry, Gullit called Mosquito and told him those whom  
12:18:44 20 we had released from Pademba Road. In response, Mosquito said  
21 Gullit should - Gullit and others should take great care of those  
22 people and Gullit told him that they were under safekeeping at  
23 State House. Mosquito said Gullit should provide security and  
24 take great care of those people, until he tried by all possible  
12:19:10 25 means and dispatch them to Kailahun. So, whatever activities  
26 that was going on Gullit used to transmit the message to  
27 Mosquito. At that time SAJ Musa was dead. And even myself as a  
28 radio man I had my personal radio, because it was my  
29 responsibility according to Mosquito to give him all detailed

1 information about the Freetown operation. That was what I was  
2 doing. Any conversation going on between Mosquito and Gullit I  
3 used to monitor that. At times I will be at the radio station  
4 and I will get information about that and --

12:19:52 5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness go over the  
6 last bit?

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the interpreter needs you to  
8 repeat the last part of your answer.

9 THE WITNESS: Any information that was going around in  
12:20:09 10 Freetown either by voice or by messages, that is written  
11 messages, I used to monitor that and write it down, and any  
12 information that Gullit failed to tell Mosquito that was my  
13 responsibility to tell him. And from there I was able to give  
14 him details, but when SAJ Musa entered Camp Rosos and what  
12:20:37 15 happened around his death and after his death, what actions, why  
16 we didn't wait and we entered Freetown. I gave all of these  
17 pieces of information to Mosquito.

18 MR BANGURA:

19 Q. Mr Witness, apart from the prisoners from Pademba Road whom  
12:21:00 20 you had taken to State House, were you holding any other persons  
21 there at State House?

22 A. Yes, as we were fighting so we were capturing ECOMOG  
23 troops, but for the SLA we didn't have much problems with them  
24 because some of them were running from the government and coming  
12:21:21 25 to join us with their guns. And for the ECOMOG soldiers, when we  
26 captured the ECOMOG we killed them at the front line and those  
27 that we would bring to the State House we report them to Gullit  
28 and he himself would report to Sam Bockarie. Sam Bockarie would  
29 tell him that he had no prison for ECOMOG. No politicians. As a

1 result, those ECOMOG soldiers were killed under the Cotton Tree.  
2 That area there were more than ten or 15 ECOMOG corpses and some  
3 other areas, so we never spared ECOMOG.

4 Q. Now, you have mentioned that - what was the state of - what  
12:22:12 5 was the situation regarding civilians in Freetown when you  
6 entered?

7 A. Oh, it was pathetic. Of course I am a member of the RUF,  
8 but it was pathetic, but there was no other way to do. The  
9 civilians were suffering. They suffered raping, hard labour,  
12:22:40 10 execution, amputation, burning of the property. That was how  
11 they were in Freetown. And this was effective when the situation  
12 changed, when the military situation changed, that when the  
13 ECOMOG had had power over us again all those atrocities that I  
14 had mentioned became more rampant.

12:23:12 15 Q. Mr Witness, how long were you at State House? How long did  
16 you occupy State House?

17 A. State House, it was almost a day. Of course, ECOMOG did  
18 not drive us there. The air raid was going on. Every two hours  
19 we will get a report on the radio that "448". So the 448 always  
12:23:38 20 was directed at State House, that ECOMOG had planned to bombard  
21 State House because of the massive killing that was going on at  
22 Cotton Tree. So, from that point we changed our location. We  
23 slept there and the next day we changed our location, but we were  
24 beyond State House towards the west. Two days we started  
12:24:05 25 retreating.

26 Q. Now, did you have further communications with Sam Bockarie  
27 about the situation?

28 A. Yes, of course. That was our daily activity. Every  
29 morning, every afternoon, every evening we would send situation

1 reports, and any time we would send situation reports because of  
2 the way ECOMOG was threatening us he would even answer more and  
3 say, "Make that area fearful. Go and destroy Kissy Terminal. Go  
4 and set road blocks. Go and set road blocks at this and that  
12:24:46 5 place; places that are government owned", so ECOMOG would lose -  
6 I mean, ECOMOG will - they will block roads. That is what  
7 Sam Bockarie was telling us. He just asked that we reinforced  
8 him.

9 Q. At what stage --

12:25:08 10 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, I am sorry to interrupt. I  
11 have listened now like three paragraphs into the record. The  
12 witness has described the situation of the civilians which you  
13 asked him to do so. However, the testimony does not show who was  
14 doing these things.

12:25:28 15 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour, I will come to that:

16 Q. Now, you have just mentioned that Sam Bockarie gave an  
17 order. Well, let us get this point clear first. Now, I asked  
18 you earlier what was the situation with civilians and you said  
19 that it was not very good. Can you explain clearly what was -  
12:26:00 20 what was happening and who was responsible for what was  
21 happening?

22 A. During this time the RUF fighters, AFRC, including the STF,  
23 were burning houses, amputating, looting, killing, raping,  
24 setting road blocks, no transportation, no movement. Most of the  
12:26:41 25 civilians were indoors.

26 Q. Now, can you say in which locations these activities were -  
27 these acts were carried out?

28 A. Let me say almost all the areas that we occupied from the  
29 first day until the last day that we left Freetown, but the worst



1 thing happened in eastern Freetown - the eastern part. From  
2 eastern police coming down to the end of Freetown, that was where  
3 the worst situation was experienced, because areas like Kissy  
4 Terminal I did not too understand the place, but there was fire  
12:27:28 5 at that place which made some other areas - some parts of the  
6 terminal was destroyed and some houses were burnt down that any  
7 street you pass you will see civilians, children, boys and girls,  
8 died. Some houses you go there and you see a house on fire,  
9 blazing. You will see people coming from upstairs falling from  
12:27:56 10 upstairs. That happened in the east.

11 Q. How did you operate in Freetown? How did you move in  
12 Freetown? Were you moving - were you in particular groups  
13 belonging to one force only, or were you mixed groups?

14 A. I don't understand that. Please go over it.

12:28:27 15 Q. How were the groups composed, the groups that operated  
16 within Freetown?

17 A. We are all fighters. There was the AFRC, RUF and the STF  
18 and each of these groups belonged to certain groups, because  
19 anywhere you will see thousands of fighters they must have units.  
12:29:00 20 As I stated earlier, from the time we left Koinadugu I said in  
21 this group we had one unit which was the - which dominated the  
22 RUF group. I am not talking about the AFRC. This group - it was  
23 two groups, but one of these two groups dominated the whole  
24 group. We called that one Red Lion. Red Lion was a battalion on  
12:29:30 25 its own which comprised Komba Gbundema's bodyguards. They formed  
26 that unit, but it was RUF. They overwhelmed the Cobra Unit and  
27 so all of the RUF fighters fell under Red Lion battalion, but we  
28 were all RUF.

29 Q. Now, you did mention that at some point the military

1 situation changed and you said that as this happened you got  
2 messages from Sam Bockarie. Is that correct?

3 A. Yes, all what I am talking happened in 1999 under  
4 Sam Bockarie's administration. All what I am talking about we  
12:30:18 5 used to get message from Sam Bockarie on a daily basis.

6 Q. When you say the military situation changed, what do you  
7 mean?

8 A. Well, at that time we were not that strong to fight ECOMOG.  
9 Their firing power was more than us and so we started to retreat.

12:30:41 10 Up to the time we got to Ugun turntable, we moved from that  
11 point and went to Shell Road and at that time the situation had  
12 changed against us. ECOMOG was chasing us. That is what I meant  
13 by the military situation had changed.

14 Q. What messages or orders did you get from Sam Bockarie in  
12:31:05 15 this changed military situation?

16 A. After the military situation had changed, we received  
17 reinforcements of a message which says we should make Freetown  
18 more fearful than before. Also we received another message that  
19 we should come to Waterloo, we should send troops to meet at  
12:31:36 20 Hastings because at that time the other troops that we had left  
21 behind us, which was Superman, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and some  
22 others, had come to Waterloo. So, for them to reinforce us we  
23 were to send a team so we should organise ourselves and attack  
24 Kossoh Town, together with Superman's group, so that we could  
12:32:07 25 clear Kossoh Town where ECOMOG was based on the main road. The  
26 troops from Waterloo could join us after that. That was the  
27 message that we got.

28 Q. Mr Witness, you said that one of the messages ordered that  
29 you should make the area more fearful. At this point, what was -

1 what was this message intended, or what did you understand from  
2 this message?

3 A. Well, what I knew if before we entered Freetown if we had a  
4 message that we should make an area fearful it was to destroy,  
12:32:58 5 kill, amputate, destroy bridges, set road blocks. That was the  
6 meaning of making an area fearful. And in that message he talked  
7 about some areas as well and it was not just one message. I  
8 spoke about Kissy, Kissy Road, Kissy Terminal and the ferry and  
9 some other important areas. He said we should set up road blocks  
12:33:27 10 that should delay ECOMOG to clear and maybe that will lead them  
11 to reduced attention.

12 Q. Now, you mentioned Kissy Terminal. What was there?

13 A. Well, what I understand by Kissy Terminal it is a place  
14 where they will get oil, petrol, diesel, engine oil. That was  
12:33:59 15 where it was refined. That was a major area for Sierra Leone.

16 Q. Did you follow the orders about burning Kissy Terminal?

17 A. Yes, I went there myself and I saw fire. I saw thick smoke  
18 coming from the place and I made sure that the order was  
19 implemented.

12:34:27 20 Q. Now following these orders from Sam Bockarie, can you  
21 describe the scale of atrocities that occurred after he had  
22 passed his orders to make the order more fearful?

23 A. Please repeat.

24 Q. Now you said that - you already described some of the  
12:34:56 25 things that you were doing in Freetown, burning and killing and  
26 blocking roads, and because the military situation changed  
27 Sam Bockarie sent you a message, or messages, one of which was to  
28 make the area more fearful. Did this - in carrying out this  
29 order, did it even change the situation regarding the acts that

1 you have just described; the killing and the burning and blocking  
2 of roads?

3 A. This one did not change the situation. The more the  
4 burning, the killing, the amputations, the more ECOMOG used to  
12:35:46 5 advance. So, these atrocities did not stop ECOMOG from chasing  
6 us.

7 Q. Now, why did Sam Bockarie order you to use more terror in  
8 Freetown to make the place fearful? Why did he order you to do  
9 this?

12:36:05 10 A. Well, in the first place he said if we did that the  
11 international body would intervene and ECOMOG would stop and  
12 would be there and maybe they start calling for peace talks.  
13 That was what he stated in his message.

14 Q. Now, earlier you said when you were at State House you had  
12:36:30 15 448 messages. Where were these messages coming from?

16 A. These messages were from Buedu from Sam Bockarie.

17 Q. Now you have mentioned that, in addition to ordering you to  
18 make the area fearful, Bockarie told you about another force that  
19 was now at Waterloo. Is that correct?

12:37:03 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What exactly did he say regarding that force at Waterloo?

22 A. Well, he said that group that had come to Waterloo, in fact  
23 they came as far as Hastings. They were based there. He said  
24 those groups we should organise ourselves and send some men so  
12:37:33 25 that they in turn would send some men to attack Kossoh Town. He  
26 said those groups were a reinforcement for us. They had come to  
27 join us to enter Freetown. That was exactly what he told us.

28 Q. It is not so clear when you say you were to send some men  
29 and they were to send some men to attack Kossoh Town. Can you

1 clarify that? What exactly were you supposed to do from both  
2 sides?

12:38:21 3 A. Gullit's side, Gullit was to send fighters at a point where  
4 they will meet and attack Kossoh Town and Superman, Issa Sesay,  
5 Morris Kallon were to also dispatch fighters to go and attack  
6 Kossoh Town so they will clear the route, so that the fighters  
7 could come and enter Freetown and join Gullit so we could  
8 re-attack and regain all the areas we had lost and even to take  
9 over - to take all over the city. That was the plan.

12:38:42 10 Q. Now, which forces were at Waterloo at this time?

11 A. The forces which were at Waterloo were Superman's group,  
12 including Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay. That was the group which  
13 was at Kono and Koinadugu which I led - they all came and joined at  
14 Waterloo. According to the plan which we had at Buedu, they had  
12:39:10 15 now come and merged. If they had met us there we would have  
16 entered Freetown together, we wouldn't have stopped getting  
17 Freetown, but our group did not wait.

18 Q. Now, did you send - did Gullit send troops to Kossoh Town  
19 as was ordered by Mosquito?

12:39:33 20 A. No.

21 Q. What about the troops waiting at Waterloo? Did they  
22 advance to Kossoh Town as was the plan?

23 A. Yes, those men organised themselves. They attacked Kossoh  
24 Town at night until daybreak, but they could not get the town.  
12:40:00 25 But among that group they had one AFRC strong fighter who was Red  
26 Lion - sorry, Red Goat, Rambo Red Goat. He was the only man who  
27 could garner up to 15 manpower and they bypassed ECOMOG and came  
28 to Freetown and joined us.

29 Q. Now, this fighter who you have just mentioned, Rambo Red

1 Goat, you say he was an SLA and he had 15 manpower, I assume  
2 fighters, is that correct, with him?

3 A. Yes, he came to Freetown with 15 manpower.

4 Q. Now, at the time that he left, or up until the time that he  
12:40:52 5 left Waterloo and bypassed ECOMOG positions, who was he fighting  
6 under?

7 A. Well, he was with Superman's group.

8 Q. Now, when this group came into Freetown, did anything  
9 happen?

12:41:24 10 A. Those 15 men that I told you about, they came to Freetown  
11 and met us at Kissi Old Road. When they arrived they said from  
12 Waterloo they attacked Kossoh Town but they could not succeed,  
13 but Rambo, who was Red Lion - sorry, Red Goat, was able to take  
14 15 men to come and join Gullit's group in Freetown, but at that  
12:41:54 15 time they met us now on our way going. The day they arrived

16 Gullit passed an order that all those who had motorcycles and  
17 vehicles and what you could not - somebody could not carry, let  
18 us burn everything. So, everything was put at one place and they  
19 were burned. Vehicles and everything was burnt, those that we  
12:42:21 20 could not carry. So, when Red Goat Rambo came he said he had not

21 come to return. He said he had come to stay in Freetown. Some  
22 men were happy to be with Rambo in Freetown and Gullit himself,  
23 who he met there, he gave him the okay to stay. In fact, at that  
24 moment only a few of us returned because we were more than 4,000  
12:42:52 25 in Freetown. Most of the people hadn't guns, particularly those  
26 who were released from Pademba Road, so most of us, the armed men  
27 - a few armed men and a few unarmed men returned to Waterloo.

28 Rambo stayed in Freetown with many other men.

29 Q. Now, amongst the men that stayed in Freetown with Rambo, do

1 you recall any of them that you now remember?

2 A. Yes, I can recall one name: Rambo Red Goat himself.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness has called a  
4 name that I need clarification on.

12:43:42 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Could you please repeat the name for the  
6 interpreter.

7 MR BANGURA:

8 Q. Could you go back, Mr Witness?

9 A. Striker, who was the Red Lion's commander, Red Lion  
12:43:55 10 Battalion Commander.

11 Q. And what was the size of the force that you said decided to  
12 stay in Freetown with Rambo Red Goat?

13 A. That number was too much. I cannot recall now.

14 Q. Now, were any orders given to Rambo Red Goat before you  
12:44:23 15 pulled out of Freetown?

16 A. Yes, of course. Rambo was given an order by Gullit.

17 Q. Now, the decision to allow Rambo Red Goat to stay in  
18 Freetown, was it discussed at all in any communication with  
19 Mosquito?

12:44:44 20 A. Yes, Mosquito told him that as far as that man has said  
21 that he is living there and he is able to get manpower, they  
22 should leave and they should come back to Waterloo, reorganise  
23 themselves and re-attack Freetown. I want to ease myself.

24 MR BANGURA: Your Honours?

12:45:12 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: I see. Madam Court Attendant, if you  
26 would assist the witness to leave, please.

27 [In the absence of the witness]

28 MR KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, could I take advantage of the  
29 break and just bring to the Court's attention that we have

1 discussed with the Defence and I believe your legal officers are  
2 aware that we have a request for a witness TF1-150 to testify on  
3 a specific date beginning 18 February and we would ask the  
4 Court's permission to schedule him to begin his testimony, if  
12:46:09 5 necessary interrupting another witness, on that date because of  
6 the schedule of that witness.

7 PRESIDING JUDGE: I was not aware of this application. I  
8 do recognise the number and I am aware, from what has been said  
9 previously, of the background of this witness. Mr Munyard?

12:46:33 10 MR MUNYARD: Madam President, can I make it plain that the  
11 Defence are willing to accommodate the Prosecution in relation to  
12 this witness. We understand that he is an academic and that he  
13 has commitments. However, I want to make it absolutely clear  
14 that this is a one-off case of agreeing to advance the witness in  
12:46:58 15 this way. I don't want it to be taken in any sense as a  
16 precedent. We are still in discussions with the Prosecution  
17 about the foreshortening of the 42 day rule in relation to  
18 others, but nothing - and those negotiations so far haven't borne  
19 fruit, so nothing that I say in relation to TF1-150 should be  
12:47:21 20 taken as in any way laying down a precedent. I am sure that is  
21 clear.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand your position.

23 MR KOUMJIAN: Could I just clarify one matter: For  
24 TF1-150, there is not a 42 day rule issue. That is not the  
12:47:38 25 issue. The issue is simply his schedule and interrupting other  
26 witnesses.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I thought Mr Munyard was making a more  
28 general observation in relation to other witnesses. Am I  
29 correct, Mr Munyard?



1 MR MUNYARD: You are absolutely correct, Madam President.

12:48:04 2 I wanted to make it plain to the Court that as far as  
3 accommodating witnesses is concerned, we are happy with the  
4 accommodation of this particular witness and I wanted the Court  
5 to know that we are in discussions with the Prosecution to try to  
6 accommodate other witnesses to whom the 42 day rule does apply  
7 and, as I have indicated at the moment, our offer to accommodate  
8 them has not borne fruit. I will say no more than that at the  
9 moment.

12:48:50 10 PRESIDING JUDGE: The Bench will accommodate this request  
11 for the Prosecution. We note the remarks of the Defence and any  
12 other applications will be dealt with on a case by case basis.

13 [In the presence of the witness]

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Bangura, please proceed.

12:49:51 15 MR BANGURA:

16 Q. Are you all right, Mr Witness?

17 A. I am all right, thank you.

18 Q. Now, you were at a point where orders had been given to  
19 Rambo Red Goat who was going to stay in Freetown, but before that  
12:50:17 20 I think I asked you whether any communications were had with  
21 Mosquito about Rambo Red Goat staying in Freetown. Do you recall  
22 that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What was the communication about and did - what was the  
12:50:35 25 communication about?

26 A. One thing I would want to start with, it was when they were  
27 unable to attack Kossoh Town, or to capture Kossoh Town, Mosquito  
28 asked Gullit to try and pull out and, by doing so, when Gullit  
29 received Red Goat that was Rambo, Gullit told Mosquito that the

1 men said they are going to stay in Freetown. He said they should  
2 leave, but he told them that they should destroy to make the area  
3 fearful until they came back and reorganised themselves, but,  
4 "Since the time you got the former president and the other  
12:51:28 5 prominent people, you try and pull out with them, you bring them  
6 to Waterloo so that you can dispatch them to me," Mosquito, "and  
7 then we will reorganise and regain Freetown." That was how the  
8 communications went on.

9 Q. Do you know what specific orders Gullit gave to Rambo Red  
12:51:51 10 Goat before he left him in charge of Freetown?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What were the orders?

13 A. One - when our commanders said that we should make the area  
14 fearful, that means we should destroy most of the houses. We  
12:52:13 15 should burn down houses, make road blockades, amputate and kill.  
16 That was the order that he gave. Also he gave him the order that  
17 any politician Rambo knew and saw, he should not spare them and  
18 he should not bring any prisoner of war to him, and he should not  
19 make any reports on that. That is what he told him. That was  
12:52:43 20 what Gullit told Rambo.

21 Q. Now, how long had you been in Freetown before you left?

22 A. In Freetown, our own group, I can say we spent almost two  
23 weeks and then we also left the other groups.

24 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that one of the men who decided  
12:53:27 25 to stay with Rambo Red Goat was Striker, who was of the Red Lion  
26 battalion, is that correct?

27 A. Yes, he also had men who were fighters. They were many and  
28 he was the commander for this Red Lion battalion and since he  
29 said he should leave, that meant that the majority of his

1 fighters who were with him, when he was leaving they all left  
2 with him.

3 Q. Now, when you say leaving can you clarify what you mean?

12:54:23

4 A. What I mean, when he said he was leaving it meant that he  
5 was leaving with Red Lion, or I mean Red Lion would go from  
6 Freetown. It means all the fighters who were with him were going  
7 to stay in Freetown.

8 Q. Mr Witness, do you mean that Rambo Red Goat and Striker  
9 were leaving Freetown to go somewhere else?

12:54:37

10 A. No, what I am saying, Rambo, Striker and the manpower who  
11 was behind him they all stayed in Freetown. We left them in  
12 Freetown and then we came to Waterloo.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, following the orders which were given to  
14 Rambo Red Goat by Gullit, do you know what happened as you left  
12:55:14 15 Freetown?

12:55:42

16 A. Yes, some of the things that happened in Freetown, in the  
17 first place we never left them behind with radio communication  
18 sets, but anything that happened we used to listen to commercial  
19 radio and even the BBC media and they reported on activities,  
20 atrocities, that took place in Freetown. They used to talk on  
21 that.

22 Q. Were you able to gather what was happening in Freetown as  
23 you left?

12:56:01

24 A. Yes, most of the information, though not all, but we were  
25 able to gather them over the media that those were radios from  
26 Freetown. We got information from them that the rebels in  
27 Freetown were amputating civilians, they were raping, they were  
28 burning down houses, they were making road blockades, they were  
29 killing. Those were some of the things that were on the media

1 and also they abducted civilians. They forced them to follow  
2 them to the jungle. All those informations we got on the media.

3 Q. Now, in what area in Freetown did you leave the group that  
4 we are talking about: Rambo Red Goat, Striker and the others?

12:56:55 5 In what part of Freetown did you leave them as you moved out?

6 A. This group we left them behind around Texaco. That is  
7 around Old Road area and that is the eastern part of Freetown.

8 Q. Now, can you help the Court with which part of the east in  
9 Freetown Texaco was?

12:57:24 10 A. Texaco is in front of this area when coming from the  
11 provinces from Waterloo, or when coming from Kossoh Town trying  
12 to enter Freetown from Waterloo, that is when you are entering  
13 the eastern part of Freetown and Texaco is on the main new  
14 highway entering the city. Texaco is a place where the refugees

12:57:57 15 from Liberia were encamped and Texaco is also called Clay  
16 Factory. Opposite there you can see a big pole in the centre of  
17 a compound. That was where they used to make clay and at present  
18 they are using it as a new park in Freetown.

19 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier that when you left Rosos, coming  
12:58:34 20 down to Freetown, the head of the group was O-Five that left -  
21 Koinadugu, sorry, my error. When you left Koinadugu, the head of  
22 the group was O-Five. Was he with you up until this time in  
23 Freetown?

24 A. Yes, sir. O-Five was with us since the time we started  
12:59:02 25 from Koinadugu, Rosos, Freetown and even when we returned to  
26 Waterloo.

27 Q. Was he in your group, in the group that returned to  
28 Waterloo?

29 A. Yes, he was among the group when we returned to Waterloo.

1 Q. Now, earlier you mentioned that there were troops at  
2 Waterloo who Sam Bockarie had ordered to fight their way through  
3 Kossoh and join you in Freetown, is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

12:59:48 5 Q. What was the composition of that group?

6 A. This group was an AFRC/RUF, including STF. Some of them  
7 were based at Koinadugu and some based in Kono.

8 Q. And who were the commanders with this group that was at  
9 Waterloo?

13:00:15 10 A. The main commanders amongst this group was Issa Sesay,  
11 Dennis Mingo, alias Superman, Morris Kallon, Rambo, RUF Rambo.  
12 They were the main commanders.

13 Q. Now, you had also said that the orders from Sam Bockarie  
14 was for Gullit to go back to Waterloo and regroup. What was the  
15 purpose of going to regroup at Waterloo?

13:00:53 16 A. Well, the purpose of going back to Waterloo and regroup was  
17 to come back and re-attack Freetown. That was the purpose.

18 Q. Did you get to Waterloo?

19 A. Yes, we came to Waterloo.

13:01:19 20 Q. Did anything happen when you got there?

21 A. Yes, yes, after we got to Waterloo something happened.  
22 They held a meeting and we were able to reorganise to re-attack  
23 Kossoh Town and we attacked twice, but we couldn't make it.

24 Q. Mr Witness, during - and did anything happen after that?

13:01:48 25 A. During this, after the attack when we realised we couldn't  
26 make it, we were there for some time and then some people decided  
27 to retreat and while Rambo was in Freetown, Red Goat, the Guinean  
28 troops moved from Guinea. They forced their way into Freetown  
29 and they started attacking them. By then they came and attacked

1 us at Waterloo. Then we now left Waterloo and we were now around  
2 Four Mile, Six Mile, up to Songo Junction going towards Masiaka.  
3 That is area where we were. After some days, Rambo Red Goat  
4 again he started retreating. They withdrew all their men from  
13:02:41 5 Freetown.

6 Q. Mr Witness, let me take you back. I am checking to see if  
7 there are any spellings to help with. I think they have all been  
8 spelled before.

9 Let me take you back to Freetown briefly. During the  
13:03:08 10 period that you stayed in Freetown, which you said was about two  
11 weeks, what was the state of communication amongst the forces,  
12 that is the combined forces not only from within Freetown, but  
13 with your other locations outside Freetown?

14 A. Well, I have said this before. I said the communication  
13:03:42 15 was cordial with people outside Freetown, like, for example,  
16 Superman, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay and even our headquarter  
17 station in Buedu, which is Sam Bockarie, alias Mosquito.

18 Q. Now, before you entered Freetown, in fact, you had  
19 established that there were various other forces moving towards  
13:04:08 20 Freetown, various other groups, is that correct, from different  
21 locations, is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And was there a communication flow among the various groups  
24 that were advancing towards Freetown?

13:04:26 25 A. During the time of SAJ Musa, no, I never knew about that.  
26 It was after SAJ Musa's death that I was able to know that  
27 communication started flowing between these groups and the ones  
28 that we left behind, which is Superman, Issa Sesay, Morris  
29 Kallon.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, at this stage I would like the  
3 witness to be shown the second of the two maps that were provided  
4 to the Court. That is the digits ending 0183:

13:06:11 5 Q. Mr Witness, do you see the map in front of you?

6 A. Yes, I have seen it.

7 Q. At the top there can you read what is written there?

8 A. Yes, "AFRC/RUF primary radio locations - January 1999, as  
9 indicated by TF1-360."

13:06:46 10 Q. Now, what does this map tell us?

11 A. This map is telling us about the areas and during this time  
12 in 1999 the major areas where they were deployed, this is what  
13 this map is indicating.

14 Q. Can you guide us through those areas where you were  
13:07:21 15 deployed during the period that we are discussing?

16 A. Number 1, I will start from there, right, which is Buedu,  
17 the eastern part. That was a place where Mosquito was based,  
18 which was our headquarters, and Koidu-Sefadu, which was in the  
19 Kono District, you can see it by the right. There also is the  
13:08:04 20 eastern part of Freetown and this area was an area where Superman  
21 came from before he came to the area that I have spoken about.  
22 Here is Binkolo, Bombali District, which is the northern part of  
23 Freetown. This was another station that we controlled under  
24 Superman.

13:08:27 25 Q. Let me pause you. Did you say that Koidu was in the  
26 eastern part of Freetown?

27 A. No, I am talking about - I think you said I should have to  
28 describe the areas. I started from the east of Sierra Leone. I  
29 am talking about the whole of Sierra Leone. I have not come to

1 Freetown as yet.

2 Q. Can you just simply say where Koidu is?

3 A. Well, that is where I am pointing at [indicated]. It is  
4 written Koidu, or Sefadu.

13:09:10 5 Q. In what part of the country?

6 A. It is in the part - eastern part of the country. Go ahead.

7 Q. Continue from there, please.

8 A. From here you have the centre of the map where you can see  
9 Makeni and very close to there you can see Binkolo. Makeni is in  
10 the northern part of the country. It was another headquarters of  
11 the RUF when the troops were moving. From there we are going  
12 towards the left now. We come to the next point, you can see  
13 Port Loko District and it is pointing at Lunsar. Lunsar was  
14 Superman's base after all of those areas were captured. Then you  
15 can see we come to the Western Area of Sierra Leone on the map.

13:10:11 16 You see Freetown itself. We had a radio, a point. Then we come  
17 to Hastings, or Waterloo. Waterloo was one of the other bases  
18 where Superman, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay and some others were  
19 based and in this Freetown, it was Gullit who was there and his  
20 own station.

13:10:44 21 Q. You have said that these are bases that were occupied by  
22 the AFRC/RUF forces in January 1999. Can you tell us who - which  
23 commanders were operating within these locations at this time?

24 A. Oh, yes. This 1999, number 1 I will start with, here  
13:11:19 25 Buedu, it was Mosquito who was there as commander and it was our  
26 headquarters in Kailahun District. Then here, Koidu-Sefadu, was  
27 Morris Kallon who was there and that was the other High Command  
28 when Superman left. And Binkolo that I am pointing out  
29 [indicated], Binkolo was a place - I mean, sorry, Makeni, under



1 which you have Binkolo, was a place where Superman - it was  
2 Superman's headquarters also and with another radio station and  
3 then here Lunsar. Lunsar was Superman's base also with a radio  
4 station, but Makeni was a combined headquarters where Superman,  
13:12:13 5 Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon this time round. And then Hastings,  
6 Hastings, Waterloo or Hastings, all these commanders who move  
7 from there later came and based here. So, this was a  
8 reinforcement ground to reinforce Freetown. Here, now in  
9 Freetown, was the command ground of Gullit. He was there. This  
13:12:40 10 is what I can tell you about this map.

11 Q. These positions are indications which you made to the  
12 Prosecution during your interviews, is that correct?

13 A. Yes, I explained this to the Prosecution about these main  
14 areas.

13:13:04 15 Q. Thank you.

16 MR CAYLEY: Can we just clarify that, excuse me, because I  
17 think the last map it was stated that it was done in the session  
18 when you spoke with the witness before he testified. Is this  
19 connected to one of his interviews, or is this connected to the  
13:13:26 20 rehearsal session you did?

21 MR BANGURA: This map, the indications on it came out of  
22 interviews with the witness prior to his testimony.

23 MR CAYLEY: So that was with yourself, yes?

24 MR BANGURA: Yes.

13:13:38 25 MR CAYLEY: Thank you.

26 MR BANGURA: Thank you, Mr Witness. Your Honours, I  
27 respectfully ask that the document be marked for identification.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: The map headed "AFRC/RUF primary radio  
29 locations - January 1999" is marked for identification MFI-46.

1 MR BANGURA:

2 Q. Mr Witness, you have said that you regrouped at Waterloo  
3 and attacked Kossoh, is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

13:14:33 5 Q. This attack was unsuccessful, is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Which groups were composed of your - of the group that  
8 attacked Kossoh?

9 A. Gullit from Freetown, his group was in there, Superman's  
13:14:57 10 group, Morris Kallon's group, Issa Sesay's group, they were all  
11 amongst that attack.

12 Q. And following the failure of this attack on Kossoh Town,  
13 did you do anything?

14 A. During this time we couldn't do anything again. We didn't  
13:15:21 15 carry out any attack to my knowledge.

16 Q. Did you go anywhere when you failed to take Kossoh?

17 A. Yes, some men were now retreating, some men were going to  
18 base in Makeni, Lunsar, Masiaka and I also found my way out to  
19 Waterloo and I spent a few days and then I started retreating.  
13:15:53 20 Little by little I got to Masiaka and some other days later I  
21 found myself in Makeni and then later returned to Lunsar and  
22 established myself there with Superman.

23 Q. Now, what about the group that was left in Freetown?

24 A. Those groups who had stayed in Freetown, I was now on my  
13:16:19 25 way. I understood later that Rambo Red Goat, who had stayed in  
26 Freetown, had retreated and he has joined the other men in  
27 Waterloo. After Waterloo, Four Mile/Six Mile where they were,  
28 they later came and spread out at Masiaka.

29 Q. Now, before most of the groups retreated from Waterloo, or

1 just before that, do you know in what manner this group that  
2 remained in Freetown retreated? How did they get out of  
3 Freetown?

13:17:13 4 A. Oh, yes, because they didn't use the main road. They  
5 jumped into the bush, they used the bush to come to Waterloo  
6 until they came down to Waterloo. They used the bush. The same  
7 way we managed our ways to Waterloo was the same way they did to  
8 Waterloo from Freetown.

13:17:35 9 Q. Now, you have said that when you left that group in  
10 Freetown you did not have communication with them, but you  
11 monitored commercial radio and you learnt of some of the things  
12 they were doing in Freetown, is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

13:17:57 14 Q. Now, what did you learn from the commercial radio about the  
15 activities in Freetown?

16 A. Well, they were reporting on the radio that the juntas were  
17 in Freetown, they were raping women, they were amputating  
18 civilians, they were killing, they were burning down houses, they  
19 were looting properties. That was what they were saying on the  
13:18:24 20 radio and, therefore, all the people who were in that area, that  
21 is the eastern part of the area, they should move from there and  
22 come to the centre of the town.

23 Q. Now, apart from hearing over the radio about what was  
24 happening, did you yourselves, as you moved out of Freetown,  
13:18:46 25 observe anything about Freetown?

26 A. Yes, the jets used to come and bombard whilst Rambo was  
27 going along burning. We saw smoke of the air whilst we were  
28 leaving Freetown.

29 Q. Now, this group when they eventually left Freetown, could

1 you describe their composition as they left Freetown?

2 A. Rambo was amongst that group as commander and also the Red  
3 Lion battalion was there, but when they came I didn't see them  
4 again with my naked eyes, but I only heard the radio

13:19:44 5 communication that the men who were in Freetown, they have  
6 retreated and they have joined with those on the main highway  
7 towards Waterloo to Masiaka.

8 Q. Was the group comprised only of combatants?

9 A. These groups, whilst they were retreating they abducted  
13:20:08 10 civilians from Freetown. They brought them. They carried their  
11 loads. They were using them as wives also. The men were  
12 carrying their loads. That is their properties they had looted  
13 from civilians in Freetown and the men were using the women as  
14 bush wives.

13:20:29 15 Q. Now, before most of these groups retreated from Waterloo,  
16 was there any plan about the retreat from Waterloo?

17 A. Say again?

18 Q. Was there any meeting in Waterloo before most of the groups  
19 retreated beyond Waterloo?

13:20:58 20 A. I can't recall again, but the first day we got to Waterloo  
21 we held a meeting to re-attack. After that meeting I can't  
22 remember we had another meeting again.

23 Q. Were there any orders at this time, after the failure of  
24 the attack on Kossoh, about what to do?

13:21:23 25 A. Oh, yes. The only order I can talk about for now was the  
26 order of dispatching the former president and the names that I  
27 had given that were taken from Pademba Road. That was the first  
28 order that I can recall for now, but as time goes on maybe I will  
29 be able to tell you more.

1 Q. Now, these prisoners that you have mentioned that were  
2 released from Pademba Road, the former president, the  
3 broadcaster, were they taken anywhere?

4 A. Oh, yes. Those people, they took them directly to Makeni.

13:22:22 5 That is where Gullit took them. They were there until some of us  
6 reached there, because when I got to Makeni I used to see the  
7 former president. The other day I can recall when they had left  
8 Foday Sankoh, the former President JS Momoh attempted to escape  
9 and he was recaptured at the border. They brought him to Makeni.

13:22:46 10 Foday Sankoh was there by then. After they had released Foday  
11 Sankoh, he came to visit the RUF. He told them that they should  
12 release him. He said he will take him to Freetown for him to  
13 stay there. He said nobody should do anything to him. So, he  
14 took JS Momoh and took him to Freetown. I don't know what

13:23:07 15 happened there later.

16 Q. What about Hilton Fyle, the radio broadcaster? Do you know  
17 what happened to him after he was taken to Makeni?

18 A. Not - I don't know all that happened at that point to  
19 Hilton Fyle. I don't know what actually happened to him in  
13:23:30 20 Makeni.

21 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, I am sorry to interrupt  
22 again. This witness keeps referring to "they said this" and  
23 "they said that" and I am not sure who "they" are? All these  
24 orders that you have been asking him about, there is no  
13:23:50 25 indication where the orders came from, or who said what to whom.

26 MR BANGURA: I will get him to clarify, your Honour:

27 Q. Mr Witness, I have to take you back to a few areas that we  
28 have already covered. I believe I asked about whether any order  
29 was given before you left Waterloo and you said the only order

1 you remembered was about the prisoners. Now, who gave that  
2 order?

3 A. It was Sam Bockarie. In fact, after we had released them  
4 they were no longer prisoners. They were part of us because they  
13:24:34 5 were arrested for the purpose of RUF, so we never used to call  
6 them prisoners again. We called them brothers. I mean,  
7 Sam Bockarie even gave orders for them to be carried to Makeni  
8 for their safety and after that I can recall now about Hilton  
9 Fyle, that Sam Bockarie requested for him to be taken to Buedu.  
13:24:59 10 JS Momoh, he stayed in Makeni because Makeni was very close to  
11 his village, which is Binkolo.

12 Q. Now, who did Sam Bockarie order to take Hilton Fyle to  
13 Buedu?

14 A. It was Issa Sesay.

13:25:22 15 Q. And was that order complied with?

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. Now, you yourself, you said you ended up at Makeni and how  
18 long did you stay in Makeni?

19 A. Well, I was at that time in Makeni in 1990 - Makeni,  
13:25:56 20 Lunsar, Kono, I was now there 1990 up to the time of disarmament  
21 and all this time I am talking about it was under Mosquito's  
22 administration. RUF ran administration under different  
23 leaderships, but they were all under the RUF. When, or during  
24 Sankoh's administration I have spoken on that and this time now I  
13:26:26 25 am talking about was Sam Bockarie's administration up to the time  
26 he resigned from the RUF and then we will come to Issa, and all  
27 of those times I was in Makeni and I used it as my own base, but  
28 sometimes I went on trips and I would come to Lunsar for some  
29 days and then I will move from there. Then when the diamond

1 business re-established effectively in Kono, and that was under  
2 Issa's administration, I went to Kono up to the time of  
3 disarmament.

13:27:06 4 Q. Now, you have mentioned the - you have mentioned two  
5 different leaders and their tenure over the RUF. You mentioned  
6 Sam Bockarie and now you have mentioned Issa Sesay. When was  
7 there a change of leadership between these two men?

8 A. All of these times I am talking about it was the tenure of  
9 Sam Bockarie's administration and then when Sam Bockarie  
13:27:39 10 resigned, in fact he wrote a message to the effect, Foday Sankoh  
11 appointed Issa as the field commander, or commander for the RUF,  
12 because he was on the peace process and Foday Sankoh said because  
13 he is now engaged with the peace process they said he should stay  
14 on the ground as overall commander in my absence, because by then  
13:28:12 15 Issa was in Kono, Sankoh was in Freetown.

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the question that the counsel  
17 asked was when was there a change in this administration. You  
18 haven't answered that question.

19 THE WITNESS: Sorry, it was in 1999, but I cannot be able  
13:28:34 20 to say the date, or the time.

21 MR BANGURA: Thank you. Your Honours, I am mindful of the  
22 time.

23 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Before we adjourn, the witness mentioned  
24 something about Issa being appointed as something commander. Was  
13:28:48 25 that free commander? Was that the word, free commander?

26 MR BANGURA: I see it came up as free commander.

27 THE WITNESS: Field commander.

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: As it is now the lunchtime adjournment,  
29 we will rise and resume at 2.30.

1 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please adjourn Court.

3 [Lunch break taken at 1.30 p.m.]

4 [Upon resuming at 2.30 p.m.]

14:30:08 5 PRESIDING JUDGE: Good afternoon. Mr Bangura, I note that  
6 Mr Koumjian is not at the bar.

7 MR BANGURA: That is so, your Honour.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. I will note the change of  
9 appearance.

14:30:26 10 MR BANGURA:

11 Q. Good afternoon, Mr Witness.

12 A. Good afternoon, sir.

13 Q. We shall continue with your evidence-in-chief and hopefully  
14 we will be done not too long from now. Now I would like to mop  
14:30:50 15 up a few areas where we have come from already and they largely  
16 relate to the situation in Freetown. Now first of all I would  
17 like you to clarify for the Court, you mentioned that Rambo who  
18 came across ECOMOG positions in Kossoh and joined you in Freetown  
19 was called Rambo Red Goat, is that correct?

14:31:32 20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Earlier in your evidence yesterday I believe you mentioned  
22 another Rambo as we were looking through the list of names in one  
23 of the documents I showed you. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

14:31:47 25 Q. Now are they one and the same person?

26 A. No, they are not the same person and they did not even  
27 belong to the same group.

28 Q. Now in relation to the Freetown situation which we have  
29 discussed this morning which of these two was present in



1 Freetown?

2 A. It was the one we called Rambo Red Goat.

3 Q. And just for clarification, the other Rambo is - what is  
4 his own full name?

14:32:32 5 A. The one I'm referring to - referring to Rambo Red Goat, I  
6 don't know any other name for him.

7 Q. Yes, that's fine. The other one who was not in Freetown,  
8 what's his own full name?

9 A. The one that did not come to Freetown was RUF Rambo, we  
14:32:57 10 called him Premo.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness speak up a  
12 bit.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the interpreter needs you to  
14 speak a little louder and perhaps if you could get a little  
14:33:08 15 closer to the microphone.

16 MR BANGURA: Thank you, Mr Witness:

17 Q. Mr Witness, during the Freetown invasion, you call it an  
18 invasion here, you mentioned that Gibriil Massaquoi was released  
19 from Pademba Road prison and he was with the fighting forces in  
14:33:47 20 Freetown. Is that correct?

21 A. Yes, that is correct.

22 Q. Do you recall the role that he played with these forces  
23 with you during the Freetown operation?

24 A. Yes, Gibriil Massaquoi, the role that I saw him playing, he  
14:34:14 25 also contributed in organising the fighting forces to go and  
26 fight in Freetown and he was also involved in meetings which they  
27 held during the AFRC and RUF were in Freetown with Gullit, Bazy,  
28 Five-Five and others.

29 Q. Now do you know whether he was in communication with Buedu?

1 A. Yes, he used to send informations. At times he will send  
2 information to where I was. He used to communicate directly with  
3 Sam Bockarie in Buedu.

14:35:04 4 Q. And when he communicated with Sam Bockarie in Buedu what  
5 would be the subject of these communications?

6 A. Well, he reported on military situations in Freetown and  
7 also gave information about the arrangements which they were  
8 doing in Freetown. That is the meetings he, Gullit and others  
9 were holding in Freetown.

14:35:35 10 Q. Do you know whether any orders were given to Gibriil  
11 Massaquoi specifically by Sam Bockarie during this period?

12 A. No, I can't recall for now.

13 Q. Thank you. Now also within Freetown during the period of  
14 the attack do you recall whether any communication was going on  
14:36:15 15 with other commanders who were not within Freetown, this is apart  
16 from Sam Bockarie?

17 A. Yes. After our group had entered into Freetown there was  
18 communication with Superman and Gullit and there was  
19 communication between Issa Sesay, Gullit, Five-Five and others.

14:36:45 20 Q. Now who was communicating with who?

21 A. Well, sometimes Gullit was talking to Dennis Mingo, who was  
22 Superman, in respect of the situations there and also Issa Sesay.  
23 Gullit used to talk to Issa Sesay and even Five-Five, Bazy and  
24 others. Bazy was talking to Issa Sesay and Superman.

14:37:18 25 Q. You have mentioned that one of the groups that entered  
26 Freetown as part of the big force was a group that served as the  
27 security to Superman. Is that correct?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Just for clarity what was the name of that group again?

1 A. It was part of Superman's bodyguards, Cobra Unit.

2 Q. And this Cobra Unit, were they part of a bigger force  
3 within Freetown?

4 A. Yes.

14:38:09 5 Q. Which force were they a part of?

6 A. Well, they were all under Red Lion Battalion.

7 Q. Now do you --

8 A. But Red Lion Battalion was a group which was an RUF group  
9 as well, but these names were units because of their bodyguards  
14:38:41 10 that were attached to commanders.

11 Q. Thank you. Do you know whether the men who belonged to the  
12 Cobra Unit as well as the Red Lion Battalion which was the big  
13 umbrella unit, whether they communicated at all to their unit  
14 commander Superman?

14:39:08 15 A. Yes. Like for examples Superman's bodyguard who was a  
16 senior man among the bodyguards who Superman contributed for this  
17 mission, he was --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the witness has called a  
19 name that I can't recall.

14:39:28 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, please, you mentioned a name,  
21 the interpreter did not hear it very well. Can you repeat it,  
22 please.

23 MR BANGURA:

24 Q. Mr Witness, can you take that again. The question was  
14:39:39 25 whether there was any communication from this unit, from this  
26 group to their commander Superman?

27 A. Yes. There was communication between the unit and Superman  
28 who was the commander.

29 Q. Who was communicating from this unit to Superman?

1 A. From this Cobra Unit to Superman it was CY because CY was  
2 the senior man among the bodyguard unit which Superman  
3 contributed for this particular mission.

4 Q. Now did CY carry a rank?

14:40:17 5 A. Yes, CY went up to the rank of captain.

6 Q. Thank you. Now can you recall what was the subject of the  
7 communications that CY had with Superman?

8 A. Yes. CY used to tell Superman about the military situation  
9 in Freetown and from Freetown, from the time SAJ Musa joined Camp  
14:40:55 10 Rosos until his death and we entered Freetown and the military  
11 situation in Freetown, CY used to report that to Superman.

12 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Bangura, can I take it CY are just the  
13 initials C-Y?

14 MR BANGURA: I need to clarify this with the witness, your  
14:41:14 15 Honour:

16 Q. Mr Witness, you have said that the leader of Superman's -  
17 rather his senior bodyguard who was head of the unit in Freetown  
18 was called CY. Now is that his name or are those initials?

19 A. Well, that is the name I know for him.

14:41:44 20 Q. But you are not able to tell whether these were just  
21 initials, are you?

22 A. No.

23 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, in that case we will, I suggest,  
24 treat it as initials.

14:42:01 25 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura.

26 MR BANGURA:

27 Q. I'm not sure I did ask you about the subject of  
28 communications between CY and Superman?

29 A. Well, I have said it, that he was reporting on - when

1 SAJ Musa joined us at Rosos camp, then also when we got to  
2 Freetown what the military situation was like, CY used to report  
3 all of these to Freetown and also the casualties that their unit  
4 incurred. He reported all about this.

14:42:57 5 Q. Thank you. Mr Witness, just one last point on Freetown.  
6 You have testified before that you would get radio messages  
7 whenever Sam Bockarie travelled to Liberia to secure arms and  
8 ammunition, he would send a message when he was about to leave  
9 and you would get a message when we came back to tell you what he  
14:43:28 10 had come with. During the period of the Freetown invasion did  
11 you get any such message about movement by Sam Bockarie?

12 A. Please repeat that question.

13 Q. Was there any message from Buedu or from any other source  
14 about movements of Sam Bockarie during the Freetown invasion,  
14:43:59 15 during the period you were in Freetown?

16 A. No, I did not get information at that time because I  
17 explained that the time we were moving towards Freetown I didn't  
18 have access to communication. Only that when - it was only after  
19 SAJ Musa died that I had access to communication, but I don't  
14:44:28 20 have information about that.

21 Q. Thank you. Now you have testified that the leadership of  
22 the RUF changed in 1999 and Issa Sesay became the RUF leader. Is  
23 that correct?

24 A. Yes.

14:44:49 25 Q. And yourself, you said you were based in Makeni at that  
26 time. Well, most of the period after the Freetown invasion. Is  
27 that correct?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And who were you attached to as an operator during that

1 period?

2 A. This time I was attached to Superman.

3 Q. Now Sam Bockarie when he was the leader of the RUF was  
4 based in Buedu. Is that correct?

14:45:35 5 A. Yes, he was based in Buedu.

6 Q. Now what was the position in your other areas of deployment  
7 at this time just after the Freetown invasion? You had  
8 deployments in other parts of the country up until the time you  
9 attacked Freetown and this attack - after two weeks or so you

14:46:04 10 came back, you retreated, some of you were based in Makeni. What  
11 about the other areas that were under your occupation before you  
12 moved down to Freetown?

13 A. Well, all the areas that were under our control, they were  
14 still under our control. Even after we retreated from Freetown

14:46:32 15 they were still under our control.

16 Q. Now can we focus on - one of those areas is Kono, Koidu.  
17 Is that correct?

18 A. Yes. Kono was under our control.

19 Q. Now can we focus on Koidu after the Freetown invasion.

14:46:53 20 What was happening in Koidu after the invasion?

21 A. Just after the Freetown invasion when majority had  
22 retreated to Makeni some were based in Kono. What we were doing  
23 mostly, because at that time we were not engaged in fighting, was  
24 diamond mining. We were mining diamonds.

14:47:26 25 Q. And what was the - what was it all focused on, the proceeds  
26 of the diamonds that you were mining, what was the whole purpose  
27 for which you were mining those diamonds?

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: You've actually asked two different  
29 questions there, Mr Bangura.

1 MR BANGURA: Sorry, your Honour.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: There's a difference between purpose and  
3 proceeds.

4 MR BANGURA: I'm sorry, your Honours. I strike that:

14:47:53 5 Q. What was the focus of the mining during this period?

6 A. Well, from the beginning up to this time when we were  
7 mining the main reason why we were mining was for us to have more  
8 defensive arms and ammunition from Mr Taylor, because the moment  
9 our leader went for peace it was at that time that he told us  
10 that in times of peace we should prepare for war, so when you go  
11 for peace talks you should always be prepared for war. So as a  
12 result he organised the miners to mine for diamonds. But before  
13 mining for diamonds we would have to arrange the conditions. So  
14 they started calling the civilians to mine the diamonds.

14:48:22 10  
14:48:50 15 Q. Now who arranged the mining, as you said the mining was  
16 arranged, who arranged the conditions?

17 A. From the beginning when Mosquito had not gone yet he sent  
18 an instruction to Issa Sesay. Issa Sesay returned and based in  
19 Kono. So Issa Sesay arranged - rearranged for the mining to be  
14:49:17 20 more effective.

21 But before that we had a message, RUF heard a message from  
22 Sam Bockarie saying that Charles Taylor was going to send white  
23 people to come and inspect Kono and the airfield so that they  
24 could support the mining and we would do effective mining.

14:49:46 25 Supporting, they said they would send machines like Caterpillar  
26 and any other machine that we would use for the mining.

27 And it got to a point when two white men came from Buedu.  
28 They were escorted by RUF security forces. They just came and  
29 took snapshots at the mining field and took snapshots of the old

1 mining machines. According to them, according to the message we  
2 received, Charles Taylor had sent them from Liberia. They just  
3 came and took snapshots and wrote all the things that we would  
4 need, machines, for the mining and they returned the following  
14:50:28 5 day.

6 Q. Now during this period that we are talking about did you  
7 continue to get any supplies from the proceeds of the mining?

8 A. Yes. We used to have ammunitions, but it was not frequent,  
9 but our ammo dump was only in Buedu because there was no fighting  
14:51:04 10 around there. So when ammunition would come Mosquito would keep  
11 it at Buedu. But again the mining, we initially did it with our  
12 hands, we didn't use machines, but at this point in time we  
13 started using machines.

14 Q. The two white men who came from Liberia to Buedu and then  
14:51:28 15 to Koidu, did you know their names?

16 A. No, I can't recall their names again.

17 Q. Now you said the leadership changed in 1999. After the  
18 change of leadership where was Issa Sesay settled as head of the  
19 RUF?

14:52:25 20 A. When the leadership changed that was from the time when  
21 Mosquito wrote a letter - I mean a message to all RUF that he was  
22 no longer a member. So at that time Foday Sankoh had the chance  
23 and allowed Issa to be based in Kono. So Issa was in Mosquito's  
24 former position, Sam Bockarie, but he was based in Kono then.

14:52:56 25 Q. And during the leadership of Issa Sesay did the mining  
26 continue?

27 A. During Issa Sesay's time mining was more effective than  
28 before because at that time we were using Caterpillar and other  
29 machines to do the mining.



1 Q. Now who was actually doing the mining, who were involved in  
2 the mining exercise itself?

3 A. Mostly those who were doing the mining were civilians.  
4 They were doing the mining. And also if you the fighter, if you  
14:53:50 5 could get a civilian just according to the list that we looked at  
6 from yesterday, if you have a civilian manpower you could use  
7 them, they will get gravel for you, then you will give a  
8 government pile and the one that the civilians would wash for  
9 you, you would always be responsible to feed them. Then there

14:54:18 10 was another group who were civilians, they were then permanently  
11 for the government. They would not divide diamonds or the  
12 gravel, they were just there to mine without payment.

13 Q. Now can you be a little more clear on the distribution of  
14 the gravel. You said - you talked about a government pile but  
14:54:41 15 it's not very clear. Can you explain exactly what happened?

16 A. Well, if you were a good or strong commander, if you had  
17 civilians who would get gravel for you, the RUF government, AFRC,  
18 they would go and divide it into two. You the officer who had  
19 your civilians who got this gravel, you have one part and the  
14:55:08 20 government would have one part of the gravel. But the government  
21 of the RUF would again look into it. The gravel that was given  
22 to you, they would provide security for that to be washed. If  
23 they got any big diamond they would take that from you. But even  
24 apart from that, if you see any big diamond you should report to  
14:55:32 25 the RUF office in Lebanon, the RUF government should buy that  
26 diamond from you, whether it was a big diamond or not. And the  
27 way they bought it, they did not do it to your satisfaction, they  
28 would just give you any amount that the government of RUF wanted  
29 to give to you. That was how it went on.

1 Q. Now can you describe the condition of the civilians who  
2 were engaged in this mining at this time?

3 A. This early time of the mining, civilians had no access to  
4 money or any percentage at the early stage. But as time went by  
14:56:19 5 civilians had access to mine and have gravel on their own. But  
6 they themselves, when they would be washing the gravel, the  
7 government would provide security for them. If you don't have  
8 somebody who will talk on your behalf, even if you had a diamond  
9 which would be as big as your head you would not benefit anything  
14:56:41 10 from it. Or sometimes when civilians would pack their gravel, if  
11 their gravel is much and the information got to Issa Sesay he  
12 would pass an order for - to arrest the gravel and ask the  
13 civilians to move out of the place and he would send machine to  
14 wash the gravel.

14:57:04 15 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, can the witness repeat his  
16 last answer?

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Witness, the interpreter needs you to  
18 repeat the last part only of your answer. I think start,  
19 "Sometimes when civilians would pack their gravel". Pick up from  
14:57:27 20 there, please.

21 THE WITNESS: Sometimes when civilians would pack their  
22 gravels Issa Sesay will send security forces to go, take the  
23 gravel forcefully and he will send a machine to wash it for  
24 government. But at that time in Kono people got diamonds, many  
14:57:50 25 of them, as if it was not difficult to get diamonds. So that  
26 made civilians to start running away from Kono. They were going  
27 to other areas to fend for their living.

28 Even at the early stage during the Issa Sesay regime we had  
29 a big container at the MP office and MP office was a very big

1 house, those who would go and mine this diamond for government,  
2 for them not to escape, after work he would pass an order for  
3 them to be put into that container and they would lock the house  
4 until the following day and the food that they used to give to  
14:58:38 5 them was not sufficient.

6 MR BANGURA:

7 Q. Mr Witness, what happened to the diamonds that were  
8 produced at this time?

9 A. Well, this time that I'm talking about, the diamonds that  
14:58:57 10 Issa Sesay gathered from the beginning of Issa Sesay's  
11 administration, Gibril Massaquoi used to go and collect it and  
12 bring it to Freetown at this stage until the UN problem happened.  
13 That was the time the RUF arrested the UN personnel. From the  
14 time Mosquito left the RUF until the time RUF arrested the UN  
14:59:34 15 Issa was sending diamonds to Mr Sankoh in Freetown. But when  
16 Mr Sankoh was arrested in the May 6th incident in Freetown all  
17 the diamonds we used to get from that May 6th up until the time  
18 of the final disarmament in Sierra Leone, all the diamonds were  
19 going to Mr Taylor.

15:00:03 20 Q. And when you say up until the time of final disarmament  
21 what time was that?

22 A. If I don't forget I think it was 2001, the disarmament. I  
23 think so, 2001.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, this May 6th, is there a year  
15:00:31 25 to this date, the May 6th incident?

26 THE WITNESS: It was the year 2000. May 6th 2000.

27 MR BANGURA:

28 Q. Now you said from May 6th through to disarmament the  
29 proceeds of diamonds were - diamonds were taken by Issa Sesay to

1 Mr Taylor in Liberia. How frequent were these trips to Liberia?

2 A. This was happening every two weeks, because the diamonds we  
3 were mining, we used to have it now more than before because at  
4 this point we had machines and Issa started going to Liberia and  
15:01:15 5 he was even bringing vehicles from Mr Taylor. Any time he would  
6 bring these vehicles he would call us and say, "I've brought one  
7 or two vehicles from Mr Taylor, Mr Taylor donated this" and at  
8 the same time he would keep the diamonds. He said Mr Taylor was  
9 storing the diamond for any time Sankoh would be released. So

15:01:39 10 that would be the time when he would report the diamonds to  
11 Sankoh. He said that was what Mr Taylor said. He would bring  
12 documents to the effect that they would read that to us, we would  
13 see the number of diamonds, the date and time that he left it  
14 there. Sometimes he would bring diesel, petrol, engine oil for  
15:02:05 15 the machines that were working in the fields and even food.

16 Q. Mr Witness, do you recall some time in 1999 - sorry, 2000.  
17 Your Honours, may I ask for a moment?

18 MR CAYLEY: Madam President, I just notice one thing. In  
19 the transcript it says he would bring desert, petrol, engine oil.  
15:03:08 20 I'm not sure whether he said desert. It sounded like dessert,  
21 but I can't imagine he brought desserts.

22 PRESIDING JUDGE: I thought it was dessert too. Perhaps we  
23 could clarify this, Mr Bangura.

24 MR BANGURA:

15:03:25 25 Q. Mr Witness, you mentioned some of the things that were  
26 brought from Liberia by Issa Sesay. Amongst them you  
27 mentioned --

28 PRESIDING JUDGE: The word was dessert.

29 MR BANGURA:

1 Q. Can you just say again some of things that were brought  
2 from Liberia?

3 A. Yes. He would bring vehicles from Mr Taylor and also he  
4 would bring petrol for the machines. He would bring diesel.

15:03:53 5 Diesel. Engine oil and also food.

6 Q. Do you recall the year 2000, May 2000?

7 A. Yes, May 2000, yes.

8 Q. Where were you at this time?

9 A. May 2000 I was in Makeni. At times I would travel to Kono.

15:04:31 10 Q. Now you have mentioned that Sankoh was arrested and that  
11 was in May 2000. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, I have just forgot the date. It was May 8, 2000. The  
13 date I called, it was a mistake. The date should be May 8th  
14 2000.

15:05:04 15 Q. Just before the arrest of Mr Sankoh did anything happen in  
16 Makeni around May of 2000?

17 A. Before Sankoh was arrested a big thing happened in Makeni.  
18 That was the arrest of the UN in Makeni Town ordered by Issa  
19 Sesay, because Sankoh was arrested in Freetown and at that time I  
15:05:33 20 was in Makeni when this happened.

21 Q. Now after the arrest of the UN peacekeepers as you have  
22 mentioned were they eventually released?

23 A. Yes, they released them but they were not released in  
24 Sierra Leone. After we had arrested UN and all the arms and  
15:06:07 25 ammunition, communication, vehicles from them Issa had to inform  
26 Mr Taylor through a satellite phone that the UN personnel were  
27 under detention.

28 Immediately after Mr Taylor got the story he ordered Issa,  
29 saying, "Bring those people here to me in Liberia". That was the

1 message Mr Taylor sent and Issa Sesay in Makeni, he called  
2 everybody and told all the authorities and fighters on the ground  
3 and they loaded these people from Makeni. In fact they were  
4 stripped naked, they travelled from Makeni to Yengema. Yengema  
15:07:00 5 was one RUF strong training base. Yengema is a very short  
6 distance from Koidu Town which is in Kono. From Yengema he  
7 crossed with them to Liberia. He transferred all of them to  
8 Foya. It was a helicopter that came from Monrovia sent by  
9 Mr Taylor and when this helicopter came it brought a lot of  
15:07:31 10 ammunition from Liberia and dropped them at Foya. In return it  
11 took the peacekeeping forces, loaded them into the helicopter and  
12 took them to Liberia to Mr Taylor. That was how we released  
13 those people.

14 Q. Now what happened to the equipment of the peacekeepers that  
15:07:53 15 you also seized?

16 A. Those smaller weapons were with us, but the bigger ones  
17 like tanks - we arrested the UN from two locations, in Makeni  
18 Town they were based there and Makote. Makote is about 12 miles  
19 off Makeni.

15:08:29 20 Q. Can you pause, Mr Witness. Your Honours, Makote is  
21 M-A-K-O-T-E. Continue, please.

22 A. Those armoured tanks, I don't know but they were many. The  
23 UN commander who was in Sierra Leone at that time, he arranged  
24 with the RUF leadership who was Issa Sesay and they accepted to  
15:09:00 25 come and collect their materials. That was where Morrison Kallon  
26 went. I was there myself and I saw one prominent reporter, a BBC  
27 reporter Mark Doyle. He came and interviewed all of us in the  
28 village where those armoured tanks were released. But the lowest  
29 weapons and the vehicles, trucks and Land Rover vans, we were

1 using them. RUF was using them to keep their defensive.

2 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I see the name Mark Doyle come  
3 up. I'm not so sure how Doyle is spelt but --

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: It's usually spelt D-O-Y-L-E.

15:10:06 5 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour.

6 Q. Mr Witness, you said that the helicopter which took the  
7 peacekeepers across to Liberia from Foya had brought with it  
8 weapons, arms and ammunition which were given to you, to Issa  
9 Sesay and he brought them to the RUF. Do you know what those  
10 arms and ammunition were used for later?

15:10:30

11 A. Yes. According to Issa Sesay he said Mr Taylor had said  
12 since we had arrested and molested the UN, let us expect  
13 fighting. So the light weapons that we had taken from the UN, we  
14 should keep them and even the ammunition that he was sending, we  
15 should reserve them, in case they attempted to attack our  
16 positions we would use those against the UN. That was why he  
17 sent the ammunition.

15:11:04

18 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Mr Bangura, the witness keeps saying that  
19 Mr Taylor sent ammunition and you keep suggesting to him that  
20 this included arms. The witness has not said that arms and  
21 ammunition came from Liberia. He keeps saying ammunition.  
22 Perhaps you could clarify.

15:11:26

23 THE WITNESS: It was ammunition.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: You see.

15:11:47

25 MR BANGURA: Thank you, your Honour, my error. I will  
26 stick to what the witness has said:

27 Q. Mr Witness, in your earlier testimony to this Court you  
28 mentioned that you had been in Liberia. This was very early in  
29 your testimony. You were pushed out of Sierra Leone and you went

1 to Liberia for a period before you came back into Sierra Leone  
2 and during that time you were in Liberia you were involved in  
3 fighting with forces in Liberia. Is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

15:12:18 5 Q. Now did you in your later period - later years with the  
6 RUF, did you ever get into any - did you ever go into Liberia  
7 again at all?

8 A. Please repeat the question.

9 Q. Did you go to Liberia at all after this period that you  
15:12:41 10 came from Liberia initially? This was after the 1992 period.  
11 Did you ever go into Liberia again?

12 A. No, I never travelled to Liberia again. When I returned in  
13 1992 I never returned to Liberia.

14 Q. Were RUF forces involved in any fighting in Liberia at any  
15:13:08 15 period after 1992?

16 A. Yes, 1993 a group went there and even up to the time when  
17 we had disarmed Taylor sent instructions for the RUF to go there  
18 as a stand-by force in case UNAMSIL would attempt to attack our  
19 positions. In 1993 when our supply route was blocked by ULIMO  
15:13:39 20 Mr Kallon had to send - I am sorry, Mr Kallon had to lead a group  
21 to go and fight in Liberia. It was a request from Mr Taylor to  
22 Sankoh at that time. That was the first group I can remember  
23 went to Liberia. They were the ones who went and formed - I mean  
24 they attacked ULIMO positions so that we could get supply routes  
15:14:05 25 to Mr Taylor's headquarters.

26 Q. This I understand, Mr Witness, was 1993. Correct?

27 A. Yes, it was in 1993 when this happened.

28 Q. After that do you recall any other time that the RUF had  
29 been involved in fighting inside Liberia?



1 A. Yes. I can recall after these UN problems occurred ULIMO  
2 started attacking Mr Taylor's position from the Guinea border and  
3 he requested from Sam Bockarie and Sam Bockarie used to send  
4 troops there to fight. Even up to the time when Issa was in  
15:14:56 5 command of the RUF he used to send troops there to go and fight.

6 And apart from that, Mr Taylor also sent an order that  
7 Superman should go and block between Guinea and Liberia to fight  
8 there. This latter part that Superman went, this information  
9 that we got was that one of Mr Taylor's fighters had killed  
15:15:31 10 Superman. That was the last time RUF sent troops, apart from Sam  
11 Bockarie who was there on his own accord.

12 Q. Now you said that the request for the RUF to send troops to  
13 inside Liberia first came to Sam Bockarie from Mr Taylor and this  
14 was after the Freetown invasion period - sorry, after the  
15:16:01 15 abduction of the UN peacekeepers. Now where in Liberia were the  
16 RUF forces asked to participate in fighting?

17 A. Okay, sorry. Let me make that area clear to you. After  
18 the UN invasion Bockarie was not in Sierra Leone. It was during  
19 Issa's command. Issa used to send manpower. And before Bockarie  
15:16:36 20 left Bockarie used to send manpower to go and fight in Lofa.  
21 Lofa is an area that joins Sierra Leone. That was an instruction  
22 from Mr Taylor.

23 And even when we attacked UN, ULIMO was also attacking  
24 Taylor from the border, the Guinea border. So he requested for  
15:17:04 25 Mr Sesay who would come and contribute manpower, they would go  
26 and fight along the Guinea and Liberia borders. This used to  
27 happen all the time. And later again Taylor called for RUF  
28 senior officers' meeting in Monrovia. He requested for a mission  
29 that was to go and attack Guinea by Sierra Leone and also attack

1 Guinea's position by Liberia, Lofa County.

2 Q. Just briefly when was the - when did Mr Taylor ask Sam  
3 Bockarie to send forces to go and fight inside Liberia?

15:17:58

4 A. It was in 1999. It was in 1999. That was when we had  
5 returned from Freetown, our fighting had quelled down a little.  
6 That was the time. Because immediately after our men had  
7 withdrawn from Freetown we were not fighting any more. So our  
8 troops were going to fight in Liberia. That was under Sam  
9 Bockarie's administration.

15:18:21

10 Q. And when was it that Issa Sesay was asked to raise manpower  
11 to help fighting inside Liberia again - Guinea, I'm sorry?

12 A. That was the time when Issa Sesay was now the RUF commander  
13 and this was the time we had arrested and taken away the UNAMSIL  
14 or United Nations weapon and ULIMO started attacking Taylor from  
15 the border, so he requested for Mr Sesay so that Issa Sesay would  
16 send troops there because of the route Issa Sesay would use to  
17 Liberia so that that route should not be blocked. That went on  
18 until the time he called again for a meeting to organise and  
19 attack the Guinea position. Mr Taylor called this meeting.

15:19:00

15:19:26

20 Q. And do you know which forces were fighting against  
21 Mr Taylor in Guinea - from Guinea?

22 A. The troops were coming and they would change their names.  
23 Initially we started experiencing they were ULIMO-K, ULIMO-J and  
24 at last we heard that they were LURD forces.

15:19:55

25 Q. In the latter period which forces do you know that attacked  
26 or that were fighting from Guinea in the latter period?

27 A. What I understood, it was Liberians who went and regrouped  
28 themselves. They were coming from Guinea and they would come and  
29 attack Taylor. They called themselves LURD rebels.

1 Q. Now how did Issa Sesay raise the manpower that was required  
2 to help fighting these forces who were against Mr Taylor?

3 A. Well, RUF at that time, we divided it into brigade or  
4 battalion. Any time we needed manpower every battalion would  
15:20:53 5 contribute to this manpower. Makeni, Lunsar, Magburaka, Kono,  
6 Tongo, Kailahun, Magburaka, all of those areas would contribute  
7 manpower and put them together to build up and have a large  
8 manpower to go and fight in Liberia.

9 Q. Other than the existing forces did you raise manpower from  
15:21:18 10 any other sources?

11 A. Please repeat.

12 Q. Did you raise manpower - in addition to the forces who were  
13 there at the time when this request was made did you try to raise  
14 manpower from any other - in any other way?

15:21:49 15 A. Yes, we started this - that was the time when we went and  
16 attacked Guinea, from Foya we attacked Guinea, that is Liberia,  
17 and also we attacked Guinea from Pamelap. That is northern part  
18 of Sierra Leone. It was at that time that we started recruiting  
19 again and this arrangement was from Mr Taylor, according to our  
15:22:17 20 senior officers who were invited to Monrovia.

21 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, that will be all for this  
22 witness.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr Bangura.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: Would you please spell the name of that  
15:22:34 25 last location, Pamelap or something.

26 MR BANGURA: It's P-A-M-E-L-A-P, Pamelap.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, Mr Cayley, I understand you're  
28 conducting the cross-examination.

29 MR CAYLEY: Yes, thank you.



1 in your hands.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: We can deal with it now [inaudible].

3 MR CAYLEY: Could we go into private session for a moment  
4 because I'm concerned that what I'm going to discuss shouldn't be  
15:25:56 5 transmitted to the public, but maybe then my learned friend can  
6 clarify if I've misunderstood something. I just want to be  
7 extremely cautious about this.

8 PRESIDING JUDGE: Two things, Mr Cayley. First of all,  
9 whilst I will do that, we need the Court Attendant here and in  
15:26:15 10 the circumstances we will wait for the witness as well to give  
11 him the assurance of hearing what is being said.

12 MR CAYLEY: Thank you.

13 [In the presence of the witness]

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam Court Attendant, we will require to  
15:28:51 15 go into private session for some procedural matters if you could  
16 implement that, please.

17 MS IRURA: Your Honour, I'm informed that it is possible to  
18 go into private session but with the usual - that all the  
19 machinery would have to be turned off to stop streaming.

15:29:39 20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Is that the one that takes a very long  
21 time? Can we not just turn the sound off so it can't be heard  
22 outside? I note there's no one there but somebody could wander  
23 in.

24 MS IRURA: I think the technicians are referring to - with  
15:30:03 25 regard to the internet.

26 MR BANGURA: If I may be of assistance, with regard to the  
27 witness's prior testimony which we are quite mindful of not  
28 coming out in the open which was in closed, we would be prepared  
29 to cope with a situation if references to any portion of his

1 testimony is referred to perhaps as prior proceedings and not  
2 specifically saying that he testified in any particular trial.

15:30:52 3 MR CAYLEY: This is being transmitted. These discussions  
4 are being transmitted to the public at the moment, what we're  
5 talking about.

6 PRESIDING JUDGE: Those points have been said in public I  
7 think, Mr Cayley. That particular point was said at the  
8 beginning. [Microphone not activated]. If it appears to  
9 infringe any protective measures we will stop it.

15:31:14 10 MR BANGURA: I don't know how extensive my learned friend  
11 intends to be, but an alternative could be that he defers that  
12 portion of his cross-examination to a particular convenient time  
13 when the system is able to meet with the convenience of time  
14 here.

15:31:38 15 JUDGE LUSSICK: Mr Bangura, do I take it that you would  
16 have no objection to Mr Cayley referring to the prior proceedings  
17 as such but not naming the proceedings?

18 MR BANGURA: Indeed, your Honour, because - I'm a little  
19 careful now about the fact that what we say goes out openly to  
15:31:59 20 the public, but, as my learned friend pointed out the other day,  
21 much of the testimony here today or in the past couple of days is  
22 more or less what had come out in previous testimony in prior  
23 proceedings.

24 JUDGE SEBUTINDE: The point of course being that you want  
15:32:18 25 to maintain the protection in the prior proceedings rather than  
26 in these proceedings?

27 MR BANGURA: Yes, your Honour.

28 MS IRURA: Your Honour, there is a possibility of effecting  
29 redactions because we had have delayed streaming by 30 minutes so

1 if anything needs to be expunged it can be done upon the  
2 instruction from the parties.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you for that. That would be most  
4 helpful. As my learned colleague Justice Sebutinde has pointed  
15:32:59 5 out, if you think you're going to come into an area that is going  
6 to encroach on protective measures please indicate and we will  
7 entertain the normal applications.

8 MR CAYLEY: I'm sorry to labour the point, but just so I'm  
9 clear, the fact that the witness has testified previously is not  
15:33:18 10 something that needs to be protected but we can't actually name  
11 the proceedings but the content, his actual evidence, is  
12 something that is subject to continuing protective measures?

13 MR BANGURA: That's correct. But also the fact that he  
14 testified before, that in itself, in a particular proceedings of  
15:33:40 15 the - in a particular trial of [redacted].

16 PRESIDING JUDGE: You're even giving away - you don't even  
17 need to state the Court. We will redact which court it was.  
18 Please redact that particular part.

19 From an abundance of caution, Mr Cayley, if you think you  
15:34:10 20 could wander in - because you know the questions, we don't - into  
21 a question where a protective - from an abundance of caution make  
22 the appropriate application, we will consider it and we will hear  
23 what the Prosecution has to say in relation to that.

24 MR CAYLEY: Yes, I will do my best not to go in and out of  
15:34:34 25 closed session but that's the one thing that does concern me,  
26 that it's going to be difficult to do this without doing that,  
27 but I'll do my best because I know it takes time to go into  
28 closed session. Anyway, your Honour, may it please the Court I  
29 will begin. Thank you.

1           PRESIDING JUDGE: Please do so.

2                           CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CAYLEY:

3       Q.     Witness, good afternoon. I know you understand that  
4       Mr Munyard to my right here and myself, we represent Mr Taylor.

15:35:03 5       Now when I ask you questions there is a tendency for you to look  
6       at me, that's natural in a conversation, but if you could address  
7       the Bench, please. Do you understand that? Is that clear to  
8       you? Your microphone is off. Can you switch your microphone on?  
9       Sorry, could you repeat your answer?

15:35:30 10      A.     Yes. Yes, I heard what you said.

11      Q.     Now during the conflict that you've described over a number  
12      of years you engaged in looting and thieving yourself, didn't  
13      you, as a member of the RUF?

14      A.     Say again.

15:35:54 15      Q.     During the conflict that you've described in your evidence  
16      in the past few days you yourself engaged in looting and  
17      thieving, didn't you?

18      A.     Yes, I was also engaged in looting.

19      Q.     And I think you took part in the burning down of Koidu  
15:36:19 20      Town, didn't you?

21      A.     Yes, I did it under command. I did it because it was an  
22      order from the high command and I had no option and how I engaged  
23      in the burning of Koidu Town, I can explain that shortly. Can I  
24      go further?

15:36:42 25      Q.     That's fine. We'll come back to that. That's perfect,  
26      your answer, thank you. Now you accept, don't you, that looting  
27      and thieving is wrong and it's dishonest, isn't it?

28      A.     I cannot just say yes or no to your question that you have  
29      asked me. I have to throw light on certain things. Thank you.



1 The burning and looting, you see looting in the military - in the  
2 military it is thieving that we refer to as looting and as a  
3 guerilla we never had any other means to get food or to get other  
4 things, therefore I have not exempted myself from either of these  
15:37:35 5 actions. Yes, it happened that way.

6 Q. Let me put the question to you again. You accept, don't  
7 you, that taking property that doesn't belong to you regardless  
8 of your needs is dishonest and wrong, isn't it?

9 A. Yes, that's true, but if I get the orders to do that then I  
15:37:59 10 will do it.

11 Q. Now you also understand, don't you, witness, that it would  
12 be wrong for you to tell lies in this Courtroom, wouldn't it?

13 A. Well, I know it's wrong for me to come to this Court and  
14 tell lies, but I tell you that I trust myself, I will not come  
15:38:21 15 here to tell lies.

16 Q. Now you have given, I believe - or you have given 12  
17 interviews to the Office of the Prosecutor. Does that sound  
18 about right?

19 A. Repeat that.

15:38:37 20 Q. You have given 12 interviews to the Office of the  
21 Prosecutor between June of 2004 and the present day. Is that  
22 right? Not including your evidence?

23 A. Well, I can't tell you how many times I was interviewed,  
24 but I was interviewed many times from Prosecution. Yes, they  
15:39:06 25 interviewed me many times. I am aware of that very well.

26 Q. Many, many times, didn't they, witness?

27 A. Yes.

28 Q. And your position is that you told the truth throughout,  
29 correct?

1 A. Yes, through the interviews what I know was what I said  
2 throughout.

3 Q. Now I want you to direct your mind to the period of 1991  
4 and 1992. Can you think about that time for me?

15:39:48 5 A. Yes. I recall that time since 1991, yes.

6 Q. And I want you to place yourself in Liberia?

7 A. Yes, I have taken myself to Liberia right now.

8 Q. Perfect. The Court manager has gone. I would like to hand  
9 out some bundles, your Honour, that's all, and she's not here.

15:40:22 10 Sorry, Madam Court Manager, my fault actually, I should  
11 have asked you to do this a moment ago. Could you hand out the  
12 bundles, please?

13 Now, witness, what I want to address with you now are the  
14 statements that you have made and the evidence that you have  
15:41:25 15 given about your sightings and hearing of Charles Taylor in  
16 Liberia during this time period that we're addressing. Do you  
17 follow?

18 A. Yes, I'm with you.

19 Q. Now if you could turn to tab 15 and if you could turn to  
15:41:58 20 page 6468. That is the last four digits of the number that you  
21 see at the top right-hand corner of the page?

22 A. Repeat the number.

23 Q. Sorry. It's tab 15. So if you look along the side you  
24 will see 15. Do you have it?

15:42:41 25 A. Yeah, I can see 15 here.

26 Q. And there's a statement behind that tab. Yes, perfect,  
27 exactly, 15. Then if you observe you will see some numbers in  
28 the top right-hand corner. Do you see that?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. And if you turn to 6468 which is actually the fifth - it's  
2 the fifth page?

3 A. 6468?

4 Q. Yes.

15:43:19 5 A. 6468, yeah.

6 Q. Now if I could direct you to the fourth paragraph. Now  
7 this is a statement that you made between 17 November and 9  
8 December of 2006 and I'm going to read it.

9 "The witness first saw Charles Taylor in late 1991 in Senge  
15:43:50 10 Liberia when Taylor addressed the witness and a group of soldiers  
11 before going to the battle front. The witness saw Charles Taylor  
12 for the second time in 1992 in Kakata when Charles Taylor was  
13 standing on the street with his security, but the witness did not  
14 hear his voice. The third time the witness was in Gbarnga in  
15:44:26 15 1992 and the witness heard Charles Taylor addressing the man in  
16 charge of the ammunition (the witness does not know his name)  
17 from his compound for him to load the ammunition for Kailahun.  
18 The witness therefore heard Taylor speaking in person on two  
19 occasions before the radio communications which took place from  
15:45:01 20 1994 to 1996."

21 Now if you could turn, please, to tab 19. Do you have  
22 that, witness?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now these are these prepping or proofing notes that  
15:45:41 25 Mr Bangura took down from you on 23 and 24 January of 2008. This  
26 is what you discussed in your meeting with him and I'm going to  
27 read paragraph 2:

28 "The witness clarified that when he was in Liberia in 1991  
29 and 1992 he saw Charles Taylor on two occasions. The first time

1 was in Senge when ULIMO took over Bo Waterside and Taylor  
2 addressed the parade and said that they, the RUF and the NPFL,  
3 were brothers who should fight together to kill ULIMO. Foday  
4 Sankoh was present. The witness stated that the second occasion  
15:46:27 5 was when he and other fighters were being sent back to Sierra  
6 Leone from Kakata. They were provided with rice and  
7 ammunitions."

8 Now that's what you said prior to testifying. Now finally  
9 when you gave evidence this is what you said and this is when you  
15:46:48 10 gave evidence on Monday of this week. It was put to you.

11 "Q. When you say he too visited you, who visited you?

12 A. Mr Taylor visited at as Senge.

13 Q. Senge, your Honours, is Senge" and then Mr Bangura  
14 spells the name. Moving ahead:

15:47:18 15 "Q. What happened during that visit?

16 A. This time around Mr Taylor came along with ammunition,  
17 by then we were all together. General Devon was there,  
18 General Peper was there together with some of the  
19 authorities.

15:47:32 20 "Q. Was anything said at the meeting?

21 "A. Yes, Taylor stood before us and said this ammunition  
22 he had come with was to fight very strongly and to push  
23 them out of Liberia so that the other ammunition he brought  
24 was for we the RUF. There were arms that was written on it  
15:47:52 25 RUF. He brought them. It was they who distributed them to  
26 the RUF."

27 You were then asked about the second time that you saw  
28 Mr Taylor and you said: "Yes, the other time which was in 1992,  
29 I saw Mr Taylor at Kakata in Liberia."

1 You described that particular sighting as follows:

2 "Well, Mr Taylor gave a message to one of his major  
3 commanders who was Isaac Musa. He was in Kakata as a commander.  
4 What he told Isaac was that he should bring all the RUF  
15:48:31 5 together that were in Kakata and the surrounding villages. He  
6 said Foday Sankoh will collect all of them and take them to  
7 Sierra Leone. They have a very big mission."

8 Then you go on and you say:

9 "Well, we were - when Foday Sankoh himself came with a  
15:48:51 10 convoy from Sierra Leone he Mr Taylor and his commanders were  
11 there together with his bodyguards."

12 Now concentrating for a moment, witness, on the first  
13 statement - sorry, not the first statement, your first sighting  
14 of Mr Taylor, now you see how in your first statement you don't  
15:49:14 15 mention the fact that Foday Sankoh was present. You told  
16 Mr Bangura when you spoke to him that Foday Sankoh was present  
17 and then in your evidence that you gave on Monday Foday Sankoh  
18 disappears and here we're talking about the sighting in Senge.  
19 Do you see that, witness?

15:49:35 20 A. Yes. I will start with first the name that you have used  
21 is not the correct name. The one you have said, Isaac Mongor.  
22 The name I made mention about in Kakata was Isaac Musa.

23 Q. Let's stop. We're talking about the first meeting. The  
24 first sighting in Senge, okay, not the second meeting in Kakata.  
15:49:59 25 Do you understand?

26 A. Yes. Go ahead.

27 Q. Now that first sighting of Mr Taylor in Senge in your  
28 statement that you gave in November of 2006 you do not mention  
29 that Foday Sankoh was present, do you?

1 A. At all. Even in my testimony I didn't say that Foday  
2 Sankoh was at Senge.

3 Q. But when you spoke to Mr Bangura you told him that Foday  
4 Sankoh was present?

15:50:37 5 A. I am not sure of that statement that Foday Sankoh was at  
6 Senge. The area I brought Foday Sankoh into the statement was  
7 Kakata, but in Senge, no.

8 Q. Let me read it to you again just so that you're clear and  
9 so you don't think I'm misleading you. This is tab 19, paragraph  
10 2.

11 "The witness clarified that when he was in Liberia in 1991  
12 and 1992 he saw Charles Taylor on two occasions. The first time  
13 was in Senge when ULIMO took over Bo Waterside and Taylor  
14 addressed a parade and said that they, the RUF and NPFL, were  
15 brothers who should fight together to kill ULIMO. Foday Sankoh  
16 was present."

17 Did you tell Mr Bangura that fact, that Foday Sankoh was  
18 present, in your prepping session, witness?

19 A. No, this is not something I can recall and I did not tell  
15:51:23 20 Mr Bangura that Foday Sankoh and Taylor were at Senge.

21 Q. So is your position that Mr Bangura copied down what you  
22 said incorrectly?

23 A. It is possible sometimes.

24 Q. Now in respect of your first statement, the statement that  
15:52:15 25 you gave in November of 2006, you state that you saw Mr Taylor on  
26 a third occasion, don't you? Don't you? In your first statement  
27 that I read out to you. Do you want me to refresh your memory  
28 about that?

29 A. Yes.

1 Q. This is behind tab 15, 6468 and I will read the third  
2 sentence.

3 "The third time the witness was in Gbarnga in 1992 and the  
4 witness heard Charles Taylor addressing the man in charge of the  
15:53:16 5 ammunition (the witness does not know his name) from his compound  
6 for him to load the ammunition for Kailahun."

7 Is that true or false?

8 A. This is true.

9 Q. This is true? So you did see Charles Taylor on a third  
15:53:47 10 occasion in Gbarnga; is that what you're now saying?

11 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, I believe my learned friend is  
12 not being fair with the witness. My learned friend has himself  
13 pointed to the last of the statements which this witness gave in  
14 prepping and he has clearly read that that was a clarification  
15:54:10 15 and that statement states that he had met with Mr Taylor or had  
16 seen Mr Taylor twice.

17 MR CAYLEY: Unfortunately, your Honour, this is a statement  
18 that was given very early on in the process of all of these  
19 interviews that this witness has given, including the interview  
15:54:31 20 that my learned friend conducted with him, and this statement was  
21 read over to him over three and a half hours. So I think that I  
22 have a perfect right to ask him about a statement that he made  
23 that was read back to him.

24 PRESIDING JUDGE: Just a point of clarification here. The  
15:54:49 25 first statement we have been referred to at tab 15 says,  
26 "Therefore he heard Taylor speaking in person on two occasions",  
27 but saw three occasions. And the other refers to saw on two  
28 occasions. Are you challenging the number of times he saw him or  
29 the number of times he heard him?

1 MR CAYLEY: Well, your Honour, the third sighting is  
2 actually a hearing as well, if you see what I mean, so, yes, I  
3 am, I'm challenging both.

15:55:26

4 PRESIDING JUDGE: And what's your objection, Mr Bangura,  
5 exactly?

15:55:41

6 MR BANGURA: Your Honours, my objection is that the last  
7 statement which was taken from the witness during prepping which  
8 is a clarification statement and to which my learned friend has  
9 already referred, in paragraph 2 of that statement, that is the  
10 statement in tab 19, I believe, clearly the second paragraph  
11 reads that the witness clarifies that when he was in Liberia he  
12 saw Charles Taylor twice.

15:56:03

13 My learned friend has already - in his previous questions  
14 he's already put this to the witness. My position is that it's  
15 unfair for my learned friend to go back to the prior statement  
16 about the witness's sighting of Mr Taylor in which it is reported  
17 that he saw Mr Taylor three times when in fact there is a later  
18 statement which clarifies the position and which should be the  
19 more operative situation as far as this witness --

15:56:26

20 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Bangura, I think counsel for Defence  
21 is entitled to challenge the witness on the record or the  
22 interview notes at tab 15 which says three occasions.

23 MR BANGURA: My position is that he puts to the witness  
24 whether what he said was true or false and --

15:56:51

25 PRESIDING JUDGE: That's what he's asking and the witness  
26 is entitled to answer it.

27 MR BANGURA: I take the point, your Honour.

28 MR CAYLEY: I might also add, your Honour, that the  
29 statement that my learned friend actually took from this witness



1 the witness has confirmed was inaccurately taken down, that he  
2 didn't actually say that Foday Sankoh was present at the first  
3 meeting. So I have a statement which apparently is not  
4 accurately taken down. No answer. Fine. Thank you.

15:57:17 5 Q. Witness, the third time that you say that you saw Mr Taylor  
6 in Gbarnga in 1992 - now first of all I want you to go to the  
7 back of that statement, the last page which is 6487 and I'll read  
8 it to you what it states:

9 "The statement was reviewed with the witness from 12.30  
15:57:48 10 until 1600 with Alain Werner and Stephen Niemi. In a future  
11 interview the witness stated that he would continue to discuss  
12 the war in Guinea, the abduction of UN personnel, the collection  
13 of weapons captured from the UN."

14 So there you were giving a preview of what you would offer  
15:58:12 15 next to the Prosecution, but what I'm interested in is this:  
16 That statement was reviewed by you for three and a half hours,  
17 wasn't it?

18 A. Which one? This? This statement, December 9, 2006?

19 Q. Yes. Do you see it states that you reviewed the statement  
15:58:38 20 from 12.30 until 4 o'clock in the afternoon with Mr Werner and  
21 Mr Niemi?

22 A. Yes, I have seen there.

23 Q. Now let me ask you the question again. Is it true or false  
24 that you saw Charles Taylor in Gbarnga in 1992 addressing the man  
15:59:01 25 in charge of the ammunition?

26 A. Because the statement was plenty I cannot just decide that,  
27 and I can almost say yes that was true because this was not  
28 something that happened yesterday. These events took place a  
29 very long time ago. That I saw Charles Taylor, I can tell you I

1 can only recall that I saw him twice.

2 Q. Pause there, witness. You only saw him twice, didn't you,  
3 witness?

4 A. Yes.

15:59:43 5 Q. So when you said in this statement that you had seen and  
6 heard him on a third occasion that would be untrue, wouldn't it?

7 A. That, it could be correct because not just one person took  
8 all these statements from me and not just - the statement was not  
9 taken in a month. The statement was taken maybe in a year or  
16:00:13 10 months.

11 Q. Witness, you stated to me earlier that you had told the  
12 truth every time you had spoken to the OTP. Now I'm going to ask  
13 you again to respond to my question. When you said in this  
14 statement that you reviewed with Mr Werner that you had seen and  
16:00:35 15 heard Charles Taylor in Gbarnga in 1992 that was false, wasn't  
16 it?

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Let us be completely fair to this  
18 witness. Twice he heard and once he saw but did not hear. It  
19 says the witness did not hear his voice. You said see and hear.

16:01:01 20 MR CAYLEY: It says, your Honour, that the third time the  
21 witness was in Gbarnga and the witness heard Charles Taylor  
22 addressing.

23 PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, I'm not quibbling about that,  
24 Mr Cayley, but you're saying you saw and heard three times.

16:01:13 25 MR CAYLEY: No, I'm asking him specifically about the event  
26 in Gbarnga and I'm sorry if I wasn't clear.

27 PRESIDING JUDGE: I will withdraw that observation then.

28 MR CAYLEY: No, I did say Gbarnga, your Honour. I did make  
29 it clear.

1 PRESIDING JUDGE: Very well. I withdraw that observation.

2 MR CAYLEY:

3 Q. Witness, when you said in this statement in 2006 that you  
4 had seen and heard Charles Taylor in Gbarnga in 1992 that was not  
16:01:40 5 true, was it?

6 A. I heard him. I didn't see him.

7 Q. So you heard Charles Taylor in Gbarnga in 1992? Is that  
8 your evidence now?

9 A. Yes.

16:01:58 10 Q. Why is it when you clarified matters with Mr Bangura across  
11 the well here you didn't clarify Gbarnga in that respect? You  
12 said that you had only seen him on two occasions. Why didn't you  
13 clarify matters and say, "I heard him in Gbarnga but I didn't see  
14 him"?

16:02:20 15 A. Well, you see, the events were so plenty I cannot recall  
16 all and say them at the same time. That was why I did not say  
17 about Gbarnga.

18 Q. That's not the question I put to you. I want you to  
19 explain to the Court why in your proofing interview you did not  
16:02:42 20 clarify matters and say, "I didn't see Mr Taylor in Gbarnga but I  
21 heard his voice". Did you hear my question, witness?

22 A. I heard your question, but, you see, the thing that I want  
23 to say is that the events were so many and the statements were  
24 plenty too and the human brain is not a machine. Sometimes there  
16:03:30 25 are possibilities that you might forget or sometimes you make  
26 mistake. But probably it might be my own fault or the one who  
27 took down the statement. But I will say before this Court that I  
28 did not see Charles Taylor three times. It is the two that I  
29 recall. That was why when I was making my statement I said I saw

1 him two times and even him - even if I saw him for the third time  
2 I can only recall the two times.

3 Q. Now you said a moment ago that on this third occasion in  
4 Gbarnga you didn't see him but you heard him. Is that right?

16:04:16 5 A. Yes, I can say it's right.

6 Q. So you had heard Mr Taylor speaking on one previous  
7 occasion in Kakata and then on this third occasion you only heard  
8 him speaking. Correct?

9 A. Yes, in Kakata I saw him and I heard him when he was  
16:04:39 10 talking, but the third time I didn't see him in Gbarnga.

11 Q. Now you're going to tell us I'm sure that you recognised  
12 his voice in Gbarnga. Can you tell us the circumstances in which  
13 you heard him speaking in Gbarnga but you didn't see him?

14 A. Yes, because where we were we were many and it was not a  
16:05:09 15 small group. He was amongst the group. Because I am a short man  
16 I was unable to see him. That was why I said I heard his voice  
17 but I did not see him in person, because the population was so  
18 much I was not - I was unable to go close to him and see him.

19 Q. What did he say?

16:05:29 20 A. Well, it was something that concerned the ammunition for  
21 them to be loaded into the trucks and taken to Foday Sankoh's  
22 house, because Foday Sankoh also had a house in Gbarnga and that  
23 was the thing. They were also preparing to go on a mission and  
24 that is the NPFL I'm talking about.

16:05:49 25 Q. Witness, I'm putting it to you that it is complete nonsense  
26 what you're saying, this third occasion. You did not hear or see  
27 Mr Taylor on a third occasion, did you?

28 A. What my own response also to you is - is that I cannot come  
29 here for you to be using abusive languages against me. I take

1 exception to that.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE: I don't think that's abusive, Mr Witness.  
3 Counsel is entitled to put certain things to you and he's  
4 entitled to put it the way he's done.

16:06:39 5 MR CAYLEY:

6 Q. What I'm saying to you, witness, is this: Because you've  
7 now realised that you lied in that first statement you are  
8 attempting to explain away that particular part of the statement  
9 with this story of nonsense that you heard Charles Taylor but you  
10 didn't see him in Gbarnga, aren't you?

11 A. This is not nonsense. I am saying something realistic.

12 Q. Now I want you to direct your mind to what you said about  
13 the group Black Ghadafa that you belonged to. Do you remember  
14 that evidence, do you recall that from Monday?

16:07:33 15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Do you know somebody called General Devon?

17 A. I know General Devon.

18 Q. And what was his position if any in this group Black  
19 Ghadafa?

16:07:52 20 A. Well, General Devon was the overall fighting force  
21 commander in Cape Mount County. That covered the area where the  
22 fighting was taking place under the NPFL.

23 Q. Can you spell his name for us, I'm sorry, because probably  
24 my pronunciation is absolutely appalling. Could you spell his  
16:08:17 25 name for us, please, witness?

26 A. I'm sorry, I am unable to spell that name for you for now.

27 Q. Is it spelt G-B-O-N?

28 A. I don't have the idea. If I knew I would have spelt it for  
29 you.

1 Q. Thank you. Now where is General Devon now?

2 A. Well, General Devon, I understood in 1992 at the time we  
3 got to Kakata, I had information from the fighters that General  
4 Devon was killed by Charles Taylor.

16:09:08 5 Q. Now were you aware that this group that you belonged to  
6 Black Ghadafa was in fact a renegade organisation within the  
7 NPFL? Were you aware of that?

8 A. Not at all. I don't know about that. The reason explained  
9 to me with regards the death of General Devon is not what you are  
16:09:37 10 explaining to me.

11 Q. Isn't it right that General Devon opposed the mainstream  
12 NPFL and was arrested, court-martialled and shot?

13 A. Say again.

14 Q. Were you aware that the Black Ghadafa organisation that  
16:09:58 15 General Devon was running actually was against the mainstream  
16 NPFL and consequently Devon was arrested, court-martialled and  
17 shot because he was the leader. Are you aware of those facts?

18 A. No, that was not what happened and I don't know about that  
19 because if General Devon and the Black Ghadafa were against the  
16:10:34 20 NPFL I see no reason why Mr Taylor would have issued ammunition  
21 to Devon. Mr Devon and Mr Taylor were friends and he was a  
22 strong general for Mr Taylor.

23 Q. But, witness, these events happened later than the issuance  
24 of that ammunition and I'll ask you again and if you don't know  
16:10:52 25 it's fine. Were you aware that Devon actually stood against  
26 Taylor eventually and he was arrested, court-martialled and shot?

27 A. I don't know whether he was killed for that reason, whether  
28 Devon was killed for that reason. I don't know whether that was  
29 the reason why he was arrested, court-martialled and killed at

1 all. Because if that was the reason why was Pele Boy not killed  
2 who was amongst us. Why didn't they arrest all of us, the RUF  
3 and the NPFL who were fighting within the Black Ghadafa.

4 Q. General Devon was the leader, wasn't he, of Black Ghadafa.

16:11:44 5 That's right, isn't it?

6 A. He was the leader for the whole Cape Mount County area  
7 fighting and we had a unit. The Black Ghadafa was just a unit  
8 headed by Pele Boy. That is what I know.

9 Q. And General Devon had overall command, didn't he, of units  
16:12:10 10 within that area of Cape Mount County which included Black  
11 Ghadafa. Correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Cayley, I think I heard a name,  
14 something boy.

16:12:25 15 MR CAYLEY: It's Boy Pele which I think my learned friend  
16 spelled the name.

17 PRESIDING JUDGE: Please continue.

18 MR CAYLEY:

19 Q. So it would be logical, wouldn't it, if General Devon was  
16:12:40 20 essentially engaging in activity which was against mainstream  
21 NPFL and he was the leader that he would be the one that would be  
22 arrested, court-martialed and punished, wouldn't it?

23 A. I am not going to agree the fact that General Devon had  
24 different intention for the NPFL. But what I know is that the  
16:13:10 25 Black Ghadafa was not involved into any events that would affect  
26 the NPFL. Whether something later happened for which they killed  
27 General Devon, that was later. That was what I know.

28 Q. Thank you, very well. Now you will recall on Monday in  
29 your evidence you were speaking about members off a group called

1 the Vanguard s. Do you recall that evidence?

2 A. Yes, I recall that name and I recall the time.

3 Q. And you gave a list of people that you knew were members of  
4 the Vanguard s. Do you recall that?

16:13:55 5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you stated the following individuals, Sam Bockarie,  
7 correct?

8 A. Yes, Sam Bockarie is correct. He was Vanguard.

9 Q. Matthew Barbue?

16:14:10 10 A. Yes, correct. Matthew Barbue is correct. He's Vanguard.

11 Q. Isaac Mongor?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Sylvester?

14 A. Yes.

16:14:23 15 Q. And lastly you mentioned Momoh Rogers?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did I say the first name correctly? Is it Momoh Rogers? I  
18 thought it was Momoh Rogers. That's what my note says?

19 A. Yes.

16:14:41 20 Q. Now Mike Lamin, he was a Vanguard too, wasn't he?

21 A. Mike Lamin, he was also a senior man among the Special  
22 Forces.

23 Q. He was a Vanguard, wasn't he?

24 A. I didn't say he was a Vanguard.

16:14:59 25 Q. Witness, if we can now change course slightly and I want  
26 you to direct your mind to the general situation in Sierra Leone  
27 and Liberia in 1991 and 1992. Can you do that for me?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. Now during that period that I've just given you



1 Charles Taylor was the head of the NPFL in Liberia, wasn't he?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And you yourself were in the RUF first in Sierra Leone and  
4 then you moved across into Liberia and worked alongside the NPFL  
16:15:50 5 or with the NPFL in Black Ghadafa. Is that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now at this time ULIMO was a group of Liberians who had  
8 crossed into Sierra Leone, hadn't they? Is that right?

9 A. Yes, they were Liberians who went to Sierra Leone.

16:16:13 10 Q. Those individuals within ULIMO were being armed and funded  
11 by the Sierra Leonean government, weren't they?

12 A. Well, I cannot tell you that the Sierra Leone government  
13 did that because I was not a member amongst them. I was not  
14 there. So I cannot tell you how they were helping them.

16:16:38 15 Q. They were fighting alongside the Sierra Leonean government,  
16 weren't they, ULIMO? Is that what you observed?

17 A. Yes, in the sense that they also would have been able to  
18 get their ways and means to be able to attack Taylor's position.

19 Q. And so the Sierra Leonean government was sharing their  
16:17:03 20 military resources with ULIMO in order to attack Charles Taylor.  
21 Right?

22 A. No, I don't know. I don't know how ULIMO was getting arms  
23 and ammunition, I don't have any idea about that. And I was not  
24 on the side of the government so I don't know the secrets about  
16:17:25 25 them.

26 Q. But as you have stated ULIMO was fighting alongside the  
27 Sierra Leonean government, weren't they?

28 A. Yes.

29 Q. And ULIMO and the Sierra Leonean government were attacking

1 Charles Taylor and the NPFL, weren't they?

2 A. Inside Sierra Leone the Sierra Leone Army and the ULIMO  
3 attacked the RUF and the NPFL. They were moved out of Sierra  
4 Leone. It was after that we saw ULIMO enter Sierra Leone, but we  
16:18:08 5 didn't see the Sierra Leone Army members among the ULIMOs in  
6 Liberia.

7 Q. Now you've just stated that within Sierra Leone ULIMO and  
8 the Sierra Leonean government were attacking both the RUF and the  
9 NPFL. Correct?

16:18:34 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And at this time Foday Sankoh was the head of the RUF,  
12 wasn't he?

13 A. Yes, Foday Sankoh was the head of the RUF.

14 Q. So it's fair to say that at this time both Charles Taylor  
16:18:52 15 and Foday Sankoh were under attack from ULIMO. Correct?

16 A. Say again.

17 Q. This time that we're talking about, it's fair to say that  
18 as leaders of their respective organisations both Foday Sankoh  
19 and Charles Taylor were under attack from ULIMO. It's logical,  
16:19:13 20 isn't it, based on what you've said?

21 A. I can say yes, because the NPFL and the RUF were in Sierra  
22 Leone when these troops moved to go and attack their position.

23 Q. So at this particular point in time it was to the common  
24 advantage of the NPFL and the RUF to work together and share  
16:19:43 25 resources in terms of defending themselves against ULIMO, wasn't  
26 it?

27 A. Yes, because it was NPFL that brought war into Sierra  
28 Leone. They joined hands with RUF to enter Sierra Leone. So if  
29 any troop came to attack the RUF they must help the RUF.

1 Q. Now when you say they joined hands with RUF to enter Sierra  
2 Leone you mean the NPFL, correct?

3 A. Yes, it was the NPFL that joined the RUF to enter Sierra  
4 Leone with war. So they were all there whilst the ULIMO and the  
16:20:50 5 government forces, the ULIMO also helped the government forces to  
6 push the NPFL and the RUF out of Sierra Leone into Liberia.

7 Q. And this explains why, doesn't it - why Charles Taylor was  
8 at this time providing material to the RUF, doesn't it, because  
9 the RUF were fighting with him against ULIMO?

16:21:26 10 A. Not just for that.

11 Q. But it did actually include that. It included that  
12 particular objective, correct, of defending against ULIMO  
13 together?

14 A. Yes, that is part of the reason but that is not all the  
16:21:47 15 reason.

16 Q. Now I want to move on and I want to move on and discuss  
17 with you your specialisation which is military communications.  
18 Now you stated in evidence on 4 February that Mr Taylor was known  
19 as Ebony and Mr Sankoh was known as Toyota and that these were  
16:22:18 20 their code names over the military net. Is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now just to clarify this with you, those particular code  
23 names, those are names by which signallers would refer to them  
24 by, is that right? Do you understand what I mean by a signaller?  
16:22:43 25 You were a signaller?

26 A. Yes. These were the code names that they used to call  
27 Charles Taylor and Sankoh will call him Ebony and he will call  
28 Sankoh Toyota.

29 Q. But just to be clear about this, if a Sierra Leonean

1 signaller was trying to get in contact with Mr Taylor he would  
2 ask for Ebony, is that right?

3 A. Yes, that was his code name but he had a station. The RUF  
4 signaller will call Mr Taylor as Ebony and on the NPFL  
16:23:29 5 communication side they will refer to Sankoh as Toyota.

6 Q. Now if you could return, please, to tab 15 which is going  
7 back to this statement that you reviewed for three and a half  
8 hours in November and December of 2006 and I'd like you please to  
9 turn to page 6468. Now I'm going to read to you --

16:24:01 10 A. Please hold on. Please wait. 6468.

11 Q. Witness, it's the numbers in the top right-hand corner. Do  
12 you see it?

13 A. Yes, 6468.

14 Q. I want you to look at the final paragraph and I'll read it  
16:24:19 15 to you:

16 "The witness stated that when he monitored the  
17 communications on the radio the code name of Foday Sankoh used by  
18 the Liberian radio operators was Toyota. Charles Taylor was not  
19 referred to by his real name. The Liberian radio operators  
16:24:41 20 referred to him as the Father or the Subject. The Sierra Leonean  
21 radio operators referred to Foday Sankoh as Lion. But between  
22 the radio operators in Sierra Leone there was never any reference  
23 to Charles Taylor. The Sierra Leonean radio operators referred  
24 to Charles Taylor as the Subject, Chief or Father when they  
16:25:05 25 communicated with the Liberian radio communicators".

26 Now there is no mention, is there, of the code name Ebony?

27 A. You see a code name in communications comes different  
28 times, but this was the major name of Mr Taylor. You might say  
29 Subject, Father or Chief. So in some statements I will mention

1 one code name and forget about the others, or I might call  
2 another code name and forget about others. So that might have  
3 been the case. Because these were appointment titles. We never  
4 used them all the time. At different times we used different  
16:25:55 5 appointment titles just to confuse the enemies.

6 Q. Now I accept that, witness, but here you have a number of  
7 code names, don't you, that must have been used over a period of  
8 time. Is that right? So the names here, I can't imagine that he  
9 was referred to as Subject, Chief or Father all at the same time.

16:26:14 10 Those code names were used over a period of time, weren't they?

11 A. Yes, they were not used at the same time. They used them  
12 at different times. So the few that I recalled were the ones  
13 that I referred to in my testimony or in my statements.

14 Q. You did not mention the code name Ebony here, did you?

16:26:45 15 A. Yes, I didn't talk about that but in my statement I did say  
16 that code names will come and code names will go. We used to  
17 change the names. So the ones that came into my mind were the  
18 ones I made mention of.

19 Q. Now the conversations that you referred to between Sankoh  
16:27:09 20 and Taylor that you allegedly heard over the radio, were they  
21 conducted in English? Now I'm talking about them as individuals,  
22 not through signallers. Do you understand me?

23 A. What year are you referring to? Is it throughout the  
24 conversation?

16:27:33 25 Q. Let us concentrate for now on the period '91 and '92. Are  
26 you saying that you heard as individuals Mr Taylor and Mr Sankoh  
27 speaking on the radio with each other? Is that your evidence?

28 A. I started giving evidence since 1992, not on 1991 with  
29 regards the radio communication between Mr Taylor and Mr Sankoh.

1 When Sankoh will send message to Taylor and Taylor also will send  
2 message to Sankoh and at the same time they will speak English,  
3 but mostly the words, sometimes the word they were speaking of,  
4 things they were speaking about did not get to do with ammunition  
16:28:27 5 or just bringing of ammunition. If they wanted to say something  
6 with regards military business they will write it in code or when  
7 as they are speaking - when it gets to that point they will use a  
8 particular coded form of word that they will cover the word  
9 ammunition or arm. But if they were talking directly and when  
16:28:50 10 they got to a point where they should use ammunition they will  
11 cover up. They will use a coded word that will cover up that  
12 word, in which case people who did not have anything much to do  
13 with that society will not be able to understand.

14 PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr Cayley, no doubt you will wish to  
16:29:10 15 clarify that answer but I'm afraid time has run out and so has  
16 the tape. So will have to adjourn at this point and resume again  
17 tomorrow morning at 9.30.

18 Mr Witness, we are again adjourning for the evening. I  
19 again remind you that you must not discuss your evidence with  
16:29:28 20 anyone else and we will start court again tomorrow at 9.30. Do  
21 you understand, Mr Witness?

22 THE WITNESS: Yes.

23 [Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.  
24 to be reconvened on Thursday, 7 February 2008  
16:31:14 25 at 9.30 a.m.]

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## I N D E X

### WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION:

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